(Elías Capriles) lucidly challenges Wilber’s well-known ontogenetic holarchy model, claiming it is based on a delusion and its complicated gradations are only gradations of delusion; (he) also challenges other well-known transpersonal models, such as Washburn’s and Grof’s. Compellingly, (he) presents a strong case for an alternative view that could have major impact on transpersonal thought (due to the) powerful perspective (it presents).


NOTICE:

THIS VOLUME IS NOT READY.
QUOTATIONS FROM GORAMPA, DÖLPOP A AND OTHERS ARE TO BE INSERTED IN THE REGULAR TEXT—WHERE THE APPENDIX MIGHT BE INSERTED AS WELL—AND THE NOTES ARE YET TO BE CHECKED.
AFTERWARDS THE ENGLISH WILL BE CORRECTED BY AN EXPERT ON THE SUBJECT.
THEREFORE THE PRESENT TEXT IS FAR FROM BEING THE DEFINITIVE VERSION OF THIS VOLUME.

Elías Capriles

BEYOND BEING
BEYOND MIND
BEYOND HISTORY

A DZOGCHEN-FOUNDED
METATRANSPERSONAL, METAPOSTMODERN
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
FOR SURVIVAL AND AN AGE OF COMMUNION
VOLUME II:

BEYOND MIND:

A METAPHENOMENOLOGICAL, METAEXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY, AND A METATRANSPERSONAL METAPSYCHOLOGY
Title: Beyond Being, Beyond Mind, Beyond History: A Dzogchen-Founded Metatranspersonal, Metapostmodern Philosophy and Psychology for Survival in Communion

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(Originally written in English by the author.)

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This book is dedicated to:

The dharmakaya, true Teacher of humankind
and original, single source of spontaneous liberation;

HH Dudjom Rinpoche and Dungse Thinle Norbu Rinpoche,
who dispensed the teachings that allow spontaneous liberation
to occur regularly in the context of Dzogchen practice;

HH Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, who bestowed so many
Empowerments and the strength of whose Contemplation
provided such an effective help for spontaneous liberation;

Chögyal Namkhai Norbu, who most effectively herded
this practitioner from 1986, who provided the teachings
necessary for writing what had to be written,
and whom I hope will provide the teachings still needed;

And also:

Chadräl Rinpoche, Dodrub Chen Rinpoche, HH Pema Norbu Rinpoche
and several other important Masters, who bestowed
transmissions, lungs, teachings and/or assistance;

Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, who dispensed the first teaching
on Dzogchen and engaged in important dharma conversations.
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BEYOND MIND II:
METAEXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY AND METATRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY
V

The Metaexistential View:
Beyond Bad Faith, Beyond Hell,
Beyond Existence and Beyond Existential Philosophy
Throughout this volume it will be taken for granted that the reader is aware of the concepts introduced in the brief synopsis of the Dzogchen teachings provided in the first chapter of vol. I of this book, and in particular:

(1) Of the general meaning of the term Dzogchen—which I have rendered as Total Plenitude and Perfection—and its specific meaning when qualified by the words *qua*-Base, *qua*-Path and *qua*-Fruit: Dzogchen-*qua*-Base—which here I call the Self-*qua*-Base—(is) the undivided, unthinkable, ineffable true condition of the individual and of the whole of reality; Dzogchen-*qua*-Path—which here I refer to as the Self-*qua*-Path—consists in the repeated unconcealment of this condition while on the Dzogchen Path; and Dzogchen-*qua*-Fruit—which here I name the Self-*qua*-Fruit—is the irreversible unconcealment of the condition in question as the Fruit of the Dzogchen Path. However, the reader must keep in mind that throughout this volume I will use the terminology introduced in chapter IV of vol. I, which on the basis of a redefinition of Sartre’s concept of the *soi* or Self refers by this name to the condition of Dzogchen—so that Dzogchen-*qua*-Base is called the Self-*qua*-Base, Dzogchen-*qua*-Path is referred to as the Self-*qua*-Path, and Dzogchen-*qua*-Fruit is named the Self-*qua*-Fruit.

(2) Of the conclusions of the ontological investigations carried out in chapters two and three of the same volume of the book, and in particular of the following two facts: (a) that the true condition of reality the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen-*qua*-Base cannot be understood in terms of any of the four extremes consisting in being, nonbeing, both-being-and-nonbeing and neither-being-nor-nonbeing, and (b) that the phenomenon we refer to by the word *being* is a delusive appearance manifesting only in samsara, which arises together with the illusory subject-object duality as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle thought called the threefold thought-structure (Tib. khor sum\(a\)).

Likewise, throughout this volume I will use the distinction, introduced in chapter IV of vol. I, between the nondual, nonthetic, nonpositional, nonreflective awareness the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings symbolizes as a mirror, and a dualistic, thetic, positional and often reflexive consciousness, which the Semde teachings compare with a reflection in the mirror—the latter being a baseless appearance that arises when the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle “threefold thought structure” produces the mental subject, which is an incorporeal phenomenon of dang energy, and the Gnitiveness and motility of nondual awareness seem to be individual capacities of this mental subject. Furthermore, I will refer by the term being-for-Self to the (delusive) mode of being of the mental subject that seems to be a separate source of Gnitiveness and motility (and that as such appears to be a dualistic, thetic, positional, often reflexive consciousness different and separate from the rest of the Self-*qua*-Base, as well as a separate, autonomous source of action); and I

\(a\) *khor gsum*.
will designate as being-that-is-in-itself-to-being-for-Self the (delusive) mode of being of all that is experienced, (1) as object, (2) as lacking subjectivity, and (3) as being substantial or in-itself. As explained in the aforementioned chapter, being-for-Self is the mode of being that is for attaining the plenitude, self-coincidence and perfection of the Self that it feels it lacks—and as such it is a delusive mode of being produced by the second of the senses the terms avidya and marigpa\(^a\) have in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book and explained in vol. I, for the Self (i.e., the condition of Dzogchen) it yearns for, is the true condition of both being-for-Self and being-that-is-in-itself-for-being-for-Self. (Since the threefold classification of avidya in question will be used throughout this volume, those readers who have not gone through vol. I should read the corresponding explanation in the note indicated by the reference mark that appears at the end of this sentence.\(^1\) Whenever I use the terms avidya or marigpa without specifying one of the senses in question, I am referring to the fully fledged avidya that involves all three senses at once.)

To conclude, throughout this volume I use the noun elusion and the various forms of the verb to elude in the etymological sense R. D. Laing\(^b\) gave them in the explanation of the diagram of a spiral of pretences reproduced in the next chapter. In fact, since the root of these terms is the Latin verb ludere, which, as will be seen below, considering its various in classical and late meanings, may be understood in the senses of “to play,” “to play at,” “to make a sport of,” “to mock,” and “to deceive,” following Laing I use them to refer to the operations whereby we ignore all that we are intent on keeping outside our consciousness, which Jean-Paul Sartre subsumed under the term bad faith.

The Metaexistential View:
The Paradise of Truth, the Hell of Delusion,
And the Perennially Frustrating Elusion of the Hell of Delusion
(Featuring a Discussion of the Concept of the “Unconscious”)

Søren Kierkegaard defined his thought in terms that may be made extensive to the whole of existential thinking, as one in which the thinking subject includes itself in its own thinking, and which does not conceive this subject as a substance that may be objectively determined, for its being lies in a making or constituting itself. For his part, Jean-Paul Sartre defined existentialism as the doctrine according to which existence precedes essence, for in his view the determinations constituting an individual’s essence result from the choices made by the human existent in its absolute freedom.\(^2\) In terms of these criteria, the view expounded here may be called metaexistential: though it agrees with existential thinking in acknowledging the human existent to give rise through its own choices to an essence that these very choices cause to be repressive and repressed, it does not accept the premise that the existent possesses an absolute freedom, for, as shown in Vol. I of this book, the mental subject’s decisions and actions are in truth the illusory, ultimately nonexistent play of the energy or thukje\(^c\) aspect of basic, nondual awareness—or, in terms of Heraclitus’ Fr. 2 DK, of the logos that is the true agent of all that sentient beings believe to be choices and actions of their own separate, particular and private intellect.

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\(^a\) ma rig pa.
\(^b\) Laing (1961).
\(^c\) thugs rje.
In fact, the idea of an absolutely free existent that through its choices produces its own essence is virtually as mistaken as that of an \textit{a priori} essence that all human existents are bound to actualize. Furthermore, though we must concede that, no matter how illusory the mental subject that seems to make decisions may be, our essences do come about as a result of the subsequent choices the subject in question seems to make throughout our lives, these decisions are to a great extent conditioned by the interaction of our past \textit{karma} as primary cause (Skt. \textit{hetu}; Tib. \textit{gyu}'), with the pressure or influence of others (originally “external” to our psyche and then, as we internalize them, “inside or our own psyche”) as a determinant contributory condition (Skt. \textit{pratayya}; Tib. \textit{kyen}'). Therefore, metaexistential systems posit neither the precedence of existence over essence nor that of essence over existence; on the contrary, they explain essence and existence as co-emergent, illusory developments. Indeed, in its rejection of the precedence of any of these two factors over the other, metaexistential thought coincides with the view Heidegger expressed in \textit{Brief über den Humanismus}—even though the reasons for this rejection in metaexistential thought are quite different from the German philosopher’s.\textsuperscript{c} And in its rejection of both the extreme of absolute free will that is upheld by existentialism and that of relative determinism implicit in essentialism, metaexistential thought may seem to coincide with Sufi Master Abdelkader Ghilani’s “Middle Way regarding Tadqir,” which consisted in rejecting both the Qadiriyya doctrine that asserts the human being to have absolute control over the origin and cause of actions, and the absolutely fatalist Jabariyya doctrine.\textsuperscript{d}

However, the basic reason for coining the term “metaexistential” is not the fact that, as noted above, we are not a separate source of thought and action, or a separate receiver of the sensa we use for perception. We have seen that \textit{choice} was the crucial, defining concept of existential thinking in general. Most representatives of this trend of thought were keenly aware of the fact that each and every human choice involves awareness of the uncertainty of its possible outcomes; that therefore \textit{anguish} (which the “first Sartre”\textsuperscript{4} defined as fear of the possible unwanted consequences of our actions, as different from plain fear, the object of which is whichever unfortunate events may fortuitously occur to us) is \textit{inherent in \textit{choice}; and that this implies that \textit{anguish in the face of our own freedom is essential to the human reality}. In fact, Sartre went so far as to assert our being to be \textit{anguish} and as such to reveal itself in the experience of anguish—as well as in other distressful experiences, including boredom, uneasiness and nausea—and to declare the human reality to be “in its being suffering.”\textsuperscript{5} Kierkegaard viewed \textit{Angst}, despair, dread, fear and trembling, and so on, as central to the human reality. The “first Heidegger”\textsuperscript{6} deemed the \textit{Angst} inherent in \textit{being toward the end} to be a constitutive element of the \textit{Dasein} or human existent, and in general \textit{Existenzphilosophie} (in the ampler sense of the term in which it is not confined to Jaspers’ philosophy) viewed \textit{Angst} as a pivotal element of our reality. However, as it will become clear when we consider the degenerative view of evolution and history expounded in some detail in vol. III of this book, these views apply to the human reality of the final era of the time cycle that the view in question calls Era of Darkness (Skt. \textit{kaliyuga}) or Iron Age, and particularly of modernity—and, even more so, of the final phase of modernity that trendy

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{a} \textit{rgyu}.
  \item \textsuperscript{b} \textit{rkyen}.
  \item \textsuperscript{c} Heidegger (1947).
  \item \textsuperscript{d} Alam (1980).
\end{itemize}
thinkers miscall “postmodernity.” They do not apply to the human reality at all times and in all places.

At any rate, the basic reason for coining the term *metaexistential* is that most of the existential thought that asserts the human reality to be marked by Angst, anguish and, in general, suffering, also emphasizes the fact that we have the choice of either facing this distressful reality and, by doing this consistently, giving rise to an “authentic” life-project and essence, or eluding it through self-deceit and, by doing this consistently, begetting an unauthentic life-project and essence marked by make-believe and self-deceit. The systems I call metaexistential agree with existential philosophy in categorizing the human reality (at least that of the late periods of the time cycle) in terms of suffering, and in negating the essentialists’ postulate of an immutable human essence that would be previous to existence and that would be actualized as the latter. Furthermore, the systems in question agree with existential philosophy in viewing our successive choices and the life-project they conform as unauthentic if they aim at concealing the suffering inherent in the human reality through make-believe and self-deceit, and regarding them as authentic if they are intended to undo make-believe and self-deceit so as to come into terms with true character of the human reality and face the suffering inherent in it. Thus metaexistential systems view the being of the human individual that according to Sartre is anguish and the human reality that in his view is in its being suffering, and in general the experiences that Kierkegaard, the first Heidegger and the first Sartre deemed authentic, as being in fact far more authentic, in the sense of being far less alienated and deceitful, than whatever may be achieved by eluding them. However, they clearly recognize these “more authentic experiences” to be spurious appearances concealing what we are in truth and therefore to be instances of delusion that alienate our conscious experience from this truth (roughly in the sense of Entäusserung as Hegel defined the term, though certainly not as he understood it).

In fact, the “authentic” experience of pure anguish is a bare experience of being-for-Self, which is the conditioned “floor” of delusion, alienation and falsehood that is the most basic instance of samsara and that serves as the foundation on which all higher samsaric states are built: driven by the animal drive to flee unpleasant experiences, we are compelled to elude the bare experience of being-for-Self through the exclusively human means that consist in building experiential edifices of unauthenticity, make-believe and self-deceit—which are doubly spurious and conditioned, for they are spurious, conditioned appearances we produce in order to cover up the more basic spurious, conditioned appearances which existentialists deem authentic (which thereby are mistakenly confirmed as actual truths—this being the reason why few philosophers realize their spurious, conditioned character). Once we have built this edifice and established ourselves in one of its upper floors, the distressful experiences in question, which are the ground on which the edifice rests, lie in the way to the direct, nondual, non-conceptual unconcealment of the Self-qua-Base (i.e., of our true condition), which in terms of this metaphor would lie underground. Furthermore, in the upper floors of this building, delusion feels so comfortable that we unreflectively stick to it, whereas in the ground it is so uncomfortable that a Dzogchen practitioner with the necessary capacity and conditions would be reminded by it to apply the pith instructions that make the spontaneous liberation of delusion and its inherent discomfort possible—and since each instance of spontaneous liberation of states of deep anguish (like those denoted by the Arabic word karb) neutralizes delusion to a far greater extent than the spontaneous liberation of less conflictive conditions, if a Dzogchen practitioner manages to stay in the ground floor delusion can be neutralized in record time.

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Thus the term metaexistential refers, (1) to those systems that acknowledge absolute authenticity and truth to consist in going beyond existence in all its manifestations—those which are more unauthentic and less conflictive and distressful, as well as those which are less unauthentic and more conflictive and distressful—and (2) to those Paths of Awakening possessing the means for effectively going beyond existence and thus achieving absolute authenticity and truth. In fact, (1) only the Self-quapath and the Self-quafruit, which as shown in vol. I of this book are devoid both of being-for-Self and of the phenomenon of being, constitute a genuine surpassing of alienation and delusion, and hence only these conditions are true to our innermost nature; and (2) only a really effective practice of metaexistential Paths of Awakening such as Dzogchen and the like can be conducive to these realizations.

Now let us briefly trace the successive philosophical and mystical systems that, in both East and West, share the view that suffering is inherent in the human reality and that the attempts to conceal this suffering and reality are unauthentic, or have views somehow related to it. Buddhism in general stresses the fact that the smooth working and continuity of samsara depends on operations of the kind existential thinking regards as unauthentic—such as the misrepresentation of our habitual condition as being free of the serious defects discussed in the last chapter of vol. I of this book, and the consistent elusion of the experience of these defects as well as of “hard facts of life” such as the ineluctability of old age, illness, suffering and pain, death and so on. Therefore, all Buddhist schools and vehicles stress that becoming fully aware of the shortcomings and “hard facts” in question is a prerequisite for moving from samsara to nirvana, and teach manifold practices and modes of behavior effective for impairing our capacity to perform the unauthentic operations in question. For example, a Buddhist lamrim (gradual) tradition deep-rooted in Tibet—according to which we must initially practice the Hinayana, then practice the Mahayana, and then practice the External / Lower Vajrayana, so that we may finally approach the Inner / Higher Vajrayana—establishes as the practice for the Hinayana stage of the Path the taking of Refuge and the reflection on four topics, which are: (1) the precious, unique opportunity for liberation or Awakening the human condition provides; (2) the impermanence of all that is produced / caused (Pali bhòta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepa^), born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kyepa^), and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhata; Skt. samskrita; Tib. düjai^), and in particular of the precious human condition; (3) the relentless, insurmountable sufferings of samsara, and (4) the law of cause and effect (karma) and its inexorability. In its turn, the practice of the Inner Vajrayana (in the ample sense in which it includes the vehicles of the Path of Transformation, as well as the Path of Spontaneous Liberation of Dzogchen Atiyoga), regardless of the approach in terms of which it is undertaken, has very often involved dwelling in charnel grounds, using tools and wearing adornments made of human bones, hanging our with outcasts and lepers, taking up occupations or courses of behavior reproofed by society (so long as these are harmless to other beings), and avoiding regular, predictable patterns of conduct, among other things. Furthermore, in general the practice of

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^a Pali, samsara; Tib. khor ’ba.
^b Pali, nibbana; Tib., mya ngan las ’das pa.
^c skyes pa.
^d skyes pa.
^e ’dus byas.
all Buddhist schools and vehicles progressively boosts self-awareness, which gradually impairs elusion and self-deceit—to put it in Buddhist terminology, it impairs the “mechanisms that sustain birth and death,” including the “habits established by wholesome practices and attitudes”—and by the same token establishes the conditions for nirvana or Awakening to become possible. Buddhism in general views the human reality as being characterized by suffering, and implicitly views the elusion of suffering as unauthentic and the facing of suffering as authentic; however, rather than taking the facing of suffering as an end in itself, it views it as a necessary step on the way to the unconcealment of Truth in Awakening or nirvana and the concomitant cessation of suffering. Therefore, its view and its Path are of the kind I call metaexistential: they are, indeed, the models on the basis of which this neologism was coined.

In Europe and the Mediterranean basin, there were both philosophical and religious traditions with approaches comparable to that of Buddhism in that they intended to impair their followers’ capacity to perform unauthentic operations such as those described above and make them face the hard facts of life. For example, in pre-Christian Greece, the Cynics routinely gave up home and possessions to “live the life of a dog,” carrying with them only what fitted their pouches, enduring hardships, and becoming objects of scorn and contempt by standing at the bottom of the social scale and consistently breaking social conventions (nomos). Since their intent was soteriological, their view was certainly metaexistential—and their practice would have been metaexistential as well should what they called the “liberation of natural perceptions” consist in the spontaneous liberation of conditioned states (which the scorn to which they were subjected as a result of their behavior caused to be associated with unpleasant feelings that could be used as a detector of delusion reminding them to apply the pith instructions which are the condition of possibility of spontaneous liberation), so that in the long run the constant repetition of this would have eradicated such states definitively (this eradication being what they called parajarattein).12

Centuries later, voluntarily enduring hardships and leaving family, homely comforts, possessions and status behind became customary among desert anchorites and other Christian ascetics (whose endeavors, contrarily to those of the Cynics, were often based on an antisomatic, life-negating perspective). Since their intent, like that of the Cynics, was soteriological, their view was no doubt metaexistential; had their practice resulted in some type of liberation, it would have been metaexistential as well. Finally, after the invention of modernity, a growing number of European philosophers—some Christian, some atheist—took to denouncing the fact that the human condition is inherently unhappy and marked by boredom, anxiety, uneasiness and so on; that the elusion of unpleasant experiences is a universal human urge; and that this elusion is a movement away from authenticity—all of which has been undoubtedly true in the last thousands of years.13 It is thus that existential philosophy came into being.

The first modern European philosopher to have proceeded in this way and to have done so in explicit terms may have been the seventeenth century Catholic mathematician and physicist Blaise Pascal, who clearly pictured the human reality as being characterized by suffering, and showed human beings to constantly elude this reality through choices involving self-deceit;8 since he did not avow soteriological aims, the Catholic, Jansenist philosopher may be regarded as the forefather of existential thought.14 Nearly two centuries after Pascal’s time, Arthur Schopenhauer acknowledged the need to gain a clear awareness

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8 Pascal (1962).
of the pain of living; since in his opinion this constituted the way to the suppression of suffering, his view may be viewed as being to some extent metaexistential.\textsuperscript{15} Danish Protestant philosopher Søren Kierkegaard,\textsuperscript{a} Schopenhauer’s contemporary who was born twenty-five years after him yet died five years before him, explicitly characterized as unauthenticity our attempts to flee \textit{Angst} and other distressful emotions;\textsuperscript{16} however, he demanded the surrendering of reason and passion, not before the ineffable mystical condition of \textit{nirvana} as in the case of the German nontheistic\textsuperscript{17} philosopher, but in a leap of faith allowing the individual to obey commands of the Judeo-Christian God that are incomprehensible to reason and contrary to passion and pathos—and hence his system was not soteriological in the sense I am giving the term.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, the twentieth century saw the arising of both existentialism and \textit{Existenzphilosophie} in the ample sense of the term as leading philosophical and psychological movements having Christian\textsuperscript{19} and non-Christian representatives, who often declared their methodology to be “phenomenological” and who in general expressed their views in ontological terms.

Though Freud coincided with existentialism and a great deal of \textit{Existenzphilosophie (lato sensu)} in acknowledging human reality to be unhappy and conflictive, he did neither assert \textit{Angst} and conflict to be more authentic than their elusion / repression, nor did he admit conscious human responsibility in giving rise to a repressive / repressed essence. In fact, Freud’s first topic was base on the premise—which the Viennese thinker and analyst asserted to have precedents in both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche\textsuperscript{20}—that all ideas and representations linked to \textit{urges} or \textit{drives} (\textit{Trieben}, which James Strachey\textsuperscript{b} inaccurately rendered as \textit{instincts})\textsuperscript{21}, the pleasure-giving actualization of which would affect the equilibrium of the individual’s psychological functioning upon becoming sources of displeasure, were to be repressed by a \textit{topos} (a “place” or “region”) external to the individual’s conscious awareness to be called the “unconscious”—or, more specifically, by the unconscious’ preconscious aspect, which worked in terms of secondary process (for as a whole the unconscious worked mainly in terms of primary process, which could not carry out this function).\textsuperscript{22} Though Freud was right in asserting secondary process to determine which contents could be allowed into our conscious awareness and which should not be allowed into it, he was wrong in positing an agent external to our own consciousness that opened and closed doors of perception / floodgates of emotion—and the invention of such agent, insofar as it helped us elude our responsibility for concealing disturbing contents, and thus fulfill the Freudian ideal of conforming to the reality principle and adapting to the social pseudoreality, did not do any good to our understanding of the psyche, and became a further obstacle to achieving true mental health.\textsuperscript{23} Hence in this regard the views of Blaise Pascal, and the posterior views of existentialism and \textit{Existenzphilosophie}, are potentially more therapeutic—at least in the case of those who can apply metaexistential methods that effectively result in the spontaneous liberation of conflict, for there would be no value in attempting to prevent the elusion of anguish and distress, or in feeding this anguish and distress, as well as the dynamic of the shadow considered below, with the potential guilt of knowing ourselves to be responsible for their elusion, unless we were certain that each time conflict manifests it will liberate itself spontaneously, together with the illusion of a self, in the total bliss of the Self-\textit{qua}-Path, and therefore that in the long run we will become

\textsuperscript{a} Kierkegaard (1968, 1970).
\textsuperscript{b} Freud (1953-1974).
established in the Self-qua-Fruit (cf. the section on Humanistic Psychology in Chapter VII of this volume).

In fact, as we have seen, in the view of Blaise Pascal, in order to elude boredom, uneasiness and in general what the Buddha called duhkha, we must make ourselves believe we are pursuing something else than the mere elusion of these experiences: what gamblers want is to divert their attention from the experiences in question to the revolving roulette wheel, the dispensing of the cards, etc., and fill their inner void with the emotion of whether they will win or lose, yet in order to do so they have to make themselves believe that they want the prize; what hunters want is to elude these experiences, yet in order to do so they have to make themselves believe that they want the game; etc. Later on, Søren Kierkegaard made the point that when we have to face despair, Angst, fear and trembling, experiences of sin, consciousness of our own nothingness, and so on, we may try to discard these motifs by objectifying and explaining them, and asserted that if we did so we would be fleeing from ourselves by the means described by Pascal: by “distracting ourselves.” Despite the fact that Heidegger invented the abstraction he called Dasein or existent partly in order to elude the problem of consciousness and its being, as well as that of unraveling the complex constitution of the illusory human entity, the German thinker was right in not following Freud’s thesis that the uncanny or disturbing is eluded by the action of a place, region or entity different from consciousness, and implying that (as previously Pascal and Kierkegaard had realized) it is eluded through our own action: in his view, the recurrent factual dying of the Dasein while it exists, immediately and regularly in the mode of falling prey, amounted to the Dasein’s opening closing and concealing itself with falsehood (i.e. unauthenticity, alienation [Entfremdung], publicness, idle talk, leveling down, averageness, everydayness, average everydayness). Elaborating on the approach shared by these thinkers, Sartre developed the concept of bad faith (i.e. self-deceit), according to which we elude the uncomfortable experiences he deemed authentic by means of a twofold deceit: we deceive ourselves and in the same operation we deceive ourselves about the fact that we are deceiving ourselves, so as to elude the fact that we are deceiving ourselves and thus be able to effectively deceive ourselves. However, as Sartre noted, this deceit is achieved at once, in a single operation, and hence its twofold character—which is rather infinite, for in the same operation we also deceive ourselves about the fact that we are deceiving ourselves with regard to the fact that we are deceiving ourselves, and so on, ad infinitum—is limited to the description. Since Sartre’s explanation of bad faith, if made sufficiently precise, will be of considerable value for understanding the way in which we conceal what we do not want to see, it will be discussed in depth below.

According to the original Freudian conception of the unconscious, the latter was the result of repression and consisted of repressed contents. According to the view presented here, maintaining our sense of identity and avoiding displeasure depends on precluding the permanence in our consciousness of aspects of ourselves that may threaten our sense of self-identity, restraining the actualization of urges or drives, and so on, but these activities, rather than being the function of repression by an autonomous topos of the human psyche different from and external to consciousness called the unconscious’s preconscious aspect, are carried out by our own conscious awareness—a fact that, however, does not efface the

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\[a\] Pascal (1962).
\[b\] Heidegger (1996), § 45-53.
\[c\] Sartre (1980).
reality behind the Freudian distinction between repression (Verdrängung\textsuperscript{a}) and suppression (Unterdrückung\textsuperscript{b}), for in the former we elude the fact that we are restraining an impulse so as to elude awareness of the fact that the impulse in question manifested in our psyche.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, the sum of the contents we are compelled to keep from stably remaining in our conscious awareness does not make up an unconscious as conceived by Freud in this period—a topos with contents that rarely or never could become conscious—because, though most of the time we manage to keep these contents outside our consciousness, thus thwarting the threat to our tranquility, comfort and sense of identity they represent, they nonetheless recur again and again—which means that again and again we must negate them, while in the same operation negating that we are negating something (and negating that we are negating that we are negating something, and so on \textit{ad infinitum}), so as to instantly ignore them while ignoring the fact that we are ignoring them. Since we recurrently control our behavior so as to show that we are \textit{not} this or that way, at first sight it may seem that the contents we ignore produce effects even while they are being ignored; since as explained in Vol. I of this book the Madhyamika criterion for establishing actuality or effectiveness (Skt. \textit{arthakriyashakti}; Tib. dönche nüpa\textsuperscript{c}; Ger. \textit{Wirlichkeit}) is the capacity to produce effects, we may infer that unconscious contents possess being-\textit{qua}-actuality and that the totality of the contents we ignore make up an “unconscious” that is actual relative truth. However, this would be a hasty conclusion, for accomplished meditators will verify in their experience that each time we control our behavior so as to show that we are \textit{not} this or that way, we do so because what intend try to deny through our behavior implicitly (i.e., in the form of a subtle concept\textsuperscript{28}) and fleetingly showed up in our conscious awareness, and hence the cause of the effect in question, rather than being a content of which we have not been aware, is a content of which we \textit{have} been aware—and that it has been precisely this awareness that has caused us to try to prove with our behavior that the content does not apply to us, negating it in ourselves while at the same time negating that we are negating something. This means that the unconscious as Freud originally conceived it has no actual or effective existence and hence that it does not belong to actual or effective relative truth. However, as will be shown below, \textit{in some sense} we may speak of an unconscious conformed by the totality of doubly negated, doubly ignored contents.

In the \textit{Project} of 1895\textsuperscript{d} Freud posited a “primary process,” which in the following century was shown to be associated with the working of the cerebral hemisphere located on the right,\textsuperscript{29} and of a secondary process, which later on was shown to be associated with the left cerebral hemisphere and which in 1899\textsuperscript{e} Freud presented as responsible for building our stable conscious experiences through structuring in its own terms the matrix constituted by primary process. Since primary process is the spontaneous, creative aspect of human awareness, and since it cannot entertain negation, which is the condition of possibility of critical cognitive activity, it fits Nietzsche’s conception of the function of “instinct” in true creators, for according to the philologist and philosopher in such individuals creativity is a function of uncritical instinct, and only \textit{a posteriori} do they criticize “their” creation.\textsuperscript{30} By

\textsuperscript{a} Fr. \textit{refoulement}.
\textsuperscript{b} Fr. \textit{répression}.
\textsuperscript{c} \textit{don byed nus pa}.
\textsuperscript{d} Freud (1974).
\textsuperscript{e} Freud (1983).
\textsuperscript{f} Nietzsche (1988).
1915, a Freud had given up the original conception of the unconscious as being only a result of repression resulting from the accumulation of repressed contents, and had developed the view that whatever manifested in the code of primary process was and had to remain unconscious, so that all that belonged to this process was from the beginning part of the unconscious, which thereby came to be conceived as an a priori and as being inherent in the make up of human individuals. 31 This second Freudian conception of the unconscious seems to be more dubious than the original one, for an experienced meditator who carefully observes her or his own experience notices that in the moment in which the spontaneity of awareness gives rise to a primary process content, a clear-cut division between conscious and unconscious has not yet manifested. In the ordinary wakefulness of normal individuals in civilized societies, immediately after the arising of the content, secondary process—the code of which is alone capable of negation and hence of critical functions—arises to critically reflect on the content. This establishes: (a) whether the content may be allowed to remain in the scope of consciousness or whether it should be doubly / infinitely negated (i.e., negated while in the same operation we negate we have negated something—and negate we have negated that we have negated something, and so on ad infinitum), so that it may be immediately forgotten and thereby excluded from consciousness, 32 (b) if the content is allowed to remain within the scope of consciousness, in which way should it enter secondary process experience so that it will not threaten the individual’s tranquility, comfort and sense of identity (e.g., whether it should be attributed to another or attributed to oneself, what its verbal mode and tense must be, whether it should be taken as literal or metaphorical, etc.). 33 This proves the contents of primary process not to be a priori and by their very nature unconscious, but to be either made to become unconscious, or somehow modified by the mechanisms Sartre called “bad faith” so that they may enter our stable secondary process experience in such a way as not to disturb our sense of identity. 34 Hence to speak of an unconscious as conceived by Freud after 1915, b even in a figurative way, would require that we stretched too far the elasticity of concepts. Some events have been attributed to unconscious psychical activities in both East and West. For example, when we worry that something unwanted may occur to us, or when we are infatuated with someone, even if we have become distracted for some time with other topics or occurrences, have fallen into a swoon, or have fallen asleep, after a lapse of distraction, or when we come out from the swoon or awaken from our sleep, the thought of worry, or the image of the person who is the object of our infatuation, may spontaneously manifest in our consciousness. These occurrences have been seen as implying that during distraction, swoon and sleep, the psychical activity sustaining our concerns goes on even though we are unaware of it. Within Mahayana Buddhism, the canonical texts of the Third Promulgation or Third dharmachakra c and the philosophical schools based on these texts (such the Yogachara, wholly based on them, or schools partly based on them such as the Madhyamaka Swatantrika Yogachara, the Uma Zhentongpa d and Mahamadhyamaka 35 ), explain occurrences of the kind in terms of a continuity of cause-and-effect, comparable to the transmission of an impulse by the impact against each other of a series of perfectly

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a Freud (1963).
b Freud (1963).
c Tib. chökhör (chos ’khor) or chökyi khorlo (chos kyi ’khor lo).
d dbu ma gzhan stong pa. Uma render the term Madhyamaka; zhentong corresponds to Parashunya; pa means “adhering to”—which in Sanskrit is indicated by the termination, or by the addition of the suffix “vada.”
elastic billiard balls in a vacuum with no gravity, so that no friction reduces the impulse, without there being an entity that continues—such as the supposedly self-existent psyche or soul assumed by common sense and many religions and philosophies. These events are said to be functions of what these schools call the alaya vijñana, which literally means “storehouse consciousness,” but which is translated into Tibetan as kunzhi namshē or kunzhi nampar shepa, which literally means “consciousness of the base-of-all.” Thus it is not surprising that Buddhologists have often explained the alaya vijñana to conform an “unconscious” (it could be objected that insofar as the alaya vijñana is itself not conscious of objects or of its own contents, and insofar as these are not automatically accessible to the conscious mind, a composite term involving the words vijñana and namshē are not suitable for referring to it; however, this problem arises from the translation as “consciousness” of the term vijñana, which does not have the former’s implications).

However, the concept of alaya vijñana has connotations that correspond to some of those the concept of the “unconscious” has in Western philosophy and psychology, and connotations that do not correspond to any of the latter. The Yogacharas described the alaya vijñana as a vast whole of vijñana or namshē, which they compared unto a great tank the contents of which are not automatically accessible to the conscious mind—which implies that a great deal of the alaya vijñana may be said to conform an unconscious.

Furthermore, (unlike the Dzogchen teachings) they asserted the source of the creativity of awareness and therefore of all possible contents of consciousness to be the alaya vijñana as well, thus implicitly including the workings of what Freud christened “primary process” (though they did not refer to the characteristics Freud attributed to this process). However, the alaya vijñana may not be identified with Western conceptions of the “unconscious” insofar as the term embraced both the potentiality for all experience, and the experiencing process that this school unifies under the term “mind” (Skt. chitta; Tib. sem): all of the perceptions that during wakefulness manifest through the six sensory vijñanas or namshē, those that take place during sleep, and even the yogi’s meditative absorptions, according to the Yogacharas have as their basis the alaya vijñana, which is itself the continuum linking the different states of consciousness (this being the reason why the concept explains the above-discussed phenomena of remembering the object of one’s worries or the face of one’s beloved after coming out from a swoon, from sleep and so on). Furthermore, the term “storehouse” and the metaphor of the tank should not deceive us into conceiving it as a container-like topos, static and passive: the alaya vijñana (is) a continually changing stream of consciousness (Skt. santana; Tib. semgyū) consisting of successive instants of knowledge (and as such, rather than being a continuous entity, as implied above it may be compared to a succession of perfectly elastic, friction-free billiard balls hitting each other), which is regarded as the vehicle carrying karmic imprints (Skt. avarana or vasana, according to the case; Tib. bagchags) from one life to the next—or, which is the same, from one psychological state to the next.

It is important to note that the term indicates specific states of experience as well, for in the Yogachara school it also refers to an ample condition that yogis may find by

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a kun gzhi rnam shes.
b kun gzhi rnam par shes pa.
c sems.
d sems rgyud.
e bag chags.
absorption, and which may be beyond both consciousness and unconsciousness (in the Dzogchen teachings, the ample condition that may be found by absorption, provided neither samsara nor nirvana manifests, is called kunzhi [Skt. alaya], whereas alaya vijñana [kunzhi nameṃbha⁴] refers to the immediately subsequent condition in the progressive process of manifestation of samsara, in which the concrete objects of the five senses are not yet present as such yet a subtle cognitive capacity that tends to grasp its objects has risen and made itself ready in every respect to receive the impressions of the potential objects of deluded mind, like a mirror—and so vision sees color-forms, hearing hears sounds, smell smells fragrances, taste tastes flavors and touch has kinesthetic sensations⁴⁰). To conclude, though the alaya vijñana has the nature of the single, essential constituent of all entities called thusness or thatness (Skt. tathata; Tib. dezhinnyi⁵)—which is patent in all states of realization, and the first, incipient, partial glimpse of which occurs in the first of the four stages of the Mahayana path of preparation / application (Skt. prayoga-marga; Tib. sbyor lam)—this consciousness is also the root of samsara.⁴¹

The Madhyamaka Prasangika School of philosophy outright rejected the concept of an alaya vijñana and whichever concepts could roughly correspond to the Western concept of the unconscious, for it viewed them as substantialistic deviations from the purest essence of Madhyamaka, which in its view lay in not asserting anything oneself, and refuting by reductio ad absurdum (Skt. prasanga; Tib. thalgyur⁶) the supposed self-being of whatever may be asserted by others. Despite the fact that the alaya vijñana is not a substantial entity, and that the functions attributed to it may also be explained without positing the concept, some of them (including the above considered recurrence of the objects of our worry or infatuation immediately after a swoon or upon waking up) are very aptly explained in reference to an alaya vijñana. This being so, as the eighth Karmapa, Mikyo Dorje⁷, and Nyingmapa Master Ju Mipham Jamyang Namgyal⁸ were right to assert, negation of this and other of the postulates shared by the Dzogchen teachings and the Mahayana canonical texts of the Third Promulgation which are not significantly less valid or plausible than the conventional entities of everyday experience, does not follow from the tenets of Prasangika Madhyamaka, according to which the misconception of conventional reality as self-existent is to be refuted, yet the conventional existence of conventional reality must be accepted.⁴²

In fact, as noted in the Introduction (in vol. I of this book), it is not correct to believe the prajñaparamita or wisdom leading beyond [delusion and samsara] as interpreted by the Madhyamaka school of philosophy to entail circumscribing philosophy to the reductio ad absurdum (Skt. prasanga; Tib. thalgyur⁵) of the assertions made by others and therefore abstaining from positing “autonomous [theses and] syllogisms” (Skt. swatantraprayoga; Tib. ranggyukyi jorwa⁶). In the Introduction, I cited K. Venkata Ramanan’s paraphrase of the Prajñaparamitashastra, which the Chinese attribute to the founder of Madhyamaka, the incomparable Nagarjuna:⁴³

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⁴ kun gzhi rnam shes.
⁵ de bzhin nyid.
⁶ thal ’gyur.
⁷ mi bskyod rdo rje.
⁸ ’ju mi pham ’jam dbyangs rnam rgyal.
⁹ thal ’gyur.
⁰ rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba.
(The Madhyamika’s) rejection of views does not mean that he is opposed to building systems; he would himself formulate specific systems, not to cling to them, but to use them as a help to those who are in need of them.\textsuperscript{44}

The schools that make up the Subtle, Inner Madhyamaka\textsuperscript{a}—Mahamadhyamaka\textsuperscript{b} and Madhyamaka Zhentongpa\textsuperscript{c}—kept to this Prasangika principle more faithfully than the late Prasangikas and, like the Dzogchen teachings, maintained the pure nonsubstantialistic Prasangika Madhyamaka view while employing concepts such as those of \textit{alaya vijñana}, \textit{swasamvedana} (a concept which I discussed at length elsewhere\textsuperscript{d} and which will be discussed below as well),\textsuperscript{35} and so on. Furthermore, these schools excluded the least sophisticated tenets of the Prasangikas and, by upholding the continuity of Base, Path and Fruit expounded in Maitreya’s \textit{Ratnagotravibhaga} (\textit{Uttaratantra}), like the Dzogchen teachings and unlike the texts of the forefathers of the Prasangika School they perfectly accounted for the unconditioned nature of the Fruit.\textsuperscript{46} (It must be noted that many Tibetan Prasangikas viewed the \textit{Ratnagotravibhaga} as a Prasangika treatise. For an extensive discussion of this subject see the upcoming version in book form of Capriles [2004].)

Freud’s discovery of primary and secondary process, his finding that determining which contents may be allowed into our conscious awareness and which must not be allowed into it was a function of secondary process, and in general many of his innovations were colossal breakthroughs that constituted him as one of the figures who defined his time and the times to come.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, his attribution to a preconscious of the operations he called repression, was surely based on the actual awareness that these operations are not unconscious yet do not take place in the explicit way proper to coarse thoughts of the discursive kind,\textsuperscript{48} and that they are forgotten immediately—therefore \textit{seeming} to occur in a region located between consciousness and unconscioussness (the decision, the intention and the action of doubly negating a content, attributing it to another individual, and so on, are all based on intuitive, subtle concepts, which in the ordinary experience of “normality” are somehow implicit, the explicit objects of consciousness being the contents of coarse thoughts of the discursive kind\textsuperscript{49}—and, most important, while carrying out the operations in question we elude them, thus obtaining the illusion that they take place below the threshold of consciousness). However, this does not justify positing a preconscious—whereas, as we have seen, there are valid grounds for postulating an unconscious only \textit{figuratively} and solely in the sense Freud gave the concept until 1915. In fact, the Viennese analyst was compelled to attribute the operations responsible for self-deception to something other than the conscious mind, probably because acknowledging that we consciously and intentionally deceive ourselves would have contradicted his sense of identity as a sincere and honest individual, impairing his ego and giving rise to a conflict he felt compelled to avoid—which he justified by positing the ideal of smooth adaptation of the ego to the social pseudo-reality as the only way to avoid neurosis or psychosis (which is a Freudian ideal despite its being attributed to Ego Psychology and Annafreudism, which not only upheld it more openly and explicitly, but maximized it). Therefore, although, as shown above, there were no grounds for the Prasangikas’ adamant rejection of the Third

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{a} Tib. nang trawai uma (\textit{nang phra ba’i dbu ma}).
\item\textsuperscript{b} Tib. uma chenpo (\textit{dbu ma chen po}).
\item\textsuperscript{c} This term, which has become widely accepted in the West, combines the Sanskrit “Madhyamaka” with the Tibetan “Zhentongpa” (\textit{gzhan stong pa}). The Tibetan term is “Uma Zhentongpa” (\textit{dbu ma gzan stong pa}).
\item\textsuperscript{d} Capriles (2003).
\end{itemize}
Promulgation concept of alaya vijñana, there were solid grounds for Sartre’s rejection of the first Freudian topic and in particular for his assertion that there is no actual relative topos to be called “preconscious,” for we ourselves qua conscious individuals are the agents of our self-deceit and therefore are fully responsible for it (from the viewpoint of this book, we must add “to the extent and in the sense in which it may be valid speak of agency and responsibility”\textsuperscript{50}). The view expressed here coincides with Sartre’s because the keen awareness of mental operations proper to Buddhist practice shows the Freudian concept of preconscious to be a fiction masking our self-deceit, and doing away with this fiction can be helpful in the process of eradication of delusion insofar as this process requires the impairment of the self-deception that is necessary for adapting to the social pseudo-reality.

Furthermore, in the pristine period that the Eurasian degenerative view of evolution discussed in vol. III of this book calls Golden Age, Era of Perfection (krityayuga) or Era of Truth (satyayuga)—which at this point may seem to be no more than an unlikely myth, but which has been substantiated by a whole array of evidence, some of which is provided in the volume in question\textsuperscript{51}— the Self-qua-Path easily manifested, and hence a sense of ego / self with its concomitant egotism / selfishness could neither become firmly established nor develop significantly in the process of ontogenesis. Because of this, and because the full awareness of primary process characteristic of this period implied empathy with all sentient beings (and thus com-passion in the etymological sense of feeling with others their passio or suffering\textsuperscript{52}), primal human beings related with the natural environment and other human beings in a nonviolent, collaborative manner, and were egalitarian, nonviolent, loving, nonhierarchical and devoid of the drive for domination and possession. Therefore, they were free from the evil impulses and memories that humans of our time feel compelled to elude. Moreover, they were in a state of nature (physis) and hence did not have a limited and spurious sense of identity conditioned by social conventions (nomos) that the contents of their awareness should not contradict. Due to all of this, they did not need to maintain a limited, relatively hermetic focus of conscious awareness, or to structure the contents of primary process in terms of secondary process in such a way as to prevent them from threatening a particular self-image—and hence no topos or region of their psyche could, even figuratively, be regarded as an unconscious. (However, as I have noted in others of my works\textsuperscript{a} and as I make it clear in Vol. III of this book, this should \textit{not} be taken to imply that in order to achieve wholesomeness human beings should return to a way of life like the one that was characteristic of prehistoric times—which would be impossible, and, even if it were possible, it would not solve our present predicament.)

Likewise, conditions of total Space-Time-Awareness\textsuperscript{53} like the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit are thoroughly oceanic conditions free from the subject-object duality and what Gestalt theory called \textit{figure-ground minds}\textsuperscript{54}—the selective consciousness with a narrow, scarcely permeable focus of attention and the concomitant compulsion, in normal civilized adults, to single out segments of the continuum of sense data and by the same token become partially unaware of the rest of that continuum. Nobel prize awarded novelist Romain Rolland, in his epistolary exchange with Freud, positively appraised what he called the “oceanic feeling,” in which no definite boundaries of individuality are felt and which in his view was at the root of religion and constituted the core of mysticism. For his part

Freud, in the epistolary exchange in question and in subsequent writings, interpreted the existence of that feeling in infants negatively—viewing them as instances of the “primary Narcissist union between mother and infant,” as a deposit of desire involving a need to remain tied to the maternal union that infants experience as a limitless “bond with the universe,” and as involving a sense of helplessness, powerlessness or vulnerability. Freud interpreted the occurrence of this feeling in adults in an even more negative light, as a regression to the symbiotic stage of object relations development wherein the infant’s ego boundaries are not yet individuated and thus the child does not experience her or his self as distinct from the undifferentiated unity of the mother-child matrix. Wilhelm Reich, on his part, viewed the occurrence of the feeling in question in adults in a positive light, and later on Norman O. Brown asserted oceanic conditions to have the potential of healing the divisions created by repression. What we are concerned with at this point, however, is that, even if we agreed that it is permissible to speak in some sense of an unconscious cupboard for skeletons with regard to the “normal” adult psychological states of our time, insofar as the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit do not involve a limited focus of conscious awareness that may be regarded as a “conscious,” or a sense of identity that could be contradicted by specific contents of awareness, they could not be said to involve an unconscious in this sense. In fact, the Self-qua-Path involves the temporary dissolution, and the Self-qua-Fruit involves the definitive extinction, of the elements of Freud’s first topic that have been admitted here albeit in a somehow figurative sense. (It must be noted, however, that the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, which are the omega of ontogenesis, as such are radically different from the oceanic condition of infants that is the alpha of this process: [1] Unlike the condition of infants, which features an incipient subject-object duality and therefore is not thoroughly oceanic, and which involves propensities for developing delusion and the small time-space-knowledge states Stan Grof has called hylotropic conditions, the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit are devoid of the subject-object duality and as such are thoroughly oceanic conditions—the latter being utterly free from delusory propensities as well, since by definition it manifests only when all delusory propensities have been neutralized. [2] Whereas the infant in the oceanic condition is helpless, advanced instances of the Self-qua-Path, and even more so the Self-qua-Fruit, feature all of the capabilities normally acquired by adults—which in these conditions are further perfected than in ordinary people insofar as in them the individual is not subject to the self-impediment inherent in dualistic self-consciousness. [3] The Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit cannot be properly said to involve the oceanic feeling, for they are devoid of the subject-object duality that is the condition of possibility of feeling tones insofar as these result from the different varieties of the three possible attitudes of a subject to its objects, which are acceptance, rejection and indifference; indeed, the oceanic feeling is a function of the proto-duality of subject and object proper to the infant (which with the passing of time gradually develops into fully fledged delusion through interaction with the human environment), and therefore according to the infant’s attitude it can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. [4] Oceanic conditions such as the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, rather than being a deposit of desire or involving a need to remain tied to the maternal union experienced as a limitless bond with the universe, put an end to the illusion of separate selfhood / egohood that is the root of desire and need, and therefore

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b Brown (1968 [or. Ed. 1959]).
constitute the only possible genuine liberation from these two fetters. [5] These conditions do not involve either the sense of dependence infants experience with regard to the original other, without whom they could neither satisfy their needs nor survive, or the experience of powerlessness, insignificance and fragility that may occur when the budding ego-delusion manifests in oceanic conditions: the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, in which there is no ego-delusion and in which it is evident that we are the nondual awareness that the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings calls the All-Creating King, are characterized by absolute power and plenitude. Furthermore, the oceanic conditions corresponding to the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit may not be viewed as instances of regression to the symbiotic stage of object relations development at which the infant’s ego boundaries have not yet become defined and hence there is the undifferentiated unity of a mother-child matrix; on the contrary, just as the individuation and differentiation that gradually develop in the process of ontogenesis represent the overcoming (though not in the sense of Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation) of the symbiotic stage in question, the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit represent the overcoming (in the same sense as the former) of this individuation and differentiation, as well as of the illusion of a separate self or ego that is the ultimate root of all feelings of dependence—which in the infant manifests in a budding form, and which becomes fully developed as a result of individuation and differentiation. Therefore, only in the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit can we find true, absolute independence.

It is only after we develop a limited sense of identity corresponding to a self-image conditioned by social conventions and a limited focus of conscious awareness the contents of which must not contradict the sense of identity in question (as well as an id understood qua cluster of wicked urges and unruly passions: cf. the discussion of Freud’s second topic at the end of this section), that secondary process acquires the functions that Freud’s first topic attributed to what he called “the unconscious’ preconscious aspect”—such as that of determining which impulses and contents of awareness may be allowed to remain within the scope of this focus of conscious awareness and which may not be allowed to remain within it, that which I have explained in Sartrean terms as doubly negating that whatever society deems unacceptable has to do with us and by the same token seeing it as having to do with other individuals; etc. Thus the precondition for the elusion that Sartre called bad faith, and hence for speaking, albeit figuratively, of an unconscious to some extent similar to Freud’s before 1915, is what Gestalt theory called figure-ground minds: the split of awareness into a focus of attention restricted to a figure or foreground that is singled-out in the sensory continuum of the six senses (the five admitted by Western philosophy, science and common sense, plus the one that according to Buddhism is in charge of apprehending mental contents), and a ground or background consisting in all that has not been so singled-out—which is left in what may metaphorically be called a penumbra of awareness, for it never becomes fully unconscious, and whenever we need to take segments of it as figure we automatically do so (if, while my attention is fully directed to the phenomenon in front of me, someone comes from my right to attack me with a stick, I will have some awareness of the attack and thus will be able to defend myself—which implies taking the attacker and his actions as figure and then being able to take as figure whatever it may be necessary at each different moment of the fight).

Sartre explains this in terms of the concept of human consciousness as a nihilating nothingness: in sensory perception, consciousness’ nihilating power nihilates whatever is to be turned into ground, and in self-deceit it nihilates whichever aspect of ourselves we wish to elude. This way of explaining is due to the already considered fact that Sartre believed
that in itself the given was and had always been being, and hence that the obliteration in sensory perception of all that becomes ground, or in self-deceit of the aspects of ourselves we are compelled to elude, amounted to a nihilation of self-being. However, in vol. I of this book it was made clear that the given is not in itself being, for being qua self-being is a deceptive phenomenon that arises co-emergently with the subject-object duality as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the super-subtle threefold thought-structure in which the concept of being is implicit (as we have seen, this structure is the thought of there being an object-that-is, a subject-that-is and an experience-that-is), which causes both the mental subject and the continuum of what manifests as object to appear to be endowed with being. It is after this has occurred, that a segment of the continuum of what appears as object is singled out for perception, while the rest of the continuum is turned into ground. Since the segment that is thus singled out appears as object as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure in which the concept of being is implicit, and since we fail to realize that it was our perception that isolated it from the rest of the sensory continuum, we perceive it as involving self-being, and hence it seems to be what Aristotle called a first substance; since the intuitive or subtle concept interpreting the segment singled out for perception is delusorily valued, we perceive the object as being the concept in question, and hence it seems to be what Aristotle called a second substance or essence. Thus at this point what we explicitly experience as being is the figure; however, we have an implicit knowledge of the rest of the continuum as being, and thus it would not be really correct to assert that it was nihilated—unless we understood this neologism exclusively in an epistemological sense, depriving it of the ontological sense that Sartre seems to have given it and that is implicit in its etymology.

The next question is whether the turning into ground of most of the continuum of what appears as object is the function of a power inherent in consciousness. As noted in the last chapter of vol. I of this book in the context of the discussion of the insubstantiality of mind illustrated with sayings by Heraclitus (fr. 2 DK), Lichtenberg, Paz and so on, all of the functions we attribute to a power inherent in consciousness are in truth the play of the energy or thukje aspect of primordial, nondual awareness. However, the turning of most of the continuum of what appears as object into ground may not be meaningfully explained by simply asserting it to be the play of the energy aspect of primordial, nondual awareness, for in its pristine condition the awareness in question is all pervading and panoramic, and does not turn any part of the continuum of sense data into ground. What Gestalt theory called “figure-ground mind” (the selective consciousness having a narrow focus of attention with scarcely permeable limits that makes normal civilized adults single out segments of the continuum of sense data, by the same token becoming partially unaware of the rest of the continuum) is a function of the reduction of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that in human phylogenesis develops with the gradual degenerative spiritual and social evolution that in its later stages gives rise to civilization, and that in ontogenesis in civilized human groups is an effect of the process of socialization—though it always occurred to a limited extent, even in the primordial age. (Tantric energetics claims that the rebukes and punishments whereby infants are constrained to adapt to society induce muscular contractions, which with the passing of time become chronic, producing “knots” that strangle the central channel [Skt. avadhūti; Tib. uma] through which the energy on

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a thugs rje.
b dbu ma.
which awareness and its scope depend flows into the organism’s higher energy centers [Skt. *chakra*; Tib. *khorlo*] and by implication the brain, reducing the energy flow that enters the centers in question and thereby reducing proportionally the scope of conscious awareness, as a result of which normal adult experience necessarily involves the figure-ground split—and, we may infer, we obtain the capacity to perform the operations for the managing of self-identity that Sartre explained in terms of the concept of bad faith or self-deceit. Then the regular discharge of energy in ejaculation (in the man) or in ejaculation and menstruation (in the woman) helps keep the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness relatively low. Since, however, so far Western science has not found any “evidence” supporting this interpretation, it would be prudent for us to follow Rigdzin Changchub Dorje’s advise and abstain from conceiving the energetic system posited by the Buddhist Tantras as a concrete, discrete, “objective” reality.  

Thus with regard to the turning into ground of all that is not singled out for perception, rather than positing a nihilating power of awareness, it would seem far more reasonable to say that the reduction in ontogenesis of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness gives rise to a selective consciousness, which in interaction with the learning achieved in the process of socialization allowing us to distinguish the manifold configurations that may be recognized in the continuum of sense data, causes us to single out segments of this continuum for perception, becoming primarily aware of the singled out segment while by the same stroke relegating to the background of awareness the rest of the continuum—and that, as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, we understand the singled out segment as being inherently this or that. In the last chapter of vol. I of this book we saw that Sartre spoke of the “translucency of consciousness,” but that what the French philosopher called “translucency” would be better expressed by combining terms such as limpidness, transparency, immateriality and boundlessness. However, as shown in the chapter in question, these qualities, rather than belonging to consciousness, are proper to the dang form of manifestation of energy—which, as noted in the first chapter of vol. I of this book, the Dzogchen teachings illustrate by the example of a crystal ball, and which, as I have noted elsewhere, symbolizes the essence or ngowo aspect of primordial, nondual awareness. Furthermore, we saw that deluded human beings attribute to consciousness the qualities of dang energy because the basic human delusion causes awareness’ most characteristic functions, which are Gnitiveness and motility, to appear to be functions of the mental subject, which is a phenomenon of dang energy and which seems to be the king and owner of the inner dimension constituted by this form of manifestation of energy, whereas the phenomena of tsel energy in our experience, despite being manifestations of awareness as well, seem to be different from and external to awareness because: (1) they manifest in a dimension that seems to be external with regard to the inner dimension of dang energy; (2) the mental subject that in samsara seems to be the source of Gnitiveness and motility does not seem to automatically have power over them (it cannot control them merely by conceiving the intention to do so, as it often seems to be able to do in the case of dang energy, and very often it cannot even do so by using the

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a *khor lo*.  
b *gdangs*.  
c Capriles (2003), the definitive, revised and corrected version of which will soon be available in print.  
d *ngo bo*.  
e *rtsal*.
body—and some times even technology), for this form of manifestation of energy “offers resistance” (in the sense of Heidegger’s “substantiality” and “in-itself” discussed in Vol. I of this book) to a far greater degree than dang energy; (3) since tsel energy is shared by many sentient beings, the mental subject does not seem to automatically own it. This is the reason why the characteristics of the tsel form of manifestation of energy, such as for example opaqueness, concreteness and corporeality, are taken to be characteristics of what is not awareness.

Though the qualities of dang energy are the same in all individuals, and in all of us the true condition of this form of manifestation of energy is the nondual, empty, limpid, transparent, all-embracing, boundless aspect of the Buddha-nature that here is being called the dharmakaya-qua-Base, when we perceive phenomena of dang energy such as thoughts we fail to realize their true condition, wrongly taking their contents to be absolutely true or false interpretations of a substantial reality, and to have disproportionate importance. The same is the case with phenomena of rölpa energy, which if perceived by deluded people are taken to be substantial supernatural realities, rather than being realized to be what here is called the sambhogakaya-qua-Base. On the Path proper to the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings, the true condition of dang energy is first apprehended in the practice of Tekchö, in which the dharmakaya-qua-Path manifests each and every time thoughts spontaneously liberate themselves. However, the true condition and qualities of this energy are manifest without interruption only in fully Awake individuals, in whom awareness is never reduced by a decrease in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and hence no partial obliteration of its all-embracing, panoramic transparency and emptiness occurs, and delusion no longer arises to conceal the indivisibility of the three kayas. (As implied above, in infants the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness has not yet decreased to the point of significantly obliterating the all-embracing character of awareness, and yet infants, who are unable to realize the dharmakaya, epitomize the incompleteness of human capabilities, whereas fully Awake individuals, who never stray from the indivisibility of the three kayas, epitomize the total completeness / perfection of these capabilities that as such is wholly beyond the human level.)

Now we can ponder on the “nihilation” that, according to Sartre, is responsible for the elusion of anguish and for bad faith in general, and determine whether or not the elusion of these phenomena is as different from the elusion of external objects as Sartre’s description portrayed it. We have seen that, as required by his existentialist conception of existence as an absolute freedom that can constitute itself as anything without being itself determined, Sartre explained the elusion of all that inwardly-divided human beings do not want to see, in terms of the concept of bad faith or self-deceit: in a single, instant operation we deceive ourselves, deceive ourselves about this self-deceit, deceive ourselves about this deception about this self-deceit, and so on ad infinitum. Let us consider the way Sartre explains this mechanism:

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a rol pa.
b khregs chod.
c Sartre (1980), pp. 81-82.
Do we manage to suffocate or cover up our anguish through these different constructions? It is certain that we will not manage to suppress it (la supprimer), because we are anguish. With regard to the meaning of veiling it, besides the fact that the very nature of awareness and its translucency forbid us from taking the expression literally, it is necessary to note the particular type of behavior that we signify by this term: we can mask an external object because it exists independently of us, for the same reason, we can turn our sight or our attention away from it, that is, simply to fix our eyes on some other object; from that moment, both realities—my own as well as the object’s—regain their own life and the accidental relation that linked the subject to the thing disappears without thereby altering the one or the other existence. However, if I am that which I want to veil, the matter takes on a totally different aspect: in fact, I cannot wish “not to see” a certain aspect of my being unless I am aware of the aspect that I do not want to see. This means that I must point to it in my being in order to turn away from it; better still, it is necessary for me to constantly think of it in order to take good care of not thinking of it. For this reason, it must be understood that necessarily I must, not only perpetually carry with me that which I want to escape or elude, but also focus on the object of my flight in order to flee it—which means that anguish, an intentional focusing on anguish, and a flight from anguish toward tranquilizing myths, must be given within the unity of a single consciousness. In one word, I flee in order to ignore but I cannot ignore that I am fleeing, and the flight from anguish is no more than a way of being conscious of anguish. By such means, properly speaking the latter cannot be masked or avoided. However, to be anguish or to flee anguish could not be exactly the same thing: if I am my anguish in order to escape it, this implies that I can place myself off-center with regard to what I am, that I can be the anguish under the mode of “not being it,” that I can dispose of a nihilating power in the core of anguish itself. This nihilating power nihilates anguish in so far as I flee it and nihilates itself in so far as I am anguish in order to escape it. This is what is called bad faith. Therefore, it is neither a matter of “expelling anguish from consciousness,” nor a matter of constituting the anguish as an unconscious psychical phenomenon: rather, I can simply become of bad faith in grasping the anguish that I am and this bad faith, destined to fill the nothingness that I am in my relation with myself, implies precisely the nothingness that it suppresses.

The first important point that Sartre’s reflection may cause us to make is that we cannot look away from anguish because anguish is not an object we can either look at or look away from, but fear of an object: an object that in terms of Sartre’s definition of anguish may be the intuition of our own freedom, or possibly the oscillating options among which we are obliged to choose and their respective possible, unwanted consequences. In fact, rather than being an object, anguish is an attitude before a thought or oscillation of thoughts very intensely sustained by delusory valuation-absolutization and giving rise to uneasiness and distress. However, the same is not the case with looking away from what Sartre referred to as “aspects of our being” (but which it would be more correct to call “aspects of the entity indicated by our name”), for such aspects can either be taken as object or not be taken as object. Furthermore, even though, insofar as anguish is an attitude before the recognition of our own freedom, or before the oscillation of thoughts pondering on the possible desirable or undesirable results of the alternatives between which we have to choose, we cannot take it as object, the same does not apply to the recognition of our own freedom, or to the oscillation of anguish-begetting thoughts, which we can certainly take as object, experiencing anguish, or not take as object, not experiencing anguish. The same is the case with the unpleasant sensation in the center of the trunk at the level of the
heart that is the feeling tone (Skt. *vedana*; Tib. *tsorwa*) of the experience of anguish: we can either take as object, potentially giving rise to the feedback runaway of conflict to a climax that will be discussed below, or not take as object and thus not give rise to the runaway in question (throughout this volume, the term *runaway* is used in the sense of “feedback runaway”). It is also worth noting that, though it is true that elusion cannot suppress anguish (in the sense of the French *supprimer*), eluding both the thoughts that trigger anguish and the feeling tone that is its main symptom allows us to avert the just mentioned runaway of conflict to a climax. However, even if we are successful at eluding the thoughts at the root of anguish, these will repeatedly manifest in our consciousness, having to be automatically, immediately eluded each and every time they occur—thus giving rise to the anxiety and stress that are ubiquitous in our time, particularly among city dwellers. (In fact, though anxiety has been with our species for some time, it has gradually increased during the last stages of development of the time cycle as delusion and delusory valuation-absolutization have increased, and it has done so in a greater proportion among city dwellers—to a great extent due to the pace and other circumstances of contemporary urban life, the nature of the jobs that nowadays most people have to take, the contradictions between tradition and fashion, as well as between the different fashions that succeed each other ever more rapidly, and in general what we call “environmental conditions,” which are ever more conducive to stress, anxiety, anguish, gloom and despair.)

Let us take as an example of singling out a segment of the continuum of sense data, the perception of a palm tree in the beach. When the tree is singled out, by the same stroke by which we become aware of the tree as figure or foreground, we relegate to a background of awareness the sand, the sea and the sky around it. However, we not only relegate to a background of awareness the continuum of color and form surrounding the tree. If we are normal adults, so long as our attention is placed on the object, also the feelings that may be occurring in our bodies are relegated to a background of awareness—provided they are not strong enough as to call our attention to them, causing us to single them out and take them as figure. Now imagine that, rather than perceiving a palm tree on the beach, we experience anguish and therefore have an unpleasant feeling tone in the centre of the body at the level of the heart, and to a lesser degree in other energy centers (Skt. *chakra*; Tib. *tsakhor*): if we manage to place our attention elsewhere than the object of anguish and also elsewhere than the sensation in the centre of the body, and that on which we place our attention is not yet another source of anguish, we might manage to temporarily relegate to a background of awareness the *sensation* in question. Of course, if the intensity of the feeling tone goes beyond a given threshold, we will be incapable of focusing our attention elsewhere for a considerable lapse—and, while our attention is not focused on it, the sensation will be insistently calling our attention to itself, as would happen if someone were poking us with the fingertips from the back in order to call our attention. Furthermore, even in cases in which the sensation is not particularly strong, if an increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (no matter whether it were due to the occurrence of psychosis, to intensive practice of *kundalini yoga*, *koan* study or meditation, to ingestion of those so-called psychedelic substances that will be discussed in a subsequent chapter of this volume and which I have christened *chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic,*

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*a* tshor ba.

*b* rtsa 'khor.
potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect [CREV], or to any other reasons) did not permit the normal relegation to the background of awareness of all that was not singled out for perception, we would be unable to concentrate elsewhere, and hence, for the reasons considered below, the sensation would grow from its own feedback, giving rise to a runaway (i.e. an autocatalytic systemic loop) of conflict.

Thus Sartre was right when he asserted that we cannot look away from anguish as we look away from an object—the reason for this being that anguish is not an object but an attitude before an object or series of successive objects—and yet, as we have seen, Sartre was wrong in asserting that we cannot look away from aspects of ourselves, for these can certainly appear as object. Sartre also posited a difference between veiling an aspect of ourselves and veiling an external object, on the grounds that in order to veil the latter I can simply look away from it and forget the object, whereas in the case of the former I cannot wish “not to see it” unless I am aware of the aspect that I do not want to see—which according to Sartre means that I must point to it in my being in order to turn away from it, and that it is necessary for me to constantly think of it in order to make sure that I will not think of it. In positing this difference Sartre was wrong as well, as may be corroborated by considering what happens when someone is driving by a corpse beheaded in a car accident and, in order to avoid the disturbing sight, she or he places his or her attention elsewhere. Just as according to Sartre occurs when we veil an aspect of the entity that we are, while driving by the corpse we are aware that it is there, and we must continue to be aware of the fact that it is there in order not to look at it. However, there is an essential difference between looking away from an external object and bad faith, which is comparable to the Freudian difference between suppression (Ger. Unterdrückung, which was not what Sartre had in mind when he spoke of supprimer l’angoisse, for this term is rendered into French as répression) and repression (Ger. Verdrängung; Fr. refoulement). In the elusion of the sight of an external object I must continue to be aware that the object is there and that I am eluding its sight, for this is the necessary condition of its continued elusion. Conversely, in bad faith, as soon as I elude the object I must forget I eluded something, or else I would continue to be aware that I eluded it and thereby I would continue to be aware of what I intended to elude. In the particular case of anguish (in which, as we have seen, what we have to elude is not the anguish, but the object of anguish and the feeling tone of anguish, both of which appear as object and as such may be eluded in the same way as the beheaded corpse69), awareness that I am eluding the object of anguish would remind me of the object in question, and thus would feed the anguish I intend to elude—whereas awareness that I am eluding the feeling tone associated with anguish would make it patent, giving rise to the runaway of anguish referred to above. This proves Sartre to be wrong in claiming that the essential characteristic of bad faith is that in it I must point to what I intend to elude in order to look away from it: as we have just seen, it is when I elude an external object that I must point to what I intend to elude in order to turn away from it. Contrariwise, in bad faith, after eluding a given content, I am forbidden from continuing to point at it in order to turn away from it: I must simply forget it, at the same time forgetting I have forgotten it, so as to immediately ignore it and not occupy myself with the content until it spontaneously enters my focus of conscious awareness again. It is only at this point, that once more I will become aware that I have to elude it—and then, in order to elude it, in the very act of eluding it I will have to forget that I eluded it and that I forgot this fact, just as described here.
Before we can continue to explore the anguish that according to Sartre is the being of the human individual and the elusio
n of this anguish, so as to determine whether or not this elusion is qualitatively different from the turning into ground of all that is not singled out as figure in perception, and so whether or not a different power, that may be properly categorized as nihilating, is involved in elusion, we must keep in mind that, as noted in the first chapter of Vol. I of this book, the Stoics made it clear that in themselves sensations are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. In fact, though sensations may be more or less intense, and their quality may be of one type or another, as illustrated in vol. I by the examples of the nymphs with the goose feathers, the masochist and so on, it is our attitude to sensations that causes us to experience them as pleasurable, painful or neutral: as we have seen, the intense sensation associated with a huge abscess is experienced as unbearable pain because we have a tropism to reject with all our might sensations of that intensity and quality; the sensations associated with lovemaking become pleasurable because we have a tropism to accept sensations of that quality and intensity; and neutral sensations become thus because we have a tropism to remain indifferent to sensations of certain qualities the intensity of which remains below a certain threshold.

We have seen that at the root of delusion is the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, which is a function of the vibratory activity that seems to take place, or to be particularly strong, in the focal point in the center of the body at the level of the heart (though in some cases some individuals might feel it more strongly in other focal points of experience), and which gives rise to the feeling Buddhism calls mental sensation (Skt. vedana; Tib. tshorwa)—which as shown in Vol. I of this book accompanies all thoughts, and which is directly proportional to the intensity with which these are delusorily valued. In fact, when this vibration and the associated feeling become particularly intense—which in general occurs when it sustains thoughts linked with the “four worldly concerns”—they become emotional intensity, for what we call passions are no more than thoughts that are delusorily valued with particular intensity, causing the associated mental sensation to be particularly intense and the impulse to act in response to the thoughts to be especially strong. As also shown in vol. I, the fact that our attitude to the present object makes sensations become pleasant, unpleasant or neutral, explains why emotions that are forms of rejection involve unpleasant sensations, whereas emotions that are varieties of acceptance involve pleasant ones. In fact, judging an object negatively causes us to reject it, and since this rejection embraces the totality of our potential objects, the mental sensation in the background of awareness is implicitly rejected as well, whereby it is made unpleasant. Furthermore, since this rejection causes us to contract the muscles of the region where the mental sensation manifests, the vibration at the root of delusory valuation-absolutization that gives rise to mental sensation reverberates in a way that causes it to be further judged as unpleasant and thus to be further rejected: hence the positive feedback loop that will be discussed below, which gives rise to a runaway of both vibratory rates and unpleasant sensations. Conversely, judging an object positively causes us to accept it; since the ensuing acceptance embraces the totality of potential objects, the mental sensation in the background of awareness is implicitly accepted as well, whereby it is made pleasant. Furthermore, since this acceptance results in the relaxation of the muscles of the region where the mental sensation manifests, the vibration responsible for delusory valuation-absolutization and mental sensation, rather than reverberating, is absorbed and smoothed-

\(^a\) tshor ba.
out like that of a vibrator in lard, in a way that causes it to be further judged as pleasant and thus be further accepted. Hence the negative feedback loop that is the core of pacification meditation (Pali, samatha; Skt. shamatha; Tib. zhinai\(^a\); Chinese chih) and that makes vibratory rates decrease. Finally, when we judge an object as neither positive nor negative, we remain indifferent to it and hence to our sensations, which therefore become neutral (and yet if this neutrality persisted “for too long” we would conceptualize it as boring and reject it, by the same token rejecting the sensations in the background of awareness, which would become unpleasant). At any rate, despite the fact that sensations turn unpleasant, pleasant or neutral depending on whether we react to objects with rejection, acceptance or indifference, and that our reactions depend to a great extent on idiosyncratic conditioning, in the perception of a singled out object we take the unpleasant sensation produced by rejection, the pleasant sensation issuing from acceptance, or the neutral sensation resulting from indifference, to be objective proofs of the inherent character of the object—which will be deemed negative, positive or neutral, respectively.\(^73\)

In general, the experiences that *Existenzphilosophie* and existentialism (at least in the case of authors such as Kierkegaard, the first Heidegger and the first Sartre) deem most authentic involve rejection and are therefore associated with unpleasant sensations. For example, in fear we think of the likelihood of an undesirable event, rejecting the thought of the event and thus giving rise to an unpleasant sensation. In Kierkegaard’s dread, the object we reject is not an undesirable event, but nothing[ness]: this dread may be a variety of the terror of emptiness that, according to the Mahayana, characterizes the shravakas or “listeners” (human beings with one of the two main Hinayana capacities). In Heidegger’s *Angst* as manifest in what he called “being toward the end,” the object, and therefore what we reject, is being-in-the-world itself (and if we misidentified the object of fear as “death” this would be another way to flee the *Dasein’s* fundamental being in the open[ing] in which the *Dasein* exists as thrown “being toward its end”). For his part, Sartre contrasted fear and anguish: as we have seen, in the former we ponder and reject the possibility that something carrying dire consequences may *happen* to us (or to people dear to us, or to our property, etc.), whereas in the latter what frightens us is our own freedom in general, from which we shrink—or the specific possibility that we *may do* something carrying dire consequences.\(^74\) (Since being-for-Self involves the illusion that the mental subject is the source of the actions and decisions of a given individual, all of which will have effects that may be either beneficial or detrimental, it involves the appearance of responsibility for these effects—and therefore anguish in Sartre’s sense is inherent in it. This anguish may involve repeatedly focusing our consciousness on the thought of an undesired possible outcome of *one of our possible decisions* and, on the occasion of rejecting that outcome, feeling the unpleasant sensation that issues from rejection. Furthermore, if our fear of the undesired outcome is too strong, our attention might become fixed on the thought of that outcome, making the sensation continuous—and things may get worse if the ensuing unpleasant sensation is painful enough as to elicit intense aversion.\(^75\))

Since we fear intensely the unpleasant sensations involved in dread, *Angst*, anguish and so on, and this intense fear of unpleasant sensations elicits rejection, making sensations unpleasant, the very thought of the experience of dread, *Angst*, anguish and so on is likely to induce the experience we so intensely fear. Furthermore, once the experience in question has manifested, our rejection of the associated sensation will work as “the second hand of

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\(^a\) zhi gnas.
the “tweezers” of the distressing experience: it will boost the unpleasant sensation we dread, making it far more unpleasant—which will elicit further rejection, which in its turn will make it all the more unbearable. This is particularly clear when we are taking the sensation of anguish as object, for the sensation in question is particularly distressing, and since taking pain directly as object elicits a particularly intense rejection, which multiples the painful character of the sensation, so long as we continue to take the sensation as object, both its unpleasantness and our rejection of it will shoot up interdependently in a runaway. This is why the situations under consideration give rise to a positive feedback loop of distress—a nightmarish, hellish autocatalytic loop of dread, Angst, anguish or whatever. (Even if originally the sensation of anguish were not so strong, if an increased energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness prevented the relegation of the sensation to the background of awareness, or somehow hampered the mechanisms whereby we elude contents and simultaneously elude the fact that we elude contents, a positive feedback loop of the kind just considered could boost distress: since we would be unable to elude the sensation of anguish, we would be unable to avoid rejecting it with all of our might, and thus would cause it to grow from its own feedback to its apex. As we have seen, psychosis, intensive practice of kundalini yoga, koan study or meditation, ingestion of so-called psychedelics (and in particular of those I have christened chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect [CREV]), and so on, are among the conditions that may raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness.)

To sum up: (1) according to Sartre the bare experience of being-for-Self may be said to be fear before one’s responsibility. (2) If we translated Heidegger’s basic views into Sartrean categories, we could say the naked experience of being-for-Self is also Angst in Heidegger’s sense, which we flee, among other means, by building a self-identity through bad faith and clinging to this self-identity. (3) If we have the capacity of the shravakas, we may be subject to Kierkegaard’s dread with regard to being-for-Self (i.e. to fear of the lack of self-being of this mode of being) and with regard to the self-identity we have built as a means to elude the unpleasantness of the naked experience of being-for-Self (i.e. to fear of the lack of self-being of this self-identity): both instances of dread have an object, which in the first is the emptiness of the subject who fears, and in the second is the emptiness of the self-image that the subject clings to. (4) Finally, as we have seen, all of these fears oscillate with fear of fear and fear of the distressful sensation of fear. (5) Therefore, qua being-for-Self we are fear of responsibility and fear of fear, Angst and fear of Angst—and both qua being-for-Self and qua the self-identity we build by means of bad faith we may be Kierkegaard’s dread and dread of dread. In short, in a sense we may be said to be horror of anguish, Angst, dread and so on.

However, we are not fear of anguish, Angst, dread and so on in order to remain in the naked experience of this fear and of this anguish, Angst, dread and so. Sartre noted that we are anguish in order to flee it, and a similar idea is implicit in Heidegger’s thesis that Angst is inherent in the Dasein but that this Angst causes the Dasein’s open[ing] to close / conceal itself with falsehood: it may be said that we are fear of anguish, fear of Angst, fear of dread and so on in order to elude both this fear and the objects of this fear, for in our

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b Systemic activity that increases from its own feedback.
time we could not function on the basis of delusion if we did not become of bad faith in the apprehension of these experiences—the psychophysical basis of which is the powerful and quite unpleasant vibration *cum* tension in the center of the body at the level of the heart that has been repeatedly considered in this book and that, as we have seen, would make life unbearable if it were patent without interruption. However, insofar as indifference causes sensations to become neutral, if we managed to remain totally indifferent to all of our successive objects, and at the same time managed to ignore the vibration *cum* tension that manifests in the center of the body at the level of the heart—which would require that we simultaneously ignore the fact that we are ignoring it—and thereby became totally indifferent to it, the sensation in the center of our body at the level of the heart would cease being a strong, unpleasant vibration *cum* tension, becoming hardly perceptible. However, in general it is impossible for us to remain totally indifferent to all of our successive objects, and therefore the vibration *cum* tension in question will repeatedly become strong enough as to call our attention toward itself. While the vibration *cum* tension is noticeable, it may be possible for us to look away from it for short whiles by concentrating on objects that are not further sources of anguish; however, since we cannot control our attention uninterruptedly, we will be unable to keep it continuously away both from the vibration *cum* tension and from anguish-begetting thoughts. Furthermore, if we succeeded in remaining indifferent to all successive objects for a long while, we would automatically conceptualize the ensuing neutral sensation as boring and reject it, putting an end to our indifference to objects; in fact, as Pascal made it clear and as shown in vol. I of this book and other of my works, most of our pursuits are means for eluding boredom. It is, as we have seen, because of all of this that the means to definitively rid ourselves of the discomfort inherent in being-for-Self and in delusion in general, rather than lying in the obliteration of anguish, *Angst* and so on, consist in making these emotions evident, so that they force us to do whatever is needed in order to uproot the delusion from which they spring.

In short, in order to carry on with our lives we must look away from the sensation of anguish, *forgetting that we looked away from it and, in the same operation, forgetting that we forgot something*. Now, is this “forgetting and at the same time forgetting that we have forgotten something” a special type of forgetting that only occurs in bad faith and that is a function of the special nihilation posited by Sartre, or is it something that occurs in other situations as well? For our purposes, we may distinguish two types of forgetting that are to some extent reminiscent of two key types of negation in Buddhist logic: (1) one in which we forget the object of forgetting without remembering something else, as happens when we totally forget someone we met in a party years ago; and (2) one in which we forget the object of forgetting while remembering something else, as happens when the image of someone we know quite well comes to our mind, but we cannot remember his or her name. In all instances of the first type of forgetting, forgetting involves forgetting that we have forgotten something, whereas in the second type of forgetting, forgetting implies being aware that we forgot something and trying to remember what we forgot. This shows that the “forgetting and in the same operation forgetting that one has forgotten something” that is characteristic of bad faith is not an extraordinary kind of forgetting that only occurs in bad faith, but one common type of forgetting. What makes this kind of

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\(^a\) Capriles (1977, 1986, 1994a, 2000a, 2003, etc.).
forgetting peculiar in the case of bad faith is that we can achieve it at will and in an instantaneous manner.

The fact that after a long time has passed and our memory is no longer fresh, we may forget a fact, forgetting we have forgotten it, seems so natural that there does not seem to be necessary to try to explain it. However, the same does not apply to bad faith, for the instantaneous production at will of this “forgetting and simultaneously forgetting one has forgotten” may either seem impossible, or appear to require a special nihilating power like the one posited by Sartre. It is clear that in order to elude whatever we intend to elude, we must have previously conceived the intention of so doing, and therefore that in order to elude what we intend to elude, together with it we must elude the intention to elude it and the act of elusion itself. As we have already seen, one fact that facilitates the elusion of the intention in question is that, rather than being formulated in terms of coarse thoughts of the discursive kind, it is conceived in terms of subtle, intuitive thoughts, which in “ordinary normality” are somehow implicit—the explicit objects of consciousness in general being the contents of coarse thoughts. Furthermore, the intention to elude is conceived in the mode of elusion (which is almost the same as saying “in the mode of distraction,” or, figuratively speaking, “looking away from it”): we manifest it elusively (i.e., distractedly), for we somehow elude the fact that we manifest it, so as not to clearly register it. However, this does not seem to be sufficient for explaining how can we, at will and instantaneously, “forget while in the same operation forgetting we forgot something:” this operation still seems to require the special nihilating power posited by Sartre.

We have already seen that in Pramanasamuchchaya 1:11d Acharya Dignaga stated that whenever we have a memory of the aspect of blue, we also have the memory of having been conscious of this aspect—from which it has been inferred that, when the perception of the aspect of blue that we remember took place, it was accompanied by an awareness (of) being conscious of seeing this aspect. And we have also seen that this is precisely the thesis of Dignaga’s main direct disciple, Dharmakirti: that for perception to be possible there has to be awareness (of) the fact that one is perceiving. In fact, as I have noted elsewhere, the condition of possibility of self-conscious remembrance is that a reflexive mnemonic imprint be established (which depends on the cerebral cortex, organ of reflexiveness, and which may be contrasted with unselfconscious forms of memory such as that of lower organisms that lack a cerebral cortex, that of fetuses whose cerebral cortex is not fully formed, and that of neonates whose cerebral cortex is not completely mielitized), and this can only occur when there is a delusorily valued perception, thought or action—which, insofar as it goes along with the delusory valuation-absolutization of the underlying threefold thought structure, involves nondual, nonthetic, nonpositional awareness (of) a dual, thetic, positional consciousness of an object that is understood in terms of a concept. When the base-of-all or kunzhi (Skt. alaya) manifests as a neutral condition (lungmaten), there is unconsciousness, not in the sense of lack of awareness, but in that of manifestation of a stunned condition involving the first type of avidya / marigpa posited in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book and lacking reflexive awareness (of) being conscious of something and hence involving no knowledge—in which therefore no reflexive mnemonic imprints are established. This condition manifests for a very brief instant between each

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a Capriles (2004). (The definitive, corrected version of this book will soon be available in print.)

b kun gzhi.

c kun gzhi lung ma bstan.
coarse thought of the discursive kind and the next, and although it may be said to be unconscious in the sense just defined, its occurrence, rather than making us lose track of the relationship between the thoughts in question and fall into a stunned condition, has the twofold function of separating each thought from the preceding one (according to how long it manifests, in writing it will be represented by a comma, a semicolon or a period), and of establishing the connection between thoughts that makes mental discourse possible. Therefore, what the Dzogchen teachings call the neutral condition of the base-of-all, which is an immediate phenomenal reality, may be regarded as the phenomenal unconscious that performs the functions that the Yogacharas ascribe to the metaphysical abstraction they call alaya vijñana (Tib. kunzhi namshe\(^a\)) and that, as noted above, the modern West often attributes to the partly analogous metaphysical abstraction called “the unconscious”—such as that of establishing connections of which we are not consciously aware, which above was illustrated by the case of the object of infatuation or worry spontaneously presenting itself after we come out of a swoon or awaken from sleep.

When the condition of the base-of-all manifests more conspicuously and durably as the nyam\(^b\) called heddewa\(^c\), it plays mainly the first of the two above-mentioned roles: that of disconnecting preceding thoughts from subsequent ones. This is why in practices such as Tekchö, if we become absorbed in a powerful, compelling line of thought, and as a result of this, momentarily lose the capacity to look into the thought present at the moment and reGnize its true condition, we may induce the nyam in question by explosively and sharply shouting the syllable PHAT: not only may this nyam itself be a condition allowing us to reGnize the dharmakaya, but the interruption of the compelling line of thought that was absorbing our attention makes it possible for us to look directly into the first thought that manifests immediately after the occurrence of the nyam in question, and reGnize its true condition, which is the dharmakaya. (Of course, if the argument of the line of thought is of the highest interest to us, it will repeat itself at some point, but this does not change the fact that at the time the continuity of thought was broken by the nyam called heddewa.) In the operations that Sartre called bad faith, what has the effect Sartre attributed to an abstract “nihilating power inherent in consciousness” is the occurrence of an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten\(^d\) more powerful and clear than the usual lapse between one discursive thought and the next, yet not as powerful and extended as the one occurring in the nyam called heddewa: this allows us to forget the aspect of ourselves we intended to elude, or elude both the object and the sensation of anguish, and by the same token forget we forgot something—thereby keeping the act of elusion, as well as whatever we intended to elude, outside our conscious awareness.\(^{83}\) As Sartre noted in the passage quoted above, in order to elude anguish and/or the aspects of ourselves we do not want to see, we often invent and come to believe a tranquilizing myth. We have seen that usually the neutral condition of the base-of-all has the twofold function of interrupting and connecting, and its manifestation in bad faith is no exception, for beside working as the interrupter of all that we intended to elude (including the act of elusion itself), it works as the channel that carries the intention to invent and come to believe a tranquilizing myth, causing the first line of thought to manifest immediately after the condition in question to

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\(^{a}\) kun gzhi rnam shes.  
\(^{b}\) nyams.  
\(^{c}\) had de ba.  
\(^{d}\) kun gzhi lung ma bstan.
express the appropriate myth—or whatever it is convenient for us to look at after “looking away” from what we intend to elude and, in the same operation, “looking away” from our “looking away” from it. Since the neutral condition of the base-of-all left us with no immediate reflexive memory either of what we intended to elude or of the act of elusion, and since subsequently we become absorbed in the myth we want to believe, becoming unaware of everything else (including the fact that we are telling ourselves a myth), we automatically forget what we intended to forget and come to believe the myth enunciated by the new chain of thoughts (there being not need for us to elaborate the myth beforehand, for when the moment comes the spontaneity of awareness will do so in the most convenient way). Thus we face the paradox that the theoretical, nonphenomenal abstractions posited by the two main twentieth century Western theories explaining the concealment of contents from conscious awareness—Freud’s “unconscious” and Sartre’s “nihilating power”—to a great extent stand for the same phenomenal reality: what Dzogchen teachings calls kunzhi lungmaten or “neutral base-of-all.”

Despite his basic blunder of believing that the holon was unattainable and all of the misguided theses and concepts that derived from it, which in the last chapter of vol. I of this book forced me to redefine Sartre’s basic concepts so that I could use them for my purposes, the “first Sartre” hit the target in many essential points: he posited the holon as the telos of human existence, explained the being of human consciousness to be being-for-the-holon, asserted dualistic human consciousness to be in its being suffering without a possible surpassing of this state of suffering, noted how the different strategies whereby human beings attempt to surpass this suffering are all self-defeating—and, among many other hits, as shown in this section, he made it clear that concealing anguish or aspects of ourselves that threaten our self-identity is not achieved by a supposedly autonomous region of the psyche external to consciousness to be called the preconscious, but by consciousness itself. However, in doing this he incurred in a series of inexactitudes, some of which I pointed in this section—such as his misidentification of the essential distinction between eluding external objects and eluding what we consider to be aspects of ourselves, and the fact that, despite having correctly attributed to a “nihilating power” our capacity to intentionally and instantly forget something and in the same operation forget we forgot something, he failed to identify the actual phenomenon responsible for this capacity, which as shown above is the stunned, neutral condition of the base-of-all. Furthermore, as seen in the last chapter of vol. I of this book, Sartre was wrong in understanding ontologically the nihilation he ascribed to this nihilating power (i.e. in assuming the given to be ab origine, in itself being—understood qua self-being—which consciousness nihilated), for if we are to refer by the term “nihilation” to the event that conceals what we intend to elude together with the intention to elude it and the act of elusion itself, we must use the term solely in an epistemological sense. (This should not be taken to mean that all nihilations are solely epistemological. For example, in Dzogchen practice the spontaneous liberation of karmic perceptions that occurs on the occasion of the reGnition [of] the all-liberating single gnosis [Tib. chikshe kundröl] involves a total nihilation of these perceptions and a partial nihilation of the propensities for them to come about, both of which are ontological as well as epistemological—not because they nihilate something that ab origine and in itself is being, but because they momentarily nihilate the phenomenon of being that arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure, in

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\textsuperscript{a} gcik shes kun grol.
some measure neutralizing or burning out [i.e. to some degree nihilating] properly speaking] the dispositions for this phenomenon and the perceptions based on it to recur.

In its turn, Freud’s Project of 1895 hit the mark by distinguishing between primary process and secondary process, and so did the Viennese analyst’s first topic by attributing self-deception to secondary process, by distinguishing between repression and suppression, and by making many other fine points. However, the first Freudian topic incurred in the error of attributing self-deception to a topos external to consciousness (making this topic’s explanation of the difference between repression and suppression faulty) and had a series of other defects, some of which have been discussed here. Concerning the second Freudian topic, to begin with it must be noted that the distinction into a superego, an ego and an id will be accepted—and, in fact, the terms ego and superego will be used freely throughout the next section of this chapter—and yet the way in which Freud conceived these topoi will be criticized. However, since at this point we lack the elements for carrying out a thorough critique of that topic, its critique will be undertaken right after the discussion of the Jungian shadow in the next section of this chapter.

Existence through the Other and Being-for-Others: Genesis of Human Modes of Being and Resultant Self-Consciousness and Evil

It is now clear that the manifestation of being-for-Self is the first instance of human delusion, and the basis for the further development of delusion. However, so far the way in which being-for-Self is the basis for the development of delusion has been explained in an abstract, non-genetic way. In order to explain how self-identity develops in the process of ontogenesis and identify the forces that impel the mechanism of bad faith, first of all it must be noted that, in each and every individual, a tropism compels being-for-Self to establish a link of being with the object-for-others (i.e. the noematic entity) indicated by the individual’s name, thereby becoming that object (e.g. in Peter a tropism causes being-for-Self to become the entity that others perceive as Peter). Sartre a noted that in its barest manifestation this link of being is a link of hell, to which he referred by the term “shame;” however, from the first time this link of hell manifests in a human lifetime the individual has not yet assimilated the concept of “shame,” I prefer not to use the term to refer to the initial manifestation of the link in question. Since also after successful socialization, once we have learned “how to behave,” at any moment others may direct at us a scorning or reproving glance and thereby plunge us in hell, Sartre’s leitmotiv in Huis clos b is really to the point: “l’enfer, c’est les autres” (“hell is the others”).

In Being and Nothingness Sartre illustrated the link in question with the example of a man who, as he is unselfconsciously looking through a keyhole, suddenly realizes he is being watched. He instantly “feels touched in the heart by the Other’s look,” whereupon a link of being is established, via the sensation experienced in the heart, between being-for-Self (i.e. the being of the mental subject) and the shameful entity the Other is perceiving as object. This is at the root of that which Sartre called being-for-others—the bare, most basic experience of which may be said to be the experience of hell that Sartre called “shame.”

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a Sartre (1980), Part Three (pp. 275-503).
b Sartre (1947).
As I have noted in other works, infants become being-for-Others through a link of hell for the first time when the original other (who is most often the biological mother) perceives an unwanted course of motility (i.e. spontaneous motion) in the infant and, in order to inhibit this motility, plunges the infant in hell: the infant’s consciousness is forced to become the shameful object the other perceives as him or her, so that her or his free flow of motility may be inhibited as she or he is fixed by being forced to become an object. This happens again and again with ever-greater clarity and distinction, as a result of which the infant comes to experience fear that the original other may plunge him or her in hell again. Finally, the infant will manifest subjectivity properly speaking upon learning to consciously choose the course of motility and coming to experience it as the intentional activity of the mental subject, and so will have the possibility of experiencing anguish in Sartre’s sense of the term (i.e. fear of producing unwanted results through his or her conscious decisions and intentional actions): having experientially learned that the original other punishes some courses of behavior, the infant will be afraid to exhibit those likely to elicit punishment—yet will be capable of dousing or averting anguish by inhibiting these courses of behavior (this will be so unless mother’s reactions depend on her own moods to a greater extent than on the quality of the infant’s actions—which according to Winnicott may be at the root of autism). It is at this point that there is a being-for-Self properly speaking whose being may be said to be anguish—which means that in a sense anguish may be said to result from, and being-for-Self may be said to become fully developed as an outcome of, the experience of hell that Sartre called “shame” (which in its turn implies that the first times this experience manifests what becomes being-for-others is a proto-being-for-Self).

The activity of infants is initially motility in the strict sense of the term—i.e., spontaneous, uninhibited, free activity. Then the original other and others of those Harry Stack Sullivan called significant others repeatedly compel the infant to become being-for-others by means of reproving messages that may include looks, volume and intonation of the voice, facial expressions, gesturing—and in some cases milder or stronger physical violence such as shaking and/or beating. By these means consciousness is forced to stick to and become the entity that the Other perceives as the infant and so intensely makes into an object of reproof—giving rise to a link of being between consciousness and the entity in question, which is established and sustained by the vibratory activity in the center of the body at the level of the heart. At this point, in order to get the observer / judge to release them from hell, and to free them from the forceful inhibition of their spontaneity so that they may fully recover their freedom to move (at least until another inadmissible course of motility elicits a further inhibition of subjectivity), infants have no choice but to abandon the course of motility that the original other had inhibited. Whenever someone inhibits the motility of infants, the individual in question perceives the infants’ activity as resulting from their own intentions and choices—and, as noted above, it is after repeated experience of this inhibition that the motility of infants fully becomes subjectivity properly speaking, in the sense of being experienced by the infants themselves as being absolutely the action of the mental subject (qua entity-that-is). Furthermore, before the motility of infants has been repeatedly inhibited, on the occasions when others show them love, make them laugh,
admire them, approve of them and so on, they have mainly an experience of free play that may correspond to what Germans call *mitmachen*; it is only after their motility has been repeatedly inhibited, that they can have a perfectly clear and distinct experience of being-for-others and thus become objects of love, approval or admiration, thereby experiencing the corresponding emotions, and having full awareness that they are the object that is being loved, approved or admired. To conclude, it must be noted that if, following Alan Watts, we understand the verb *to behave* in the etymologic sense of “be having” oneself, then it is only after the mental subject has become the object indicated by an individual’s name in the experience of being-for-others that he or she may “behave:” in fact, only objects can “be had” by a subject.

When the infant shows courses of motility that the original other regards as socially desirable, if the original other is well-adapted, well-meaning and so on, she or he will grant the infant an approving or admiring look that will let him or her know that these courses of motility are acceptable or admirable, and that by the same token will allow the infant to accept her or his own sensations—and, should the message is that the course of motility be admirable, experience pride. The aim of this all is that, in want of comfort and pleasure, the infant may seek to exhibit the courses of behavior that elicit approval in the original other, and avoid those that would elicit the inhibition of motility and the concomitant experience of hell. However, whether or not the process of socialization will lead the infant to embody the kind of person the original other approves of or admires, will depend on a combination of causes and circumstances. On the one hand, it will depend on the infant’s karmic propensities as manifest, because of contributory conditions, in his or her genetic make-up. On the other hand, it will depend on a series of interrelated contributory conditions responding to the infant’s karma, such as: (a) whether the original other allows the infant to embody the person she or he approves, or does not allow her or him to embody the person in question and hence forces him or her to seek approval in another of the environments in which she or he moves by embodying the type of person that would be admired or accepted in that environment; (b) which sibling does the original other see the infant as taking after and hence whom does she or he “map onto” the infant; (c) whether the original other responds to the infant’s behavior or is compelled to respond to her or his own moods, possibly under the driving power of guilt; etc.—all of which can contribute to activate one or another of the infant’s principal sets of karmic propensities as manifest in his or her genetic make-up, so that he or she may become one way or another.

As I have noted in other works, once the link of being between being-for-Self and the entity indicated by our name has been established, an approving look from the original other, from significant others, from people whose opinions are important to us, and to a lesser degree from other others, induces a pleasant mental sensation, for it makes our consciousness take as object, from the standpoint of the Other, the entity referred to by our name and accept it; since consciousness’ acceptance of its object entails the acceptance of the continuum of sense data in which we single out our successive objects, including the “mental sensation” in the centre of the body at the level of the heart, this acceptance makes the sensation in question become pleasant. An indifferent, neutral look induces a neutral mental sensation, for should it cause our consciousness to take as object from the standpoint of the Other the entity referred to by our name, by the same token it would cause us to remain indifferent to it; since indifference to our object entails indifference to the

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continuum of sense data in which we single out our successive objects, including the mental sensation linked to perception, our attitude makes the latter become neutral. Finally, a reproving look induces an unpleasant sensation, for it makes our consciousness take as object from the standpoint of the Other the entity referred to by our name, rejecting that object and by implication our mental sensations, and thus causing these sensations to become unpleasant.

In David Cooper’s view, that the original other and other significant others have been internalized, means that the images expressing their most characteristic moods have installed themselves in our psyches and come to play a decisive role in determining our experience and behavior, so that everything happens as though the others in question, on the basis of their own superegos, bestowed on us looks of approval, indifference or censure from inside our own psyche. In this way, the superegos of these others are assimilated into our own superegos, for our consciousness comes to observe, judge and organize behavior and experience from the standpoint of their superegos. As we have seen, it is as a result of having being repeatedly plunged into hell by the reproving look bestowed by the Other as an external individual that, if everything goes well, children begin to be ever watchful of their behavior, observing it from the standpoint of the original other, who in the earliest stages of life is watching a great deal of the time and is often the only repressive authority in the infant’s environment; with the passing of time, from the standpoint of the synthesis of standpoints of others that the individual builds up as he or she moves between different environments (syntheses that will depend mainly on the standpoint of the original other, for all posterior criteria will be arranged in relation to this one—even in the case of adults who have assimilated a variety of criteria from other others, near or distant, or from books, the mass media and so on, and even when the criteria in question contradict those of the original other). At any rate, it is after this has occurred that, if socialization is optimal, in order to avoid being thrown in hell we come to choose the courses of behavior that will grant us our consciousness’ approving or admiring look—in terms of R. D. Laing’s spiral of pretenses, we pretend to be a certain way and, in the same operation, pretend that we are not pretending (and, just as in the case of Sartre’s bad faith, pretend not to be pretending not to be pretending, and so on ad infinitum). Those who are successful at this kind of self-deceit and manage to produce a consistent and well-adapted ego-function are those who, among other factors, in their relation with the original other were subject to the type of double-bind (the communicational pattern identified by Gregory Bateson et al. in their studies on the genesis of “schizophrenia”) I christened “normalizing double-bind.” (Bateson distinguished between: [1] Pathogenic double-bind—which in his view was directly related to mental and behavioral pathologies and in particular to what is called “schizophrenia”—in which the original other or other significant others in a position of power give children mutually contradictory orders [often one of them being expressed verbally and the other one paraverbally], while implicitly forbidding any commentary as to the fact that two mutually contradictory orders are being given—and since the only way to comply with one of the orders is by disobeying the other one, punishing the victim for so doing no matter what his or her reaction is and thereby making him or her absorb the guilt

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a Cooper (1971).
b Laing (1961).

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and conflict the person giving the orders felt compelled to get rid of. Upon being subject to this extreme conflict and guilt, especially if the infant has certain genetic propensities, he or she may be literally driven crazy.\textsuperscript{97} [2]) Therapeutic double-bind, which is the one applied by a Master in a Wisdom-tradition in order to transform a disciple’s contradiction into conflict and, activating the development of a process of empiric \textit{reductio ad absurdum} of delusion of the type Bateson deemed to be at the root of alcoholism and some psychoses,\textsuperscript{a} create the conditions for this process to result in an experience of Awakening.\textsuperscript{98} In an earlier work,\textsuperscript{b} I posited [3] the new type of double-bind I christened “normalizing double-bind,” which Bateson et al. did not view as a double-bind: the one in which the person in the position of power, because of a smoother-functioning bad faith, is not tormented by guilt and conflict, and hence can issue orders that compel children to smoothly assimilate a contradiction, by causing them to ignore, by means of Sartrean bad faith, the fact that a contradiction is being assimilated, and thus leading them to experience no conflict in this regard: this is the type of double-bind that can successfully make children adapt to a self-deceived, hypocritical, self-contradictory society and thus become “normal.”\textsuperscript{99}

Henceforth consciousness will recurrently adopt the standpoint of what Freud called \textit{superego}—the bearer of the ego ideal, that with regard to which the ego measures itself, that to which it aspires and whose demands for ever-increasing perfecting it struggles to satisfy. David Cooper\textsuperscript{c} depicted the superego as a hierarchical arrangement of internalized others and, as noted above, insisted that, rather than an abstraction, it was a phenomenal reality consisting of the internalized looks, facial expressions, intonations of the voice, gesturing and so on with which significant others reacted to the individual’s courses of behavior.\textsuperscript{d} This is a most important point, for so long as its phenomenal components and the process of its genesis are overlooked, we may be prone to take the superego to be a \textit{conscience} in the Christian sense of the term (i.e. an inborn, abstract, God-installed, absolute moral principle establishing what is right and what is wrong), and so long as we do so have no chances whatsoever of freeing ourselves from its power: so long as we take the prevailing conventions (\textit{nomos}) of our society to be the absolute imperatives of a metaphysical reality, believing them to be “by nature” (\textit{physis}) or, even worse, “by divine power,” we will continue to be under their power—that is, they will continue to determine our behavior and the quality of our experience, and we will continue to \textit{be having ourselves} and thus to be trapped in dualist delusion. Hence Cooper’s assertion that the superego is a hierarchical arrangement of internalized others, and his insistence in decomposing the superego into its phenomenal components, are most helpful in the process of depriving the superego of its power over the individual’s experience and behavior, or, which is the same, in uprooting the superego—which is a key aspect of the process of Awakening. However, it would be more precise to define the superego as a “hierarchical arrangement of the superegos of others:” since the reactions of internalized others are determined by their own superegos, Freud was right in pointing out that the superego, rather than being constituted directly by the assimilation of the views and criteria of the original others, is constituted by the assimilation of their superegos (it is the superego of the internalized significant others that the original other embodies when inhibiting an infant’s subjectivity—which is the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{a} Bateson (1972); cf. in particular the essay, “The Cybernetics of Alcoholism.”
\textsuperscript{b} Capriles (1986).
\textsuperscript{c} Cooper (1971).
\end{flushright}
reason why Freud made it clear that the transmission of a society’s values and traditions is perpetuated from generation to generation through the superego, which is a key factor in upbringing and education.\textsuperscript{100}

Just as our superego is constituted by the superego of the internalized others, our ego (understood mainly in the sense of sense of self associated with a self-image, which is the one in which the term is used in the following quotations) is made up of the egos (in the same sense) of the internalized others. Consider the following excerpt from David-Neel’s \textit{The Secret Oral Teachings in Tibetan Buddhist Sects}:\textsuperscript{a}

The Secret Teachings lead the pupil farther. They teach him to look, with the same serene indifference, at the incessant working of his mind and the physical activity displayed by his body. He ought to succeed in understanding, in noting that nothing of all that is \textit{from him}, is \textit{him}. He physically and mentally, is the multitude of others.

This ‘multitude of others’ includes the material elements—the ground one might say—which he owes to his heredity, to his atavism, then those which he has ingested, which he has inhaled from before his birth, by the help of which his body was formed, and which, assimilated by him, have become with the complex forces inherent in them, constituent parts of his being.

On the mental plane, this ‘multitude of others’ includes many beings who are his contemporaries: people he consorts with, with whom he chats, whose actions he watches. Thus a continual inhibition is at work while the individual absorbs a part of the various energies given off by those with whom he is in contact, and these incongruous energies, installing themselves in that which he considers his ‘I’ form there a swarming throng.

…According to the Secret Teachings, the ‘crowd of others’ is made up of quite different things than ‘memories’. It is formed by living beings whose activity follows its course and will continue it indefinitely while taking various shapes for there is no death.

It is not the ‘memory’ of Plato or of Jesus which exists in Mr. Peter or Mr. Smith. There are Plato and Jesus themselves, ever-living and active thanks to the energies which they have formerly set in motion. And the men who bore these names were themselves only the manifestation of multiple energies. In Plato teaching in Greece, in Jesus moving around in Galilee, just as in Mr. Peter or Mr. Smith, were a crowd of living presences whose ancestry is lost in the unfathomable depths of eternity.

Does that mean that the various personalities who, together, form an \textit{ego} remain inert or, in other words, does it mean that this \textit{ego} is in no way active? —In no way, is the answer in the Secret Teachings. The individual Peter or Smith is a center of energies which, at each of his gestures, each of his words, each of his thoughts, shoots out into the world and there produces effects…

According to previous \textit{karma}, to the genetic propensities (determined by ancestry as a contributory condition) that become dominating manifestations of \textit{karma} in this lifetime, to those other manifestations of \textit{karma} (also determined by contributory conditions) which are the projections and “attributions with force in injunctions” (see Laing’s explanation of this concept below in this chapter) that in response to the genetic propensities in question are received throughout an individual’s life, and so on, the individual in question identifies with some of those others that psychologically constitute her or him\textsuperscript{101}—assimilating their personalities, their energy orientations (Skt. \textit{bijā}; Tib. \textit{sa bon})\textsuperscript{b} and their values—and comes

\textsuperscript{a} David-Neel (1967).
\textsuperscript{b} \textit{sa bon}.
to regard other of those others as not being part of her or his being. Alexandra David-Neel tells us that:²

The ego is a collage of others.

To which we may add the words “hierarchically organized,” for in the collage in question the others are hierarchically organized. In general terms, this view is not exclusive to Tibetan Buddhism; Lebanese Christian, Sufi-influenced poet Gibran Khalil Gibran expressed an analogous view of the constitution of ordinary human beings:³

The phantoms of their fathers still live in their bodies. They are like those deserted caves in the mountains that echo voices the meanings of which are not understood.¹⁰²

The above explains why many Tibetan practices have a section called Requesting the Land, in which the beings who possess and rule the place where one is doing practice are asked to cede it, not for it to be possessed and enjoyed by the individual practitioner, but for setting up the mandala—which, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, is the impersonal dynamic of the process of Awakening. There being no cleavage between mind and world, inside and inside, dang⁶ and tsel⁷ energies, one is asking for the land, which is as well the territory of one’s own psyche, to the sentient beings possessing it and ruling over it, which at the level of dang energy are different types of thought: demons are evil thoughts; nagas are sticky, swampy lustful thoughts; gods are proud and arrogant thoughts; etc.¹⁰³ This is why in the Dzogchen teachings, and in Ch’an or Zen Buddhism as well, it is asserted that the beings of samsara are our own delusorily valued thoughts. At any rate, it is to the extent to which we repeatedly become the same combinations of sets of thoughts in a consistent way, that we can be viewed as having a continuous personality. Therefore, in order to free the lands of our own minds from the power of the beings possessing them and ruling over them, first a process of preaching and conversion of the beings in our own mind must to a considerable extent re-orient the disparate energies that constitute us, giving rise to a relatively consistent cluster of energies (which, as will be shown in chapter VII, is what David Cooper christened noia)⁸—so that then those beings may be led to deliverance through the spontaneous liberation of thoughts in the practice of Dzogchen, in a process that makes our energies become ever more consistent in their orientation, until all beings obtain deliverance and therefore the energies in question become the spontaneously-arisen form of the nirmanakaya. We read in the Sutra of Hui-Neng:⁹

Learned Audience, all of us have now declared that we vow to deliver an infinite number of sentient beings; but what does that mean? It does not mean that I, Hui Neng, am going to deliver them. And who are these sentient beings within our mind? They are the delusive mind, the deceitful mind, the evil mind, and such like minds—all these are sentient beings. Each of them has to deliver himself by means of his own Essence of Mind. Then the deliverance is genuine.

² David-Neel (1967).
⁴ gdangs.
⁵ rtsal.
It is important to note, however, that when we become those thoughts and they drive us to act, it is us as individuals who create karma, and it is us as individuals who ripen the fruits of the karma we have created. Therefore, in a very important sense it is the one who has set foot on the Path who must be released through his or her “Essence of mind,” going beyond both the causes and the effects of karma.

At any rate, just as the anguish that is the bare experience of being-for-Self is more authentic than whichever states are achieved by eluding it through bad faith, the experience of hell (in the sense of what Sartre called shame) that is the bare experience of being-for-others (i.e. of psychological states involving a link of being between the mental subject and the object that others perceive as oneself) is more authentic than its elusion by embodying a positive self-image. In fact, the experiences of hell that Sartre called shame are an effect of the reactions of others to our motility in early infancy, which is spontaneous, natural and authentic, whereas the less unpleasant states that we reach as we flee those unpleasant experiences are produced through self-control, studied behavior, pretence and self-deceit—and, just as the experiences whereby we elude anguish, being contrivedly produced, they are temporary, so that again and again we will fall again into the unpleasant experiences we were eluding. And yet, as made clear in the preceding section of this chapter, the anguish that Sartre viewed as the being of being-for-Self and the hell we may posit as the being of being-for-others are far from being the unveiling or our true condition, for these modes of being are instances of unawareness and delusion concealing the true condition of ourselves and the universe, which is the Self-qua-Base, and Truth lies solely in the unconcealment of the condition in question (either temporarily as the Self-qua-Path or definitively as the Self-qua-Fruit), which entails the dissolution of being-for-Self and therefore of the anguish that constitutes its bare experience, and of being-for-others and therefore of the hell that constitutes its bare experience—involving undivided panoramic awareness and a playful flow of free, uninhibited spontaneity. In fact, since the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit does not involve a dualistic, thetic, positional consciousness, in these conditions there is no reflexive consciousness to observe and judge behavior and experience, and therefore there can be no link-of-being between, on the one hand, a being-for-Self (which, as just noted, does not manifest in this condition) and, on the other hand, the conventional object (i.e. the noematic entity) indicated by the individual’s name, or that imaginary object which is the individual’s self-image. This further explains why Awakening involves absolute freedom from the superego—and not only from the superego, but from all topoi in Freud’s two successive topics.

We have seen that, despite the fact that infants and fully Awake individuals are, respectively, the alpha and the omega of human ontogenesis, and therefore their respective conditions represent two extremes of human possibilities, the former’s condition resembles the latter to a far greater extent than that of deluded adults insofar as it involves a far higher energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness than that of the latter and does not involve the sharp divisions produced by figure-ground minds. Now that the unauthentic condition has been shown to involve constantly watching ourselves, checking our drives and controlling our behavior, the point may be finally made that infants in the first days, weeks and months of life, when they have not yet been compelled to become being-for-others and plunged in hell and hence have not been conditioned to be constantly watching themselves, checking their drives and controlling their behavior, also coincide with Awake individuals in that their motility is a playful flow of free, uninhibited spontaneity, neither
checked nor regulated by a superego-driven reflexive consciousness. This is why Chuang-tzu illustrated mental health with the metaphor of the infant who...106

...sees all things all day long without blinking; this is possible because his eyes are not
focused on any specific object.107 He goes without knowing that he goes and stops without
knowing what he is doing.108 He has no idea of separation with regard to his environment and
moves along with it. These are the principles of mental health.

Likewise, the late Dudjom Rinpoche taught the following in a book teaching the
practice of Tekchö:b,c

Whatever perceptions arise, you should be like a little child going into a beautifully
decorated temple; he looks, but grasping does not enter into his perception at all. You leave
everything fresh, natural, vivid and unspoiled. When you leave each thing in its own state,
then its shape doesn’t change, its color doesn’t fade and its glow does not disappear.
Whatever appears is unstained by any grasping, so then all that you perceive arises as the
naked wisdom of Rigpa, which is the indivisibility of luminosity and emptiness.

The above analogies do not imply what Ken Wilber called the “pre/trans fallacy,”109
for Taoist Masters and Dzogchen Masters, like the Masters of all other genuine wisdom
traditions, are fully aware of the fact that infants are born with avidya or marigpa (they are
born with it in the first of the senses of these terms in the Dzogchen classification adopted
here, and with the propensity to develop it in the rest of the senses of the terms), whereas
Awake individuals are totally free from avidya or marigpa in all senses of the terms. In the
same way, infants are born with the disposition to develop a superego-driven reflexive
consciousness, whereas Awake individuals, after developing such a consciousness, through
the repeated reGnition of the Self-quaqu-Bese in which this consciousness and whichever
instance of delusion is manifest liberate themselves spontaneously, have completely
neutralized or burned out completely the disposition for this consciousness and all other
elements of basic human delusion to manifest. In fact, the vibratory activity at the root of
delusory valuation-absolutization manifests in the infant from a very early period, and
though initially it may not yet give rise to a clear and distinct phenomenon of being and a
clearly dualistic, thetic, positional, reflexive consciousness, it serves as the basis for the
progressive development of the phenomenon and consciousness in question—and then, on
the basis of the drive to avoid unpleasant experiences and obtain comfort, for the
progressive development of a false identity by means of bad faith. Contrariwise, as noted in
the discussion of Freud’s concept of the “oceanic feeling,” those who have become
established in the Self-qua-Fruit have rid themselves totally and definitively of the
phenomenon of being and of the delusory valuation-absolutization at its root, and hence,
unlike infants, they can never again become the segment of the continuum appearing as
object indicated by their name: since they cannot become being-for-others, they cannot be
conditioned anew.

Moreover, as it was also noted in the discussion of the oceanic feeling, infants are
incapable of effectively managing reality and dealing with life situations, whereas Awake

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b khregs chod.
c Dudjom Rinpoche (1979).
Ones are far more skillful in dealing with reality than deluded adults. In fact, they maintain the results of the learning achieved during their whole lifetime, but are not prone to the self-hampering expressed by the Anglo-Saxon poem:

The centipede was happy, quite,
until the toad for fun
asked “Pray, which leg goes after which?”
which brought his mind to such a pitch
he fell demented in a ditch
forgetting how to run.

While we are learning a given activity, we have to fully concentrate our conscious attention on it in order to do it as prescribed by the teacher or manual—yet once we have completed our learning and have firmly established the necessary habits, we can carry out the activity without concentrating our attention on it, and thus may be able to steer clear of impeding self-consciousness a great deal of the time. However, since the structure and function at the root of impeding self-consciousness has not been uprooted, contributory conditions or karmic causes may unexpectedly activate it, soiling the activity that we are carrying out. This is clear in the case of an artist or artisan: a beginner will try to direct at will his or her activity, which due to the lack of proper learning cannot be masterful as yet. A master artist or artisan has achieved the proper learning and can perform the pertinent activities more unselfconsciously; therefore, he or she will perform the activities precisely and correctly—and yet she or he will still have the possibility of blundering insofar as the dualistic structure and function of experience and action has not been eradicated, and thus at some point the drive to control or rectify his or her activities as they are carried out may manifest, interfering with the spontaneous creative flow of the Self-quaqueBase. This drive is likely to manifest proportionally to the extent to which the artist or artisan is regarded as responsible for his or her work and appraised according to the latter’s degree of excellence: the fear—or, in Sartre’s terminology, anguish—to err may elicit faltering hesitations and thus make the artist more prone to self-obstruction. These faltering hesitations tend to be magnified by exposure to the Other’s objectifying gaze, which drives the artist to become Being-for-Others and thus interfere with the spontaneity of the Self. As shown by the following anecdote, this is so even in the case of Zen masters with a certain degree of spiritual realization who, nonetheless, have not yet become established in the Self-quaqueFruit, and thus are liable to oscillate between the Self-quaquePath and samsaric delusion:

Master Kosen drew (in Chinese characters) the words “The First Principle,” which are carved on the gate of the Oaku Temple in Kyoto. He drew them with his brush on a sheet of paper and then they were carved on wood.

A student of the master had mixed the ink for him and had remained standing next to him, watching the master’s calligraphy. This student said “Not so good!” Kosen tried again. The student said “this is worse than the former!” and Kosen tried again.

After attempt number sixty-four, the ink was running out and the student went out to mix more. Left alone, undistracted by the watch of any critical eye, Kosen did one more quick drawing with the remaining ink. When the student returned, he took a good look at this last effort.

“A masterpiece!” he said.
The artist or artisan who has reached the Self-qua-Fruit, or, which is the same, who has become unwaveringly established in the state of Awakening, ridding him or herself of delusion and therefore of the fracture into a controlling aspect and a controlled aspect of the psyche, becomes an open channel for the unobstructed flow of the spontaneity of the Self-qua-Base. Only an artist or artisan of this kind is capable of steering clear of impeding self-consciousness under all circumstances, so that his or her capacity to produce consummate works of art or handicrafts is never obstructed. The Chuang-tzu tells us:

Ch’ui the artisan was able to draw circles by hand better than with the compass. His fingers seemed to accommodate so easily to the thing on which he was working that he didn’t need to focus his attention. His mental faculties thus remained one (i.e. integrated) and thus suffered no impediment.

Had the artisan needed to focus his attention on the object he was working upon, and on the hands with which he was working on it, and had he needed to resort to attention to control his activity, he would have suffered impediment. The artist who has achieved the Self-qua-Fruit, becoming an unimpeded channel for the flow of the selfless spontaneity of the Base, will not be obstructed by self-consciousness even while being observed by the most fastidious, critical, respected and fearsome of witnesses, and will be able to produce masterpieces right before the latter’s eyes. Hence not only happiness, but also consummate behavior in practical matters and in everyday life, is obstructed by the present degree of development of being-for-Self and its disposition to become being-for-others.

The above are not the only planes in which the stark contrast between the condition of children and that of fully Awaken individuals is evident. Even more important seems the fact that in our time children are tremendously egocentric and unruly, whereas Awakening involves the eradication of these vices. According to the well-founded, “retro-romantic,” degenerative conception of human spiritual and social evolution shared by Bön, Vajrayana Buddhism (including Dzogchen), Taoism, Shaivism, Sufism, Zurvanism and in general most of the Wisdom-traditions having their hub in Mount Kailash, and expounded in vol. III of this book, the current egocentricity and unruliness of children is an outcome of the spiritual and social degeneration of our species resulting from the gradual development of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa, which as we have seen causes us to mistakenly experience ourselves as substantial, inherently separate egos / selves, and which is at the root of egotism / selfishness and in general of all evils. In fact, it is not only because of the gradual development of arbitrary social conventions (nomos) along the latest stages of the degenerative evolution of our species that children must be taught how to behave in society and their impulses must be restrained, but also because of the need to curb the pernicious effects of the selfishness, the egocentricity and the wayward propensities that result from this evolution. At the time degenerate society is still to some extent balanced, its relatively balanced members inhibit the free flow of spontaneity in infants gently and in such a way as not to cause traumas and avoid the ill-effects that will be reviewed below, and do so in the context of an upbringing based on genuine loving-care. When the imbalance of society and its members becomes too pronounced, most of us come to exert our inhibitory activity in pathogenic ways—and yet the most balanced members of society continue to exert it gently and in a relatively wholesome way (there is a

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a Giles (trans. 1980); Watts (1956).
danger in bluntly exposing those who mistreat infants without providing them with the means for effectively uprooting the causes of their perverse behavior, for this would further the sensation of guilt that—as will be shown in the discussion of the shadow below—is one of the main causes in question, and hence would exacerbate what we would be trying to curb).

According to the above-mentioned degenerative conception of human spiritual and social evolution, the wickedness and in general the unruly urges or drives that characterize our species in our time arose and increased in strength along the degenerative time cycle. Their arising and development may be explained as being mainly an outcome of: (a) the gradual intensification of our illusion of being inherently separate and autonomous selves resulting from the gradual intensification of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, and the ever-increasing selfishness resulting from this intensification (which go along with an upsurge of the limited, relatively hermetic character of our focus of conscious attention, without which we could neither take ourselves for inherently separate entities, nor ignore the pain we inflict on others in order to obtain what we wrongly believe to be our own benefit); (b) the structuring of the human psyche and society in terms of vertical, instrumental, oppressive and exploitative relationships; (c) the association of the erotic impulse with aggression in war, carnage and post-war rape, and the ensuing sadist drives; (d) the development of the superego-ego-id structure (which will be discussed in greater detail below in this section); (e) the progressive development of what Jung called the shadow interdependently with the structure indicated as (d), which will also be discussed in detail below; (f) the effect of the type of religion Riane Eisler\textsuperscript{a} associated with the sword, characteristically repressive and guilt-begetting (which as such exacerbates the shadow and its dynamic, here indicated as [e]), which in Christianity has as the object of worship a bloody figure that nuns make into their spiritual lover (which might have the potentiality of exacerbating the perversion indicated as [d]); etc.

In fact, the original cause of evil is (a) the selfishness that develops in the process of degenerative spiritual and social evolution as a result of the intensification of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and the concomitant upsurge of the limited, relatively hermetic character of our focus of conscious attention, for this selfishness implies the concern for ourselves and indifference and carelessness towards others\textsuperscript{115} that makes us disposed to harm the latter in all possible ways in order to obtain whatever we wrongly believe will result in our personal benefit. According to the view of evolution under consideration, when delusion was budding, selfishness had little power, and harmony prevailed in all fields—between human beings and the rest of the ecosphere, between different societies, within each society, and within the individual. As delusion developed, gradually intensifying the illusion that we are inherently separate, autonomous selves, we became increasingly selfish; this resulted in the arising of private property and the replacement of the hitherto prevailing pancommunicative, panhorizontal relationships by instrumental, vertical relationships, which manifested as political, social and economic divisions; and later on it gave rise to sexism, violence and aggression aimed at subjugating, oppressing and exploiting other human beings and the rest of the ecosystem. In its turn, this gave rise to the guilt that is the original source of what Jung called the shadow—begotten by the awareness that we occasion harm and suffering to other sentient beings, that we appropriate riches that all have the natural right to enjoy, and in general that our lives are

\textsuperscript{a} Eisler (1987).
based on *conventions* (*nomos*) that contradict what in Greece the Sophists, the Cynics and the Stoics deemed to be *by nature* (*physis*). The arising of private property and of social, economic, political and other divisions amounted to the establishment of privileges to be protected and hence of rules that were expected to prevent human societies from becoming a war of all against all\(^\text{116}\)—which implied the need to repress human impulses, drives and spontaneous courses of behavior. Furthermore, since, as shown in the next chapter and as explained in greater detail in vol. III of this book, given the functional characteristics of our cerebral hemispheres and the corresponding mental processes (those that Freud posited in the *Project* of 1895\(^\text{a}\)) once a type of relationship develops it cannot be confined to a given context and thus it unavoidably spreads to all contexts, the already considered replacement of communicative, horizontal, empathic, respectful relationships by instrumental, vertical and oppressive ones occurred simultaneously in the “external” physical reality (*within* each society, *between* the different societies and between human beings and the rest of the ecosphere) and in the “internal” psychological reality: it was when the relationship between consciousness and the-body-and-its-impulses took on this character, that sexual repression was instituted (which, by the way, was a necessary condition for the inheritance of property and the maintenance of caste systems).\(^\text{117}\) All of this gave rise to the necessity of inhibiting specific courses of motility through the perception of infants as shameful monsters that, as shown below, installs the shadow in them—and, as a result of the internalization of the others that exert this inhibition, to self-restraint as well. Thus arose that late product of the degenerative spiritual and social evolution of humankind that, as noted above, is probably the most insidious and pernicious source of evil.

Jung noted that if, on the analogy of day and night, human beings came to divide the cosmos into a bright day-world and a dark night-world peopled with monsters, the prototype of this division must have lay in the human reality itself, which is polarized into a conscious, and an invisible and unknowable unconscious.\(^\text{b}\) Jung called *persona* (Latin for *theater mask*)\(^\text{118}\) the identity we must assume in social interaction and which while we do so—in terms of this book, provided we are under delusion—we cling to as our true self or nature, and asserted every *persona* to project a shadow to which the dark night-world is associated, and which we are compelled to deny in ourselves and see as the essence of people other than ourselves—which, as we have seen, is one of the main sources of evil in the world, among other things because we then feel compelled to punish and/or destroy the shadow by punishing and/or destroying the individuals on whom we project it.\(^\text{119}\) (It must be noted that, with the exception of the shadow itself, each and every one of the archetypes Jung posited had a shadow side, embodying the particular vices and defects that may distort the original nature of the archetype in question—which is one of the reasons why it has been doubted or denied that the shadow may be regarded as an archetype.)

Thus Jung seems to have posited as a metaphysical reality—certainly as an *inmate* reality—the duality between the persona and the shadow, the world of light and the world of darkness. In fact, probably under the influence of Darwinism, he wrongly viewed the shadow as a biological remnant of the “violent instincts of our nonhuman ancestors;” as a single, universal archetype that was common to all of us at all times insofar as he saw it as being preexistent in what he called the *collective unconscious* of our species; and as

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\(^a\) Freud (1974).

\(^b\) Jung (1981).
occurring repetitively in our psyches *ad aeternum*, determining the ways in which we perceive and behave.\(^{120}\) Although this signifies that, in Jung’s view, the shadow as a constitutive element of the human psyche has no genesis, he nonetheless posited both a *phylogenesis* and an *ontogenesis* of the archetype in question: the former, insofar as the Swiss analyst believed racial differentiation to entail a differentiation of archetypes\(^{121}\) and in particular of the shadow, which in his view made the latter mutate into a series or racial shadows;\(^{122}\) the latter, insofar as he also posited a shadow on the level of what he called the “personal unconscious,” which resulted from disavowing experiences and impulses in the course of an individual’s personal history.

However, the Swiss analyst’s view of the phylogenesis of the shadow is altogether wrong, for the phenomenon in question is not, as he believed, the remnant of the animal instincts of our non-human ancestors lying *ab origine* in a “collective unconscious” of our species, nor is it bound to remain in us *ad aeternum*. On the contrary, as stated in a note to vol. I of this book and as will be shown in greater detail in vol. III, the “evidence” paleopathology has gathered in the last two or three decades has been taken to demonstrate aggression and violence between human beings to be of rather recent origin—which in its turn implies that the shadow is a relatively recent acquisition that has been in us for an extremely short fraction of our life as a species. Martine Lochouarn\(^a\) showed how, having dissected a very large quantity of European and North-African human fossils dating from the Paleolithic and the Neolithic, paleopathologists established that in those periods human beings did not die from traumatisms caused by other human beings, and that, contrariwise, whenever possible wounds and traumatisms caused by the attack of animals or by accidents were cured with the help of other individuals. Subsequently, the new science in question analyzed a huge number of human fossils all around the world, and according to reports in the books by van der Dennen,\(^b\) James DeMeo\(^c\) and Steve Taylor,\(^d\) with the exception of some cases beginning in 12,000 BCE in isolated spots in the Nile valley, no signs have been observed of violence and aggression between human beings before 4,000 BCE—which is the approximate time when, together with the rest of wicked human characteristics enumerated above, violence and aggression became ubiquitous among the peoples DeMeo referred to as Saharasians, which progressively came to conquer virtually the whole world, contaminating with their characteristics the peoples they dominated.\(^e\) (However, I reject DeMeo’s ecological-geographical determinism, and see the development of the wayward, wicked characteristics under discussion as part of the above discussed intensification of the basic human delusion, determined by what in vol. III of this book I call the *lila telos* of evolution as manifest in the structure and function of the human brain, for the interaction of both hemispheres gradually increases wayward, pain-begetting patterns. And yet because of contributory circumstances, which *may include* the ones adduced by DeMeo, wayward relationships develop first among some particular peoples,\(^{123}\) which precisely because of this set out to conquer other peoples, which then internalize and reproduce the wayward relationships in question.) Furthermore, Jung was wrong in asserting the shadow to occur in us *ad aeternum*, for we *can* and *must* liberate ourselves of the archetype in question—as

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\(^a\) Lochouarn (1993).
\(^b\) van der Dennen (1995).
\(^c\) DeMeo (1998).
\(^d\) Taylor (2005).
\(^e\) Cf. vol. III of this book; Cf. also Capriles (2000b/work in progress 1 and various book chapters); part of the same evidence is also in Capriles (1994a).
individuals, by attaining Awakening; as a species, through the transition to the following stage of our spiritual and social evolution.

The Book of Genesis represents the arising of the shadow with the image of Adam and Eve becoming ashamed of their nakedness after “eating of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil,” for in fact, what we call “shame” is the sensation inherent in feeling that we are the reprehensible object others see as us whenever our behavior fails to conform to their expectations, and that they force us to become by means of punishments rebukes and censorious glances. As noted in vol. III of this book, the Mbuti of Africa symbolize the arising of the shadow by the killing of an antelope by a mythical ancestor, who then ate its meat in order to conceal his act; the need to conceal the act stands for the arising of shame and guilt, which later on will need to be exorcised by projecting it on others and then destroying those others—which may have been originally done in a ritual way in the form of human sacrifices supposedly intended to appease gods for the offenses of human beings, but which despite this rationalization was a further source of shame and guilt which thus furthered the shadow’s development. (For over 5000 years human beings have performed human sacrifices, in areas so distant from each other as Northern Europe, the Caucasus, Siberia, China, Central America and Mexico, the Incan Empire, Northern Africa, etc., and though it is possible that these sacrifices may have channeled the impulses that otherwise would have given rise to war and other social evils, by furthering the shadow these sacrifices ultimately produced the effects that presumably they were intended to prevent.)

What about the ontogenesis of the shadow? Provided that we understand the term “unconscious” as defined below, what Jung called the shadow may be explained in terms of British psychoanalyst Susan Isaacs’ concept of unconscious phantasy, and in civilized societies the phenomenal foundation of what Jung called the shadow may be said to be that which Sartre called being-for-others and which he imprecisely characterized as “shame.” The phantasy in question is first installed in the infant on the occasion of being forced to become the shameful object the original other and/or other significant others perceive as her or him on the occasion of inhibiting courses of action and/or dispensing punishments, and subsequently continues to be developed throughout the individual’s lifetime each and every time others, whether “external” or internalized, express scorn with regard to those of his or her actions they deem reprehensible—which means that the original other, acting on the basis of the superego she or he absorbed through the reactions of others to her or his own behavior, is the original sculptor of the shadow, and that with the passing of time other significant others continue to sculpt it on the basis of the superego they absorbed from others. Since the shadow subsumes the guilt for the evil actions of human beings, it grows and intensifies from generation to generation, incorporating the evil actions carried out by each generation; therefore, when the original other and the other significant others perceive an infant as the phantasy monster which is their own shadow, thereby inducing him or her to become that phantasy monster, they mediate to him or her the shadow as it has grown and intensified up to their own generation, turning the product of the phylogenesis of evil into the phenomenal basis of the ontogenesis of evil. Then, when members of the new generation, to a considerable extent because of the shadow and its dynamic, carry out evil actions, these are assimilated into the phylogenesis of evil—so that evil may be said to intensify itself by means of a positive feedback loop occurring between phylogenesis and ontogenesis (which is related to the positive feedback loop occurring between the processes

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associated with the two brain hemispheres discussed in the following chapter and in vol. III of this book).

All infants are sculpted one way or another by the projections the original other and other significant others cast on them— all of which respond to the infant’s karma and all of which work as contributory conditions determining the maturation of one or another set of the infant’s karmas. However, whereas some projections are intended to make infants embody and act out what is projected on them, others are intended to prevent them from embodying and acting out what is projected on them. In fact, all infants receive the projection of their significant others’ phantasy shadow when they “misbehave,” thus being made to become the phantasy shadow in question; however, whereas in most cases this is done in order to make the infant embody a persona deemed acceptable or admirable that is offered him or her as the alternative to the phantasy shadow, and thus adapt smoothly to society rather than becoming a deviant or a psychotic, in other cases this is done in order to make them embody and act out the phantasy shadow, so that—so to speak—it is turned into their persona, and thereby the original other may elude it by seeing it as being the infant’s innermost nature, being able to identify with a persona he or she learned to view positively and/or conserve a functional ego (in the second instance, the bad intention is conceived in bad faith, and hence the individual will never acknowledge it—either before others of before him or herself).

In the nineteen sixties Ronald D. Laing compared he first of the above two cases, corresponding to the current way to make infants adapt to society, to the modus operandi of a protection racket: as we have seen, whenever the infant’s motility takes a course that the original other and/or allied significant others deem inadmissible, they throw the infant in hell, causing her or him to become the shameful object they perceive as her or him. When the course of motility that was thus inhibited is abandoned, if the others in question are well adapted, they will release the infant—and if at this point the latter’s motility takes courses they came to deem desirable, they may possibly reward her or him with looks or other signs of approval, appreciation or, if the infant’s behavior comes to embody their highest values, outright admiration. Thus when smoothly adapted, well-meaning significant others inhibit an infant’s motility and perceive him or her as a horrid phantasy monster, causing him or her to become this shameful object and thus sculpting the infant as the object in question, the aim is to avert the specific possibilities of socially unacceptable behavior proper to that shameful object by using the hell inherent in being that object as a scarecrow he or she will flee by means of bad faith toward the tranquilizing myth of the positive identity the original other and allied significant others want her or him to embody, so as to be released from hell and obtain a pleasant mental sensation: the original other and allied significant others are the source of the danger against which they offer infants protection.125

However, just as fleeing a ghost confirms our belief in the ghost’s existence, fleeing the phantasy shadow by clinging to a positive persona and related myths of positive self-identity confirms the mistaken belief that the latter is our innate, inherent, innermost being, thereby causing this phantasy of there being a shameful monster at the bottom of our being to somehow condition the whole of our experience and behavior “from inside:” if we feel that at the bottom of our being we are monsters, this feeling is likely to give rise to monstrous impulses that we will have to constantly keep in check. Since this feeling is

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1 Laing (1972).
confirmed by the memories of the wicked actions and the awareness of the evil impulses resulting from the above-described developments in the process of phylogenesis at the root of evil (including the dynamic of the shadow itself), and since in order to emerge from hell and feel good we have to embody and maintain a positive persona (i.e., a positive mask we want others to see as us126), if we manage to embody the ideals of mainstream society to some extent, whenever the memories of evil actions come to our mind or wicked impulses manifest we experience an overpowering urge to project the monstrous phantasy shadow on others and to stigmatize and in many cases destroy these others. As suggested above, this may well be the worst, greatest source of evil in this world.

Whether an infant will successfully embody a persona the original other and allied significant others deem worthy, or will have no way to elude the shameful object he or she became while being punished, will depend on a series of conditions, and in particular on the interaction between two main sets of circumstances responding to the infant’s karmic dispositions: (1) the reactions of the original other and other significant others to the infant, and (2) the infant’s genetic make-up. In fact, (1) the original other and allied significant others may either allow an infant to embody a persona they deem worthy or prevent him or her from so doing, and (2) the infant’s genetic make up may, (a) elicit one or another type of reactions in the original other and other significant others, and (b) make the difference as to whether certain reactions of others will induce a psychosis, turn the infant into a deviant, or not have a significant impact on her or him.127 Concerning (1) the reactions of the original other and other significant others to the infant, whether or not the latter will be able to embody a persona they deem worthy may depend to a significant extent on: whether the character of these reactions depends on predictable criteria or on the original other’s unpredictable moods; whether these others allow the infant to embody a persona they approve of, or are compelled to exorcise their own shadow by seeing it as the infant’s inherent nature, turning the infant into a “bad vibe receptor” (in the more severe cases of this pathogenic double-binding may prevent the infant from developing an effective ego-function and thus from obtaining approval from others in all possible human environments, inducing psychoses; in less severe cases of this what R. D. Laing called attributions with force of injunctions—which often depend on which sibling the original other and other significant others see the infant as taking after, and hence on what the same author called family mapping—induce the infant to seek approval in human environments with values opposite to the original other’s and thus to embody a persona that may be admired or accepted in those environments); etc.

Within the parentheses in the preceding paragraph it was noted that the projection of one or another type of individual on the infant, which is a key element in determining the kind of person an infant will become (for example, whether he or she will become a good or a bad boy or girl) is often achieved by means of what R. D. Laing called attributions with force of injunctions. Consider the following excerpt from a work by the author in question:128

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126 Cooper (1971).
127 Laing (1972).
128 Laing (1972).
129 Retranslated into English by the author of this book from Laing (1972), pp. 100-102. See also Capriles (1977, 1986).
For example, a bad boy is a character in a particular family drama. Such drama is a continuous creation: the child’s parents tell him he is bad because he doesn’t do what they tell him. What they tell him he is, is an injunction, much more powerful than what they tell him to do. Thus, by the attribution, “You are bad,” they tell him in truth not to do what they apparently tell him to do. Probably it will be discovered that the infant is induced to behave as he does by tactile, kinetic, olfactory and / or visual signals, and that this makes part of a “secret” network of communications, different from what verbally is communicated to him.

These signals don’t tell the infant to be bad: they define as bad what he does. In this way, he learns that he is bad and how to be bad in that particular family. Certain children are particularly apt for “learning” in this way. I do not pretend that this the only way in which a child becomes “bad,” but it is one. Not “do what I am telling you to do,” but rather, “you will do what I say that you do.” Not “be what I tell you to be,” but rather, “you are what I tell you that you are.”

The clinical hypnotist knows he is doing what he is doing; the family hypnotist, almost never does. Some parents have spoken to me about this technique as a deliberate stratagem.

More often, the parents are themselves surprised by a child who does x when they tell him to do y while suggesting him that he is x:

—I always try to push him to make more friends, but he is so distant. Isn’t it, darling?
—I tell him all the time to be more prudent, but he is so careless. Isn’t it, darling?
—He is bad! He never does what I tell him. Isn’t it, darling?

Above it was asserted that we cling to a persona and that this persona projects a shadow that we are compelled to deny in ourselves and see as the essence of people other than ourselves; however, in order to function in society it is imperative to have more than one persona, and hence also more than one shadow. This is not limited to those who are successful and respected in mainstream society: a youth who was always viewed as a good child by his or her family holding Christian and traditional American values, who at some point joins a gang of rebellious peers and henceforth shifts between the gang and the family, in order to feel at ease in both groups may develop at least one persona with its corresponding shadow for each group. Since one persona and the other are antithetic, each is a source of shame and guilt—and hence a shadow—in the eyes of the group to which it does not belong, and therefore while interacting with the group in question the youth may feel compelled to project it on other individuals. (Just by the way, insofar as traditional American values contradict Christian values such as voluntary poverty and “offering the other chick,” even though individuals holding both Christian and traditional American values in general see both sets of values as being totally consistent, having to cling to both of them may in particular contexts give rise to contradictory personas with their respective shadows.) Like all non-psychotic human beings, also outlaws need to have more than one persona with its corresponding shadow—as evidenced by the fact that criminals who have been caught by the police often cover their faces before the press, and as evidenced even more patently by the case of Ervin Goffman’s ex-convict who loved good literature, and who before entering the public library was compelled to make sure his criminal friends were not watching. Since these problems have been considered more or less at length other authors, I will not discuss them any further.

To conclude, it seems relevant to note that, at least in the final stages of the Era of Darkness (kaliyuga) or Iron Age, adolescence often involves a dynamic related to the one

described above. In fact, Peter Bloss, Edith Jacobson and Michael Washburn have made it clear that adolescents often rebel against the superego and fight it, and that this causes the separation between the latter and the ego-ideal, which previously had been defined by the superego (Jacques Lacan differentiates between ego-ideal [Ichideal; idéal du moi] and ideal ego [Idealich; moi idéal]); if, disregarding Laplanche and Pontalis’ objections, we accepted this difference as having been actually made by Freud, then we would have to replace ego-ideal for ideal ego throughout this and the following paragraph). Regarding as conformist their former superego-sanctioned ego ideal—which, if they had formerly been “good,” “normal” kids, they had adopted and to a great degree embodied—they rebel against it, invent a new ego ideal, often adopt forms of behavior that contradict the superego’s criteria and injunctions, and frequently develop a greater or lesser degree of rejection toward those who always cared for them, without the latter having changed their behavior toward them. All of this puts an end to the relative harmony that formerly prevailed in the psyche, for acting in ways the superego reproves, on the one hand, and rejecting those who always cared for them without the latter having changed their behavior toward them, on the other, are sources of guilt. In order to found their new identity and prove wrong the superego’s criteria at the root of guilt, adolescents often side with the criteria of other adolescents against those of their parents’ superegos and hence of their own superegos—which, however, does not allow them to overcome guilt but, on the contrary, gives rise to the dynamic that, as just noted, is similar to that of children who, unable to receive approval from their parents, seek the approval of the “bad boys.”

In our age, it is common that at later stages this rebellion subsides and individuals develop an identity project that brings about the progressive reintegration of the superego and the ego ideal, insofar as the realization of the project in question requires discipline (the superego’s function, comparable to the stick) and aspiration (the function of the ego ideal comparable to the carrot). I will not go at length into this because I agree to a considerable extent with Washburn’s description of the processes involved. Suffice to add that, as shown below (going beyond Washburn’s descriptions and in agreement with David Cooper’s), if our project is going to be that of Awakening, we will have to work on the superego and the ego ideal in order to turn them into self-destroying mechanisms (i.e., the superego and the ego ideal must be modified so that they may spur one in the process of achieving freedom from the superego and the ego ideal, rather than blocking this task).

Above I referred to the entity resulting from our being perceived as a monstrous object, which is the phenomenal basis of the shadow, as a phantasy rather than a fantasy. I chose this spelling in view of Susan Isaacs’s distinction of two kinds of fantasy, supposedly following directions of Melanie Klein, which she expressed in terms of different spellings: with an “f” in the case of the conscious fantasy that Freud had posited, and with “ph” in the

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*e* Ibidem and immediately following sections and chapters.

*f* Cooper (1971).
case of the *unconscious phantasy* that she posited in the work in which she introduced the term and that Freud had not admitted.\(^\text{134}\) For the sake of brevity, in this compound term I keep the adjective “unconscious,” even though in the context of the views expressed in this book it would be more precise to speak of “phantasy that is automatically eluded through bad faith.” In fact, if the process of socialization is successful, the monstrous image that is the phenomenal basis of the shadow (which I do *not* view as being directly related to the infant’s relation with mother’s breast\(^\text{135}\)) becomes a phantasy that, if we are not to live in hell, we must negate by means of bad faith the very moment it manifests in consciousness, and which may only be allowed to remain conscious if it is identified as the identity of others. It is because again and again we become conscious of this *phantasy monster* (as though it emerged from a psychological Loch Ness), and because each time this happens we have to resort to Sartrean bad faith to frantically disclaim it as having anything to do with our own self and affirm ourselves as a contrasting *persona*, that we are compelled to see it as the true nature and absolute identity of others.\(^\text{136}\) And it is to the extent to which our shadow has been made all the more terrible by perceptions of ourselves by others (or by our own consciousness as it judges our conduct from the standpoint of the superegos of internalized others) as carrying out bad / horrible actions, that our hatred toward it becomes so intense as to give rise to the urge to punish and possibly try to destroy it by punishing and possibly trying to destroy those individuals that we perceive as embodying it—that is, by sacrificing new scapegoats on the altar of well-adapted “normality” (however, whatever harm we do to the individuals we perceive as embodying the *shadow phantasy*, harms the real individuals rather than this *phantasy*, and our awareness of so extremely evil actions makes the shadow all the more powerful and destructive).\(^\text{137}\)

In French, the earliest translators of Freud’s works rendered the German *Phantasie* with the term *fantasme*, from the Greek noun *phantasma* (meaning “apparition,” which in Latin became *fantasma*), and the French adjective *fantasmatique*, which at some time had a meaning close to that of *fantomatique*, meaning “fantastic.”\(^\text{b}\) Therefore, those who accept Susan Isaacs-Melanie Klein’s concept of *unconscious phantasy* have rendered into French the English neologism *phantasy* as *phantasme*. However, the French *fantasme* is also a synonym of *fantôme*, meaning “ghost” or “phantom;” since the *phantasy* Jung called the “shadow” works as a haunting ghost that must scare us so that we cling to the fantasy (in the sense the term has in common language) that our conscious identity (is), and since in popular fantasy (again in the sense the term has in common language) and in literature, movies and so on, phantoms are sources of evil, the French term might be appropriate for referring to the *phantasy* shadow. And, just as a ghost, despite lacking physical existence, in terms of Madhyamika philosophy may be said to exist so far as it produces effects (for example, so far as it really scares people, and in some cases so far as it actually harms people),\(^\text{138}\) the *phantasy shadow* may be said to exist, for it undoubtedly produces effects—not only the one consisting in making us flee it and cling to a conscious identity produced by means of bad faith, but also the host of evil effects that are being discussed in this subsection.

The shadow is equally in our psyche and is equally an object of hatred whether we are alone or are part of a mass of people. However, Jung was right in noting that when we are part of a mass of people, just as though we had become a cell of gigantic monster, we

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\(^a\) Isaacs (1989); Laing (1961); Hinshelwood (1991).

may easily let ourselves be taken over by the demonic dynamic of trying to punish and / or 
destroy the shadow by punishing and / or destroying the others on whom we project it—
which most of us would not feel justified to do while being alone. The point is that in such 
occaasions we do not feel individually responsible or accountable, and so each of us can, 
rather than siding with the aspects of the superego that see this dynamic as demonic and 
with the human sensibility that would check the impulse to act it out, side with those other 
aspects of the superego upholding the imperative to cleanse and purify human society, and 
thus in bad faith we can easily elude human sensibility and justify the dynamic in question, 
letting ourselves be carried away by it to the extent to which the others around us, rather 
than judging us negatively because of so doing, justify our behavior and feel justified by 
us. This explains why lynching happens so easily when a mob gathers, and why serial rape 
and other mass crimes are so easily carried out by warring armies, juvenile gangs and so 
on. However, despite the fact that those who are also part of the mass do not censure us 
insofar as they are possessed by the same dynamic, and on the contrary encourage us to 
carry out mass crimes and by the same token elude the natural human sensibility, this 
sensibility still works in us. Since the same applies to the aspects of the superegos of the 
internalized others in our own superego that condemn such crimes, after the crime is 
committed these aspects, in interaction with our sensibility, will exacerbate our guilt and 
increase the size of our shadow. Insofar as the demonic dynamic of the shadow implies the 
refusal to assume guilt and the compulsion to see the shadow as the nature of others and 
blame these for all evil, we will be compelled to blame, hate and likely try to destroy the 
shadow by blaming, hating and likely trying to destroy new external individuals, probably 
pertaining to the same category as our former victims—which is likely to give rise to 
further similar or worse crimes. Thus the shadow’s demonic dynamic and power increases 
from its own feedback, catalyzing the degenerative evolution of humankind: selfishness 
gives rise to wickedness, which is automatically associated with the perceptions of 
ourselves by significant others as shameful monsters that take place in the process of 
socialization, which are embodied in the phantasy shadow; then the dynamic of the shadow 
produces monstrosities, and these give rise to a more detestable shadow that will likely 
give rise to even worse monstrosities…

The above dynamic is exacerbated by emphasis on righteousness, which reinforces 
the compulsion to destroy evil at the root of the “crusade against evil,” so that against the 
“sinner” and the “perverse”…

...the worst acts of violence become acts of piety.

Therefore, as Michel Foucault rightly noted, all are willing to commit atrocities 
against the “criminal” worse that those that the latter supposedly committed regarding his 
or her victims. Thus people are willing to stone the adulteress to death, just as later on they 
are willing to assassinate He who at the time rescued her—and then, when time passes, 
to assassinate others in the name of the One they assassinated. In fact, in the Catholic 
church a powerful lust for power combined with a severe ideal of “justice” and “virtue” to 
produce the Inquisition—which was all the more demonic when the judges identified with

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a Jung (1972a).
b Ravignant (1978).
a severe ideal of justice and virtue. Jules Michelet wrote of Sprenger, Inquisitor and author of a most renowned *Malleus maleficarum* (*Hammer of the Evil-Doers* or *Hammer of the Witches*):^a^  

Sprenger is deeply moved. Do not believe him to be one of those insensitive scholastics, men of dry abstraction. He has a heart. This is why he kills so easily. He is compassionate, full of tenderness. He feels sorry for that grief-stricken woman, pregnant for a short time, whose child was drowned by the gaze directed by the witch. He feels sorry for the poor man who is harmed by the witch who sends hail over his field. He feels sorry for the husband who, not being a witch, realizes that his wife is a witch and drags her to Sprenger with the rope around her neck, so that he may burn her.

With a cruel man there could have been possibilities of eluding the bonfire, but with this good and charitable Sprenger there is no room for hope. His humanity is too strong; one is unavoidably burned...

To sum up, as the degenerative evolution and history of humankind and the process of civilization unfolded, it became necessary to sanction conventions regulating behavior in society, and to decree religious, moral and legal norms forbidding activities that may be harmful to others. However, true virtue cannot issue from decreeing religious, moral and legal norms, for in order to enforce them, it is necessary to brandish the phantasy scarecrow at the root of the shadow: whenever an infant is caught in a forbidden course of motility, she or he has to be turned into a phantasy monster, which henceforth the infant is supposed to constantly check in order to avoid acting it out. This, on the one hand, will endow the phantasy with the illusion of truth and with the potential to induce monstrous actions, and on the other hand will give rise to the need to see the monstrous phantasy as the true nature of some external individuals—which, as we have seen, produces the demonic dynamic of the shadow. Then the memory of the unprecedented evil actions the shadow and its dynamic lead us to commit strengthen, proportionally to the wickedness of these actions, the need to project evil on others and stigmatize and in many cases destroy these others in the belief that by so doing we will destroy the evil we projected on them—which in its turn exacerbates to an unparalleled degree the phantasy shadow and its wicked dynamic. In fact, the straitjacketing of evil impulses exacerbates these impulses, which will be let loose whenever the barrage containing them breaks. True virtue can only result from the repeated dissolution of the delusion of selfhood and the repeated seeing through the shadow that it in the long run dissolves both of them completely: without the illusion of selfhood there is no selfishness, and without the illusion that at the bottom of ourselves lies a terrible monster, we cease being driven by the propensities proper to a monster, and thus are no longer driven to project this monster on others, hate those others, punish those others, and try to destroy them. Consider the following combination of excerpts from Lao-Tzu’s *Tao-Te-Ching*:^b^  

The Tao having concealed itself, still its [inherent] virtue (*te*) was active;  
Its [inherent] virtue having been lost, benevolent love (*jen*) replaced it;  
Benevolent love having been lost, duty and justice were resorted to;

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^a^ Michelet (1987).  
^b^ The respective sections are 38, 18, 57, 58 and 65 of the regular version (in the two texts of Ma-wang-tui, which are older but which most scholars regard as less authentic, and which were not taken into account, the sequence of chapters is very different).
Justice having been lost, ritual was put in its place.
Ritual is the lid of compassion and honesty
And the source of disorder and disturbances;
Foreseeing intelligence and science are the flower of Tao
But also the beginning of folly.

When the Tao concealed itself,
Charity and justice arose;
Intelligence, knowledge and ingeniousness
Gave rise to great forgeries;
Discordance between the six types of relatives
Gave rise to filial piety and paternal love;
Darkness and disorder in the kingdom
Resulted in the invention of the subject’s loyalty.

The more prohibitions and morality there are,
The more poverty afflicts the people;
The more sharp weapons States possess,
The more revolted they become;
The more clever and ingenious humans become
The more monstrosities proliferate;
The more laws and decrees multiply themselves,
The more bandits and thieves appear.

When government is indulgent and informal
The people is pure and industrious;
When government is efficient and severe
The people are wayward and willful.

Controlling a nation through intelligence ruins it,
Whereas letting be strengthens and enriches the nation.\textsuperscript{140}

It is not difficult to understand why the New Testament exhorted humankind not to condemn or resist evil: if we do so, the dark, dishonored self triumphs and, paradoxically, emerges victorious, re-becoming the tyrant who leads us to beget evil by fighting against it. Inspired by Lao-tzu, Ronald D. Laing wrote:\textsuperscript{a}

When violence masquerades as love, once the fissure into self and other, inner and outer, good and bad occurs, all else is an infernal dance of false dualities. It has always been recognized that if you split being down the middle, if you insist in grabbing \textit{this} without \textit{that}, if you cling to the good without the bad, denying the one for the other, what happens is that the dissociated evil impulse, now evil in a double sense, returns to permeate and possess the good and turn it into itself. (Then Laing quotes Lao-Tzu):

\begin{quote}
When the great Tao is lost, spring forth benevolence and righteousness.
\textquote{When wisdom and sagacity arise, there are great hypocrites.}

When family relations are no longer harmonious, we have filial children and devoted parents.

When a nation is in confusion and disorder, patriots are recognized.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} Laing (1967), p. 63.
The Tao is concealed by the manifestation of the first of the three types of avidya posited in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book (cf. note 1), which is followed by the occurrence of the original / originary partition consisting in the subject-object duality that results from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle concept called the threefold thought structure (a partition I am calling originary insofar as it is the condition of possibility of the genesis of the multiplicity of entities), which in its turn is followed by the understanding of the object in terms of delusory valued-absolutized subtle or intuitive concepts—which is most often followed by the enunciation of our understanding of the object in terms of delusory valued-absolutized coarse thoughts of the discursive kind. Since the first two types of concept are always involved in judgment, and the third usually comes into play immediately thereafter, it is not surprising that the etymological sense of the German term for judgment—Urteil—is precisely “originary partition.”

However, what we are concerned with at this point is that, after the concealment of the Tao, its virtue (te) continues to be functional, just as the smell of naphthalene continues to impregnate a drawer for a long time after the mothball that was the source of the smell is removed. Then, just as the mothball’s smell gradually fades out with the passing of time, the virtue (te) inherent in the Tao progressively fades away. As delusion develops, giving rise to selfishness and later on to the shadow and its dynamic, evil arises and intensifies, compelling us to artificially produce virtue by deliberately imposing on ourselves ways of behavior that contradict the wayward impulses that naturally flow from our present, corrupt condition—which in its turn elicits rebelliousness against the “virtuous” molds that we feel compelled to adopt. However, the worst evils result from the crusade against evil aimed at doing away with it by destroying those in whom we perceive it, which has given rise to a long series of horrors that did not culminate in the Holocaust—for presently we are about to do away, not with a single ethnic group, but with humankind as a whole, and possibly with all life on the planet.a

Now that we have all the necessary elements, we can discuss the second Freudian topic. Though this topic hit the target in many respects, it erred in conceiving the id as an a priori, ab origine chaotic receptacle of urges or drives (Trieben)—including those in the categories of Eros and Thanatos—and unruly, indomitable passions that, unless properly managed by the ego (which in this topic is not clearly differentiated from the id, in which the superego sinks its roots141), would cause the individual to remain a puppet of the urges and passions in question—which in its turn would ineluctably lead him or her to ruin or destruction. According to this topic, at birth we have the id and nothing else, but then, to fully become persons in society, we must internalize and align ourselves with the rules and structures of our society, forgoing the pleasure principle of the natural state and accepting the reality principle of society. b Freud did not see this as an operation carried out at an early stage of life that may be somehow undone at a later stage, for his conception of the id as being inherently and ab origine a cluster of wayward forces implies that the ego and the superego—and hence the structuring of the psyche in terms of the second topic—may not be dissolved at any stage of life, and so the best we can do is to keep as well-adapted to society as possible, accepting the reality principle and developing an efficient ego so as to avert neurosis and psychosis—even though the price of so doing is the perennial tension

a Cf. Capriles (1994a), chapter 2 in general, and chapter 3, section on ethical value.
resulting from the ongoing negotiation between our natural and social dimensions. Just as Aristotle’s *Poetics,* this topic implied that we could at best “resolve” some of this tension through the catharses achieved through art. However, though Freud failed to realize this, the ultimate root of tension and conflict is the basic human delusion that the Mahayana and higher vehicles viewed as the second noble truth. Since, as shown in various of my works, this delusion is the source of the current ecological crisis, insofar as Freud’s theories imply that we cannot put an end to tension and conflict, they imply that we cannot undo delusion, and hence that we cannot avert self-destruction. However, this book makes the point that self-destruction can and must be averted, and intends to show how can this be achieved—which implies the dissolution of the Freudian topics, to the extent that they may be considered valid.

*Totem and Taboo* (which even Psychoanalysts have termed “a Darwinian fantasy” and which has been shown to incorporate elements from the works by Frazer, Smith, Atkinson and Westermak) took up the theory of recapitulation Darwin and Haeckel borrowed from Lamarck, according to which ontogenesis reproduces phylogenesis, and “primitive” human beings—insofar as, just like small children, they were supposed to be characterized by magical thinking, which betrayed the belief in the individual’s omnipotence—found themselves at the so-called “narcissistic stage.” Though *Totem and Taboo* was prior to the second topic, if read in the light of the latter we may conclude that early human beings in their natural state (specifically, in the hypothetic stage Lewis Henry Morgan called “savagery,” corresponding to the “primeval, consanguine horde”) was ruled by the *id* until the “rebellion against the despotic male-father” who hitherto monopolized the women in the group gave rise to the two totemic taboos: the one against incest (intercourse with the women of the totemic clan) and the one against killing the father-totem—the two crimes of which Oedipus was guilty. However, in Freud’s view the state of nature that corresponded to the horde never had actual existence, being no more than the form internalized by the subject (ontogenesis) of a collective story (phylogenesis) that repeated itself from generation to generation and as such being no more than a myth. At any rate, this book by Freud implies that, had there been a “state of nature” previous to the genesis of the social institution (which, just as that of the psyche structured in terms of the second topic, depended on revalorizing the “male” principle of reason in the form of law, which is then assumed by the whole of society), it would have been even more unruly than Hobbes—and therefore it implies the conception of the *id* reviewed above.

We may accept the existence of an *id* in relation to an *ego* and a *superego*; what we may not accept is the Freudian conception of the *id* expressed in the above two paragraphs, which must be denounced for the following reasons, among others:

(1) It is posited as an *a priori, ab origine topos* of the psyche (as such existing, not only in the psyche of the newborn, but even in that of hypothetic human beings in a state of nature), whereas in reality it develops gradually along the process of human phylogenesis (and, beginning at a certain stage of the latter, to a great extent along the process of human ontogenesis) interdependently with the *ego* and the *superego,* and has its existence only in relation to these two.

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a Aristotle (1983).
b Freud (1946).
(2) It is posited as being inherently and ab origine a cluster of evil urges or drives to be restrained, or repressed in the Freudian sense of the term. However, as explained above, the unruly or evil urges or drives that characterize our species in our time arose and then increased in strength in the process of our degenerative spiritual and social evolution, as the result of a series of developments (among which some of the most important ones were enumerated and discussed above). At this point, it must be added that these unruly or evil urges or drives arise and then develop interdependently with the superego-ego-id structure, and that at some point—as in a dialectical leap—they are inscribed in our genetic make up. As this happens repeatedly, human beings are born with more unruly genetic behavioral propensities—which are the ones that, because of his modern mentality and his Darwinist worldview, Freud wrongly believed to be inherent in an a priori, unruly id.

(3) Since, as noted in (2), Freud viewed the id as being inherently and ab origine a cluster of evil urges or drives to be restrained and ignored, and also as being indissoluble, he thought that should the ego and the superego be uprooted these urges or drives would inescapably lead the individual to ruin or destruction—and that if the uprooting of the ego and the superego occurred in a widespread manner the urges or drives in question would lead society to ruin or destruction. In the context of the Path of Awakening this could hardly be more contrary to fact, for advancement along this Path progressively eradicates the elements of the second Freudian topic and all roots of evil, and so the Fruit of the Path is utterly free both from the former and from the latter.

In fact, since Awakening divests the looks of others of their power for touching us in the heart and make us become what they see as us (cf. the following section of this chapter) and frees us from the influence of conventional values, it makes us impervious to the looks of others, totally divesting the internalized others that constitute the phenomenal reality that is the foundation of the superego\(^a\) of their power over us—which amounts to the eradication of the superego. Since Awakening involves a total awareness that is not split into subject and object, that is not compelled to divide the sensory continuum into figure and ground, and that does neither become nor identify with a self-image or with whatever others see as us, it involves the dissolution of the individual’s illusory sense of personal limits and false sense of identity, and hence of the ego in both the early and later Freudian senses (the later one being the one it has in the second topic).\(^{145}\) And since Awakening spells the dissolution of the evil urges or drives and passions that Freud viewed as making up an id—and, furthermore, without the superego-ego complex what formerly was the id may no longer be so called—Awakening undoes all of the elements of Freud’s second topic. Since this may seem to correspond to David Cooper’s\(^b\) conception of sanity, the reader is directed to the discussion, in a subsequent chapter of this volume, of the work in which Cooper expounded his radical views, so as to contrast them with those expounded in this book.

To conclude the discussion of the topic under consideration, it is important to make it clear that, both in phylogenesis and in ontogenesis, earlier conditions are less delusive than later ones—except for the ideal concluding stage of the process, which in ontogenesis is unsurpassable, irreversible Awakening, and in phylogenesis is a new Age of Perfection, Age of Truth or Golden Age, or a concluding millennium of plenitude, harmony, peace and equality. However, the theory of recapitulation which Darwin and Haeckel borrowed from

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\(^a\) Cooper (1971).

\(^b\) Cooper (1971).
Lamarck, and which thereon was adopted by authors as disparate as Sigmund Freud and Ken Wilber, according to which ontogenesis reproduces phylogenesis and the earlier stages of phylogenesis exhibit the characteristics proper to the earlier stages of ontogenesis, could hardly be more flawed. In fact, only in ontogenesis are we initially unable to manage reality and exhibit the various defects that representatives of the theory of recapitulation wrongly attribute to the initial stages of phylogenesis, such as narcissism and a delusive feeling of omnipotence (Freud\(^a\)), a pre-conventional morality based exclusively on egocentric goals such as avoiding punishment and gaining rewards (Wilber\(^b\) using Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral development) and in general the egocentrism and incapacity of manifesting empathy and compassion that precedes Piaget’s operational stage (Wilber\(^c\)).\(^{146}\) As documented in works by Steve Taylor\(^d\) and in vol. III of this book, primal humans were characterized by a pronounced lack of egocentrism; as also documented in vol. III of this book, the impact of early Amerindians on Amazonian biodiversity\(^e\) suggests that primal human beings, rather than being incapable of effectively dealing with the world, dealt with it far more effectively than humans or our time, whereas anthropological, archeological and paleopathological evidence suggests that early humans, rather than lacking the virtues that manifest as a result of the practice of Paths of Awakening, naturally exhibited many of these virtues—which, on the contrary, we lack.\(^f\)

What is common to both ontogenesis and phylogenesis is that, for delusion to be eradicated, it has to develop to its logical extreme and achieve its *reductio ad absurdum*. Gregory Bateson\(^g\) divided the learning process into successive levels, among which the one he called Learning II—which results, among other things, from the repeated rejection of the pain begotten by rejection and the pursuit of the pleasure produced by acceptance—is responsible for developing dualistic delusion with the defects inherent in it. Once delusion has fully developed and its ill effects have been experientially verified, the possibility arises of achieving the level of learning that Bateson called Learning III, which is the one that gives rise to systemic wisdom, and that *if achieved in the process of Awakening*, can result in the genuine mental health that will be discussed below. In fact, this is the reason why Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche referred to delusion as “underdeveloped wisdom.”\(^{148}\)

We have seen that Sartre asserted anguish to be the bare, authentic experience of being-for-Self, and the *hell* he called shame to be the bare, authentic experience of being-for-others. And we have also seen that although anguish and the hell in question are not the unconcealment of our true condition, they may lie on the way to it. Concerning anguish, the point is that, on the occasion of facing it, fully formed adults have two alternatives:

(1) To resort to bad faith in order to temporarily “look away” from the sensation of anguish and from whichever thoughts may be at its root, so that indifference to a new object may give rise to a neutral feeling tone, or, ideally, acceptance of a new object may give rise to a pleasant feeling tone. However, even when this strategy is successful, the dread of anguish that caused us to implement it implies a concern with the anguish, and by

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\(^a\) Freud (1946).
\(^d\) Taylor (2003, 2005).
\(^e\) Descola (1996).
\(^f\) Taylor (2003, 2005); Capriles (vol. III of this book).
\(^g\) Bateson (1972).
implication with the thoughts (or with the oscillation of thoughts) at the root of anguish, which will cause these thoughts to manifest again a short time after we elude them, giving rise to anguish; therefore, each time they manifest, both the thoughts and the feeling tone of anguish have to be immediately eluded—just for them to recur after a short while. The thoughts capable of unleashing the experience of anguish as understood by Sartre are not only the subtle / intuitive thought that conceptualizes the unlimited possibilities of choice that we face (and hence our own freedom), or the succession of coarse thoughts of the discursive kind that expresses the possible desirable and undesirable results from our choices: also the subtle / intuitive thought expressing fear of giving rise to anguish and its horrible feeling tone, can unleash the experience of anguish. At any rate, the result of this strategy is that we spend our lives alternating between the experience of anguish and the less conflictive states toward which we flee it—which, however, are characterized by lack of plenitude and as such are inherently dissatisfactory. Since anguish can manifest again at any time—and actually does so recurrently—this dynamic sustains the unremitting anxiety and stress that characterize our time, particularly among town dwellers.

(2) To face the coarse, subtle or supersubtle thoughts involved in anguish and apply the instructions of Tekchö (first level of practice in the Menngagde or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings) or an analogous practice, so that if all goes well the present thought may liberate itself spontaneously, instantaneously putting an end to anguish, the phenomenon of being and being-for-Self. This strategy, however, has possibilities of functioning only in those who have been directly introduced to the state of Dzogchen and thus have entered the Path in the truest way possible; who no longer remain in doubt as to the fact that what was reGnized at the time of direct introduction (is) the true condition of all reality; who have received the oral instructions of a practice such as Tekchö; and who have developed a significant capacity of spontaneous liberation. The stronger the anguish and the higher the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness at the time of the spontaneous liberation of anguish, the more clear the reGnition of the Self-quay-Base, and the more clear the contrast between the contradictory, dualistic samsaric condition that by turning into conflict fully revealed itself for what it is, and the nondual nirvanic condition that manifests on the occasion of the spontaneous liberation of the former. Moreover, in this case the individual’s capacity of spontaneous liberation will be boosted proportionally to the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the intensity of anguish, optimizing the practice of the Upadeshavarga (Menngagde) series of Dzogchen teachings (or its equivalents in other traditions, should they exist).

Among the thoughts that may trigger the experience of anguish as conceived by Sartre I have mentioned the coarse thoughts of the discursive kind expressing the possible desirable and undesirable results from our choices, the subtle / intuitive thought that conceptualizes the unlimited possibilities of choice that we face (and by implication our own freedom), and the subtle / intuitive thought expressing fear of giving rise to the experience of anguish. In the practice of Tekchö whichever of these thoughts, or whichever other thought may be present at any given time, must be reGnized so that it liberates itself spontaneously together with the tensions it induces and sustains. However, in particularly intense experiences of anguish in which the attempt to reGnize other thoughts has failed, specially if the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is very high, the

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*a khregs chod.*

*b man ngag sde or man ngag gyi sde.*
prevailing thought may be the subtle / intuitive thought conceiving the feeling tone of anguish as a painful object that is imposed on us and that gives rise to an unbearable torture—in which case this is the thought to recognize, which may be attempted in terms of the instructions laid out in my book on Tekchö, and should spontaneous liberation occur, this would particularly boost our capacity of spontaneous liberation. At any rate, it is only when we face anguish this way that the anguish may be said to lie on the way to Awakening. (It must be kept in mind that, insofar as the recognition of the Self-qua-Base cannot be caused, there is no way to guarantee its occurrence.)

In eluding the experience of hell that Sartre called shame, the strategy for becoming a respected member of society is basically that of the child who embodies the persona the mother or original other admires, or at least tolerates. Apart from the opinions of the superegos of the significant others the internalization of which originally made up our superego, we care mainly about the opinions of people we value in a positive way, and in particular of those who to some extent embody—and who hence admire or approve—the kind of qualities that we want others to acknowledge and admire in us. Therefore, we too must come to embody these qualities in order to get from them the feedback that will allow us to experience pride, and thus to accept the sensations associated with becoming being-for-others and experience these sensations as pleasurable. In exchange for confirming us as being the way we want to see ourselves and thus allow us to deceive ourselves through them into believing that we are what we want to be, we must confirm the people whose opinions we care for as being the way they want to see themselves so that they may deceive themselves through us into believing they are what we confirm as their true identity: this is an instance (though certainly not the only possible one) of what R. D. Laing called “collusion.” The author in question writes:

The term ‘collusion’ has kinship with de-lusion, il-lusion, and e-lusion. Lusion comes from the verb ludere, whose meaning varies in classical and Late Latin. It can mean to play, to play at, or to make a sport of, to mock, to deceive.

Delusion implies total self-deception. Illusion, as frequently used psychoanalytically, implies a capacity to deceive oneself under a strong wish, but does not involve self-deception as total as delusion.

I had to interrupt the excerpt from Laing’s work in order to note that in my usage of the terms illusion and delusion to express the views of Dzogchen and of the higher forms of Madhyamaka philosophy, the distinction between them is not the one psychoanalysis makes. In fact, in the latter system illusion is a partially deceptive experience that often occurs in neurosis but is not exclusive to neurosis, whereas delusion is a totally deceptive experience exclusive to psychosis; in contrast, in my usage of the terms both illusion and delusion are ubiquitous in normality, neurosis and psychosis. In fact, in terms of my usage of the words, a mirage in the desert, or the visions seen by a person under the effect of datura (or of sensory deprivation, psychosis, etc.), would be examples of illusion—whereas delusion would lie in taking the mirage or the visions for “physical” entities. However, the Dzogchen teachings and higher Madhyamaka philosophy do not circumscribe the concept of illusion to mirages and visions; for example, the ubiquitous samsaric perception of the

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a Capriles (1990a).
b See the whole of Chapter VIII in Part II of Laing (1961).
c Laing (1961), Part II, Chapter VIII, initial paragraphs.
so-called physical phenomena of tsel energy as lying in an external dimension is an illusion as well, whereas delusion in this case would consist in taking these phenomena to be actually external, to constitute a self-sufficient material reality, to involve self-being, etc.\textsuperscript{153}—so that in general all perceptions conditioned by avidya or marigpa in the second of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book may be regarded as illusions, whereas delusion must necessarily involve avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses these terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book. To conclude, the fact that both illusion and delusion as defined here are ubiquitous in normality, neurosis and psychosis does not mean that they are healthy occurrences that must be allowed to thrive: higher forms of Buddhism view all deluded conditions (whether they belong to normality, neurosis or psychosis) as pathologies\textsuperscript{154} to be cured through the application of the prescriptions of the physician Shakyamuni—or, in the Dzogchen teachings, of those of physicians such as Garab Dorje and Padmasambhava. In fact, as will be seen below and then again in vol. III of this book, Madhyamika Prasangika philosopher Chandrakirti illustrated the delusion proper to normality with the parable of a whole country that becomes insane upon drinking polluted water\textsuperscript{4}. And indeed, I can hardly think of something more insane than the way humankind is destroying the material basis of life on this planet. Laing goes on:

Collusion has resonances of playing at and of deception. It is a ‘game’ played by two or more people whereby they deceive themselves. The game is the game of mutual self-deception. Whereas delusion and illusion and elusion can be applied to one person, collusion is necessarily a two-or-more-person game. Each plays the other’s game, though he may not necessarily be fully aware of doing so.\textsuperscript{155} An essential feature of this game is not admitting that it is a game.

However, no matter how good at collusion we may be, we cannot collude with all human beings, and although as noted above the opinions we seriously value are those of like-minded individuals, we are not immune to those of the rest of humankind, to which we are exposed insofar as we are constantly moving between social groups that admire or approve different patterns of behavior. Furthermore, in our time it has become ever more difficult to establish comfortable personas, for admired and approved patterns of behavior change with increasing speed, and do so in different directions in diverse social groups.

Beside the difficulties inherent in getting others to confirm us as the persona we want to have confirmed as us, there is the moral problem stemming from the fact that in order to rise in samsara we have to push others down, not only because of the pyramidal structure of cyclic existence (the higher the realm of samsara the lesser the number of its denizens, and the lower the realm the greater the number of its denizens), but also because, as shown in the preceding section, in order to embody a positive identity we have to project our shadow phantasy on others, giving rise to the demonic dynamic that has produced the worst human-induced horrors humankind has endured in the last thousands of years. This is the price of embodying a high concept of ourselves, thereby attaining a spurious heaven of pride for a while—for the hell of shame and the related phantasy shadow will again and again show up in our consciousness, and in order to elude this hell we will be repeatedly compelled to project the phantasy shadow on others. And, furthermore, this dynamic will

\textsuperscript{4} In the West, this parable is reproduced in Trungpa (1976), and Chöphel (2005). Shah (1978) gives us the Sufi version.
feed the uneasiness, anxiety and stress that characterize contemporary life, especially in urban environments.  

The opposite strategy in the face of the hell Sartre called “shame” and the phantasy Jung called “the shadow” begins with a development of mindfulness enabling us to refrain from projecting the shadow on others, thus curbing this demonic dynamic. Jung referred to this by the term “living in the House of the Gathering,” which involves conflict and pain insofar as the chief mechanism for eluding hell can no longer be applied—but which, as the Swiss analyst emphasized, should we learn to deal with our shadow, would constitute our individual contribution toward the resolution of social problems. (However, Jung’s Wotan and his alleged anti-Semitism, sympathy for and collaboration with the Nazis, if confirmed would show that he was not successful in achieving this learning.) And yet if, in a bid for sincerity and with the intention of helping solve social problems, we assumed the shadow and the unpleasantness it implies without learning the proper way of dealing with it, most likely we would come to view it as our own inherent identity, consolidating the illusion that we are inherently evil or defective—which, since we naturally act out what we feel and believe we are, would further the source of evil. Furthermore, this would be both an error and an instance of bad faith, for we would be making a phantasy that resulted from the development of delusion in the process of phylogenesis pass for our ultimate essence and our whole, innate, innermost self—thereby sustaining the self-deceit that makes sincerity impossible and by the same token preventing the discovery of our true condition (it was for similar reasons that in Being and Nothingness Sartre insisted that heeding the champion of uprightness and “admitting his homosexuality” would have caused the homosexual to be in bad faith). At any rate, “living in the House of the Gathering” is not easy, for constantly warding off the drive to project the shadow on others and see it as the true nature of those others, and continuously checking the drive to resort to bad faith in order to build a more pleasant identity, requires uninterrupted alertness—and if we lack the capacity that makes it possible for hellish states to liberate themselves spontaneously, will cause us to live in a hell without remission. This is why Sartre asserted sincerity qua absence of self-deceit not to be an actual human possibility, and why in terms of the view expressed here the only way to effectively put an end to self-deceit and definitively eradicate the demonic dynamic of the shadow, would be by genuinely setting on the Path of Awakening and treading it to its end.

In particular, the practice of Tekcho (which as we have seen is the initial level of practice in the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings) has the twofold function of, on the one hand, developing mindfulness in the dualistic, deluded condition—which we need to maintain unremittingly in order to reGnize thoughts rather than be conditioned by them—and, on the other, furthering the spontaneous liberation of the dualistic, deluded condition that has as its core the phenomenon of being and being-for-Self, and in this way gradually weakening the latter and therefore progressively neutralizing the propensity to become being-for-others and cling to a self-image, which are the motor of both self-deceit and the demonic dynamic of the shadow. Therefore, this practice endows us with the two indispensable elements that must interact if we are to become gradually free of the demonic dynamic in question, which are unremitting mindfulness in the dualistic, deluded condition, and the gradual neutralization of dualistic, delusive impulses through repeated spontaneous

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a Jung (1977a).
b Jung (1970a).
liberation of the condition in question. This results in definitive Awakening, which puts an end to self-deceit and the dynamic of the shadow, for in this condition the phenomenon of being, being-for-Self, the impulse to become being-for-others and clinging to a self-image have been definitively eradicated, and hence the urge to deceive ourselves and project the shadow on others have been definitively eradicated. Since both selfishness and the dynamic of the shadow have been eradicated, there is no possibility of evil or of harming others; since our lack of plenitude, pain, anxiety, stress and impeding self-consciousness has come to an end, we ourselves are no longer harmed: this is why, both with regard to ourselves and others, we have the responsibility of moving toward Awakening. (However, those who lack the conditions for applying a practice such as Dzogchen should at least apply relative methods for coming to terms with guilt—one example of which might be the practice of what A Course in Miracles calls “Forgiveness.”\textsuperscript{159})

The above means that in order to effectively undo bad faith and the concomitant dynamic of the shadow, we must begin by hearing and studying the teachings of a tradition leading to Awakening, then we must reflect on what we have heard and studied, and finally we must apply the practices taught by the tradition we have decided to follow.\textsuperscript{160} As noted in vol. I of this book, in the case of Dzogchen Atiyoga, the third of these elements starts with Direct Introduction, consisting in an initial manifestation of the Self-qua-Path (i.e., in an initial the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base); continues with not remaining in doubt, which is achieved by repeatedly applying the oral instructions that are the condition of possibility of the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path until no doubt arises in the post-Contemplation state concerning the true nature of reality; and then goes ahead with continuing in the State to which we were Introduced through the main practices of Dzogchen Atiyoga. As shown in Vol. I of this book and in the above paragraph, the practice of Tekchö consists in the reGnition of the true condition of the thoughts (coarse [paradigmatically discursive], subtle / intuitive, or supersubtle) conditioning our experience each and every time these thoughts arise, so that delusion will liberate itself spontaneously on the occasion of the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path, temporarily dissolving the illusion of a separate self at the root of the selfishness that is the initial root of evil, together with the phantasy Jung called the shadow, which as we have seen exacerbates evil. Each and every time this occurs, it neutralizes to a small degree the propensities for the occurrence of delusion—including the illusion of selfhood and the phantasy shadow—while by the same token boosting in us the capacity for the spontaneous liberation of delusorily valued-absolutized thought.

If we fulfill the prerequisites listed in the discussion of the use of anguish on the Path, we must resort to traditional methods for raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and for turning into conflict the delusion the Buddha Shakyamuni called avidya, which is the basic human contradiction;\textsuperscript{161} then, each and every time it turns into conflict (whether fortuitously or as a result of the application of these methods), we must apply the oral instructions which are the condition of possibility of its spontaneous liberation. The reason for this is not only that contradiction is much more easily detected when it has turned into conflict, but also that the degree to which the reGnition of the Self-qua-Path and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of contradiction / conflict neutralize our delusive propensities, and boost our capacity of spontaneous liberation as well as our awareness of the illusoriness of separate selfhood and of the shadow, is proportional to the intensity of the conflict (or of the passion in general) immediately preceding it and to the

\textsuperscript{a} Holland & MacDonald (2006).
height of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness the moment this reGnition and spontaneous liberation occur. Under conditions such as these, the repeated spontaneous liberation of the illusion of separate selfhood and the phantasy shadow rapidly neutralizes their evil power. As implied above, the point is that when both being-for-Self and being-for-others dissolve, either temporarily on the Path or definitively as the Fruit, we can neither become what others see as us nor see others as being in themselves this or that, and hence neither the selfishness inherent in the illusion of selfhood nor the evil dynamic of the shadow can manifest.

The alternative, which as we have seen lies in the elusion of anguish and of the hell that Sartre called “shame,” requires that we transform shame and anguish into pride, which in its turn depends on an attitude of acceptance. Now, we have seen that the way others perceive us has the power to induce in us acceptance, rejection or indifference: if the one perceiving us approves us or admires us, our consciousness will accept the continuum of all that manifests as object, including our sensations, which will therefore become pleasant; if she or he rejects us or censure us, our consciousness will reject all that manifests as object, including our sensations, which therefore will become unpleasant; and if she or he has a neutral or indifferent attitude toward us, our consciousness will remain indifferent toward all that manifests as object, including our sensations, which will become neutral. Thus the project of transforming shame and anguish into pride in a stable way is a project aimed at controlling the way others perceive us in order to get them to project on us what we want to be to ourselves through others and thus be able to accept our sensations and feel good—and since, as we have seen, the perception those others for whose opinions we particularly care have of us have a greater power to affect us, this project is aimed particularly at controlling the way the others in question perceive us. However, because of its paradoxical nature, this project is doomed to failure. In fact, if we could force others to grant us a look of approval, we could not avoid being aware that they are being forced to grant it—and thus we would be unable to value the look in question. Therefore, we have to cause all others, or at least those for whose opinions we care the most, to constantly project on us, by their own free choice, the type of entity we want to be to those others and, through them, to ourselves—which is clearly impossible, but even if it were possible, it would not produce a continuous, stable, pleasant feeling-tone. At any rate, insofar as this project makes our feelings, our quality of life and the nature of our very being depend on the freedom of others, which is beyond our control, it subjects us to constant fear about what the Other may project on us at each moment, and to constant anguish with regard to the type of individual that our actions will reveal to the Other. And, what is worse, since in order to embody an acceptable persona we have to project our shadow on others, this project sustains the dynamic of the shadow, causing us to continue to be responsible for the evils it produces.

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre described many of the strategies whereby being-for-Self tries to achieve the above, and gave his explanation of how and why all of them are doomed to failure. What Sartre failed to consider is the series of meditational techniques applied throughout the ages in order to establish healthy habits and attitudes that may allow the individual to elude anguish and the hell Sartre called shame and accept the sensations linked to the phenomenon-of-being for longer periods than otherwise would be possible, causing these sensations to become pleasurable in a more stable way—and, if possible, go so far as to attain what Buddhism calls the “state of a divinity” or “condition of a god.” Though these techniques can be effective for achieving these purposes, the states they give rise to are delusive, for they are founded on the phenomenon-of-being and being-for-Self.
In fact, though these states are often longer lived than ordinary samsaric states, insofar as they result from acceptance, which depends on causes and conditions and hence cannot be sustained uninterruptedly, they are transient, conditioned samsaric conditions. And insofar as they are farther away from the bare experience of anguish and shame and insofar as we take them to be spiritual attainments beyond samsara, they are far more unauthentic than ordinary samsaric conditions. Worse still, dwelling in these states causes us to become attached to lack of conflict, to an illusion of personal power and changelessness, and other illusions we deem desirable, while by the same token it makes us become unaccustomed to coarse sufferings; therefore, as will be shown below, falling from them gives rise to the suffering of losing what we cherished, and causes us to reject with greater impetus the sufferings of ordinary samsaric conditions, which therefore become far more unbearable to us. Therefore, we must forsake the pseudo-gurus who sale the meditational techniques used for climbing in samsara as true Paths of Awakening.

In fact, the gloomy-go-round we call samsara may be compared with the turnings of a Ferris-wheel, for climbing to higher states creates the conditions for falling into lower ones. Given the cyclic nature of conditioned existence, and given the fact that conditioned states depend, on the one hand, on action and habits to work as “fuel,” and, on the other hand, on “contributive conditions,” the very fact of obtaining the state of a divinity creates the conditions for, later on, having to suffer the “fires of hell.” In fact, as suggested above, when one falls from a spiritual high in which one had grown disaccustomed to the anguish that the bare experience of being-for-Self is, to the hell of becoming a negative object to others, to the fear of being despised or ignored, to the anguish of eliciting disapproving looks from others one cares about, and in general to the problems inherent in the ordinary human condition, most likely one will be unable to refrain from reacting with wholehearted rejection to these occurrences—which will make them far more unpleasant than they would otherwise have been. Furthermore, as will be shown in the next section, if the spiritual high involves a wider scope of awareness, upon falling to a condition involving a narrower scope of consciousness, one is likely to react to it with claustrophobia—and so on.

If complemented with a demonstration of the impossibility of surpassing unhappy consciousness by means of spiritually-assisted bad faith (i.e. by means of what the late Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche called “spiritual materialism” and which elsewhere I called “the path of darkness”) like the one provided in this chapter and the following one of this volume, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and Pascal’s Thoughts may be most helpful for obtaining a good grasp of the Buddha’s First Noble Truth and come to understand that ek-sistence—i.e., being-for-Self—implies inescapable lack of plenitude, dissatisfaction and recurring frustration, suffering and pain. This understanding is extremely important if we are to develop the motivation for devoting ourselves single-mindedly to the practice of the true Path, acquire the courage for braving the stormy moors that lie on that Path, and keep alert in order to steer clear of spiritually-assisted bad faith. However, more important than the intellectual understanding gained from reading a book, is the critical observation of our own experience in order to practically corroborate the validity of the Truth of Suffering, the circular nature of samsara, and so on.

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\(^a\) Capriles (1977, 1986, 1999a, 2000a, 2000c).
\(^b\) Trungpa (1973).
\(^c\) Capriles (1986, 1999a, 2000a, 2000c).
To conclude this section, it is important to remind the reader that according to Sartre the human individual cannot surpass human subjectivity. He was right, both in terms of his own system and in terms of the one outlined in this book: in his own system, the way to surpass human subjectivity would be by achieving what he called the *holon*, which, as we have seen, he deemed impossible; in the system expounded in this book, human subjectivity is surpassed in the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, which embody the most essential qualities Sartre attributed to the *holon*, and which are beyond subjectivity insofar as they involve the dissolution of the mental subject together with the phenomenon-of-being. Furthermore, since the Self-qua-Fruit spells the definitive eradication of being-for-Self, of being-for-others, and of being-a-self-image, those who attain this condition can no longer be called human beings: they are Buddhas, and, as we have seen, according to Buddhism, on the one hand there are Buddhas, and on the other hand there are the sentient beings of the six realms, *gati* or *loka* (one of which is the human realm).\textsuperscript{164} Hence it is a fact that the human individual cannot surpass human subjectivity, which in terms of this book consists in the illusion that actions are carried out by a mental subject different and separate from that on which it acts and from other doers: subjectivity thus understood disappears temporarily in the Self-qua-Path and definitively in the Self-qua-Fruit.\textsuperscript{165}
VI

Ascending in the Wheel:
The Error of Striving to Achieve Higher Conditioned States
The Sanity of Awakening and the Insanity of Deluded Normality

Here Awakening will be referred to as absolute sanity and absolute mental health, and by contrast I will refer to deluded normality—in which most of the time we get others to project on us a persona acceptable to us and deemed to be sane and thus elude conflict and avoid functional or legal incapacitation—by the name masked insanity. These labels are based on the fact that both Dzogchen and Buddhism in general acknowledge statistical normality to involve the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa, which is at the opposite extreme from soundness, sanity and mental health, and agree that true soundness, sanity and mental health is exclusive to Awakening.

In the above usage, the term “delusion” denotes a distorted perception of reality that is taken for reality itself or for an accurate perception of reality—the distortedness of which is revealed by the contradictions between the intentions behind our actions and the latter’s effects, and by its contrast with what manifests in the undistorted awareness of the Buddhas. Different systems of psychology and psychiatry have their own conceptions of delusion; however, in terms of most of them avidya or marigpa could not be categorized as a delusion, for they understand this term as indicating a degree of distortion of reality that in their view is characteristic of psychosis and cannot be reached in either neurosis or normality (even though what they view as instances of delusion occurring in psychosis are often metaphoric ways of soundly perceiving relative reality). On the other hand, the semantics of Alfred Korzybski, according to which sanity is determined by the structural fit between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world, and insanity by the lack of such fit, lends itself for a definition of delusion coincident with the one sketched in the preceding paragraph, in that the terms delusion and insanity would be applicable to whichever distorted perception of reality were taken for reality itself or for an accurate perception of reality, and not only to those occurring in psychosis. In fact, in terms of the criteria set out by Korzybski, the delusion that Shakyamuni Buddha called avidya or marigpa is certainly a form of insanity (and indeed it is the widest and most ubiquitous form of insanity), for it gives rise to a severe structural discrepancy between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world: our attempts to achieve satisfaction yield dissatisfaction, our efforts to suppress pain produce pain, and our efforts to destroy death and all negative aspects of life and build a technological Eden have originated the ecological crisis that is producing major natural disasters and which threatens to disrupt human society and put an end to human existence in the course of the present century.

However, in Korzybski’s view the sciences could achieve the structural fit defining sanity, for in terms of his renowned map-territory analogy, the map is not the territory but, when correct, it has a structure similar to that of the territory that allows it to be useful in

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a Korzybski (4th Ed. 5th printing, 1973).
dealing with the latter. In fact, Korzybski’s criterion seems to correspond to the one that, in the face of Hume’s law and the accumulated objections of subsequent epistemologists (cf. the next volume of this book), Alfred Julius Ayer\(^a\) devised with the aim of validating the sciences: one according to which “we are authorized to have faith in our procedure, so long as it carries out its function, which is that of predicting future experience and thus control our environment.” However, as noted above, in trying to control our environment with the avowed aim of creating an artificial Eden and kill death and pain, the sciences and the technology based on them, rather than achieving their avowed effect,\(^{168}\) have produced a hellish chaos and taken us to the brink of our extinction—and, moreover, at no moment did they foresee this result. Therefore Ayer’s criterion, and by implication Korzybski’s, rather than validating, invalidates the sciences.

The reasons for this have been discussed in depth in other works of mine and also in vol. III of this book;\(^b\) at this point suffice to say that, whereas conceptual maps are digital and thus discontinuous, the sensory territory is analog and thus continuous—and hence it is impossible for the former to correspond precisely to the latter (in other works\(^c\) I illustrated the impossibility of our digital maps to correspond precisely to the analog territory they interpret with a series of examples; at this point suffice to mention the mismatch between a digital photograph and the analog reality it is intended to replicate: though the mismatch may be imperceptible when the number of dpis is very high, if we just zoom in, we will see a combination of colored squares bearing no resemblance with the continuous reality that was photographed). Even more important is the fact that the sensory territory is holistic and intricately interconnected, whereas the perception at the root of our maps is lineal, and has a fragmentary character that makes it unable to grasp the interconnectedness of the territory. Thus it is not surprising that, by acting on the ecosphere with the powerful technology we devised to that end, we give rise to all kinds of mishaps, and ultimately disrupt it to the point of threatening its viability. However, the fact that action taken on the basis of digital maps and lineal, fragmentary perception produces effects that diametrically contradict those that we intend to produce and as such betrays the most extreme lack of structural fit between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world, in general becomes evident only in the long run, for such action is often instrumental to our most immediate aims (for example, the first times we apply a pesticide we may manage to exterminate most of the mosquitoes in a swamp, and only in the long run, after its repeated application, do we realize that our drinking water has become polluted, that anura and other species have been exterminated, that mosquitoes have developed resistance to the poison, etc.\(^{169}\)

Our problems arise from the fact that the progressive intensification of the delusion called avidya or marigpa at the root of the degenerative spiritual and social evolution of our species, has brought to an extreme the functioning of what Gestalt theory calls figure-ground minds, as well as our understanding of the territory in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized, digital secondary process maps, thereby exacerbating the fragmentation of our perception in such a way that the figures we single out in the sensory continuum appear to be in themselves isolated from the ground, and we become consciously unaware of the indivisibility of the analog continuum of the territory and of the interdependence of the

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\(^a\) Ayer (1981).
\(^c\) Cf. Capriles (1994a), among others.
singled out figure and the rest of the continuum, and of all potential figures among themselves. The result is a grave lack of overall understanding of the holistic, indivisible, analog continuum and network of interdependences that is the territory—which, according to the Udaana (third book of the Khuddaka Nikaya in the Pali Canon, which contains the sermons of the First Promulgation at the root of the Hinayana), the Prajñaparamitasutras (Second Promulgation), the philosophy of Nagarjuna (based on the latter sources) and other Buddhist sources and systems, is a central aspect of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa. K. Venkata Ramanan paraphrases the explanation the Prajñaparamitashastra, which the Chinese attribute to Nagarjuna,\(^a\) gives of this essential aspect of delusion:

> We select from out of the presented only the aspects of our interest and neglect the rest; to the rest that is neglected we become first indifferent and then blind; in our blindness, we claim completeness for the aspects we have selected. We seize them as absolute, we cling to them as complete truth... While the intellectual analysis of the presented content into its different aspects is conducive to and necessary for a comprehensive understanding, analysis is miscarried if the fragmentary is mistaken for the complete, the relative is mistaken for the absolute.

In the Udaana of the First Promulgation,\(^b\) Shakyamuni Buddha illustrated this aspect of the basic human delusion with the story of the six blind men and the elephant, according to which the one who held the elephant’s head asserted the object to be like a pot, the one who held the ear said it was like a winnowing fan, and so on:\(^c\) each of them held so firmly to his partial view, taking it to be the exact, absolute view of totality, that they quarreled bitterly, unable to come to an agreement as to the nature of the object before them. The same story is told in the Tathagatagarbhasutra of the Third Promulgation, as follows:\(^d\)

> The king assembled many blind men and, [placing them before] an elephant, commanded, “Describe [this object’s] particular characteristics.” Those among them who felt the elephant’s nose said that [the object] resembled an iron hook. Those who felt the eyes said that [it] resembled bowls. Those who felt the ears said [it] resembled winnowing baskets. Those who felt the back said it resembled a sedan chair, and those who felt the tail said it resembled a string. Indeed, though [their respective descriptions responded to the parts of the] elephant [they touched], they were lacking in overall understanding...

Furthermore, as shown in the following chapter of this volume, because of the radical difference between the digital code of the process that in the Project for a Scientific Psychology of 1895 Freud called secondary (based on the computations of the left cerebral hemisphere) and the analog code of the process that he called primary (based on the computations of the right hemisphere), the action of consciousness in terms of the former is

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\(^b\) Udaana 6,4: Tittha Sutta.
\(^d\) Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 295. The quotation is from Sutra of the Nucleus of the Tathagata. Tib., De bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po’i mdo. Skt., Tathagatagarbhasutra. Tohoku University catalogue of the sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon (Ed. H. Ui et al., Sendai, 1934), 258. P. Pfandt, Mahayana Texts Translated into Western Languages (Köln: In Kommission bei E. J. Brill, 1983), 231. The parts in parentheses are those I modified in order to make the text more comprehensible in the content in which it is being used.
very often read inversely in the latter—which causes it to yield effects diametrically opposed to the ones intended, as is proper to the samsaric “reverse law” or “law of inverted effect” that was briefly reviewed toward the end of the last chapter of vol. I of this book. The result of the inverted meaning that contents of digital secondary process have in the analog code of primary process, of the perception of parts of the whole as intrinsically isolated entities and the incapacity of consciousness to apprehend interconnections, and in general of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa, is the above-mentioned lack of fit between the aims behind our actions and the results these produce. In this regard I wrote elsewhere.\(^a\)

A delusion is a distorted perception of reality. Someone who, being deluded with regard to the direction of cardinal points, tries to go south, at a given moment could as well discover she or he is going north. As we have seen, this happens all the time in our daily lives, as so often our attempts to get pleasure result in pain, the actions whereby we intend to get happiness give rise to unhappiness, what we do achieve security produces insecurity, and so on and on. In fact, the essential human delusion (avidya or marigpa) gives rise to an inverted dynamics that often causes us to achieve with our actions the very opposite of what we set out to accomplish—which is what a popular twentieth century British-born author called “law of inverted effect” or “reverse law.”\(^b\)

The great Dzogchen Master Vimalamitra provided us with an excellent example of this law in the *Three Sections of the Letters of the Five Spaces*, where he noted that all the happiness of *samsara*, even if it momentarily appears as such, is in reality only suffering, maturing in the same way as the effects of eating an appetizing yet poisonous fruit: again and again the appetizing aspect of the fruits of *samsara* beguile us into gobbling them, yet we fail to learn from the ensuing stomachaches. In *The Precious Vase: Instructions on the Base of Santi Maha Samgha*, Chögyal Namkhai Norbu explains the examples [in terms of the five senses] with which the *mahasiddha* Sarahapada illustrated this law: \(^c\)

> “Not knowing what to accept and what to reject, even though we crave happiness we obtain only sorrow, like a moth that, attracted by a flame dives into it and is burnt alive; or like a bee that, due to its attachment to nectar, sucks a flower and cannot disengage from it, dying trapped inside; or like a deer killed by hunters while it listens to the sound of the flute; like fish that, attached to the taste of the food on the fisherman’s hook, die on the hot sand; like an elephant that, craving contact with something cool, goes into a muddy pool and dies because it cannot get out. In fact the *Treasury of the Dohas* (*Do ha mdzod*) says:

> “Observe the deeds of the fish, the moth, the elephant, the bee and the deer, [each of which brings about its own suffering through attachment to objects of one of the five senses]! [...]”

From the *Three Sections of the Letters of the Five Spaces* (op. 3: p. 7, 1):

> “There is no end to all the various secondary causes, just like following the mirage of a spring of water.”

> “In fact all the beings that transmigrate through the power of *karma*, whether they are born in the higher or lower states, are in fact beguiled and dominated by the diverse secondary causes so whatever actions they perform become a cause of suffering. They are never content with what they do and there is nothing on which they can really rely...”

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\(^a\) Capriles (2003).

\(^b\) Watts (1959).

\(^c\) Namkhai Norbu (1999/2001), p. 41. The quotation is from Vimalamitra (discovered as a terma [*gter ma*] by Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo (*jam dbyangs mkyen brtse dbang po*) [1820-1892], *klong lnga’i yi ge dum bu gsum pa* (*man ngag thams cad kyi rgyal po klong lnga’i yi ge dum bu gsum pa*), p. 6, 6.

\(^d\) Namkhai Norbu (1999/2001), p. 44.
Each society has its conventions, which contradict those of many other societies and
which are as arbitrary as the latter: while the Arabs see burping after partaking of a meal at
someone else’s home as a sign of politeness showing one is satisfied, Europeans would see
the same behavior as a scandalous breach of etiquette. However, the problem does not lie in
the contradiction between conventions, but in the fact that both the Arab and the European,
just as all other peoples, mistaking convention (Greek, nomos) for nature (Greek, physis),
view their social rules as absolute, universal standards. Far worse, religiously sanctioned
ideologies have brought about terrible forms of repression of children and women, Caste
systems that justify oppression and condemn dalits to unthinkable forms of ignominy, etc.
Likewise, insofar as the followers of theistic (and especially monotheistic) religions take
their own faith to be divinely sanctioned, and insofar as the followers of each ideology take
their own doctrine to be the only true and/or just one, religious and ideological divergences
have for millennia produced sheer insane behavior like wars, massacres, crucifixions, the
Inquisition with its tortures and stake, lynching, etc. However, in the last centuries things
have turned for the worst, for as shown in vol. III of this book, the currently prevailing
ideology, which is that of progress and of science as the bearer of truth, has given rise to
courses of behavior that, unless our delusion is healed and we radically change course, are
likely to destroy human society and even put an end to human life on this planet in the
course of the present century, and which as such are the most insane ever taken by our
species.

Thus we must agree with seventeenth century French thinker Blaise Pascal, who
compared the state of mind of normal individuals to a psychological disorder, and with ex-
Frankfurt philosopher, social psychologist and transpersonal forerunner Erich Fromm, who
gave to understand that our society as a whole is way far from sanity.

Just as there is a folie à deux there is a folie à millions. The fact that millions of people
share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many
errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the
same form of mental pathology does not make these people sane.

In fact, deluded normality consists in being well adapted to an extremely deranged
society, and as such implies becoming extremely deranged. In its turn, society is deranged
because its members are affected by an extreme instance of the basic human delusion called
avidya or marigpa, which has led them to develop common, clearly insane cultural views
and conventions. Roughly twelve centuries before Erich Fromm, Buddhist Madhyamika-
Prasangika Master and philosopher Chandrakirti related the fable of a king that consulted a
famous astrologer, who predicted that a rainfall of “maddening water” would pollute the
reservoirs in his kingdom, as a consequence of which all who drank from them would be
driven insane. Consequently the king warned his ministers and subjects, telling them to
prepare a protected supply of water and avoid drinking the deranging water. However, the
subjects, being less wealthy, exhausted their reserves more rapidly, and soon had to drink
contaminated water. Since the King and the ministers behaved quite differently from the
subjects who had drunk the maddening water, the latter concluded that all of the former had

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a Pascal (1962).
become insane. When the ministers used up their reserves, they also had to drink the deranging water—upon which the rest of the subjects thought the ministers had become sane, and all agreed the only one still insane was the king. Thus in order to keep his kingdom and avoid being impeached and put into an asylum, the king had no option but to drink the polluted water.\textsuperscript{a}

As noted above, the current, mortal ecological crisis we have produced is ample proof that there is a structural lack of fit between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world, for as we have seen, confirming that we are heading South while intending to go North proves that we are basing ourselves on a delusive perception and therefore that, in terms of criteria such as Korzybski’s, we are at the extreme opposite to sanity—which is just what Chandrakirti suggested, what Pascal and Fromm asserted, and what antipsychiatry in the ample sense of the term turned commonplace. (Though it was Laing’s disciple, David E. Cooper, who coined the term antipsychiatry, and R. D. Laing never applied it to his own system, when I use the term in an ample sense I include Laing under the label—a custom that, according to Adrian Laing,\textsuperscript{b} David Cooper initiated in his Introduction to The Dialectics of Liberation,\textsuperscript{c} but which I have observed in other works as well\textsuperscript{d}. I also include under the label those whom the Scottish psychiatrist influenced: Aaron Esterson, Joseph Berke, Morton Schaszman, Leon Redler, Noel Cobb, James Low, Jungian Psychologist John W. Perry,\textsuperscript{173} Ross V. Speck, Andrew Feldmár, Douglas C. Smith, David Small, Mina Semyon, M. Guy Thompson, Steven J. Ticktin, Ljiljana Filipovic, Steven Gans, Peter R. Breggin, Kevin F. McCready, Peter Sedgwick, and so on. And I include under the label even those akin thinkers or therapists having a different filiation—some of whom influenced Laing and some of whom were probably influenced by him—such as Gregory Bateson, Michel Foucault, Thomas Szasz, Kazimierz Dabrowski, Jay Haley, Bert Kaplan, Franco Basaglia, Stan and Christina Grof, Michael Washburn, etc.)

All of the above makes it clear that those vedantists who claim that there is no delusion, asserting that what here I refer to as delusion is no more than a lower degree of truth, whereas what I call Supreme Sanity is a higher degree of truth, are simply wrong.\textsuperscript{174} In fact, truth cannot be at the root of the dynamics of inverted effect under discussion and its dire effects. Though Buddhism, beside contrasting delusion and Gnosis, speaks of a relative truth and an absolute truth, it refers to the former by the Sanskrit term samvriti satya, which, as Gendün Chöphel (2005) made it clear, has the etymological meaning of “obscuration to correctness” or “thoroughly confused.”\textsuperscript{175}

It must be noted that when \textit{masked insanity} is unmasked in the context of a Path of Awakening with the concurrence of the necessary conditions—the main ones being the transmission and instructions given by a genuine holder of a lineage in the Path chosen—a transition toward \textit{absolute sanity} could be set in motion. However, when in contemporary societies the insanity under discussion is unmasked by adventitious circumstances, what in other circumstances could have been a spontaneous self-healing process turns into the pathetic madness we see in most psychiatric patients, which rather than leading them

\textsuperscript{a} Trungpa (1976); Chöphel (2005). The original Buddhist version of the story was told in Chandrakirti’s \textit{Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhsatatika} (Tib., \textit{dbu ma bzhi brgya pa’i ’grel pa, or byang chub sems dpa’i rnal ’byor spyod pa gzhis brgya pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa}): a Commentary to Aryadeva’s \textit{Chatuhisataka} (Tib., \textit{bzhi brgya pa}). Shah (1978) gives us the Sufi version of the same story.

\textsuperscript{b} Laing (1996).

\textsuperscript{c} Cooper (Ed. 1968).

\textsuperscript{d} For example, in Boyers & Orrill (Eds. 1971), or in Sedgwick (1982).
straight to ever greater sanity, endlessly repeats loops of pain.\textsuperscript{176} Though antipsychiatry is right in claiming that in the right environment and with the support of the right assistants this madness might become the spontaneous self-healing process Laing called “true madness,” it is wrong (with exceptions such as those of James Low and Noel Cobb,\textsuperscript{177} who are well aware of the need for transmission in the context of a Path of Awakening) in giving to understand that in itself and by itself going through madness can give rise to \textit{absolute sanity}.

At the beginning of this section it was noted that the terms \textit{absolute sanity} and \textit{absolute mental health} refer to Awakening. In fact, since samsaric spiritual attainments such as the formless absorptions that will be discussed in the following section and the corresponding realms involve the basic human delusion comprising the three senses the term \textit{avidya} has in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book (though not so in the third of the senses they have in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjampa\textsuperscript{178}), the criterion of sanity as absence of delusion implies that \textit{absolute sanity} could not lie in becoming established in those absorptions. In particular, \textit{absolute sanity} must necessarily exclude the subject-object duality that is at the heart of the formless absorptions, for this duality introduces the most fundamental distortion of the true, undivided condition of reality—and, insofar as the absorptions in question are often taken for the \textit{absolute sanity} or \textit{absolute mental health} of Awakening, they are the most treacherous, most dangerous instances of \textit{masked insanity}, which as such could be characterized as \textit{doubly masked insanity}. However, we may not reduce \textit{absolute sanity} to the absence of the basic human delusion that involves the subject-object duality, for then those meditative absorptions of the neutral base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten (\textit{kun gzhi lung ma bstan}) which are free from the delusion and the duality in question, but which involve \textit{avidya} or marigpa in the first of the senses the terms have in the two main Dzogchen classifications, would be instances of \textit{absolute sanity}—which in terms of the Korzybski-founded criterion adopted here cannot be the case, for in such absorptions no reactions to the world occur that may either fit or fail to fit what is actually going on in it, and which in terms of Buddhism in general and the Dzogchen teachings in particular is not the case insofar as they are not Awakening. In fact, \textit{absolute sanity} must exclude the unawareness of the Self-qu\-Base constituting the first of the meanings of \textit{avidya} and marigpa in the classification adopted in this book, so as to involve a capacity to effectively and consummately manage everyday situations—and hence it could not lie in conditions of cessation of Gnitive activity or \textit{niruddha} such as the neutral (i.e., neither samsaric nor nirvanic) condition of the base-of-all that Tibetans call kunzhi lungmaten\textsuperscript{a}. Since both the formless absorptions and the neutral condition of the base-of-all are transpersonal insofar as they do not involve the illusion of being an inherently separate individual limited to the bounds of the human organism, and yet neither of these absorptions may be said to be an instance of what I am calling \textit{absolute sanity}, the sanity in question \textit{may not} be reduced to the manifestation of unspecified transpersonal conditions.

To conclude, the impossibility of our digital, discontinuous, lineal, conceptual maps to match precisely the analog, continuous, holistic, nonconceptual territory of the given implies that \textit{absolute sanity} and \textit{absolute mental health} could not lie in a perfect fit between one or another scientific map of reality and the territory it interprets.\textsuperscript{179} On the contrary, as implied by the ontological and epistemological investigations in vol. I of this book and

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{kun gzhi lung ma bstan}. 

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in other works by this author,\(^a\) absolute sanity and absolute mental health imply that we neither mistake our conceptual maps for the territory of the given, nor believe a map to be absolutely correct and true and the opposite map to be absolutely incorrect and false:\(^i\) this mistake and this belief are instances of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa, which result from the interaction between what I call the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and the mechanisms of perception.

Above absolute sanity and absolute mental health were equated with Awakening; at this point we can be more precise and explain that absolute sanity and absolute mental health lie in the condition that, when it occurs transitorily on the Path, I call the Self-qua-Path and, when it manifests definitively as the Fruit, I call the Self-qua-Fruit. As noted in vol. I of this book, the distinction between the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit is due to the fact that in most cases the patency of the Self-qua-Base cannot be irreversibly established in a sudden way; initially the Self-qua-Path alternates with samsaric states, yet the latter become gradually less delusive as the mechanisms at the root of samsara lose strength and we become progressively aware of the apparitional character of all phenomena, by the same token developing conceptual systemic wisdom—and only after a long period of practice we can become firmly established in the Self-qua-Fruit, so that the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought never manifests again, and we are definitively liberated from the self-hindering and the host of defects inherent in delusion. This implies that, together with the concept of absolute sanity or absolute mental health we must accept the concept of a relative sanity or relative mental health consisting in the alternation of the absolute sanity or absolute mental health of the Self-qua-Path and the ever more mitigated insanity of those samsaric states in which delusion has progressively lost strength.

**Humpty Dumpy Sets the Causes for a Great Fall**

In order to fully understand what follows, the layman must know that Buddhism divides cyclic existence (samsara) into six realms (Skt. shadgati; Tib. drowa rig drug\(^b\)), on the one hand, and into three spheres (Skt. tridhatu, triloka or trilokadhautu; Tib. khamsum\(^c\) or jigtengyi khamsum\(^d\)), on the other. The six realms through which we transmigrate are: (1) the realm of purgatory (Skt. narakagati or narakaloka; Tib. nyälwai kham\(^e\)); (2) the realm of Tantaluses or hungry ghosts (Skt. pretagati or pretaloka; Tib. yidwaggyi kham\(^f\)); (3) the animal realm (Skt. tiryagionigati or tiryagioniloka; Tib. düdro’i kham\(^g\)); (4) the human realm (Skt. manushyagati or manushyaloka; Tib. mikyi kham\(^h\)); (5) the realm of antigods or titans (Skt. asuragati or asuraloka; Tib. lhamayingyi kham\(^i\)); and (6) the realm of gods (Skt. devagati, suragati, devaloka or suraloka; Tib. lha’i kham\(^j\)). The three spheres

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\(^{b}\) ‘gro ba rigs drug. This Tibetan term, rather than “six realms,” means “six classes of sentient beings.”

\(^{c}\) khamsum gsum.

\(^{d}\) ’jig rten gyi khams gsum.

\(^{e}\) dmyal ba’i khams.

\(^{f}\) yi dwags gyi kham.

\(^{g}\) sud ‘gro’i khams.

\(^{h}\) mi kyi khams.

\(^{i}\) lha ma yin gyi khams.

\(^{j}\) lha’i khams.
through which sentient beings can move are: (1) the sphere of sensuality (Skt. kamadhatu or kama loka; Tib. döpaikham\(^a\)); (2) the sphere of form (Skt. rupadhatus or rupa loka; Tib. zugkham\(^b\)); and (3) the formless sphere (Skt. arupadhatu or arupa loka; Tib. zugmekyi kham\(^c\)).

Thus among the six realms, the highest—that is, the least conflictive and/or most pleasant, but also the one that is farthest away from authenticity—is the realm of the gods (deva or sura). Concerning the three spheres, the lowest one is the sphere of sensuality (Skt. kamadhatu or kama loka; Tib. döpaikham\(^d\)); the middle one is the sphere of form (Skt. rupadhatus or rupa loka; Tib. zugkham\(^e\)), and the highest one is the formless sphere (Skt. arupadhatu or arupa loka; Tib. zugmekyi kham\(^f\)). The realm of sensuality, which is the one in which we are possessed by coarse passions, comprises the lower five among the six realms, plus the lowest section of the realm of the gods. The sphere of form, which may also be called “sphere of appreciation of pure forms [begetting pleasure or displeasure],”\(^181\) and which is divided into the seventeen realms experienced through the four meditative absorptions on form,\(^182\) occupies the middle section of the realm of the gods. Finally, the sphere of formlessness, which is the highest section of the realm of the gods, divides into four formless realms (Skt. chaturarupadhatu; Tib. zugme khampai gne zhi\(^g\)), which are: (1) the infinitude of space (Skt. akashanantyayatana; Tib. namkha thaye kyeche\(^h\)); (2) the infinitude of consciousness (vijñananantyayatana; Tib. namshe thaye kyeche\(^i\)); (3) the infinitude of nothingness (akimchanyayatana; Tib. chiyang mepe kyeche\(^j\)); and (4) the infinitude of neither perception not nonperception (naivasamjñanasamjñayatana; Tib. dushe me dushe memin kyeche\(^k\)), which is also called the “Summit of Existence” (Skt. bhavagra) insofar as it is the summit of experience conditioned by delusion and thus of what Buddhism calls “cyclic existence” or samsara.

Literally understood, the doctrine of the six realms and the three spheres may seem to a Westerner like an alien, dry, perhaps improbable cosmology. However, in Buddhism concepts have several levels of meaning, and hence we should not confine the notion of transmigration to whatever takes place after the physical death of the organism: in a most important sense, transmigration is something that is constantly occurring while we are in a biologically human organism, for the six realms and the three spheres are psychological states we constantly transit. In this sense, whenever we are confined to relationships of aggression, no matter on which end of the relation we stand, we are denizens of purgatory, which is divided into a series of hot and cold sub-realms, according to the character of the aggression.\(^183\) When we are possessed by a sense of deprivation that manifests as insatiable avidity, we are in the realm of hungry ghosts or Tantaluses. When we are overtaken by the urge to ignore whatever can alter our sense of comfort or security, we are in the animal

\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^a\) 'dod pa'i khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^b\) gzugs khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^c\) gzugs med kyi khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^d\) 'dod pa'i khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^e\) gzugs khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^f\) gzugs med kyi khams.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^g\) gzugs med kham pa'i gnas bzhi.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^h\) nam mkha' mtha' yas skye mched.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^i\) rnams mtha' yas skye mched.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^j\) ci yang med pa'i skye mched.}}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize{\(^k\) 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched.}}\)
realm. When we possess the aloofness and critical intelligence required for questioning our experience, we are in the human realm. While we struggle or conspire to overthrow those occupying important positions in order to take their place, are possessed by envy, or live in a world of intrigue, totally occupied with status and position, we are living in the realm of antigods or titans. When we are possessed by a sense of power, pride, achievement and/or delight, we are denizens of the realm of the gods.

Concerning the three spheres, as implied above, with the exception of some of the psychological states pertaining to the god realm, the six psychological states discussed in the above paragraph stand within the sphere of sensuality. However, profound experiences of aesthetic appreciation, as well as concentrations on figure that exclude a great deal of the sensory continuum, which is turned into ground, and in general those experiences involving the figure-ground distinction yet not involving the coarser passions proper to the realm of sensuality, fall within the sphere of form. Finally, psychological conditions involving what seems to be a panoramic consciousness that does not divide the continuum appearing as object into figure and ground, fall within the sphere of formlessness—and hence the four sub-realms of the sphere of formlessness listed above correspond to the four formless absorptions (Skt. catuḥsamāpatti of the arūpadhyānas; Tib. zugmepai nyomjug zhi). 184

Insofar as these absorptions make up the highest region of cyclic existence or samsara, and the highest of these absorptions is the very summit of cyclic existence, they constitute transient, illusory, unauthentic attainments. This is why, concerning the gods of the formless sphere, the Dzogchen Kunzang Lama tells us: 185

By practicing a meditative absorption in which no sense of good and evil obtains and conceiving this state as liberation, they are born as gods of the sphere beyond perception and lack of perception and stay in this absorption for many great aeons. But when the karma that gave rise to this state becomes exhausted, on account of their erroneous view (of setting out to build a constructed / conditioned state that as such is transient and pertains to samsara, and mistaking it for liberation), they are reborn in the lower realms of existence. Hence this state is an unfavorable condition for practicing the dharma.

For his part, Thogme Zangpo expressed in the following verses the unauthenticity and impermanence of the attainments of the gods—whether of the sphere of sensuality, of the sphere of form or of the sphere of formlessness—and the paramount error consisting in taking refuge in the gods:

The gods of this world are not yet free from sorrow,  
for caught in samsara, some day they must fall.  
If they’re bound as we are, how can they protect us?  
How can someone in prison free anyone else?

Such verses could as well have been written by the ascetic Gautama Siddhartha—the future Buddha Shakyamuni—after abandoning his two successive teachers, for he did so precisely because he realized that, though they had the power to enter lofty absorptions,
these were conditioned, and hence after some time they would “fall” from their “highs” and be totally possessed by the afflictions. Furthermore, he came to realize that dwelling in such “highs” causes meditators to become disaccustomed to the discomfort and suffering inherent in the lower realms, and so when the “fuel” consisting in the actions and habits—that is, the *karma*—that allowed them to climb to the higher realms is exhausted, or when the secondary causes or contributive conditions that allow them to remain therein are no longer manifest, they will frantically reject the discomfort they had become disaccustomed to—as a result of which they may give rise to the experience of one of the most suffering-ridden realms of existence. In fact, the *Samadhirajasutra* reads:

> Though they cultivate those concentrations (of the peak of existence [*bhavagra*] and so forth), they do not destroy the discrimination of self. Therefore, the afflictions return, and they are thoroughly disturbed—as in the case of the cultivation of the concentrations by Udraka Ramaputra.

With regard to the above, the “Great Fifth” Dalai Lama commented:

> Through the force of not having abandoned the conception of self-existence, they are disturbed again by the afflictions, as in the case of the forger (Tirthaka) Udraka Ramaputra. They again fall into a consciousness of lower states. Therefore, how could it be that trainees who are beings of greatest capacity would seek worldly special insight that only suppresses manifest afflictions?

Independently of whether or not we accept the already discussed thesis according to which the authentic experience of being-for-Self is anguish and that of being-for-others is the *hell* that Sartre called “shame,” it is indisputable that in the last of the four or three ages into which the cosmic time cycles called aeons (Skt. *kalpa*; Tib. *kal pa*; Greek, *aion*) are traditionally divided, statistical psychological normality depends on having some degree of success at eluding anguish and *hell* by modifying our attitudes in order to make sensations more bearable and avoid self-impediment, and that we try to achieve this mainly by getting others to project on us a convenient *persona*—ideally one that is source of pride, but otherwise one we can be indifferent to so as to replace the painful experiences of anguish and/or shame for ones involving neutral sensations. However, in our time—final stage of the fourth of the ages in question—the *reductio ad absurdum* of the *avidya* that is the basic human contradiction, achieved through the technological multiplication of human power to modify the individual, society and the ecosystem, has caused this contradiction to turn into conflict. In fact, the agitated, stressful, extremely accelerated way of life resulting from this multiplication produces increasing anxiety and stress, whereas the accelerating pace of change of standards and proliferation of social subgroups with different standards make it increasingly difficult to steadily derive pride from embodying a convenient *persona* by means of bad faith. Since these and a host of other conditions make the ideal of a relatively undisturbed existence impossible to attain, normality comes to imply ineluctable anxiety and stress.

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c *bskal pa* or *kal pa*. 
However, not all human beings content themselves with achieving a grey, average normality: there are those who strive to excel in their respective walks of life, learn how to charm and manipulate other people, and/or improve their mastery of mental mechanisms, of their bodies, of their sexuality, etc. in order to attain the condition of a god of sensuality. Nevertheless, even if they succeed at this, the highs of pride will continue to alternate with the downs of shame, and anxiety will be boosted by the fear of losing the image and status they have achieved—and, in many cases, by the way of life resulting from these exploits. The same applies to the very few who aim beyond the sphere of sensuality and set out to achieve the condition of a god of form, or even of a god of formlessness: even when their intents are successful, they are still incapable of holding on uninterruptedly to the spurious paradises they have conquered. In fact, though time moves slower in the sphere of form and hence stays in it may be experienced as lasting longer than in the paradises of sensuality, and though times moves even slower in the formless sphere and hence the stays in it may be experienced as lasting even longer, a law analogous to that of gravity makes all that goes up by means of action go down at some point—and, once down, it is very likely that the more unpleasant experience may elicit rejection, which in its turn produces an experience of hell.

Buddhism makes it clear that higher realms depend on good karmas and merits, and their attainment may result from the application of spiritual methods based on action (Skt. *karma*) and / or other activities or circumstances. Ch’an Master Yung-chia Hsiian-chueh\(^{187}\) compared the ascent to higher realms to an arrow shot upwards, and noted that insofar as the arrow’s ascent depends on the limited impulse / energy of action, given the downward pull of gravity, sooner or later it will have to fall. Yung-chia writes:\(^a\)

\begin{quote}
Giving (*dana*) practiced with an aim  
may result in the grace of being reborn in heaven.  
This, however, is like shooting an arrow upwards:  
when the force that thrusts the arrow is exhausted  
it will return to the ground  
and its ascent will have created adverse *karma*  
for the times to come.
\end{quote}

In Tibet, those who, by means of spiritual techniques, ascended to the formless sphere, were compared to a bird taking flight that sooner or later would have to descend, and their being-for-Self’s *becoming* an entity appearing as object (as in the manifestation of being-for-others) was compared to the bird’s shadow (a term that in this case, rather than having the sense Jung gave it, stands for the individual’s sense of self). In our time, some Tibetan teachers and Western authors\(^b\) have modified the traditional image, and compare such individuals unto an airplane that can fly so long as there is fuel in its tanks and the right contributory conditions are present. As I have noted elsewhere\(^c\), the fuel stands for the primary cause (Skt. *hetu*; Tib. *gyu*\(^d\)) of the ascent to the formless sphere and stay therein, which Buddhism compares to the seed from which a plant sprouts and grows, and which

\(^{a}\) Adapted from: Yoka Daishi / Taisen Deshimaru (1981); cited in Capriles (1999a, 2000a, 2000c).
\(^{c}\) Capriles (1977, 1986, 1999a, 2000a, 2000c).
\(^{d}\) *rgyu*. 

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basically consists in the potentiality (Sanskrit: \textit{karma}; Tib. \textit{le^{a}}) for the experiences of this sphere—which in this case is a result of the actions (Sanskrit: \textit{karma}; Tib. \textit{le^{b}}) taken in the context of the spiritual practices whereby we establish healthy habits and attitudes, and of other meritorious actions. Contributory conditions (Skt. \textit{pratyaya}; Tib. \textit{kyen^{c}}) are compared to light, humidity, earth, heat, etc., which in the case of individuals in the formless sphere might include a calm environment, admiration by disciples, fame, absence of confrontation with adverse opinions—and, in some particular cases, psychoactive substances.

In this metaphor, as the airplane flies higher and higher its shadow progressively broadens and blurs; then at some height it becomes strikingly more blurred, and finally at a given altitude it seems to disappear.\footnote{188} In fact, when the formless sphere is attained, the practitioner’s sense of self seemingly reaches Totality and includes everything, and finally, on the occasion of attaining the summit of the formless sphere—thus seeming to go beyond both conceptualization (Skt. \textit{samjña}; Tib. \textit{dushe^{d}}) and non-conceptualization (Skt. \textit{asamjña}; Tib. \textit{dushe me^{e}}), as the name of this realm suggests—they gain the illusion of “being one who transcended the notion of self.” Nevertheless, conceptualization has not really been surpassed, for there is still the subtle concept of being beyond both conceptualization and lack of it, and what the plane’s shadow represents—being-for-Self’s \textit{becoming} an entity appearing as object, and the ensuing sense of self—rather than dissolving, has become the sense of being someone who has gone beyond the extremes in question. Therefore, when the \textit{karma} involved runs out or contributory conditions become adverse—\textit{in terms of} the metaphor, when the aircraft runs out of fuel or atmospheric or mechanical conditions make it impossible for it to go on flying—the individual will fall from the formless sphere and be confined to a narrow focus of attention and thereby to a narrowly limited sense of self. In terms of the example, the plane will have to descend and meet its shadow once more.

In the heights of the formless sphere individuals get accustomed to the wider scope of consciousness involved in samsaric states of greater space-time-knowledge,\footnote{189} represented by the apparently unlimited character of the sky; to the illusion of no longer having a sense of self, represented by the illusion of having no shadow; and to the lack of coarse passions. Therefore, when they fall from those heights, the reestablishment of the narrow focus of attention and of confinement to the limits of a narrow entity may induce claustrophobia; likewise, having become unaccustomed to being tossed by coarse passions, they may feel being so tossed to be a torture—which may lead them to reject experience and thus make mental sensation become painful. Insofar as the formless sphere depends on the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness being higher than in the psychological states that make up the current statistical normality, upon falling from the heights in question the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is likely to be quite high, and hence the limits of the focus of conscious awareness might not have recovered the rather hermetic character that (as shown in the preceding chapter) is needed for preventing rejection from activating hellish positive feedback loops. Therefore, those who fall from the sphere of formlessness are likely to face a hellish experience.\footnote{189}

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\textit{Tarthang Tulku (1977a).}
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Ronald D. Laing wrote:

Elusion is a relation in which one pretends oneself away from one’s original self; then pretends oneself back from this pretence so as to appear to have arrived back at the starting point. A double pretence simulates no pretence. The only way to “realize” one’s original state is to forgo the first pretence, but once one adds a second pretence to it, as far as I can see, there is no end to the series of possible pretences. I am. I pretend I am not. I pretend I am. I pretend I am not pretending to be pretending...

Figure 1.

The positions A and A₁ on the perimeter of the circle are separated by an impermeable barrier which is thinner and more transparent than one can imagine. Begin at A and move towards B. Instead of going back in a clockwise direction to A, continue in an anti-clockwise direction to point A₁. A and A₁ are “so near and yet so far.” They are so close that one says: “Is not A₁ just as good as A, if it is indistinguishable from A?”

Those who engage in the process of falsification of the realization of our original condition make themselves believe that that they are striving toward this realization, which they deem supremely valuable. Therefore, if they manage to achieve their final goal, unable to admit the unauthentic character of their achievement, they make themselves believe they have attained the genuine realization of our original condition, and hence rather than telling themselves, as in Laing’s explanation of the diagram, “Is not A₁ just as good as A, if it is indistinguishable from A?,” they tell themselves: “What an achievement—I finally arrived at A!”

Unlike logical processes, which are reversible and thus characteristically atemporal insofar as the negation of what was formerly posited annuls it, phenomenological processes of the kind Laing described involve the irreversibility proper to temporality, in the sense that the negation of whatever was formerly posited conceals it rather than annulling it, and thereby asserts it and sustains it. In the above diagram, B is a phenomenological negation of A; whereas in a logical process the negation of B qua negation of A would again be

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A, in a phenomenological process of this kind the negation of the negation of A represented as B, rather than being A, is an imitation of A—which is what the diagram represents as A₁. Therefore, contrarily to Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation, which was supposed to increase plentitude and truth but which is not found in phenomenological processes (it may seem to occur in non-phenomenological processes such as scientific development, in which new theories very often negate older ones while retaining a great deal of what they posited—as Washburn’s example of the negation / incorporation of Newtonian physics by Einstenian physics—but what happens in these cases is that logical negation is applied to some aspects of the older theory but not to other aspects). The processes I call “phenomenological” are those involving the succession of states of being rather than the succession of systems of thought built on the basis of secondary process / operative thinking logic; in processes of this kind, the only negation involved that is different from logical negation is the one under discussion, which increases fragmentation and falsehood. Understanding processes of this kind as involving Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation would only be possible on the basis of the false Hegelian premise that nature and reality in general are a projection of spirit ruled by the secondary process / operative thinking logic that rules thought, but which are self-contradictory and hence can only be described dialectically in terms of contradictions. (The phenomenological double negation that Laing illustrated with the above diagram was contrasted with Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation in others of my works; a brief outline of the contrast in question is also drawn in Vol. III of this book.)

The first thing to do if Laing’s diagram is to be made useful for the purposes of this section, is to clarify what the points in it represent. For the purposes of this chapter, point A₁, which in Laing’s diagram is the final result of the process of simulation and as such is the extreme of unauthenticity, will stand for the peak of experience which is the summit of samsara, in which we gain the illusion of having become one with the universe, of having achieved totality, of having eradicated all possible concepts of self and thus having attained Buddhahood, etc.—and which therefore is a samsaric imitation of the Self-qua-Fruit. Since in Laing’s diagram A is what A₁ simulates, and since Laing noted that A is our original condition, the usage of A₁ for representing the simulation of the Self-qua-Fruit implies that A must stand for the Self as defined in this book. Since, as it has been established, the Self in this sense remains concealed throughout early infancy, and since, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, it remains concealed throughout prenatal conditions and throughout the intermediate state between death and rebirth or bardo (except in the case of those who managed to reGnize the true condition of the experiences of the state in question), the above assertion that phenomenological negations, unlike their logical counterparts, involve the irreversibility proper to temporality, should not lead us to infer that the diagram under consideration represents human ontogenesis. In fact, rather than a process of chronological development, the diagram represents a process of unauthentic ontological development.

The process of phenomenological double negation illustrated by Laing’s diagram is the one involved in bad faith, whereby, as shown in the preceding chapter, we elude all that we find disturbing, by the same token building a self-identity. However, the diagram is too general and abstract to illustrate this process properly. For example, Laing intended point A to represent our original Self (i.e., our original condition, however he conceived it) and B to

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b The definitive explanation of this will be found in Capriles (work in progress 2); previous, less precise explanations were provided in Capriles (1992, 1994a).
represent the illusion of being away from our original Self. Since in my reading of Laing’s diagram A stands for what I am calling the Self, and since what conceals this condition is the arising of being-for-Self, then B must stand for this mode of being (although, in terms of a looser usage of concepts, it could be made to stand for being-for-others as well). And since, insofar as by definition action—including the action of pretending—can only be performed by the mental subject of which being-for-Self is the being, being-for-Self is the condition of possibility of pretence—and hence B is the point where the process involving serial pretences starts. Therefore, the diagram is wrong in representing the transition from A to B as a pretence. Moreover, before the arising of being-for-Self and of being-for-others there is no need to elude anything, for the experiences we are compelled to elude arise with these modes of being: as we have seen, anguish is the bare experience of being-for-Self, and the disposition of this mode of being to become being-for-others is at the root of the hell that Sartre called shame.

Furthermore, though the transition from B—which, as noted above, is the condition of possibility of pretence and the starting point of the process of serial pretences—to the simulation of A represented by A₁ involves countless pretences, Laing’s spiral represents it by a single pretence. In fact, after arising as B, being-for-Self resorts to a complex series of double pretenses in order to elude the distress inherent in the bare experience of this mode of being (which as we have seen is anguish) and in that of being-for-others (which as we have seen is the hell Sartre called “shame”), achieve a comfortable self-image and believe beyond any doubt to be the self-image in question. And only after successfully achieving a self-image in this way, would some sophisticated individuals with extremely particular inclinations set out to climb to the “peak of samsara”—which is achieved by combining serial pretences of the kind represented by Laing’s spiral, with meditation practices based on negative feedback establishing what Buddhaghosa’s Atthasalini called “healthy habits and attitudes that sustain birth and death.”

Finally, Laing’s diagram has the defect of explaining exclusively in terms of the digital process Freud called secondary, associated with the working of the left cerebral hemisphere, a dynamic that involves the interaction of this process with the one Freud called primary, associated with the working of the right brain hemisphere (explanations of these processes and their interaction are briefly provided in a subsequent chapter of this volume and in Vol. III of this book; in other works I have explained them in greater detail). And yet the dynamic that Laing illustrates with the diagram is a key aspect of the process of ascending to the peak of samsara that constitutes the imitation of our true condition, and the diagram is extremely useful for understanding this dynamic.

Let us consider Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche’s explanation of the ascent to the peak of samsara, which compares the core of delusion referred to by the Sanskrit term ahamkara and the Tibetan term ngadzin, which has the etymological meaning of “self-grasping,” but which denotes a complex idea that involves self-affirmation and self-preoccupation, with a monkey living in a house with six windows (five windows standing for the five senses universally admitted in the West, and the sixth standing for the sense that perceives mental contents posited by Buddhism)—and which is most relevant at this point insofar as it makes it clear that access to the peak in question depends on a combination of conditioned

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c nga 'dzin.
meditation practices based on negative feedback with the process of serial pretences illustrated by Laing’s diagram. (Previous paragraphs of the explanation by the late Tibetan Buddhist Master illustrated the monkey’s ascent to the realm of the gods. The ones reproduced below illustrate the monkey’s transition to the sphere of formlessness and its progressive ascent through the four realms of this sphere.)

The monkey discovers that he can go beyond the sensual pleasures and beauties of the God Realm and enter into the Dhyana or concentration states of the Realm of the Formless Gods, which is the ultimate refinement of the six realms. He realizes that he can achieve purely mental pleasure, the most subtle and durable of all, that he is able to maintain his sense of a solid self continuously by expanding the walls of his prison to seemingly include the whole cosmos, thereby [seeming to] conquer change and death. First he dwells upon the idea of limitless space. He watches limitless space; he is here and limitless space is there and he watches it. He imposes his preconceptions of the world, creates limitless space, and feeds himself with this experience. Then the next stage is concentration upon the idea of limitless consciousness. Here one does not dwell on limitless space alone, but one also dwells upon the intelligence which perceives that limitless space as well. So ego watches limitless space and consciousness from its central headquarters. The empire of ego is completely extended; even the central authority cannot imagine how far its territory extends. Ego becomes a huge, gigantic beast.

Ego has extended itself so far that it begins to lose track of the boundary of its territory. Wherever it tries to define its boundary, it seems to exclude part of its territory. Finally, it concludes that there is no way of defining its boundaries. The size of its empire cannot be conceived or imagined. Since it includes everything, it cannot be defined as this or that. So the ego dwells on the idea of not this and not that, the idea that it cannot conceive or imagine itself. But finally even this state of mind is surpassed when the ego realizes that the idea that it is inconceivable and unimaginable is itself a conception. So the ego dwells on the idea of not this, and not not that. This idea of the impossibility of asserting anything is something which ego feeds on, takes pride in, identifies with and therefore uses to maintain its continuity. This is the highest level of concentration and achievement that confused, samsaric mind can attain.

The monkey has managed to reach the ultimate level of achievement, but he has not transcended the dualistic logic upon which achievement depends. The walls of the monkey’s house are still solid, still have the quality of “other” in a subtle sense. The monkey may have achieved a temporary harmony and peace and bliss through a seeming union with his projections; but the whole thing is subtly fixed, a closed world. He has become as solid as the walls, has achieved the state of egohood. He is still preoccupied with securing and enhancing himself, still caught up in fixed ideas and concepts about the world and himself, still taking the fantasies of the fifth skandha seriously. Since his state of consciousness is based on concentration, on dwelling upon other, he must continually check and maintain his achievement. “What a relief to be here… I finally made it. I have really got it now. But wait a minute… Have I really made it? Ah, there it is. Yes, I’ve made it. I have made it.” The monkey thinks that he has achieved nirvana, but actually he has achieved only a temporary state of egohood.

Thus it is clear that climbing from the sphere of sensuality to the peak of experience which in the psycho-cosmology of the Sutrayana is the summit of ek-sistence / samsara, and which consists in the “highest” of all four realms of the formless sphere, is a process

\(^a\) Trungpa (1973).
based on causes and conditions that involves: (1) the panoramification of consciousness leading beyond the figure-ground schism (but not beyond the subject-object duality); (2) molding one’s attitudes by means of meditation practice based on negative feedback; and (3) convincing oneself of something in the way Laing described in terms of the diagram of a spiral of pretences. It is because the process of ascending to higher realms is based on causes and conditions, and in particular in convincing oneself of something in the way Laing illustrated with the diagram of a spiral of pretences, that it represents an increase in falsehood and self-deceit, and that attaining the “peak of samsara” amounts to attaining the peak of falsehood and self-deceit.

Since a basic feature of the basic human delusion the Buddha called avidya is the illusion of separateness and finiteness, it implies the terror of death Aldous Huxley called “the essential horror” and the concomitant drive to avoid death or dissolution and continue to exist, which implies the compulsion to maintain the existence of being-for-Self. Since, for the reasons already considered, the delusion in question involves the need to maintain a continuous self-image, to feel in control of experience and to maintain what is popularly called executive ego-function, it implies terror of madness and of the concomitant death of ego (in the Earlier Freudian sense of the term, and in general in all of its senses). And, for obvious reasons, delusion involves terror of pain and the concomitant drive to avoid painful experiences and disturbances—which, insofar as terror is painful, includes terror of terror. In fact, as shown in the last chapter of vol. I of this book, the fundamental contradiction inherent in being-for-Self is that this mode of being experiences itself as lack of the plenitude inherent in the Self, and therefore craves for plenitude and perfection and strives by all means to achieve them (a toil that confirms and maintains the illusion that we are destitute, hungry entities separate from the plenitude of the Self, and thus sustains our illusory lack of plenitude and perfection)—but, because of the first of the basic features of delusion under consideration, by the same token it struggles to prevent the dissolution of the cause of the lack-of-plenitude, which is its very existence (and in general that of the human delusion called avidya or marigpa).

Because of all of the above, human beings must content themselves with eluding by means of bad faith this destitution and hunger, as well as the recurring frustration yielded by the failure of our attempts to achieve satisfaction, and in general the duhkha inherent in samsara. The combination of elusion by means of bad faith with spiritual techniques based on negative feedback in order to climb toward the peak of ek-sistence or peak of samsara, as discussed in this section, is simply the most elaborate and sophisticated way of trying to achieve this in the hope that we may finally obtain the satisfaction and the fulfillment that eluded us throughout our more pedestrian samsaric endeavors. However, as we have seen, in the best of cases the result will be a vacation from the full experience of duhkha.

The first stages in the arising and development of delusion from the meditative absorption of the base-of-all

As we have seen, the process of ascending through the three spheres to the peak of ek-sistence / samsara which is the subject of this chapter is impelled by what the Dzogchen teachings refer to by the Sanskrit term ahamkara and the Tibetan term ngadzin⁹, which as noted above has the etymological meaning of self-grasping, but which denotes a stirring of

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⁹ nga 'dzin.
self-affirmation and self-preoccupation. Since the arising and development of delusion from the neutral base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active begins with the stirring of what I am literally rendering as self-grasping, and then involves successively entering the sphere of formlessness, the sphere of form, and the sphere of sensuality, at this point it seemed necessary to provide a brief explanation of the process in question in terms of the categories discussed in this chapter, as well as in those discussed in the last chapter of vol. I. (However, in order to reduce complexity, in the explanation in question the stages of the process have been minimized.)

In terms of the Dzogchen teachings, the discussion of the above process may begin with a description of the neutral condition of the base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten\(^a\), which at this point it is relevant to consider in its function as the base-of-all-carrying-propensities (bagchagkyi kunzhi).\(^b\) In this condition, the limitless space where all phenomena appear (Skt. dharmadhatu; Tib. chöjing\(^c\)), which has been compared to a limpid, clear sky, may be nonconceptually patent, constituting an experience of voidness—which may coincide with an experience of clarity, and/or one of pleasure. We have repeatedly seen that, though the condition in question is not samsara insofar as it does not involve the subject-object duality that is the pivot of the second of the senses the terms avidya and marigpa have in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book (and hence does not involve the second and the third of the senses in question), it is not nirvana either, for there is no reGnition of spontaneous nondual self-awareness, insofar as the awareness in question is obscured by the beclouding element of stupefaction corresponding to the first of the senses of avidya and marigpa in the classification adopted in this book—and hence the chikshe kundröl\(^d\) or all-liberating single gnosis that in nirvana is patent and functional, in this condition is neither patent nor functional. It is most important to note that the condition in question—which, by the way, matches the descriptions of the state of turiya-ananda that according to Upanishads such as the Mandukya and the Taittiriya is the realization of the absolute nature,\(^e\) as well as those of nirvikalpa samadhi in some Hindu systems\(^f\)—is often mistaken for nirvana or Awakening and, in the context of the Dzogchen teachings, for the dharmakaya (the correct apprehension of the dang mode of manifestation of energy that is the first level of realization on the Path of Ati Dzogpa Chenpo)—a distortion that according to a prophesy of the great tertön Jigme Lingpa\(^g\), is supposed to be particularly widespread in our time. However, this condition does not last uninterruptedly; at some point it is interrupted by the sudden shining forth of what is known as ngowo shi\(^h\), which gives Dzogchen practitioners the opportunity of obtaining the reGnition of the clear, limpid, all-embracing essence or ngowo aspect of spontaneous nondual self-awareness (Skt. swasamvedana; Tib. rang rig) called dharmakaya.

In fact, if, as this shining forth occurs, a spontaneous nondual and nonconceptual reGnition makes patent the true condition of the ngowo aspect of spontaneous nondual self-awareness (rangngo shepa\(^i\)), the dharmakaya—first level of realization in Dzogchen

\(^a\) kun gzhi lung ma bstan.
\(^b\) bag chags kyi kun gzhi.
\(^c\) chos dbyings.
\(^d\) gcig shes kun grol.
\(^e\) 'jigs med gling pa.
\(^f\) ngo bo'i gshis.
\(^g\) rang ngo shes pa.
Atiyoga\textsuperscript{200}—manifests in an initial actualization of the chikshe kundröl\textsuperscript{a} or “all-liberating single gnosis” which characterizes the condition of nirvana. When this liberating gnosis becomes patent, whichever thought is present spontaneously liberates itself; however, the way in which this occurs depends on the capacity of spontaneous liberation prevailing in the individual at the time. At any rate, the gnosis in question is most clearly illustrated by taking as a paradigm the third and highest mode of spontaneous liberation, which is the one called rangdröl\textsuperscript{b}, in terms of which it may be exemplified by a spring in which the water gushing from the earth makes the surface’s total pattern change so rapidly and constantly as to make the identification of enduring forms impossible, and in which no perceiver seems to lie at a distance from the spring who may identify forms so as to cling to them or reject them: this is why thoughts liberate themselves spontaneously as they arise, like drawings on water.\textsuperscript{201} However, this condition does not last forever: at some point (and initially most likely after very few seconds) avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book manifests again, reinstating the dimension of the base-of-all—from which samsara begins to develop once more. (Before Awakening, Shakyamuni was resting in the meditative absorption of the neutral base-of-all; Awakening is said to have occurred in his continuum when, on the occasion of seeing the morning star, Awake awareness was recognized, giving rise to nirvana.)

However, in Dzogchen we are not passive: we do not remain in kunzhi until ngowo shi spontaneously shines forth; we must do whatever is necessary to induce this shining forth and facilitate the manifestation of the nondual, nonconceptual recognition that makes patent the true condition of the ngowo aspect of spontaneous nondual self-awareness, so that rigpa-quā-Path manifests as the dhammakaya. When the neutral condition of the base-of-all is manifest as the base-of-all-carrying-propensities and we are neither asleep nor in a stone-like state of total unawareness, there is a most clear awareness. A precise application of the secret oral instructions may contribute to the nondual, nonconceptual recognition of this awareness: \textit{in terms of these instructions}, we look and check to what or whom is this condition present—or in what awareness, just like a reflection in a mirror, is it manifest. This puts an end to the condition of the base-of-all, inducing a stirring tending to give rise to the subject-object duality and the phenomenon of being that are the core of samsara; however, since the illusory mental subject can perceive objects only, and by no means can perceive itself, the precise way of looking explained in the instructions may provide a most precious opportunity for the subject-object duality that is the core of the basic delusion corresponding to the second of the senses the term avidya or marigpa has in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book to short-circuit just as it arises, and collapse together with the phenomenon of being. In that instant, the nondual, nonconceptual recognition that makes the true condition of spontaneous nondual self-awareness patent manifests, putting an end to the beclouding of primordial awareness that is the first sense avidya or marigpa has in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book, and therefore allowing this self-awareness to manifest and function as chikshe kundröl or “all-liberating single gnosis.” When this occurs, it is self-evident that it did so spontaneously rather than having been \textit{produced} by our action, and that such occurrence cannot be \textit{produced} by any means whatsoever. (If the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness has reached a given height and certain specific conditions are present, the recognition may take place after

\textsuperscript{a} gcik shes kun grol.

\textsuperscript{b} rang grol.
a positive feedback loop has led tensions to a threshold, and then, in connection with the application of the instructions, but not as an effect of this, the subject-object duality and the phenomenon of being liberate themselves spontaneously [i.e. liberate of their own accord, in a perfectly spontaneous way] together with the tensions they generate: since whichever action we perform, and whichever hope we may harbor that tensions will spontaneously liberate themselves, causes these to increase exponentially, in this case it will be even more evident that the reGnition that makes the true condition of spontaneous nondual self-awareness patent and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of delusion do not at all depend on our actions or on our will.)

However, at the time of the shining forth of ngowo shi, the beclouding element of stupefaction (Tib. mongcha\(^a\)) that has always been flowing with the continuum of those beings who have never realized the true condition and that is the core of the first type of avidya or marigpa in all Dzogchen classifications—the one that prevents the reGnition of our true condition and that precedes the process of origination of samsara, which in the threefold Dzogchen division adopted in this book is called innate beclouding of primordial, nondual awareness (Tib. lhenkye marigpa\(^b\) or lhenchik kyepai marigpa\(^c\)), and that in the alternative threefold Dzogchen classification of avidya favored by Longchen Rabjampa is referred to by the hardly translatable term gyu dagnyi chikpa marigpa\(^d\)—may prevent the reGnition of the true condition of that which shone forth, which otherwise would have made the dharmakaya patent, and thus give rise to an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all (in which there is no nirvana insofar as this type of avidya is manifest, yet there is no samsara insofar as the other types of avidya are not manifest). If, immediately after failing to reGnize the sudden shining forth in question and thus failing to experience it as the (expression of the) Base, the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle threefold thought structure gives rise to the subject-object duality, and hence we take that shining forth for an external reality, this is the second type of avidya according to the threefold classification favored by Longchenpa—in which it is called spontaneous illusion or lhenchik kyepai marigpa\(^e\)—and the one that marks the beginning of the development of samsara. This gives rise to the illusory distance between the perceiver and the perceived necessary for the perceiver to subsequently cling to the perceived, and hence for the arising of the grasper and the grasped which are the condition of possibility of grasping at appearances. And, in fact, it is after this that there manifests the delusiveness (Skt. kliśhtamanas; Tib. nyön yi\(^f\))—the propensity for which is inherent in the base-of-all-carrying-propensities ()—that, on the basis of the delusory valuation-absolutization of subtle (intuitive) thoughts, instantly conceives the base-of-all-carrying-propensities as an independently existing “I” that rules over the skandhas, thus giving rise to the basic disturbing attitude referred to by the Sanskrit term ahāmbhāra and the Tibetan ngadzin\(^g\) that I am rendering as self-grasping (but that as we have seen involves self-affirmation and self-preoccupation), which conceives an I or me as the experiencer, would-be controller and

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\(^a\) rmongs cha.

\(^b\) lhan skyes ma rig pa.

\(^c\) lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa.


\(^e\) lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa. Cf. Longchenpa (1975a, p. 51; 1976, pp. 24 and 122 note 10) and Cornu (2001, p. 62). This is the same term that the other classification uses to refer to the first type of avidya.

\(^f\) nyon yid.

\(^g\) nga 'dzin.
somehow owner of what is cognized. This will give rise to the third type of āvidya in the threefold classification espoused by Longchenpa, which is termed kun tu tagpai marigpa\(^a\) or imaginative delusion, and which as the term suggests is related to the third truth of Mahamadhyamaka.\(^{203}\) This type of āvidya involves the singling out of objects within the continuum that appeared as object the very moment spontaneous illusion (lhenchik kyepai marigpa as understood in the threefold classification favored by Longchen Rabjampa) arose in the immediately preceding stage—thus presupposing the operationality of a divisive, hermetic focus of awareness—and the perception of these objects in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized subtle (intuitive) thoughts (thus involving the confusion of the digital, fragmentary maps of thought with the analog, holistic territory of the given that such maps are incapable of matching)—which produces the illusion of there being a plethora of entities existing inherently, independently and disconnectedly. Since the idea of an I has been superimposed on the illusory subject associated with dualistic consciousness, a compelling drive arises to confirm its existence and gratify its acquisitiveness by means of contacts with the seemingly self-existing, apparently external entities perceived at this stage. With this, the illusion that constitutes the second type of āvidya in the division adopted in this book becomes complete; insofar as a low energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the defense mechanisms discussed in this volume allow us to ignore (mishepa\(^b\)) this illusion to be no more than an illusion, we are under the power of the third type of āvidya in the classification adopted in this book—and, as we thus become totally deluded, samsara consolidates.

The grasper’s clinging to the grasped reinforces and consolidates the inhibition of spontaneous liberation that, as a result of the arising of āvidya and marigpa in the first of the senses the terms have both in the Dzogchen classification adopted here and in the one espoused by Longchen Rabjampa, was already manifest in the condition of the base-of-all—and it makes the complete development of samsara possible insofar as the whole of samsara functions in terms of the subject-object duality. In fact, in terms of the above illustration of the chikshe kundrö\(^c\) or all-liberating single gnosis by the example of a spring, in samsara there is a perceiver that seems to lie at a distance from the water, and the spring now flows like a river in which this perceiver can single out relatively lasting forms, conceptualize them, and cling to them, thereby fixating them and thus preventing their spontaneous liberation.

So that the distinction and relationship between the two threefold classifications of āvidya in the Dzogchen teachings discussed above may become crystal clear, it is essential to keep in mind that the first sense of āvidya in the Dzogchen division adopted here is the same as in the Dzogchen classification favored by Longchenpa, even though each system refers to it by a different name; the second sense of āvidya in the division adopted here comprises both the second and third senses of the term in the Dzogchen classification espoused by Longchenpa (even though the name of the second type of āvidya in the latter classification is the same as that of the first in the former); and the third sense of āvidya in the division adopted here is the seal that maintains the operationality of the combination of the other two types of āvidya in the division adopted here, and of all three types of āvidya in the classification used by Longchenpa.

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\(^b\) mi shes pa.

\(^c\) gcig shes kun grol.
However, also in case the shining forth of ngowo shi had been recognized and hence nirvana had manifested, this would not last forever: at some point (and initially most likely after very few seconds) avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses it has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here and in the one favored by Longchen Rabjampa would manifest again, reinstating the dimension of the base-of-all, from which samsara would rapidly develop. If we wish to explain the ensuing origination of samsara in more precise terms, we may do so in terms of three stages that successively produce birth in the three spheres of samsara; if at any of these stages we let go of the drives that give rise to delusion, the development of samsara will be interrupted, but otherwise the corresponding samsaric sphere will become established. These three stages are:

1. The co-emergent arising of the activity I call “delusory valuation-absolutization” and the supersubtle thought I call threefold thought-structure, which gives rise to avidya in the second sense of the term in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjampa, produces a directional, dualistic structuring and functioning of the cognitive complex (which has polarized into subject and object) and by the same token gives rise to the phenomenon of being—thus generating the illusion that there is an experience-that-is, an experiencer-that-is and something-experienced-that-is. The arising of the subject-object duality at a time when there is nothing that may be taken as object except for the continuum of the neutral base-of-all that manifested when the beclouding element of stupefaction prevented the recognition of ngowo shi\(^a\) that otherwise would have made evident the essence or ngowo aspect of the Base (i.e. the Base’s voidness that constitutes the dharmakaya-qua-Base), causes the continuum in question to be replaced by a seemingly limitless object that is neither the sudden shining forth of ngowo shi nor the condition of the base-of-all, but which, being beyond a figure / ground distinction, may be easily taken for a totality or an infinitude (which it is not, for the illusory subject-object duality has concealed Totality, and the experience of there being a subject different and separate from whatever appears as object has introduced a limit that makes the object finite). If, in the immediately following moment, the mental subject establishes a link-of-being with the object in question, gaining the illusion of having attained totality or infinity, the result is a formless absorption of the top of samsara.\(^b\) This absorption involves the two basic modes of being discussed in the last chapter of volume I: being-for-Self (the being of the mental subject that seems to be a separate, autonomous perceiver-thinker-doer, which is being-qua-actuality insofar as without this mode of being there would be no mental subject, and illusion of self-being insofar as it makes the subject seem to involve self-being) and the one which Sartre called being-in-itself, but which, in order to use a term consistent with the vision of reality expounded herein, I have been calling being-that-is-in-itself-to-being-for-Self (the being of the field of all objects of our experience, as well as of each of these objects, which is being-qua-actuality insofar as without this mode of being there would be no actual objects, and illusion of self-being insofar as it makes the objects appear to involve self-being)—which in this case sustains the continuum appearing as object, which is thereby experienced as a totality or infinitude that is. If we could make stable the figureless and in this sense formless condition produced in this way, attaining what Longchenpa calls “the cognition

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\(^a\) *ngo bo'i gshis.*

\(^b\) In Capriles (2004) a longer explanation of the arising of samsara from the base-of-all is provided, and relevant Tibetan sources are given.
that is in the state of contemplation [and that] involves a stable absorption of tranquility”, we could take birth in the formless sphere; however, if we have not developed the necessary healthy habits through negative feedback and constructive practices such as pacifying meditation (Skt. shamatha; Tib. zhiné\(^b\)), and we are not applying either yogic or shamanic methods at the time this happens, the condition in question will last for an extremely brief instant. If, rather than grasping at the object and adhering to it, we managed to recognize the true condition of the thought involved in this perception, the latter would liberate itself spontaneously in the unveiling of the dharma-kāya and the corresponding realization of the dānag of the gnosis (or wisdom) of dharma-dhatu, which is rendered as all-pervading gnosis (or wisdom).\(^2\) However, what normally happens is that the basic drive to produce, confirm and sustain the illusion that the mental subject has self-being and absolute importance—which as we have seen is called self-grasping—gives rise to the next stages in the unfolding of samsāra, sustaining the unhappy consciousness that results from the contradiction between the yearning to recover the plenitude concealed by the arising of the dualistic consciousness that, insofar as it experiences itself as being at a distance from the rest of the Base, experiences the lack of the latter’s plenitude, and the compulsion to affirm and sustain the existence of the illusory mental subject cum dualistic consciousness that is the root of the experience of lack of plenitude.

(2) Then there manifests an interest that drives the mental events (Skt. chaitta; Tib. semjung\(^c\)) to single out, within the ever-changing sensory pseudo-totality appearing as object, a segment having sufficient continuity of configuration as to be seen as a collection of characteristics (Skt. lakshana; Tib. tsenpai\(^d\)) corresponding to one of our concepts—and thus as an entity—and make the segment stand as figure against the rest of the continuum, which thereby becomes ground.\(^2\) This involves what the Dzogchen teachings call consciousness of the base-of-all (Skt. alaya vijñana; Tib. kunzhi namshe\(^e\) or kunzhi nampar shespa\(^f\)): though at this point the concrete objects of the five senses are not yet present as such, a subtle cognitive capacity that tends to grasp its objects has risen and made itself ready in every respect to receive the impressions of the potential objects of deluded mind, like a mirror, and so the eyes see color-forms, the ears hear sounds, the nose smells fragrances, the tongue tastes flavors and the body has kinesthetic sensations. The reason why the consciousness-of-the-base-of-all is compared to ice on water,\(^6\) is because grasping at its would-be objects amounts to singling them out, which is akin to freezing segments of the ocean insofar as it causes what is as yet unpatterned to become configured.\(^2\) We have seen that in the stage indicated as (1) the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure endowed both the subject and the continuum appearing as object with being; in this stage, this being will sustain whatever is singled out within the continuum in question, and so we will perceive it as an entity-that-is. Since the defining characteristic of being-that-is-in-itself-for-being-for-Self is the appearance of independence and in-itself (in

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\(^a\) dri med ’od zer (Longchen Rabjam), rdzogs pa chen po sens nyid ngal gso'i ’grel ba shing rta chen po, vol. I, 85b/5; quoted in Tulku Thöndup (1996), p. 223. The terminology was adapted to the one used here.

\(^b\) zhi gnas; Pali, samatha; Chinese chih.

\(^c\) sens byung.

\(^d\) mtshan dpe.

\(^e\) kun gzhi rnam shes.

\(^f\) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa.

the sense of offering resistance and so on illustrated with a quotation from Heidegger’s *Being and Time* in the discussion of the twentieth century concept of “reality” in Vol. I of this book), perceiving whatever we single out as an *entity-that-is* implies perceiving it as an independent, in-itself entity. And since the perception of what we take as figure occurs in terms of a delusorily valued concept, which consciousness takes for its inherent essence, we become unaware of the fact that it was our perception that separated the figure, and take it to be *in itself* separate and independent from the rest of the sensory continuum. When this occurs we enter the sphere of form, which in Mahayana terms is principally determined by the defilement of knowledge (Skt. *jñeyavarana*; Tib. *shedrib*); however, if we have not carried out an intensive practice of pacification meditation and at the time we are not under the effect of yogic or shamanic methods, we do so for a brief instant only.²⁰⁹ If we could manage to make the ensuing condition stable, attaining what Longchenpa calls “the cognition in the state of contemplation of clarity and lack of [coarse] thought [involving] stable [yet] partial insight”,²¹⁰ we would take birth in this sphere; on the other hand, if we recognized the true nature of this condition and the dharmakaya unveiled (for example, by searching for the mind experiencing it), it would turn into the dang of mirror-like gnosis (or wisdom).²¹¹ However, normally the next stage of the process immediately manifests and *samsara* continues to develop.²¹²

(3) Then the cluster of mental operations called “consciousness of defilements” (Skt. *klishtamanovijnāna*; Tib. *nyongmongs pa can yid kyi namshe*, or *nyongmongs pa can yid kyi nampar shepa*), which is the source of *avidya* in the third of the senses the term has in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjampa, on the basis of the delusory valuation-absolutization of subtle (intuitive) thoughts, gives rise to the self-grasping / self-affirmation / self-preoccupation / egocentricity that compels us to establish, confirm, demonstrate and sustain the illusion that we are separate, absolutely important and true individual selves, by reacting passionately with grasping, appropriation or confrontation to the structures or collections of characteristics that we single out in the sensory continuum, in an attempt to achieve plenitude and pleasure (which as we have seen is a self-defeating task, for it is the illusion of a separate self that gives rise to the lack of plenitude at the core of *duhkha*, whereas the quest for pleasure causes pleasure to elude us). This is the sphere of sensuality, in which the cluster of mental operations called “consciousness of defilements” functions through the following consciousnesses posited by the Dzogchen teachings, which it would be more precise to call *fields of presentation of phenomena*: (a) the field of presentation (“consciousness”) of mental phenomena (Skt. *manovijnāna*; Tib. *yikyi namshes*, or *yikyi nampar shepa*), which presents those phenomena of the dang mode of manifestation of energy that the higher Tantras call “coarse thoughts”—which as we have seen correspond to the mental images that Dharmakirti called *samanyalakshana* (Tib. *chitsen*), or general collections of characteristics and that David Hume called *ideas*,²¹³ and which reproduce

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²⁰⁹ *dri med 'od zer* (Longchen Rabjam), *rdzogs pa chen po sens nyid ngal gso ’i ‘grel ba shing rta chen po*, vol. I, 85b/5; quoted in Tulku Thöndup (1996), p. 223. The terminology was adapted to the one used here.
²¹⁰ *nyong mongs pa can yid kyi rnam shes*.
²¹¹ *nyong mongs pa can yid kyi rnam par shes pa*.
²¹² *yid kyi rnam shes*.
²¹³ *yid kyi rnam par shes pa*.
²¹⁴ *gdangs*.
²¹⁵ *spyi mtshan*. 

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perceptions of phenomena of tsel\textsuperscript{a} energy achieved through the five universally accepted senses—and, (b) the fields of presentation ("consciousnesses") of the five universally accepted senses (Skt. pañchadwārajñāna; Tib. gongai namshe\textsuperscript{b}, or gongai nampar shepa\textsuperscript{c}), which present what the Dzogchen teachings call phenomena of tsel energy.\textsuperscript{213} We can single out and take as figure the collections of characteristics of tsel energy manifesting through the five senses insofar as they seem to correspond to one or another of the collections of characteristics that appear in the field of presentation exhibiting the mental phenomena of dang energy that serve as models for perception (i.e., in the manovijñāna or yikyi namshe). Then, the cluster of mental operations referred to as "consciousness of defilements" recognizes and understands these collections of characteristics (whether they appear through the fields of presentation of the five senses or in the field of presentation of mental phenomena) in terms of the subtle thought—i.e., of the comprehension of essence—with which they were associated in the process of socialization, and as this understanding is taken to be the absolute nature of the collection of characteristics, the supposed self-existence and self-value both of the imaginary self that is the core of self-grasping and of an objective world is confirmed.\textsuperscript{214} Furthermore, the associations that the comprehension in question acquired in the process of socialization, and/or the specific determinations of the particular collection of characteristics that is recognized in terms of this comprehension, lead the cluster of operations called "consciousness of defilements" to ascribe a positive, negative or neutral ethical or aesthetic value to the collection of characteristics in question, and thus to react to it with acceptance / desire, rejection or indifference, thereby confirming the supposed self-existence and self-value of the imaginary self that is the core of self-grasping and of the world. Since in this way we attempt to gratify the acquisitiveness of this imaginary self, the sphere of sensuality—which in Mahayana terms is primarily determined by the defilement of the passions (Skt. klesharāna; Tib. nyöndrib)—is the realm of I and mine.

The above explanation makes clear the reasons why the Dzogchen teachings do not limit themselves to positing the six so-called consciousnesses the Madhyamaka Prasangika accepts (those of the five universally accepted senses and that of mental images): in these six "consciousness" different types of images are presented, yet because of the nature of these "consciousness" all of them are necessarily (a) particular and (b) dimensional (i.e., spatiotemporal); therefore, if these were all the "consciousnesses" there were, there could be collections of characteristics but there could be no comprehension of the essence of these collections,\textsuperscript{215} and therefore there could be neither recognition of the collections in question (without which deluded sentient beings could not manage reality), nor emotionally charged reactions to them (without which the sphere of sensuality could not manifest). This is the reason why the Dzogchen teachings posit the cluster of mental operations called "consciousness of defilements." Furthermore, it would not suffice to present the cluster of operations in question as a kind of consciousness that perceives the contents of the fields of presentation of the so-called "six consciousnesses" which, as a result of the structuring of experience in terms of the threefold directional apparitional structure, seem to lie in front of this "consciousness;" it is necessary to acknowledge that, as a result of the structuring of experience in terms of the directional structure in question, the drives activated by karmic

\textsuperscript{a} rtsal.
\textsuperscript{b} sgo lnga'i rnam shes.
\textsuperscript{c} sgo lnga'i rnam par shes pa.
imprints (Skt. avarana or vasana, according to the case; Tib. bagchag\(^a\)) that determine the impulses and reactions of this cluster of operations seem to come from a source somehow located behind it, and that this allows the cluster of operations in question to conceive the illusion that the illusory mental subject that is one of the poles of the threefold directional apparitional structure is a self-existent, autonomous self or soul—an illusion which, as we have seen, is the core of self-grasping, and which is also the condition of possibility of life in the sphere of sensuality. Furthermore, as shown above, all of the elements posited by the Dzogchen teachings are necessary in order to account for the arising of samsara from the neutral condition of the base-of-all (which, as we have seen, carries propensities)—whereas as shown in the discussion of the concept of “unconscious” and of self-deceit, the base-of-all-carrying-propensities itself (which as we have seen is a neutral condition manifesting in our experience rather than a metaphysical abstraction) is necessary in order to account both for the continuity of our deluded experience and activities and for the elusion of egodystonic contents (i.e., those contents that contradict one’s sense of self qua self-image).\(^{216}\)

(It must be kept in mind that all of the so-called “consciousnesses” discussed here, their objects, the sequence in which they arise and so on, depend on the karmic dispositions carried by the “base-of-all carrying propensities.”)

With regard to the above three stages, the corresponding spheres of samsara, and their relationships with the various “consciousnesses” posited by the Dzogchen teachings, it is convenient to consider the following explanation by Buddhaguhya:\(^b\)

> In the realm of sensuality the seven consciousnesses, such as that of the eyes [and other senses, that of mental forms, and that of the passions] are principal, whereas all else [including the base-of-all and the consciousness of the base-of-all] are subordinate. In the realm of form the consciousness of the base-of-all and the consciousnesses of the gates [or senses] are principal and all else is subordinate. In the formless realm the base-of-all itself is principal and all else [(namely the eight consciousnesses)]

The same applies to the following words by Longchen Rabjam:\(^c\)

> E ma! By holding on to duality, living beings, while dwelling in the dream-like illusory samsara, whichever efforts they make are causes and effects of samsara.

By [dualistically] experiencing [what in the immediately preceding moment was] the non-conceptual base-of-all, they stray into the formless realm;

[while] experiencing the clear-empty [yet dualistic and figure-ground] consciousness of the base-of-all, they stray into the realm of form;

[while] experiencing the six consciousness [through the consciousness of defilements] they stray into the realm of desire.

Nonetheless, in the case of Dzogchen practitioners who are familiar enough with the unwavering manifestation of the dharmakaya and the spontaneous liberation of delusory

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\(^a\) bag chags.

\(^b\) Buddhaguhya, commentary to the Kunzhi Dang Yeshe Takpa (kun gzhi dang ye shes brtag pa), quoted by dri med 'od zer (Longchen Rabjam) in rdzogs pa chen po sens nyid ngal gso'i 'grel ba shing rta chen po, vol. I, 85b/5; translation in Tulkü Thöndup (1996), p. 223. The terminology was adapted to the one used here.

\(^c\) Longchen Rabjam, rdzogs pa chen po sens nyid rang grol, translated in Tulkü Thöndup (1996, pp. 326-327). The terminology was adapted to the one used here.
thoughts, even at this point it will be enough for them to look into whichever thought is present, as though to apprehend its true condition (with which they are quite familiar due to their previous, repeated experience of spontaneous liberation), for the thought to liberate itself spontaneously in the unveiling of dharmakaya\textsuperscript{217} and of the dang of the wisdom or gnosis of equalness—or not to do so, for spontaneous liberation is beyond causality and thus, unless the individual is quite advanced on the Dzogchen Path, there are no guarantees that it will take place in any particular occasion.\textsuperscript{218} This is why the Kayatraya\textsuperscript{[vatara]} sutra reads:\textsuperscript{a}

The dissolution of the base-of-all into the ultimate sphere is the primordial gnosis or wisdom of the ultimate sphere. The dissolution of the consciousness of the base-of-all into the ultimate sphere is the mirror-like primordial gnosis or wisdom. The dissolution of the mind-consciousness into the ultimate sphere is the primordial gnosis or wisdom of equanimity. The dissolution of the [consciousness of defilements or] defiled mind into the ultimate sphere is the discriminative gnosis or wisdom. The dissolution of the consciousnesses of the five senses into the ultimate sphere is the primordial gnosis or wisdom of accomplishment.

\textit{Samsara}, rather than being continuous, is constantly arising and developing: in fact, a process roughly analogous to the one described above develops again and again as short cognitive gaps constantly recur in our experience throughout the activities of daily life (as shown in the preceding chapter, the gaps in question at the same time separate and connect discursive thoughts, and it is a particular type of such gaps that makes bad faith / elusion possible). However, in daily life it is hardly possible for most people to identify the process in question because it takes place just too rapidly and confusedly, the distinction between its stages is too murky, space-time-awareness is too narrow, and we are too distracted by turmoil, duties and worries. Furthermore, the process begins with the neutral condition of the base-of-all, which, as we have seen, cannot be reflexively remembered insofar as it does not involve the condition of possibility of reflexive remembrance, which is the nondual, nonthetic, nonpositional, reflexive awareness (of) consciousness of an object that is recognized in terms of a concept.

Now, the fact that, according to the Dzogchen teachings, sensory consciousnesses arise as the result of the cognitive activity of “more profound” consciousnesses, should not be taken to constitute an idealistic (or, even less so, solipsistic) metaphysical cosmogony. The explanations provided in the Dzogchen teachings are not metaphysical, for they are based solely on experience and metaexperience; I call them metaphenomenological insofar as they are not based exclusively on the phenomena of \textit{samsara} and/or on the manifestation of the base-of-all, but also on the metaphenomenon or metaphenomena of \textit{nirvana}.\textsuperscript{219} I call them metaontological insofar as they issue from the dissolution of the phenomenon of being in the unveiling of the Base that I am calling the Self-\textit{qua-}Path (which, insofar as it shows us that being is no more than a delusory phenomenon, is the event allowing us to discern the true nature of being instead of being confused with regard to it). In fact, the description given above, rather than being a metaphysical explanation of the arising of thoughts and of the data of the other five senses, is a simple metaphenomenological

\textsuperscript{a} Quoted by tshul khrims blo gros (Longchen Rabjam) in the \textit{theg pa chen po ’i man ngag gi bstan bchos yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod kyi ’grel ba pad ma dkar po}, as translated in Tulku Thöndup (1996, p. 410). The terminology was adapted to the one used here.
description of the genesis of consciousness of those thoughts and data. It so happens that, though the data of the senses are there at any moment, there is no consciousness of them until consciousness develops from the base-of-all through the sequence of stages described in the Dzogchen teachings: first of all, there is the consciousness of a pseudo-totality; then there is the consciousness of color-form called consciousness of the base-of-all; then, there is the consciousness of the passions or venom-consciousness; then there is consciousness of thought or of mental states; and, finally, there is sensory consciousness. In short, there is consciousness of the five senses only when the data of the senses are being recognized as this or that—which implies the previous existence of consciousness of thought.

To conclude, the fact that in the development of samsara from the condition of the neutral base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, first there manifests a formless condition, then a condition of pure form, and finally a condition belonging to the sphere of sensuality, does not imply that the Mahayana map of samsara is inverted and the sphere of formlessness should be represented at the bottom of cyclic existence while the sphere of sensuality should be represented at the top. All that has been discussed so far shows that there is no law of “spiritual gravity” pulling us toward the formless sphere that the Mahayana regards as the peak of experience, against which we would have to struggle in order to be able to remain in the sphere of sensuality, but that, on the contrary, “spiritual gravity” pulls us toward the bottom of the sphere of sensuality and we have to constantly struggle, resorting to a combination of karma and secondary conditions, to elude the hellish experience of this condition and ascend to higher states—and then, when the karma that allowed us to ascend to higher states is exhausted, or the contributory conditions allowing us to stay in these states change, we fall back to the bottom of samsara.

In fact, in the process of arising of samsara from the neutral condition of the base-of-all, we initially go through an experience of the formless sphere; however, as shown above, we cannot halt the process and stay in the sphere in question: in order to stay in it for some time we would have to train in practices based on negative feedback, combining them with the dynamic represented by the spiral of pretences—yet even if we did so sooner or later we would fall from this sphere. Though subsequently we go through an experience of pure form, we cannot halt the process and stay in the sphere of form: in order to do so for some time we would have to train in practices based on negative feedback, combining them with the dynamic represented by the spiral of pretences—yet even if we did so sooner or later we would fall from this sphere. And we cannot even remain in the higher realms of the sphere of sensuality, because, as we have seen, when the karma that allowed us to ascend to higher states were exhausted or the contributory conditions allowing us to stay in these states changed, we would fall back to the bottom of the sphere in question.

In the Vajrayana there is a symbolism, represented by the Vajracharya’s hat, which inverts that of the Mahayana, for the hat’s feather, which is its highest part, stands for the sphere of sensuality; the crown, which is its middle part, represents the sphere of form; and the brim, which is its lowest part, represents the sphere of formlessness. This, however, is due to the fact that in the Vajrayana sensuality is worn as an adornment, and practices of the sphere of sensuality such as those involving the achievement of total pleasure through the development of heat (whether of not practiced in union with a consort) are a principal method for catalyzing the manifestation of the Self-quà-Path—but does not imply that a law of spiritual gravity would pull us toward the sphere of formlessness or that we would have to struggle against such law in order to reach the sphere of sensuality.
VII

The *Divine Comedy*
and the Two Stages of the Self-Healing Process
In this chapter, I will deal in metaphenomenological, metaexistential terms, and in the context of the Buddhist division of *samsara* into three main spheres of experience, with the primeval symbolism Dante Alighieri expressed poetically in Christian terms in the *Divine Comedy*, but which is common to different traditions, ranging from Dzogchen to paleo-Siberian shamanism, and which is directly related to the levels of being that will be discussed in the next chapter of this volume. This symbolism will be considered both in general terms, and in terms of the Path of Dzogchen *Atiyoga*.

In the process of undoing delusion the individual may live through some or all the types of basic, “authentic” experiences he or she underwent as delusion was built up in the course of ontogenesis—and in particular through what Sartre called “anguish” and posited as the most basic experience of *being-for-Self*, and what Sartre called “shame” and posited as the most basic experience of *being-for-others*. However, while undergoing this process it will not be of any use to identify and distinguish the various types of such experiences, and hence in this chapter I will no longer differentiate between Sartre’s anguish, the closely related concept of *Angst*, what Sartre called shame—or, should they occur, the states that Kierkegaard called despair, fear and trembling, experiences of sin, and consciousness of our own nothingness.

**The Undoing of Delusion on the Dzogchen Path**

**Vs the Delusive Paths Based on Building**

All genuine systems and methods having *nirvana* or Awakening as their aim agree in underlining that the true Path is based in undoing rather than doing, in destroying rather than building, in deconditioning rather than conditioning, in realizing our original, unborn nature rather than giving birth to a new state of being. This is very clear in *Theravada* Buddhism (the only independently surviving school of the *Hinayana*); for example, in the *Atthasalini*—a commentary to the canonic Pali text *Dhamma Sangani* widely attributed to fifth century C.E. teacher Buddhaghosha—we read:

> While healthy attitudes and meditative practices ranging over the three worlds (of sensuality, form and formlessness) build up and make grow birth and death in a never-ending circle and hence are called building-up practices, it is not so with this meditation. Just as if a man were to erect a wall eighteen cubits high, while another man were to take a hammer and to break down and to demolish any part as it gets erected, so also this meditation sets about to break down and to demolish death and rebirth that have been built up by healthy attitudes and meditative practices ranging over the three worlds, by bringing

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*a* Dante Alighieri (1979/83).

*b* Eliade (1964).

about a deficiency in those conditions which tend to produce birth and death, and therefore this meditation is called “the tearing down one” (apachayagami).

The simile of the man with a hammer should not lead us to believe that the true Path involves effort and struggle, for the excerpt itself, right after the example of striking delusion with the hammer of practice, makes it clear that the point is to bring about a deficiency in those conditions that tend to produce birth and death. We have seen that, in terms of the symbolism according to which the formless sphere is the highest region of samsara and the sphere of sensuality is the lowest one, there is a “law of gravity” pulling us down to the hellish states that are the naked experience of delusion / ek-sistence, so that, although a great deal of the time we manage to elude these states in a more or less effective way and thus climb up to some height in the wheel of samsara, we always fall back into them. It must be kept in mind that the only way we can climb up from the hellish states in question is if we are unaware that we are deluded (i.e., if we are affected by the third sense of avidya / marigpa in the Dzogchen classification adopted here) and therefore take our deluded perceptions for the bare, faithful apprehension of the given, and that climbing involves the self-deceit that Sartre called bad faith, for only if we close our eyes to the deceit involved in climbing to higher realms will we manage to climb to them and to take the resulting conditioned, forged, spurious states for our unconditioned true condition.

Various Kailash-related wisdom traditions compare the ensuing states to being in a cage or jail having walls that are so transparent as not to allow us to realize that we are in a cage or jail, and assert that the precondition for escaping from the invisible psychological jail or cage to which we are confined, lies in discovering that we are in a psychological cage or jail. As seen in vol. I of this book, for his part the Mahayana Master Shantideva compared unto a hair the lack of plenitude, dissatisfaction, and recurrent frustration and suffering characteristic of ek-sistence / delusion; likened to the palm of a hand the normal individual in samsara; and compared unto an eyeball the bodhisattva who is on the way to absolute sanity: since in the palm of the hand the hair of duhkha goes unnoticed, it can remain indefinitely, but in the eyeball, where it stings, it has to be removed immediately. Perfecting our capacity to elude the hell inherent in our being by combining meditational techniques with the elusion represented by Laing’s spiral of pretenses is comparable to improving, enlarging and making cozier the jail to which we have confined ourselves, and in particular to making its walls more transparent, or to wearing gloves so as to become even more insensitive to the pains of samsara than the palm of a hand. Contrariwise, the Path of Awakening involves bringing about a deficiency in the dynamic whereby we elude the hell that is the bare experience of our being and ascend in samsara, while at the same time setting the conditions for Seeing through our being into the unconditioned, inherently all-liberating Self-qua-Base, so that this being—and delusion in general—together with its distressing symptoms, (illusorily) liberate themselves as soon as the symptoms in question become evident. This is why the only way to escape from the jail of delusion and elusion, remove the hair of all-pervading suffering and attain unrestricted freedom is through the repeated dissolution in the Self-qua-Path of the illusion of there being a separate self and a jail restraining its freedom—which gradually neutralizes the illusion of selfhood until it occurs no more and the Self-qua-Fruit consolidates.

Thus Buddhaghosha’s image of breaking down and demolishing death and rebirth that have been built up by healthy attitudes and meditative practices ranging over the three worlds, by bringing about a deficiency in those conditions which tend to produce birth and
death, applies to the Buddhist Path in general. However, the image applies to the practice of Dzogchen far more than to that of the Theravada, for in the former the bare experience of the discomfort, self-hindering, conflict and so on inherent in delusion, provided that the right contributory conditions concur (including transmission and the blessings of the lineage, knowledge of the oral instructions and a capacity to apply them, a previously developed capacity of spontaneous liberation of delusion, and so on), is not likely to result in spontaneous liberation. (In the initial capacity of spontaneous liberation, called cherdrol, discomfort, self-hindering, conflict and so on work as an alarm reminding the practitioner to apply the oral instructions so that spontaneous liberation may occur—and if it does not occur immediately, a positive feedback loop may trigger a runaway of conflict that takes it to a threshold level at which it may spontaneously liberate itself together with the delusion at its root, in the patency of the nondual gnosis of dharmakaya. In the next capacity of spontaneous liberation, called shadrrol, as delusion manifests together with the tensions it begets, an automatic reaction of attention may result in spontaneous liberation. And in the highest capacity, called rangdröl, all that arises spontaneously liberates itself as it arises, without the need for either action or reaction on the part of the mental subject, which does not manifest.) In general in Dzogchen practice, once the recurrence of spontaneous liberation has given rise to a sufficient development of capacity, the more discomfort, self-hindering, conflict and so on manifest, the more delusion will spontaneously liberate itself. Since the spontaneous liberation of delusion neutralizes to some extent the karma for delusory phenomena to manifest, and since the degree to which karma is neutralized is directly proportional to the intensity of delusion and the height of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness the moment spontaneous liberation occurs, the more often discomfort, conflict, self-hindering and so on arise and free themselves spontaneously, and the greater the intensity of the samsaric experience when spontaneous liberation occurs, the more rapidly samsara is exhausted.

In Sufism, the principle expressed by the Atthasalini was illustrated with the story of a king who sponsored a competition between two groups of painters—one Chinese, the other Greek (in Sana’i, the Chinese represented the genuine, “descending” Path that is being illustrated here, whereas the Greek represented the spurious ascending one; in Rumi, it was the other way around). The king ordered the two groups of painters to adorn the walls of two rooms facing each other and divided by a curtain, and confined each group of painters in their respective room until they completed their work. One group of painters set out to paint the walls with unseen ability and proficiency of detail, whereas the other group set out to polish the walls in order to uncover their primordial mirror quality. One day, those who had been painting the walls sent the guard to call upon the king in order to let him know that they had completed their work and invite him to appraise it. When the king entered the room, he was speechless before the splendor of the paintings, and thought no one could surpass the work of these artists. However, as he was leaving the room, the second group of painters drew the curtains dividing the two rooms, and hence all that had been painted in the other room was reflected in its walls, appearing far more impressive and splendorous. The king, as was due, decided in favor

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\[a\] gcer grol.  
\[b\] shar grol.  
\[c\] rang grol.  
\[d\] Iqbal (1964).
of the wall-polishers and handed them the prize. It must be noted, once again, that the
active character of the task the wall-polishers carried out in the simile should not lead us
to believe that the true Path is based on action, effort and struggle.

The principle illustrated by the two above references seems to be precisely the one
that late eighteenth-early nineteenth century poet William Blake dealt with in The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell. He wrote:

The ancient tradition that the world will be consumed in fire at the end of six thousand
years is true, as I have heard from Hell.
For the cherub with his flaming sword is hereby commanded to leave his guard at the
tree of life; and when he does, the whole creation will be consumed and appear infinite and
holy, whereas it now appears finite & corrupt.
This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment.
But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged; this I
shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and
medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite that was hid.
If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is,
Infinite.

Not only did Blake express the essence of the “descending Path;” he also expressed
masterfully the essence of the experience of the kalpa or aeon that will be considered in
chapter VIII, and which concludes with what is symbolically expressed as the consumption
of the world by fire and the collapse of time.

A Ch’ an (Zen) Buddhist story that clearly makes the point that Awakening cannot
be produced or created is the dialogue between Ma-tsu (Japanese, Baso Doitsu) when he
was still seeking Awakening, and Master Huai-jang, who was to become his teacher. Ma
was sitting in meditation and Huai asked him what was the aim of so sitting, whereupon
Ma replied:

“To become a Buddha.”
Jang got hold of a tile and began polishing it. When Ma asked what he was doing,
he replied:

“A mirror.”
Ma asked: “How could a mirror be made by polishing a tile?”
Whereupon Huai replied:

“And how could sitting in meditation make a Buddha?”
This Ch’an story aptly illustrates the basic distinction between genuine and fake
spirituality, so clearly expounded in the Surangama Sutra of the Mahayana:

If the causal basis is false, its fruit will be false, and the search for the Buddha’s
Awakening will lead to failure.

The Sutras belong to the causal vehicle (hetuyana); therefore, in order to help us
avoid spurious results, this Sutra warns us against basing our search for Awakening on a
spurious cause. The Dzogchen Atiyoga being beyond cause and effect, we would have to

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a Blake (1975).
b Suzuki (1972a), pp. 277-8; Watts (1956).
say, “if that which we take for the Self-quaque-Path is false (for example, if we take the state of kunzhi to be the dharmakaya), the Self-quaque-Fruit will be false and the search for the Buddha’s Awakening will lead to failure.” The same Sutra states:

If you wish to restore the true, this very wish (pertains to deluded, samsaric mind and) is not in harmony with the absolute nature. If unreal mind is used to recover our true nature, the latter will (not manifest; on the contrary, that which we will get) will be (an) unreal (imitation of our true nature), from which necessarily illusory birth and existence will originate, as well as unreal mind and (unreal) dharma which will develop unceasingly, (ever) gaining in intensity, and in this way giving rise to (new) karma as well as (to) responses from those who share the same karma. This karmic responsiveness leads to the interdependence of births and deaths. Hence the inverted cause of the seeming existence of living beings.

In terms of Dzogchen, we could state that the true Path is based on Seeing through the conditioned into the unconditioned, inherently all-liberating single gnosis (chikshe kundrolb), so that whichever conditioned experience is manifest at the time spontaneously liberates itself that very instant. The repetitive spontaneous liberation of what is conditioned progressively neutralizes conditioning, so that if this process is intense enough and uninterruptedly the individual’s conditioning is fully undone, to that the unconditioned becomes ever patent and resplendent, never being hidden again.224 Although the liberation of delusion is spontaneous, the first three above examples—destroying a wall with a hammer as it is erected, polishing walls with emery stone, and applying corrosives on apparent surfaces so that they melt away—to some extent give the wrong impression that the process of discovering the inherently all-liberating unconditioned and thereby undoing conditionings is an active, effortful endeavor. In order to dispel this idea and show that deconditioning on the Path, rather than being an active, effortful endeavor, lies in spontaneously Seeing through the conditioned into the inherently all-liberating unconditioned primordial gnosis, I often resort to the story of the way the Cantonese woodcutter Wei-lang (Mandarin, Hui-neng; Jap. Eno) became the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism in China. c The Fifth Patriarch, Hun-jen, had already perceived Wei-lang’s qualities, but concealed his perception so as to prevent others from becoming jealous and harming him. When the time for the Patriarch to establish his succession came, he called for all to take part in a poetry contest, the winner of which would become the next Patriarch. The poem by Shen-hsiu, the most famous scholar and meditator of the monastery, was so widely praised by Hun-jen that no one else dared to compete against him. As he was illiterate, Hui-neng had been unable to take part in the competition, or to read Shen-hsiu’s poem for that matter; therefore, so that he could come to know its contents, Hun-jen asked for it to be written on a wall and for all to recite it day and night. The poem read:

Our body is the bodhi-tree,  
a brilliant mirror is our mind;  
wipe the mirror to keep it free

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b gcig shes kun grol.  
of dust that its true nature may blind.

Upon listening to Shen-hsiu’s poem, Hui-neng knew that its author had not yet attained the Fifth Patriarch’s level of realization, and felt compelled to reply with a poem of his own that proved that he himself had achieved it. His poem read:

There has never been a bodhi-tree,  
nor has there been a mirror-mind;  
since everything is substance-free  
no dust the true nature may blind!

The action of cleaning the mirror proposed by Shen-hsiu would affirm, confirm and sustain the illusion of there being a subject that is a separate, autonomous source of action and thought. Therefore, its effect would be like that of wiping a mirror with a dirty cloth: the more we wipe it, the more soiled it becomes. This is the reason why the Semde\textsuperscript{a} series of Dzogchen Atiyoga urges us to discover that all reflections (extended objects exhibiting color and form, as well as entities lacking extension, color or form such as the mental subject and other thoughts) and all that may be taken to be muck on the mirror (such as the passions that the way of renunciation considers as poisons to uproot) arise as the play of the mirror’s energy, and insists that those reflections and seeming muck may be used to discover the mirror’s true condition, which cannot be soiled insofar as it is primordially pure (katak\textsuperscript{b}) and cannot be improved insofar as it is spontaneously perfect (lhun grub\textsuperscript{c}). Furthermore, the Path of Dzogchen Atiyoga is based on the second of these aspects of the mirror’s nature, for its principle is that of spontaneity or lhundrub\textsuperscript{d}, rather than being based on actions like that of wiping the mirror denounced in Wei-lang’s poem, this Path is based on the principle of spontaneous liberation and on the unconstrained systemic activities of the lhundrub aspect of the Base that will be discussed below.

In fact, it is not that the Dzogchen Path conforms to a principle distinctive of Ch’an or Zen illustrated by Wei-lang’s poem, but that the essential, distinctive and characteristic principle of Dzogchen practice, which as noted above is that of spontaneous perfection or lhundrub\textsuperscript{e}, is aptly illustrated by the poem’s rejection of the idea that the Path consists in an active, ceaseless process of removing hindrances. Ch’an or Zen does not fully embody the principle in question, for as Nub Namkhai Nyingpo\textsuperscript{f} and Nubchen Sangye Yeshe\textsuperscript{g} made it clear in their elucidations of the basic differences between Buddhist vehicles and Paths—respectively, in the Kathang Dennga\textsuperscript{h} and the Samten Migdrön\textsuperscript{i}—the Mahayana in its totality, including the Sudden School, overemphasizes the katak\textsuperscript{j} aspect of the Base, which is voidness, overlooking to a great extent its lhundrub aspect.\textsuperscript{k} This limitation is reflected in the argument with which Hui-neng’s poem objects Shen-hsiu’s advise that we constantly

\textsuperscript{a} sems sde.  
\textsuperscript{b} ka dag.  
\textsuperscript{c} lhun grub.  
\textsuperscript{d} lhun grub.  
\textsuperscript{e} gnubs nam mkha’i snying po.  
\textsuperscript{f} gnubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes.  
\textsuperscript{g} bka’ thang sde lnga.  
\textsuperscript{h} bsam gtan mig sgron.  
\textsuperscript{i} ka dag.  
wipe the looking glass: that there is neither a truly existing mirror nor a truly existing dust. Dzogchen Atiyoga does not limit itself to emphasizing the indivisibility of the two aspects of the condition illustrated by the mirror, but, as we have seen, uses the Lhundrub aspect to discover the complete condition of the Base, with all its aspects. Furthermore, it uses the aspect in question to spontaneously neutralize, in record time, the illusion of substantiality of the “reflections:” as implied above, the Base’s Lhundrub aspect does not consist solely in the spontaneously perfect manifestation of the myriad of phenomena and the spontaneously perfect functionality of these, but comprises as well the spontaneous systemic processes beyond action and contrivance proper to Dzogchen Atiyoga, including the spontaneous liberation distinctive of this Path (which in Ch’an or Zen is an extraordinary occurrence—provided it still occurs in our time\textsuperscript{230}). For example, in the Upadeshavarga or Mennagade\textsuperscript{a} series of Dzogchen teachings the first level of practice, which is that of Tekchö\textsuperscript{b}, stresses the katak or primordial purity aspect of the Base—which is voidness—insofar as the point is to discover the essence or ngowo aspect of the Base and the true condition of the dang form of manifestation of energy, which is the dharmakaya, each and every time a thought veils this condition. However, whenever this happens, all thoughts that are manifest at the time spontaneously liberate themselves, on the occasion of which the tensions generated by the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure (which, as we have seen, gives rise to the phenomenon of being and the subject-object duality) are instantly, absolutely relaxed, which is a function of the principle of Lhundrub—and the same occurs in the practice of Chö\textsuperscript{c} that in many cases must precede that of Thögel.\textsuperscript{231} Finally, the second level of practice of the same series of Dzogchen teachings, which is that of Thögel\textsuperscript{d}, is almost exclusively based on the principle of Lhundrub, as manifest: (1) in the arising of the visions of rölpa energy which are the condition of possibility of this practice; (2) in the spontaneous systemic loops inducing the runaway toward a threshold level of the tension inherent in basic human delusion; and (3) in the spontaneous liberation of delusion-cum-tension that dissolves the illusion of a perceiver separate from the visions without dissolving these visions.

The Runaway of Conflict to a Threshold Level:
The Function and Structure of the Bardo,
of Psychoses, and of Higher Dzogchen Practices

The Lhundrub dynamic giving rise to the runaway of the tensions inherent in human delusion to a threshold level, is at the root of processes following a course analogous to the one Dante charted in the Divine Comedy, to the one the Dzogchen teachings illustrate by the symbol of the mandala, and to the intermediate state (Skt. antarabhava; Tib. bar do) between death and rebirth—which, given its ample, key repercussions throughout human experience, and in particular its crucial role in the Dzogchen process of Awakening, Dr. Herbert V. Guenther was right in calling the “human constant”.\textsuperscript{e232} At the individual level, such processes—discussed below in this chapter and in others of works of mine\textsuperscript{f}—are the

\textsuperscript{a} man ngag sde or man ngag gyi sde.
\textsuperscript{b} kregs chod.
\textsuperscript{c} gcod.
\textsuperscript{d} thod rgal.
\textsuperscript{e} Guenther (1963).
\textsuperscript{f} Capriles (1977, 1986, 2000a, 2000c).
basis of the most powerful methods of the Dzogchen teachings, but also of dangerous, conflictive, and not necessarily liberating occurrences such as psychoses, alcoholism and so on. However, the processes in question also catalyze the spiritual and social phylogenetic evolution of our species, for they are at the root of the degenerative development of the cosmic time cycle or aeon (Skt. *kalpa*; Tib. *kalpa*; Greek, *aion* and in particular of its final period—called the Era of Darkness (*kaliyuga*) or Iron Age—discussed in the 3rd volume of this book and others of my works.

In a subsequent section of this chapter I explain the Thögel level of practice in the Menngagde or *Upadeshavarga* series of Dzogchen teachings as a lhundrub (spontaneous) practice of zhitro or “Sequence of the Peaceful and the Wrathful” (a term defined in the section in question) rooted on the structure and function of the intermediate state (Skt. *antarabhava*; Tib. *bar do*) between death and rebirth, and applied in this state. In the same section it will be further shown that the *Bardo Thödröl* or *Tibetan Book of the Dead* deals mainly with this zhitro practice, which like all zhitro practices discussed in this book, is to be applied while one is physically alive. Although Jung was unaware of these facts, and although he failed to fully understand the true import of the book in question, which he believed was to be read inversely (i.e., from the end to the beginning), he and other of its early Western commentators were right in asserting that its contents were applicable to experiences that can be gone across while the organism is physically alive.

As suggested above, the structure and function of miscellaneous spontaneous processes occurring outside the context of Dzogchen practice, including some types of psychosis, certain so-called psychedelic and so-called psychotomimetic experiences, alcoholism, etc., are to a great extent analogous to the structure and function of the “intermediate state” between death and rebirth—as well as with those of the closely related, in some cases identical processes illustrated by the *Divine Comedy*, the *mandala* and so on. Gregory Bateson wrote with regard to so-called “schizophrenic” psychoses:

It would appear that once precipitated into psychosis the patient has a course to run. He is, as it were, embarked upon a voyage of discovery, which is only completed by his return to the normal world, to which he comes back with insights different from those of the inhabitants who never embarked on such a voyage. Once begun, a schizophrenic episode would appear to have as definite a course as an initiation ceremony—a death and a rebirth—into which the novice may have been precipitated by his family life or by adventitious circumstances, but which in its course is largely steered by endogenous process.

Partly influenced by Bateson, yet certainly on the basis of his own experience, R. D. Laing for his part wrote:

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a *bskal pa* or *kal pa*.
c *zhi khro*.
d Trungpa (1975). (Trungpa briefly describes this practice but does not say it is a zhitro.)
e Jung (1928); Anagarika Govinda (1928); etc.
f Bateson (1961, 1972 pp. 324 ff.). (Bateson makes no reference to the bardo.)
g Leary, Metzner & Alpert (1964).
h Bateson (1972), pp. 324 ff.: The Cybernetics of Alcoholism (Bateson makes no reference to the bardo).
i Bateson (1961).
j Laing (1967).
There is a great deal that urgently needs to be written about this and similar experiences. But I am going to confine myself to a few matters of fundamental orientation. We can no longer assume that such a voyage is an illness that has to be treated. Yet the padded cell is now outdated by the “improved” methods of treatment now in use.

If we can demystify ourselves, we see “treatment” (electro-shocks, tranquilizers, deep-freezing—sometimes even psychoanalysis) as ways of stopping this sequence from occurring.

Can we not see that this voyage is not what we need to be cured of, but that it is itself a natural way of healing our own appalling state of alienation called normality?

In other times people intentionally embarked upon this voyage.

Or if they found themselves already embarked, willy-nilly, they gave thanks, as for a special grace.

Back to Gregory Bateson, just after the paragraph quoted above, the English-born American researcher and writer continues:

In terms of this picture, spontaneous remission is no problem. This is only the final and natural outcome of the total process. What needs to be explained is the failure of many who embark upon this voyage to return from it. Do these encounter circumstances either in family life or in institutional care so grossly maladaptive that even the richest and best-organized hallucinatory experience cannot save them?

Bateson is to a great extent right. For example, in Mircea Eliade’s famous book on Shamanism, we learn that in Siberian shamanism the gift for being a shaman is revealed by symptoms that in modern civilization are seen as indicators of psychosis or epilepsy, and the largely spontaneous process they have to go through in order to become shamans, as depicted in that book, is not very different from the one some psychoses would follow if they were not psychiatrically or socially interrupted. And yet Siberian shamans do not become unable to adapt to society and perform a role in it, but, on the contrary, develop qualities and abilities that are not shared by standard adults. (For a survey of shamanism see the books by Joan Halifax.) In this regard, it is relevant to quote Laing again:

From the alienated starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not ‘true’ sanity. Their madness is not ‘true’ madness. The madness of our patients is an artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us, and by them on themselves. Let no one suppose that we meet ‘true’ madness any more than we are truly sane. The madness that we encounter in ‘patients’ is a gross travesty, a mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of that estranged integration we call sanity may be. True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated social reality: the emergence of the ‘inner’ archetypal mediators of divine power, and through this death a rebirth, and the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego functioning, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer.

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a Bateson (1961).
b Eliade (1964).
d Laing (1967).
Bateson explained both the psychoses of those individuals who are diagnosed as schizophrenics and the techniques applied by the AA for curing people from alcoholism, in terms of the reductio ad absurdum of wayward patterns, and explained this reductio ad absurdum in terms of the relationship between the analog mental process that in the Project of 1895 Freud called “primary” and the digital mental process that Freud called “secondary”\(^a\)—which, in the twentieth century, neurological research associated with the functioning of the right brain hemisphere and the left brain hemisphere, respectively.\(^{237}\) In general, primary process becomes conscious in dreams and “nonordinary states of consciousness” (NOSC);\(^{238}\) however, this does not mean it becomes disconnected in the “normal,” ordinary state of wakefulness: in the latter, it provides the analog matrix on the basis of which the conscious communications of secondary process, both within the individual and between her or him and other individuals, and in general all “conscious” experiences, structure themselves in digital terms in the “normal” states of wakefulness. As Fenichel noted,\(^b\) primary process: (1) lacks negatives; (2) lacks any indication of verbal tense and mode; (3) is metaphoric, and (4) places the emphasis on the type of relations taking place between individuals rather than on the place each of the interacting individuals has in the relationship (the latter being a function of secondary process). Bateson writes:\(^c\)

This description of achieving a reductio ad absurdum verges upon teleology. If the proposition “It won’t work” cannot be entertained within the coding of primary process [insofar as it is analog and therefore cannot entertain the possibility of negation],\(^d\) how can then the computations of primary process direct the organism to try out those courses of action which will demonstrate that “It won’t work”?

Problems of this general type are frequent in psychiatry and can perhaps only be resolved by a model in which, under certain circumstances, the organism’s discomfort activates a positive feedback loop to increase the behavior which preceded the discomfort. Such positive feedback loop would provide verification that it was really that particular behavior which brought about the discomfort, and might increase the discomfort to some threshold level at which change would become possible.

In psychotherapy such a positive feedback loop is commonly provided by the therapist who pushes the patient in the direction of his symptoms—a technique which has been called the “therapeutic double bind.”\(^{239}\) An example of this technique is quoted later in this essay, where the AA member challenges the alcoholic to go and do some “controlled drinking” in order that he may discover for himself that he has no control.

It is also usual that the symptoms and hallucinations of the schizophrenic—like dreams—constitute a corrective experience, so that the whole schizophrenic episode takes on the character of a self-initiation. Barbara O’Brien’s account of her own psychosis,\(^e\) is perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon, which has been discussed elsewhere.\(^f\)

It will be noted that the possible existence of such a positive feedback loop, which will cause a runaway in the direction of increasing discomfort up to some threshold (which may [sometimes] be on the other side of death), is not included in conventional

\(^a\) Bateson (1972), pp. 324 ff.
\(^b\) Fenichel (1945); Bateson (1972).
\(^c\) Bateson (1972).
\(^d\) I added the words in brackets in order to clarify Bateson’s statement.
\(^e\) O’Brien (1958).
\(^f\) Bateson (1961).
theories of learning. But a tendency to verify the unpleasant by seeking repeated experience of it is a common human trait. It is perhaps what Freud called the “death instinct.”

Since the code of primary process cannot entertain negatives, this process cannot say no to wayward function-relationships in order to interrupt them. Secondary process, in its turn, can say no, but, as will be shown below, the no that secondary process gives to a primary process function-relationship cannot be read as a no in the code of primary process, in which, contrariwise, it places an emphasis on what secondary process is trying to interrupt (furthermore, as shown below, if what it is trying to interrupt is a function-relationship that begets discomfort, since discomfort is always the result of a function-relationship of rejection, this function-relationship will be exacerbated by the rejection involved in the attempt to interrupt it, increasing the ensuing discomfort). This is why the only way to radically interrupt the wayward primary process function-relationships that produce discomfort is by exacerbating them so that, (1) we may verify that they are the source of the discomfort, and (2) they may be brought to a threshold at which they reach their breaking point in the literal sense of the term, and thus they are made to snap like a rubber band that is stretched beyond its maximum resistance.240 In ascertaining the way in which we choose the courses of action which exacerbate the function-relationships that must be eradicated, Bateson overlooked the role of secondary process and, implicitly assuming the choice in question to be made by primary process alone, asked himself how, if the code of the process in question, not being binary, cannot entertain the thought “let’s see whether or not it will work,” could it choose the right course of action. His conclusion was that there was a teleology that, under certain circumstances, caused the organism’s discomfort to activate a positive feedback loop that increased the behavior preceding or accompanying the discomfort.

The problem with Bateson’s conclusion is that the concept of feedback implies a duality between one aspect that provides feedback and one that receives it; since the one providing feedback is primary process, an element different from it must be involved in the activation of the positive feedback loop—and, in fact, it is consciousness, working in terms of secondary process, that receives feedback, and then reacts to this feedback in ways that activate the loop in question. (Pittendrigha would have seen another problem in Bateson’s use of the term teleology in this context, and would have demanded that he replaced it with teleonomy; however, in the light of the objections Mayrb raised against Pittendrigh’s pretensions, Bateson’s use of teleology is seen to be fully justified, and its replacement by teleonomy, insofar as Mayr redefined the latter term in such a way that it does in no way contradict the concept of teleology, is shown to simply make the point that the end-directedness Bateson expressed by the term teleology is due to the operation of a program.241 This is why in a subsequent section of this chapter I note that we could speak of a teleonomy of rölpa energy—a form of manifestation of energy that activates the positive feedback loops Bateson discussed—and that this way of speaking would not contradict the teleological view implicit in the Dzogchen teachings and in the teachings of other genuine Paths of Awakening.242 Finally, though there can be no doubt that with regard to the activation of the positive feedback loops Bateson was concerned with, we

a Pittendrigh (1958).
b Mayr (1965, 1974).
are justified in positing a teleological *Awakening principle*, what is important to us here is to explain the dynamic involved in the activation of the loops in question.)

As suggested above, in order to understand how the positive feedback loops under discussion are activated, we must take into consideration: (1) the thoughts of secondary process, which is normally the language of consciousness, and the actions consciousness takes on the basis of these thoughts, and (2) the “inverted” meaning secondary process negation may have in the code of primary process, which is at the root of so many of the paradoxical results subsumed under the law of inverted effect proper to *samsara*. In fact, we have seen that when consciousness, functioning in terms of digital secondary process, negates a function-relationship, in the analogue code of primary process, which cannot entertain negation, this negation is read as an affirmation, in the sense that it places the emphasis on the function-relationship, and this might reinforce it instead of interrupting it.\(^{243}\) We have also seen that negating a function-relationship of rejection boosts rejection and the ensuing discomfort: as explained in Vol. I of this book and illustrated by examples such as the nymphs with the goose feathers, the masochist, and so on,\(^{244}\) *in themselves* sensations are neither pleasant nor unpleasant, and we experience them as pleasant, painful or neutral depending on our attitude toward them: rejection makes our sensations painful and by the same token begets tension; pain and tension are sensations we are compelled to reject, but if we do so this makes sensation become more painful and increases tension, which in its turn intensifies our rejection... in a loop increasing from its own feedback that is determined by the interaction between primary process (tension and pain being our experience of primary process relationships) and secondary process (the negation at the root of consciousness’ rejection of experience, which as we have seen begets tension and pain). Therefore it is clear that the Thanatic positive feedback loops that intensify the behavior that preceded or accompanied discomfort are to a great extent determined by conscious acts based on the binary computations of secondary process, rather than being reducible to a “teleologically-determined” yet incomprehended and incomprehensible Thanatic impulse inherent in uncritical, normally unconscious primary process.

In conclusion, consciousness’ actions, based on the computations of secondary process, drive a positive feedback loop which, as in the case of repetition-compulsion or compulsion-to-repeat—observations of which were the basis of Freud’s postulation of the concept of *Thanatos*—leads the individual to repetitively place him or herself in painful situations that, in the case of psychoses, neuroses and vices such as alcoholism, may be seen as replicas of older experiences: this is why Bateson identified this loop with Freud’s *Thanatos*.\(^{245}\) However, the fact that we have explained the role of secondary process in the activation of the positive feedback loops under discussion does not mean that we have sufficiently explained the *Thanatos*. Brodey\(^a\) observed a tropism\(^{246}\) in human infants of our time that makes them run from danger to mother, and Laing\(^b\) observed that, when the source of danger is mother, the more the infant clings to her, the more uptight she becomes, and so the more she frightens the infant, who clings to her with further intensity, making her even more uptight... This tropism, which is one of the roots of the dialectic between the Good Mother and the Terrible Mother discussed by Washburn,\(^c\) and which, as Laing\(^d\)

\(^{a}\) Brodey’s tropism is described in Laing (1961/1969).
\(^{b}\) Laing (1961/1969).
noted, presently seems to condition human experience from the cradle to the grave, is thus at the root of some of the instances of the Thanatos that manifest earliest in life, and could be seen as being somehow the basis of the most dangerous sequences of positive feedback occurring throughout human experience—i.e., as being what Bateson had in mind when he posited a Thanatic impulse inherent in primary process. Moreover, if, while accepting Freud’s categories of Eros and Thanatos, we replaced Freud’s Darwinian conception of phylogenesis with the one upheld in this book, we would conclude that in the early stages of humankind, when those who raised children were not sources of danger (for as noted in Chapter V of this volume and in vol. III of this book, relations of domination, repression and violence had not yet arisen) and possibly mothers did not monopolize the initial phases of the process of socialization of infants, the tropism that at a later stage made infants cling to mother in case of danger was an instance of Eros that maintained life and wholesomeness and could not turn into a manifestation of Thanatos that under certain conditions could give rise to death and harm. Furthermore, if we concluded that all instances of Thanatos are somehow based on Brodey’s tropism, we would have to conclude as well that in the earlier stages of humankind there was no Thanatos, and that the “Death Drive” resulted from a modification of Eros that occurred after monopolistic mothers became potential sources of danger (and, indeed, Norman O. Brown’s assertion that Eros and Thanatos could be subsumed into one unity could be read in this light). However, even if this interpretation were correct, the Thanatos could not be seen as an aberrant distortion of Eros, for it plays a most precious function in human existence as the drive activating the spontaneous lhundrub mechanisms that, once delusion has developed, under certain circumstances can lead to the spontaneous liberation of both delusion and the mechanisms susceptible of resulting in harm and death: as evils arise in the degenerative evolution of our species, often they themselves provide the basis for remedying these very evils. The reason why Bateson suggested that the idea of Thanatos as he understood it verged upon teleology is that it is ultimately a drive or urge, not toward death, but toward what Ch’an or Zen Buddhists call the Great Death, consisting in the extinction of being-for-self that the Buddha Shakyamuni called nirvana and that Sufis call fanâ (both terms meaning “extinction”). In fact, what here is being called the lila telos of evolution involves the progressive concealment of the Self-qu-
qua
-Base that is our true condition, then its repeated unconcealment as the Self-qu-
qua
-Path, which involves the temporary extinction of being-for-Self, and finally the establishment of the Self-qu-
qua
-fruit, which represents the definitive extinction of being-for-Self and thus of human ek-sistence (though not the death of the organism’s biological life, which is absolutely unavoidable for those who never reach the unconcealment of the Self, and which is avoided only by those who reach the Total Transference, ultimate attainment of Dzogchen).

One question remains: how is it that the positive feedback loop being discussed is seldom activated in normal individuals? In the discussion of elusion it was shown that ignoring whatever we need to ignore for delusion to function smoothly depends on both, (1) the narrow-sc conce of conscious awareness with scarcely permeable limits that encompasses at a time only a fragment of the continuum of the given and thus gives rise to the clear-cut separation between figure and ground that is inherent in the condition of

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a Laing (1961).

b Brown (1968 [or. Ed. 1959]).

c lhun grub.
small space-time-knowledge resulting from the reduced energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Skt. *kundalini*; Tib. *thig le*) proper to “normality” (on which, as we have seen, the illusion of self-existence or substantiality depends), and (2) the regular recurrence of what the Dzogchen teachings call the neutral base-of-all. The combination of these factors reduces discomfort and most of the time keeps this reduced discomfort outside the focus of conscious attention, so that the mental subject barely reacts to it and hence does not activate the positive feedback loop that makes both discomfort and the mental subject’s rejection of discomfort increase exponentially.²⁵⁰

Conversely, as will be seen in greater detail in the discussion of the *mandala*, the increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the consequent expansion and permeabilization of the focus of conscious awareness can make human individuals become aware of the insubstantiality of entities, and in particular of the entity the individual is—which in people of lower capacities is likely to activate an experience of *panic* (i.e., “irrational” dread before the patency of totality and the concomitant intuition of the insubstantiality of all entities). This expansion and permeabilization may also allow into conscious awareness ego-dystonic contents (i.e., contents that are incompatible with the individual’s self-image) which as such may jeopardize the person’s sense of identity and impair her or his ego-function, giving rise to conflict. Furthermore, if any of these or any other circumstances induce anxiety, anguish or other emotions involving unpleasant feeling-tones (Skt. *vedana*; Tib. *tsorwa*¹: the sensation in the center of the chest at the level of the heart that accompanies every perception), the latter will be experienced in its fullness—which in its turn will cause the mental subject to react to them with an intensity that will activate positive feedback loops of discomfort (and in particular of anguish). However, as shown above, the illness is itself the potential medicine, for the ensuing runaway of conflict takes the latter to the threshold level at which it finally can break like a rubber band that is stretched beyond its maximum resistance. Moreover, the runaway of conflict may further increase the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, which further boosts conflict but which—insofar as the spontaneous resolution of conflict requires the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness to reach a threshold—by the same token provides the condition of possibility of the spontaneous resolution of conflict.²⁵¹ In the case of those facing the process within the framework of the practice of Dzogchen, this resolution will correspond to the spontaneous liberation of delusion in the manifestation of the Self-*qua*-Path.²⁵²

When both conflict and the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness are made to increase by the combined action of an individual’s genetic dispositions and communicational pathologies such as recurrent pathogenic double binding,²² being placed in untenable situations,²³ mother’s reacting to the infant on the basis of her own moods rather than on the course of the infant’s behavior,²⁴ and so on, the result is likely to be a psychosis. When they increase as a result of the application of time-honored practices in the context of a genuine wisdom tradition, this may set the stage for swiftly moving toward realization.²⁵³ For example, in *Theravada* Buddhism an increase of the energetic-

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¹ *tsor ba.*
² Bateson (1972): Epidemiology of a Schizophrenia; Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia; The Group Dynamics of Schizophrenia; Minimal Requirements for a Theory of Schizophrenia; Double Bind, 1969.
³ Laing (1972).
⁴ Winnicott (1974).
volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness may be triggered by an intensive practice of mindfulness or recollection (Pali, sattipatana; Skt. smrīti; Tib. tenpa\textsuperscript{a}),\textsuperscript{254} of insight (Pali, vipassana; Skt. vipāsyāna; Tib. lhantong\textsuperscript{b}),\textsuperscript{255} and of the various possible forms of the apachayagāmi or “tearing down” meditation described in the Atthasālīni. In Ch’ān and Zen Buddhism, it may result from a combination of intensive meditation practices and the Master’s therapeutic double binding—including, though not being limited to, koan (Chinese: kung-an) study.\textsuperscript{256} In the Path of Transformation of Vajrayāna, it results mainly from application of various kundalini-increasing practices pertaining to the completion / perfection stage or Dzogrim\textsuperscript{c}.\textsuperscript{257} In Dzogchen Atiyoga, the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is made to increase almost instantly when Tekchō is boosted by the practice of Chō, and is made to increase to unforeseen heights in a very short time by the practices of Thögel and the Yangthik (which, as will be seen in a subsequent section, are carried out in the intermediate state of the dharmata or chönyi bardo\textsuperscript{d} and therefore involve the dynamic of rölpa energy activating the propensity for irritation indicated by the Tibetan term zhedang, thus being the most direct methods for activating the positive feedback loop discussed by Bateson and thus for triggering the dynamic represented by the Divine Comedy and the mandala). At any rate, the higher a Path, the higher it rises the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, the more rapidly it does so, and the more effective and powerful it is for catalyzing the dynamic Bateson described in the above-cited passage. However, all true Paths simultaneously set the conditions for the spontaneous liberation of all samsaric experiences in the manifestation of the Self-quapiPath—and, should a path fail to do so, it would prove not to be a true Path.\textsuperscript{258}

Insofar as the process that Bateson explained above responds to the structure and function of the Divine Comedy, of the dynamic represented by the mandala, and of the bardo or intermediate state between death and rebirth, I have been able to assimilate his explanations into the ones provided in this book (with some modifications, such as the acknowledgment of the role of secondary process in the activation of positive feedback loops and the determining role of a high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness). However, it is crucial to caution that the experience of the “human constant” Tibetan Buddhism refers to as the bardo or intermediate state between death and rebirth, in itself does not lead to Awakening or nirvana; all sentient beings are supposed to go through it between one lifetime and the next, and yet liberation during the passage is so extraordinary that with extremely rare exceptions we continue to be reborn just as ever—and in psychosis and so on quite a few human beings slip into the bardo while physically alive, yet we hardly know of anyone who has achieved full Awakening as a result of such occurrences. In fact, in themselves the spontaneous (Tib. lhundrub\textsuperscript{e}) processes Bateson,\textsuperscript{f} Laing,\textsuperscript{g} Perry,\textsuperscript{h} Cooper,\textsuperscript{i} Dabrowski,\textsuperscript{j} Basaglia\textsuperscript{a} and others\textsuperscript{b} dealt with—which perhaps

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{a} dran pa.
\item \textsuperscript{b} lhag mthong; Chin. kuan.
\item \textsuperscript{c} rdzogs rim; Skt. sampannakrama.
\item \textsuperscript{d} chos nyid bar do.
\item \textsuperscript{e} lhun grub.
\item \textsuperscript{f} Bateson (1961, 1972).
\item \textsuperscript{g} Laing (1967).
\item \textsuperscript{h} Perry (1974; also 1953, 1999); O’Callaghan (1993/2001).
\item \textsuperscript{i} Cooper (1967, 1971, 1974, 1980).
\item \textsuperscript{j} Dabrowski (1964a, 1964b, 1972); Dabrowski, Kawczak & Piechowski (1964).
\end{itemize}
could be seen as manifestations of what Jung called the “transcendent function”\textsuperscript{259} and which begins with what Jung called the night sea journey\textsuperscript{d}—are not Paths to Awakening. However, in an ideal environment, with the help of a wise therapist, and with the right karmic connection (which in worldly terms would be seen as luck), they may help deranged people overcome impairing psychological disorders and by the same token open up to manifold dimensions, including spiritual ones.\textsuperscript{260}

By setting up the Arbours Association, the late Ronald D. Laing and his associates did a great service to those facing psychotic experiences in the UK, and so did John W. Perry and Stan and Christina Grof in the USA—the former by setting up Diabasis in Berkeley in the 1960s,\textsuperscript{261} and the latter couple by establishing their Spiritual Emergency Network (SEN).\textsuperscript{262} In these places, spontaneous self-healing processes, rather than being blocked, are allowed to follow their course so that, provided they successfully reach their natural outcome, those undergoing them may achieve increased individual harmony and greater integration of conscious and eluded contents, and by the same token open up to new, spiritual dimensions. Though such processes should also prepare those who are too deranged to immediately enter Spiritual Paths, to possibly do so at the conclusion of the process, the theoretical frameworks applied in these places are often not conducive to this end. To begin with, they fail to discriminate between transpersonal experiences within \textit{samsara}, those of the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither \textit{samsara} nor \textit{nirvana} are active, and those in which the \textit{Self-qua-Path} manifests, and therefore fail to warn that the so called peak experiences involving feelings of oneness and so on that often arise in the course of these processes as a rule are not instances of \textit{nirvana} (which, as we know, depends on reGnition of the \textit{Self-qua-Base} and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of the delusorily valued thoughts conditioning experience)—and hence those who have successfully undergone such processes may come to believe they have already reached a high spiritual level and thus forsake the quest for \textit{absolute sanity}. In the same way, the spontaneous resolution of conflict on the occasion of reaching a threshold level (which before 1998 Stan Grof would have explained as a transition from BPM 3 to BPM 4\textsuperscript{263}) in unplanned processes such as psychoses, casual so-called “psychedelic” sessions, and so on, is most unlikely to result in instances of the \textit{Self-qua-Path}; therefore, even when this spontaneous resolution of conflict helps overcome impairing dysfunctions, those who undergo them should keep in mind that in themselves such unplanned processes are not a Path of Awakening, and brace themselves for other problems of a more subtle kind to subsequently arise. In particular, as shown in a posterior section of this chapter, Stan and Christina Grof’s classification and understanding of what they refer to as spiritual emergencies is \textit{not} in agreement with the teachings of genuine Awakening traditions and does not facilitate the transition to a more detached and wholesome mode of existence. Hence it is imperative that it be acknowledged that the main function of spontaneous self-healing processes and alternative systems of psychotherapy is to help deranged people overcome problems which, (1) make their lives more conflictive and harder than those of average samsaric humans,\textsuperscript{264} and (2) prevent them from successfully

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\textsuperscript{a} Basaglia (1971, 1982).
\textsuperscript{b} Barnes & Berke (1972); Esterson (1972); Foucault (1967/1986); Ruitenbeek (Ed. 1972); Grof & Grof (1992); etc.
\textsuperscript{c} Jung (1975).
\textsuperscript{d} Jung (1967b).
following a Path of Awakening. And that it be understood that the processes and systems in question do not directly lead to Awakening—and in particular that many of the varieties of spiritual emergency listed by the Grofs, unless used as a platform for questioning the dualistic, delusive structure of the experience, are likely to give rise to hindrances rather than breakthroughs.  

In fact, there is an unbridgeable abyss between the unsought manifestation of the intermediate state between death and rebirth (Skt. antarabhava; Tib. bar do) or “human constant” in episodes of madness triggered by adventitious circumstances (such as social, communicational situations, possibly with the concurrence of conducive genetic set-ups), and the highest Dzogchen practices performed in the state in question—namely those of Thögel and the Yangthik. Mary Barnes noted that madness is not the library but the nursery, and in fact for the unsought processes of madness occurring to people lacking emotional, spiritual and intellectual maturity to become therapeutic occurrences what is needed is wise paraverbal responsiveness—intellectual explanations being to some extent beside the point, if not outright counterproductive. Though processes of madness such as those undergone by Jalaladin Rumi or Padmasambhava, and even more so practices such as Thögel, the Yangthik and so on, are not the library either, they lie at an extreme of human ontogenesis diametrically opposite to that of the nursery, for in order to approach them one must have reached an exceptional degree of spiritual, emotional and intellectual maturity. “Intellectual maturity” does not mean becoming a scholar; what it means is that, no matter to what degree we may have developed the intellect, to this degree we must establish the intellectual view that may allow us to successfully tread the Path. In fact, as the Paramitayana makes it clear, in order to obtain the absolute prajña—i.e., the non-conceptual wisdom—that results from Contemplation (i.e., from direct Vision of the true condition of reality), proportionally to our intellectual acumen and the sophistication of our learning we must develop the relative prajña or discriminative awareness that results from reflection, and before we develop the latter we must develop to the same proportion the relative prajña that results from listening and studying—for otherwise doubts will either prevent us from devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to the practice, or somehow interfere with the latter. Furthermore, we will not reach the citadel of Awakening unless we learn to distinguish those transpersonal, holotropic (i.e., tending to wholeness) experiences pertaining to samsara or pertaining neither to samsara nor to nirvana, from the condition of nirvana characterized by the spontaneous liberation of thought and hence of thought-conditioned experiences (whether personal or transpersonal, hylotropic or holotropic), and establish the conditions for the thought-conditioned experiences of transpersonal, holotropic realms to liberate themselves spontaneously. Otherwise these experiences will give rise to infatuation, attachment to experiences and other deviations, becoming new sources of bondage and giving rise to new obstacles: it must be clear by now that only the reGnition of the true condition of thought resulting in the manifestation of the inherently all-liberating Self-quà-Path and hence in the spontaneous liberation of delusorily valued and emotionally charged thoughts, can progressively neutralize the propensities for samsara.

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a thod rgal.
b yang thig.
c Barnes & Berke (1972).
Thus it is clear that positive feedback loops are at the root, both of the process of Awakening in genuine wisdom traditions such as Dzogchen and other Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems, and of spontaneously occurring processes which on their own cannot lead to Awakening, and which according to the setting and conditions can either become dead ends of suffering and impairment, or result in greater integration of conscious and eluded contents, individual harmony, openness to mysticism, and capacity to successfully tread a genuine Path of Awakening. Though negative feedback loops are not as important as positive feedback loops in the dynamic of the bardo or human constant discussed in this section, it seems pertinent at this point to consider whether or not they also have a function in the process of Awakening. The learning achieved through positive feedback, insofar as it destroys the mental subject’s illusion of being in control of experience and subsequently may result in the disappearance of the subject in question, is central on the more abrupt Paths of Awakening. On the contrary, learning through negative feedback, such as the one achieved in the practice of pacification (Pali, samatha; Skt. shamatha; Tib. shine; Chinese chih), allows secondary process to increase its control over primary process, and hence outside the context of a genuine Path of Awakening it may facilitate the subsistence of the illusory mental subject. In fact, this learning is typically used for ascending in samsara, which does not solve the problem of life, for the control that secondary process may acquire over primary process is limited both in extent and in duration, and its applicability depends on contributory conditions—which is why, as we have seen repeatedly, any ascension in samsara is sooner or later followed by a fall. However, in the context of Paths of Awakening, pacification achieved through negative feedback can result in experiences that may serve as the basis for the application of the various kinds of insight meditation (Pali, vipassana; Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhantong; Chinese, kuan) that may create the conditions for an initial manifestation of the Self-quaint Path, and for the individual’s subsequent development on the Path.

The Symbolism of the Divine Comedy

On the individual plane, unsought spontaneous or lhundrub self-healing processes taking place outside the framework of wisdom traditions begin when the individual departs from the “world of the living” consisting in statistical normality (which as we have seen is achieved by adapting through self-deceit to a deluded, extremely disturbed society, and which occupies some range of the space between the spurious heavenly states we wish to attain and the hellish conditions we are compelled to elude), entering the Underworld or Hades—i.e., the “region” of experience where one has gained access to what formerly lay below the threshold of consciousness. Since maintaining a self-image within the range of normality depends on the elusion of ego-dystonic contents (i.e., of whatever contradicts that self-image), if this “departure from the world of the living” occurs spontaneously outside the context of a Path of Awakening, one’s ego function may be impaired in what amounts to a death of the well-adapted ego.

The following stage involves a descent through the region of experience that the Tuscan Classic represents as Hell—which comprises the turning of contradiction into conflict and which may involve the naked experience of being-for-Self, of being-for-others

\[a\] zhi gnas.
\[b\] lhag mthong.
and so on—to the point of utmost conflict. The circles of Hell stand for the vicious circles of conflict and suffering begotten by the wayward, malignant mental patterns of samsara, which the positive feedback loop at the root of Hell, insofar as it drastically intensifies the conflict and suffering these circles represent, causes to become ever narrower as we descend—so that conflict and suffering increase toward the threshold represented as the bottom of Hell, at which tension and the frequency of the vibratory activity responsible for delusory valuation reach their breaking point. Tension depends on the appearance of there being two poles in mutual opposition, and in order to develop requires that a mental subject feels separate from its object and rejects it; when the feeling of tension is so unpleasant as to be singled out as object, the subject reacts to it with further rejection, causing tension to increase. The heightened unpleasant sensation of tension causes the subject’s rejection to further increase, making tension and the associated unpleasant sensation grow further—in an autocatalytic dynamic that brings tension to a point at which the mental subject is so overwhelmed by the unpleasant sensation of tension from which it feels different, that it cannot turn its attention away from it. It is this that the Divine Comedy represents as the bottom of Hell, which features a hole through which it is possible to pass into Purgatory—which in its turn illustrates the fact that the condition in question is a threshold at which tension can collapse, producing a breakthrough. Reaching this point may be most valuable to those whom, having received the transmission and oral instructions proper to Dzogchen, embarked voluntarily in this voyage; whose psychological state is the one Buddhism calls the “human realm” and who have the due capacities, including the aplomb necessary for questioning their experience and applying the pith instructions in turbulence. In fact, if at that point such individuals apply pith instructions like those of Dzogchen, provided the Self-ququa-Base and the lineage Masters bestow their blessings on them, the breakthrough achieved may involve the reGnition of the Self-ququa-Base I call the Self-ququa-Path and thus represent an initial, decisive transition beyond samsara. When this reGnition occurs, tension, conflict and pain, together with the basic delusion at their root, spontaneously break, and being-for-Self undergoes what Ch’an or Zen Buddhists call the “Great Death,” extinguishing itself momentarily in nirvana (or, in Sufi terms, temporarily undergoing fanâ). This has supreme value because spontaneous liberation increases the individual’s capacity of spontaneous liberation in direct proportion to the height of energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the intensity of the conflict that resolves itself on the occasion: since at the threshold pictured as the bottom of Hell both of these are at their peak, spontaneous liberation radically increases the individual’s capacity of spontaneous liberation—as a result of which, whenever the same intensity of conflict is reached with the same energetic-volume, the application of the pith instructions will unfailingly result in spontaneous liberation. Besides, the occurrence in question shows the individual that the progression of increasing conflict and suffering that she or he was undergoing is not a fall through Hell conceived as a bottomless abyss of ever increasing pain, but the Royal Road to the true, irreversible Heaven of the Self-ququa-Fruit (as different from the spurious, fleeting, conditioned, samsaric abodes of the gods of the three spheres in Buddhism). This is the reason why Purgatory bears this name: because at this point we know through direct experience that the runaways of conflict and suffering we are experiencing lead beyond conflict and suffering, into the Self-ququa-Path that in this symbolism may be said to be a temporary instance of unconditioned Heaven, and that the process we are undergoing is—just like the Roman Catholic Purgatory and in contrast with the Christian
idea of Hell—a purifying passage that those soiled by “sin” must undergo in order to gain admission to the irreversible Heaven of the Self-qua-Fruit. The point is that, since the Greek word rendered as “sin” is *hamartia*, meaning “error” or “delusion,” the “expiation of sin” that is the essence of Purgatory may be etymologically understood in the sense of purging the delusion called *avidya* or *marigpa*—and, together with it, purging the particular karmas produced by actions determined by the delusion in question. In fact, each instance of spontaneous liberation neutralizes, to a degree that is proportional to the height of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the intensity of the conflict that resolves itself on the occasion, the propensities for the occurrence of the basic human delusion—and hence for the occurrence of the tension, conflict and suffering which are the bare experience of delusion—as well as the particular individual karmas related to the specific manifestation of delusion that liberated itself. Therefore, the unceasing repetition of this over a sufficiently prolonged period purges all that has to be eradicated in order for the individual to become established in the Self-qua-Fruit.

This is the reason why in the practice of Dzogchen, in order to purge both the basic human delusion and an individual’s *karma*, which are the conditions of possibility of all distressing experiences, methods are applied that keep the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness particularly high, cause the basic contradiction consisting in basic human delusion to turn into conflict as soon as it arises, and catalyze the repeated reGnition of the Self-qua-Base I call the Self-qua-Path and the concomitant liberation of tension and the delusion at the root of tension. Thus Purgatory, when traversed in the context of a practice such as Dzogchen, represents the most thorough, irreversible *katharsis*, which rather than giving rise to a release of tensions that will well up again after a while (as in the cases of Aristotle’s tragic *katharsis*, or of the almost equally superficial catharses achieved by some methods of humanistic or transpersonal psychology), progressively neutralizes both the dualistic delusion that is the ultimate root of all tensions and an individual’s karmas 275—by the same token increasing the individual’s capacity for spontaneous liberation in daily life and giving rise to the systemic Wisdom that according to Gregory Bateson results from what he called Learning III. Once delusion has been neutralized to a great extent, becoming far subtler, the next stage of the journey begins: the one represented as ascending through Heaven toward the Empyrean—i.e., toward the Self-qua-Fruit, which is beyond up and down and beyond the illusory duality of *samsara* and *nirvana*, and which constitutes the only safe haven.

In fact, the transition from Purgatory to Heaven represents the point at which the neutralization of delusion and recurrence of the Awake condition that gradually stabilizes supreme wisdom and true sanity becomes somehow automatic, for conflict spontaneously liberates itself in the patency of the Self-qua-Base as it begins to manifest—and so the individual, who no longer has to practice, or to go through any more experiences of Hell or Purgatory, has become free from the coarse sufferings of *samsara*. At the end of the *Divine Comedy* Dante reaches his beloved Beatrice’s dwelling place, just as at the end of the process under consideration a Dzogchen practitioner may become established in the state of indivisibility (Tib. *jerme*3) of the opposites represented by the primordial Buddha which is the *yab-yum* (sexual union) of Samantabhadra (male aspect) and Samantabhadri (female aspect),276 thus surpassing the dualism of hells and paradises and in general all dualisms—and in particular obtaining the state of indivisibility or jerme with regard to the

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275 'dbyer med.
phenomena of tsel energy, which have fused with rölpa energy, and therefore no illusory distance will ever again separate the practitioner from the absolute plenitude of the Self-quà-Base. If we interpreted Dante’s Empyrean in this light, it would be the same as the supreme unconditioned Heaven called the Akanishta Pure Land—the pure dimension of Awakening, the natural expression of the Awake condition, the dharmadhatu garden of the Primordial Buddha, which bears the suffix ghanavyuha or “richly adorned” because it spontaneously gives rise to the “offerings and adornments” of complete enjoyment, and which has not been created or produced and hence will not dissolve or be destroyed: it is the Self-quà-Fruit, in which being-for-Self no longer arises and hence there is no parting from the state Sufis call fanâ and Buddhists call nirvana, and which involves freedom from all delusive experiences—from the spurious paradises of the three spheres of the god realm (of sensuality, of form and or formlessness) down to the conflictive, pain-ridden hells and other lower realms. Though at this point being-for-Self has become extinguished in nirvana, due to the spontaneous functioning of the rupakaya (nirmanakaya cum sambhogakaya) a Buddha can be perceived by devout Buddhists as working on their behalf. Furthermore, if this realization is carried to its limit, when all Buddha-activities have been completed, there is the real possibility of manifesting one of the extraordinary modes of death, or the mode of putting an end to life that does not involve death, and thus continuing to teach those who have the capacity of perceiving the “body of light.”

First we need to obtain Direct Introduction and receive the traditional instructions and so forth. Then, the repeated manifestation of the most clear and powerful instance of the Self-quà-Path must allow us to no longer remain in doubt. Subsequently, if conditions are favorable, each and every time that, as we go through the stages described in the Divine Comedy, delusion and self-consciousness arise, they will liberate themselves spontaneously in the manifestation of the all-liberating gnosis inherent in the Self-quà-Path—and if at some point this liberation does not occur in an immediate manner, it will do so after the unfolding of a positive feedback loop. The conditioned consciousness that each and every time will arise at some point, putting an end to the manifestation of the Self-quà-Path, will possess ever more systemic wisdom, whereas the delusion inherent in consciousness will be progressively mitigated. If the process is catalyzed by the necessary practices and conditions (which include a sufficiently high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and so forth), and if the practitioner obtains the necessary blessings and applies the necessary zeal for the practice to reach its final aim, eventually the propensities for the manifestation of delusion will be totally neutralized, so that consciousness will no longer arise and the individual will obtain the Fruits discussed at the end of the above paragraph.

We must not fear this “descent through Hell” and “ascent through Purgatory,” for the initial experience of conflict need not be long lasting, and (as will be shown below in the discussion of the practice of Thögel) upon each instance of spontaneous liberation total bliss will manifest, which will be interrupted by a moment of conflict only when delusion crops up—to become immediately re-established the instant conflict liberates itself together with the delusion at its root. What is terrifying is the failure to undergo this process, for samsara’s law of inverted effect will cause us to repeatedly face the extremely painful experiences. But this is the path of the Buddha, and hence the practitioner has no fear of undergoing these experiences.

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[a] 'og min stug po bchod pa'i zhing.
[b] Tib. tugpo köpa (stug po bchod pa). In this regard cf. e.g. Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 413.
[c] Pali, nibbana; Tib., mya ngan las 'das pa.
experiences that we frantically strive to avoid, while preventing us from dwelling even for a moment in the coveted palace of perfect plenitude, satisfaction and enjoyment. In fact, in \textit{samsara} we try to achieve plenitude by affirming the existence of being-for-Self, which is what bars plenitude, and we are doomed to reproduce Sisyphus’ torment, pushing to the pinnacle of Hell the stone of \textit{karma} to which we are chained, for it to slip as we place it on its tip, dragging us down to the foot of the mountain—from where we have to begin to climb to the pinnacle once more: \textit{samsara} involves the ceaseless strife to climb to the higher regions of \textit{samsara}, from which we recurrently fall back into Hell, each time having to begin the climbing once more. Furthermore, the representation of the Path as a process of descent does not imply renouncing the experiences of the higher realms of \textit{samsara}: in the way of renunciation of the \textit{Sutrayana}, practices for ascending through the spheres of form and formlessness may be important elements of the Path; in the way of transformation of the \textit{Vajrayana}, there are practices for ascending through all three spheres of \textit{samsara}—and the same applies to the way of spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen \textit{Ati}, in which practitioners obtain experiences of emptiness / total space, clarity and total pleasure. However, the point in this is not to fruitlessly try to remain in those higher realms (which would subject us to the dynamic just denounced), but to use the ensuing experiences as reflections in a mirror that allow us to directly discover the nature of the mirror and thus go beyond \textit{samsara} with its ups and downs.

It was German scholar Herbert V. Guenther\textsuperscript{a} who, on the basis of a text by Tibetan master Longchen Rabjampa, first offered the West an account of the Dzogchen process of Awakening in terms of the above considered dynamic.\textsuperscript{b} However, Dr. Guenther’s account hardly allowed people lacking an effective Dzogchen practice to figure out what it referred to. Furthermore, Dr. Guenther used an unfit terminology to refer to the various stages of the process: he used the term \textit{dys-chreodic} movement to refer to the first stage—which in this book, in terms of the \textit{Divine Comedy}, I have presented as a descent though Hell to its very bottom, where the threshold level at which radical change becomes possible is reached. Dr. Guenther used the term \textit{dys-chreodic} interruption to indicate the transition from the first to the second stage of this process, which, in his terminology, is marked by the manifestation of “pristine cognitions” that re-orient the process—and which this book represents as the transition from Hell to Purgatory. Dr. Guenther used the term \textit{eu-chreodic} movement to refer to the second stage of the process—which above was represented by the recurrence of conflictive experiences in Purgatory, and the immediate resolution of conflict, each and every time it arises, in the manifestation of the all-liberating gnosis of the Self-qua-Path. Finally, Professor Guenther used the term “a stable flux of homeorhesis” to indicate the dynamic leading the individual to and through the last stages of the process, which in the \textit{Divine Comedy} correspond to the successive levels of Heaven.

However, Waddington coined the term \textit{chreod} to indicate a systemic activity having the function of dynamically keeping systems on a necessary path\textsuperscript{284} (rather than conserving a steady state, as in the case of homeostasis), which in his own terminology\textsuperscript{c} is a type of

\textsuperscript{a} Guenther (1984).
\textsuperscript{b} Dr. Guenther (1984) bases himself on Longchen Rabjampa (klong chen rab ’byams pa), \textit{Longdrel} (klong ‘grel), Chogchui munpa thamche nampar selwa (phyogs bcu’i mun pa thams cad rnam par sel ba), p. 490 (Paro, Bhutan, 1975), of which he quotes a fragment in his own English translation.
\textsuperscript{c} Waddington (1957).
homeorhesis or simple development. As I learned from Anthony Wilden, homeorhesis, like homeostasis and homeogenesis, is a type of morphostasis—which is how Maruyama called processes of the general kind that General Systems Theory calls self-stabilization, which are those based on negative feedback, not involving either a change of norms or a change of code, and keeping systems on the preexisting state of self-organization. The term chreod does not apply to any of the systemic activities that Guenther referred to by composite terms involving the vocable in question, for they are not types of morphostasis or self-stabilization.

The processes based on positive feedback and the radical transformations involved in the elaboration of new structures and functions by means of systemic activities giving rise to a change of norms and an essential change of code—so that what is essential in them is not the program but a change of programs—thereby leading systems to more negentropic states, belong to what General Systems Theory calls self-organization and that Maruyama called morphogenesis. (Maruyama-coined terms such as morphostasis and morphogenesis became so common in sociology because of their usage by Walter Buckley in his systemic theory of society.) Insofar as what Guenther called dys-chreodic movement is based on positive feedback, comprises radical transformations involving a change of norms and an essential change of code, and so on, it is a type of morphogenesis rather than morphostasis (which, as we have seen, is the reason why they should not be referred to by a composite expression involving the vocable chreod). This implies that what Dr Guenther called dys-chreodic interruption is the stoppage of a type of morphogenesis; however, insofar as it consists in a temporary liberation with regard to conditioning by programs, this stoppage itself is not an instance of morphogenesis. Moreover, although what Dr. Guenther called eu-chreodic movement is based on positive feedback and gives rise to a change of norms, codes and programs, insofar as this process results in progressive liberation with regard to all conditioning by programs, it goes beyond morphogenesis. These are the reasons why, in order to refer to what Dr Guenther designated dys-chreodic interruption, I tentatively propose the expression “metamorphic breakthrough,” whereas in order to refer to the subsequent progressive liberation from conditioning by programs and metaprograms that the same author called eu-chreodic movement, I tentatively propose the composite term “metamorphrhesis.” The crucial point in all this is that, in a most important sense, Awakening amounts to freedom with regard to the programs and metaprograms of what John Lilly reductionistically called “the human biocomputer.”

The Mandala Principle

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a Wilden (1980).
b Maruyma (1963).
e Wilden (1980).
h Maruyama (1963); Buckley (1993).
i Buckley (1993).
Below, as in other works,\(^a\) it is shown that in Vajrayana Buddhism, and particularly in Dzogchen Atiyoga, the above-discussed process is represented by the mandala—which, as noted elsewhere,\(^b\) symbolizes a principle that is central to different mystical traditions of humanity and appears in the literature and fine arts of many civilizations. The fact that the mandala principle is central to mystical traditions of different civilizations should not be taken to necessarily imply genetic links among traditions and civilizations. Carl Gustav Jung asserted the mandalas appearing spontaneously to some of his neurotic patients in dreams or hallucinations to be maps pointing the way to sanity—which, in its supreme form, does not consist merely in overcoming neurosis (which Jung correctly understood to be spontaneous, potentially self-healing processes), but in uprooting the basic human delusion. If Jung’s patients actually hallucinated mandalas or dreamed them up and thus obtained spontaneous maps of the process they had to undergo in order to heal, there can be no doubt that these symbols are well-known to the true mystics of all genuine spiritual traditions, who are so familiar with the dynamic represented by mandalas.

Jung pointed out that the center of the mandala represents the nonduality and lack of plurality characteristic of the true condition of reality, whereas the periphery represents the world of duality and plurality—which according to Buddhism is a world of deceit and delusion. In spite of having written “psychological commentaries” to the translations of two important, original Dzogchen books,\(^c\) Jung failed to grasp some of the mandala’s levels of meaning, particularly in the Dzogchen teachings. Let us consider the three regions of a mandala from one particular Dzogchen standpoint:

1. The periphery represents the normal state in which we are totally immersed in delusion and completely deceived: since we are confused and at the same time confused with regard to the fact that we are confused, we deem our judgments and perceptions to be sound. 2. The four wrathful guardians (dharmapala) or dakini in the intermediate zone, who guard the gates to the center, represent the dynamic of the transition between the periphery and the center. 3. The central yab-yum (male-female erotic-mystical union) figure is the Adi-Buddha of Primordial Awakening, which at this point is the symbol of the nondual, insubstantial, nonplural true condition of reality, explained as the indivisibility of the kata\(^d\) or primordial purity aspect of the Base that is our true condition of Dzogchen—its voidness, consisting in the basic space of phenomena (Skt. dharma; Tib. chö;\(^e\) ) represented by the female figure, Samantabhadri or Kuntuzangmo—and the lhunrub\(^f\) or spontaneous perfection aspect of the Base—vision\(^g\) or, which is the same, the phenomenal world that manifests through the senses with its perfect functionality, represented by the male figure, Samantabhadra or Kuntuzangpo. Now let us consider these zones of the mandala as stages on the Path to absolute sanity, beginning with the initial state of those who have not yet begun moving forward on the Path.

(I) The periphery involves avidya or marigpa in all three senses these terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book: (1) in that of unawareness of the true, unthinkable (Skt. achintya), nonconceptual (Skt. nishprapancha) condition of all of reality;

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\(^b\) Capriles (2000c), pp. 169-70.
\(^c\) Evans-Wentz (1927, 1977).
\(^d\) ka dag.
\(^e\) chos dbyings.
\(^f\) lhun grub.
\(^g\) Tib. nangwa (snang ba).
(2) in that of the deceptive appearances that outright contradict the true condition of reality; and (3) in that of the confusion lying in taking the deceptive appearances in question for the exact apprehension of the true condition of reality, which is responsible for keeping the delusion that is the basic human contradiction from outright turning into conflict—even though it cannot stop it from generating derivate, secondary conflicts. This threefold delusion is the basic human contradiction because it makes us perceive everything inversely, and because it thereby generates the dynamic of inverted effect or backward law briefly discussed in this volume (which I dealt with in greater detail in two other works\(^a\)): by the same token it gives rise to lack of plenitude and to attempts to attain plenitude that keep plenitude at bay, to suffering and to attempts to stop suffering that perpetuate and accentuate suffering, to yearning for pleasure and to attempts to obtain pleasure that keep pleasure at bay, to self-hindering and to attempts to attain skillfulness that beget and accentuate self-hindering, to evil and to the strategies for achieving goodness that perpetuate and boost evil, and so on. In particular, avidya in the third sense the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book may be seen as a meta-contradiction insofar as it sustains all of this by concealing it and thus curbing the dynamic that would eradicate them and thus give rise to plenitude, pleasure, mastery and goodness.

(II) The intermediate zone, featuring the wrathful guardians or dakinis, involves (1) the concealment of the true condition of reality corresponding to the first sense of the terms avidya and marigpa in the Dzogchen classification adopted in this book, as well as (2) the deceptive appearances that outright contradict the true condition of reality that correspond to the second sense of avidya or marigpa in the classification adopted here. However, (3) the confusion lying in taking these deceptive appearances for the correct apprehension of the true condition of reality, which constitutes the third of the senses of avidya or marigpa, no longer works effectively, for the deceptive character of the appearances that make up the second of the senses of these terms has been disclosed as such, as a result of which the basic contradiction has turned into extreme conflict—which is what the guardians or dakinis represent.

(III) In the center, avidya or marigpa, in all three senses of the term, has dissolved in the unconcealment of the nondual primordial gnosis of unborn awareness that is our true condition—i.e., in the unconcealment of the Base of Dzogchen in which, as evidenced by the figure of the Adi-Buddha yab-yum, the katak and lhundrub aspects are indivisible. Let us consider these three stages in greater detail.

\(\text{(I) The Peripheral Phase in the Transition from the Mandala’s Periphery to its Center}\)

As noted above, the state of statistical normality represented by the periphery of the mandala indicated as (I) involves: (1) The basic unawareness of our true condition, which characterizes the neutral condition of the base-of-all (Tib. kunzhi lungmaten\(^b\)) in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, and which underlies all samsaric states as well. (2) The deceptive appearances produced by the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, which are the core of all samsaric states, and in particular, the illusion that ourselves, other sentient beings, and the configurations that we single out in the sensory continuum and

\(^{a}\) Capriles (1990a, 2001).
\(^{b}\) kun gzhi lung ma bstan.
experience as object, are absolutely true, inherently separate, self-existing entities, and the illusion that we are the center of the universe and that our self and our experiences are ultimately important—which as a whole beget lack of plenitude, selfishness, tensions, self-hindering, conflicts, apprehensions and fears. (3) The unawareness of the fact that the deceptive appearances indicated as (2) are deceptive, on which the efficacy and continuity of delusion depends insofar as awareness of the deceptive character of the appearances of dualism, plurality and self-being would prevent us from taking them for the true condition of reality. As noted in the preceding section, this unawareness in its turn depends on the restricted, scarcely permeable focus of conscious attention, which allows our consciousness to cut off its objects from the rest of the sensory field so that we may experience them (and in particular the object designated by our name and experienced as our self) as inherently separate and hence as involving self-being, and which most of the time allows our focus of consciousness to exclude whichever facts and occurrences contradict our self-image and to shut out the lack of plenitude, frustration and pain inherent in samsara—thereby allowing us to maintain our habitual sense-of-self and to continue to revolve in samsara in pursuit of the carrot of satisfaction.

It is (3) the unawareness of the fact that the delusion indicated as (2) is the basic human delusion and contradiction that bars entrance to the mandala’s intermediate zone featuring the wrathful guardians of the four gates that, as noted above, represent the turning of the delusion that is the basic human contradiction into extreme conflict. In particular, beings of lower capacities, in whom the intuition of the emptiness of self-being of entities that is a stage on the way to and a precondition of the realization of the true condition of all entities that the center of the mandala represents would induce the terror of the emptiness of self-being of entities I have called “panic,” and in whom the intuition of the fact that the condition represented by the center of the mandala is beyond duality and beyond good and evil would induce even greater dread, are compelled to elude both the emptiness of self-being of all entities and the true condition of these represented by the mandala’s center. In fact, dread of the terror I call panic and of the horror of the basic features of our true condition compels them to cling to the threefold delusion that is the source of terror and dread (as well as of the perennial lack of plenitude and the recurrent frustration and pain inherent in samsara), and to shun this fear together with the panic and dread which are its objects, and together with the respective objects of panic and dread—thereby preventing the unfolding of the spontaneous dynamic represented by the mandala, which if allowed to unfold with the concurrence of all contributory conditions, could have taken them from the periphery, with its inherent lack of plenitude, suffering, frustration and conflict, to the plenitude and harmony of the center. Since only the center would put a definitive end to fear, terror and dread, by the same token giving rise to plenitude and fulfillment, there can be no doubt that fear of panic and dread, and panic and dread themselves, are paramount, paradigmatic manifestations of the fundamental human contradiction.

In fact, to beings of lower capacities in the mandala’s periphery, the four wrathful guardians or dakinis represent what R. D. Laing (1967), in the context of a discussion of psychosis and without referring to the symbolism of the mandala, expressed by saying that they believe that farther in that direction, “there is an abyss, there are wild beasts:” beings in the periphery are kept there because they cling to it in the belief that the road toward the center is a dead end haunted by monsters and leading to an abyss. At any rate, it is clear that the condition for the contradictory deceptive appearances that make up the second of
the senses the term avidya or marigpa has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, and in general for the fundamental human delusion—threefold avidya or marigpa—to carry on indefinitely, is the continuity and efficiency of avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here,291 which keep us from slipping into the intermediate region of the mandala. In fact, it must be clear by now that we are compelled to elude awareness that the contradiction consisting in threefold avidya or marigpa is a contradiction and a delusion, because otherwise it would turn into conflict, making this contradiction unbearable: with regard to the hair that Shantideva used as an example of the “all-pervasive suffering” (one of the three kinds of duhkha), we would become like the eye, which unlike the palm of the hand cannot bear its presence indefinitely.292

As suggested in the preceding section, one of the main conditions that could cause contradiction to be realized as such and thus turn into conflict, and that then could activate a runaway of conflict toward the threshold the Divine Comedy represents as the hole that leads from the bottom of Hell into Purgatory, is a sizable increase in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Tib. thig-le; Skt. kundalini), for this would make our focus of conscious attention become ampler and have more permeable limits—which in its turn would hinder our capacity to consider ourselves and other entities as substantial, to maintain a habitual self-image and sense-of-self, to bear the pain inherent in samsara, and so on. However, this could by no means produce or cause the condition of absolute sanity that Buddhists call Awakening or Enlightenment, which insofar as it is not fabricated, contrived, arisen, born, or produced by causes and conditions, all Buddhist teachings characterize in terms of the concept expressed by the Pali term abhëta, the Sanskrit anutpada or anupatti, the Tibetan makyepa\(^a\), etc., which are rendered as unproduced, unbecome, uncaused; of the concept expressed by the Pali and the Sanskrit ajata and the Tibetan makyepa\(^b\), etc., which are rendered as unborn; and of the concept expressed by the Pali asankhata, the Sanskrit asamskrita, the Tibetan di\(\text{"m\text{"ajai}\text{"c}\text{"}}, which are often rendered as “unconditioned,” but which also have the connotations of “uncompounded,” “unproduced,” “unfabricated,” “unmade” and “uncontrived.”293 In fact, in the unprepared individual who clings to the illusion of substantiality, instead of resulting in the unveiling of the mandala’s center, the expansion-permeabilization of the focus of conscious attention could as well induce disturbances, psychotomimetic experiences, or psychosis. (Alternatively, it could give rise to the experience of the base-of-all wherein neither samsara nor nirvana is active, followed by samsaric experiences of the realms of the gods.)

In our time, in the process of socialization our innate propensities compound with conditioning to produce a powerful clinging to the illusion of self-being or substantiality of entities (including the entity indicated by our name), and to the self-image developed in the process in question. The pan-oramification of the focus of conscious attention that results from an increase in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness makes this focus’ limits thinner and vaguer, as happens to the rubber of a balloon that is inflated: the bigger the balloon, the thinner and more transparent the rubber becomes, so that at some point one can see through it. And, if this pan-oramification goes beyond a threshold, the limits of the focus of consciousness, and hence the very existence of such focus, may seem

\(^a\)ma skyes pa.
\(^b\)ma skyes pa.
\(^c\)‘dus ma byas.
to disappear altogether. At any rate, the pan-oramification in question can beget intuitions of totality—i.e., of what the Greek god Pan represents—and by the same token make patent the emptiness of self-being of the entity that we are and of all other entities in our world—which in the case of individuals of lower capacities is most likely to give rise to experiences of panic. Furthermore, this pan-oramification can make us aware of aspects of ourselves that contradict our self-image—which in the unprepared would impair the ego function and induce intense conflict. Finally, no matter what our capacities or preparation may be, if for adventitious reasons discomfort or mental pain manifested when this pan-oramification has occurred, the thinning, diffusion or seeming dissolution of the limits of consciousness would cause us to experience this discomfort or pain in its fullness—which would elicit rejection, which would increase pain, which would elicit further rejection, unchaining self-catalyzing, positive feedback loops of pain, anxiety and discomfort.

(II) The Intermediate Phase in the Transition from the Mandala’s Periphery to its Center

Willingly or unwillingly, people enter the intermediate zone when the contradiction constituted by the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa is realized as such and thus turns into conflict. This occurs when the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought at the root of the deceptive appearances of dualism and self-being and corresponding to the second sense the term avidya / marigpa has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here (which above was indicated as [2]) is active, but the focus of conscious attention is no longer sufficiently narrow and hermetic as to allow us to fully believe the illusions of duality and self-being to be the true condition of reality, or to shun the three types of pain inherent in samsara—and hence avidya / marigpa cannot manifest in the third sense the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here (above indicated as [3]). In people of lower capacities, the ensuing intuition of the emptiness of self-being of entities induces the terror of emptiness I am calling panic—which in its turn automatically induces an increase of the intensity and frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, in a bid to restore the illusion that duality and self-being constitute the true condition of reality, and thus put an end to panic. However, as shown in vol. I, both the illusion of self-being and the intuition of the lack of self-being are sustained by the phenomenon of being produced by the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure, and therefore whichever of these two is manifest when the latter accentuates itself, will be made to accentuate itself proportionally; since at this point the mechanisms at the root of avidya in the third of the senses of the term are not working properly and hence the illusion that duality and self-being constitute the true condition of reality cannot be obtained, the increase of the intensity and frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, rather than restoring the illusion in question and thus put an end to panic, will further accentuate the intuition of the emptiness of self-being of entities, further accentuating the experience of panic and, to the same degree to which it does so, further accentuating the compulsion to experience the illusion of dualism and self-being to be the true condition of reality. Therefore, a positive feedback loop is activated that gives rise to a runaway of vibratory rates.

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* I.e., “ego-dystonic” aspects.
Above it was also noted that in these occasions the focus of consciousness is not sufficiently narrow and hermetic as to allow us to shun the three types of pain inherent in samsara. Therefore, the conflict and so-called mental pain (i.e., the painful feeling-tone in the center of the body at the level of the heart) inherent in panic are experienced nakedly. This causes the mental subject’s rejection of pain and conflict to increase proportionally, which in its turn makes this pain *cum* conflict increase to the same proportion, in a positive feedback loop inducing a runaway of vibratory rates, conflict and pain. Thus, it is clear that in this situation *conflict and discomfort cause the individual to cling ever more forcefully to the source of conflict and discomfort*—which, as we have seen, is the basic human delusion with its inveterate self-contradictory, reverse-effect mechanisms. R. D. Laing\(^a\) compared reactions of this kind to that of someone leaning on a bus who, as the vehicle unexpectedly begins to move, grabs the handrail, which is the closest but most dangerous object. As noted in the preceding section, reactions of this kind seem to be associated with the tropism observed by Brodey,\(^b\) which drives infants to run from danger to mother—which, in the present stage of degenerative social and spiritual evolution,\(^c\) often gives rise to situations in which the source of danger is mother and so, as Laing observed\(^d\), the more the infant clings to her, the more uptight she becomes, and hence the more she frightens the infant, who clings to her with further intensity, making her even more uptight...

We should not think, however, that people of higher capacities, who are elated by the intuition of voidness, are safeguarded from runaways of conflict and pain. If, because of adventitious circumstances, anxiety or anguish occurs while the mechanisms of elusion of the pain inherent in samsara are impaire, the bare experience of the painful character of these occurrences will elicit the intense rejection of experience that activates the positive feedback loop at the root of the above-mentioned runaway of conflict and pain. At any rate, the self-contradictory, reverse-effect, wayward autocatalytic dynamic being considered—which Gregory Bateson\(^d\) viewed as a manifestation of Freud’s *Thanatos*\(^297\)—is the driving force in the process represented by the mandala’s intermediate zone, which leads the individual to the threshold level at which, if all necessary conditions are given—including transmission, knowledge of the instructions and so on—the tension inherent in delusion spontaneously breaks, and conflict and mental pain, together with the delusion at their root, liberate themselves spontaneously in the unveiling of the nondual primordial gnosis of unborn awareness that makes patent the true condition of reality: this is what “entrance” to the center of the mandala represents.

After “entering” the center for the first time, yet in the stages in which the less advanced capacities for spontaneous liberation still prevail, if we maintain a high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness in association with several other contributory conditions, the four wrathful guardians or dakinis would keep wide awake and alert, so that whenever the individual leaves the center he or she will not be able to dwell in the relative tranquility of the periphery (which would allow the person to feel comfortable in delusion): the dynamic represented by the wrathful guardians or dakinis will catch him or her, and the ensuing disturbance will function as a reminder for him or her to apply the *upadesha* instructions of Dzogchen.

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\(^a\) Laing (1961/1969).
\(^b\) Brodey’s tropism is described in Laing (1961/1969).
\(^c\) Laing (1961/1969).
\(^d\) Bateson (1970).
Later on, in the stages in which the more advanced capacities for spontaneous liberation prevail, every time the individual leaves the center, provided that a sufficiently high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is activating the irate dynamic represented by the wrathful guardians or dakinis, the spontaneous dynamic in question will actionlessly push the individual to the center.

(III) The Center from the Standpoint of the Transition from the Mandala’s Periphery to its Center

Finally, once the individual’s tendencies to leave the center have been neutralized, he or she will not leave it anymore. Then the wrathful guardians or dakinis will represent the individual’s actionless, spontaneous activities: though his or her mind is not active and he or she does not perceive sentient beings in samsara to be helped, his or her spontaneous behavior, which will have become as shocking as a wrathful deity, will repel those who are unprepared, causing them to perceive him or her as outrageous and fearsome, but will attract those who are prepared, creating the conditions for them to swiftly move towards the center. In other words, the individual will have become a Lama-heruka, so that his or her activities will be spontaneously accomplished by the wrathful guardians or dakinis.

Further Examples of the Dynamic of the Mandala and of the Divine Comedy in Different Traditions

The spontaneous “descent” represented by the Divine Comedy and the symbolism expressing it, as well as the corresponding mandala principle and its symbolism, have been known to Wisdom traditions of different civilizations. According to Mircea Eliade, paleo-Siberian shamanism had a map of the descent through Hell analogous to Dante’s, which like the latter featured a hole at the bottom of Hell the shaman had to go through in order to proceed toward Heaven. In Sufism, the term “chasm of fire” or “circle of fire” is used to indicate the region of experience that has to be traversed in order to reach the condition of Awakening the center of the mandala represents. In the same tradition, there is the story of a disciple of Master Ibn-el-Arabi who dreamed of Master Maaruf Kharki surrounded by flames and became extremely troubled, for if one of the greatest Masters of Sufism was in hell, then surely Sufism was a wrong, sinful path to be shunned. However, El-Arabi was quick to explain to his troubled disciple that the fire represented the region he had to go through in order to reach Maaruf’s state. In terms of mandala symbolism, the fire stood for the intermediate zone—the “circle of fire” that is the dwelling place of the four wrathful dharmaapalas or dakinis—which the man perceived from the periphery, and Maaruf was at center. Also the following doha by mahasiddha Sarahapada expresses the principle of the mandala:

If ineffable, never is one unsatisfied, if unimaginable, it must be bliss itself.

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a Eliade (1964).
c Shah (1975).
Though from a cloud one fears the thunderclap, the crops ripen when from it pours the rain.

The following statement by Ch’an Master Hsueh-toua expresses the same meaning, together with the fact that on the true Path agitation and conflict are most helpful allies—which, as we have seen, is what the mandala’s intermediate zone represents from the standpoint of the more advanced stages of the Path—whereas the covering up of the basic contradiction through improving the mechanisms of elusion and bad faith that “sustain birth and death” by means of spiritual techniques may be the most treacherous enemy:

At the three-tiered Dragon Gate, where the waves are high, fish become Dragons... yet fools still go on scooping out the evening pond water.

Another analogous Ch’an (Zen) dictum goes:b

Haven’t you heard it said, “Reclining Dragons are not to be seen in stagnant water; where they are not, there is moonlight and the ripples settle, but where they are, waves arise without wind.” Again, it was said, “Reclining Dragons always fear the blue pool’s clarity.”

As Heraclitus noted,c if beer is not stirred constantly as it is brewed, it turns sour. For his part, our contemporary, Dzogchen Master Chaträl (Sangye Dorje) Rinpoched said:e

If you have a small fire and the wind blows it goes off, but if you have a big fire, the wind will further and further inflame it, until samsara is consumed.

Here the fire stands for the Gnosis of primordial awareness; however, the wind is what normally stirs samsaric thoughts, and hence it is clear that also this saying is related to the mandala’s dynamic.


As we know, for their purposes, the Dzogchen teachings distinguish three aspects in the undivided Base—the called the Self-qua-Base—which are: (1) Essence or ngowo, which is voidness, meaning that the Base has no fixed form or color and therefore (through its nature or rangzhin and its energy or thukje aspect) it can contain and manifest any form or color, just as a mirror can reflect any form—or, to adapt the example to our times, just as a LCD screen can show any image—precisely insofar as its surface has no fixed form or color. (2) Nature or rangzhing, which is clarity, and which is compared to the brightness

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c Fr. 125 DK.
d bya ’bral sangs rgyas rdo rje rin po che.
e Personal communication by his disciple Shakya Dorje.
f ngo bo.
g rang bzhi.
and reflexiveness of a mirror, which is the condition for it to reflect forms and colors—or, in terms of the example for our times, to the luminosity of a LCD screen, which is the condition for it to show forms and colors. (3) Energy or thukje\(^a\), which corresponds to the disposition for uninterruptedlly manifesting phenomena and the process of manifestation itself, and includes both the phenomena in question and the moments of nonmanifestation (for, insofar as these phenomena are utterly nonexistent, they do in no way alter this aspect of the Base by their occurrence or disappearance), and which is compared to a mirror’s uninterrupted manifestation of reflections—or, in the example for present times, to the uninterrupted manifestation of images in the LCD screen of a TV set that is always on.\(^301\)

The example for our times has the advantage of making the point that there is nothing external to the Base, and hence that the latter is empty of substances other than itself (Skt. *parashunya*; Tib. *zhentong\(^b\)*); both examples are equally good, however, for illustrating the fact that phenomena depend on the three aspects of the Base to manifest, and hence that they are all empty of self-being (Skt. *swabhavashunya*; Tib. *rangtong\(^c\)*).

We have also seen that the energy aspect of the Base (i.e., of what I am calling the Self-*qua*-Base) manifests in three different ways, which for didactical reasons here I will consider in an inverted sequence: (3) as the tsel\(^d\) mode of manifestation of energy, which manifests as a seemingly external dimension, and the paradigmatic expression of which is what we call “material reality,” which is both visible and tangible; (2) as the rölpa\(^e\) mode of manifestation of energy, which does not allow the illusory subject-object duality and the duality of an internal and an external dimension to consolidate (being therefore functional in dissolving the illusion of there being such dualities), and the paradigmatic expression of which is the self-luminous apparitions occurring in the intermediate state\(^f\) of the *dharmata* or chönyi bardo\(^g\), which are visible—and in fact may be brighter than physical reality—but not tangible (this mode of manifestation of energy is experienced while the organism is clinically alive in advanced practices such as those of Thögel and the Yangthik, but it is correctly apprehended only upon the dissolution of the subject-object and interior-exterior dualities); and (1) as the dang\(^h\) mode of manifestation of energy, which in itself does not involve the division into interior and exterior or into subject and object (and yet, once tsel energy manifests, it seems to constitute an internal dimension with regard to it, and comes to feature the illusory subject-object duality), and the paradigmatic manifestations of which are our thoughts and the images of fantasy and imagination, which are neither tangible nor visible properly speaking\(^302\)—although this form of manifestation of energy can feature visible phenomena such as the “inner” luminosity called tingsel\(^i\).

In the Menngagde\(^j\) or *Upadeshavarga* series of Dzogchen Atiyoga, the first stage of the practice is that of Tekchö\(^a\) or “spontaneous, instant, absolute release of tension.”\(^303\)

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\(^a\) thugs rje.  
\(^b\) gzhan stong.  
\(^c\) rang stong, which abbreviates the adjective rang bzhing gyis stong pa. The corresponding noun is rang bzhing gyis stong pa nyid.  
\(^d\) rtsal.  
\(^e\) rol pa.  
\(^f\) antarabhava.  
\(^g\) chos nyid bar do.  
\(^h\) gdangs.  
\(^i\) gting gsal.  
\(^j\) man ngag sde.
In it, the individual faces thoughts—mainly coarse one of the discursive kind, which at this stage are easier to notice—and, rather than letting her or himself be deceived by their contents, recognizes (in contrast with the conceptual, dualistic recognition that is the cornerstone of *samsara*) the true condition of the *dang*-qua-*Base*—and thus by the same token the essence or *ngowo*-aspect of the Self-qua-*Base* becomes fully patent. Insofar as this amounts to the instant manifestation of the *dharma* aspect of the Self-qua-Path, and insofar as the Self-qua-Path is the all-liberating single gnosis (Tib. chikshe kundröl), this results in the instant spontaneous liberation / dissolution—which will take place in one or another of the three ways in which spontaneous liberation may occur, according to the capacity that at the time prevails in the individual and other conditions—of whichever thoughts may at the time conceal the Self-qua-Base: whichever coarse thought of the discursive kind thought may be “crossing the mind,” whichever subtle / intuitive thought may be involved in thinking, perception or action, and the supersubtle threefold thought structure that always underlies thoughts of the first two kinds, dissolve instantaneously the very moment the recognition in question makes the *dharma* patent. The instant disappearance of the supersubtle threefold thought structure the moment the *dharma*-qua-Path manifests, amounts to the instant dissolution of both the mental subject and the experience of sensa as object: as the Dzogchen teachings make it clear, the mental subject or “grasper” and the object or “grasped” instantly dissolve like feathers entering fire. Since the subject, the object and the illusion of importance and absolute truth of these two, all of which result from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure, are the bonds tying our existence that we experience as tension, the moment the subject-object duality instantly dissolves, all tension instantly breaks of its own accord—which is what gives this practice its name. This is why the spontaneous rupture of tension in the practice of Tekchö is compared unto the spontaneous rupture of a rope tying a bundle of hay or firewood, upon which the hay or firewood falls totally relaxed on the floor: rather than being the result of an action of cutting (which in the case of the practice would sustain tension insofar as it would affirm and sustain the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure and of thought in general), it occurs spontaneously the moment the stuff and essence of thought is barely, nonconceptually recognized, so that the *dharma*-qua-Path instantly manifests and thoughts spontaneously liberate themselves. The practice of this first stage of the *Upadesha* or Menngagde series of teachings may be optimized by the practice of Chö, which I have dealt with in some detail in another of my books and which consists

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*a* *khregs chod.*

*b* *gdangs.*

*c* *ngo bo.*

*d* *geg shes kun grol.*

*e* Capriles (1990a, 2000a).

*f* Skt. *grahaka* (Tib. 'dzin pa), *vishayi* (Tib. *chos can*) or *dharmin* (Tib. *chos can/yul can*).

*g* Skt. *grahaka* (Tib. 'dzin pa).

*h* Skt. *grahya* (Tib. *gzung ba*), *vishaya/artha* (Tib. *yul/don*) or *dharmin* (Tib. *chos can/yul can*).

*i* Skt. *grahya* (Tib. *gzung ba*).

*j* Capriles (2000a).

*k* Capriles (1990a, 2000a).

*l* *gcod.*
in spending the night in the famous fearsome Tibetan charnel grounds and offering our body to the demons dwell in such places, so as to induce visions in which we are attacked by a host of demons intending to eat our bodies. This unleashes episodes of terror which are among the most extreme and conflictive experiences of the sphere of sensuality, and which, each and every time they occur, at some point free themselves spontaneously in the patency of the dharmakaya, rapidly neutralizing the “defilement of passions” (Skt. kleshavarana; Tib. nyöndrib) at the root of the sphere of sensuality.

In the same series of Dzogchen Atiyoga, the second stage of the practice is that of Thögel, which is carried out in the intermediate state of the dharmata or chönyi bardo while the individual is physically alive, and which requires having an effective practice of Tekchö insofar as it consists in boosting the latter through the arising of the intangible, self-luminous, extremely vivid visions of rölpa energy—the paradigmatic examples of which are the renowned deity-bearing thigles. The teleonomic dynamic inherent in these visions causes the emergence of delusorily valued-absolutized subtle / intuitive and supersubtle thoughts to give rise to strong tensions, which make us notice them and by the same token catalyze their spontaneous liberation in an instant rupture of tension (Tekchö). And every time the spontaneous liberation of thought results in the instant disappearance of the mental subject that seemed to be at a distance from the visions—which is figuratively called “reintegration into our externally projected true condition”—the sambhogakaya that is the true nature of these visions manifest. (In the “Thögel of the day,” practiced with the sunlight of early morning and late afternoon, the emergence of the visions is catalyzed by looking in the direction of the sun in pre-established ways [which requires protecting and treating the eyes with specific medicines], bodily postures and other conditions. In the “Thögel of the night,” practiced in specially conditioned dark rooms, the arising of rölpa visions is most easily elicited by a particular use of light—yet always in combination with postures and other conditions that may include pressure on points of the organism.) The practice of Thögel differs from that of Chö in that the latter, with the purpose of neutralizing coarse instances of delusion, is designed to induce terror, which is an instance of the “defilement of passions” (Skt. kleshavarana; Tib. nyöndrib) pertaining to the sphere of sensuality, and which in the course of the practice must liberate itself spontaneously again and again until it is completely neutralized together with all that pertains to the sphere in question, whereas the former activates the “defilement of knowledge” (Skt. jñeyavarana; Tib. shedrib) at the root of the sphere of form, so that this defilement may spontaneously liberate itself again and again until the obstacle in question is completely neutralized. Therefore, a sufficiently intense practice of Tekchö—even more so if optimized by the practice of Chö—followed by a sufficiently intense practice...

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a Capriles (2000a), Part III, section “La práctica del chö (gcod).” This discussion will be further elaborated in the upcoming Part III of Buddhism and Dzogchen in English, which, as already happened with Part I (cf. Capriles [2003] [the definitive, corrected version of which will soon be available in print], will become a book and will initially be published in the same web page where Part I is published.

b nyon sgríb.
c thod rgal.
d antarabhaya.
e chos nyid bar do.
f nyon sgríb.
g shes sgríb.
intense practice of Thögel, has the power for neutralizing both the coarse and the subtle seeds of samsara.

In the Upadeśavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings, the seemingly “external” manifestation of visions that “come from inside” (in the sense that they are not elicited by the imprint on the retina of the images conveyed by the light reflected by entities of tsel energy), is called “manifestation in the external dimension or jing.”

This applies to the self-luminous, intangible visions of rölpa\(^b\) energy, which initially seem to lie outside the individual—i.e., they appear in the way characteristic of tsel\(^c\) energy, which the teachings illustrate by the spectrum of colors that manifest externally to a rock crystal when light is refracted by it, and which in our time could be illustrated by the images that issue from a movie projector or a video beam. Since the visions in question exhibit the inconceivable dimensionality\(^3\) and teleonomic dynamics that characterize rölpa energy, their occurrence activates spontaneous endogenous processes that drastically accelerate the individual’s progress along the Path of the Menngagde or Upadeśavarga series of Dzogchen teachings. This is the reason why the teachings call this practice Lhundrub Thögel,\(^d\) the etymological meaning of which may be expressed by phrases such as spontaneous;\(^e\) [instant] transition from here to there\(^f\) or spontaneous\(^g\) crossing over [as though in a leap]\(^h\)—which is why some have rendered the term as taking the leap (which, however, conveys the totally wrong idea that by means of action a self moves from one place to another). In fact, the supreme practice of Thögel is an accelerator of the Dzogchen process of Awakening because the dynamics proper to the visions of rölpa energy do not allow the individual to waste time as a result of either being distracted by thoughts, or dwelling in avidyā-tainted transpersonal, holotropic meditative absorptions (samādhis) of the base-of-all;\(^i\) when delusorily valued / absolutized thoughts arise (which in this practice as a rule are supersubtle and subtle), if their true condition is not instantly recognized, positive feedback loops produce a runaway of the tension inherent in delusory valuation—and it is impossible to rest in the neutral base-of-all, for rölpa visions will manifest and the dynamics of this form of energy will activate the wrathful mechanisms that swiftly lead delusion to its spontaneous liberation. As noted in the preceding paragraph, in those who, through the practice of Tekchö, have developed a true capacity of spontaneous liberation, the runaways of tension and vibratory rates always conclude with the spontaneous liberation of thought through spontaneous rupture of tension (i.e., Tekchö). However, in those lacking this capacity, the occurring runaways of tension and vibratory rates are likely to give rise to dangerous psychotic episodes (or, at best, psychotomimetic experiences)—this being the main reason why an effective practice of Tekchö is an indispensable prerequisite for approaching the practice of Thögel.

Moreover, even if the practice of Thögel did not immediately activate dangerous positive feedback loops, since this practice involves the appearance of the self-luminous,

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\(^a\) dbyings.
\(^b\) rol pa.
\(^c\) rtsal.
\(^d\) lhun grub thod rgal.
\(^e\) lhundrub (lhun grub).
\(^f\) thögel (thod rgal).
\(^g\) lhundrub (lhun grub).
\(^h\) thögel (thod rgal).
\(^i\) Tib. zagchekyi tingnedzin (zag bcas kyi ting nge 'dzin).
extremely vivid visions characteristic of the intermediate state\textsuperscript{a} of the dharmata or chönyi bardo, those lacking the awareness of illusoriness, the feeling of apparitionality, and the capacity to discern the mode of experience or bardo state to which a given phenomenon belongs (which result from advance on the Path, and in particular from the practice of Dzogchen, the practice of Chö, and/or Tantric practices such as the yogas of dreaming or mi lam\textsuperscript{b} and of the illusory body or gyu lü\textsuperscript{c} and so on), are prone to face problems when the visions present themselves. Dzogchen Master Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche has warned that:\textsuperscript{d}

It is true that the Thögel practice of Dzogchen is a method for rapid acceleration, which may also be compared to making a jump.\textsuperscript{311} However, making such a rapid jump does not depend on reading books, having a mental concept, knowing some categories or something of the kind. If you have to take a broad jump from there over to here, you must have some preparation, for otherwise you try to jump and you just fall on your face, getting nowhere. And not only because it is damaging to start off in an unprepared way, but also because we are so accustomed and habituated to dualism, it is really very hard to learn to integrate your consciousness into the seemingly external projection of your own true condition.

Thögel visions present themselves outwardly and appear to be objective, manifesting as objects because of your mental concept. If somebody has had a pleasant dream and is delighted, he may say, “Oh, I had a marvelous dream” and think, “Who knows, maybe I am really getting realized.” Thus it is very easy to develop an attachment. How much more may this be so and how much more danger of attachment there is, if you have a Thögel vision that appears to you as though it were concrete and real! Since we don’t have much experience with these things, you immediately get into this “Far out, everything’s groovy now” kind of attitude.

We know perfectly well somebody who is taking a certain kind of drug, is capable of saying, “Oh, I see the fourth dimension,” or some strange thing like that, and be really happy thinking he has really got it together. That is the principle of how to create problems. And you can easily begin to create problems if you get off on the vision emotionally like this. So it is not so simple for the practice to work properly if you are lacking the concrete basis resulting from the right preparation. Our habit patterns, our tendencies, are such that whichever nyam\textsuperscript{e} or illusory experience of practice manifests—whichever illusory vision or experience, whether it is something we see, something we hear or something we somehow have contact with—really strikes us. We respond with great intensity to such things.

A Thögel vision is a manifestation that seems utterly concrete. If you find yourself in the correct and appropriate state, then it really develops. Otherwise you block yourself there and then the worse for you.

As we have seen, in the practice of Thögel there arise fantastic visions that seem as objective as the phenomena of everyday life. Those lacking a feeling of apparitionality with regard to all phenomena and the capacity to discern the mode of experience or bardo state to which a given phenomenon belongs, will take those visions for phenomena of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{a} antarabhava.
  \item \textsuperscript{b} rmi lam.
  \item \textsuperscript{c} sgyu lus.
  \item \textsuperscript{d} Namkhai Norbu (1984a), p. 279. The English was modified to make it less colloquial.
  \item \textsuperscript{e} nyams.
\end{itemize}
tsel mode of manifestation of energy that makes up what we regard as the “physical” world and react to them in the emotional ways in which we habitually react to the latter, giving rise to serious problems. For example, they will develop attachment to visions that are pleasant or that they may see as signs of realization and use to derive pride (such as those featuring thigles, deities, great Masters of the past and so on). And if they do so, they will automatically react with horror to visions that for some reason seem frightful or menacing—which, because of the peak energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness involved in the manifestation of rölpa energy, will activate positive feedback loops of rejection inducing runaways of tension. Moreover, even when the visions that manifest are peaceful, the teleonomic dynamic of the self-luminous visions proper to the intermediate state of the dharmata or chönyi bardo will at some point set going the tendency to react to them with irritation (Tib. zhedang⁴), activating the positive feedback loops of rejection that induce runaways of tension. At any rate, independently of the way in which the runaways in question are activated, if the individual has not developed a capacity of spontaneous liberation through the practice of Tekchö, the result may as well be the unleashing of a psychosis.

Many of those who have had experiences of any of the various kinds that Stan Grof⁵ subsumed under the category of transpersonal—such as oneness with the universe, out-of-the-body experiences, the presence of immaterial guides or guardians, etc.—and who believe these occurrences to be high spiritual accomplishments, become possessed by what, in the context of the practice of Chö⁶, is called the demon of complacence (Tib. gadrökyi diü⁷), conceitedly wallowing on such experiences for the rest of their lives, and very often trying to convince others that their experiences prove them to be spiritually extraordinary individuals. The dangers resulting from such deviations must not be taken too lightly, for quite a few of those who, after having had experiences of the kind and thereby having become convinced of their spiritual specialness and extraordinariness, in the short or in the long run have come to face psychological problems that caused them to land in the mental hospital or face other calamitous outcomes.³¹⁲ And many of those who, after having had experiences of the kind, managed to convince others of their spiritual specialness and superiority, becoming renowned (pseudo-)gurus, have—intentionally or not—severely harmed others.³¹³ In Dzogchen practice, in particular, the way to minimize these and other dangers is to count with the supervision of a realized master possessing the instructions and transmissions and officially recognized as the heir of another Master officially recognized as the heir of his own teacher, in a line of transmission going back to the source of Buddhist Dzogchen, which is Tönpa Garab Dorje:³¹⁴ such a master will let us know when we are ready to practice Thögel, and will then bestow on us the due instructions.

As we have seen, the manifestation of rölpa energy goes along with an extremely high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness—which, as explained in the discussion of the mandala, under some conditions may hamper the functionality of the delusion called avidya / marigpa that is the basic human contradiction, turning it into conflict. In addition, because of their peculiar characteristics (including their sui generis

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⁴ zhe sdang.
⁵ Grof (1985) and others of the works listed in the Bibliography.
⁶ gcod.
⁷ dga 'brod kyi bdud.
dimensionality), the visions of rölpa energy activate the teleonomic peaceful / wrathful (zhītro\(^a\)) dynamic that is the most radical catalyst of the process of Awakening insofar as it prevents practitioners both from becoming distracted with delusorily valued thoughts and from dwelling in neutral meditative abstractions of the base-of-all. We have seen that the subject-object duality that arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure underlies all subtle / intuitive thoughts; that recognition in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized subtle / intuitive thoughts underlie all delusorily valued-absolutized coarse thoughts of the discursive kind (so that coarse thoughts are always the top stratum of a three-tier thought complex in which the lower strata work like a filter through which we perceive the higher ones);\(^{315}\) and that the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure gives rise to tensions—which become particularly uncomfortable when the thought-structure in question underlies thoughts of rejection. The reason why rölpa energy prevents practitioners from becoming distracted with delusorily valued thoughts is that its visions do not let the subject-object duality consolidate and subsist for long periods—to a considerable extent because they set going the tendency to irritation referred to by the Tibetan term zhedang\(^b\), and the occurrence of aversion when the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness goes beyond a threshold activates a runaway of the frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and of the tensions produced by this activity, causing the former to go far beyond the threshold at which they are rejected and thereby experienced as pain, and the latter to become so extreme as to be hardly bearable. The reason why it prevents dwelling in neutral meditative abstractions of the base-of-all is that rölpa visions are so compelling that they instantly cause the interposition in sensory awareness of the threefold thought-structure, so that a mental-subject-cum-dualistic-consciousness seems to be at a distance from them and is compelled to react to them with aversion, giving rise to the just considered runaway of vibratory rates and tension. In those having a good capacity of spontaneous liberation and receiving the blessings of the Self and of the lineage, this results in the spontaneous liberation, in the Tekchö or rupture of tension manner, of all occurring thoughts together with the appearances resulting from their delusory valuation: of supersubtle thoughts together with the subject-object duality resulting from their delusory valuation; of subtle / intuitive ones and the illusion of inherent this-or-thatness arising from their delusory valuation; and—if they are manifest—of coarse thoughts of the discursive kind seeming to be inherently true or false. This may occur in many ways, which here are subsumed under three general possibilities: (1) It outright results in the spontaneous liberation / rupture of tension, without the individual having to apply any instruction. (2) Otherwise, it makes the tension and high vibratory rates patent, which may be used as an alarm reminding us to apply the pertinent secret oral instruction (Skt. upadesha; Tib. menngag\(^c\))—which in their turn are the condition of possibility of spontaneous liberation / rupture of tension. (3) If spontaneous liberation / rupture of tension does not occur in either of these two ways, a runaway of the frequency of the vibratory activity responsible for delusory valuation-absolutization and the associated tension may swiftly bring them to the threshold at which vibratoriness collapses and tension breaks. The danger for individuals lacking a

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\(^{a}\) zhī khro.

\(^{b}\) zhe sdang; Skt. dvesa. In common language both terms mean anger, hatred, etc.

\(^{c}\) man ngag.
sufficient capacity of the spontaneous liberation resulting in rupture of tension (Tekchö), lies in the fact that in their case neither (1) nor (2) will work, and so the runaway of tension and vibratory rates indicated as (3) will take place—yet most likely, rather than resulting in spontaneous liberation, it will induce dangerous psychotic or “psychotomimetic” episodes.

In order to understand the above, we must take into consideration the fact that the delusory perception of the visions of rölpa energy in the external dimension or jing, is a samsaric experience pertaining to the sphere of form (Skt. rupadhatu or rupa loka; Tib. zugkham), which as Padmasambhava noted, “is an ocean of vibration that becomes ever more turbulent as one moves away from its peaceful profundities,” is “sensitive to the slightest tremor of pain or displeasure,” and comprises “impulses that formulate their own antidote to disharmony.” The point is that the teleonomic dynamic of rölpa energy makes its visions refractory, in that the mental subject cannot control them, affect them, or cause them to react to its emotions or actions. This is why those visions activate the propensity for irritation referred to by the Tibetan term zhedang, which causes the consciousness-cum-mental-subject complex to react to them in manners that, given the extremely high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, the refractoriness of the visions and the other characteristics of rölpa energy, activate positive feedback loops that unleash wrathful runaways of both vibratory rates and tension. Under these conditions, even the slightest manifestation of dualistic delusion gives rise to quite strong tensions sustained by quite high vibratory rates, which increase from their own feedback: this is the reason why, as noted above, in people with the right capacity and under the right conditions, the instant dualism manifests, spontaneous liberation in the Tekchö manner may occur; if it does not occur, the tension and discomfort inherent in the high vibratory rates remind them to apply the secret oral instructions, which provide the conditions under which the spontaneous liberation in question can easily occur; and if it does not occur in either case, then a wrathful runaway of vibratory rates and tension takes delusion to the threshold level at which they collapse, so that spontaneous liberation in the Tekchö manner necessarily occurs. In short, the practice activates the wrathful (Tib. trowa) systemic activity the Dzogchen Teachings call irate spontaneous activity (Tib. thinle drakpo), which has the teleonomic function of doing away with dualism by forcing us to “integrate ourselves into the visions,” so to speak. (In spite of the already noted fact that in this practice the mental subject that in samsaric experience seems to be at a distance from sense data, altogether dissolves each and every time spontaneous liberation occurs and hence it may not be said to integrate itself into the visions of rölpa energy, the expression integrating into the visions is not unwarranted. In fact, concerning the practice of Thögel, this way of speaking is an apt metaphor for the fact that what the teachings of Thögel call the semnyi momentarily stops appearing to be a mental subject

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*a* dbyings.

*b* gzugs khams.

*c* Padmasambhava (1977), p. 15. Due to the loss of the English text, I had to retranslate into English from Italian.

*d* zhe sdang; Skt. dvesa. In common language both terms mean anger, hatred, etc.

*e* khro ba.

*f* phrin las drag po: “spontaneous wrathful dynamic.”

*g* sems nyid; Skt. chittata or chitta eva.
separate from what these teachings call the chönyi\(^a\). Concerning the *fruits* of Thögel, it expresses literally the way in which the two highest realizations of Thögel are achieved, since, as will be shown below, they are the result of the semnyi’s irreversible reintegration into the chönyi. It is for these reasons that the teachings say that, whereas in the Semde series of teachings all phenomena must be integrated in our own state of Dzogchen, in Thögel the individual integrates her or himself into the apparently external projection of what in fact is her or his true condition.

The point is that, as implied above, the whole practice of Thögel is essentially a zhitro\(^b\) or “peaceful-wrathful” practice in the Dzogchen sense of the term: it is a lhundrub (spontaneous) zhitro taking place in the intermediate state of *dharmata* or chönyi bardo, like the one described in the *Bardo Thödröl*. The zhiwa\(^c\) (peaceful) aspect of the zhitro, corresponding to the periods in which no seemingly separate mental subject crops up to face the visions of rölpa energy, manifests as total bliss—which lasts until dualistic delusion emerges again. This emergence is the source of the *trowa*\(^d\) (wrathful) aspect of the zhitro, for as we have seen, when the consciousness-cum-mental-subject complex is manifest, the visions of rölpa energy activate in it the propensity for irritation referred to by the Tibetan term zhedang\(^e\), which turns into conflict the basic human contradiction: the threefold delusion called *avidya* or marigpa involving the subject-object duality and the illusion of self-being. As shown above, each and every time the consciousness-cum-mental-subject complex that is the core of dualistic delusion crops up, conflict and the contradiction at its root spontaneously liberate themselves the Tekchö way—either (1) as soon as they arise, (2) after the instructions for the practice are applied, or (3) after the runaway of conflict takes it to the threshold level at which tension breaks. However, no matter how they liberate themselves, their liberation results in a further instance of the zhiwa (peaceful) aspect of the zhitro and the total bliss that goes along with it—which, when delusion crops up again, is once more replaced by the *trowa* aspect. And so this repeats itself again and again. (It is most important to note that dealing with conflictive, sometimes painful experiences on the Dzogchen Path, is not equivalent to torturing the body in the ways characteristic of Hindu tapashyas: the latter may harm the vehicle of realization that is the human body; it falls into the category of asceticism, which is one of the extremes excluded by Buddhism; it discourages practice insofar as pain is something we feel compelled to avoid; and it does not have the potential of exhausting *samsara* and resulting in the highest realizations of Dzogchen, which are those that result in the special ways of putting an end to human life exclusive to the *Atiyogatantra*.\(^{317}\) In practices such as Thögel, rather than being led to elude practice because of fear of pain or conflict, one is eager to continue with the practice, for total bliss manifests most of the time, whereas conflict spontaneously resolves itself as soon as it arises.)

Each and every time the basic human delusion, together with the tension inherent in it, spontaneously liberate themselves, the samsaric propensities for delusory valuation-absolutization and tension to manifest are neutralized to a degree that is proportional to the height of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness at the time, and

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\(a\) *chos nyid*; Skt. *dharmata*.
\(b\) zhi khro.
\(c\) zhi ba.
\(d\) khro ba.
\(e\) zhe sdang.
to the intensity of conflict in the immediately preceding moment. In fact, the point of Thögel practice is not only that delusion is forced to liberate itself spontaneously each and every time it crops up, but also that, since the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is extraordinarily high, and since the spontaneous wrathful dynamic (Tib. thinle drakpo) inherent in the practice induces extremely high vibratory frequencies and proportionally strong tensions, each and every time spontaneous liberation occurs the propensity for delusion to manifest is neutralized to a particularly great extent. Moreover, as this occurs we learn through direct experience the distress inherent in delusion and the total bliss inherent in the absence of delusion—which is most important in achieving the supreme type of the learning that Gregory Bateson called Learning III, which is at the root of what the same author called “systemic wisdom.” It is for all these reasons that no other Path or vehicle has as much power to neutralize delusion and its propensities as that of Dzogchen Ati, which this Path can totally eradicate in a single lifetime—as a result of which it is possible to attain levels of realization that are not reached through any other Path or vehicle (such as those resulting in extraordinary ways of ending human existence).

As we have seen, the self-luminous visions manifesting in the practice of Thögel initially do so in the projective manner characteristic of tsel energy, for they appear in a dimension experienced as external. However, the moment the illusory mental subject that appears to lie in an internal dimension and at a distance from the visions disappears in an instantaneous way, so that the illusory duality of subject and object instantly dissolves, the illusory duality of an interior and an exterior instantly ceases as well. Since, as noted above, each and every time this takes place it neutralizes to a far greater extent than any other occurrence the propensities for these dualities to manifest, the unrelenting repetition of this in Thögel practice rapidly neutralizes the propensity for us to experience ourselves as being at a distance from whatever we would otherwise experience as lying in an external dimension. This is the reason why, if the mass of light and in general the self-luminous manifestations of rölpa energy (such as thigles and, in case we have trained in Tantric visualization, the five dhyani Buddhas), which are seemingly external manifestations of our own state, have not appeared in the external dimension or jing, and hence the dynamic described above does not develop, it is hardly possible for us to ever reach a complete integration with tsel energy and with all that samsaric individuals experience as phenomena in an external dimension—which means that those phenomena of tsel energy that we regard as physical and external (to give only auditory examples: screams, conversations, the noise of television and so on) will continue to have a greater or lesser power to disrupt our Contemplation. On the contrary, if the visions manifest and the practice of Thögel is carried to its limit, at the end rölpa energy blends with tsel energy (and in particular with what we interpret as the physical world), and the individual never again experiences her or himself as being at a distance from the continuum of the universe—and therefore never parts again from total plenitude (Dzogchen). Likewise, there being no longer a mental subject in the individual that may establish a link-of-being with the object others perceive as that individual, encumbering self-consciousness cannot manifest any more, and her or his performance of activities can never be hindered again.

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a rtsal.
b dbayings.
c rdzogs pa chen po.
so that these activities are characterized by total perfection (Dzogchen). Finally, since rölpa energy has blended with the tsel energy of the so-called physical universe, the peculiar dimensionality of the former has the power of affecting the latter, as is proper to the wondrous sambhogakaya wisdoms of quality (Tib. ji tawa khyenpe yeshe) and quantity (Tib. ji nyepa khyenpe yeshe)—which results in what deluded common sense would regard as a “capacity of miracles.”

The illusory yet actual separation of the Gnitiveness cum motility lying in and depending on the organism that the teachings of the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen call the semnyi, from the chönyi understood as the nature of those phenomena that do not depend on the organism, is what makes the cosmic hide-and-seek game (Skt. lila; Tib. rölpa) of Gnitiveness with itself possible—not only because it is an essential element of the delusion called avidya and marigpa (it is inherent in the second of the senses of these terms, both in the Dzogchen classification adopted here and in that favored by Longchen Rabjampa), but also because without the difference in question there cannot be a human organism. In fact, the two highest realizations of Buddhism result in the dissolution of the organism, which occurs precisely as a result of the integration of the semnyi into the appearance as the seemingly external manifestations of our own state (i.e., in the external dimension or jing), of a “mass of light” and in general of self-luminous manifestations of rölpa energy, and through them into the chönyi. The lower one of these realizations is the one called “body of light,” which results from the development of the fourth vision of Thögel or the Yangthik, called chöze londe, and involves the mode of death called “self-consuming like a fire”—in which the integration of the semnyi into the chönyi, involving the dissolution of the material body and the arising of the body of light, occurs post mortem. The higher one of the realizations in question, which is the supreme realization of Buddhism, is the one called the “total transference” or phowa chenpo: once all Buddha activities have been completed and what otherwise would be the time of death has come, as the result of having gone into seclusion and developed to its limit the fourth vision of the practice of Thögel or the Yangthik, life comes to an end in the way called “invisible like space,” which does not involve going through the process of death, for the semnyi integrates into the chönyi while the organism is physically alive, and that moment the tangible body dissolves and there arises the body of light of the total transference, which is also known as the Vajra Body or dorjeku. As in the renowned cases of Vimalamitra and Padmasambhava, for centuries the ensuing body of light of the total transference has the possibility of appearing from time to time to those beings having the level of realization necessary for perceiving it, so as to transmit to them, and through them to all of those

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* ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes.
* ji bsnyed pa’i mkhyen pa’i ye shes.
* sems ngyi; Skt. chittata or chittha eva d.
* chos nyid; Skt. dharmata.
* rol pa.
* sems ngyi; Skt. chittata or chittha eva d.
* dhyings.
* chos nyid; Skt. dharmata.
* öphung (od phung) or ökiku (’od kyi sku).
* chos zad blo ‘das.
* pho ba chen po.
* Phowa chenpo ku (pho ba chen po’i sku), sometimes called jalü phowa chenpo (’ja’ lus ’pho ba chen po).
* rdo rje ’i sku.
interested, the teachings suited to the time of those receiving them. And the condition of possibility of these two realizations, and in general of the application of the swiftest method for the neutralization of delusion, which as we have seen is that of Thögel, is the appearance as the seemingly external manifestations of our own state (i.e., in the external dimension or jing\(^a\)), of the “mass of light” and in general of the self-luminous manifestations of rölpa energy.

To conclude the discussion in this section, it seems important to note that the most essential and direct teachings of the Menngagde series of Dzogchen are those that make up the Nyingthik, in which the practices of Tekchö and Thögel are indivisible, and which in the Wylie letter-by-letter transliteration system is *snying thig*. Though this compound noun is often mistranslated as “heartdrop,” as Chögyal Namkhai Norbu\(^b\) has remarked, in this case *snying* has the sense the term “heart” has in the phrase “the heart of the matter,” which is that of “most essential,” while the second vocable of the compound noun, rather than *thigs*, meaning “drop,” is *thig*, root syllable of the polysemic word *thig le*, which in this context must be understood as potentiality\(^321\)—and hence it is appropriate to rendered the term as “essence of potentiality.” The most essential teachings of the Nyingthik are condensed in the Yangthik, written *yang thig*; since the Tibetan term *yang* means “even more so,” if we rendered Nyingthik as “essence of potentiality,” we could then translate Yangthik as “innermost essence of potentiality.”\(^322\) The adjective “innermost” is applied to the Yangthik because, although the Nyingthik involves the indivisibility of Tekchö and Thögel, the general teachings of this category place the emphasis on Tekchö, failing to expound those methods specifically intended for activating luminosity in the form of rölpa energy which are the condition of possibility of an all out Thögel practice: in this context, these methods and all that specifically concerns the practice of Thögel are found in the Yangthik, and hence if practitioners of the Nyingthik are to develop to its zenith and carry to its ultimate consequences their realization, at some point they will have to apply the methods of the Yangthik.

### A Critical Appraisal of Transpersonal Psychology
#### With the Emphasis on the Psychology of Stanislav Grof

As we have seen, antipsychiatry in the wide sense of the term, by acknowledging that intrinsically some of the experiential journeys psychiatry in general labels as psychotic are potential self-healing processes that in the right environment and with the support of wise and experienced assistants can fulfill their potential, intrinsic healing function—a fact acknowledged by Grof’s transpersonal psychology as well—made a key contribution to the understanding by Western modern science of the human mind and experience. However, though no doubt under the right conditions such processes can further individual harmony and result in greater integration between conscious and eluded contents, and by the same token open the individual up to transpersonal, more holistic dimensions, as we have seen, antipsychiatrist David E. Cooper was mistaken in giving to understand that, in themselves and by themselves, the processes in question may result in the absolute sanity that consists in Awakening.

\(^a\) *dbyings*.

\(^b\) Namkhai Norbu (unpublished ms.).
Another key contribution both transpersonal psychology and antipsychiatry in the ample sense of the term made to Western science was the vindication and validation of transpersonal and more (or less) holistic conditions in general—among which lie the two conditions that constitute absolute sanity: the Self-qua-Fruit that is the ultimate realization and final fulfillment of human life and the only definitive solution to the dissatisfaction and suffering of samsara, and the Self-qua-Path that has to manifest again and again for the Self-qua-Fruit to be attained—which mainstream Western schools of psychology and psychiatry consistently overlooked and, whenever their characteristics were brought to the attention of its leaders or adherents (as novelist Romain Rolland did with Sigmund Freud), the latter pronounced them to be psychotic pathologies.

However, antipsychiatry shares the defect of transpersonal psychology in general, including Grof’s, denounced throughout this volume: that of failing to discriminate among the different kinds of transpersonal states of seeming oneness and infinitude and equating them in value and usefulness—namely those belonging either to samsara or to passive, inactive conditions which pertain neither to samsara nor to nirvana (so that coming to dwell in them would keep us either whirling in samsara or stuck in the passive, inactive, neutral conditions in question), and the just mentioned conditions of absolute sanity. In fact, for absolute sanity to be possible, it is vital that we distinguish most clearly between the three kinds of seemingly or truly holistic states discussed throughout this chapter: 

(A) What Buddhism calls nirvana, and in particular the modality of nirvana it calls Awakening, which here I call absolute sanity, and which rather than being merely holotropic—i.e., tending to wholeness (from the Greek verb trepein, meaning “to turn to,” and the Greek noun holos, meaning “whole”)—is a truly and fully holistic condition. It must be noted that, although Awakening is the common aim of all higher Buddhist vehicles and Paths, the higher the Buddhist vehicle or Path followed in order to reach it, the more thorough the condition in question will be. For example, for the Dzogchen teachings Awakening is the consolidation of the state of Awake awareness they call rigpa, involving the full patency and operativeness of what they refer to as all-liberating single gnosis (chikshe kundröl), which is so called because, so long as it is manifest, delusorily valued thoughts—coarse, subtle / intuitive, and super-subtle—liberate themselves spontaneously. As we have seen repeatedly, when rigpa manifests for limited periods while on the Path, it constitutes what here is being called the Self-qua-Path; when it manifests irreversibly as the Fruit, it constitutes what here is being called the Self-qua-Fruit.

(B) Conditioned experiences of holotropic, pseudo-holistic transpersonal realms that pertain to samsara and that as such feature the delusory valuation of thought and involve all three of the senses the terms avidya and marigpa have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here—and that therefore comprise the subject-object duality that is the most basic of all deceiving phenomena. Among these experiences, those of the formless sphere that, in the psycho-cosmology of Buddhism, is the highest region of conditioned cyclic experience (samsara), are frequently mistaken for nirvana or Awakening. These states are holotropic because they are the result of a panoramification of the scope of awareness asymptotically tending to wholeness (i.e. tending to wholeness without ever reaching it), and they may be called pseudo-holistic because, though they

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a Capriles (1999a, 2000c).
b gcik shes kun grol.
appear to be realizations of totality or wholeness, they are structured in terms of the subject-object duality that constitutes the fundamental partition and that is the basis of all further fragmentation.

(C) The transpersonal and sometimes in some sense holistic, yet inoperative conditions wherein neither samsara nor nirvana are active, which involve the ignorance of the true condition of reality (or, what is the same, of all-liberating nondual primordial gnosis) that is the first of the three senses the terms avidya and marigpa are given in the Dzogchen teachings, but not so the second and third of these senses, and therefore do not feature delusion as such. When these conditions feature the continuum of sense data, they may be regarded as being in a limited sense holistic (even in this case they are not truly and fully holistic because they do not involve the full awareness and operativeness of holism, which is proper to the sambhogakaya’s wisdoms of quality [Tib. ji tawa khyenpe yeshe\(^a\)] and quantity [Tib. ji nyepe khyenpe yeshe\(^b\)], and therefore exclude awareness [of] some of the four dharmadhatus discussed in the *Avatamsakasutra*\(^{324}\), but cannot be regarded as being in any sense holistic when they exclude this continuum (a condition in which we are cut off from all *sensa*, which are part of the whole, cannot be said to be in any sense holistic). In all cases, the states under consideration are instances of the condition the Dzogchen teachings call kunzhi lungmaten,\(^c\) which, as the all-knowing Jigme Lingpa\(^d\) had predicted, in our time many yogis confuse with the dharmakaya that is the first level of realization in the process of Awakening, and which would become a jail—though a comfortable one—should we manage to establish ourselves in it, for our freedom would be suspended and our progress on the Path blocked.

In terms of a simile in which Mount Kailash represents the condition of absolute sanity indicated as (A), the states designated as (B) and (C) are compared with finding a nice and comfortable place on the way to the great Tibetan mountain and staying there in the belief that one has reached one’s destination. As shown in a previous chapter, these resting places are impermanent and hence, rather than being a definitive Refuge, they are new sources of danger: sooner or later we have to fall from them, and when this happens we are likely to reject with all our might the more conflictive states that we had become disaccustomed to—which, given the high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Skt. *kundalini*; Tib. *thig le*) characteristic of these conditions, is quite likely to give rise to a hellish experience. In particular, the Dzogchen teachings compare the state of imperturbability indicated as (C) with cutting our own head: as suggested above, were it possible for us to remain in it indefinitely, we would squander our precious human lifetime, as we would be unable to accomplish the ongoing journey-to-Kailash in which Kailash is always dawning, which constitutes the genuine meaning and sense of human existence.

The creators of transpersonal psychology failed to discriminate between the above three types of holistic or pseudo-holistic / holorotropic states. Abraham Maslow subsumed them under the term *peak experiences*, and in spite of his later warning against pursuing experiences falling into this ample category for their own sake and his insistence that for them to be truly valuable, they had to arise in the context of a self-consistent method,\(^{325}\)

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\(^{a}\) *ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes.*

\(^{b}\) *ji bsnyed pa’i mkhyen pa’i ye shes.*

\(^{c}\) *kun gzhi lung ma bstan.*

\(^{d}\) *’jigs med gling pa.*
subsequently most transpersonal psychologists took them as ends in themselves to be achieved by whichever means, under whichever circumstances. What is more significant, most of the descriptions of peak experiences, whether by Maslow or other transpersonal psychologists, fail to correspond to nirvana and, on the contrary, portray quite precisely the formless realms that make up the highest region of samsara. This is evident in Maslow’s description of these experiences, according to which in them the whole world is perceived in a profound and deep way as an integrated and unified whole of which we are part and to which we belong, nature is easily seen as being there for its own sake rather than having been put there for human purposes, perception can be ego-transcending and hence unselfish, the everyday consciousness of time and space can dissolve, the world is seen as beautiful and good, even bad times in life are accepted more easily, and there tends to be a temporary loss of fear, anxiety, inhibition, defense, control, perplexity, confusion, conflict, delay and restraint. Finally, Maslow’s concept of self-actualization—roughly corresponding to Jung’s concept of self-realization—sets up a standard for sanity that falls short of Awakening or nirvana and as such is not at all conducive to absolute sanity.

The fact that subsequent transpersonal theorists perpetuated Maslow’s failure to discriminate among the three different kinds of seemingly holistic or truly holistic states under consideration is illustrated in the next chapter of this volume by Ken Wilber’s definition of liberation (Skt. moksha or mukti) as the “comprehension” of what by 1977 he was calling the mental level, which in his own words was “what is commonly known as mystic consciousness,” and which involved the “sensation of being fundamentally one with the universe”—thus implying the existence of a mental subject separate from its object and feeling fundamentally one with it, as manifest in the holotropic and pseudo-holistic formless sphere that occupies the highest region of samsara. In the chapter in question I also show how, although with the passing of time Wilber—who in 1983 ceased categorizing his own position as transpersonal, and then came to define his approach as integral—made his system more sophisticated and posited an ever greater number of levels, he continued to incur in the basic error in question. Significantly, throughout the whole of their writings the rest of the beacons of transpersonal psychology failed to distinguish between the three different kinds of conditions under discussion.

As noted above, Stan Grof was one of the transpersonal psychologists who failed to distinguish among the conditions in question. He contrasted what he called hylotropic or matter-oriented consciousness (an infelicitous term compounded of the Greek verb trepein and the Greek noun hyle, meaning “matter”)—which embraces, among others, the manifold varieties of the narrow, restricted perceptual perspective and state of mind that are standard in modern societies and that mainstream psychiatry, in the belief that they correctly reflect a supposedly objective reality, equates with sanity and views as the only legitimate perspective and state of mind—with what he called holotropic consciousness, which in his view offers an alternative to the experience of the world as made of discrete entities in absolute linear time and three-dimensional space reflected by Newton’s physics, for it involves awareness of the fact that the discontinuity and solidity proper to the experience in question are illusions generated by a particular orchestration of events in consciousness, of the fact that time and space are ultimately arbitrary, of the fact that being a part is not incompatible with being the whole, of the fact that something can be true

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a Wilber (1993a).
and untrue at the same time, of the fact that emptiness and form and of nonexistence and existence are interchangeable, etc.

It must be kept in mind that, if we understand the etymology of the term *holotropic consciousness* in the sense of “wholeness-oriented consciousness,” we may understand it as referring to consciousness when it is oriented to wholeness—as occurs in the formless realms, in which consciousness takes pseudo-totalities as object. Therefore it may be more than a coincidence that Grof\(^a\) asserts *holotropic consciousness* to involve identification with an area of consciousness lacking definite limits: since identification can only take place between a mental subject and an object that is understood in terms of a concept, it necessarily involves the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure that produces the subject-object duality—and since the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and the resulting appearances, including the subject-object duality, are absent both in nirvana and in the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, it is clear that Grof’s definition of *holotropic consciousness* excludes these two states and corresponds only to the formless absorptions that constitute the highest regions of samsara. Moreover, among these absorptions, Grof’s definition of *holotropic consciousness* (like one of Wilber’s descriptions of the ninth fulcrum, as shown in the next chapter of this volume) seems to fit the second one, called infinitude of consciousness (*vijñananantyayatana*; Tib. namshê thaye kyeche\(^b\)), in which the mental subject identifies with the concept that an infinite consciousness perceives the seemingly infinite continuum of sense data. However, since Grof was unaware of the fact that there are various kinds of pseudo-holistic experience and truly, fully holistic realization, it is most likely that when he conceived his definition he intended it to apply to all of the experiences he deemed holistic (including both the *holotropic* so-called psychedelic experiences he often observed directly and the Awakening and/or nirvana he read about in the books of genuine spiritual traditions)—yet formulated it on the basis of experiences of the formless realms of samsara, which were the only ones he had witnessed (i.e., perceived reflexively).

Stan Grof has worked mainly with abrupt ways to raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, and especially with psychedelic substances of the kind I have christened *chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness* that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV), which in themselves and by themselves do not give rise to stable, clearly recognizable instances of nirvana, yet can easily induce instances of the neutral base-of-all immediately followed by samsaric experiences of the formless realms (which, however, does *not* mean that nirvana could not have occurred in some people under the effect of these substances who, probably as a result of previous practice, were ripe for it to occur, or who on the basis of teachings received and practice applied in “past lives” happened to apply traditional instructions). In my view Grof structured his definition of *holotropic consciousness* in terms of the characteristics of the formless realms because, (1) the instances of the neutral base-of-all cannot be reflexively remembered insofar as they do not involve reflexive awareness (of) consciousness of object, and hence Grof could not evaluate them, whereas the experiences of the formless realms, as all samsaric states, can be easily remembered insofar as they involve awareness (of) consciousness of object, and (2) he confused the realms of formlessness with nirvana,

\(^a\) Grof (1985, Ch. 6, section “Nature of Psychogenic Symptoms,” definition of holotropic consciousness).

\(^b\) *rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched.*
which most likely was what he wanted his concept of holotropic consciousness to reflect. This interpretation seems to be corroborated by the definition of holotropic states of consciousness quoted below, which suggests Grof had in mind so-called psychedelic experiences—whether induced by those drugs I call chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV) or attained by other means. He writes:

Holotropic states of consciousness are characterized by a profound change in perception in some or all sensory areas usually associated with the intrusion of other dimensions. Typically the experience is very intense, even overwhelming and “real” yet a person usually does not completely lose touch with everyday reality. A holotropic experience is often accompanied by extraordinary changes in day-to-day sensory perception with profound changes in color, shapes, sounds, smells and tastes as well as profound perceptions that have no counterpart in this realm. With eyes closed a person is often flooded with visions drawn from personal history and the collective subconscious involving various aspects of the cosmos and mythological realms.

The above description does not apply either to instances of the Self-qua-Fruit such as the Awakening of a Buddha or the nirvana or an Arhat, or to instances of the Self-qua-Path, such as the Contemplation state of a superior bodhisattva, a yogi and so on, among other things because in none of these states are people supposed to experience a flood of visions upon closing the eyes; therefore, it does not seem to refer to any instance of the nirvanic conditions subsumed under (A) in the threefold division of holistic and seemingly holistic states discussed above. Nor does it apply to any instance of the neither samsaric nor nirvanic condition indicated as (C): whereas in the type of samadhi Patañjali described as “being asleep and simultaneously being fully awake” one completely loses touch with everyday reality, in the absorptions of the condition of the base-of-all in which there is awareness (of) the sensory continuum there is no reflexive awareness (of) consciousness of object and hence whatever occurs in them cannot be reflexively remembered—while on the other hand one lacks the capability to effectively manage reality. Contrariwise, as shown in the discussion of so-called psychedelic experiences in the last section of this chapter, some of the characteristics in the description fit quite well those so-called psychedelic experiences pertaining to the formless realms indicated as (B), whereas others fit quite well so-called psychedelic experiences of the realms of form and sensuality.

As shown in the discussion of the mandala in a previous section, not all holotropic states are characterized by plenitude, harmony and security. Since Grof has had such a wide experience in the use of so-called psychedelics, it is not surprising that he is well aware of this. Consider the following quotation:

The emotions associated with holotropic states cover a broad spectrum that extends far beyond the limits of our everyday experience. They range from feelings of ecstatic rapture, heavenly bliss and “peace that passeth all understanding,” often associated with a sense of “connectedness” or “oneness” with the universe, through to episodes of abysmal terror, overpowering anger, utter despair, consuming guilt and other forms of emotional suffering.

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a Grof (1998a, p. 5).
b Grof (1998a, p. 6).
Depending on the content of the experience, a person can experience a sense of extraordinary health and well-being, optimal physiological functioning and orgiastic sexual sensations of enormous intensity or alternatively extreme discomfit such as excruciating pain, pressure, nausea or suffocation.

Incidentally, the above contradicts Grof’s definition of holotropic consciousness as involving identification with an area of consciousness lacking definite limits (and as such being holistic) insofar as a holotropic state—i.e., a state with a scope of awareness more panoramic than the average in civilized modern societies—can only involve such extreme discomfit when it comprises the divisiveness inherent in the subject-object duality, and the mental subject clings to the divisive, fragmentary perspective and values proper to what Grof calls hylotropic states (which excludes “identification with an area of consciousness lacking definite limits”). For example, the panic that people of lower capacities may experience upon having an incipient intuition of totality and thereby intuitions of the lack of self-being of their own selves and the manifold entities, occurs because the mental subject has not dissolved and, since it clings to the divisive, fragmentary perspectives and values that characterize what Grof calls hylotropic states, it dreads its own dissolution, together with that of the illusion of there being a substantial and autonomous individual of which it is a part (and that it has often become and with which it regularly identifies). Furthermore, even the dreadful experiences people of higher capacities can have when fortuitous occurrences make anguish and the like manifest while a high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is giving rise to a more panoramic condition, can only occur so long as there is a mental subject that seems to be different and separate from the feeling tone associated with the anguish, and that complains about the latter. In short, holotropic states can only involve extreme discomfit when in a holotropic condition elements of the hylotropic condition such as the subject-object duality remain, and the spurious mental subject becomes or identifies with the seemingly substantial human entity that is conceived and experienced only within the framework of the divisive, fragmentary perspective proper to what Grof calls hylotropic states. Hence in terms of Grof’s own definition of holotropic consciousness, the phrase “holotropic states involving extreme discomfit” is an oxymoron.331

At any rate, since pleasant samsaric experiences of the kind Grof calls holotropic are further sources of danger insofar as they are often followed by experiences of the lower realms, and since panic, dread and other unpleasant experiences cannot occur in any of the varieties of the truly, fully holistic condition of nirvana insofar as it does not involve a seemingly separate subject that may react to experience either with dread or with elation, there can be no doubt that only the truly, fully holistic condition of nirvana represents a true, definitive, changeless Refuge. This is why Grof’s distinction between holotropic and hylotropic states, and other distinctions between seemingly holistic states and divisive, tunnel-like perspectives, are not the most significant ones for transpersonal psychology and spirituality: the truly significant distinction is the one between samsaric states (whether they seem to be holistic, or are openly and outright divisive-fragmentary), the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, and the truly holistic condition of nirvana that offers the only genuine liberation from the drawbacks of conditioned existence.

Beside his distinction between hylotropic and holotropic states, Grof posited four interdependent levels or realms, into which he divided the human psyche. These are:
(1) The sensory barrier.
(2) The individual unconscious, corresponding to the biographic realm, which is the one Freud, among others, took as the object of his study.
(3) The level of birth and death, corresponding to the perinatal realm and involving intrauterine life previously to the onset of the process of birth, the process of birth itself, and the experiences immediately following birth. As Grof has noted in his works, Freud had touched upon this area, but it was Freud’s disciple Otto Rank (with his 1924 work The Trauma of Birth) who opened it to study by going deeper into it. Later on Nandor Fodor and Lietaert Peerbolte further developed it, and then it became an object of interest to anti-psychiatry as well.
(4) The transpersonal domain, which has been the privileged object of study for the mystics of all religions and ages, who often dealt with it in poems, yet—especially in the East—on countless occasions did so in philosophical and / or psychological treatises. In the West, late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosopher William James, who revived and reformulated pragmatism, took this domain as an object of psychological study, as had done before him other Western philosophers. However, C. G. Jung and Roberto Assagioli may have been the first among the so-called scientific psychologists to have taken it as an object of psychological research. Later on this domain became of primary concern to the humanistic psychologists who later on founded transpersonal psychology—namely Maslow and Sutich—and to the so-called “anti-psychiatrists.” Finally, it became the chief object of study of transpersonal psychology and a privileged object of interest to so-called integral psychology.

Grof coined the concept of *systems of condensed experiences* or COEX systems, which he defined as “emotionally-charged memories from different periods of our life that resemble each other in the quality of emotion or physical sensation that they share,” which he called “constellations of emotionally relevant memories stored together and which he deemed determinant in the formation of individual psychology. Among these so-called COEX systems, most determinant are the four Basic Perinatal Matrices or BPMs, which according to Grof’s initial view originated in the third of the above realms: that of “birth and death” making up the “perinatal realm” (however, in 1998 Grof acknowledged that, though he continues to classify some of the experiences that manifest in nonordinary states of consciousness [NOSC] in terms of perinatal matrices, those experiences need not be seen as determined by the birth process or as replicating the later: though BPMs often accompany the reliving of birth, they can also emerge independently of such liaison, and the manifestation of BPMs in NOSC and the process of birth itself may be both determined by an archetypal dynamic, rather than the former being determined by the latter). Grof views these BPMs—within each of which different COEX systems can manifest—as conditioning human experience in all of the levels / realms into which our author divides the human psyche, and in particular as determining the experiences of the fourth of the above levels / realms, which is the transpersonal domain. It must be noted that, for roughly the same reasons why above I said that experiences involving partial intuitions of totality can be either harmonious or conflictive, in Grof’s opinion experiences of the transpersonal

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*a* Rank (1973).
b* Grof (1998b, p. 346); cf. also Grof (1985) and others of his works.
d* Grof (1985) and others of the works listed in the Bibliography.
domain can either be “positive” (as in the case of “positive” COEX systems, “positive” BPM 1 and BPM 4, and “positive” transpersonal matrices), or “negative” (as in the case of “negative” COEX systems, BPMs 2 and 3, “negative” BPMs 1 and 4, and “negative” transpersonal matrices)—a distinction I do not endorse, for the fact that an experience is conflictive does not mean it is necessarily negative (on the contrary, as shown in the discussion of the symbolisms of the *Divine Comedy*, the *mandala* and so on, on the Dzogchen Path conflictive experiences may be more valuable than serene ones).

BPM 1 corresponds to the fetus’ experience in the womb before the start of labor. When this experience is positive, it involves feelings of safety and oneness; therefore, in later life positive manifestations of this BPM are associated with oneness and belonging, as well as with the capacity to surrender to divine play with full trust: it is the content of good *holotropic* experiences, and is associated with experiences in which the world is radiant, safe, nourishing. Its negative side is psychotic distortion; dissolution of boundaries which is confusing and experienced as threatening, as in the case of *panic*; experiences in which one feels endangered, under attack by demonic forces, possibly poisoned, and in which there is all-embracing uncertainty and paranoia.

BPM 2 starts when the birth contractions begin, so that there is pressure on the fetus yet no possibility of release. Its initial phase is similar to a negative BPM 1, for it involves disruption of the intrauterine paradise—the difference lying in the fact that it includes a sense of mechanical entrapment and claustrophobia. In fact, full BPM 2 is a feeling of no exit, of hell, of a world hopeless, full of meaningless suffering; in the case of an adult, he or she may feel deeply guilty and precisely because of this identify with the role of helpless victim.

BPM 3 starts when contractions are still occurring, but the birth canal is now open, and so titanic forces squash the head and body and there is a feeling (and reality) of a life-death struggle, with great emotional and physical tension. In later life, the pattern is one of problems with the control of destructive impulses (directed to self or / and others), cruel fantasies, sexual disturbances, and preoccupation with demonic, perverted or scatological themes: the world is a dangerous place, an existential battlefield ruled by the law of the jungle where one has to be strong to survive and fulfill one’s needs.

BPM 4 is the release of all tension and pain upon birth, which according to Grof corresponds to the death-rebirth experience; if uncomplicated, it gives rise to feelings of physical and spiritual rebirth, rejuvenation and emotional renewal: being full of excitement and energy, yet centered and peaceful, it involves perceiving the world as though through cleansed senses, and ads zest for life. However, it may have a negative aspect when birth is followed by traumatic experiences, such as beatings, circumcision, isolation from mother, war and so on.

In Dzogchen terms, the aspects or manifestations of BPM 1 Grof views as positive would include, (C) cozily resting in meditative absorptions or samadhis of the neutral base-of-all, and (B) formless samsaric absorptions or samadhis. However, they would exclude (A) all instances of *nirvana*, insofar as the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of thought are out of the question in intrauterine states, and though it would be conceivable that in reliving them as adults we could apply the instructions that may facilitate the occurrence of the reGnition in question, this is not what Grof proposes.³³²

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³³² Grof *(1985, Ch. 6, section “Efficacious Mechanisms of Psychotherapy and Personality Transformation”).*
Among the above, (C) the meditative absorptions of the neutral base-of-all include various kinds of deep, thought-free absorptions, such as: the *niruddhasamapatti* valued by the Hinayana and discussed in a subsequent section; the Vedantic *nirvikalpa samadhi*; the *samadhi* or *turiya* that is the supreme realization of Patañjali’s Yoga *darshana* (the blank condition that is similar to sleep yet different from it insofar as one is simultaneously fully awake); absorption in the so-called “inner” luminosity of the dang form of manifestation of energy known as *tingsel* and in general in the nondual luminosity manifesting in the chikhai bardo (so long as the Self-qua-Base is not recognized); 333 the various thought-free absorptions involving the continuum of sensations, the *dharmadhatu* (i.e., the space where all phenomena manifest), etc., yet not featuring the subject-object duality or the singling out and recognition of sensations—and probably the state of *turiya-ananda* described in *Upanishads* such as the *Mandukya* and *Taittiriya*, and in Shankaracharya’s *Adwaita Vedanta* (the uncertainty in this regard being due to the ambiguity in the definitions of the state in question).

For their part, (B) the samsaric formless absorptions include those experiences that take place when the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure gives rise to a mental subject that intends to take as object the infinitude that manifested in the experience of the base-of-all, and that either becomes or identifies with the seemingly limitless (or unthinkable, etc.) object that arose as a result of the same operation—which, however, at this point is no longer an infinitude insofar as it excludes the mental subject experiencing the object and which arose together with it—and derives joy from or takes pride in being that seemingly limitless (or unthinkable, etc.) object.

Though, as Jigme Lingpa had predicted, in our time it is common to mistake the neutral condition of the base-of-all—and hence what Grof calls BPM 1, with its typical appearance of nonduality—for the *dharmakaya* that on the Dzogchen Path constitutes the first stage in the progressive unveiling of the Self-qua-Base (a confusion that seems to be at the root of Ken Wilber’s association of his fulcrum-9 both with the dharmakaya and with different instances of the condition of the base-of-all, which will be discussed in a subsequent section), unlike the neutral condition of the base-of-all the *dharmakaya* is not in any sense analogous to cozily lying in the safety of the womb before labor begins (whereas the absorptions that Wilber mistakes for the dharmakaya, on the other hand, are analogous to it). In fact, the patency of the all-accommodating voidness that constitutes the essence aspect of the Self-qua-Base is the *dharmakaya* if and only if it involves reGnition of the stuff of which the phenomena of dang energy are made (independently of whether this energy is manifesting as the “inner” luminosity called *tingsel* or as the various types of thought)—which, insofar as this reGnition is the “all-liberating single gnosis” (Tib. *chikshe kundröl*), automatically results in the spontaneous liberation of whatever type of thought may be manifest. Concerning the already mentioned, partial analogy between Grof’s BPMs and the stages of the intermediate state between death and rebirth, just as in the absence of the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base the luminosity of the chikhai bardo (which as noted above is the first intermediate state) is an instance of BPM 1, reacting with aversion to the shining forth of luminosity initially may be seen as what Grof

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* a *ging gsal.*
* b ‘chi kha’i bar do.*
* c *gcig shes kun grol.*
would call a “negative” BPM 1, and then it may give rise to the subsequent BPMs the author in question posits.

Bateson, Laing, Cooper and others of the authors mentioned in a previous section as having dealt with unsought, spontaneous manifestations of the self-healing processes occurring in “nonordinary states of consciousness” I have related to the Divine Comedy, the mandala and the intermediate state between death and rebirth, describe all such processes in terms of a death and a rebirth. Stanislav Grof accepted that these processes and some transpersonal (and in particular so-called psychedelic) experiences involve a death and a rebirth, but as noted above, related them, and in general most “nonordinary states of consciousness” (NOSC), to the third of the above levels: that of “birth and death” making up the “perinatal realm,” which as we have seen in his view determines to a great extent individual psychology and involves the four BPMs—a—among which, as we have seen, it is specifically BPM 4 that he associates to death-and-rebirth. (However, a relationship may be established between Grof’s BPMs and the structure and function of the intermediate state between death and rebirth that, as we have seen, involves three successive bardos. In fact, if those BPMs manifested as a sequence beginning with BPM 1 and concluding with BPM 4, this sequence would be partly analogous to the unfolding of the intermediate state from the moment of the shining forth of the clear light in the first of the bardos between death and rebirth [the one called chikhai³] until the moment of the reGnition of the true nature of the rölpa energy of the visions of the wrathful deities in the second of the bardos between death and rebirth [that of the dharmata or chönyi’] and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of delusion—provided this reGnition and spontaneous liberation occurred, and did so in the second bardo rather than in the first one. Nevertheless, this unfolding of the intermediate state would not be complete insofar as the third bardo—the sidpa’d bardo—would not manifest, and it would not be fully analogous to a sequence of BPMs 1, 2, 3 and 4 insofar as BPM 4 does not involve reGnition of the Self-qua-Base.)

As to the symbolism of Dante’s Divine Comedy, BPM 2 exemplifies the no-way-out character of the experience of Hell and corresponding passages of the bardo, whereas BPM 3 exemplifies the experiences of runaway of tension occurring in Purgatory and the corresponding passages of the bardo. Likewise, BPM 4 corresponds to the openness that, in unsought self-healing processes occurring outside the context of a wisdom tradition, manifests right after the spontaneous resolution of tension and conflict following their runaway to the threshold level at which they break like a rubber band pulled beyond its maximum resistance—so long as this openness is not the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path, which does not occur in the process of birth upon the transition from the struggle of labor to the openness of BPM 4. Above it was noted that I do not endorse Grof’s view that transpersonal and other “nonordinary” experiences can be “positive” or “negative,” because the fact that an experience is conflictive does not mean it is necessarily negative. It is clear that an all-out experience of paranoia in which the individual feels persecuted by an ubiquitous enemy, which Grof would see as an instance of BPM 2, is most difficult to use as an opportunity to reGnize the Base in which the experience manifests, or that

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a Grof (1985) and others of the works listed in the Bibliography.
b ‘chi kha’i.
c chos nyid.
d srid pa.
some BPM 3 can be very dangerous. However, as shown in this paragraph, the self-healing process illustrated by the *Divine Comedy* may be seen as involving a succession of various of these BPMs, including some that Grof deems negative, and yet this process can result in greater wholeness and harmony—or, if activated in the context of a Path such as Dzogchen, may be the royal way to full Awakening.

Since I have never compared either the experiences that specific individuals have in “nonordinary states of consciousness” (NOSC), or the systems of condensed experiences (COEX) that condition their experience in the biographical level or realm, with trustworthy reports of what actually happened to the same individuals in the process of birth and in the preceding intrauterine life, I can neither endorse nor contest the early Grof’s assertion that the perinatal process determines the events occurring in NOSC and individual psychology in general. Furthermore, doubts have been expressed as to the existence of grounds for distinguishing BPM 1 from BPM 4, as well as to whether the boundary between BPMs 3 and 4 is just as Grof established it to be. However, we have seen that Grof’s perinatal matrices partly correspond to stages of the intermediate state, and that BPMs 2, 3 and 4 are analogous to the lhundrub processes charted in the *Divine Comedy*—so long as such processes do not occur in the context of the higher Dzogchen practices, for in this case the analogy would be only partial insofar as that which would resemble the transition from BPM 3 to BPM 4 (but which in this case would involve reGnition of the Self-qua-Base), rather than being the concluding stage of the process, would initially occur on the occasion of the transition from Hell to Purgatory, and thereon would have to occur again and again until samsara is exhausted. In the same way, the intermediate state between death and rebirth begins with the shining forth of undifferentiated light—which if not reGnized, yet not rejected, would give rise to a BPM 1—and yet as noted above a pattern comparable to the sequence BPM 3 - BPM 4 (except for the fact that in this case BPM 4 would involve reGnition of the Self-qua-Base) manifests if and only if, in the second bardo, which is that of the dharmata or chönyi, when visions of rölpa energy manifested, their true condition—the Self-qua-Base—were reGnized and hence the perception of these visions as objects to a subject and as lying in an external dimension spontaneously liberated itself; however, just as noted with regard to the symbolism of the *Divine Comedy*, in the Dzogchen practices carried out in the intermediate state of the dharmata or chönyi while the organism is physically alive, which are those of Thögel and the Yangthik, this transition occurs repetitively and hence it is far from being the concluding stage of the process.

Furthermore, in the light of the findings of paleopathology which are interpreted as showing that prior to 4,000 BC (or prior to 12,000 BC in the only sites, located in the Nile valley, which are an exception to this rule) no violence occurred between human beings, we would have to conclude that in case the early Grof were correct in tracing the origin of violence to BPMs 3, before such dates women bore children utterly without struggle or pain, either on their own part or on that of the infant—which is what the words the *Book of Genesis* attributes to God on the occasion of punishing Eve seems to suggest: “I will greatly increase your pangs in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children.” Likewise, children born through a cesarean operation before labor begins would possibly lack a major source of violence—yet I have seen no evidence supporting this assumption

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a Bray (1998).

b chos nyid.

c Lochouarn (1993); van der Dennen (1995); DeMeo (1998); Taylor (2003, 2005).
(on the contrary, it is believed that Nero was born of cesarean section, and eventually he killed his own mother, Agrippina, and engaged in wanton violence; King Richard III of England was also born of cesarean section, and he was accused of killing the little princes he had confined to the tower; \(339\) etc.).

We have seen that none of the holotropic conditions, transpersonal experiences and BPMs Stanislav Grof posits seems to involve the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base I call the Self-qua-Path and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of thought (a fact that is discussed in greater detail below)—which is the main reason why I criticize his system from what I have christened a metatranspersonal standpoint. At this point it is important to emphasize the fact that Grof classifies all shamanic experiences, experiences of spirit and demon possession, and many other occurrences that are not necessarily holotropic or mystic, as belonging to the transpersonal domain, while failing to alert his readers to the fact that shamanic experiences—at least as Michael Harner has defined them\(^a\)—have little (if any) relation with the transition from \textit{samsara} to \textit{nirvana}, and that spirit and demon possession can hardly have a wholesome outcome for the individual him or herself. In fact, concerning Grof’s views, my critique of transpersonal psychology from what I call a metatranspersonal perspective needs to be coupled with the following warnings, issued from the standpoint I have christened metashamanic,\(^b\) concerning the shamanic:\(^c\)

Though shamanic cultures had a pan-communicative vision that caused human beings to relate communicatively with natural phenomena, thereby preserving ecological order, shamanism also has serious defects. Michael Harner\(^d\) pointed out that the South American shaman thinks the nonordinary reality to which he or she gains access through shamanic means—which Western culture would consider supernatural—is the true reality, and that his or her everyday, ordinary vision, as well as that of other individuals, is a false reality. [According to Harner] information on shamanic cultures from other regions suggests that [this] may be applied to a great deal of what goes under the term shamanism: although [different] shamanic tribes and cultures may attribute a greater or lesser degree of reality to the everyday vision of normal individuals, most of them [would] attribute a higher degree of reality to “supernatural” shamanic experiences tainted by thoughts sustained by delusory valuation-absolutization, which as such are delusive. It is perhaps the greater scope of the focus of conscious [aware]ness and the greater intensity of the experience resulting from the higher energetic [volume] \(\textit{kundalini} \text{ or } \textit{thig-le}\) at the root of such experiences that make these seem more real to shamans than the ones they face in their everyday lives.

In Tibet and its zone of cultural influence, popular culture \[features\] important shamanic elements\(^340\) that representatives of the two most important religious systems never tried to discourage. Lamas, Bönpo as well as Buddhist, referred to local spirits and demons as relatively existing, \[actual\] entities capable of causing great harm to human beings and social life, and, in general, encouraged the belief in supernatural entities that could harm or help human beings. The reason for this is that as long as the tendency to experience “supernatural” reality as inherently, absolutely true, and to become its victims is still present, it is of no use to simply tell oneself that the reality in question does not exist. In fact, \[Lamas of both systems used to teach the bravest and most capable of their students, practices considered very dangerous that\] allowed them to experience directly

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\(^a\) Harner (1973).
\(^b\) Capriles (1990c, 1999a, 2000c).
\(^c\) Adapted from Capriles (2000c): expression was corrected for greater precision.
\(^d\) Harner (1973).
the "supernatural" reality with their gods and demons and that, if all went well, resulted in the spontaneous liberation of the experience [in the state of rigpa] and therefore of dualism and tension—which freed them from the influence and power [of this reality so long as they remained in the state of Contemplation, and which kept them aware of its illusory character [and progressively freed them from its influence and power in post-Contemplation]. [In fact, the incessant repetition of this practice [progressively neutralized] the tendency to experience the reality accessed by shamanic and yogic means as self-existing, independent of the practitioner's mental processes, and absolutely true. As they learned not to take seriously visions and experiences that seemed so real, practitioners also became free from the illusion that their normal everyday experiences were self-existing, independent of their own mental processes, and absolutely true. Their liberation from delusory valuation-absolutization during shamanic experiences, gradually freed them from it—and therefore from delusion in general—in their daily lives as well.

Dzogchen and [the] other spiritual systems [transmitted in Tibet] regard as delusory both our ordinary experience of everyday reality and the experience of nonordinary reality that shamans and yogis may have access to. This does not mean they consider both realities as mere hallucinations; [on the contrary, some such systems posit] the existence of something given that, once processed and interpreted by our mental functions, is experienced as the world in which we live, with all its entities. Delusion arises when we fail to recognize that entities do not exist inherently and absolutely, for they depend on other entities and on our own mental processes in order to exist in the manner [in which] they exist for us. Thus, delusion is a confusion regarding the mode of existence of entities (including that of human individuals): when we believe that our objects and we ourselves exist inherently and substantially (in the sense of being self-existing: not depending on the mind and/or other objects or subjects to exist), that the relative is absolute, we are under delusion. This delusion is produced by the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought [in combination with the mechanisms of perception].

Delusion produces emotional responses that beget recurring suffering, dissatisfaction, and frustration. If we take shamanic nonordinary reality to be inherently and absolutely existent, we may become the victims of demons and spirits, as has happened to many Tibetans and members of tribal cultures; if we believe in the inherent, absolute truth of the entities, beliefs, and values of normal everyday reality, we will strive to maintain our identities, possessions, and so on, thereby giving rise to: (a) constant discomfort, dissatisfaction, and personal frustration; (b) contradictions and social conflicts; and (c) ultimately, an ecological crisis such as the one we presently face.

As I have shown elsewhere, though I regard worldviews based on shamanism in the specific, narrow sense in Michael Harner gave this term, as being far less noxious than the scientist worldview, it is the "metashamanic" spirituality of Awakening traditions that I deem to be truly therapeutic and to constitute the key to the survival of our species and the initiation of a new age of Communion, harmony and plenitude—the term "Communion" not having in this case the sense given it by Gilligan, Tannen, and Wilber, among others, for I capitalize it to make it clear that I am using it in what I believe was its original sense: to refer to the dissolution of the illusory boundaries separating us from each other and from the rest of nature, in the unveiling of the Self-qua-Base.

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a Capriles (1990b, 2000a, 2007a vol. II)
b Gilligan (1982).
c Tannen (1990).
The above does not imply disparaging hunter-gatherers, early horticulturalists and primal peoples in general, for according to the Kunje Gyalpo and other root texts of Dzogchen, the Dzogchen teachings, which constitute the very paradigm of metashamanism, were promulgated in the primordial era—whereas shamanism, according to the late Sufi Master Idries Shah, was a late result of the degeneration of true Paths of Awakening within tribal cultures. Moreover, according to the Kunje Gyalpo and other Dzogchen texts, the Dzogchen teachings and their transmission disappeared and were reintroduced on successive occasions—most of them in prehistoric times. Who can then categorically assert these teachings not to have survived until our age, at least partially, among hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists and so on? (Mircea Eliade showed Paleo-Siberian shamanism to have used a spiritual map analogous to the one Dante drew in the Divine Comedy, which as such applies to metashamamic teachings as well. Though I have always believed Carlos Castañeda’s books to be concoctions elaborated on the basis of Eastern teachings and a great deal of imagination, and at any rate the teachings he attributed to Don Juan Matos are certainly not Dzogchen teachings, since they claim to lead the apprentice beyond both the way of seeing of normal human beings and the way of seeing of the witch, in case they were not concoctions by Castañeda they could as well come from a genuine metashamamic tradition. Furthermore, a Mexican shaman—I seem to remember it was María Sabina—spoke of two different ways followed by her colleagues, one of them leading to realization of the divine—which suggests that they possessed a metashamamic tradition, or at least a path leading to higher samsaric realms that they mistook for the realization of the divine.)

Above I asserted that from a general Buddhist or a specific Dzogchen perspective most of the ten types of spiritual emergency listed by Stan and Christina Grof have no ultimate therapeutic potential. In fact, my evaluation of these occurrences is as follows:

(1) “Episodes of unitive consciousness” or “peak experiences.” So long as they are not mistaken for instances of nirvana, they may be useful for awakening faith in the possibility of attaining states of consciousness more holistic and wholesome than normal hylotrropic consciousness, and for arousing interest in the Paths of Awakening. However, they may also be a source of ego infatuation.

(2) “Awakening of kundalini.” This is what I am calling increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, which as shown repeatedly throughout this book and in other works of mine is the principal cause of most nonordinary states of consciousness (NOSC) and condition of possibility of all kinds of spiritual breakthrough. In fact, though the Grofs classify this “awakening of kundalini” as one of the ten varieties of what they call spiritual emergency, what they refer to by that term is the energetic basis of most types of spiritual emergency, and although they describe it as involving rushes of energy, violent shaking, extremes of emotion, “speaking in tongues,” visions of nonordinary beings and archetypes, auditory phenomena such as celestial music, visions of

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a kun byed rgyal po; Skt. Sarwadharmamahashantibodhichittakulaya ra ja.

b Cf. Namkhai Norbu & Clemente (1999), among other sources.

c Shah (1975).


e Eliade (1964).

f If memory does not betray me, this assertion was made in Castañeda (1971); otherwise it was made in one of his two following books, but at any rate it was not made in the first of his books.

g Grof & Grof (1992, Part I. chapter 4).

beautiful geometric patterns, perception of agreeable odors or other such phenomena, most of these occurrences (and in particular energy rushes, violent shaking, extremes of emotion, and “speaking in tongues”) take place only when the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness increases spontaneously in individuals who are not duly prepared. If, with a very high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, we question our dualistic experience in terms of specific, secret oral instructions, it is very likely that the result may be an instance of the Self–qua-Path—yet the phenomena the Grofs list need not manifest. And in fact the sole purpose of raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness on the Dzogchen Path is that of using the ensuing states in order to apply this questioning. The reason for this is that, if the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness increases spontaneously without this resulting in a spontaneous breakthrough, and the ensuing experiences are not used for questioning their structure and function in terms of traditional instructions, this increase will have no value and will most likely become an obstacle to progress on the Path of Awakening. This is why here it is claimed that the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness should only be raised in the context of a practice such as Dzogchen and in individuals fulfilling the requisites for the raise in question to result in recognition of the Self–qua-Base: because otherwise this raise may either result in destructive varieties of madness, or generate interests that deviate the individual from the Path of Awakening, give rise to attachment and inflate the ego.

(3) “Near death experiences” (NDE). They very often have the beneficial effect of eliciting interest in the Path of Awakening, but they are random occurrences no one in his or her senses would intentionally induce, except as a replication (which is reportedly easily achieved with ketamine\(^a\)).

(4) “Emergence of memories of past lives.” This is always a distraction that as a rule inflates the ego and can hardly have a beneficial effect on the individual.

(5) “Psychological renewal through return to the center.” As the Grofs understand this term, it refers to a vaguely defined type of occurrence in which dreams, fantasies and so on indicate one is entering a spiritual journey and may provide useful orientation for the journey in question. However, though the signs listed by the Grofs\(^{346}\) will be beneficial if they actually orient the individual spiritually, they will be harmful both if they give rise to disorientation and if they beget infatuation.

(6) “Shamanic crisis.” What the Grofs call by this name may involve experiences in which one journeys to the underworld or world of the dead, or that feature rituals and ceremonies, rites of dismemberment, or animals that later appear as power animals or as guides. They typically involve an experience of annihilation followed by resurrection and ascent to celestial realms. And the journeys that may occur often include those into hidden realms of reality. Though such occurrences may be an index that a spontaneous self-healing process is beginning or is in course, and though they often take place in Awakening Paths, in unprepared individuals they may also become sources of attachment and give rise to obsessions that most likely would deviate the individual from the direction of Awakening.

(7) “Awakening of extra-sensory perception” or “psychic ability.” According to the Grofs this often includes the ability to make intuitive connections and an awareness of synchronicity. However, not only are the ensuing experiences difficult to tell from outright delusions, so that they may either have a relative usefulness or become hindrances, but, like

\(^a\) Kolp, Young, Friedman, Krupitsky, Jansen & O’Connor (2007, p. 4).
those of the fourth type, in unprepared individuals they inflate the ego and give rise to deviating obsessions.

(8) “Communication with guide spirits and channeling.” Such occurrences may be relatively useful to some people (an example of this possibly being Jung’s meetings with Elijah-Philemon, Salome and the black serpent, a which seemed to be somehow useful to him), yet to others they may spell the beginning of trouble (for example, when in a Thögel or related context someone takes such guides as a self-existing reality and reacts emotionally to them with either pride or fear). Furthermore, in unprepared individuals they may result in attachment to the extraordinary / paranormal, and reinforce belief in and dependence on so-called extrasensory forces and phenomena.

(9) “Experiences of encounters with UFOs.” These occurrences are spiritually useless, as a rule awaken a morbid interest in phenomena that have no role in eradicating delusion, and in general inflate the ego. However, on the Dzogchen Path the presentation of thigles is a condition of possibility of the practice of Thögel.

(10) “States of spirit and demon possession.” Occurrences in this category are in general morbid and extremely dangerous, have no healing potential, and hence as a rule should be avoided. (However, there are exceptions to this rule: the use of spirit possession for oracle consultation has been practiced in Tibet with seemingly useful results, and elemental spirit possession is successfully practiced by Amerindian shamans for medical purposes.)

The term *spiritual emergence*, originally used for these occurrences (later changed to “spiritual emergency” because of the dangers inherent in them), implies that they occur without having been sought—and in fact, for the reasons adduced above, except in the case of inducing the first two in the context of the practice of metashamanic, metatranspersonal systems, it would be a grave error to intentionally induce them. Since they involve illusory experiences of the kind that with regard to *vipassana* practice the Pali Canon calls the “ten corruptions,” that Ch’an/Zen calls by the Mandarin term *mo-ching* and the Japanese word *makyō*, that Dzogchen refers to as *nyams*, and that Sufis denominate *hal*, when they manifest spontaneously, if one is unable to employ them as a platform for applying secret oral instructions (Skt. *upadesha*; Tib. *menngag*) susceptible of resulting in recognition of the true condition of the experience and thereby in the latter’s spontaneous liberation, rather than giving them importance either as a positive or a negative occurrence, one should regard them as dream-like, illusory events. Since Washburn rightly identifies such experiences as instances of the “ten corruptions” and tells us that, should we deal with them in the right way, they would subside with the passing of time, his attitude to such phenomena is indisputably wiser than that of the Grofs. However, the ideal way of dealing with such experiences is that of the Dzogchen teachings, in which, as we have seen, rather than remaining as aloof as possible in their regard and waiting for them to subside of their own accord, we employ them as precious occasions for applying the secret oral instructions that facilitate the recognition of the Self-qua-Base that results in the spontaneous liberation of the experience. In fact, when such experiences occur, not only are the instructions in question more likely to result in the spontaneous liberation of delusion, but this liberation

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a Jung (1964).
b *nyams*.
c *man ngag*.
has a greater power for neutralizing \textit{karma} and by the same token increasing the individual’s capacity of spontaneous liberation.

What may be really useful to highly deranged individuals who have not received instructions or introductions to a Path of Awakening and have no capacity of spontaneous liberation is the kind of process discussed by Gregory Bateson,\footnote{Bateson (Ed. and Introduction, 1961; 1972).} R. D. Laing,\footnote{Laing (1967).} David Cooper,\footnote{Cooper (1971). Cf. also the less important Cooper (1967, 1974, 1980).} John Perry\footnote{Perry (1974). Cf. also Perry (1953, 1987, 1999).} and several others, and/or the type of process discussed by Michael Washburn,\footnote{Washburn (1994, 1995).} which is not essentially different from the former but which the transpersonal theorist does not classify as psychotic (as its milder varieties would probably not classify as psychosis under most prevailing reference systems).

As shown in the initial section of the preceding chapter, one of the contributions of antipsychiatry and transpersonal psychology (having a precedent in Erich Fromm and a few other authors) to psychology and psychiatry is their radical rejection of the misconception of sanity or mental health as consisting in “normality” in the sense of relatively conflict-free functional adaptation to socially sanctioned rules, myths and, in general, pseudorealities. However, so far as I know, no transpersonal psychologist has ever defined \textit{absolute sanity / absolute mental health} in as precise terms as done in the initial section of the preceding chapter. In terms of this definition, it is clear that \textit{absolute sanity / absolute mental health} does not correspond to shamanic experiences, for these always involve \textit{avidya} or marigpa in all three of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, being totally conditioned by delusion. As we have seen, such sanity could not lie in transpersonal states within \textit{samsara} such as the four formless absorptions and realms either, for these also comprise \textit{avidya} or marigpa in all three of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here (though not so in the third of the senses they have in the classification favored by Longchenpa), featuring the subject-object duality and being totally conditioned by delusion; furthermore, insofar as these states are so often mistaken for \textit{nirvana}, they are the most treacherous and dangerous instances of \textit{masked insanity}.\footnote{\textit{kun gzhi lung ma bstan}.} Nor could it correspond to the transpersonal condition neither pertaining to \textit{samsara} nor being \textit{nirvana} called the neutral base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten\footnote{\textit{kun gzhi lung ma bstan}.}, for this state involves \textit{avidya} or marigpa in the first of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, and, moreover, in it we cannot react to our perception of what goes on in the world in ways that may either fit or fail to fit what is actually going on in it. Nor could it consist—as Grof, Wilber (whose views in this regard are discussed in a subsequent section of this volume) and other transpersonal theorists seem to believe—in those experiences of deluded \textit{hylotropic} consciousness that are not taken as absolutely true occurrences or as absolutely serious and important events, for the experiences in question involve \textit{avidya} or marigpa in the first and second of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, and as such could not constitute \textit{absolute sanity / absolute mental health}. In fact, as we have seen, \textit{absolute sanity / absolute mental health} consists in the Self-qua-Fruit—i.e., in irreversible supreme Awakening or \textit{anuttara samyak sambodhi}—whereas \textit{relative sanity / relative mental health} corresponds to the alternation of the Self-qua-Path.
or the Contemplation state (Skt. samahita; Tib. nyamzhak\textsuperscript{a}) of superior bodhisattvas, yogis and siddhas, with the ever more mitigated instances of delusion occurring in the hylotropic consciousness of the post-Contemplation condition (Skt. prishthalabdha; Tib. jethob\textsuperscript{b}) of these individuals, in which they are aware that their experience involves delusion, do not take the characteristics of hylotropic consciousness as absolute truth, and do not feel that the events occurring and phenomena manifesting in this state are absolutely serious and important, for they have considerable systemic wisdom and their experience is imbued with a sense of apparitionality.

During so-called psychedelic experiences induced by substances of the kind I have christened chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV), many have driven their cars and motorcycles, some have gone so far as to practice extreme sports without suffering accidents—and some have even accomplished feats they never achieved in their ordinary condition. However, such exploits are instances of extreme irresponsibility, for in some so-called psychedelic sessions some people lose touch with reality to the degree of requiring a caretaker—and, in fact, no one in his or her senses would give a jetliner to a pilot who is under the effect of so-called psychedelics. In short, it would be wrong to take for granted that under the effect of such substances people will be able to consummately manage reality. Since Grof’s criterion of sanity appears to agree with the Korzybskian one expressed in the preceding chapter, in terms of which those states in which we cannot manage reality cannot constitute absolute sanity, if it were true that, as suggested above, Grof took so-called psychedelic experiences induced by the substances I call chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV)—experiences that, by the way, cannot be prolonged indefinitely and therefore cannot be a model for sanity—as the model for his definition of holotropic consciousness, it would be easy to understand why he concluded that “superior sanity” or “true mental health” did not consist in any kind of holotropic consciousness. The hypothesis that Grof may have taken so-called psychedelic experiences triggered by CREV as the model for his definition of holotropic consciousness seems to be substantiated by the passage by our author cited above, which features suggestive sentences—such as, “With eyes closed a person is often flooded with visions drawn from personal history and the collective subconscious involving various aspects of the cosmos and mythological realms,” or, “Typically the experience is very intense, even overwhelming and ‘real’ yet a person usually does not completely lose touch with everyday reality” (which implies that he or she loses touch with it to some extent). The hypothesis in question seems to be substantiated as well by the following passage:\textsuperscript{c}

Usually in holotropic states the intellect is not impaired but rather operates in a way significantly different from its day-to-day functioning. While we might not be able to rely in these states on our judgment in ordinary practical matters, we can be literally flooded with remarkable new information on a variety of subjects.

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\textsuperscript{a} mnyam bzḥag,

\textsuperscript{b} rjes thob.

\textsuperscript{c} Grof (1998a, p. 6, italics my own).
In the standard *hylotropic* consciousness the prevailing civilization and mainstream psychology refer to as “normality,” individuals alternate between experiencing themselves as a body *qua* tangible physical entity with definite boundaries and with a limited sensory range, experiencing themselves as a *ghost inside the machine* that as such is different from the body, etc. Grof tells us that in this condition the world seems to be a collection of self-existent material objects, and has distinctly Newtonian characteristics: time is linear, space is three-dimensional, and events seem to be governed by chains of cause and effect. He further notes that *hylotropic* experiences systematically support such commonsense assumptions about the world as: matter is solid; two objects cannot occupy the same space; past events are irretrievably lost; future events are not experientially available; one cannot be in more than one place at a time; one can exist and experience in only one temporal framework at a time; a whole is larger than a part; something cannot be true and untrue at the same time; etc. Since Grof concluded that superior sanity or true mental health could not be any kind of *holotropic* condition, and he clearly recognized the standard *hylotropic* condition I have called the “masked insanity of deluded normality” to involve delusion and as such to give rise to a lack of fit between our reactions to the world and what actually goes on in the world (which as we have seen is so extreme as to have produced the current ecological crisis, which has put human survival at stake), Grof concluded that the sanity or mental health in question should lie in a particular mode of *hylotropic* consciousness in which, having assimilated the *holotropic* outlook, we no longer take the perceptions and experiences of this condition as absolute realities or as something ultimately serious, and we possess enough systemic wisdom as not to give rise to effects contrary to the ones we wish to produce.

The gradual Mahayana and other higher forms of Buddhism make it clear that the repeated occurrence of *nirvana* while on the Path that corresponds to the Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas and so on, causes these individuals, while in their post-Contemplation state, to cease taking everyday experiences as absolutely true or as extremely serious and important events and, by the same token, to acquire enough systemic wisdom as not to be caught in the law of inverted effect or reverse law. Thus, if what Grof called *holotropic consciousness* and which in his view by occurring repeatedly would affect *hylotropic* consciousness, causing the individual to cease taking *hylotropic* experiences as absolutely true, extremely serious and important events, consisted in the manifestation of *nirvana* while on the Path, what he calls *superior sanity / true mental health* would correspond to the post-Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas and so on, which in the preceding chapter was called, “the ever more *mitigated insanity* of those samsaric states in which delusion has progressively lost strength,” and which, in alternation with the provisional *absolute sanity* of the instances of *nirvana* that manifest on the Path, constitutes the condition I called *relative sanity*. However, as we have seen repeatedly, Grof claims the *holotropic* condition to involve, (1) *identification* (and hence the subject-object duality and delusorily valued thought in general), and (2) a difficulty to consummately manage reality. Since neither of these two is involved in the Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas, yogis and siddhas, which is devoid of the subject-object duality and of delusorily valued-absolutized thoughts in general, and in which we manage reality with increasing effectiveness as we become accustomed to the condition in question, what Grof calls the *holotropic* condition simply could not be this Contemplation state. Moreover, what Grof calls *hylotropic consciousness* can only develop the feeling of apparitionality, playfulness and lack of compulsion to control
experience he ascribes to what he calls superior sanity or true mental health, as a byproduct of the repeated occurrence of the Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas and so on—or, to a minor degree, of a combination of practices such as illusory body (Skt. mayadeha; Tib. gyulü), imagining the experiences of wakefulness to be sequences of a dream, and dream yoga (Skt. swapanayoga; Tib. milam naljor). Since Grof’s system can hardly give access to the Self-qua-Path, it seems most unlikely that he could have derived his concept of superior sanity or true mental health either from the results of a spiritual practice of his own, or from the observation of his patients—and so I suspect his conception to have been inspired by the descriptions of the post-Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas in Buddhist texts. Worse still, by claiming that in holotropic states it is impossible to manage reality in a truly effective way, and by reducing superior sanity or true mental health to a hylotropic condition, he negated the possibility of attaining full, irreversible Awakening (Skt. anuttara samyak sambodhi)—for this condition excludes all forms of hylotropic experience, the subject-object duality, dualistic self-consciousness, and the ego-delusion, with their respective defects (such as the self-hindering inherent in self-consciousness, the evil inherent in ego-delusion and in what Jung called the shadow, and so on), yet involves all the learning and skills individuals develop in both hylotropic and holotropic states throughout their life, and therefore is characterized by a consummate managing of reality (which the Chuang-tzu illustrates with the cases of the artisan who made circles more perfectly by hand than with the compass, and the butcher who for years did not need to sharpen his knife), as well as by the natural goodness that makes it possible to do away with self-control and morality. (For a Buddhist scriptural substantiation of the explanation of full, irreversible Awakening given here, cf. the next chapter of this volume.)

Finally, most of transpersonal psychology is wrong in giving to understand that the repeated occurrence of transpersonal, holotropic states of the kind Maslow called “peak experiences” as a result of the application of its own methods and techniques is in itself a Path to a condition saner than the standard “normality,” which is often thought to be the same as the absolute sanity of full Awakening. In fact, psychology needs to acknowledge its inherent limits and limitations, make it clear that the absolute sanity of Awakening can only be reached by treading a traditional Path of Awakening having its source in a fully Awake individual, and circumscribe itself to its inherent tasks—such as describing and explaining mental processes and operations, defining sanity and insanity, describing the self-defeating mechanisms of samsara, distinguishing and describing the various psychoses and neuroses, mapping self-healing processes, helping individuals who face over average levels of suffering and who are confused with regard to the causes of their suffering and disoriented in life, solving the psychological troubles that prevent some of those who intend to tread a traditional Path of Awakening from effectively doing so, etc.—and, in the best of cases, charting the process of Awakening. It must be noted, however, that although in this section I have criticized many aspects of transpersonal psychology—from its failure to distinguish the various types of holistic and pseudo-holistic conditions, through its breaching the inherent limits of psychology—I view the movement in question as a very

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a Goals and Results of Psychotherapy, in ch. 7 of Grof (1985).

b sgyudus.

c rmi lam rnal ’byor.
valuable development. In fact, by coining the adjective metatranspersonal,\(^a\) rather than calling for the birth of a wholly new philosophical-psychological movement, I am stressing the need to rid transpersonal psychology of the blemishes denounced here and make it keep within the limits proper to psychology in general.

I find it necessary to make a concluding remark: though Grof asserts his view of the process of human evolution to differ from Wilber’s only in minor aspects, his view of the present crisis as exhibiting the characteristics of a BPM 3 just before the transition to BPM 4\(^b\) contradicts Wilber’s characteristically modern, fairy tale, “happy ending” view of spiritual and social evolution and appears to coincide with the one shared by the great spiritual traditions of humankind and the present book—even though, as shown throughout this section, he does not distinguish between BPMs and the recognition of the nondual awareness in which they manifest. In fact, we have seen that the structure and function of the sequence of BPMs is to some degree analogous to those of the intermediate state between death and rebirth, and it is equally analogous to that of the aeon (Skt. kalpa; Tib. kalpa) that will be discussed in the initial section of the following chapter. Since the transition to a BPM 4 at the level of the species that we are about to go through appears to correspond to the transition from the end of the era of darkness (kaliyuga) to a new era of truth (satyayuga) or era of perfection (kritiyayuga), or to a final Millennium like the one prophesized in the Kalachakra Tantra, I think that in this particular point the author under consideration has made a most important contribution.

Finally, I find it important to assess Oscar Ichazo’s placing John Lilly\(^c\) and others in sensory deprivation water tanks right after administering LSD to them, as I fear that some readers could relate this invention to my explanations of the principle behind the practice of Thögel, when in truth there is no similarity whatsoever between the one and the other. To begin with, Thögel has the role of triggering positive feedback loops of vibratory rates that make the latter increase exponentially and that, on each and every occasion, conclude with the spontaneous liberation of delusion that temporarily interrupts the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation / absolutization of thought; on the contrary, Ichazo and Lilly valued the reduction of vibratory rates, which they seem to have wrongly taken as an end in itself and to have mistakenly understood as a sign of spiritual achievement. In the same way, in the practice of Thögel the practitioner must have been trained to neither give any importance nor attribute any significance to whichever visions may arise in his or her experience, and through the previous practice of Tekchö must have developed a sufficient capacity of spontaneous liberation, so that whichever visions may arise will activate the just mentioned positive feedback loops of vibratory rates and that these may, each and every time, conclude with the spontaneous liberation of delusion, and therefore with the dissolution of the mental subject that seems to be different from the visions and to lie at a distance from them—and that is compelled to either accept them or reject them—in the potency of primordial gnosis,\(^d\) thus instantly (albeit temporarily) bringing to a halt the vibratory activity at the root of samsāra; on the contrary, in Lilly’s (1972) experience with the guides in the sensory deprivation tank under the effect of LSD, he believed them to be inherently true and took pride in their manifestation—which is exactly that which Chögyal

\(^a\) Capriles (1999a, 2000c, 2006a, and the present work).
\(^b\) Grof (1985, last pages of the Epilogue).
\(^c\) Cf. John Lilly (1972).
\(^d\) Skt. jñāna; Tib. yeshe (ye shes).
Namkhai Norbu (1984a) has called “the principle of how to create problems,” as it can either lead to infatuation or directly trigger the unleashing of a psychosis. Lastly, as the same Dzogchen Master (*ibidem*) has strongly emphasized, in Dzogchen practices carried out in the dark the ingestion of any drugs is strictly prohibited.

**A Critical Appraisal of David Cooper’s**

*The Death of the Family*

In *The Death of the Family*, David Cooper described the shift from the normal condition of alienated normality that in this volume I have been calling *masked insanity*, to the one he viewed as representing true sanity, in terms of four successive conditions and three consecutive transitions.

These transitions he called *metanoia*: the Greek *meta* meaning “with,” “across,” or “after,” and the Greek *noia* meaning “mind,” the term has the sense of “change of mind,” and was used by Medieval Christian theologians to refer to religious conversion. This is why in the diagram below they are represented by the letter *mu* (µ)—the Greek “m”—and indicated as µ₁, µ₂ and µ₂. As Joseph Berke’s account of dialogues with Ronald D. Laing attests, in conversations with colleagues the latter frequently employed this term, as well as some of the words Cooper used for referring to the four successive conditions he posited, and so it is likely that Cooper borrowed some of these terms from him, or vice versa. For reasons that will be exposed below, rather than speaking of three successive *metanoias*, I prefer to refer to the total process of transition from alienated normality to absolute sanity as a *process of metanoia*, in the sense of “a process of change of mind finally leading beyond (*meta*) mind (*noia*).” However, as will be shown below, both in Cooper and in this book the term *metanoia* conserves the meaning it had in medieval theology as well, for in its initial stages the process in question involves a “process of conversion.”

In Cooper’s terminology, this process begins in the state of *eknoia*, which is that of conventional “normality” in which we are relatively well adapted to society, so that we may be said to be part of the “mass” (not in contrast with the elites, but in the sense of being utterly conditioned by the assumptions, attitudes and goals shared by the whole of a people, *including* its elites). In fact, Cooper used the term, the etymological sense of which is “outside one’s mind,” to refer to the state in which we are wholly driven by the influence of those others that we internalized in the process of socialization, whose egos compounded to make up the collage our ego is, with whom we became agglutinated, and whose ways of looking at us, facial expressions, intonations of the voice, injunctions, reproaches and so on passed on their superego to us, thereby giving rise to our compound superego. In short, *eknoia* is a condition in which we lack an independent, autonomous and coherent orientation of psychological energies that may be viewed as a “mind” or center of our own, yet we believe ourselves to be our own masters; in which there is a divorce between the “conscious” and the conglomerate of eluded contents that may be validly called “the unconscious;” and in which we are totally possessed by the delusion involving the three senses of the terms *avidya* and marigpa in the Dzogchen classification.

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*a* Cooper (1971). Three related books by the same author are Cooper (1967, 1974, 1980).

*b* Barnes & Berke (1972).
adopted here, for (1) we are unaware of our true nature, (2) all of our experiences are deceptive, and (3) we are unaware that our experiences are deceptive.

According to Cooper, a first metanoia should take us from eknoia to paranoia, in which we begin to detach ourselves from the internalized others and from the collage of our ego, so that the possibility opens of developing a mind or center of our own, but in which we face the paramount danger that inner disorientation, on the one hand, and/or incomprehension and interference on the part of the human environment, on the other, may disrupt the process we have embarked in, leading us to attempt to return to eknoia—which, being impossible, would cause us to heartrendingly turn round in circles of pain rather than moving ahead in the direction in which the process would naturally take us. This “turning round in circles” is the madness that in general we see in mental hospitals and other institutions, which is destructive rather than liberating; however, if we steer away from this vortex and manage to move straight ahead through the stage of paranoia to its term, in Cooper’s view a second metanoia would take us from paranoia to noia (or en-noia), consisting in a properly centered mind which has ceased to be part of the mass, for the whole of our energies have developed a coherent orientation different from those which are the standard result of social hypnosis, which aims at achieving liberation from the power of others and in general from the drawbacks of eknoia—and, if successful in this respect, at helping others achieve the same goal and uprooting the suffering and achieving the stable well-being of all sentient beings. According to Cooper, finally a third, recurring metanoia should allow us to freely flow between noia (or en-noia) and anoia or no-mind (which would be anti-noia so long as it provides an antidote to the illusory existence of an individual mind or center).353

The term anoia, like the Chinese term wu-hsin (or, in some interpretations, wu-nien), literally means no-mind.354 Since in the Dzogchen teachings the term mind (Skt. chitta; Tib. sema) refers to the core of the basic human delusion involving all three senses the terms avidya or marigpa have in the classification used throughout this book, in the context of these teachings anoia would be understood as referring to the absence of that core of delusion. However, for the term in question to be as clear as the term wu-hsin, which in Ch’an Buddhism applies to nirvana but not so to what the Dzogchen teachings call the neutral base-of-all, the condition of the base-of-all, in spite of involving neither
elaborate nor conscious psychical activity, should be as unambiguously established to be an instance of the state of mind, *chitta* or *sem* (*noia* in Greek) as in the Dzogchen teachings. With its scope thus narrowed, Cooper’s term would become far more precise than most of the ones by which transpersonal psychologists refer to holotropic conditions, for not only would it exclude all conditions involving the existence of the illusory mental subject that seems to be different and separate from its objects and therefore all experiences of the formless sphere, but would exclude all instances of the neutral base-of-all. (Fritz Perls, Ralph Hefferline and Paul Goodman—*who tried to overcome dualism by asserting mind and body to be one—*viewed what they called “mind” as being no more than an illusion. However, their usage of the term does not seem to coincide with that of *sem* in the Dzogchen teachings or that of *hsin* [or *nien*] in Ch’*an* Buddhism, for according to the Dzogchen teachings *sem* is manifest so long as there is *avidya* or *marigpa* in any of the senses they give the word, whereas the founders of Gestalt therapy restricted the scope of the term mind to coarse thinking of the discursive kind. Consider the following two facts: [1] Perls, Hefferline and Goodman noted that in modern societies, in which “there exists a chronic low-tension disequilibrium, a continual irk of danger and frustration, interspersed with occasional acute crises, [that is] never fully relaxed,”* which makes us continually keep in a state of “chronic low grade emergency,” *whenever we look into our own minds we become aware that we are thinking*, and [like Descartes] we are compelled to interpret this thinking as the action of an entity different from the thoughts, wrongly viewing this entity as a separate “part” of ourselves: in the terminology of this book, we wrongly see the mental subject as the separate thinker of thought and as existing apart from the body [an error that, as shown in vol. I of this book, Heraclitus in ancient Greece and some modern Western philosophers and poets had already denounced, but which in the field of “scientific” psychology Carl Jung was first to denounce]. 356 [2] Perls was quoted as saying, “Lose your mind and come to your senses,”* inviting us to be like those human beings in the simpler societies of high antiquity, most of whose actions, in his view, needed not to be preceded by thinking. These assertions make it clear that Perls reduced thinking to the discursive variety of its coarse modality, failing to realize the “mute” subtle, intuitive thoughts involved in perception and action, and even the supersubtle threefold thought-structure, to be instances of delusorily valued thinking, and as such instances of mind—which higher Dzogchen practices such as Thögel and the Yangthik have the function of eradicating together with their propensities, and which the Japanese Zen archery training aimed at “shooting without shooting” aims to suspend. Since Perls spent time in a Zen Monastery, it seems most likely that his view that mind is an illusion to be surpassed was taken from Ch’*an* Buddhism;* however, just as he would have been wrong if he believed that his concept of mind corresponded to the Ch’*an* concept of *hsin*, he would have been wrong if he believed that *hsin* could be surpassed by means of Gestalt therapy and without treading a genuine Path of Awakening.)

I think it important to distinguish the etymological sense of the term *paranoia*, which is that of “being beside one’s mind,” from its psychiatric meaning, which has been expressed as “a psychosis characterized by systematized delusions of persecution or grandeur, usually without hallucinations.” We must spend some time “beside our minds” in the sense of being constantly watchful of our inveterate, wayward mental habits and
drives in order to avoid being unwittingly carried away by them, and realize as such the contradiction inherent in delusion in general\textsuperscript{360} as soon as it manifests, so that it turns into conflict—which in the practice of Tekchö is to be used as an alarm reminding us to question our dualistic experience in terms of the relevant oral instructions, so that it may liberate itself spontaneously each and every time it manifests. However, not only the practice of Dzogchen can take us “beside our minds” in this sense; also lower Buddhist Paths have methods susceptible of doing so: in the \textit{Theravada}, for example, the effect in question may be induced by the practice of mindfulness (Pali, \textit{sattipatana}; Skt. \textit{smriti}; Tib. tenpa\textsuperscript{a})—which was the reason why Ronald D. Laing applied it intensively in a monastery in Shri Lanka. However, according to Cooper, paranoia in the clinical sense of the term also has a role to play in the process. Noting that the superego, manifesting in our most significant others, controls us through the latter’s reactions to us—both from the “external world” in which they function as phenomena of tsel energy, and from our own minds, where they live and actively do their job in the form of mental images of dang energy of the kind that Dharmakirti called \textit{samanyalakshana} (Tib. chitsem\textsuperscript{b}) or \textit{general collections of characteristics} and David Hume called \textit{ideas}\textsuperscript{361}—our author suggested that a precondition for liberation from this control lay in realizing that, while believing to be in control, we are actually being controlled by others (who in turn are controlled by others...), who in many cases, in order to keep their control over us, make us the object of an actual persecution—which would cause the contradiction lying in being controlled and yet believing to be in control, to turn into conflict, and this in its turn would give us the possibility of ridding ourselves of it. In fact, Cooper, building up on the pioneering work by Lemert\textsuperscript{c}, asserted paranoia \textit{qua persecutory feelings} to always be the perception of an objective persecutory reality—even though, insofar as social and family taboos forbid realization of the actual persecution just as it is, imaginary surrogate subjects and means of persecution may be used as a metaphor for the real ones (for example, the delusion of being controlled, closely watched and harmed by aliens, may be an individual’s way of experiencing the fact that he or she is being controlled, closely watched and harmed by members of his or her own family). However, personally I am not sure as to the value of paranoia in the clinical sense of the term, even in spontaneous self-healing processes occurring out of the context of the practice of the methods of wisdom tradition. In the context of a practice such as Tekchö, dread of an impending external threat is likely to curtail the individual’s capacity or disposition to circumscribe attention to the phenomena of dang energy in the “inner” dimension or jing\textsuperscript{d} in order to deal with them in terms of the corresponding secret oral instructions, and hence block the individual’s advance on the Path.\textsuperscript{362} If this problem arises before the individual has become a consummate Tekchö practitioner, the solution may lie in engaging in the practice of Chö\textsuperscript{e}; if the individual is already a consummate Tekchö practitioner, the solution may lie in engaging in practices such as Thögel or the Yangthik, which can result in the full integration of the external dimension or jing—upon which the illusion of an external reality can no longer have a sway on the individual.

\textsuperscript{a} dran pa.
\textsuperscript{b} spyi mtshan.
\textsuperscript{c} Lemert (1962).
\textsuperscript{d} dbyings.
\textsuperscript{e} gcod.
Hence the twofold meaning of the statement by the late Tibetan Master Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche, “when we are in a state of paranoia, we have to take the leap.”\(^a\) To begin with, understanding the term *paranoia* mainly in its etymological sense, this phrase may be taken to mean that, when the delusion called *avidya* or *marigpa* that is the basic human contradiction has turned into intense conflict, we must question our experience in terms of the oral instructions of the Dzogchen teachings so that this conflict and the basic human delusion at its root liberate themselves spontaneously. However, understanding the term *paranoia* mainly in the clinical sense of the term (that of “persecutory feelings” and so on), it may also be taken to mean that when advanced practitioners of Tekchö\(^b\) enter into a prolonged rather than momentary state of *paranoia* in the clinical sense of the term, they must undertake the practice of Thögel\(^c\)—the etymological meaning of which, as shown in vol. I of this book, may be rendered as “taking the leap,” but which Chögyal Namkhai Norbu prefers not to refer to by this term.

At any rate, for us to survive as a species, the ego-delusion which causes us to feel we are the center of the universe, making us extremely selfish and blindly individualistic, and which has brought us to the brink of self-destruction, will have to liberate itself spontaneously in the Dzogchen way, dissolving in the *anoia* of the Self-qua-Path again and again until it is totally neutralized together with its root, which is the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought.\(^363\) However, so long as *anoia* has not consolidated as the Self-qua-Fruit, it has to alternate with a state of progressively mitigated delusion in which: (1) the “land of our own psyche” becomes progressively free from possession and control by those beings consisting in the various types of thought, and in particular by the internalized others with whom we became agglutinated as they passed on their superego to us and became constitutive elements of our ego, so that we gradually develop the freedom from the superego\(^364\) and the genuine autonomy that Cooper called *noia*—which I understand as an individuation that, despite being explained differently from Jung’s, shares many of the valid characteristics of the one postulated by the Swiss analyst.\(^365\) (2) To some extent like in the case of Jung’s individuation, the divorce between the “conscious” and the conglomerate of eluded contents that may be validly called “the unconscious” is gradually surpassed. And, (3) the power of delusion is progressively mitigated and we develop an ever-increasing awareness of apparitionality.

As implied above, the point of developing a *noia* is that in traveling on the Path to Supreme Sanity all the energies that make up the cluster of our own mind take on a single orientation, so that on the one hand Awakening becomes our only North, and on the other hand we stop being puppets controlled by others who are puppets controlled by others... *ad infinitum*. To this end, we must gradually deprive the superego of what is normally its most basic function, which consists in maintaining the *status quo* and keeping the ego well adapted to society, and make it side with the *dharma*, embracing Awakening as its ideal and hence aspiring at its own dethronement and at the dissolution of the ego—so that there would be nothing in contrast with which what Freud viewed as an *id* may be so called. In Wisdom traditions such as Ch’an/Zen, Vajrayana Buddhism and Dzogchen, this is made possible by the position of supreme authority given to genuine gurus, who value the ego’s dissolution and the dethronement of the superego and abhor their preservation.

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\(^a\) Trungpa (1973).
\(^b\) *khregs chod*.
\(^c\) *thod rgal*.
Furthermore, Cooper introduced into Western psychology a key aspect of the psychology proper to Asian wisdom traditions by noting that in order to prevent the superego from obsessively trying to sabotage the process of Awakening it is imperative to engage in what he called a process of preaching and conversion aimed at the internalized others—which is a most important element in the process of developing a noia qua consistent cluster of energies directed to the achievement of absolute sanity (which, though Cooper fell short of realizing this, consists in Awakening and hence in the pure anoia of the Self-quaque-Fruit).

As shown in a previous chapter, Cooper explained the superego as a hierarchical arrangement of internalized others and insisted that, rather than an abstraction, it was a phenomenal reality consisting of the internalized looks, facial expressions, intonations of the voice, gesturing and so on with which significant others reacted to the individual’s courses of behavior. As we have seen, so long as the superego’s phenomenal components and the process of its genesis are overlooked, we are likely to take it to be a conscience in the Christian sense of the term—i.e. an inborn, abstract, God-installed, absolute moral principle establishing what is right and what is wrong—and as a result of this have no chances of freeing ourselves from its power. Therefore Cooper’s assertion that the superego is a hierarchical arrangement of internalized others, and his insistence in decomposing the superego into its phenomenal components, are most helpful in the process of depriving the superego of its power over the individual’s experience and behavior, or, which is the same, in the process of developing a noia. To this aim, Cooper proposed an exercise he called the “visualization of a family queue:” individuals should visualize, one after the other, in one of their most characteristic moods, the most significant others who conditioned them throughout their life, and at the end see themselves in a characteristic mood—in each and every case seeing through what is being visualized, in the sense of becoming aware that they are but empty images. I have not tried this exercise and hence cannot ascertain whether it is effective, but I think it aptly illustrates Cooper’s thesis that the superego is to be disassembled into its phenomenal components.

Nevertheless, as suggested above, ultimately the development of noia depends on the process represented by the mandala, for the repeated release of the beings in the Lands of our minds progressively frees us from the forces that formerly ruled over these Lands, by the same token radically reorienting our energies through the origination of a mind and an ego directed to their own self-dissolution in anoia and to the Awakening and well-being of all sentient beings. However, liberation from the forces that ruled over the lands of our minds does not amount to becoming our own masters, for the mental subject and the ego dissolve each and every time these beings are released “by their own Essence of mind” (as Hui-neng put it in his Sutra), thus being gradually neutralized until the point is reached at which the mental subject and the ego never manifest again. In fact, as we gradually free ourselves from the influence of others by developing a noia, the recurrence of anoia as the Self-qua-Path gradually neutralizes the manifestation of a chasm between one aspect that controls and another that is controlled, along with the illusion of a central, true mind and ego—and hence rather than “becoming our own masters” we are gradually liberated from ourselves as well. (At this point it must be noted that, as David Cooper rightly pointed out, the superego functions in terms of mental images of significant others that convey the latter’s superegos—which then are compounded as our own superego.\footnote{Cf. Capriles (1977, 1986, 1999a, 2000c).}
Therefore, although understanding human individuals as systems of relations may be quite useful as a step toward putting an end to the illusion of self-being, we must also bear in mind that such relations have a very personal character.)

Though the process represented in the Divine Comedy, as that of the intermediate state between death and rebirth or bardo, involves a succession of stages and transitions between them, they do not seem to strictly correspond to those represented in Cooper’s map. In fact, though the transition to Hell may be viewed as corresponding to the first metanoia (the one marking the transition from eknoia to paranoia), Cooper’s map seems to suggest that noia is established before the initial occurrence of anoia, which does not seem to be precise: in the context of a practice such as Dzogchen, the shift to Purgatory is marked by the first occurrence of anoia, which takes place before noia in the sense in which the term was defined above has been fully developed. Furthermore, noia continues to develop during the passage through Purgatory, in which anoia recurrently manifests. And yet becoming established in the Empyrean means that noia manifests no more, for we have become firmly established in anoia.

The above shortcomings of Cooper’s view of the transition from masked insanity to what he viewed as representing true sanity, including the diagram reproduced above, may be due to the fact that Cooper believed the transition in question to be based on spontaneous processes of madness undergone outside the context of a genuine wisdom tradition. As we have seen again and again, in such conditions it is very likely that the individual experiences the neutral condition of the base-of-all involving the manifestation of sense data and the samsaric experiences of formlessness that occur immediately after the former, but it is most unlikely that the manifestations of nirvana while on the Path I am referring to as the Self-qua-Path may occur—and, should they do so, the individual would have no means to tell them from the instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all or the samsaric experiences of formlessness. In any case, the greatest discrepancy I have with Cooper is that he seems to imply that spontaneous episodes of madness in unprepared individuals and outside the context of a genuine tradition of Awakening, provided that such episodes are not socially or institutionally distorted or aborted, may in themselves and by themselves give rise to the absolute sanity that is the Fruit in genuine Wisdom traditions.

However, I introduced this section on The Death of the Family and reproduced the above diagram because I believe them to have significant merits. In particular, if the term anoia were used as a strict synonym of the Chinese term wu-hsin and of what in this book I am calling the Self-qua-Path, the fluid movement between noia and anoia Cooper posits would correspond to the alternation of the states of post-Contemplation and Contemplation in superior bodhisattvas, yogis and siddhas—and, although Cooper did not contemplate this, if at some point we ceased to oscillate between noia and anoia, becoming established in anoia, this would constitute the Self-qua-Fruit that in Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism is the Fruit of the Path of Awakening. Furthermore, Cooper’s book and diagram make a most important point by claiming that the journey to true sanity that involves the constant recurrence what the author in question calls anoia, and hence increasing familiarization with it, necessarily involves the development of what he called noia, the full development of which implies the dethronement of the superego. Actually, despite the stridency of the whole book and the unrealistic character of the political revolution it proposed,367 I deem The Death of the Family to be more precise, valuable and universally valid than most of the texts by Wilber, Grof and Washburn—and I
believe the same to be the case with the diagram reproduced above when compared to Grof’s BPMs.368

**Seeing Through the Jungian Shadow, and in General**
**Through what Susan Isaacs called Unconscious Phantasies**369

In a previous chapter the means were discussed whereby those of us who are well adapted to the social order, in order to be able to function in society with some degree of ease, and if possible derive pride and thereby some degree of pleasure, try to get others to confirm us as being the valuable or at least up to standard persona(s) or theater mask(s) that we project in our social life. As we have seen, so long as we are under delusion, the ensuing ease—and if we are particularly successful at this game, the ensuing pride and pleasure—makes us adhere so firmly and unthinkingly to our confirmed persona as being our true self or nature, that we can hardly question the resulting sense of self or, even less so, let go of our adherence to it. As we have also seen, every persona projects a shadow that, to the extent that we cling to the persona, we are compelled to deny in ourselves and see as the identity of people other than ourselves—which is one of the main sources of evil in the world, among other things because we then feel compelled to punish and/or destroy the shadow by punishing and/or destroying the individuals on whom we have projected it. Therefore, if we are to cease being responsible for the evil in this world, we must interrupt this dynamic through the gradual neutralization of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought at the root of the drive to adhere to and become the persona and to loathe the shadow and project it on others, so as to obtain an ever-increasing awareness of the voidness both of the persona and of the shadow, and, in the long run, irreversibly neutralize the drive to adhere to and become the former and loath and project the latter.

The fact that Jung viewed the shadow as a remnant of the “animality” of our non-human ancestors, pre-existing as a single, universal phenomenon in what he viewed as the equally pre-existent collective unconscious of our species, and occurring repetitively ad æternum in the psyches of all of us, shows that he failed to realize it to be no more than a psychological fiction installed in us in the process of socialization that is real only insofar as it produces effects. In fact, though Jung said he wished for the lights of human beings to grow brighter, insofar as he deemed the shadow to be everlasting, he believed darkness would always be lurking beyond the domain of consciousness: he viewed the shadow and all archetypes as having a collective aspect that could never be totally integrated into the individual ego, and since he did not realize our experience of self-being to be no more than an illusion, he could not contemplate the possibility of neutralizing it and thereby putting an end to the ego with its inherent clinging to the persona and compulsion to negate the shadow. Therefore in his view the only way a human being could cease being responsible for the evil in the world would be by coming to own the shadow, and thus ceasing to project it on others: the opposites traditionally represented by light and darkness had to be—so to speak—enthroned side by side in the service of a comprehensive pattern greater than the sum of one and the other, and all tensions generated thereby had to be borne, for evil should not be opposed or resisted but transformed and redeemed so that the individual could grow to the point of permitting a coexistence of these opposites in the realization of an ampler self. In fact, although he saw the shadow as the darkness at the root of evil,370 Jung asserted that it is 90% gold.371 Hence it is not surprising that he warned that a spiritual practice like many of those in
Western theosophy, in which the conscious mind was filled with ideal conceptions and figures of light such as angels and similar archetypes embodying ingenuous notions of goodness and sanctity, would yield the unintended effect of reinforcing the drives and urges responsible for the dynamic of the shadow—or that he insisted that in the quest for the individuation he regarded as true sanity, the individual would have to confront the shadow and the “world of darkness” that, in terms of the view expressed in this book, formerly the individual had been compelled to elude, making it “unconscious.”

In the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, there is a stage of creation (Skt. *utpattikrama*; Tib. *kyerim*) that consists in visualizing oneself as a figure of light; however, in most cases the figures visualized, rather than embodying ideal conceptions of goodness, sanctity and so on, exhibit external traits characteristic of an embodiment of the shadow, leading laymen to mistake them for demons. In most cases these figures are in male-female sexual union, symbolizing the totality of the bisexual human essence and to some extent corresponding to what Jung called the Syzygy or “Divine Couple,” in many other cases, they are of the opposite sex, being associated with what Jung called the *anima* / *animus*—yet in both cases they are skillful means for the realization of our total essence. In fact, though the layman may see them as embodiments of evil, the shadow-like figures visualized in the stage of creation symbolize our originally pure (Tib. *katak*) and spontaneously perfect (Tib. *lhundrub*) true nature, and in a subsequent phase of the practice, called the stage of completion or stage of perfection (Skt. *sampannakrama*; Tib. *dzogrim*), while being thus visualized we carry out practices whereby we can discover this nature, which is the Primordial Buddha Samantabhadra yab-yum. This name, which means “All Good,” makes the point that the whole of reality, including the positive and negative extremes of all dualities, is our Buddha-nature-*qua*-Base; that not only the entities and activities conventions establish to be pure, commendable or good, but also many that they establish to be impure, reprovable or evil, are viable means on the Path to the realization of this Buddha-nature, and that the Fruit is the realization of the *whole* of this nature, without excluding any of its aspects. Thus in these Tantras it is mandatory to overcome our inveterate dualistic discrimination between “pure” and “impure,” “good” and “evil,” “commendable” and “reprovable,” “to-be-accepted” and “to-be-rejected”—this being the reason why in the rituals they set up, rather than using solely what conventions establish to be pure, good and laudable, what they declare impure, evil and reprovable has to be used as well (such as, for example, sexual union, alcohol and the five nectars or amritas).

The goal of the inner Tantric practices is to change our impure vision into pure vision and realize the five passions and the five elements to be the five primordial gnoses or wisdoms. The transformation of impure vision into pure vision is achieved in the stage of creation by means of the visualization of ourselves as insubstantial, intangible non-Jungian archetypal figures made of pure light—as noted above, in most cases embodying characteristics associated with the shadow—and of the universe as the figure’s *mandala* or palace, which must also be seen as insubstantial, intangible and made of pure light. For

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a Adapted to the views expressed in this book from Jung (1967b).
b *bskyed rim*.
c *ka dag*.
d *lhun grub*.
e *rdzogs rim*. 
their part, the practices of the stage of completion or perfection involve working with the organism’s energy system in order to raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness beyond a threshold, produce illusory experiences of voidness, clarity and pleasure, and in general set the conditions in which the questioning of our experience in terms of traditional secret oral instructions will likely result in Seeing through concepts and figures into the primordially pure, spontaneously perfect Self-qua-Base. When this actually occurs, the belief that the persona is our true self or nature and the consequent clinging to it, together with the belief in an evil nature that we cannot accept and hence have to view as the true self of nature of others, temporarily dissolve. Since every time this Seeing through concepts and figures into the Self-qua-Base occurs, our propensities to cling to the persona and deny the shadow in us are partially neutralized, its constant recurrence progressively neutralizes the power of both the persona(s) and the shadow(s) over us—and if we carry this practice far enough we may become totally free from both the one(s) and the other(s). This, by the way, illustrates one crucial sense in which the Inner Tantric Path of Transformation is a “descending” Path.

Since our true nature comprises the totality of the human reality, it involves both the male and female aspects of this reality: this is why Vajrayana Buddhism asserts the true condition of the individual to be a hermaphrodite, bisexual condition, and why the Nyingmapas of Tibet represent the Primordial Buddha as the sexual union (yab-yum) of its male aspect, Samantabhadra, and its female aspect, Samantabhadri—whereas some of the non-Buddhist traditions having their hub in Mount Kailash possess hermaphrodite deities such as the Ardhanarishwara of the Shaivas and the Zurvan of Zurvanism. Jung, Freud, Adler and Depth Psychology in general, unknowingly shared the outlook of the Buddhist Tantras in this regard, acknowledging our true condition as individuals to be hermaphrodite / bisexual both on the physical plane and on the psychological one. On the first of these planes, it is a fact that fetuses secrete hormones of both sexes and that they originally have undifferentiated sex organs; chromosomes cause one type of hormones to prevail, and the prevailing hormones cause the sex organs to gradually become physically male or female; after birth and throughout our lives, we continue to secrete hormones of both sexes, but at different periods their balance can shift, making those that correspond to our sex organs or those corresponding to the opposite sex organs prevail—which will not cause our sex organs to metamorphose into those of the opposite sex, but which could produce significant effects on our bodies, experience and behavior. On the second of these planes, it is a fact that at birth our psyche is neither male nor female, and that after birth society begins molding us psychologically into men or women: our persona becomes male when the original other sees us as males, or female when the original other sees us of as females. The resulting identity may be plain and one-layered when the original other sees the infant as having the sex of the physical organism, but will be more complex when the sex projected on the infant is the opposite to that of the organism, for after acquiring through the original other a psychological sex opposite to the physical one, other individuals may at first sight see the individual as having the sex of the physical organism, thus giving rise to a two-tiered identity. However, sooner or later these others will realize the individual’s psychological sex to be the opposite to that of the body, and begin projecting on him or her the corresponding three-tiered identity. Thus a process that may be explained in terms of Laing’s spiral of pretences can mold the individual, who may develop

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successive layers of sexual identity, as in the case of Sartre’s description of Jean Genet.\(^a\) However, as in the case of an onion, the core of the individual is not any of the layers, for ultimately we are neither male nor female.

Insofar as our true condition as individuals involves the totality of the masculine and the feminine, when we develop a persona with a definite sex at the exclusion of the other, we not only actualize only half of our potential, but become psychologically split, coming to feel that the sensation of lack that results from the illusion of separateness will be filled through physical and/or spiritual union with members of the sex opposite to that of our persona. If we surrendered the struggle to prevent the dissolution of our being-for-Self inherent in this mode of being and applied the appropriate skillful means, our attempt to fill the lack by these means could give rise to mystical experiences and perhaps even to the temporary unconcealment of the absolute plenitude of the Self-quaque-Path; however, so long as we fail to do so, our efforts to fill the lack will be subject to the law of inverted effect, sustaining the lack. Moreover, delusion implies that in order to establish an effective ego-function, feel to some extent at ease, and effectively function in society, we must get others to admire / accept our persona, thus causing our consciousness to admire / accept ourselves.\(^379\) Therefore, establishing a persona with a definite sex at the exclusion of the other extends into the plane of sexuality the problematic of the interaction between persona and shadow, with all its consequences; in particular, in the lower stages of psychological evolution—beyond which a very large segment of society never goes—this causes the opposite sex to be associated with the shadow, generating insurmountable conflict and struggle, both within the individual and in the relationship between the sexes.\(^380\) Thus it is easy to understand why the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation make it clear that the only way in which we could cease projecting the anima / animus outside ourselves would be by dissolving the identity confined to aspects of the complete human essence in the attainment of Buddhahood—which, as we have seen, in these Tantras is to be achieved by means of the two stages of creation and perfection / completion, in which we visualize ourselves as figures that are often in yab-yum and that often exhibit the characteristics of the shadow, and then work on the energy system, in many cases while being physically in sexual union with a human consort of the opposite sex. Now we can understand why these Tantras view the Fruit in terms that Herbert V. Guenther resumes as follows:\(^b\)

The inseparability of masculinity and femininity is a symbol for the true man. The word symbol is used here, for want of another and better term, in the sense of a content in which the divergent tendencies of the human being are harmoniously united on a common basis, but not in the sense of an abbreviated substitute for something else that it well known (...)

The remarkable fact that man’s highest aim, enlightenment (bodhi, bodhichitta), is thought to be an ambierotic state, may cause some people to feel morally offended. They may, however, be reminded of the fact that the interpretation of the word sexuality varies greatly in different classes of society within the accepted and expected pattern of culture, and that this interpretation changes as soon as new cultural forms are developed.

After Freud, it became common knowledge in the West that some relationships within the family have a definite erotic character—in particular, the Oedipal relationship between boys and their mothers and between girls and their fathers (the latter, formerly

\(^a\) Sartre (1964).
\(^b\) Guenther (1969).
called after Electra), and the relationships taking place between brothers and sisters—and that at a particular point in the process of socialization the parents and the rest of society forbid the expression of aspects of family relationships having an erotic charge, by the same token demanding that their manifestation in earlier stages of life be forgotten. What is not common knowledge is that this forgetting, when successful, curtails the erotic vital charge and content of our experience, making life dull, dissatisfactory and uninteresting, and reducing the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (all of which is a precondition of the dynamic of duhkha discussed in vol. I of this book and in previous chapters of this volume, which so far it had been impossible to discuss for lack of the elements that would allow its understanding: just as erotic arousal allows masochists to accept the experience of pain, thereby enjoying it, the dynamic of duhkha could not fully develop if erotic arousal pervaded a great deal of our experience). Furthermore, we have seen that in primary process—which establishes the structure and function of relationships but not so our position in them—we are constituted by our relationships with significant others, and that it is in secondary process that we establish and delimit our position in those relationships, developing an identity. We have also seen that once we establish a persona of the sex of our physical body, we are henceforth driven to elude in ourselves the elements of the opposite sex in our psychological structure, giving rise to the anima or animus—which implies the assimilation into the anima or animus of the elements of the opposite sex manifest in the family relationships that constitute us in primary process.

Thus it is not difficult to understand the reasons why the Inner Buddhist Tantras represent the reintegration of the anima or animus and the recovery of the full erotic content of our experience in terms of incestuous images.\textsuperscript{a} The Guhyasamaja Tantra, which, being a Father Tantra, is written from the standpoint of the male, reads:\textsuperscript{b}

The adept (sadhaka) who has sexual intercourse with his mother, his sister, and his daughter, goes towards highest perfection, which is the essence of Mahayana.

In its turn, Anangavajra’s Prajñopayaviniscayasiddhi, which is written from the same standpoint, reads:\textsuperscript{c}

The adept who has sexual intercourse with his mother, his sister, his daughter, and his sister’s daughter, will easily succeed in his striving for the ultimate goal (tattwayoga).

Expressions such as the above may be quite shocking to those conditioned by the conventions prevailing in our societies. However, this shock may be assimilated if we keep in mind that the Tantras express everything in symbolic terms, and that the reason why they use the above images is that, from a metaphenomenological standpoint, in some key respects the Inner Tantric Path of Transformation is a descending Path, in which it is imperative to reintegrate both the elements of the opposite sex and the erotic charge and character of the primary process relationships that constitute us, so as to surpass our inner split and no longer establish a link-of-being with the limited individual bearing our name and its psychological and physical constitution, by attaining the unshakeable, irreversible

\textsuperscript{a} In this regard, cf. Guenther (1969) and Capriles (1977, 1986).
\textsuperscript{b} Quoted in Guenther (1969) and Capriles (1977, 1986).
\textsuperscript{c} Quoted in Guenther (1969) and Capriles (1977, 1986).
unconcealment of the total thigle\textsuperscript{a} called the Self-qua-Fruit. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that in societies such as ours, taking expressions like the ones quoted above in a literal sense could have dire consequences, which are the opposite of what the Tantras have the function of helping us achieve.

Despite the fact that Jung thought Westerners should \textit{not} practice Eastern mystical systems,\textsuperscript{382} we have seen that some of his insights coincided with realizations expressed in the Buddhist Tantras and treatises of other systems having their hub in Mount Kailash. It is also significant that Jung produced Psychological Commentaries for the first two translations of texts dealing with the Atiyoga Path of Spontaneous liberation to have been published in the West, and though his explanations were as inaccurate as the translations they accompanied, this coincidence attests to his powerful karmic relationship with the Path in question.\textsuperscript{383} This Path is most effective in carrying out the task that gives its title to this section, for its practice initially gives rise to a mindfulness (Pali, \textit{sattipatana}; Skt. \textit{smriti}; Tib. \textit{tenpa})\textsuperscript{c} that enables us to notice the drives or urges that lead us to project the shadow onto external individuals, so that we can abstain from acting out these drives or urges and use the ensuing discomfort as a natural alarm reminding us to apply the oral instructions that will result in the reGnition of the true condition of the delusorily valued thoughts that produce our conditioned experience, so that these—and consequently the phantasy shadow—free themselves spontaneously in the unconcealment of the Self-qua-Base I call the Self-qua-Path. In terms of Greek mythology, the difference between the Dzogchen Path and Jungian psychology lies in the fact that in the former we descend into the Labyrinth to face the phantasy Minotaur, not so that it may co-exist with a luminous Apollo in an ampler self, but so that the true condition of the delusorily valued thoughts that produce the phantasy Minotaur be reGnized and hence the latter may spontaneously free itself.\textsuperscript{384} If the process of spontaneous liberation is boosted by traditional Dzogchen methods, the unceasing repetition of this reGnition progressively deprives the shadow of its power over us and in the long run results in its definitive dissolution.

We have seen that this Path comprises three elements or aspects, which may also be considered as three stages: (1) Vision or tawa,\textsuperscript{d} consisting in the unveiling of the Self-qua-Base I am calling the Self-qua-Path; (2) Contemplation or gompa,\textsuperscript{e} consisting in the continuity of Vision or tawa in formal sessions of Contemplation; and (3) Behavior or chöpa,\textsuperscript{f} which in the sense I am giving the term at this point consists in maintaining as much as possible the Contemplation or gompa beyond formal sessions, during ceaseless spontaneous activities.\textsuperscript{385} We have seen that the Purgatory of the\textit{ Divine Comedy} begins with the initial manifestation of Vision; as we proceed through this region of experience, if Contemplation is fully operative, each and every time an aspect of the shadow or a related unconscious phantasy manifests, it immediately frees itself spontaneously—and since this neutralizes to a small degree the shadow and its dynamic, the continuous

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{thig le}. As we have repeatedly seen, one of the meanings of this term is “energetic-volume-determining-the
    scope-of-awareness.”
  \item Jung (1928, 1954).
  \item \textit{dran pa}. This term, which translates the Pali \textit{sati} and the Sanskrit \textit{smriti}, has been rendered into English as “mindfulness,” “collectedness,” “attention,” etc. In Pali, the foundations of \textit{sati}, which are four (that of the body, that of the feelings, that of the mind, and that of mental objects), are called \textit{sattipatana}.
  \item \textit{ltu ba}.
  \item \textit{sgom pa}.
  \item \textit{spyod pa}.
\end{itemize}
repetition of this spontaneous liberation progressively frees us from the need to cling to a *persona* and to project the shadow on other individuals. However, the third of these three elements is most relevant for the progressive uprooting of the shadow, for, as we have seen, the Behavior of Dzogchen involves going beyond the self-observation and self-control conventional spiritual practitioners employ for avoiding courses of behavior that may be seen as nonvirtuous or nonspiritual and manifesting solely those of which they may be proud, as a result of which they project a huge Jungian shadow—and since this entails letting ourselves be carried away by the impulses occurring naturally (so long as these are not harmful to ourselves, sentient beings or the rest of the ecosphere), it gives rise to seemingly contradictory courses of conduct. Insofar as this causes us to seem whimsical and inconstant, and insofar as some of the courses of behavior we adopt may embody the shadow projected by the type of *persona* religious conventionalists strictly adhere to, this is likely to cause them to reject what they see as us. Therefore, as we become what they see as us or identify with it, we automatically reject it, thus giving rise to unpleasant sensations that, rather than encouraging unreflective adhesion to what we have become or have identified with, work as an alarm reminding us to apply the oral instructions for reGnizing the various types of thought involved (coarse, subtle and supersubtle) so that they may spontaneously liberate themselves—or, if we have an even higher capacity of spontaneous liberation at the time, unleashing a spontaneous reGnition dynamic whereby all delusive experiences spontaneously free themselves. Furthermore, insofar as delusion implies that others’ disapproval of our subjectivity drives us to become the reprehensible-object-not-deserving-to-give-free-rein-to-its-subjectivity they perceive as us, this can as well affect our conditioned and conditional spontaneity, activating the self-hindering effect of dualistic, thetic, positional self-consciousness that may be aptly referred to as “centipede effect”—which can also have the just considered result on our practice. No matter what the effect of becoming what others see as us or of identifying with it may be, however, instructions such as those Longchenpa expressed in the *Dzogchenpo Semnyi Rangdröl* are most useful for facilitating the spontaneous liberation of our becoming the object or identifying with it:  

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386 *rdzogs pa chen po sems nyid rang grol.*

387 Another version of these verses in Longchenpa (1975); another version of these verses and commentary (in French) in Cornu (1994).
The function of Behavior in Dzogchen is to catalyze the neutralization of karmas, and in particular of the drive to cling to personas and reject the shadows personas project, so that these karmas, clinging and rejection be rapidly exhausted until the point at which, there being no longer any karmic forces that may give rise to conditioned experiences that interrupt the self-manifesting Contemplation, the states of Contemplation and post-Contemplation fuse. In fact, Behavior makes phantasy shadows manifest again and again in the practitioner’s experience while at the same time obstructing his or her capacity to project them on others; therefore, if he or she has the necessary capability of spontaneous liberation, the shadows free themselves spontaneously each and every time they manifest, being rapidly neutralized and eradicated—which in its turn neutralizes and eradicates the drive to cling to a persona. Consider the expression of the basic principle of Dzogchen Behavior in the poem *Calling the Lama from Afar*, by twentieth century Dzogchen Master Dudjom Rinpoche:

The careless craziness of destroying clinging to a style... may this human lifetime be spent in this State of uninhibited, naked ease.

The non-Jungian archetype of convention-breaching skillful means is Dorje Trollö, the crazy wisdom manifestation of Guru Padmasambhava, and the most famous seemingly crazy adept among Tibetans was Drugpa Kunle, whose level of realization allowed him to carry the corresponding Behavior to an extreme that would have been most detrimental to less capable practitioners even in his time and place, and which in the societies of our time would have landed him in jail, the madhouse or another highly unpleasant place—for again and again he mocked high lamas and monks, ridiculed rituals, provoked authorities, made love with his occasional consorts in front of bystanders and passersby, and breached social conventions in all possible ways. It is also significant that among the female links in the lineage of transmission of the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings, though there were several princesses, many others were prostitutes, and that many of the links in all three series of Dzogchen teachings voluntarily became outcasts and hung around with lepers, chandalis and chandalas, and in general all sorts of pariahs. We have seen that the practice of Chö, in which practitioners offer their own bodies as food to demonic entities in order to transform into dread the belief in an ultimately important, self-existent self and the self-clinging inherent in this belief, so that the belief in a self and the self-clinging inherent in it become untenable and the practitioner be forced to apply the secret oral instructions that may facilitate its spontaneous liberation, was often used by practitioners of Tekchö as a catalyst of their practice. So it is no coincidence that Tucci, basing himself on a reputed Tibetan source, described the Behavior of these Chöpas in the following way:

The familiarity of the followers of gcod with demonic powers (which are thoroughly real in the eyes of simple people), and the emphasis placed by them on everything macabre

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a Dudjom Rinpoche (unpublished ms).
b Biography: Dowman (1980).
c *sems sde*.
d Cf. for example, Namkhai Norbu & Clemente (1999), *passim*.
e Tucci (1980, p. 92). Tucci’s source for this passage is the *Zhi byed dang gcod yul gyi chos ‘byung rin po che’i phreng ba thar pa’i rgyan*, p. 23b.
and gruesome has brought about an even stronger movement of the sect towards an attitude that links them, perhaps genetically too, apart from the specific content of their teachings, with certain Indian sects who were concerned with proving their total indifference to common opinion through ever stranger practices. The rules which they observed bear witness to a marked disdain towards everyday customs, indeed a total lack of concern and insensitivity (phyogs ris med) with regard to them. These people would eat the food of lepers and beggars and wear their clothes, and live in their company rather than in the monasteries.

The point in the Behavior of these Chöpas was not to prove their total indifference to common opinion, but to become free from the power of others, external or internalized, to make them become what they see as them—for this power is a main source of bondage that makes us fall to lower states of ascend to higher ones, revolving in samsara, and that enslaves us to social conventions. In Sufism, a Behavior quite similar to those of Dzogchen and Chö is common, especially among Khajagans or Khwajagans (nowadays better known as Naqshbandis because of the prominent figure of Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari [1318 - 1389]). Consider the words by the great Master (Maulana) Jalal-ud-din Rumi, source of another Sufi order—that of the Mevlevi dancing or whirling dervishes:

Make yourself like the community, that you may feel spiritual joy;  
Enter the street of the tavern, that you may behold the wine-bibbers.  
Drain the cup of passion, that you may not be ashamed;  
Shut the eyes in your head, that you may see [with] the hidden eye.

Afzal Iqbal writes of Rumi’s Behavior at a key period of his life:

Rumi began to devote himself increasingly to dance and music. The contemporary scholars who had great regard for him were shocked at his unconventional life and endeavored to wean him from it, but Rumi had been completely converted to [the Way of] Shams [-i-Tabriz, his teacher (who was reputedly a grandson of a lieutenant of Hassan Ibn El-Sabbah, the chief of the Ismailis),] and there was no room in his life for reservations. He had already become “notorious” for his new mania—music.

A person who was once considered the last word on religion by his own generation, and who had, according to his own light, ruled out music as undesirable, had now become so enamored of it that the threw all “decorum” to the winds, listened to music with rapt attention at odd hours of the day and danced in ecstasy. This is how his own son, [Sultan Walad,] described his condition:

“Day and night he danced in ecstasy,  
On the earth he revolved like the Heavens.  
His [ecstatic] cries reached the zenith of the skies  
And were heard by all and sundry.  
He showered gold and silver on the musicians;  
He gave away whatever he had.  
Never for a moment was he without music and ecstasy;  
Never for a moment was he at rest.  
There was an uproar [of protest] in the city,

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a Cited in Iqbal (1964). I modified some words to make clear what I understand to be the true meaning of the verses.  
b Iqbal (1964).
Nay, the whole world resounded with that uproar.
[They were surprised that] such a great Qutb and Mufti of Islam
Who was the accepted leader of the two Universes
Should be raving like a madman—
In public and in private.
[On his account] the people turned away from religion and faith
and went crazy after love!
The reciters of the Word of God now recited [erotic] verses
And mixed freely with the musicians.”

Dance and music were by no means an escape from the tribulations of his soul. They were, on the contrary, an artistic and spiritual expression of the definite [spiritual] advance he had made by then, [as may be appreciated from the words of his great poetic work, the Mathnavi]:

“Dance where you break yourself and tear away the cotton from the sore of lust. Those [treading the Path] dance and wheel on the [spiritual] battlefield: they dance in their own blood. Clapping a hand, they are released from the hand of the self; making a dance, they escape the imperfection [of the illusory, seemingly separate self]. From within them musicians strike the tambourine; at their ecstasy the seas burst into foam.”

Iqbal further says of Rumi at this period:

He was undoubtedly mad, as his contemporaries said, but there was a method in his madness which few seemed to discern at the time.

In ancient Greece, the Cynics manifested ways of conduct similar to some of the most extreme manifestations of Dzogchen and other “crazy yogi” Behavior; likewise, it is said that in the Low Countries members of the Brotherhood of the Free Spirit sometimes dressed like noblemen, attended aristocratic parties and so on, and at other times dressed as beggars and moved in extremely lowly circles. However, we have no way to know for sure whether or not the ways of conduct of these groups was the expression of a practice partly analogous to Dzogchen, beginning with Vision, developing with Contemplation, and then further developing with Behavior (a problem that I have discussed in other works). At any rate, the Behavior of Dzogchen would no longer fulfill its purpose if its principle became widely known, for then fakers would imitate that Behavior as a means to derive pride from being seen as practitioners of the highest Path—at which point it would likely be more profitable for Dzogchen practitioners to adopt the behavior of a fully ordained monk or nun, or that of an ordinary householder. (I intend to provide a more thorough review of the Behavior of Dzogchen in the upcoming vol. II of Buddhism and Dzogchen.)

At any rate, the key to the treasure of instructions of Dzogchen Atiyoga and the condition for these instructions to allow us to progressively free ourselves from the grip of the shadow and related unconscious phantasies, and hence from clinging to our persona(s),

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a Mathnavi, vol. IV, pp. 9-10, Nicholson’s translation as quoted in Iqbal (1964). (Some of the words added by the translator and/or by Iqbal were deleted by the author of the present book.)
b Iqbal (1964).
c Capriles (1999b, work in progress 3).
d Cf. Capriles (1999b, work in progress 3); some references to the Cynics may be found in vol. I of this book.
e Capriles (work in progress 3). Cf. also Capriles (2000a).
is the relationship with a true Master holding a genuine lineage. Then the application of the instructions received may result in the repeated unveiling of the Self-qua-Base and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of delusion that gradually neutralize delusion and put an end to the concomitant suffering, as well as to all neuroses and all types of imbalance. The Lankavatara Sutra reads:

Things are not as they seem to be, nor are they otherwise.

In this context, I want this to be understood as meaning that we are neither our persona(s), nor our phantasy shadow(s).

**Undoing the Ego-Defenses and Meeting Hell in the Humanistic Psychology Movement**

Existential and Jungian psychology share the basic premise that genuine sanity is not achieved by perfecting the defense mechanisms whereby we elude painful and ego-dystonic contents, but that, on the contrary, it requires the systematic dismantling of these mechanisms, so that we get fully in touch with our own pain and become fully aware of the contents that hitherto we were compelled to elude. In fact, we have seen repeatedly that through this elusion or self-deceit we become fakes, arriving at the extreme opposite to that occupied by the authenticity that is the most cherished value of existentialism and Existenzphilosophie; since existential psychology and therapy is based on the values of these systems, it is not surprising that it demands the systematic dismantling of defense mechanisms and the facing of anguish, death and so on. For his part, Carl Jung posited an innate need for self-realization driving us to explore and integrate the contents we have been compelled to elude, giving rise to the process he called individuation—the process of becoming an individual—that ideally could result in the actualization of the Self, which is the archetype of the coherent whole that unifies our conscious and our unconscious, the realization of which would allow us to bear the tension between the mutually opposing parts of the whole, and would imply the reintegration of the anima or animus, according to the case, and a coexistence of our personas with their shadows that would put an end to the drive to project the shadow on others the very moment it surfaces in our conscious awareness. This archetype is, according to Jung, symbolized by the circle (especially when divided into four quadrants), the square, and the mandala.

Humanistic psychology is the movement that arose in the USA in the 1950s and that thrived in the 1960s, which called itself the “third force” in contrast with the “first force,” behaviorism, and the “second force,” psychoanalysis—and from there arose the “fourth force,” transpersonal psychology. Humanistic psychology assumed the basic premise expressed at the beginning of the first paragraph of this section, to a great extent because existential psychology was a decisive influence on virtually all of the theorists of the new movement. Moreover, the most prominent exponent of existential psychology in the USA, Rollo May—whose views are in most respects close to those of Ludwig Binswanger’s, the father of existential psychoanalysis or Daseinanalysis—became a key figure of the “third force.” For their part, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, the most renowned figures of the new movement, received, each in his own way, important influences from existential psychology: the former acknowledged the crucial influence that, in Brandeis University, where he became chairman of the Department of Psychology in
1951, exerted on him Kurt Goldstein, whose system incorporated principles of existential phenomenology; the latter admitted the philosophical foundations of his system to have been determined by existential phenomenology. For his part, Clark Moustakas coincided with existential psychology in acknowledging the need to delve into the experiences we dread, and in particular into loneliness (which he reportedly faced after his five-year-old daughter died in his arms, amid convulsions, unable to recognize him and screaming at him that he was the devil); moreover, he edited a book containing an essay by Sartre. Finally, Gestalt therapy, developed by Frederick “Frits” Perls, his wife Laura Perls (born Lore Posner), anarchist theorist Paul Goodman, and Ralph Hefferline, is said to have established its philosophical foundation on the basic concepts of existential philosophy and the method of phenomenology. (Furthermore, Gonzague Masquelier developed in a well-known paper several founding themes of existentialism, trying to show that Gestalt therapy shares them, yet pointing our some points of divergence, and, as will be shown below, Lee McLeod asserted Fritz Perls’ concept of the self to derive from existentialism.) At any rate, Fritz Perls adopted Goldstein’s understanding of anxiety as an “existential fact”; Laura Perls, in her Frankfurt years, grew interested in the existential philosophers, becoming personally acquainted with Martin Buber and Paul Tillich; and Goodman was a keen reader of Sartre and Camus. Nevertheless, the existential and existentialist view of anxiety as being more authentic than its lack does not seem to be a basic theme of Gestalt therapy, for this system views authenticity as having to do with fully being in the here and now, whereas anxiety is for Perls a result of leaving the here and now and worrying about what our present choices will bring about in the “later.” At any rate, the fact that existential psychology was a key influence on humanistic psychology is evidenced not only by the latter’s traits, but was overly acknowledged by the inclusion in the 1960 book *Existential Psychology*, edited by Rollo May, of essays by Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers and Gordon Allport (the latter being one of the earliest humanistic psychologists, who influenced both Maslow and Rogers)—as well as by Herman Feifel, who coincided with Binswanger, Rank, Frankl, Yalom, May, etc. in stressing the need both to face one’s own death and to be honest with the dying about their condition (a need which was always emphasized by Buddhism and which later on would be emphasized by antipsychiatry, transpersonal psychology and other systems). However, humanistic psychology is deeply connected with Jung as well, for the key figures of this movement either received a significant influence from the Swiss analyst, or coincided with him in crucial points; likewise, virtually all the figures in question received influences from the *Gestalttheorie*-inspired holism of Kurt Goldstein. In fact, as noted above, Abraham Maslow, icon of humanistic psychology and co-founder of transpersonal psychology, developed his views partly under Goldstein’s influence, having absorbed from him the crucial concept and ideal of his system: that of self-actualization—which also

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* a Moustakas (1961); Haule (1990).
* b Moustakas (Ed.) (1956).
* c Masquelier (2003).
* e Wulf (1996); the reference is to Goldstein (1963).
* f Wulf (1996).
* g May (Ed.) (1960).
* h Feifel (1959).
* i Goldstein (1963).
relates him to Jung insofar as the concept and ideal in question roughly corresponds to Jung’s above discussed “self-realization.”\textsuperscript{a} Also Carl Rogers acknowledged the influence on his system of Goldstein’s ideas (among others that included Maslow’s),\textsuperscript{b} and allegedly “on the sole basis of empirical data”\textsuperscript{c} he posited a concept comparable to Goldstein’s and Maslow’s self-actualization and Jung’s self-realization: that of the “actualizing tendency,” which drives all beings to seek actualization, understood as the progressive development and constant self-improvement that can occur in any of us if the adequate conditions are present.\textsuperscript{d} Rollo May, who developed themes dear to the “third force” such as the value of ecstasy—a phenomenon ignored by most existential thinkers and seen by Binswanger as a symptom of melancholy,\textsuperscript{e} but which May keenly defined as “a magnificent summit of creativity [involving] a union of form and passion with order and vitality”\textsuperscript{f}—also partook of the Goldstein and Jung related ideal of self-actualization;\textsuperscript{g} however, at first sight he seems to have been less sophisticated than Jung at least in one respect: in that he included as part of the tendency for self-actualization what he called “positive regard,” involving the need for a positive self-image—which, however, does not mean he was unaware of Jung’s assertion that that our clinging to our positive personas goes along with the need to project the shadow on others, thus being at the root of evil and psychological imbalance.\textsuperscript{h}

Furthermore, May coincided with the Swiss analyst in emphasizing the need to achieve an equilibrium between the tendency towards individual development, and the “opposite” tendency toward the welfare of others and achievement of a good society, and in a way coincided with him when he posited a mind made up of “daimons” (such as the desires for sex, love and power) which were phenomenologically objective in their being autonomous with regard to the conscious mind\textsuperscript{i}—for Jung’s episodes with Elijah-Philemon, Salome and the black serpent\textsuperscript{j} showed him that daimons were objective phenomena \textit{in experience}. Clark Moustakas coincided with Jung as well, for he claimed that by delving into loneliness he found new capacities and resources within himself, a new liveliness and vividness, an awareness of the importance of the world, and a new sensitivity that put him more in touch with his own existence and made him more aware of others’ needs, thus “finding himself anew”\textsuperscript{k}—in which he came near positing what Jung called the “transcendent function.”\textsuperscript{l} And, in fact, Moustakas edited a book that featured essays by both Jung and Goldstein (as well as Rank, Maslow and Rogers).\textsuperscript{m}

Finally, Fritz Perls’ organismic self-regulation (as contrasted with “shouldistic” self-regulation\textsuperscript{n}),\textsuperscript{p} which is an aim as well as a means in Gestalt therapy, is very similar to Goldstein’s Jung-related ideal of self-actualization—which is not surprising, since Perls, who spent one year as Goldstein’s assistant in Frankfurt, incorporated the latter’s organismic theory into his system. Furthermore, Gestalt therapy shared the Jungian and humanistic concept of the Self, which as reported above McLeod\textsuperscript{q} associated with existentialism (independently of whether of not this association is correct): “[The self] is the foundation of a psychology without a psyche, the corollary in

\textsuperscript{b} May (1975, p. 49).
\textsuperscript{c} Frick (1973).
\textsuperscript{d} Jung (1964).
\textsuperscript{e} Moustakas (1961).
\textsuperscript{f} Haule (1990); Haule is referring to the already considered Jung (1975).
\textsuperscript{g} Moustakas (Ed.) (1956).
\textsuperscript{h} Perls (1987).
\textsuperscript{i} McLeod (1993, p. 26).
psychotherapeutic terms of Sartre’s [view that] existence precedes essence; [in fact, Gestalt therapy shares] with existentialism the radical subversion of Western philosophical dualism..."13

As implied above, humanistic psychology, like some other trends of existential psychology, differed from Sartre in that it did not reduce authenticity to the Hell that in the view of the French thinker constitutes our true being (but in which according to Sartre it is impossible for non-psychotic individuals to live, since he deemed bad faith impossible to eradicate). In fact, as we have seen, the reason why humanistic psychology emphasized the need to face what we are driven to elude and create a deficiency in the mechanisms of elusion / bad faith, lies to a great extent in the conviction that this could activate the kind of mechanisms that above were compared to Jung’s “transcendent function,” which according to humanist psychology had the potential of allowing the individual to cease organizing his or her life around the most superficial concerns, such as gaining approval from members of his or her social group, and give rise to more autonomous, life-affirming and experience-enhancing patterns, as well as to a fuller and deeper experience of life. As we have seen throughout this volume, the true value of the transformation of contradiction into conflict and the ensuing Hell is that we are given the opportunity of questioning our experience in terms of instructions such as those of Dzogchen, thus making it possible for the basic contradiction, which is the avidya or marigpa explained in a threefold way in the Dzogchen teachings, to spontaneously liberate itself. Insofar as humanistic psychology cannot provide us with the conditions of possibility of spontaneous liberation, it cannot make use of the deepest and most radical potential of the descent to Hell, and hence its proposal may be compared to descending to the bottom of Hell and, rather than going through the hole to Purgatory, staying there long enough as to habituate ourselves to pain—and then, as pain slowly diminishes interdependently with our rejection of it, progressively climbing back through Hell toward the world of the living, which we can face in a more wholesome way insofar as the drives at the root of the worst forms of suffering have mellowed down in us, at least to some extent. In fact, as we have seen repeatedly, pain results from the rejection of our sensations, and thus the principle of this method appears to be that by opening to pain and thus making our apprehension to it diminish, and staying in pain until habituation to it makes our rejection of it lessen significantly, pain becomes less and less painful—and thus to the degree that we become more authentic and less superficial, our life becomes less conflictive and more harmonious and fulfilling. However, even when these benefits are actually achieved, the gain is too small in relation to the price in suffering paid along the way, for the subject-object duality is not eradicated, and since this duality implies the three alternatives consisting in acceptance, rejection and indifference, therefore being the core of the wheel of samsara, its persistence amounts to the persistence of the ceaseless ups and downs of the wheel in question. In short, if one does not go through the hole at the bottom of Hell into Purgatory, ascending through this region of experience and then through the Heavens, one will never reach the Empyrean that is the natural destination of the journey described by Dante: the Akanishta Pure Land of irreversible Awakening.

Arthur Janov⁴ (probably best-known for having been John Lennon’s therapist) held that we have an unreal self that results from what in the language of this book may be called elusion of past traumas (which he divided into three levels: first level traumas, which are those occurring from adolescence through the rest of one’s life; second level traumas,

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which are those occurring during the period of later childhood; and first level traumas, which are those dating from early infancy or intrauterine life), and that, by reliving as many pains as possible, the unreal self progressively weakens and the individual becomes progressively “real,” so that defenses, insofar as they were intended to protect the unreal self, become unnecessary, and by the same token new life-enhancing behavior patterns and ways of responding to the world can come into being, so that life is experienced to its fullness and psychosomatic problems are left behind—all of which is, as we have seen, an essential theme of humanistic psychology. When one of his clients told him he experienced deep anxiety on the occasion of witnessing a scene in a theater play, Janov advised him to behave like the actor in order to enter fully into that feeling; the client followed his advice, and when the anxiety turned into overwhelming anguish he experienced the urge to utter a heart-rending scream. Janov called this “primal scream,” and turned the supposed need to utter it into an axiom of his primal therapy: his clients had to reach the state where they would feel an irrefrangible impulse to scream, and freely give way to this impulse, for the scream itself would be a liberation. This means Janov acknowledged the need to face Hell, but failed to understand that, rather than finding a momentary relief from it by giving way to an emotional outburst, it was mandatory to recreate Dante’s journey as described in the Divine Comedy. Since the basic principle of this process is that delusion must be clearly experienced as tension, so that the latter may be used as an alarm reminding us to recognize the dualism at its root and hence the latter spontaneously liberates itself each and every time it manifests, in the case of those fulfilling all requisites for going through this process in the context of a tradition such as Dzogchen, to release tensions through an outburst of emotion would sabotage the process of Awakening. In fact, it is common knowledge that in order to resolve a psychological trauma it may be important and useful to re-experience the traumatic episode that is deemed to be its source; however, reacting to it with a “primal scream” would confirm and reaffirm the delusory valuation of thought in general, which is the ultimate source of all tension, and in particular the belief that the traumatic episode was in itself a most terrible, unbearable experience, which constitutes the most profound root of the trauma—and, insofar as such reactions are expressions of compulsive, all-out rejection, rather than neutralizing to some extent the individual’s original karma, they create further karma for the Hells that, as we have seen, are the naked experience of rejection.

Thus Janov falls short of the norm of humanistic psychology, most of which, as we have seen, demands that we open up to pain, thus making apprehension to it lessen, and that we stay with the pain long enough as to become habituated to it, thereby making the rejection of pain and therefore pain itself diminish, and possibly inducing a transformation of experience. Though Janov never claimed the aim of his therapy to be the achievement of catharsis, in practice the outcome of primal therapy was a momentary, partial release of tension that, as a katharsis or purge, was nearly as superficial and inconsequential as the one posited in Aristotle’s Poetics, and which, insofar as it consisted in complaining about pain with all of our being by means of the heart-rendering “primal” scream, intensifies our rejection of pain, thus failing to achieve even the relative benefits of other humanistic therapies. Furthermore, after the partial relaxation, tension rapidly accumulates that we have no way to liberate, and the trauma once more shows its effects on us—so that we will continue to be at the mercy, both of the tension-inducing trauma, and of everyday life situations. This why so many of Janov’s clients had to submit to his therapy again and again in order to re-experience the primal feeling and send forth a new scream—and it is
also the reason why, in discussing Reich’s therapy, Fritz Perls\(^a\) insisted that “...a single explosion doesn’t mean a thing. The so-called breakthroughs of Reichian therapy, and all that, are as little useful as the insight in psychoanalysis. Things still have to work through.”

As we have seen throughout this volume, so long as we elude the duhkha—the lack of plenitude, dissatisfaction and unhappiness, and the recurrent frustration, anguish, fear, and pain—pervading our experience, we cannot realize as such and question the illusion of duality at its root, and therefore we do not have any possibility of overcoming either the root, the trunk or the branches. Only when the illusion of duality is disclosed as such and turns into conflict, do we have the possibility of overcoming it together with its negative consequences. Thus the reason why it is essential to create a deficiency in the mechanisms of elusion / bad faith, is not so as to come to live in the Hell that existentialist thinkers such as Sartre view as authenticity and as the being of the human individual, nor in order to achieve increasing balance and integration without eradicating delusion as in most of humanist therapies, nor so as to induce superficial catharses through emotional outbursts as in primal therapy. The only definitive and irreversible purification is the one achieved through the process illustrated by the Divine Comedy, provided that it is undertaken in the context of a genuine metatranspersonal, metashamanic Path having the potential of definitively neutralizing the basic human delusion at the root of all evil and thus give rise to a most radical and irreversible transformation of the individual’s experience: only by uprooting the cause, will its negative effects cease manifesting. It is thus that the absolute sanity that must be the ultimate aim of therapy may be effectively achieved—provided we undergo a conscientious preparation and receive the oral instructions of a genuine mystical tradition in the context of a sincere relationship with a true Master of that tradition.

Other humanistic approaches to psychotherapy have similar shortcomings. In many “group therapies,” whether regarded as humanistic or transpersonal, individuals are forced to face something they had always avoided, but they are not given the means to overcome the basic delusion at the root of all suffering. Clients of such group therapies often achieve a superficial catharsis through emotional relief, and in some cases may gradually overcome the fear of rejection, shame and reproof, going so far as to be more open before others in daily life, and possibly as to be less frightened by the shadow—which could reduce their need to project it on others as soon as it surfaces into the atmosphere of consciousness. However, there is the risk that by exposing themselves “exactly as they are,” they make themselves and others believe that the ultimate truth about themselves is the “self” they show others at that moment—which is no more than a phantasy shadow surfacing into consciousness. Of course, the belief in question was implicit in the need to elude the phantasy that finally surfaced during therapy, and undoubtedly it is more authentic to show it than to conceal it. The problem is that the therapy, rather than helping its clients free themselves from the delusion at the root of all problems and thereby from their shadows, has taken the false beliefs involved in delusion—and in particular the individual’s phantasy shadows—for granted, affirming them, sustaining them and consolidating them.

**The So-Called Psychedelic Experience**

Insofar as so-called psychedelics were a constant in Stan Grof’s early therapies and continue to be crucial in his theoretical elaborations, in my critique of his work in a

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\(^a\) Perls (1969).
previous section of this volume I was obliged to refer to these substances. Upon so doing, for the class of such drugs he privileged I coined the neologism *chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV)—which, however, I left undefined. This, together with the fact that a great deal of transpersonal researchers, theorists and therapists have been passionate promoters of so-called psychedelics, with the fact that the etymology of the latter term fails to express the most specific effects of the substances it refers to, and with the fact that most specialists now refer to the substances in question by the term “enteogens”—the etymology of which, in the light of true Paths of Awakening, reveals itself plainly self-contradictory—inspired me to write this Section in order to reveal the etymological flaws of the term “psychedelics,” define the neologism I introduced, briefly distinguish the effects of some varieties of psychoactive substances from those of other varieties, explain some of the effects of the most representative of the varieties in question from the perspectives of Buddhism in general and Dzogchen in particular, and expose the self-contradictory character of the term “enteogens” in the light of the systems just mentioned.

To begin with, it must be remembered that “psychedelics” is the term that in 1957 Humphrey F. Osmond coined for designating the class of psychoactive substances that includes LSD, mescaline and those tryptamines present in psilocybe mushrooms (such as psilocin and psilocybin), among others, and that nowadays the term is applied to an ample class of psychoactive substances that beside the tryptamines present in magic mushrooms is deemed to include tryptamines from other sources such as DMT, 5-MeO-DMT, NN-DMT, DET, DPT, 5-MeO-DIPT, 5-MeO-MiPT, AMT, 5-MeO-AMT, and so on;414 such atypical designer amphetamines as MDA, MMDA, DOM (4-Methyl-2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine, known in the streets as STP) and TMA; dissociative general anesthetics such as PCP, DXM / DM and ketamine; miscellaneous substances such as the harmala alkaloids present in Syrian rue and Amazon plants of the Banisteriopsis family (such as harmine and harmaline), muscimol (the active principle of both amanita muscaria and amanita pantherina) and ibogaine (the active principle of the Central African shrub Tabernanthe iboga); and a daily growing, huge list of substances possessing a kind of consciousness expanding effect, yet having other effects as well, which differ widely from one substance to the next.

For example, PCP, DXM / DM, ketamine and similar drugs, which often induce states that have been compared to lucid dreaming, have dissociative, anesthetic, mind-numbing and heroic effects, making people feel detached both from the environment and their own selves and often inducing feelings of strength, power, invulnerability and the like415—their effects thus being radically different from those of substances such as LSD, mescaline and psilocybin, except in that, just like the latter, these substances have a powerful consciousness expanding function that *tends* to dissolve ego boundaries and induce depersonalization, and are potentially psychotomimetic. In their turn, so-called psychedelic, designer amphetamines such as MDA, MMDA and DOM (aka STP), and harmala alkaloids such as harmine and harmaline,416 in spite of having effects that differ widely from one drug to the next, in the 1970s were classed together under the heading “non-psychotomimetic psychedelics” (a doubtful characterization insofar as frightening,
“psychotomimetic” episodes have been reported by users of some if not all of these substances; however, consumers of STP, in spite of reporting weariness as a result of the breathtaking, long-lasting, exhausting torrent of experiences this drug unleashes, have also claimed it does not cause pronounced depersonalization or identity confusion, for “you know who you are”—this being probably one of the reasons why it was classed under the heading in question.\(^{417}\) Fly agaric (amanita muscaria), the famed mushroom containing muscimol as its main psychoactive alkaloid that was employed in paleo-Siberian shamanism for inducing so-called shamanic states in general and sequences of “shamanic ascension” in particular (the latter in many cases involving a dynamic partly analogous to the one illustrated by the Divine Comedy), in spite of being potentially psychotomimetic, unlike substances such as LSD, mescaline and psilocybin does not induce “structured” hallucinations, at the onset of its activity may induce sleep (which according to the way the mushrooms are prepared may either be a state of utter unconsciousness that external observers may mistake for death, or sleep involving very vivid dreams),\(^{418}\) and in parts of Asia was used for enhancing awareness of erotic pleasure\(^{419}\)—roughly like Foxy Methoxy (5-MeO-DIPT) in the US, ayahuasca in the Amazon, Bufo toad exudations\(^{420}\) allegedly in Asia and the West Indies, etc. Because of the vividness and continuity of the visions produced by ibogaine, the effects of this substance have been described as a “visionary onslaught” and an “unending flow of encyclopedic images”;\(^b\) besides, the substance has been reported to have a strong aphrodisiac effect.\(^{421}\) And, in general, countless other so-called psychedelics have a host of other, very different effects.

Substances like cannabis and MDMA are often placed in the borderline of so-called psychedelics. Cannabis, which Shaivas regard as a sacred plant of their Lord Shiva—a status later endorsed by the Atharva Veda and therefore accepted by orthodox Brahmanism—whether ingested orally in the form of bhang or smoked in the form of ganja, charras or hashish\(^{422}\) has a much milder consciousness expanding effect than LSD, mescaline or psilocybin and the like, and besides is somewhat hypnotic—yet in some cases consumers have reported effects similar to those of the latter drugs. The designer amphetamine MDMA (ecstasy), which is often excluded altogether from the class of drugs called psychedelics, induces tingling along the spine and throughout the body, which may increase in intensity to enraptured levels; furthermore, if the individual engages in erotic relationships, this sensation may mingle with erotic pleasure, making the latter particularly intense; however, on the other hand it has been established as the cause of many deaths, and the fact that it elicits loving acceptance of both self and environment, blocking inhibitions, and arousing enthusiasm for the ideas received during its effects even when these contradict the individual’s ideology, in spite of having been deemed useful in treating some types of psychoses, could also make the drug effective as a brainwashing tool.

Since the Greek etymology of “psychedelic” is “making the psyche evident” or “showing the psyche,” the term should apply to all drugs having the power to bring “unconscious” contents into conscious awareness (and thus show the hidden aspects of the user’s psyche), to make us perceive through the senses phenomena that do not belong to the commonly perceived reality we call the “physical world” (which as such common sense would view as manifestations of the user’s psyche), to induce feelings or emotions that do not respond to the events in our commonly perceived reality that normally would

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elicit them (and that as such would be seen as evidencing dispositions or traits of the user’s psyche), etc. Infamous opiates are narcotic, heroic, anesthetic, addictive and extremely detrimental drugs having a mild hallucinogenic effect; because of the latter, strictly on the basis of the etymology of the term psychedelics should qualify as members of this class. Likewise, such psychoactive plants of the solanaceae family as the diverse species of Datura, Hyocamus, and reportedly also Atropa belladonna and Mandragora autumnalis / Atropa mandragora, beside their hypnotic and anesthetic effect, have a greater hallucinogenic potential than many of the so-called psychedelics, being capable of producing visions that, due to their lifelike character and probably also to the hypnotic effect of the drugs generating them, ordinary people are unable to recognize as such and as a rule tend to mistake either for elementals, spirits or demons, or for phenomena of our commonly perceived, so-called “material” reality—and hence on the basis of the etymology under consideration they should qualify as psychedelics. However, neither opiates nor the just mentioned plants of the solanaceae family can expand the focus of conscious awareness, thereby inducing experiences of seeming “cosmic union” or the like (the only member of the solanaceae family that to my knowledge has this potential is Vestia fœtida, which unlike her previously listed cousins contains tryptamines having the power to raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and thus expand the focus of conscious awareness)—and, coincidentally, nowadays the most serious researchers in the field classify neither the ones nor the others as psychedelics. In fact, it seems that all substances unanimously classed under this heading have a consciousness expanding effect, and that those substances lacking this effect, even if they may be said to make the psyche evident or show the psyche, are not universally classed as such. This suggests that the term in question, rather than being universally understood in its etymological sense, is often understood in the sense of “consciousness expanding”—an effect for which at some time I coined the neologism psychedeltic. Therefore I have to conclude that, (1) the etymology of the term “psychedelic” does not properly respond to the most characteristic effects of the substances universally classed as such, and (2) the category in question includes quite different subcategories that need to be clearly distinguished from each other.

Here I will circumscribe myself to reviewing the effects of those drugs that were the main focus of interest of the most influential among twentieth century publicists of so-called psychedelics in the West—including the founding members of MAPS (the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies) and the authors who wrote for The Psychedelic Review—and that became most popular among the young in the 1960s, being to a great extent responsible for the occurrence of such a consequential social phenomenon as the hippy movement: those drugs pertaining to the class including LSD, mescaline, and tryptamines like psilocybin, psilocin, DMT and 5-MeO-DMT, among many other substances. The reasons for this are: (1) that they are the most renowned of so-called psychedelics; (2) that they—and in particular LSD—were the ones privileged both by the theorists, researchers and therapists I class under the label “antipsychiatry in the wide sense of the term” and by that transpersonal icon who is Stan Grof; and (3) that they are the most relevant to this discussion insofar as, like so many of the traditional methods of true Awakening traditions, they raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Skt., kundalini; Tib. thig le)—and do so more dramatically than many of the traditional methods in question.

The most visible effect of a marked raise in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness could be what is called “consciousness expansion:” a widening in the
scope of conscious awareness that tends to dissolve the figure-ground distinction and thus bring into this awareness the totality of the sensory continuum (not only in the field of sight, but in those of all senses). A closely related effect of the raise in question is that of deferring the interposition of judgment in sensory awareness, thus deferring perception—an effect for which I coined the adjective *epochotropic*, compounded of the Greek verb *trepein*, here understood in the sense of *to tend to*, and the Greek noun *epoche*, usually rendered as *suspension of judgment*. Finally, another crucial effect of that raise is its so-called psychotomimetic or altogether psychotic potential. It is because so-called psychedelics of the class including LSD, mescaline, psilocybin and DMT, among others, are *chemical raisers of the energetic volume*, and as such they combine the three effects just described, and because their effects contrast with those of hypnotic hallucinogens such as most of the psychoactive plants of the *solanaceae* family and with those dissociative general anesthetics such as PCP, DXM / DM and ketamine, that for the drugs in question I coined the neologism *chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect* (CREV).

The effects of CREV may be viewed from different perspectives, among which the most frequent so far has consisted in relating them with the stages of dissolution, death and the bardos between death and rebirth (the most famous work on psychedelics based on the *Bardo Thödröl* being probably *The Psychedelic Experience*). However, my initial mission here is that of determining the reasons why these substances may occasionally trigger mystical experiences that are often taken for the realizations of higher forms of Buddhism and other genuine Paths of Awakening (a misunderstanding that, as shown below, caused a group of researchers to call them “entheogens”), and ascertaining the nature of such experiences in Buddhist and Dzogchen terms—a task for which it is more appropriate to consider their effects in the context of the subsequent stages in the arising of *samsara* from the neutral condition of the base-of-all (which, however, is to some extent analogous to the post-mortem sequence of bardos). After this I will switch to a different interpretative framework in order to explain why such substances may give access to those ego-dystonic contents that are normally eluded by human consciousness and to realms of experience that, due to the associated mental coding or other attributes, are ordinarily excluded from the ambit of consciousness—and in general why they may induce so-called “psychotomimetic experiences” and fully-fledged psychoses (which, however, as shown in a previous section of this volume and in other works of mine, when allowed to unfold in an appropriate environment, have a healing potential). Finally, I will ascertain whether the etymology of the term “entheogens” is legitimate or unwarranted.

Perception is always preceded by an extremely short instant of uninterpreted, pure sensation, which we are unable to reflexively remember insofar as it is an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all that as such does not involve the awareness (of) consciousness-of-an-object-perceived-in-terms-of-a-concept that—as explained in vol. I of this book and elsewhere in this volume—is responsible for the production of a reflexive mnemonic imprint. We have seen that a significant raise in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Skt., *kundalini*; Tib. *thig le*) will widen the scope of conscious awareness to a greater or lesser degree, while simultaneously deferring the coming into play of judgment in human perception. Whereas the widening of the scope of

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conscious awareness tends to dissolve the figure-ground split and thus result in a panoramic awareness encompassing the whole of the continuum of potential sense data of any of the senses of a given individual at a given moment, the delay in the coming into play of judgment postpones the manifestation of the supersubtle threefold thought structure, temporarily inhibiting the interposition of the subject-object duality in awareness (of) sense-data (the latter including the data of the sixth sense posited by Buddhism\textsuperscript{429})—and insofar as the recognition of sensa in terms of subtle / intuitive concepts can only occur when the subject-object duality is manifest, and since on the top of this the drugs in question defer the recognition of sensa, they defer perception altogether (furthermore, if thereafter coarse / discursive thoughts come into play, mentally expressing in words whatever was perceived, this also may take longer to occur).

The combined effect of the panoramification of awareness and the suspension of the interposition of the threefold apparitional structure in sensory awareness may result in an unusually long instance of nondual, nonconceptual panoramic awareness (of) the limitless space of dharmadhatu (i.e., of the basic space of phenomena) and therefore (of) the whole of our continuum of potential sensa at given moment, which insofar as there has been no reGnition of the nondual primordial awareness in which experience occurs and therefore nirvana has not manifested, keeps us in the condition the Dzogchen teachings call base-of-all carrying propensities (Tib. bagchagkyi kunzhi\textsuperscript{a}) for a shorter or longer lapse. Then the delusory valuation of the threefold thought-structure gives rise to the subject-object duality, which at this point manifests as dualistic consciousness of an undivided continuum that retains some of the basic features of the dharmadhatu and that seems to involve the totality of sense-data, but which at this point, insofar as it excludes the mental subject, rather than a totality is a pseudo-totality. Thus there occurs a samsaric experience of the sphere of formlessness, in which the mental subject usually establishes a link of being with the pseudo-totality appearing as object, thus obtaining the feeling of being that totality and of having its characteristics, and deriving elation and pride from it. If we managed to make this experience stable (which, fortunately, is hardly possible while under the effect of CREV), we would come to dwell in the samsaric sphere of formlessness.

After the experience of the samsaric sphere of formlessness that succeeded the manifestation of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, the consciousness of the base-of-all (Tib. kunzhi namshe\textsuperscript{b}) comes into play, dividing the sensory totality into figure and ground. Even if the form that has been singled out is a simple grain of sand, for a longer or shorter lapse we remain beyond concepts in the awareness of the form’s multiplicity-in-oneness (consisting in the fact that although the form is being taken as an undivided figure, it would nevertheless be possible to successively distinguish in it countless aspects, features or details), and so when a subtle, intuitive concept comes into play to interpret the occurrence, we are in awe before the marvelous character of the form, for we understand it in terms of the kind of admiring aesthetic judgments that could be expressed coarsely / discursively as “inexpressible wonder” and so on, thereby obtaining an experience of the sphere of form. If we managed to make this experience stable (which is hardly possible while under the effect of CREV), we would establish ourselves in the samsaric sphere of form.

\textsuperscript{a} bag chags kyi kun gzhi.
\textsuperscript{b} kun gzhi rnam shes.
Finally, if the singled out object is what we view as an attractive sexual partner, and particularly so if the sense of touch has come into play, the consciousness of defilements (Tib. nyönmongpa chen yikyi namshe\(^a\)) may come into play, giving rise to erotic arousal and thereby to what could be conceptualized as all-pervading, boundless, inexpressible pleasure, which is instantly taken as object. If at this point the experience is interpreted in terms of intuitive conceptualization of this pleasure, attachment arises and an experience of the higher regions of the sphere of sensuality ensues. If we managed to make this experience stable (which is hardly possible under the effect of CREV), we would come to dwell in the realm of the gods of sensuality.

However, after a while we may get used to the pleasure, in which case our attitude would switch to one of indifference, and since there is no longer a pleasure so intense as to keep us absorbed in it, distractive thoughts of all kinds would toss us about. Thus we come to yearn for a more intense pleasure, which is an experience proper to the realm of pretas (Tib. yidag\(^b\)), Tantaluses or “hungry ghosts”—which, in its turn, may lead us to act in a way that we hope will increase pleasure and thus take us back to the higher regions of the sphere of sensuality. If we end up making love with our partner, the intensity of sensation may facilitate the recurrence of the suspension of judgment or epoche in the face of sensation and subsequent interpretation of this sensation in terms of contents of intuitive thoughts such as the one that could be expressed discursively as all-pervading, boundless, inexpressible pleasure. At any rate, independently of whether or not we end up making love with our partner, sooner or later different emotions will succeed each other, making us transmigrate through the six realms of the samsaric sphere of sensuality (between one realm and the next, a sequence roughly of the same kind as the one just discussed occurs, yet insofar as it is impelled by intense passions, rather than developing as slowly and distinctly as the one already discussed, is likely to occur rapidly and confusedly, as it does in everyday experience). In any case, it is important to keep in mind that entrance into the sphere of sensuality does not depend on the occurrence of erotic pleasure, and that the initial experience of the sphere in question need not be one of pleasure. In fact, this sphere arises when the consciousness of defilements comes into play and subsequently sensa are interpreted in terms of subtle thoughts, triggering passionate reactions on the part of the mental subject inherent in dualistic consciousness.

Among transpersonal theorists who have ingested CREV, many seem to have taken for the initial manifestation of Awakening or nirvana, what in fact was no more than an instance of the condition of the base-of-all carrying propensities followed by an experience of the formless sphere. In fact, since, as we have seen, instances of the neutral base-of-all cannot be reflexively remembered, when someone reflexively remembers having fused in totality while under the effects of CREV, as a rule what he or she remembers is the experience of the formless sphere that took place immediately after the manifestation of the neutral base-of-all, on the occasion of taking the sensory totality as object, conceptualizing that object as oneness, totality, inexpressible reality or the like, and in most cases establishing a link of being (or identifying) with it. After this experience of the formless sphere, the figure / ground distinction arises again, yet the singled out figure—which may be a segment of what ordinarily we interpret as “the material world”—is not immediately experienced in terms of a delusorily valued subtle / intuitive thought: memories of the

\(^a\) nyöng mongs pa can yid kyi rnam shes.
\(^b\) yi dvags.
inexpressible wondrousness of a tree, a grain of sand or any other material structure experienced under the effects of CREV are recollections of the moment when, after having spent a longer or shorter lapse in the nonconceptual experience of the figure corresponding to the consciousness-of-the-base-of-all, this figure is interpreted in terms of a subtle thought that could be expressed discursively as “ineffable wonder” or the like. In the same way, memories of all-pervading, nondiscrete pleasure are recollections of subsequent experiences of the higher regions of the sphere of sensuality.

Does the above mean that, contrarily to what was affirmed in the section on Grof, instances of nirvana may not occur while under the effects of CREV? This would be a wholly wrong conclusion, for as we have seen their essential effect is that of raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, and as we have also seen a heightened energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness may as well be the most important of those conditions that facilitate the occurrence of instances of nirvana. In fact, all true Paths of Awakening have means for raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, thus inducing highly energetic, panoramic states, and without such means they would not be Paths of Awakening, for the higher the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, the more likely the reGnition (of) our true condition. Furthermore, the Dzogchen teachings (especially those of the Semde\textsuperscript{a} series) compare primordial, nondual awareness with a mirror and experiences with reflections in the mirror, and make it clear that it is very often on the occasion of trying to find and apprehend the mental subject that seems to perceive the extraordinary experiences / states induced by the raise of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and that seems to be different and separate from these experiences / states—or, alternatively, of trying to apprehend the awareness represented by the mirror—that, provided that the individual has received both what Vajrayana and Ch’an Buddhism call “transmission” and the oral instructions for a practice such as Dzogchen, the unconcealment of the true condition of the awareness symbolized by a mirror may spontaneously take place.

Nevertheless, no Buddhist Path, Vehicle or School teaches methods involving the use of CREV, and those that possess traditional means for abruptly raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness warn that these must be restricted to duly prepared individuals, for the effects of such raise are too dangerous for those who are not so prepared; that they must not be used in the context of mere experimentalism; and that the illusory experiences they induce, rather than being taken for realizations, are to be used as specified by the teachings: as images in a mirror that are used to reGnize the true condition of the mirror. (The necessity for transmission is almost universal on both the Paths of Transformation and Spontaneous liberation and in Ch’an or Zen; even those rare treasure-revealers or tertöns\textsuperscript{b} of the Paths of Spontaneous liberation and Transformation who, without depending on a nirmanakaya [“physical”] teacher, receive instructions and empowerment, obtaining the unconcealment of the Self-qua-Base that here I am calling the Self-qua-Path, in order to continue to proceed on the Path need to receive transmission and teachings from a Master in human form holding a genuine lineage. In fact, among the very few who receive transmission and teachings without depending on a Master in human form, the only ones who receive complete systems of teachings and do not depend on receiving further teachings or transmissions in order to continue to proceed

\textsuperscript{a} sens sde.
\textsuperscript{b} gter ston.
on the Path, or in order to teach others, are those that the teachings call primordial revealers or tönpa⁴, of which according to the Dzogchen teachings there have been only twelve in our cosmic time cycle, and which arise only when the teachings and the associated transmission have disappeared from the face of the planet.⁴³⁰)

The reason why here I am so cautious and critical with regard to CREV is that a significant raise in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness / modification of brain biochemistry such as the one induced by these substances widens the focus of conscious awareness in a sudden manner, inducing more or less panoramic states in which, insofar as perceptual divisions such as that of subject and object and that of figure and ground are either obliterated or to some extent blurred, the emptiness of all entities may become patent, and the mechanisms of elusion responsible for what in the Dzogchen classification adopted here is the third of the senses of the term avidya (namely, unawareness that the illusory is illusory, that the baseless is baseless, that the relative is relative) may be to a greater or lesser extent impaired. In individuals of lower capacities, this incipient dawning of voidness may induce panic and thus give rise to a painful feeling-tone⁴³¹ that, since the individual no longer has a narrow, relatively hermetic focus of conscious awareness that may be zeroed in on a different object,⁴³² is experienced in its full intensity. This elicits wholehearted rejection, which makes the feeling-tone all the more painful—which in its turn elicits further rejection, thus activating a hellish positive feedback loop that makes the painful feeling tone rapidly become unbearable. Since the individual clings to the illusion of self-being that is in the course of dissolving and struggles against the process he or she is undergoing, in terms of the already discussed symbolism of the mandala,⁴ rather than “going through the intermediate zone” and dissolving in the center, he or she may stay in the zone in question, facing a psychotic episode that in some cases might continue long after the drug’s effects have run out.⁴³³ Something similar may occur in unprepared individuals if ego-dystonic contents (i.e., contents contradicting their self-image) emerge while they are under the effects of the drug, for the panoramification of the focus of conscious awareness and the concomitant thinning of the latter’s walls that makes them more “transparent”⁴³⁴ makes it impossible to shield those contents, and hence those individuals could react to them with horror or anguish—and since they cannot shield the feeling-tone in the center of the chest at the level of the heart, they would react to it wholeheartedly, giving rise to the positive feedback loop just considered. And something comparable could occur even in individuals of “higher capacities” who would experience no panic before the panoramification of the focus of conscious awareness and who would not be disturbed by the intrusion of ego-dystonic contents, in case that for adventitious reasons anguish manifests in their continuum: being unable to shield the feeling-tone, they would react wholeheartedly to it, unleashing the positive feedback loop in question.⁴³⁵

The experiences briefly discussed above may occur independently of whether or not the conditioned states induced by CREV are taken to be the unconditioned unveiling of the Self-qua-Base that constitutes the Self-qua-Path—or, what is the same, whether or not they are taken to be instances of nirvana. However, as noted above, falling prey to this confusion would involve the extra danger of self-infatuation—which, what is worse, may turn into long term spiritual pride, taking those who indulge in it further away from

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⁴ ston pa.
⁵ cf. also Capriles, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c.
authenticity and therefore from Awakening, and in some cases leading them to set themselves up as gurus and use disciples to exacerbate their conceit and unauthenticity, by the same token leading the latter along the misguided way they themselves trod. For these and many other reasons, youth intending to transform consciousness and take society away from the self-destructive path that it presently treads, should avoid the psychedelic hedonism of the hippies in the 1960s, which in the short term produced a number of psychosis and suicides, and gave rise to a drive to obtain certainty, security and a positive identity that furthered both the proliferation of pseudo-gurus and spiritual groups based on manipulation and deceit, and the rapid propagation of ego-enhancing, body-damaging stimulants and narcotics. Likewise, the painful experiences that so many hippies and parahippies obtained from retaining delusion and clinging to emotions and conventional frameworks while opening to new states of mind, experiences and ways of relating to others, gave rise to fear of change, which in its turn resulted in a political reaction to the right. In order to achieve a complete, truly therapeutic transformation of consciousness and experience, and thus have a possibility to change the course our species presently follows, we must first receive transmission and instructions from a Master officially holding the transmission of a genuine tradition of Awakening, and then set out to apply those instructions in a consistent way.

Alan Watts (1962), despite having been a lucid expositor of Zen Buddhism and related Paths and views, and having been one of the first Western writers to grasp and explain the spiritual causes of ecological crisis, was prey to one of the distortions denounced above, for in the nineteen sixties he wrote that the ingestion of LSD and similar substances could induce episodes of satori without the individual having to undergo the training that in Eastern Paths of Awakening is the precondition of such occurrences. Furthermore, his descriptions of his experiences while under the effects of CREV in that work, rather than reporting episodes of nirvana, narrate experiences that any genuine dhammakaya yogi would automatically recognize as not being what Watts believed them to be: while some of them may have corresponded to some of the experiences described above, most of them, despite expressing most valuable insights, obviously featured the understanding of reality in terms of delusorily valued coarse / discursive thoughts. In order to prevent this kind of error, it is vital to stress the fact that Awakening cannot be caused, induced, produced or fabricated.

In fact, since the Self-qua-Path is by its inherent nature uncaused / unproduced / unbecome (Pali abhèta; Skt. anutpada, anuttarati; Tib. makyepa⁴), unborn (Pali and Skt. ajata; Tib. makyepa) and unconditioned / uncompounded / unmade / uncontrived (Pali asankhata; Skt. asamskrita; Tib. dümajai⁵), genuine Paths of Awakening, and with a special emphasis the Supreme Path of Awakening which is Dzogchen Ati, make it clear that it cannot be generated—either by raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness or by whatever other means—and that it can only occur spontaneously. In fact, raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness can produce potentially panoramic states in which, as shown above, recognition in terms of thoughts takes longer to occur, and which often involve conditioned experiences of emptiness, clarity, pleasure and so on—which are what Tibetans call “illusory

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⁴ ma skyes pa.
⁵ ‘dus ma byas.
experiences” (Tib. nyams), what Sufis call “states” (Ar. hal), what Chinese and Japanese Buddhists call “demonic states” (Chin. mo-ching; Jap. makyo), and probably instances of what in the context of the vipassana practice of the Pali Canon are called the “ten corruptions”—and in general can produce many kinds of illusory experiences, but it cannot produce the unproduced. In terms of the symbolism that in the Dzogchen teachings illustrates primordial nondual awareness by a mirror, these illusory experiences are no more than reflections in the mirror, which have value if and only if they are used as the occasion for discovering the true condition of the mirror I am calling the Self-qua-Base in the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path.

As we have seen, according to Buddhism, conditioned experiences arise as a result of the combination of a main cause (Skt. hetu; Tib. gyü), which is one of our karmas, with a set of secondary causes or circumstances (Skt. pratyaya; Tib. kyen). Recreational users of CREV may have “good trips” if they have the karma for having experiences of the gods’ absorptions and this karma coincides with the right contributory causes or circumstances. However, since at some point they will use up all their accumulated good karma in obtaining experiences of those spheres, and before that time, in one or another occasion, unfavorable contributory causes will most likely concur, sooner or later they will have to face a “bad trip.” Among the effects of CREV, this is the one most feared by recreational users, precisely insofar as it is the only one that does not allow them to squander away their precious human lifetime in useless enjoyment of wonderful, pleasurable, extraordinary experiences—and in the case of unprepared individuals, it is also the one that represents the most immediate danger, for it can even unleash psychoses that, insofar as in most cases the individuals themselves and their human environment will react in ways that block the process that was thus unleashed, may cause them to spin in endless loops of suffering. However, “bad trips” may be said to mimic the experiences of the wrathful mandalas in higher Dzogchen practices, which in duly prepared individuals are the occurrences having the highest potential for rapidly exhausting samsara.

We have seen that in 1957 Humphrey F. Osmond christened a wide class of psychoactive substances as “psychedelics.” Then, in 1979, Carl A. P. Ruck, Jeremy Bigwood, Danny Staples, Richard Evans Schultes, Jonathan Ott and R. Gordon Wasson coined the term “entheogens” to refer to so-called psychedelics, including CREV. My reasons for rejecting the etymology of the term “entheogens” and arguing against the use of the word are very different from the ones that made me question the etymology of the term “psychedelics,” and consist in the fact that, for the reasons explained in the last few paragraphs, it reinforces and consolidates the confusions denounced in this Section. Wikipedia defines “entheogens” as follows:

The word entheogen is a neologism derived from the ancient Greek: ἐνθεός (enteos) and γενέσθαι (geneste). Entheos literally means ‘god (theos) within,’ more freely translated as ‘inspired.’ The Greeks used it as a term of praise for poets and other artists. Geneste means ‘to generate.’ So an entheogen is ‘that which generates God (or godly inspiration) within a person.’ … The literal meaning of the word is ‘that which causes God to be within an individual.’ The translation ‘creating the divine within’ is sometimes given, but it must be noted that [the term] entheogen implies neither that something is created (as opposed to

\(^a\) nyams.
\(^b\) rgyu.
\(^c\) rkyen.
perceiving something that was already there) nor that that which is experienced is within the user (as opposed to having independent existence).

Evidently, those who coined the term “entheogens” could not have applied it to psychoactive plants of the solanaceae family such as atropa belladonna, hyocamus, the eleven species of datura, and so on, or to other drugs not having the potential to induce states of seeming “cosmic union” or the like. Thus the question is whether or not it is legitimate to apply it to CREV and other so-called “psychedelics”—which is the one that Roger Walsh (2003) made in a paper titled “Entheogens: True or False?” Though Walsh’s reply was in the affirmative, the arguments expounded in this Section have categorically demonstrated that, if we use the term “god” to refer to what, in the last chapter of the first volume of this book and after redefining the term used by Sartre (1980), I called holon, and which here I am calling Self-qua-Path and Self-qua-Fruit—which are instances of nirvana—these substances are false qua entheogens: as we read in Wikipedia, the term’s etymology is “that which generates God within a person,” which is contradictory insofar as the holon, like the Christian god, by its very nature uncaused / unproduced / unbecome (Pali abhèta; Skt. anutpada, anutpatti; Tib. makyepa), unborn (Pali and Skt. ajata; Tib. makyepa) and unconditioned / uncompounded / unproduced / unmade / uncontrived (Pali, asankhata; Skt., asamskrita; Tib., dümajai).

The definition in Wikipedia preemptively replies both to this objection and to the ones that would be raised by those who believe in a self-existing god like the one of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim traditions, yet by the same token outright contradicts the term’s etymology, by claiming that, “entheogen implies neither that something is created (as opposed to perceiving something that was already there) nor that that which is experienced is within the user (as opposed to having independent existence).” This clarification, however, does not save the term, for as repeatedly noted “(being) in the holon”—i.e., (being) in nirvana—is not something that can be caused: as the Dzogchen teachings make it crystal clear, the attainment of nirvana is wholly beyond the cause-effect relation, whereas all that is produced by causes and conditions, precisely insofar as it is produced / caused (Pali bhèta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepe), born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kyepe), and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhata; Skt. samskrita; Tib. düjai), pertains to samsara (or, in the best of cases, to the neutral condition of the base-of-all).

Neither psychoactive drugs nor spiritual practices can do more than inducing illusory experiences or nyam (nyams); however, whereas followers of traditional Paths (and in particular Dzogchen practitioners) are supposed to know how to employ the experiences produced by spiritual practices as reflections in a mirror allowing them to discover the uncreated and uncaused, nondual primordial awareness illustrated by the mirror, spontaneous, recreational users of CREV do not know how to use drug-induced experiences in this way: those who believe they experienced nirvana under the effect of such substances as a rule have not gone beyond the experiences of the formless realms (or those of other higher samsaric realms) that manifest immediately after the occurrence of the

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\[a\] ma skyes pa.
\[b\] 'dus ma byas.
\[c\] skyes pa.
\[d\] 'dus byas.
neutral condition of the base-of-all. Therefore, only if we used the term “being in god” to refer to the beings dwelling in the samsaric realms of the gods of formlessness, of the gods of form and of the gods of sensuality, would it be partly justified to use the term “entheogens” for referring to these substances: though it is karma and not any substances that are the primary cause for spending some time in the realms in question, these substances can be secondary causes or circumstances allowing users to spend short lapses in those realms—during which, however, part or all of the karma that is the primary cause for spending time in them is used up, and therefore the individual runs the risk of subsequently falling into lower realms.

The effects of the traditional methods Wisdom traditions use for raising the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness are so familiar to the tradition prescribing them that the ensuing developments are to a great extent predictable, and hence the dangers inherent in the raise in question are minimized. Most such methods are wholesome and many of them even improve health, and in the more gradual Paths they increase the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness in a quite gradual way, making it easier for practitioners to apply the instructions prescribed. The means used to this aim in the Tantric Path of Transformation raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness far more rapidly than those used in the Path of Renunciation. And methods of the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen such as those of Thögel and the Yangthik raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness in a small fraction of the time it would take through Tantric practices of the Path of Transformation working on the energetic system, setting the conditions for the reGnition of the unconditioned Base and true condition of the experience to occur, so that the Self-quahPath may manifest and by the same token whichever thoughts may be interpreting the experience spontaneously liberate themselves. Moreover, though these methods of the Upadeshavarga do not have as immediate an effect as CREV, they can raise the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness to a higher level than any drug and keep it on that level for days, weeks, months, or even longer periods. Nevertheless, these methods are exclusively taught to extremely advanced practitioners having a great capacity of spontaneous liberation and as such being able to use the ensuing experiences to maximize and accelerate the process of spontaneous liberation, rather than developing pathological attachments or undergoing psychoses the natural self-healing course of which is most likely to be blocked—which as we have seen would lead the individual undergoing them to spin in endless loops of suffering.

I wrote this section in order to keep readers from indulging in the use of so-called psychedelics in general and of CREV in particular, which as we have seen so often make users mistake samsaric and neither-samsaric-nor-nirvanic experiences for nirvana and thus derive unwarranted pride and infatuation, and which as we have seen involve far more consequential dangers. Nevertheless, some of those who used them in hippy times may have been lucky to do so, for certain Tibetan Masters have noted that some of their best students are former users / abusers of CREV who under their effects had holotropic experiences that inspired them to practice Buddhism.
VIII

The Gradation of Being:

the Degrees of the *Experience of Being*
in Different States of Consciousness and
Ken Wilber’s Inversions and Inaccuracies
The Gradation of Being

The myth of *lila* (i.e. of the hide-and-seek of primordial awareness with itself) and the related degenerative vision of spiritual and social human evolution, were transmitted by Wisdom-traditions supposedly sharing common origins and having Mount Kailash as their most sacred place—such as the Bön tradition of Zhang Zhung, the Shaiva tradition of India (and through its influence other systems that Indians classify within *Sanatana Dharma*), the Taoist tradition of China, the Zurvanist tradition of Persia, the newer Tantric schools of the different religions of India and the Himalayas (and in particular Vajrayana Buddhism, including Dzogchen), the Dionysian tradition of ancient Greece and the philosophies that derived from it (such as that of Heraclitus, that of the Cynics and that of the Stoics), etc. 439 Both the myth and the vision in question make the point that human life involves the manifestation in all individuals of unawareness of the true condition of reality (first sense of *avidya* in the Dzogchen classification adopted here), and then of a consciousness that, unaware of the fact that it is a function of a single universal Gnitiveness and an empty phenomenon manifesting in it, experiences itself as a self-existent, separate, autonomous experiencer-doer in an alien universe that it perceives as a conglomerate of manifold entities involving self-being (second and third of the senses of *avidya* in the classification adopted here). This is the core of the three-tier delusion that Heraclitus called *lethe* and Shakyamuni called *avidya*, which develops progressively until, having reached its full development and completed its *reductio ad absurdum*, it disconnects itself: in the myth of *lila*, consciousness, by treading the Path of Awakening, dissolves in the unveiling of the universal, primordial nondual awareness of the Self-*qua*-Base, initially for limited periods while on the Path—corresponding to the Self-*qua*-Path—and then irreversibly as the Self-*qua*-Fruit; in the degenerative view of spiritual and social human evolution, the dissolution of consciousness in our species puts an end to the Age of Darkness, Age of Degeneration or Iron Age of one cycle, and the recovery of awareness (of) the Self-*qua*-Base marks the beginning of the Perfect Age, Age of Truth or Golden Age of a new cycle—or, in the last cycle of our world system, of an equally perfect final Millennium, such as prophesized in the *Kalachakra Tantra*, in the *Book of Ismailis*, in the *Apocalypse* and so on. Thus, rather than speaking, as Ken Wilber did, of the “*Atman telos* of evolution,” one could speak of the “*Lila telos* of the human phenomenon common to both ontogenesis and phylogenesis:” the paradoxical juxtaposition of the Sanskrit term *lila*, which refers to an ongoing process, with the Greek term *telos*, which refers to the final condition of an end-oriented process, seems suitable for referring to the human phenomenon. 440

Just as the psycho-cosmic structure of the *Divine Comedy* is inverted in relation to the standard view according to which Heaven is straight over us rather than being straight under us, the conception of human spiritual and social evolution expounded in this book

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(which, as will be shown below, is an expression of the same psychological / teleonomic principle as the individual Path of Awakening illustrated by the Tuscan classic) is inverted with respect to the conception of modernity in the same regard—and, as will be shown in vol. III of this book, it is in diametrical opposition to Hegel’s, insofar as it asserts illusion rather than truth to increase with the passing of time. Also the view of the relationship between being and truth established in the discussion of the nature of being in vol. I of this book is inverted with respect to the most widespread conception in this regard, which is Plato’s commonsense view of being as truth, and as such it contradicts all gradations of being produced on the basis of commonsense views similar to Plato’s: insofar as being is the most basic illusory phenomenon (i.e., the most basic manifestation of avidya / marigpa in the second of the senses the terms have in the classification adopted here), a higher grade of being amounts to a greater degree of illusion (avidya or marigpa in the second of the senses in question) and thus to a lower grade of truth in this sense, whereas a lesser grade of being amounts to a lesser degree of illusion and hence to a higher grade of truth in the sense under consideration.

From the above it follows that in the system expounded in this book the degree of being increases in the process of evolution of the human spirit and society, but that this amounts to an increase of illusion rather than an increase of truth. In fact, in the unfolding of the cosmic cycle, aeon or kalpa, the degree of being was lowest at the beginning of the cycle, when the phenomenon of being barely arose in human beings and, if the necessary conditions were present, at some point it liberated itself spontaneously, giving way to the state of Communion free from the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought. With the passing of time, the phenomenon in question progressively gained in strength and power, and its spontaneous liberation became more and more uncommon. Since the experience of this phenomenon is uncomfortable, as the phenomenon in question becomes stronger and more powerful we develop bad faith / elusion in order to be able to bear its experience. To some extent, this keeps the development of this phenomenon in check; however, it cannot do so absolutely, and hence the phenomenon in question continues to gradually intensify, reaching its maximum degree at the very end of the cycle—after which it can crumble and a new cycle can begin.

Despite Ken Wilber’s claim that his “integral” philosophy and psychology is based on universal views shared by all genuine wisdom-traditions, it adheres to the modern view of human spiritual and social evolution as a progressive perfecting of the human spirit and society, which outright contradicts the views of all traditions having their focal point in Mount Kailash and of some of the systems derived from them. Since—in contradiction with Madhyamika philosophy and with the system expounded in this book—Wilber seems to identify being with truth, he might as well agree that the degree of being increases in the process of human spiritual and social evolution—yet if he did so he would most likely understand this as meaning that our species has been gradually evolving toward the Atman condition that is the telos of the human phenomenon, and that, since the latter represents absolute being, our evolution is characterized by a gradual increase of being understood as truth. Insofar as Wilber endorses the modern myth of spiritual and social evolution as improvement, and insofar as he views the Path of Awakening as a progressive “ascension” through ever more harmonic states while overlooking the wrathful dynamic of Awakening symbolized by the mandala and the Divine Comedy (which is essential to all of the

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traditions that have their hub in Mount Kailash, which implies that the Path of Awakening is a “descending” Path in the sense the term is given in this chapter, and which is an expression of the same psychological principle as the “descending,” degenerative vision of spiritual and social evolution), his readers can take comfort in believing that our species is and will be at each moment better off than in the previous moment, and in believing the process of Awakening to be free of dire straits. Therefore, Wilber’s system appeals to those who, in Krishnamurti’s words, “simply don’t want to be disturbed”—and who therefore on the collective plane dream of going ahead without having to face either catastrophes or the disjunctive between radical change or extinction, and on the individual plane dream of a Path leading to plenitude and harmony without going through turmoil. In fact, his system seems to be based on the false principles of anesthetic evolution and anesthetic Awakening.

The teachings of Dzogchen Atiyoga and of the Ancient or Nyingmapa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism in general represent the cosmic cycle, aeon or kalpa as a process of gradual strengthening and acceleration of the vibratory activity that seems to emanate from, or to be concentrated in, the center of the body at the level of the heart, and that charges our thoughts (coarse, subtle and supersubtle) with seeming truth and importance, giving rise to the basic illusion which constitutes the second of the senses the term avidya has in the classification adopted here, which is the core of the basic human contradiction, and which involves pivotal phenomena of samsara such as the phenomenon of being and the ensuing illusion of self-being and ultimate importance of entities, the subject-object cleavage and the concomitant disruption of Total Space-Time-Awareness that gives rise to space, time and knowledge, etc. This is the reason why, as noted above, the phenomenon of being becomes progressively more accentuated as the cycle unfolds—and, with it, the illusion of self-being and ultimate importance of entities increases, the subject-object chasm becomes more acute, space becomes narrower and more fragmented, time passes faster, and the basic human contradiction develops. As the degree of being and therefore the degree of illusion (i.e. the degree of avidya or marigpa in the second of the senses the terms have in the classification adopted here) gradually increase, a gradation of being is produced which, as noted above, is contrary to the ones produced by those who equate being with truth, and in which the degree of being and hence of illusion increases as time passes—yet does not do so evenly in all sentient beings, for it increases more strikingly in civilized societies than in “savage” communities, in big cities than in remote, quiet areas of the countryside, and in psychotics and neurotics than in “normal” people (the latter insofar as in normality the elusion of the naked experience of being keeps in check the strength and frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, thereby keeping in check the phenomenon of being).

The vibratory activity in question consists in the repetition of spasmodic contractions in the heart chakra or focal point, which could be partly compared to handclaps trying to produce the illusion that someone concrete and substantial is holding something concrete and substantial. At the beginning of the cosmic cycle, the strengthening of this vibratory activity and the increase of its rates, and hence the intensification of all that results from it, takes place in an extremely slow, imperceptible way. However, since the phenomenon of being is the power that feeds the drive to obtain the illusion that a self-existent grasper is grasping a self-existent, substantial, concrete entity, when in the final period of the time cycle the phenomenon of being increases beyond a threshold, the drive to gain the illusion that a self-existent grasper is grasping a self-existent, substantial, concrete entity becomes so strong that there is no way to produce the required appearance of substantiality, and
hence we begin to glimpse that there is neither a self-existent grasping subject, nor a self-existent, substantial, concrete grasped object—which amounts to the impairment of avidya or marigpa in the third sense the term has in the classification adopted here (an impairment that, as shown in vol. III of this book, is also catalyzed by the increase in the rate of change of standards of behavior, the stressing character of contemporary city life, and so on). Since the glimpse that there is no self-existent grasping subject and no self-existent, substantial, concrete grasped object causes the strength and frequency of the spasmodic contractions to increase in a bid for confirming the subject’s self-existence and the object’s substantiality and concreteness, the result is a positive feedback loop inducing a runaway of the vibratory activity under consideration and of the concomitant drive to gain the illusion that a self-existent grasper is grasping a self-existent, substantial, concrete entity. Thus in the final period of the cycle it becomes evident that the development of the cosmic time cycle is driven by the Thanatic positive feedback loops that in the preceding chapter were shown to be the driving force behind the processes and experiences represented in terms of the symbolism of the Divine Comedy and so on.\(^a\)

Since the velocity of the passing of time is directly proportional to the frequency of the vibratory activity under consideration, in the final stage of the cycle the acceleration of time becomes clearly perceptible. Since the degree of the basic illusion corresponding to the second sense the terms avidya or marigpa have in the classification adopted here, which is the core of the basic human contradiction, also depends on the strength and frequency of the vibratory activity in question, and since, as noted above, beyond a threshold of the strength and frequency of this vibratory activity the mechanisms at the root of avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here falter and the basic human contradiction is revealed as such, toward the end of the cycle the contradiction in question turns into conflict—which, because of our inborn disposition to reject conflict, increases from its own feedback, catalyzing the runaway of the vibratory activity portrayed above and hence of the phenomenon of being, the velocity of the passing of time, and so on. Since this makes the basic contradiction even more acute, at the end of the cycle the basic human contradiction attains its zenith, whereas conflict attains the level of total conflagration. At this point the vibratory activity we are concerned with reaches a threshold at which it can but crumble like a dog falling flat after trying to bite its own tail with ever-increasing speed—which, provided that the process is catalyzed by the influence of realized exponents of genuine Paths of Awakening, may result in the crumbling of all that is produced by the activity in question: the phenomenon of being, time,\(^b\) space, ek-sistence, becoming, the cleavage separating the mental subject from the continuum of what appears as object, the illusion of ultimate importance, etc. Since this puts an end to samsaric functioning, a new Golden Age, Age of Truth or Age of Perfection can begin—or, if we are in the last cycle of our world-system, what can begin is the roughly equivalent final Millennium prophesized in the Kalachakra Tantra, in the Book of Ismailis,\(^c\) in the Apocalypse and so on.

The above description makes evident that there is a partial analogy between the degenerative evolution occurring in human phylogenesis and the processes occurring in

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\(^b\) Padmasambhava (1977).

\(^c\) Under the direction of Brice Parain (1972), p. 281.
late ontogenesis I have represented in terms of the *Divine Comedy* (according to which the Awakened condition is not reached by ascending, but requires that we begin by descending in the sense in which this was understood in the preceding chapter), the *mandala* and so on, and that both the one and the others are expressions of a single principle that is central to human psycho-cosmology. Furthermore, some of the processes undergone by individuals on the Path which are represented in terms of the aforementioned symbols are microcosmic instances of the cosmic time cycle, which as Padmasambhava made it clear,\(^a\) is also a meditative experience human individuals can undergo, in which wayward patterns develop toward the threshold at which delusion spontaneously crumbles and the total plenitude and perfection of the Self-*qua*-Base becomes fully patent. One of the conditions that permit the runaway of the system toward the threshold level at which the Self-*qua*-Base can become fully patent and thus allow the human individual to have the meditative experience of the aeon or *kalpa*, is what the *Atthasalini* referred to as the “creation of a deficiency in the mechanisms that sustain birth and death” (i.e. in the mechanisms of elusion / bad faith and whichever spiritual techniques we apply in order to perfect these mechanisms). As noted in the preceding chapter, in the case of Thögel and the Yangthik, which are the practices in which the meditative experience of the aeon or *kalpa* may occur in its purest form, this depends on a dynamic proper to the sphere of form, which, as Padmasambhava noted,\(^b\) “is an ocean of vibration that becomes ever more turbulent as one moves away from its peaceful profundities,” is “sensitive to the slightest tremor of pain or displeasure,” and comprises “impulses that formulate their own antidote to disharmony.” The purpose of these practices and of the meditative experience of the aeon or *kalpa* is to achieve the irreversible neutralization of the obstacle of knowledge (Skt. *jñeyavarana*; Tib. *shedrib\(^c\)*) that remains even after the obstacle of defilements (Skt. *kleshavarana*; Tib. *nyöndrib\(^d\)*) has been successfully dealt with in the course of the practice of Tekchö.

The above implies that also the Path may be explained in terms of a gradation of being: whether we explain it in terms of the meditative experience of the aeon or *kalpa*, or explain it in terms of descending through Hell and, continuing in the same direction so as to pass through the hole at the bottom of Hell, ascend through Purgatory and later through the Heavens toward the Empyrean, we are referring to a runaway of the phenomenon of being toward its threshold level at which it may achieve its breaking point, unleashed by a deficiency in the mechanisms of elusion or bad faith, which allows us to fully experience the conflict inherent in the basic contradiction at the root of *samsara*, providing us with a springboard from which to plunge into *nirvana* (i.e. into the Self-*qua*-Path), in which the phenomenon of being has dissolved. It is because of this universal principle, and because all that is produced / caused (Pali *bhëta*; Skt. *nupada* or *nupatti*; Tib. *kyepa\(^e\)*), born (Pali and Skt. *jata*; Tib. *kyepa\(^f\)\), and compounded / conditioned / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, *sankhata*; Skt. *samskrita*; Tib. *düjai\(^g\)*), pertains to *samsara* and as such is characterized by threefold delusion (*avidya* or *marigpa*), impermanence and dissatisfaction,

__\(^a\) Padmasambhava (1977). \(^b\) Padmasambhava (1977), p. 15. Due to the loss of the English text, I had to retranslate into English from Italian. \(^c\) *shes sgrib*. \(^d\) *nyon sgrib*.
\(^e\) *skyes pa*. \(^f\) *skyes pa*. \(^g\) *'dus byas.*
that I have never structured my explanations of the Path in terms of a vertical progression from the states of greater conflict located at the bottom, up through ever less conflicting states, to perfect irreversible Awakening at the summit.

At any rate, both at the level of the species (at least once delusion has developed to a certain extent) and at the individual level, the degree of being also depends on the degree to which the strength and frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought is kept in check by avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen division adopted here—i.e., by bad faith, which as we have seen may be boosted by spiritual practices based on negative feedback aimed at containing the reactions that would activate the positive feedback loop at the root of the system’s runaway. Although the sphere of form that occupies the middle region of samsara involves the dynamic referred to above, which may give rise to runaways of the vibratory activity under discussion, and although the sphere of formlessness that occupies the highest region of samsara may involve experiences of panic that also comprise such runaways, generally speaking it may be said that the lower we manage to make the degree of being, the higher we ascend in samsara, and that in advanced stages of the process of spiritual and social degenerative evolution the condition with the least degree of being may be the “peak of experience”444 that is the summit of samsara. Therefore, the gradation of being under discussion may be roughly represented by the symbolism of the Vajracharya’s hat, which features the sphere of sensuality at the top, the sphere of form in the middle, and the sphere of formlessness at the bottom.445

Delusion as understood here may be defined as the experience of an illusion while being unaware of the fact that it is an illusion, and as such it consists in the complete, three-tiered avidya or marigpa involving all three senses of the terms in the classification adopted here. In terms of this definition of delusion, the more perfect the mechanisms that produce avidya or marigpa in the third of the present senses of the terms, and hence the less aware we are of the fact that illusion is illusion, the more deluded we are. Since the mechanisms in question keep in check the strength and frequency of the vibratory activity at the root of the phenomenon of being, the better the functioning of the mechanisms in question, the lower the grade of being. Therefore, at any given point of the development of the cosmic time cycle the grade of being will be inversely proportional to the degree of delusion (i.e., of the complete, three-tiered avidya or marigpa involving all three senses these terms are being given)—which means that the relationship between delusion and the degree of being is the opposite of the one between the degree of being and the degree of the illusion that constitutes the second of the senses of avidya or marigpa in the classification used here. In fact, at any given point of the development of the cosmic time cycle the complete, three-tiered avidya or marigpa is likely to be more pronounced in the sphere of formlessness and less pronounced in the sphere of sensuality—and hence with regard to delusion qua three-tiered avidya or marigpa, the appropriate map of samsara is the standard one featuring the realm of formlessness at the top and the realm of sensuality at the bottom.

The principle of the Divine Comedy has to do with the fact that, since the way to totally neutralize delusion is by creating the conditions that will make the vibratory activity under discussion increase from its own feedback until it “breaks,” and thereon do the same each and every time it manifests, and since generally speaking “going down in samsara” involves the increase of the vibratory activity and hence of the grade of being by means of positive feedback, to take this course until the maximum grade of being is obtained may result in the spontaneous liberation of the phenomenon of being, and to persist in this
course may in the long run result in the complete neutralization of delusion and in general of all phenomena. On the contrary, to go up in samsara, insofar as generally speaking it involves a reduction of the vibratory activity in question by means of negative feedback, is not directly conducive to the dissolution of the phenomenon of being, and under most circumstances may have the opposite effect and prevent its dissolution.

**Ken Wilber’s Inverted Gradation of Being and Inaccurate “Holarchies” in General**

Ken Wilber has produced a series of hierarchic classifications of consciousness and experience (which at some point he decided to call “holarchies”), all of which have been structured contrarily to the *Divine Comedy* insofar as—just like the classifications featured in the *Upanishads*—they represent each of the successive levels on the Path as lying above the preceding one and place full Awakening at the top, as though it were to be reached by a progressive process of ascent. In 1977, Wilber posited the initial, single hierarchy that he reviewed in the paper “Beyond Mind,” consisting of three basic levels, which are: (1) “of the ego,” which is at the base of the hierarchy; (2) “existential,” located in the middle; and (3) “mental,” lying at the top. He defined these as follows:

Now the Ego Level is that band of consciousness that comprises our role, our picture of ourself, our self-image, with both its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as the analytical and discriminatory nature of the intellect, of our “mind.” The second major level, the Existential Level, involves our total organism, our soma as well as our psyche, and thus comprises our basic sense of existence, of being, along with our cultural premises that in many ways mold this basic sensation of existence. Among other things, the Existential Level forms the sensory reference of our self-image: it’s what you feel when you mentally evoke the symbol of your self-image. It forms, in short, the persistent and irreducible source of separate I-awareness. The third basic level, here called Mind, is commonly termed mystical consciousness, and it entails the sensation that you are fundamentally one with the universe. So where the Ego Level includes the mind, and the Existential Level includes both the mind and the body, the Level of Mind includes the mind and the body and the rest of the universe.

Giving continuity to the overestimation of what Maslow called “peak experiences” proper to most of the transpersonal movement, at the time of writing the above Wilber seems to have viewed as the aim of spiritual Paths the attainment of the “sensation of being fundamentally one with the universe.” The wording of this phrase applies quite precisely to the experiences of the formless realms that, according to Buddhism, constitute the summit of samsara, in which there is a mental subject that knows an infinitude appearing as object and that establishes a link of being with this infinitude, and thus comes to feel that the latter is its true being. However, it does not at all apply to nirvana, where there is no apparently separate mental subject that may feel either one with anything or different from anything. Moreover, Wilber asserted individual liberation (Skt. *moksha* or *mukti*) to lie in the

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\[a\] Capriles (2000c).
“comprehension of the mental level”—which, if understood literally, would consist in the intellectual understanding of the level wherein one “has the sensation” of cosmic oneness.

In fact, levels belong to what Buddhism calls “conventional truth,” the Sanskrit term for which has the etymological meaning of “deluded [pseudo]truth,” and are proper to the Ferris wheel-like gloomy-go-round called samsara: the vicious circle of experience that involves climbing to higher states and then falling into lower, gloomier ones, and which features a summit (the “highest” of the four formless absorptions, defined as involving neither perception nor absence of perception, and characterized by an experience of cosmic unity) and a bottom (consisting in the lowest realm of the sphere of sensuality [Skt. kama loka or kamadhatu], which is the bottommost naraka or “purgatory” in the sense of “non-eternal hell:” the avichi naraka or “uninterrupted purgatory,” in which the experience of separation and division reaches its ceiling). On the other hand, according to the higher Buddhist teachings, nirvana is the condition of absolute equality in which there is no “I” that may ascend or descend, and which is attained by Seeing through the conditioned experiences of samsara into the unconditioned Self-qua-Base that was concealed by those conditioned experiences. That which is specifically Dzogchen (though Ch’an/Zen has a roughly analogous concept) is the explicit consideration of the neutral condition of the base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten b, wherein neither nirvana nor samsara is active, as a third possibility besides samsara and nirvana.  

With the passing of time, the number of levels in Wilber’s hierarchic classifications of consciousness and experience multiplied, yet for a long time he did not discriminate among different types of stratification. By 1982, c the levels were: (1) the physical; (2) the biological; (3) the mental (no longer intended to correspond to Awakening, for now the term indicates the “level of ego, logic and thought”); (4) the subtle (of non-Jungian archetypes, transindividual, intuitive); (5) the causal (formless brilliancy or luminosity, perfect transcendence), and (6) the absolute (consciousness as such, which would be the source of all other levels). Note that the description of the “causal level” Wilber offers at this point perfectly responds to the state known as base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten b, wherein neither nirvana nor samsara are active, as manifest when one does neither react with aversion to the inner luminosity of dang d energy known as tingsel e nor reGnize this luminosity in the manifestation of dharma f, but remains cozily fused in it, or in some nirvikalpa experiences of the samten bardo g or bardo of meditative absorption (i.e., to some forms of what is called nirvikalpa samādhi)—and may also correspond to the vaguely defined turiya-ānanda (or turīya-avasthā) of both the Māṇḍūkya and Taittirīya Upaniṣads. Finally, Wilber tells us that the sixth and last is, more than a level, the true condition of all levels; that it is the unconditioned foundation that is hidden by countless conditioning mental constructions and that the Dzogchen teachings refer to as Dzogchen-qua-Base—but which Wilber somehow turned into the Summit of his hierarchy of spiritual states (in this regard it is this level that is analogous to turiya-ānanda or turīya-avasthā as explained in the texts just mentioned).  

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b kun gezi lung ma bstan.
c Wilber (1982).
d gdangs.
e gting gsal.
f bsam gtan bar do; Skt. samādhi antarābhava.
condition of reality, which [is] there regardless of whether we realize it or not—and hence if we accepted Wilber’s schema of levels, it would be previous even to the first of these levels. Nor could Wilber’s final level consist in the direct, nondual realization of the true condition in question, for as will be shown below, Wilber asserts it not to be a discrete state [such as the final Buddhahood in which the direct, nondual realization of the true condition is never again concealed—as described, for example, in Maitreya’s Abhisamayalamkara], and asserts it to involve the subject-object duality that, as repeatedly noted, is the second of the veils that conceals the true condition in question [the first being the ignorance of the Base’s true condition that is the first of the senses of avidya or marigpa in all Dzogchen classifications].

So far as I know, Wilber has not ceased to offer his readers hierarchical schemas (which lately he has preferred to call “holarchical”). By 1996, the levels had become organized in different systems: one involving three groups of levels described by Ervin Laszlo; two involving five levels each; another one involving nine “basic structures of consciousness;” a twofold one involving twelve levels (“the great holarchy in Plotinus and Aurobindo”); and the one involving four series of thirteen levels each that Wilber calls “the four quadrants.” Among these systems, the first one, comprising three groups of levels, responds to the need (which I acknowledged in various works) to distinguish degrees of complexity in reality, and especially to acknowledge the qualitative difference between the level of human consciousness and subjectivity, and the subatomic levels of physical reality that many adherents of “New Paradigm Thinking” turned into a universal model for all of reality. However, the system that posits the ten “basic structures of consciousness” or “fulcra”—among which the tenth, Wilber claims, “is not so much a fulcrum or separate level, but is rather the very Essence of all levels, of all states, of all conditions” (thus involving the same difficulties as the sixth level in the 1982 classification)—is just another hierarchical (now called “holarchical”) division of states of consciousness of the type criticized above, as well as in other of my works.

Wilber himself has divided the evolution of his thought into Wilber I, Wilber II and Wilber III—to which Stan Grof adds a Wilber IV—noting that Wilber I had a Romantic / Jungian approach, that Wilber II resulted from a rupture with that perspective occasioned by realization of the unsolvable problems it presented (in other words, from realizing his former approach to be an aporia), and that Wilber III is different from Wilber II mainly in that it distinguishes the different developmental lines that unfold through the nine or ten basic levels he calls fulcra. However, two basic inaccuracies of Wilber’s 1977 hierarchic classification of states of consciousness persisted in all subsequent ones—and, furthermore, some of the latter seem to have introduced new inaccuracies as well. The two basic inaccuracies dating from 1977 that persisted in posterior hierarchies (“holarchies”) lay in:

1. Wilber’s failure to discriminate between: (a) samsaric transpersonal, holotropic conditions (and in particular the formless absorptions and the corresponding realms, which will be considered in a note below), in which bondage is far subtler and hence far more difficult to recognize and hence to cut out than in samsaric personal conditions; (b) the

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a Wilber (1996).
d Capriles (1999a, 2000a, 2000c).
e Wilber (1996b; 1998).
f Grof (1998d).
transpersonal, quasi-holistic condition of the neutral base-of-all, in which, as we have seen, neither samsara nor nirvana are active, and in which the precious human birth is squandered, and (c) the transpersonal conditions of nirvana in which true release and true sanity lie.

(2) His seemingly Upanishads-inspired model in which Awakening and nirvana are attained by ascending through progressive levels until a plane lying above all other planes is reached, and his insistence on presenting the successive classifications he produced on the basis of this model as applying to all Paths—despite the fact that, as will be shown in the discussion of his 1996 classification, they frontally contradict each and every one of the sequences of realization posited by the various Buddhist Paths and vehicles. Furthermore, Wilber overlooks the fact that in a metaphenomenological, metaontological sense, the Path of Awakening consists in Seeing through the multiple layers of conditioned experiences that make up samsara, into the unconditioned Self-quä-Base which those experiences conceal, so as to discover the unconditioned condition of absolute equality in which there is no hierarchy or holarchy whatsoever, thus putting an end to the illusion of an “I” that may ascend or descend and to the delusory valuation-absolutization of levels. Therefore, the inadvertent reader may fail to realize that the Path involves the undoing of the conditioning produced by the process of ontogenesis, and could go as far as to conclude that Awakening is to be attained by building successive states (which, being built, would be conditioned), each over and above the preceding one.

Among the “fulcra” Wilber posited in 1996, the sixth (the centaur or existential level) is defined as involving: (a) the integration of mind and body; (b) the authenticity of not eluding basic anguish (i.e. not eluding that which, according to the “first Heidegger” [1996], is inherent in being-for-death, and which, according to the “first Sartre,” is inherent in the being of the human individual), and (c) that which Jean Gebser called “aperspectival freedom,” deriving from the fact that one no longer privileges any point of view over the plethora of other viewpoints at one’s disposal. Then the transpersonal levels begin: in the seventh fulcrum, which Wilber calls “psychic level” and misinterprets as the nirmanakaya, the sensation of a separate identity momentarily dissolves (e.g. when, in the contemplation of nature, the illusion of someone separate from nature who is perceiving it disappears). In the eighth, which he refers to as the “subtle level” and misinterprets as the sambhogakaya, the individual contacts non-ordinary strata of perception and subtle non-Jungian archetypes. In the ninth, which he calls “causal” and mistakes for the dharmakaya (for the time being, notice that the dharmakaya cannot be causal, for it is nonrelative and hence beyond the cause-effect relation), the “pure emptiness” of the “witness” is realized in an unmanifest absorption or cessation. Finally, the tenth fulcrum is not properly a fulcrum, but the true condition of all fulcra—and yet it must necessarily be a fulcrum insofar as it is only reached after going through the ninth fulcrum.

In none of the genuine Paths I am familiar with, does the practitioner have to go through all the fulcra posited by Wilber, and to do so precisely in the order he establishes. The first level of realization may in fact be preceded by the relative authenticity Wilber associates to the sixth fulcrum, which lies in developing to some degree a capacity not to elude the experiences Kierkegaard referred to as despair, Angst, “fear and trembling,” etc.

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a Sartre (1980).
b Gebser (1986).
or the experience of Angst as manifest in what Heidegger—a called “being toward the end,” or what Sartre called angoise, nausée and so on—and which may be somehow related to the stage of paranoia posited by David Cooper. However, the bare experience of the being of the human individual that consists in basic anguish, does not in any sense involve the integration of mind and body which, according to Wilber, is also inherent in the sixth fulcrum; on the contrary, this experience arises when the contradiction inherent in the delusion called avidya or marigpa initially becomes evident and hence turns into conflict—and one of the aspects of the contradiction that turns into conflict is precisely the illusory mind-body schism. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the most advanced practices of Dzogchen, which are to be applied when there is already a great degree of body-mind integration, in a stage that is subsequent to the realization of voidness, to the realization of absolute truth and to the whole of the stages posited by Wilber (but which comprises the manifestation of the self-luminous visions of the intermediate state of dharmata or chönyi bardo, which are somehow like those Wilber associated with the eighth fulcrum), are based in experiencing in its bareness the anguish and distress inherent in the being of the human individual. To conclude, we have seen that according to Wilber the sixth fulcrum, which in his system is supposed to precede the realization of voidness, involves what Jean Gebser called “aperspectival freedom,” deriving from the fact that one no longer privileges any point of view over the plethora of other viewpoints at one’s disposal—an outcome that in all higher Buddhist Paths results from the realization of voidness beyond the subject-duality in the state of absolute truth and that, as I have shown elsewhere, can only derive from this realization (and which, therefore, simply cannot be prior to it).

Moreover, though Wilber has studied Dzogchen, he is positing a progression of realization beginning at the seventh fulcrum that he wrongly takes for the nirmanakaya (but which does not match any of the levels of realization that obtain in the genuine Paths I am familiar with), followed by the eighth fulcrum that he mistakenly identifies with the sambhogakaya (but which does not match any of the levels of realization that obtain in the genuine Paths I know well), then followed by the ninth fulcrum, which he confuse with the dharmakaya (but which does not match any of the levels of realization that obtain in the genuine Paths I am familiar with), and concluding at the tenth fulcrum, which he confuses with the swabhavikaya (but which I have been unable to identify as any of the levels of realization that obtain in the genuine Paths I know well). In so doing, not only does he mistake for the four kayas experiences that are not these kayas, but he also posits a sequence of the kayas opposite to the one that is characteristic of the Dzogchen teachings and in particular of the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of teachings—which begins with realization of the dharmakaya, continues with realization of the sambhogakaya and concludes with realization of the nirmanakaya.

A sequence of realization beginning with the nirmanakaya, continuing with the sambhogakaya, then featuring the dharmakaya, and concluding with the swabhavikaya that consists in the indivisibility of the first three kayas, is posited in the Buddhist Tantras of the Path of Transformation. As shown in vol. I of this book, this inversion by the Tantras of the Path of Transformation of the sequence of realization of the kayas proper to Dzogchen

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a Heidegger (1996).
b Sartre (1980).
c Cooper (1971).
d Capriles (2005).
Atiyoga, the “universal ancestor of all vehicles,” is related to the fact that, though in both systems the names of the kayas are the same, what the names indicate is not in all senses the same reality—which is evidenced by the fact that, as noted in vol. I of this book and elsewhere, the final realization of the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, which these Tantras call swabhavikāya and consider as the fourth and last kāya to be attained, corresponds to the state of Direct Introduction to Dzogchen that is the precondition of genuine Dzogchen practice and that, in the Upadēshavarga series of teachings, is prior to the practice of Tekchö that must establish the dharmakāya and to the subsequent practice of Thögel that must establish the sambhogakāya and that finally must result in the nirmanakāya. Therefore, the levels of realization that Dzogchen Ati calls sambhogakāya and nirmanakāya go far beyond the final level of realization of the inner Tantras of the Path of transformation and by no means can be attained through the methods of these Tantras.

In fact, in the Menngagde series of Dzogchen Ati (but not so in the Inner Tantras of the Vajrayāna) and in the present context, the dharmakāya is the correct apprehension of the dang mode of manifestation of energy in the practice of Tekchö, the sambhogakāya is the correct apprehension of the rölpa mode of manifestation of energy in the practice of Thögel, and finally the nirmanakāya is the correct apprehension of the tsel mode of manifestation of energy that obtains as the result of carrying the practice of Thögel to a given threshold: this is the reason why the Dzogchen teachings place so much emphasis on these forms of manifestation of energy, which are ignored in the Anuttarayogatantras of the Sarmpa and in the Nyingma Tantras of the Path of Transformation, and in all lower vehicles as well. The point is that in Tekchö practitioners work mainly with the katak aspect of the Base, corresponding to voidness, and with the dang mode of manifestation of energy, which is the single, fundamental constituent of all thoughts—and whenever the true condition of the dang energy is recognized, the dharmakāya, which in this context is the first aspect of Awakening, manifests. In Thögel practitioners work principally with the lhundrub or “spontaneous perfection” aspect of the Base, which comprises the absolutely unconstrained and unrestrained spontaneity of our Gniveness (and in particular the positive feedback loops that make up the Thanatos), and with the intangible self-luminous visions which occur in the intermediate state of dharmata or chönyi bardo and which are the paradigmatic expressions of the rölpa mode of manifestation of energy—and it is when the true condition of rölpa energy is recognized, so that the mental subject that seemed to be perceiving it disappears, that the sambhogakāya manifests. Finally, the nirmanakāya only manifests in a stable manner once integration with the self-luminous visions in the practice of Thögel has neutralized the tendency to experience phenomena as external objects, and

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a Nubchen Sangye Yeshe (gnubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes), Samten Migdrön (bsam gtan mig sgron).
c khregs chod.
d thod rgal.
e gdangs.
f rol pa.
g rtsal.
h gsar ma pa.
i rnying ma pa.
j ka dag.
k lhun grub.
l rol pa.
so we no longer experience ourselves as separate from the phenomena of the “material” world constituted by tsel\(^a\) energy: it may be said that the rölpa and tsel forms of manifestation of energy have fused, and so there is no longer anything that may interrupt the condition of indivisibility or jerme\(^b\) that constitutes the nirmanakaya.\(^c\) Since tsel energy has acquired the characteristics of rölpa energy, the wisdoms of quality and quantity, inherent in the sambhogakaya, manifest in the nirmanakaya as well, and thus laymen perceive the person as “having a capacity of miracles.”\(^461\)

The fact that the sequence of realization of the kayas on the Path of transformation seems to coincide with the one Wilber posits in the 1996 work we are considering does \textit{not} at all mean the “holarchy” we are considering coincides with the sequence of realization on the Path in question. To begin with, in the 1996 work that we have been considering, Wilber equated the nirmanakaya with what he called “psychic level,” but his description of this level was ambiguous enough as to apply equally to transpersonal samsaric states, to neither-samsaric-nor-nirvanic transpersonal states, and if we are not too strict perhaps even to some nirvanic states—though apparently \textit{not} so to the nirmanakaya as understood in any Buddhist system.\(^d\)

\[\ldots\] a person might temporarily dissolve the separate-self sense\(^462\) (the ego or centaur) and find an identity with the entire gross or sensorimotor world—so-called \textit{nature mysticism}. You’re on a nice nature walk, relaxed and expansive in your awareness, and wham!—suddenly there is no looker, just the mountain—and you are the mountain. You are not in here looking at the mountain out there. There is just the mountain, and it seems to see itself, or you seem to be seeing it from within. The mountain is closer to you than you own skin.

I assume that what Wilber means by \textit{identifying with} is what Sartre called \textit{becoming} and contrasted with \textit{identifying with}.\(^e\) Whatever the case, if we \textit{identify with} / \textit{become} the world \textit{qua} totality, the subject-object duality is still present, for \textit{it is the mental subject that identifies with} / \textit{becomes} the object \textit{qua} totality—and in such a case what has taken place is a samsaric experience of the formless realms.\(^463\) However, immediately after speaking of identification, Wilber uses the expression \textit{disappearance of the observer}, which implies that there is no mental subject that may \textit{identify with} / \textit{become} this or that—in which case we would not be speaking of an experience of the formless realms, which like all samsaric conditions involves the subject-object duality. Neither in nirvana, nor in the neutral condition of the base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten\(^f\) wherein neither samsara nor nirvana are active, is there a mental subject / observer; however, since in individuals who are not intensively training in a genuine Path of Awakening it is hardly possible that an initial manifestation of nirvana may take place fortuitously while “taking a walk through nature, relaxed and open,” we can be almost certain that if the mental subject / observer actually disappeared in such circumstances, that occurrence would be an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all. Nevertheless, since as we have seen this condition cannot be

\(^{a}\) \textit{rtsal}.
\(^{b}\) \textit{dbyer med}.
\(^{c}\) Cf. Capriles (2003) or, for a more in depth explanation, Capriles (work in progress 4).
\(^{f}\) \textit{kun gzhi lung ma bstan}. 
reflexively remembered, what we reflexively remember must necessarily be the instance of the samsaric formless realms that takes place when, immediately after the occurrence of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, the subject-object duality arises, so that the undivided sensory continuum is taken as object and the mental subject / observer becomes this pseudo-totality, having the feeling of being what is perceived rather than having the feeling of being inherently different from it. The fact that in the same paragraph Wilber speaks of disappearance of the observer and of identifying with (which I understand in the sense of Sartre’s becoming) the world qua totality suggests that Wilber is referring to an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all immediately followed by the arising of the mental subject / observer in an experience of the formless sphere, and that a posteriori he mixed these two successive occurrences with each other, taking them for a single occurrence. At any rate, what the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation call the nirmanakaya does not manifest in the fortuitous manner in which, according to Wilber, the occurrence he identifies as the seventh fulcrum comes about, nor does it consist in a particular type of apprehension of the phenomena of the natural world. (There is a contradiction between Wilber’s reference to a “disappearance of the observer” in this fulcrum and his claim that in it there occur the first glimpses of the pure “witness,”

like the Vajrayana Buddhist traditions that posit a sequence of realization nirmanakaya-sambhogakaya-dharmakaya-swabhavikaya has never claimed that the observer disappears in the manifestation of the nirmanakaya and then is reestablished in that of the swabhavikaya, as Wilber implies by asserting the observer to disappear in the seventh fulcrum and yet asserting the supposedly nondual realization of the tenth fulcrumless fulcrum to involve the subject-object duality—a claim that, beside being self-contradictory in that it asserts the nondual to involve the duality of subject and object, will be refuted below with numerous cites from canonical scriptures and authorized commentaries and treatises.)

However, elsewhere Wilber has produced a far more outrageous misconception of the nirmanakaya, which is the one Sean Kelly resumes as follows:

The Nirmanakaya is alternately described by Wilber as the “psychic” (or “astral-psychic”) or “low subtle” realm, and includes such things as “out-of-body experiences, certain occult knowledge, the auras, true magic, ‘astral travel,’ ... [and] what we would call ‘psi’ phenomena: ESP, precognition, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and so on” (Wilber 1980, 67). It is here that “consciousness starts to go transpersonal” (1980, 66).

If this description applies to the nirmanakaya, then the name Napoleon Bonaparte applies to the President of the USA. In the Mahayana the literal, exoteric view of the kayas is that the nirmanakaya is a Buddha in physical form (like, say, the one who, in the fifth century BCE, gave rise to the Buddhist teachings of our time), the sambhogakaya is that same Buddha’s voice (and energy), and the dharmakaya is that same Buddha’s undeluded awareness. We have seen that in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings the sequence of realization is dharmakaya – sambhogakaya – nirmanakaya, and that in this context the latter consists in the realization of the true condition of tsel energy, in which this energy is no longer experienced as a external dimension. Since we have also seen that the sequence of realization nirmanakaya – sambhogakaya – dharmakaya – swabhavikaya is proper to the Inner Tantras of Transformation, it is with these Tantras that

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a Rothberg (1998a, p. 9)
b Kelly (1998a, p. 121).
we must be concerned in this case. One interpretation of the kayas in these Tantras is that
the nirmanakaya is impure vision (i.e., the perception of a gross material dimension), the
sambhogakaya is pure vision (i.e., the perception of an immaterial dimension of pure light),
and the dharmakaya is the true condition of the former two. In another interpretation of the
kayas proper to the Tantras of the path of Transformation, which is shared by Dzogchen
Ati, the dharmakaya is the emptiness aspect of primordial awareness (qua Base, this is so
whether or not deluded mind is functioning, and hence includes the emptiness aspect of
deluded mind; qua Path and qua Fruit, it consists in the nonconceptual, nondual realization,
while in the state of ripga, of this emptiness); the sambhogakaya is the natural luminous
clarity of primordial awareness (qua Base, this is so whether or not deluded mind is
functioning; qua Path and qua Fruit, it consists in the nonconceptual, nondual realization,
while in the state of ripga, of this natural luminous clarity); and the nirmanakaya is this
awareness’ unobstructed, unceasing manifestation (qua Base, this is so whether or not
deluded mind is functioning; qua Path and qua Fruit, it consists in the nonconceptual,
nondual realization, while in the state of ripga, of this unobstructed, unceasing
manifestation). The latter interpretation is the key to the meaning of the nirmanakaya when
understood in the context of the sequence of realization proper to the inner Tantras of the
Path of Transformation, for the kaya in question is directly related to the nonconceptual,
nondual realization of the unimpededness of primordial awareness in manifesting as and
cognizing an infinite variety of images, and in manifesting countless natural impulses and
activities. Though there are other interpretations of the terms as well, in no Buddhist path
or vehicle whatsoever have I seen any descriptions that may suggest an interpretation of the
nirmanakaya as the mental subject’s sensation of identity with the phenomena of the
natural world—or, far less, as featuring such things as “out-of-body experiences, certain
occult knowledge, the auras, true magic, ‘astral travel,’ ... [and] what we would call ‘psi’
phenomena: ESP, precognition, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and so on.”

Then comes the eighth fulcrum, which Wilber calls the “subtle level,” asserting that
in it one contacts non-ordinary strata of perception and subtle non-Jungian archetypes. It
must be remarked that per se the manifestation of “non-ordinary strata of perception” and
“subtle non-Jungian archetypes” does not constitute a level of realization—and, in fact,
such experiences may take place in psychosis or as the effect of ingesting a hallucinogen.
Realization does not at all depend on what is it that manifests, but on how does it manifest:
Dzogchen-qua-Path must necessarily involve reGnition of the nondual awareness in which,
as in a mirror, experiences manifest, and the concomitant, instant spontaneous liberation of
conceptuality and hence of dualistic perception. Since Wilber identifies this fulcrum as the
sambhogakāya and depicts it as involving intangible, self-luminous visions of non-Jungian
archetypes, it is essential to note that such visions will only be the sambhogakāya if they
are apprehended in a nonconceptual, nondual way. In particular, in the Upadeśavarga or
Mennagde series of Dzogchen teachings the realization of the sambhogakāya depends on
the manifestation of the intermediate state of dharmatā (i.e., the chönya bardo) with its
luminous visions (which in the practices of Thögel and the Yangthik is induced while the
organism is alive), and it occurs when the reGnition of the nondual awareness in which
those visions manifest instantly results in the spontaneous liberation of conceptuality, of
the illusion that the vision is an object appearing to a subject, and of the illusion that the
vision is manifest in an external dimension—yet does not result in the dissolution of the
vision, which persists in spite of its not being perceived dualistically. If visions occur but
there is no such reGnition and hence no spontaneous liberation of conceptuality and so on,
what we have is a vulgar illusory experience or nyams of clarity—initially, as an instance of the consciousness of the base-of-all, but immediately, as soon as it is perceived as an external object and recognized in terms of a subtle thought, as a samsaric experience of the sphere of form (rūpadhātu or rūpaloka). Wilber’s assertion that at the summit of the subtle realm, and by implication of the sambhogakāya, one may experience union with the intangible, self-luminous visions, implies both the absurd claim that an ample range of the sambhogakāya involves the duality between a separate observer and visions, and the error of mistaking the union of the mental subject with an object for nonduality qua Path—which consists in the dissolution of the subject-object duality rather than in the identification of one side of this duality with the other.

Furthermore, we have seen that what the Dzogchen teachings call sambhogakāya manifests as a result of the application of the most advanced practices of the highest and most direct Buddhist Path—the Thögel practice of the Menngagde or Upadeśavarga series of Dzogchen teachings, or the Yangthik associated to the Nyingthik—which may only be undertaken by yogis who are proficient in the preceding practice of the same teachings—that of Tekchö, or that of the Nyingthik, respectively—and who, therefore, can no longer experience the dread of voidness I call panic. Overlooking the fact that only humans of lower capacities experience panic, and that in general they do so in the earlier stages of the Path, before the initial occurrence of Dzogchen-qua-Path (and by no means can do so in the greatly advanced stage at which the sambhogakāya is realized, which is close to the consolidation of Dzogchen-qua-Fruit, and in which the clinging to the ego at the root of panic has been neutralized to a great extent), Wilber makes the absurd claim that the fear in question occurs at the stage at which the sambhogakāya is realized, which he fancies to be his made-up fulcrum-8. The fact that only humans of lower capacities experience panic is clearly expressed in Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika literature, which note that dread of voidness is proper to śrāvakas, and that it is this dread that distinguishes them from the individuals of Mahāyāna capacities—the reason why Śākyamuni abstained from teaching the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras to his direct disciples and decided to entrust them to the King of the nagas for him to bestow them on Nāgārjuna, being that the former were śrāvakas and hence these teachings would have inspired panic in them, scaring them away from the dharma. Moreover, the second of the five paths in the gradual Sūtrayāna vehicles is that of preparation (Skt. prayoga mārgaḥ; Tib. jorwe lam), which in the gradual Mahāyāna has four stages, the third of which is called “forbearance of the unborn” because in it practitioners become increasingly familiar with the emptiness that previously inspired terror in them, until the point at which they totally overcome the terror in question: the name “path of preparation” is due to the fact that it prepares practitioners for the transition to the first supramundane path, which is called the “path of Seeing” (Skt. darśana mārgaḥ; Tib. thong lam) and which in the gradual Mahāyāna involves the initial realization of

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\(^a\) nyams.
\(^b\) Tib. zugkham (gzugs khams).
\(^c\) thod rgal.
\(^d\) yang thig.
\(^e\) snying thig.
\(^f\) khregs chod.
\(^g\) sbyor ba’i lam.
\(^h\) mthong lam.
absolute truth, in which voidness and the true condition of phenomena are realized beyond conceptuality and the subject-object duality. If terror of emptiness can no longer manifest in the last level of the path of preparation of the gradual Mahāyāna, which is a rather early stage of a rather lower Path, far less likely is it to occur in the very advanced stage of the supreme and most direct Path at which the sambhogakāya is realized. (Dread can be felt in advanced practices, as it often does in the practice of Chö that often boosts the practice of Tekchö or of the Nyingthik in which the dharmakāya manifests again and again. However, this dread, rather than panic, is terror before what is believed to cause injury and death—and, at any rate, it no longer manifests in those who have successfully practiced Tekchö or the Nyingthik to the point of being prepared for approaching the practices of Thögel or the Yangthik: if they face fear in the latter practices, this means that they are not ready to approach them, and thus it would be wise for them to boost their Tekchö / Nyingthik by practicing Chö in the traditional way.)

We have seen that Wilber related the bare experience of the being of the human individual in Angst, angoisse and so on, to the stage he referred to as the sixth fulcrum. However, the being of the human individual continues to manifest in post-Contemplation so long as the Self-qu qua-Fruit—irreversible Buddhahood—has not been attained, and the function of the supreme practices of the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings, such as those of Thögel and the Yangthik, which are catalyzed by the wrathful mandalas and which are the ones in which the visions Wilber associated with the eighth fulcrum arise, have the function of making us experience in its bareness the anguish inherent in the being of the human individual each and every time this mode of being manifests, so that we may use the associated feeling as an alarm reminding us to apply the pith instructions—or, if we are advanced enough, so that delusion liberates itself spontaneously the moment it arises without there being need for any action (it must be perfectly clear by now that the basic experience of the anguish inherent in the being of the human individual has nothing to do with what I call panic and which Wilber associates with the manifestation of the intangible self-luminous visions of the intermediate state of dharmata or chönyi bardo). Though at this stage a quite high degree of mind-body integration has been achieved, which in Wilber’s view occurs in his sixth fulcrum, unlike the latter this phase is not previous to the realization of voidness or of absolute truth. On the contrary, it is by far posterior to this realization, for as we have seen it immediately precedes the transition from the Path to the Fruit of Dzogchen, in which delusion and relative truth no longer arise, awareness has totally integrated with the body and the whole of physical reality, and death takes place in one of the three special ways described in the Dzogchen teachings—or, in case Thögel realization has reached its farthest point, simply does not occur.

According to Wilber, it is in the ninth fulcrum that Mahayana Buddhism calls “voidness” or “emptiness” (Skt. shunyata; Tib. tongpanyi; Chinese, k’ung; Japanese, ku) is realized. In order to place this fulcrum in perspective, we must begin by distinguishing voidness qua nyam or illusory experience, from the instances of the Self-qu Path in which the dharmakaya is realized and in which the emphasis in on voidness: the Dzogchen

\[\text{Skt. dharma tā; Tib. chönyi (chos nyid).}\]
\[\text{gcod.}\]
\[\text{Cf. the preceding chapter of this book, as well as Capriles (1990a, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2003, work in progress 4, work in progress 5).}\]
\[\text{stong pa nyid.}\]
\[\text{nyams.}\]
teachings compare the illusory experiences of voidness (which comprises the various types of experience of nonconceptuality, lack of characteristics and so on, and the intuitive conceptual realization that entities are empty of self-being [Skt. swabhava shunya; Tib. rangzhinggyi tongpa\(^a\)]\(^{470}\)), unto reflections in the mirror that represents the Self-qua-Base’s primordial awareness, and contrast them with the dharmakaya, which they explain as the realization of the aspect of the primordial awareness represented as the mirror they call by the terms katakb or primordial purity (in the twofold classification) and ngowo\(^c\) or essence (in the threefold division), which is voidness, and in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of teachings, more specifically as the realization of the true condition of the dang\(^d\) form of manifestation of energy—a realization that in the practice of Tekchö (lower level of practice in the series of teachings in question) recurs each and every time the true condition of thought is reGnized in a gnosis free from the illusory subject-object duality.\(^{471}\) Even though voidness qua illusory experience is not the dharmakaya, if we use it for reGnizing the essence aspect of the awareness in which it manifests and which is compared to a mirror, it will be the door to the realization of the dharmakaya that makes the all-liberating, nondual single gnosis patent and functional, and that therefore results in the instant spontaneous liberation of delusorily valued thoughts.\(^{472}\) It must be noted that the grounds on which Wilber asserts this fulcrum to be different from the seventh fulcrum are not at all clear, for if the latter were, as he seems to believe, an instance of nirvana involving the dissolution of the observer before a natural phenomenon, it would involve the realization of the voidness aspect of the absolute truth of the Mahayana\(^{473}\) beyond the subject-object duality. At any rate, the way in which, according to Wilber, this fulcrum manifests, is most relevant for discerning that author’s misconception of the Path. He writes:\(^e\)

> You pursue the observing Self, the Witness, to its very source in pure emptiness, [and] then no objects arise in consciousness at all. This is a discrete, identifiable state of awareness—namely, unmanifest absorption or cessation, variously known as nirvikalpa samadhi ... nirodh, classical nirvana. This is the causal state, a discrete state, which is often likened to the state of deep dreamless sleep, except in that this state is not a mere blank but rather an utter fullness, and it is experienced as such... Because it can never be seen as an object, this pure Self is pure Emptiness.

The emptiness that according to Wilber manifests in this “discrete, identifiable state of awareness” is, in his view, the first of two meanings of emptiness:\(^f\)

> Emptiness has two meanings... On the one hand... it is a discrete, identifiable state of awareness—namely, unmanifest absorption of cessation (nirvikalpa samadhi, jñāna samadhi, ayin, vergezzen, nirodh, classical nirvana). This is the causal state, a discrete state.

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\(^a\) rang bzhing gyis stong pa.
\(^b\) ka dag.
\(^c\) ngo bo.
\(^d\) gdangs.
The second meaning of emptiness in Wilber’s conception will be discussed below, in the consideration of fulcrum-10, to which Wilber associates it; what we are concerned with at this point is that our author’s identification of the dharmakaya with unmanifest absorption suggests he wrongly believes the former to be an experience of either pure light or pure darkness in which no forms are perceived—which is not at all the case, for most instances of the dharmakaya do not involve the absence of sensory forms (certainly in the recurring recognition of the true condition of the dang form of manifestation of energy that is the stuff of which thoughts are made, which is the essence of the practice of Tekchö in the Dzogchen Menngagde, thoughts liberate themselves spontaneously without this involving the dissolution of the forms manifesting through the five senses oriented to what in samsara seems to be an external dimension), and, conversely, the shining forth of the clear light both after physical death and after falling asleep, will only manifest as the dharmakaya if the dang energy of which it is made is recognized (if unrecoGnized, it manifests as a variety of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active—other varieties of the base-of-all being the blankness or darkness of utter unconsciuosity, the unmanifest absorptions the Yoga and Samkhya darshanas take for ultimate realization, etc.). In fact, the dharmakaya is said to be formless because it is the realization of the true condition of dang energy, which as we have seen does not exhibit either color-form (which is exhibited by both the rölpa energy and tsel energies, even though the former, just like dang energy, is intangible) or tangibility (which is a quality exclusive to tsel energy), rather than being said to be formless because it is realized in an unmanifest absorption—which is definitively not the case. On the other hand, most unmanifest absorptions are cases of the neutral base-of-all rather than instances of nirvana—and, in fact, as shown below, the terms nirvikalpa samadhi, jñana samadhi, ayin, vergezen, nirodha, and classical nirvana, do not at all refer to one and the same condition. Finally, it is worth noting that the term causal level places Wilber’s view of the dharmakaya within the ambit of the cause-effect relation—and hence of the subject-object duality and so on (as in human individuals there can be no causality in the absence of the subject-object duality, which is the reason why Awakening is beyond karma)—and as such within the sphere of the relative (which Buddhism refers to by the Sanskrit term samvriti satya, which, as Gendün Chöphel reminded us and as noted in vol. I of this book and in the section of this volume titled “The Sanity of Awakening and the Insanity of Deluded Normality,” has the etymological meaning of “obscuration to correctness” or “thoroughly confused”), of the caused / produced (Pali bhèta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepa), the born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kyepa), and the compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhata; Skt. sanskrita; Tib. düjai)—or, what is the same, within the sphere of samsara, and therefore of delusion, impermanence and dissatisfaction... thus being in stark contrast with the dharmakaya.

The Yoga darshana of Patañjali, which in the traditional classification of the six orthodox Brahmanic darshanas or philosophical systems is coupled with Kapila’s Samkhya

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a gdangs.
b rol pa.
c rtsal.
d rtsal.
e Gendün Chöphel (2005).
f skyes pa.
g skyes pa.
h 'dus byas.
Darshana, is universally acknowledged to be dualistic insofar as it affirms the existence of a plethora of souls, on the one hand—the male Purushas that it defines as being inherently different and separate from the objects of knowledge—and of the female Prakriti, which corresponds to nature, on the other. In this system, the disinterested witness or sakshin is the freedom of Purusha from the hold of the naturally active Prakriti, to be achieved by ignoring the latter’s movements in a samadhi that resembles sleep insofar as sense data do not manifest, yet is different from it insofar as one is simultaneously fully awake, and thus becoming unaffected by those movements: the sakshin is the witness of the samadhi that allows Purusha to regain its naturally passive condition.\textsuperscript{476} In the Upanishads, in the Vedanta Sutra, in Gaudapada’s Mayavada (which was influenced by the Yogachara school of Buddhist philosophy) and in the Adwaita Vedanta philosophy of Shankaracharya (which incorporated from the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy all it could without coming to contradict the basic tenets of Brahmanism)—all of which, each in its own way and to its own degree, are supposed to be nondualistic—the disinterested witness or sakshin appears to correspond to what Kant called pure apperception and viewed as the condition of possibility of the empirical apperception that consists in awareness that one is perceiving. Bina Gupta defines as follows the conception of the sakshin in the allegedly nondual tradition beginning with the Upanishads:\textsuperscript{a}

1. The witness-consciousness, in spite of being the base of all knowledge, \textit{is different from the known object}. It is the ultimate subject; it can never become an object of knowledge.
2. It is the element of pure awareness in all knowledge. It is an immutable, indivisible reality.
3. It shines with its own light; it is self-luminous.
4. It is different from the empirical individual [jiva], who knows and enjoys. In other words, it is different from the empirical individual trapped in the threefold state of wakefulness, dreaming and dreamless sleep.

Thus in all traditions the sakshin is a consciousness that, in spite of being a subject and of excluding all objects, does not get involved with these objects. Though the Adwaita Vedanta philosophy of Shankaracharya proclaims itself to be nondual (adwaita), it incurs in a dualism by positing a subject that it characterizes as “absolute” and which cannot and must not be eradicated, but which it defines as separate and different from its object—and that, as such, strictly speaking cannot be truly absolute, for it must be relative to the object. In fact, in the context of Idealism, Western philosophers raised the famous objection according to which an absolute could not be an \textit{absolute of knowledge} insofar as the object and the subject that are the poles of knowledge are relative to each other,\textsuperscript{477} and Dzogchen and Vajrayana Masters, as well as the founders of the Madhyamaka school and later on the Madhyamika Prasangikas, had raised the same objection many centuries earlier. This is why the Dzogchen teachings, which rather than being logical constructions are descriptions of what is realized in Contemplation and in Awakening, as well as of the implications of this, make it clear that the absence of the subject-object duality implies the absence of a witness that notices what is happening.\textsuperscript{b}

\textsuperscript{a} Gupta (1998). The italics are my own.
\textsuperscript{b} Trungpa (1972, simplified translation of Jigme Lingpa’s Lion’s Roar). Cf. the note having the reference mark at the end of the Longchenpa quotation below.
Of course, we cannot discard the possibility that the *sakshin* as conceived in the Brahmanic traditions that declare themselves to be nondual, may be the nondual awareness inherent in the Self-*qua*-Base, for both have in common that they cannot be turned into an object of knowledge, that they are the element of pure awareness in all knowledge, and that they are self-luminous. However, if this were so, these Brahmanic traditions would have erred in asserting it to be different from the known object, for as Longchenpa noted:

> “Although phenomena appear as they do to the mind, they are not mind nor anything other than mind. Given their illusory nature as clearly apparent yet unthinkable, void manifestations, moment by moment they are beyond description, imagination or expression. For this reason know that all phenomena that appear to the mind are unthinkable, ineffable and empty even as they manifest.

> “The apparent phenomena that manifest as the five kinds of sense objects [visual forms and so forth], and the phenomena of the universe that seem to appear in their own right, manifest to the mind and [in fact] are nothing other than [manifestations appearing to the mind]. Even though they appear to be something other [than the mind], like dreams and illusions they are by nature empty, and, [being unthinkable and ineffable, they] have never been anything other [than mind] and have never been mind [either]. In accordance with the eight traditional metaphors for illusoriness, an examination of phenomena as forms of emptiness, clearly apparent yet unthinkable, ineffable and void—whether considered to be composed of reducible or irreducible particles—determines their equalness in having no identity. *One knows the basic space of unchanging emptiness through these natural manifestations of the nature of mind*...”

Wilber notes that also Hinayana Buddhism views *nirvana* as a condition of *nirodha* or cessation, and Roger Walsh, in his presentation of Wilber’s conception of fulcrum-9 (in a piece of writing that Wilber himself asserts to be one of the best expositions of his own ideas so far) notes that in Wilber’s view:

> At the causal level (fulcrum-9) all form and experiences drop away leaving only pure consciousness, such as the Buddhist’s *nirodhasamapatti*, the Vedantist’s *nirvikalpa samadhi*, the Gnostic’s abyss.

It is well known that the Third Noble Truth, which is the cessation of suffering or, more precisely, of *duhkha*, is referred to by the Pali term *dukkha-nirodha-ariya-sacca*, and that this is the goal of the Hinayana, achieved by arhats. And it is equally well known that the vehicle in question, and the Theravada School that is its only surviving representative, hold *nirodhasamapatti* (cessation of thought and perception) to be an actual experience of *nirvana* (Pali *nibbana*) that is attained while the body is physically alive. Furthermore, all philosophical schools of the Hinayana view conditions of *nirodha* in which all Gnitive activity is arrested in a deep absorption (Skt. *samadhi*; Tib. *tingngebzin*) as unconditioned
uncompounded (asamskrita) phenomena. However, unlike Brahmanic spiritual systems that posit indefinite, ill-defined states of nirodha involving the arresting of Gnostic activity in an absorption excluding all data of the six senses as moksha or “release from the grip of illusion or maya”, Hinayana schools only attribute supreme value to absorptions involving nirodha when they are the outcome of discrimination. In fact, it is clear that if the aim of the Theravada tradition were the same as that of the Yoga darshana of Patañjali and the associated Samkhya darshana of Kapila, and these non-Buddhist systems were effective for achieving this aim, Shakyamuni, rather than teaching a wholly new spiritual system in the first promulgation of the doctrine, corresponding to the Hinayana, would have referred his shravaka followers to the Yogasutras of Patañjali and the works by Kapila; however, on the contrary, he rejected the tenets of all Brahmanic traditions, denouncing the pseudo-realizations of many of these by making it clear that absorptions of the two higher spheres of conditioned experience (the arupyadhatu and therupadhatu) were within samsara, and in his Hinayana teachings he did not even teach any form of physical Yoga.

However, most important to us is the fact that the conceptions of the dharmakaya in the higher Buddhist vehicles, including the Mahayana, the Vajrayana vehicles of the path of Transformation, and the Atiyoga path of Spontaneous Liberation—which are the ones that posit the three kayas of Buddhahood and use the terms dharmakaya, sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya—are in sharp contrast with Wilber’s. To begin with, we have seen that in no Buddhist system is the realization of the dharmakaya said to involve the dissolution of the sensory continuum into pure light or darkness, and that in the practice of Tekchö—first of the two stages of the Menngagde or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings—the realization of the dharmakaya consists in the reGnition of the stuff of which the thought present at a given time is made, which instantly results in that thought’s spontaneous liberation without this obliterating the sensory continuum. We have also seen that the only instances of realization of the dharmakaya in which only indistinct light is manifest, are the reGnition of the true condition of the clear light in the first of the bardos or intermediate states between death and rebirth, and the reGnition of the true condition of the second clear light that shines forth after falling asleep. And we have also seen that the higher Buddhist paths, vehicles and schools—including the Madhyamika schools of the Mahayana, the inner Tantras of the path of Transformation and Dzogchen Atiyoga—do neither pursue nor attribute special value to states of nirodha. At this point it must be added that no Buddhist teaching whatsoever identifies the dharmakaya with the nirodhasamapatti that as Wash (1998, p. 41) has noted Wilber associates to fulcrum-9—to which as we have seen Wilber associates the dharmakaya—and which is a state of sustained deep mental absorption that follows the attainment of nirodha in the sense of the temporary cessation of the four mental skandhas. Quite on the contrary, as the words of Shakyamuni Buddha in the following excerpt from the Vajrasamadhisutra of the Mahayana make it clear, the Greater Vehicle views nirodhasamapatti as a deviation from the Path of Awakening leading to the highest of the realms of formlessness, which is the one involving neither perception nor lack of it (naivasamjñanasamjñayatana; Tib. dushe me dushe memin kyeche) and which is the peak of samsara (bhavagra):

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a ‘du shes med ‘du shes med min skye mched.
b Buddha Shakyamuni (trans. from the Chinese, K.C. Oon) (undated). Some additions were made so that the reader could make up the sense without reading the previous passages of the Sutra, and a few changes in terminology and style were made in order to adapt it to the terminology and style of this paper.
So it is. Followers of the two [dualistic, lesser] vehicles [which are the Shravakayana and the Pratyekabuddhayana] are attached to mental absorption (samadhi) [as a means] to gain the samadhi-body [through the trance of cessation (Skt. nirodhasamapatti), whereby they attain neither perception nor non-perception]. As far as the Single-bhumi [of Buddhahood] or the sea of [the Absolute] void is concerned, they are like alcoholics who are drunk and unable to sober up, [and hence] continuing through countless tests, they are unable to attain Awakening (...) until the liquor has dissipated off, [and so] they [can] finally wake up. They will then be able to cultivate the practices [spoken of in this Sutra], eventually attaining the body (kaya) of Buddhahood. When a person abandons the [status of] icchantika (which is that of a person blocked from attaining Awakening), he will be able to access the six practices. Along the path of practice, his mind is purified [by awareness of tathata] and he definitely [come to] Know. The power of his diamond-like wisdom renders him [not subject to spiritual retrogression]. He ferries sentient beings across to liberation with boundless mercy and compassion.

In fact, nirodhasamapatti is an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, and as shown elsewhere in this volume, when subsequently to the manifestation of base-of-all the delusory valuation of the threefold thought structure gives rise to the subject-object duality, the subject takes the ensuing pseudo-totality as object, giving rise to a samsaric formless absorption. Outside the Hinayana, the only Buddhist school that posits states of nirodha as unconditioned and uncompounded (asamskrita) phenomena is the Yogachara philosophical School of the Mahayana; however, the realization this school pursues does not at all consist in any deep absorption or samadhi excluding sense data—which is not surprising insofar as this school is based on Mahayana Sutras (specifically, in those of the Third Promulgation), according to which Awakening involves a complete, panoramic, nondual awareness (of) the senses, as well as what is generally translated as “omniscience” (Skt. sarwakarajñata; Tib. nampa tamche khyenpa). Moreover, in the Mahayana, Third Promulgation literature, in particular, places a special emphasis on the fact that dwelling in absorptions or samadhis in which one is cut from the senses is a major pitfall: this is the reason why in the Vimalakirti Nirdesha Sutra various male bodhisattvas strive to awaken a young female bodhisattva from absorption (until finally a young and handsome though as yet inexpert male bodhisattva succeeds in so doing), and why the Samadhiraja Sutra repeatedly warns against dwelling in absorptions in general. As the following passages of the Sutra of Hui Neng show, the same is the case with Ch’an / Zen Buddhism:

People under delusion believe obstinately in dharmalakshana (entities / collections of characteristics) and so they are stubborn in having their own way of interpreting the ‘samadhi of specific mode’, which they define as ‘sitting quietly and continuously without letting any idea arise in the mind’. Such an interpretation would rank us with inanimate objects, and is a stumbling block to the right Path which must be kept open. Should we free our mind from attachment to all ‘things’, the Path [would] become clear; otherwise, we [would] put ourselves under restraint. If that interpretation, ‘sitting quietly and continuously, etc.’ were correct, [what would be the reason] why [as told in the Vimalakirti

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a rnam pa thams chad mkhyen pa.
b Capriles (2004).
c Luk (1972).
d Wong-Mou-Lam (1969), pp. 43-45. I modified the terminology in order to adapt it to the one used in this book.
Nirdesha Sutra] on one occasion Shariputra was reprimanded by Vimalakirti for sitting quietly in the woods?

Learned audience, some teachers of meditation instruct their disciples to keep a watch on their mind for tranquility, so that it will cease from activity. Henceforth the disciples give up all exertion of mind. Ignorant persons become insane from having too much confidence in such instruction. Such cases are not rare, and it is a great mistake to teach others to do this...

To keep our mind free from defilement under all circumstances is called wu-nien (non-conceptuality). Our mind should stand aloof from circumstances, and on no account should we allow them to influence the function of our mind. But it is a great mistake to suppress our mind from all thinking; for even if we succeed in getting rid of all thoughts, and die immediately thereafter, still we shall be reincarnated elsewhere. Mark this, treads of the Path. It is bad enough for a man to commit blunders from not knowing the meaning of the dharma, but how much worse would it be to encourage others to follow suit? Being deluded, he Sees not, and in addition he blasphemes the Buddhist Canon. Therefore we take wu-nien (non-conceptuality) as our object.

If we ponder on Wilber’s fulcra in the context of the variety of the ten oxherding pictures of Ch’an or Zen Buddhism in which the eighth is “person and ox both forgotten” (vergezzen), it will be apparent that Wilber believes his ninth fulcrum to correspond to the eighth picture.⁴⁸⁴ We have seen that in the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation the series of realization is said to start with the nirmanakaya, continue with the sambhogakaya, go on with the dharmakaya, and finally result in the swabhavikaya that corresponds to full Awakening—and that Wilber believes his ninth fulcrum to be the dharmakaya. Thus in terms of both Ch’an / Zen and the Tantras of the path of Transformation Wilber’s series of fulcra requires at least one more fulcrum after the ninth. However, by defining his fulcrum-10 as not being really a separate fulcrum or level, but the reality of all states or Suchness of all states, Wilber is implying that, just as his fulcrum-6 in the 1982 levels, his fulcrum-10 in more recent works corresponds to that which the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen-qua-Base and which in this book I call the Self-qua-Base, yet it is presented as Dzogchen-qua-Summit / the Self-qua-Summit.⁴⁸⁵ Nevertheless, Wilber claims that in this fulcrum one has dis-identified with the second and third phases of fulcrum-9, and hence—again as in the case of fulcrum 6 in the 1982 classification—it must necessarily be a specific, discrete state rather than being the true condition of all states. One could believe this contradiction to lie in the description only, and conclude that the fulcrum in question is one in which the true condition of all states is directly realized, but this simply could not be the case insofar as the direct realization in question necessarily involves the collapse of the subject-object duality that is the second of the veils that conceal this condition, whereas, as will be shown below, Wilber claims that in this fulcrum the duality in question continues to be manifest. Furthermore, Wilber⁴ says of this supposedly fulcrumless fulcrum:

… the “experience” of this nondual Suchness is similar to the nature unity experience we earlier discussed, except now this unity is experienced not just with gross Form out there, but also with the subtle Forms in here.⁴⁸⁶ In Buddhist terms, this is not just the Nirmanakaya—gross or nature mysticism; and not just the Sambhogakaya—subtle or deity mysticism; and not just the Dharmakaya—causal or formless mysticism. It is the Svabhavikaya—the integration of all three of them. It is beyond nature mysticism, beyond deity mysticism, and

beyond formless mysticism—it is the reality or the Suchness of each, and thus integrates each in its embrace. It embraces the entire spectrum of consciousness—transcends all, includes all.

In the above passage, Wilber subsumes form mysticism in the nirmanakaya (gross form) and the sambhogakaya (subtle form), failing to distinguish these kayas from higher, mystic yet samsaric conditions of the form realm (or of that of sensuality\(^4\)), and subsumes formless mysticism into the dharmakaya, failing to distinguish this kaya both from mystic yet samsaric conditions of the formless realm, and from equally mystic yet neither samsaric nor nirvanic conditions of the neutral base-of-all. At any rate, Wilber wrongly views the fruit of what he calls nondual mysticism as consisting in his fulcrum-10, and what he calls dualistic mysticism as reaching to his fulcrum-9 only and thus having this fulcrum-9 as its fruit—thus reducing a wide spectrum of very different paths to only two possibilities, one of which is a contradictory mixture of a discrete state with the true condition of all states, and the other a compound of different states. He describes these two supposed fruits as follows (Wilber begins by referring to a “second meaning of emptiness,” and so we must keep in mind that in a previous quotation Wilber asserted emptiness to have two meanings, and explained what in his view was the first meaning, attributing it to fulcrum-9, which he calls “causal”):\(^a\)

The second meaning is that Emptiness is not merely a particular state among other states, but rather the reality or Suchness or condition of all states. Not a particular state apart from other states, but the reality or condition of all states, high or low, sacred or profane, ordinary or extraordinary...

There are two rather different schools about this “Enlightened” state, corresponding to the two rather different meanings of “Emptiness” that we discussed.

The first takes as its paradigm the causal or unmanifest state of absorption (nirvikalpa, nirodha). That is a very distinct, very discrete, very identifiable state. And so if you equate Enlightenment with that state of cessation, then you can very distinctly say whether a person is “fully Enlightened” or not.

Generally, as in the Theravadin Buddhist tradition and in the Samkhya yogic schools, whenever you enter this state of unmanifest absorption, it burns certain lingering afflictions and sources of ignorance. Each time you fully enter this state, more of these afflictions are burned away. And after a certain number and type of these entrances—often four—you have burned away everything there is to burn, and so you can enter this state at will, and remain there permanently. You can enter nirvana permanently, and samsara cases to arise in your case. The entire world of Form ceases to arise.

But the Nondual traditions do not have that as their goal. They will often use that state, and often master it. But more important, these schools—such as Vedanta Hinduism and Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism—are more interested in pointing out the Nondual state of Suchness, which is not a discrete state of awareness but the ground or empty condition of all states. So they are not so much interested in finding an Emptiness divorced from the world of Form (or samsara), but rather an Emptiness that embraces all Form even as Form continues to arise. For them, nirvana and samsara, Emptiness and Form, are not two...

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\(^a\) Wilber (1996a), pp. 227 and 236-237. The first paragraph is from p. 227. The order of the following paragraphs in the quotation was inverted, for the last two paragraphs in my citation correspond to the first paragraph and the beginning of the second paragraph of Wilber’s reply in the section “Enlightenment” in p. 236 of his book, whereas paragraphs three to six in my quotation are posterior in Wilber’s book and appear in sequence in pp. 236-237.
Here it is imperative to interrupt Wilber in order to note that he is identifying *samsara* with the world of form, which is a mistake, for all Buddhist schools accept the canonical division of *samsara* into three spheres, which are that of sensuality, that of form and that of formlessness—so that formlessness may as well be within *samsara* (though we must keep in mind that in this case the term refers to the absence of a figure-ground division)—and higher Buddhist systems, in particular, contrast Awakening to *samsara* yet make it clear that Awakening does not involve the dissolution of the sensory continuum (if their sensory continuum dissolved, Buddhas would not be able to teach or even to go on living). Wilber continues:

...dualisms—between subject and object, inside and outside, Left and Right—will still arise, and are *supposed* to arise. Those dualities are the very mechanisms of manifestation. Spirit—the pure immediate Suchness of reality—manifests as a subject and an object, and in both singular and plural forms—in other words, Spirit manifests as all four quadrants. And we aren’t supposed to simply evaporate those quadrants—they are the radiant glory of Spirit’s manifestation.

But we are supposed to see through them to their Source, their Suchness. And a quick glimpse won’t do it. This One Taste has to permeate all levels, all quadrants, all manifestation.

Thus Wilber reduces the wide spectrum of spiritual traditions to only two of them: (1) ones which he defines as dualistic and which regard the Fruit of the Path as a state of *nirodha* or cessation free from the subject-object duality, and (2) ones which he categorizes as nondualistic, among which he lists Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism (the latter, we may assume, including the Path of Transformation and the Path of spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen *Atiyoga*), which seek a *supposedly* Awake condition in which the subject-object duality continues to arise, but in which the dualistic experience in question seems to be somehow impregnated by the single taste of the true essence of all reality.

According to Wilber, the primordial state that is fully realized in fulcrum-10—full, irreversible Awakening, corresponding to the swabhavikaya—is a condition in which there is neither subject nor object, neither interior nor exterior, neither left nor right, which is prior to the arising of the subject and the object, and which continues to be the ultimate reality in spite of their arising. Whereas on the one hand Wilber writes that in this fulcrum the sense that one is a sort of seer or witness or self vanishes altogether, precisely because awareness is no longer split into a seeing subject and a seen object out there, on the other hand he says that the dualistic condition is pointed out from the dualistic condition, so that we become familiar with it. This, however, need not be a problem, for we could assume he meant that when the original nondual condition is pointed out from the dualistic condition, the latter dissolves, so that the sense that one is a sort of seer or witness or self vanishes altogether. The problem lies in the fact that Wilber claims that in this fulcrum the subject-object and other dualities will always *continue to arise* (Wilber’s italics)—only that they are relative truths, not absolute or primordial truth itself. The problem of dualism is not solved, but rather dissolved, in the primordial state, which otherwise *leaves the dualisms just as they are*, possessing a certain conventional or relative reality, real enough in their

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*b* *Ibidem*, pp. 231-232.
own domains, but not absolute.\textsuperscript{a} To begin with, this outright contradicts his claim that in this fulcrum-10 the sense that one is a sort of seer or witness or self vanishes altogether, precisely because awareness is no longer split into a seeing subject and a seen object out there. Furthermore, also in ordinary \textit{samsara} the subject-object and the other dualities that, according to Wilber, in fulcrum-10 continue to arise, manifested as relative truths rather than being absolute or primordial truth itself; since Wilber is implying the supposed \textit{swabhavikaya} of his fulcrum-10 to be different from the ordinary adult human \textit{samsaric} condition, we must interpret his words as meaning that although the mental subject and the object (and all other dualities) continue to arise, \textit{now they are realized} to be relative and conventional rather than absolute—so that the third sense of \textit{avidya} or marigpa in the threefold Dzogchen classification adopted here has been removed, but not so the other two senses of the terms.\textsuperscript{488}

As we have seen, in the Tantras of the path of Transformation the \textit{swabhavikaya} is the fourth and final stage in the sequence of realization having the \textit{ NIRMANAKAYA} as its first stage, having the \textit{sambhogakaya} as its second stage, and having the \textit{dharmakaya} as its third stage. Yet the above has demonstrated the “fulcrum-10” Wilber views as full Awakening and identifies as the \textit{swabhavikaya}, not even to reach the condition the gradual Mahayana views as the eleventh level (\textit{bhumi} or \textit{sa}) / fifth path, in which the dualism of subject and object is supposed to no longer arise, for, as shown below, only nondual gnoses manifest—and surely a condition like this is simply out of the question in Wilber’s system. In fact, as will be shown below, the way Wilber describes the \textit{swabhavikaya} / full Awakening seems to match the gradual Mahayana’s view of the post-Contemplation state or jethob\textsuperscript{b} as it manifests in the fourth path and in all levels until the tenth, thus falling short of the full Awakening of the gradual Mahayana. This is fully evidenced by the description of fulcrum-10 Roger Walsh presented in a piece of writing that Wilber\textsuperscript{c} himself asserts to be one of the best expositions of his own ideas so far:\textsuperscript{d}

\begin{quote}
Finally, at the nondual culmination (fulcrum-10), phenomena reappear but are immediately and spontaneously recognized as projections, expressions, or manifestations of consciousness and as none other than consciousness. This is the Hindu \textit{sahaj-samadhi} and the Mahayana Buddhist’s “form is emptiness.”

Needless to say, these advanced contemplative experiences can be very hard for most of us to conceive. To my mind the best metaphor for \textit{sahaj-samadhi} is lucid dreaming, dreaming in which we know we are dreaming. Such lucidity has been described by yogis for millennia, denied by psychologists for decades,\textsuperscript{489} but now is well validated by laboratory studies. Here what initially appeared to be an objective, solid, independent world impinging on a physical body on which one’s life depends is recognized as a subjective, dependent projection of mind. And with that recognition the dreamer becomes lucid, the apparent victim of experience becomes its creator, and the suffering and anxiety that seemed so overwhelming are recognized as illusory. Such is said to be the mind-boggling central recognition of both lucid dreaming and awakening to the nondual.

We have seen that the direct awareness of all phenomena as conventional, relative, apparition-like, insubstantial expressions or manifestations of absolute or ultimate truth—
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 232.  
\textsuperscript{b} \textit{rjes thob}; in Sanskrit, \textit{prishthalabdha}.  
\textsuperscript{c} Wilber (1998).  
\textsuperscript{d} Walsh (1998, pp. 41-42).
or, in Dzogchen terminology, of primordial, nondual awareness—is the distinguishing feature of the post-Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas in which relative reality has been reestablished after its dissolution in the direct realization of the absolute condition beyond the subject-object duality, and that therefore this kind of awareness may not be predicated of the final stage of the Path, which is Buddhahood, in which the relative—and hence the subject-object duality—arises no more and only the absolute remains (which, however, does not mean either that the sensa we usually interpret as reflecting an objective world cease to manifest, or that one ceases to spontaneously respond to the sufferings of beings with the healing actionless activities that are the natural function of nonreferential compassion: what it means is that, since Buddhas are free from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure [Tib., khorsum\(^a\)] and therefore from the subject-object duality, whatever they do is an instance of what is called “action and fruit [of action] devoid of the concept of the three spheres” [khorsum nampar mitokpai le dang drebu\(^b\)]: from their own standpoint Buddhas are beyond activity—and yet sentient beings, if they are devout Buddhists and are able to recognize the Buddhas as such, see the latter as carrying out countless activities in their behalf). In fact, in the gradual Mahayana the realization of the absolute truth that, as the Madhyamaka school emphasizes, is beyond the subject-object duality, but which is \textit{not at all} a condition of \textit{nirodha} or cessation like the \textit{nirodhasamapatti} of the Hinayana or, far less, like the \textit{samadhi} of the Yoga Darshana, initially manifests at the moment of attaining the third path (Skt. \textit{marga}; Tib. \textit{lam}), called the “path of Seeing” (Skt. \textit{darshana marga}; Tib. thong lam\(^c\)), and the corresponding first level (Skt. \textit{bhumi}; Tib. \textit{sa}), called the “joyous level” (Skt. \textit{pramudita bhumi}; Tib. rabtu gawa sa\(^d\)), and henceforth continues to manifest in the Contemplation state throughout the fourth path, which is called “path of Contemplation” (Skt. \textit{bhavana marga}; Tib. gom lam or gompai lam\(^e\)) and which comprises levels two through ten. As we have seen, in these Paths and levels, the realization in question is always followed by the re-installation of samsaric delusion and therefore of the subject-object duality, which gives rise to the “post-Contemplation state” (Skt. \textit{prishthalabdha}; Tib. jethob\(^f\)) under discussion, in which the delusion in question does not fully involve the third of the senses of \textit{avidya} and marigpa in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, and there is some awareness of the apparitional character of all phenomena. This awareness of apparitionality results from the filtering down, into the dualistic post-Contemplation state, of the realization of the true nature of all phenomena by nondual awareness while in the Contemplation state, which somehow impregnates the dualistic state of post-Contemplation with the “taste” of the single essence of reality. Therefore it is clear that the awareness in question can only derive from the manifestation, over and over again, of the Contemplation state in which there is no subject-object duality, and by no means could it result from pointing out nondual Suchness from the state in which this nondual Suchness is totally concealed by the subject-object duality: the duality in question has to dissolve, for so long as there is a frog at the bottom of a deep well, no matter how much you point to him the limitless sky, he will continue to take it for a small luminous blue circle surrounded by dark walls. It is also clear that this dissolution

\(^{a}{\text{'khor-gsum.}}\)
\(^{b}{\text{'khor gsum rnam par mi rtog pa'i las dang 'bras bu.}}\)
\(^{c}{\text{mithong lam.}}\)
\(^{d}{\text{rab tu dga' ba sa.}}\)
\(^{e}{\text{sgom lam or sgom pa'i lam.}}\)
\(^{f}{\text{rjes thob.}}\)
of the subject-object duality does not give rise to a condition of nirodha or cessation like the nirodhasamapatti of the Hinayana or, far less, like the samadhi of the Yoga Darshana, which from the standpoint of the Dzogchen teachings are instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana is manifest and as such simply do not neutralize to any degree our karma for samsara and do not at all help us to become established in nirvana. Finally, at the time of attaining the fifth path, which is the path of no-more-learning (Skt. ashaikhamarga; Tib. milobpai lam\(^a\)) that in Tibetan Buddhism was as a rule identified with the eleventh level called “all-pervading light” (Skt. samantaprabha bhumi; Tib. kuntu ö sa\(^b\)), the state of absolute truth involving all-embracing, absolutely free awareness beyond the subject-object duality consolidates in such a way that the delusive subject-object duality never manifests again, and hence there is no post-Contemplation state: since there is no frog to whom the limitless, all-embracing sky may be concealed, and no well to conceal it from him, there is unrestricted freedom. Even the Madhyamaka-Prasangika philosophical school, which does not accept the view according to which the dualistic consciousness that manifests in samsara manifests in primordial awareness as nondual awareness (of) consciousness of object, agrees that in the Fruit corresponding to Buddhahood, rather than a dualistic consciousness, what is at work is nondual gnoses involving neither a mental subject nor an object.\(^{490}\)

To take the post-Contemplation state of those bodhisattvas in the third and fourth Mahayana paths for final Buddhahood—i.e., for the fifth and final path / eleventh level of the Mahayana—would simply block the way to the condition in question. Furthermore, the experience of post-Contemplation in the third and fourth paths, which as we have seen lies within the relative realm, may not be said to be “the very Essence of all levels, of all states, of all conditions”—which, as we have seen, is how Wilber defines fulcrum-10, which he misnames “nondual.”

With regard to Walsh’s illustration of this last fulcrum with the experience of lucid dreaming, it must be noted that this dreaming is not even an element of the Dzogchen Path, in which the practice for sleep is that of the natural light, which consists in reGnizing the true condition of the second of the clear lights that manifests after falling asleep, and then continuing in this luminosity without dreaming. In Dzogchen Atiyoga, lucid dreaming is a secondary practice borrowed from the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, to be applied when one does not manage to reGnize the shining forth of the clear light and hence cannot apply the practice of natural light, or when, having reGnized it, one does no manage to remain in the ensuing condition and begins to dream. This is so because the reGnition of the clear light, like the Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas and full Buddhahood, and unlike the post-Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas and lucid dreaming, is nondual in the qua-Path and qua-Fruit sense of being utterly free from the illusory subject-object duality (this, in its turn, being so because this reGnition dissolves avidya in all of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen teachings).

We have seen that according to Wilber in fulcrum-9 we discover the source of what different Brahmanic traditions have called “the disinterested witness” or sakshin to be pure emptiness. Since as shown above Wilber believes the subject-object duality to continue to manifest in the fulcrum-10 he misidentifies as Buddhahood, and, according to all of the traditions featuring the concept, the witness or sakshin is separate and different from its

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\(^{a}\) mi slopb pa’i lam.

\(^{b}\) kun tu ‘od sa.
object, he is claiming the witness or sakshin to continue to manifest in this condition. This is one of the paramount distortions in Wilber’s system, for as we have also seen the truly nondualistic Buddhist systems (which in the Mahayana comprise the canonical sources of the Second and Third Promulgations, the Madhyamaka school created by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, and the Mahamadhyamaka and Prasangika branches of this school, and in the Vajrayana consist in the Inner Tantras of the Path of transformation and the Tantras of the Path of spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen Ati) make it clear that in Buddhahood only nondual gnoses obtain, and hence the condition in question is utterly free from the subject-object duality—which disqualifies Wilber’s conception of the Fruit of nondual systems.

We have also seen that Wilber’s conception of realization in dualistic systems and of the penultimate stage of realization in nondual Buddhist systems does not apply to the penultimate stage in any of the latter systems, for the realization of the dharma-kaya in the Mahayana is not at all the same as the nirodhasamapatti or the other conditions involving nirodha of the Hinayana, or, even less so, as the cessation in samadhi that is the fruit of Patañjali’s Yoga Darshana (which, as we have seen, in its turn is not at all the same as the ultimate realization of the Hinayana), and no truly nondual Buddhist system does reduce the dharma-kaya to nirodha or cessation.

That the manifestations of nirvana on the Path and as the Fruit are free from the subject-object duality should be self-evident insofar as the duality in question results from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle “threelfold thought-structure.” In fact, subject and object being mutually relative, absolute truth (which by definition cannot be relative) could not be the object of any mind or conventional attention, and therefore has to manifest in the patency of primordial gnosis (Skt. jñana; Tib. yeshe) beyond the subject-object duality. We read in the Lankavatara-sutra, of the Third Promulgation:

…Mahamati, that which is characterized as being produced by the threefold thought-structure (Tib. khorsum: [subject, object and their interaction]) is consciousness, whereas that characterized as the essential nature that is not so produced is primordial gnosis. Then again, Mahamati, that which is characterized as not to be attained is primordial gnosis, since in each of us sublime primordial gnosis does not emerge as a perceptual object of realization, but is manifest [nondualistically] in the manner of the moon’s reflection in water, [which is not and does not seem to be at a distance from the water in which it is reflected].

For his part, Dudjom Rinpoche writes:

Therefore, the inconceivable primordial gnosis that is the [ultimate] Truth is a great purity of natural expression, transcending the range of the subject-object dichotomy.

The same author describes Shakyamuni’s Awakening as follows:

\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{ye shes.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{Suzuki (1956), p. 64.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{'khor gsun.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 215. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book, and the term “symbolic,” which preceded “range,” was deleted.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 421. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book. The italics are my own.}}\]

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As he became a perfectly realized Buddha, the whole earth trembled and all the psychophysical bases which were to be purified of the subject-object dichotomy awakened to the primordial gnosis free of duality, in the impeccable mansion of the dharmakaya, which is the “middle way.”

The fact that the gradual Mahayana Path, as understood by the founding fathers of the Madhyamaka School, assert that realization must involve the dissolution of the subject-object duality, is proven by verse XIV.25 of Aryadeva’s Chatuhishatakashastrakarika:

The seed of cyclic existence (samsara) is a consciousness; objects are its sphere of activity.

In its turn, verse IX.2 of Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara expresses the Prasangika interpretation of Madhyamaka in this regard:

The relative and the absolute are what is known as the two truths; the absolute is not an object of knowledge to the mind, for the mind [and all of its objects are what] is called the ‘relative’.

In fact, according to the original Madhyamaka Prasangika School, in the gradual Path of the Mahayana the absolute truth, both as it manifests on the Path and as it manifests as the Fruit, consists in the realization, utterly beyond the subject-object duality, of the true nature of all phenomena (Skt. dharmata; Tib. chönyi), which makes the voidness (Skt. shunyata; Tib. tönpanyi) of those phenomena become patent, yet does not involve what logicians call nonaffirming negation, nonimplicative negation or absolute negation (Skt., prasajyapratisedha: Tib., megag [med dgag]—or, far less, another sort of negation—for it is totally unelaborated (Skt. nishprapañcha; Tib. tödräl). Dudjom Rinpoche writes:

During Contemplative absorption, when balanced in the expanse of [all] phenomena without conditions to be clarified or established, both modes of Madhyamaka (the Outer that includes Prasangika and Swatantrika and the Inner that includes Mahamadhyamaka) are not distinct [from each other in what] regards the cessation of all signs of the subject-object dichotomy therein.

Further evidence that, according to the original Madhyamaka and the Madhyamaka Prasangika, the realizations of the Mahayana involve the dissolution of the subject-object duality, is provided in the exhaustive discussion of this subject in two recent works of mine. At any rate, the same applies to the Path of transformation of the Vajrayana, which in the ancient or Nyingmapa tradition consists of Mahayogatantra and Anuyogatantra, and in the new tradition consists in the Anuttarayogatantra. On this Path, a Contemplation state in which there is no subject-object duality, alternates with a post-Contemplation state in

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a Capriles (2005); Napper (2003).
b Capriles (2005).
c chos nyid.
d stong pa nyid.
e spros-bral or spros-med.
f Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 206. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book, I added the words in brackets, and I deleted the word “elaborate” that preceded “signs.”
g Capriles (2004, 2005).
which duality manifests anew, yet delusion has been mitigated insofar as there is some awareness of the apparitional character of phenomena. In the Fruit, the subject-object duality arises no more, as delusion is utterly transcended. In the Gyütrul Gyamtso Gyurā, a Tantra of Mahayoga, we read: b

In the manner of a clear reflection in the ocean [that is not and does not seem to be at a distance from the ocean], without making an echo in the mind, the spontaneous nondual self-awareness of direct realization that has no object as referent [becomes patent]... [It is this that] concludes the view of study, reflection and Contemplation.

Finally, it is on the Path of spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen Atiyoga that the dissolution of the subject-object duality is most abrupt, and therefore most clear. As we have seen, in the Upadeshavarga series of teachings, the practice of Tekchö consists in the reGnition of the true condition of thoughts, which is the dharmakaya—on the occasion of which all types of thought right away liberate themselves spontaneously, instantly putting an end to the subject-object duality that results from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the super-subtle thought structure known as the “threefold thought-structure.” Dudjom Rinpoche writes: c

[The term] Dzogchen thus refers to the sublime truth that is to be realized through the primordial gnosis of individual spontaneous nondual self-awareness, free from the subject-object dichotomy, and which is described under various names...

Since there are subject and object only while the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought is active, so long as they are manifest, the subject grasps at the object—which is why the term grasper is a synonym of subject and the term grasped is a synonym of object. Dudjom Rinpoche writes: d

The two deadly enemies which have bound us to samsara since beginningless time are the grasper and the grasped. Now that by the grace of the guru we have been introduced to the dharmakaya nature residing in ourselves, these two are burnt like feathers, leaving neither trace nor residue. Isn’t that delectable!

Once the practice of Tekchö has been developed to a certain degree, it must be boosted by the practice of Thögel, which activates the dynamic of spontaneous liberation established in the practice of Tekchö as soon as the dualism of subject and object begins to arise, so that this dualism liberates itself spontaneously that very moment. In a record time, this burns away the propensity for the duality in question to manifest, and so what I am calling the Self-qua-Fruit, in which the subject-object duality arises no more, can be consolidated more rapidly than on any other Path. Shri Simha’s Chittalaka reads: e

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a sgyu ’phrul rgya mtsho rgyud.
b Quoted in Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 276. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book, the italics are my own, and I added the phrases in brackets.
c Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 309. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book, and the italics are my own.
d Dudjom Rinpoche (1979), p. 22.
e Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), vol. I, p. 357. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book and the italics are my own.
Having purified the five propensities of the subject-object dichotomy, and, by the expressive powers of the five primordial gnoses, having overpowered the level (Skt. bhumi; Tib. sa) of Bounteous Array (Skt. ghanavyuha; Tib. rignga tugpo kőpai sa) [which is the ultimate realization of Mahayoga], the result gathering the five Awake families is obtained.

Since the subject-object duality arises as the product of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the super-subtle thought-structure called “threelfold thought-structure,” in a nondual primordial awareness that in itself is nonthetic, nonpositional and nonreflexive, the Kunje Gyalpo, key Tantra of the Dzogchen Semde, reads:

Ah! Listen, great courageous being! What is called “primordial gnosis (ye shes)... (is) nondual Awake awareness (rig pa) that always (is) the case [independently of whether its true condition is patent in nirvana or concealed in samsara].

“As spontaneously, [unconditionally] occurring primordial gnosis (rang byung ye shes), [in its turn], is nondual Awake awareness that (is) always [patent and unhindered in its natural and unconditioned nature, as occurs in nirvana].

As for “primordial gnosis that cognizes sense objects,” [which is the core of samsara,] it is not spontaneously [in the sense of unconditionally] occurring (rang byung) [insofar as it depends on those objects... Therefore, spontaneously, [unconditionally] occurring primordial gnosis (is) primordial gnosis that it (is) always [patent and unhindered as such].

[These are the three main senses of] “primordial gnosis.”

As for primordial gnosis as “the teacher of the retinue,” that primordial gnosis which [by giving rise to a mind] cognizes sense objects, [by means of this mind] is cognizant of each and every sense object; it is “primordial gnosis functioning as co-gnition.”

Sense objects that are co-gnized [by mind] come from Awake Mind (byang chub kyi sems), and so they [are manifestations of] Awake Mind, which [itself] takes no object.

Since [spontaneously, unconditionally occurring] primordial gnosis occurs spontaneously [and unconditionally], it is not [something achieved or] cultivated in meditative absorption. Since it is not [something] cultivated, [it does] not [involve a] meditative absorption that may reinforce some habitual pattern.

The true nature of phenomena, entailing no habitual patterns, is explained to be the Wisdom Gnosis (dgongs pa) of the Buddhas of the three times. This Wisdom Gnosis of all Buddhas of the three times does not entail conceiving of sense objects: it abides timelessly in a state of equalness.

Longchenpa comments on the above:

In spontaneously occurring primordial gnosis (rang byung ye shes), which does not conceive of sense objects, spontaneously abiding Contemplative stability is spontaneously

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\(^a\) rigs lnga stug po bkod pa’i sa.

\(^b\) Quoted in Longchen Rabjam (2001b), pp. 42-43. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book; the words in brackets are my own addition, and the parentheses around words such as “is” are my own.

\(^c\) Longchen Rabjam (2001b), p. 43. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book; the words in brackets are my own addition, and the parentheses around words such as “is” are my own.
manifest without deliberately being made to happen. This is the Contemplative stability of a yogin. [On the other hand], any integration of calm abiding (zhī gnas) with profound insight (lhag mthong) that involves concentrating one-pointedly on an object is the mundane contemplative stability of one who is spiritually undeveloped. The difference [between the one and the other] lies in whether or not habitual patterns continue to be reinforced. [Since] the essence of spontaneously abiding nondual Awake awareness (is) Awake Mind (byang chub kyi sems), it is called the “Awake gnosis (of) the true nature of phenomena.” Consciousness that arises with respect to sense objects, called “the mind of samsara,” takes the form of subject-object perception. Once you have identified [what] these [concepts refer to] and learned how to [obtain] true [spontaneous] relaxation [in spontaneously occurring primordial gnosis], within that context naturally occurring projective (tsel) energy subsides into the Base, so that Awake gnosis arises as the true nature of phenomena. The difference between these two kinds of meditative stability is so crucial that it bears repeating.

Longchenpa quotes once more from the *Kunje Gyalpo*:\(^b\)

Ah! Listen, great and courageous one!
Because there are no concepts
it is spontaneously occurring primordial gnosis—
the Buddhic awareness (thugs) of the Buddhas of the three times.
The Awake gnosis of Buddhas is not deliberate
[as] it is free of objects of thought.
If any yogins of ati, whoever they may be,
abide in [this] nonconceptual state,
they ensure the Awake gnosis of Buddhahood.
Since spontaneously occurring primordial gnosis does not conceive of sense objects,
it is not sullied by habitual thought patterns.

In the first volume of the *Dzogpa Chenpo Semnyi Ngelsoi Drelwa Shingta Chenpo*,
Longchen Rabjampa wrote:\(^c\)

Pure Contemplation is [as follows]: although it is a meditation [involving] the skillful means of compassion and the wisdom free from extremes, it has no [delusorily valued-absolutized] conceptualization [giving rise to the illusion] of subject and object and there is no meditation [that may be] designated [as consisting] “in this state.” So it [makes evident] the inconceivable nature. Although in this Contemplation one achieves joy, bliss, miracles, and foreknowledge, [there being no subject-object duality] there will be no attachment to the pleasure of it, nor will these [desirable qualities] be apprehended in [terms of] form [with] characteristics.

To recapitulate, the Mahayana and the Vajrayana—the latter including Dzogchen Ati—agree with Wilber’s assertion that nondual traditions, (1) point out the empty, nondual substrate of all states, and (2) posit the nonduality of samsara and nirvana. However, with regard to (1) Wilber’s assertion that nondual traditions point out the empty, nondual

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\(^a\) *rtsal*.

\(^b\) Quoted in Longchen Rabjam (2001b), pp. 43-44. The terminology was adapted to the one used in this book; the words in brackets are my own addition, and the parentheses around words such as “is” are my own.

substrate of *all states*, as noted above and ratified by a series of citations, the canonical sources of the Second and Third Promulgations, the *Madhyamaka* philosophical school as originally created by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva and the posteriorly arisen *Prasangika* and *Mahamadhyamaka* branches of this school (in the context of the *Mahayana*), just as the Inner Tantras of the Path of transformation and the Dzogchen *Atiyoga* Tantras of the Path of spontaneous liberation (in the context of the *Vajrayana*), explicitly assert this pointing out the empty, nondual substrate of all conditions to entail the dissolution of the subject-object duality, yet not to give rise to a condition of nirodha or cessation. With regard to the first of these assertions, it happens that the duality in question is the second layer (in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjampa) or a core element of the second layer (in the classification adopted in this book) of the three-tiered delusion which conceals the nondual, nonplural, empty and spontaneously perfect Self-qua-Base that in a passage cited above Wilber called “empty substratum,” and which makes us perceive the latter in a deluded, inverted way; therefore, the Self-qua-Base in its true condition simply cannot become an object: it can only be realized in the spontaneously, unconditionally occurring primordial gnosis (rangjung yeshe⁵) in which the subject-object duality does not manifest. This is the reason why all higher Buddhist systems coincide in asserting the Contemplation state of higher bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas and so on—or, in Dzogchen Atiyoga, the condition of Dzogchen-qua-Path—and the condition of Buddhahood—or, in Dzogchen Atiyoga, the condition of Dzogchen-qua-Fruit—to be utterly free from the subject-object duality. With regard to the second of the assertions in question, it happens that as a rule states of nirodha or cessation—including the *nirodhasamapatti* of the Hinayana and the passive *samadhi* or absorption that Patañjali’s *Yoga Darshana* posits as the fruit of its path—involves what the two main threefold Dzogchen classifications of avidya or marigpa view as the first layer of the delusion in question, which is the unawareness or concealment of the true condition of the Self-qua-Base that prevents the manifestation of nirvana: this is the reason why the Dzogchen teachings view all such conditions as instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are manifest, and why, as demonstrated above, in none of the Buddhist schools or vehicles that Wilber defines as nondual does this dissolution of subject and object occur in a state of nirodha or cessation. In fact, as made clear in this volume, in the *Mahayana* and *Vajrayana* traditions under discussion the Path has the long-term function of irreversibly consolidating the spontaneously, unconditionally occurring primordial gnosis free from the subject-object duality—and, in the case of Dzogchen, it actually does so in a relatively short time.

With regard to (2) Wilber’s assertion that nondual traditions posit the nonduality of samsara and nirvana, our author is wrong in claiming that the absence of a duality between samsara and nirvana implies that Awakening involves the subject-object duality: the most basic of dualities, foundation of all other dualities, rather than that of samsara and nirvana, is that of subject and object, and the quotations in the preceding paragraphs have proven both the *Mahayana* and the *Vajrayana* (including Dzogchen Atiyoga) to explain the Fruit called Buddhahood as being radically different from all samsaric conditions, one most important reason for this being that the former is free from the duality in question, whereas all of the latter have it as their pivot. In fact, though samsaric beings on the Path cannot pinpoint the condition that is manifest at a given moment as being the absolute truth of the *Mahayana* and of the Tantric path of Transformation, for this delusorily valued-absolutized

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⁵ *rang byung ye shes.*
judgment would put an end to it, the absolute truth in question—both as it manifests in the Contemplation state of higher bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas, etc. and as it manifests in full, irreversible Buddhahood—is free from the subject-object duality and involves the perfect patency of the true condition of the Self-qua-Base, as such being utterly different from samsaric conditions—and yet as noted repeatedly is not a condition of nirodha or cessation. Thus the negation of the duality of samsara and nirvana, rather than being the objective expression of how things really are in conventional truth (which, as Gendün Chöphel made it clear, the very etymology of the term shows it to be the deluded pseudotruth of samsara), is a skillful means for helping those who are treading the Path of Awakening achieve the transition from samsara to nirvana. If we have not listened to the teachings of a Path of Awakening, we are not aware that we are in samsara and that all the hindrances, problems and sufferings of human existence are the drawbacks of samsara, or that there is a nirvana that is the solution to these drawbacks; therefore, if we are to have a possibility of surpassing samsara together with the drawbacks inherent in it, we need to learn about these two conditions, so that we may aspire to nirvana and work towards it. However, this gives rise to a strong thirst for nirvana (the vibhava trishna that is third type of trishna taught in the explanation of the Four Noble Truths) and aversion to samsara which, insofar as they result from the delusory valuation of the concepts of samsara and nirvana and thereby of the difference between the conditions these concepts stand for, and insofar as they involve samsaric emotionality and dualism, sustain samsara and block the way to nirvana. In fact, when the higher Buddhist vehicles assert the nonduality of samsara and nirvana, they are expressing in terms of relative truth the perspective of the nondual absolute truth that is realized in nirvana, in which no duality of samsara and nirvana is perceived, and they are doing so as a skillful means for helping the transition from samsara to nirvana; therefore, this does not imply that, as Wilber asserts, Awakening is a condition involving the illusory subject-object duality—which would imply that it is not a condition radically different from samsara. It would be a most unfortunate mistake to take the skillful means in question to mean that we must conserve the subject-object duality that manifests only in samsara, and that while thus remaining in samsara we will obtain the realizations of the truly nondual traditions. What we would achieve by these means would be the illusion of having attained nonduality and having thereby become better than the rest of the beings in samsara and even than those who are truly established in nirvana—which not only would prevent us from realizing we are in samsara and hence from aspiring to nirvana, but would fill us with conceit, self-satisfaction and other of the worst samsaric vices, thus not only keeping us within samsara, but greatly worsening our samsara.

After the evidence provided above, there can be no doubt that the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit do not at all involve the subject-object duality. The above quoted excerpt from Longchenpa further clarifies that this implies that the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit are free from intention and deliberate action (which follows from the former insofar as the subject-object duality is the condition of possibility of these), and makes the point that the conditions in question do not entail habitual patterns. However, as stated again and again, this does not mean that they are states of nirodha or cessation: we have seen that the Mahayana’s Vajrasamadhisutra makes it clear that nirodhasamapatti, which the Hinayana regards as an instance of nirvana, actually lies on the way to the absorptions or realms of the highest samsaric sphere; that the Vimalakirti Nirdesha Sutra shows that those dwelling in unmanifest absorptions must be awakened from them; that the Samadhishrasutra warns against dwelling in absorptions that may take us to the formless realms; and that the Sutra
of Hui Neng warns against dwelling in states of thoughtlessness and categorically states that, should we come to dwell in them, after death we would “be reborn elsewhere.” And, as also stated again and again, the Dzogchen teachings are most explicit with regard to the fact that states of plain nirodha are instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all that, like the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, are free from the illusion of duality, but that unlike these conditions involve the ignorance of the true condition of the Self-qua-Base that is the first sense of avidya or marigpa in the Dzogchen teachings, as well the halting of the unhindered, free motility of Awareness—and that as such, from the standpoint of these teachings, though they are not instances of samsara, they are not instances of nirvana either. This is why the teachings in question compare dwelling in such conditions to cutting one’s own neck: the occurrence of these states does not neutralize karma to any extent (and thus it would be absurd to believe that entering these states four—or even infinite—times, would free us from samsara), and, what is worse, while one dwells in them one’s life passes without one having the possibility of applying practices leading to Awakening or to somehow advance on the true Path—and hence spending a long time in those conditions would amount to squandering one’s precious human birth.

In fact, the Dzogchen teachings make it clear that the Self-qua-Base is not a mere voidness: although primordial purity or katak, which is voidness, is one of its aspects, the other aspect is self-accomplishment, spontaneous perfection or lhundrub, which involves a myriad of perfect, self-accomplished manifestations with a consummate functionality. Since the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit are no more than the patency of the Self-qua-Base, it is not surprising that these teachings are even more explicit than the rest of higher Buddhist teachings in emphasizing the fact that in the two conditions in question, rather than there being unawareness of sensa or an arresting of Gnitiveness, as in plain states of nirodha, the absence of the veil and straightjacket of delusorily valued-absolutized thought results in the complete patency of our true condition, a total freedom of awareness, and an unlimited awareness (of) and a perfect responsiveness (with regard to) occurrences in the sensory continuum. And insofar as the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit are not produced or achieved, nor are they cultivated in meditative absorption, unlike states of plain nirodha or cessation (which can only manifest as a result of production, achievement and cultivation) they are genuinely uncaused, unproduced, unconditioned and unborn, and as such do not reinforce habitual patterns.

In order to clarify the meaning of nonduality in truly nondual traditions and thus prevent confusions, it is mandatory to understand the meaning of nonduality with regard to the Self-qua-Base, the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit. Since the Self-qua-Base is in itself free from duality or plurality, from its standpoint all realms of experience and all experiences are nondual. However, when avidya or marigpa manifests in the first meaning the terms have in the two main Dzogchen classifications, the neutral condition of the base-of-all manifests, and we become unaware of our true condition. And when avidya or marigpa manifests in the second and third meaning the terms have in the two main Dzogchen classifications, the illusion of duality and plurality conceals the nonduality and nonplurality of the true condition of phenomena. This gives rise to the need to tread the Path in order to surpass that unawareness of our true condition and that illusion in the realization of the nondual, nonplural, true condition of the Self-qua-Base. Since the Self-

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\[a\] *ka dag.*  
\[b\] *lhun grub.*
qua-Path is the unconcealment of the nondual Self-qua-Base, and in all Dzogchen divisions of avidya or marigpa the unawareness of our true condition involved in the neutral base-of-all and therefore in conditions of nirodha is the first layer of the three-tiered veil that is to fall in this unconcealment, the Self-qua-Path excludes all conditions of nirodha and, as we have seen, involves full responsiveness regarding occurrences in the sensory continuum and the utter freedom and unhindered motility of primordial, nondual Awareness. Since in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjam the illusory subject-object duality is the second layer of the three-tiered veil that is to fall in this unconcealment and in the division adopted in this book it is a pivotal element of this second layer, the Self-qua-Path involves a temporary dissolution of the duality in question. Finally, the Self-qua-Fruit is the condition in which the unawareness of our true condition that manifests in conditions of nirodha and underlies all samsaric conditions, and the illusory subject-object duality that is the pivot of samsara, no longer arise to conceal the nondual Self-qua-Base and hinder its perfect functionality: the patency of the nonduality and nonplurality of the latter has become uninterrupted, responsiveness with regard to the occurrences in the sensory continuum has become consummate, and the perfect, unhindered freedom of Awareness can no longer be arrested.

All of the above shows that it would be absurd to posit (as Wilber does) the same stages or fulcrums for the Paths that lead to nondual Awakening and those that lead to plain cessation / nirodha, reducing the difference between them to the existence of a further stage or fulcrum in those that lead to nondual Awakening: these two types of path are so radically different that the structure and function of one of them can have hardly anything in common with that of the other. Furthermore, in the nondual Buddhist traditions we have been considering—which consider plain nirodha as a serious deviation to be avoided yet assert the need to realize the true, nondual condition of all entities in a Gnosis free from the subject-object duality—it does not suffice with realizing this condition a small number of times for one to be able to dwell in it uninterruptedly. In fact, the gradual Mahayana claims one has to spend countless years and lifetimes alternating between the Contemplation state that is beyond the subject-object and inside-outside dualities, and the post-Contemplation state that involves these dualities, before finally attaining Buddhahood—which according to some texts occurs after three immeasurable aeons (Skt. kalpa; Tib. kalpa\(^a\)). Though in the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings the most thorough Awakening possible may be attained in a single lifetime, in order to achieve this aim one has to practice Tekchö for years, and then one has to practice Thögel for a further period: the subject-object duality and delusion in general have to liberate themselves spontaneously countless times in optimal conditions for the propensities for delusion to manifest to be neutralized or burned out, so that no matter what forms may manifest, the subject-object duality arises no more and the nonduality of the Base is no longer concealed. As we have seen, this is the Fruit of the practices of Thögel and the Yangthik, in which the subject arises and liberates itself spontaneously again and again while the forms of rölpa energy are manifest and without the latter disappearing, until the propensity for the former to manifest and for the latter to be taken as object is totally neutralized or burned out.

To sum up, Wilber intended his seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth fulcrums to be a progression of levels of realization following the sequence the inner Buddhist Tantras of the Path of transformation posit for the successive realization of the kayas, in which the

\(^a\) kal pa or bskal pa.
first to be realized is the nirmanakaya, the second is the sambhogakaya, the third is the dharmakaya, and the fourth is the swabhavikaya. However, as shown above, his fulcra do not correspond to what these Tantras refer to by these names, for: (1) His seventh fulcrum is a spontaneous experience of oneness with nature, which may consist in a manifestation of the neutral condition of the base-of-all followed by an experience of the formless realms located at the top of samsara, but which in terms of these Tantras in no case would it be a manifestation of the nirmanakaya. (2) He reduced his eighth fulcrum to the occurrence of non-ordinary strata of perception and subtle non-Jungian archetypes, without making it clear that for manifestations of the intangible, self-luminous visions of the intermediate state of dharmata or chönyi bardo to be instances of the sambhogakaya, the true condition of the rölpa energy of which they are manifestations has to be recognized, as a result of which the mental subject that seems to be at a distance from them instantly disappears and the visions remain in the condition the Dzogchen teachings refer to as the “condition of the mirror.” (3) His ninth fulcrum may either be a variety of the neutral condition of the base-of-all involving nirodha, a samsaric formless realm, or the confusion of these two on occasions when the former is immediately followed by the latter. (4) Finally, his tenth fulcrum is a condition in which the subject-object duality, thought and knowledge continue to arise, but rather than being taken for absolutes, they are realized to be merely relative or conventional—as occurs in the post-Contemplation state of higher bodhisattvas, yogis and so on, but not in Buddhahood, in which the subject-object duality arises no more, and only nondual gnoses obtain.

Finally, as we have seen, in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Ati Dzogpa Chenpo—which, as noted above, Wilber has studied with at least one of the most important Masters of our time—the three kayas are realized in a sequence that is contrary to the one Wilber posits, and they simply do not correspond to what the inner Tantras of the Path of transformation call by the same names.

It seems clear to me that the main problem with Wilber’s views and schemas is that, rather than obtaining a direct realization as a result of the practice of a Path of Awakening of his choice and then explaining from the standpoint of this realization and in agreement with the teachings of the Path he followed whatever he deems worthy of explaining, on the sole basis of a merely intellectual exercise he insists in unifying traditions that cannot be unified, for they do not go through the same stages and do not lead to the same fruits. For example, his belief that both the structure of reality and the levels of realization are to be understood in terms of the hierarchical schemas he calls “holarchical,” seems to me to have been inspired by the Upnishads. The Taittiriya Upanishad tells the story of a father who, by refuting each of his son’s successive replies to the question concerning the identity of Brahman, guides him toward the discovery of the true nature of all reality: (1) matter is to be rejected because it does not account for vegetable growth; (2) prana or the vital principle is to be rejected because it does not account for the conscious phenomena of animal life; (3) manas or mind in an ample sense is to be rejected because it does not account for the intellectual phenomena proper to the human realm; (4) vijñana qua self-consciousness is to be rejected insofar as it is subject to discord and imperfection, dualism and externality. Thus the son is led to the discovery that Brahman is realized in and as (5) turiya-ananda. In its turn, the Chandogya Upanishad features a supposed dialogue between Prajapati and Indra in which the latter is led through similar stages to the discovery of the

a rol pa.
self that cannot be affected by experience, and which results in similar conclusions: (1) the corporeal is evidently affected by experience and therefore must be rejected; (2) the “empirical,” which corresponds to the dream state, is also affected by its experiences and therefore is to be rejected as well; (3) the so-called “transcendental,” corresponding to dreamless deep sleep, is rejected insofar as it involves no consciousness or awareness. Finally, (4) the absolute is found, which is ekam sat. These four levels seem to have correlates in the Mandukya Upanishad, which distinguishes between, (1) awake experience, (2) dreams, (3) dreamless, deep sleep, and (4) the state of turiya-ananda—the first three having been explicitly mentioned by Wilber as being that in which samsaric individuals are trapped. 

However, the way turiya-ananda and ekam sat are referred to in the Upanishads does not seem to aptly describe what here I am calling the Self-qua-Path or the Self-qua-Fruit. In particular, the states posited in the Mandukya Upanishad seem to correspond to four of the intermediate states (Skt. antarabhava; Tib. bar do) that are posited in Tibetan Buddhism, none of which is the Self-qua-Path or the Self-qua-Fruit, for all of them are like reflections in the “mirror” of spontaneous nondual self-awareness, rather than (being) the reGnition of this awareness. In fact, from lower to higher according to the hierarchy set up in the Mandukya Upanishad, the four states posited by this sacred text seem to correspond to: (1) awake experience, which is called bardo of birth (Tib. kyenai bardo) or bardo of self-being (Tib. rangzhin bardo); (2) the dream state, which is called the bardo of dream (Tib. milam bardo); (3) the state of dreamless deep sleep, which is analogous to that of imageless lifelessness, and which as such should include the swoon that follows both the moment of death and that of falling asleep, which does not correspond to any of the bardos posited by Buddhism, and the bardo of undifferentiated luminosity immediately following these moments, which is the chikhai bardo; (4) non-conceptual absorptions, which might correspond to the bardo of samadhi (Tib. samten bardo) that includes specific instances of what different Hindu traditions call nirvikalpa samadhi. If this interpretation were correct (and I believe it is, for I do not see any other possibility), the state of turiya-ananda would not correspond to Awakening or nirvana and could by no means correspond to them, for Awakening and nirvana, rather than corresponding to the samten bardo or to any other bardo, consist in the reGnition of the true condition of the spontaneous nondual self-awareness in which, as in a mirror, the experiences of all bardos manifest—which results in the instant spontaneous liberation of the experience of whichever bardo be manifest at the moment. However, Wilber clings to his hierarchical view, noting that. 

Chögyam Trungpa pointed out in Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior, as did Huston Smith in Forgotten Truth, that the great wisdom traditions without exception—from the shamanic to the Vedantic, in the East as well as the West—maintain that reality consists of at least three great realms: earth, human and sky, correlated with body, mind and spirit.

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a skyes gnas bar do  
b rang bzhin bar do.  
c rmi lam bar do.  
d ’chi kha’i bar do.  
e bsam gtan bar do.  
g Trungpa (1988).  
h Smith (1976).
(gross, subtle and causal), and these are further correlated with the three great states of human consciousness: waking (gross, body), dream (subtle, mind) and deep sleep (causal, spirit).

This is an instance of the above considered transreligious fallacy lying in believing levels of the kind posited by the *Upanishads* to apply to all spiritual systems, and taking some of them to be types of Buddhist realization (if this were so, rather than preaching his own system Shakyamuni would have referred his followers to the *Upanishads*). As we have seen, Vajrayana Buddhism posits six bardos: the three of “life”—that of waking (kyenai bardo or rangzhin bardo\(^a\)), that of dream (milam bardo\(^b\)) and that of meditative absorption (samten bardo\(^c\), consisting in some types of *nirvikalpa samadhi*)—and the three between death and rebirth—the chikhai bardo\(^d\), the chönyi bardo\(^e\), and the sidpa bardo\(^f\). As noted in the discussion of Grof\(^496\) these—which rather than levels are modes of experience—cannot be divided into samsaric, nirvanic and neither samsaric-nor-nirvanic, for all of them involve the three possibilities, which, as we have seen repeatedly, are the ones which are truly relevant to spiritual development in the Buddhist sense in which I have defined it. In fact, while waking, ordinary human beings are constantly switching between the neutral base-of-all and the various samsaric conditions—whereas higher bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas and mahasiddhas switch between these same conditions and instances of *nirvana*. While dreaming, ordinary human beings also switch between the neutral base-of-all and samsaric states—whereas yogis, siddhas and mahasiddhas may switch between these two, samsaric states of lucid dreaming, and instances of *nirvana*. In the bardo of absorption, *nirvikalpa* samadhis are very often instances of the base-of-all, which, when a mental subject arises and takes the pseudototality that ensues from this arising as object, are replaced by formless samsaric conditions; however, in the case of higher bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas and mahasiddhas, these are always led to spontaneous liberation in *nirvana*. The same applies to the chikhai bardo: in those who have not reGnized their true condition, the experience of dang energy consisting in the shining forth of the clear light manifests as an instance of the neutral base-of-all, which is then followed by the perception of undifferentiated light as something external, at which point *samsara* arises as a formless realm; only in practitioners possessing the appropriate skilful means can this shining forth become an instance of the dharmakaya (in fact, if the luminosity in question always arose as the dharmakaya, there would be no point in preparing for death, and there would be no need for a book like the *Bardo Thödröl*). With respect to the chönyi bardo, the immaterial luminous visions that are the paradigmatic manifestations of rölpa energy and that Wilber rightly refers to as non-Jungian archetypes are initially instances of the consciousness of the base-of-all, which as soon as they are perceived as external, become phenomena of *samsara* pertaining to the realm of form; only in the case of practitioners possessing the appropriate means can these immaterial luminous visions become instances of the sambhogakaya (in fact, if the immaterial luminous visions in question always arose as the sambhogakaya, again there would be no point in preparing for death, and there would be no need for a book like the

\(^{a}\) skyes gnas bar do or rang bzhin bar do.  
\(^{b}\) rmi lam bar do.  
\(^{c}\) bsam gtan bar do.  
\(^{d}\) 'chi kha'i bar do.  
\(^{e}\) chos nyid bar do.  
\(^{f}\) srid pa bar do.
In the case of the sidpa bardo, the experiences of tsel energy in which we perceive copulating beings of the six realms, are initially instances of the consciousness of defilements, which immediately become samsaric experiences of the realm of sensuality; only in mahasiddhas and the like can they become instances of the nirmanakaya (in fact, if the experiences of tsel energy in question always arose as the nirmanakaya, all beings would be what Tibetans call tukus\(^b\)). Therefore, to speak of levels in the sense in which Wilber does so, is utterly irrelevant to spiritual development, with regard to which what is relevant is whether we are having a samsaric experience, an instance of the neutral base-of-all, or a clear instance of nirvana.

Vol. III of this book shows Wilber’s\(^b\) view of the spiritual and social evolution of our species as a process of gradual perfecting to be inverted. Since, as shown above, the three bardos are the three kayas only in realized individuals, and hence the intermediate state or bardo between death and rebirth is not a process of involution from dharmakaya to sambhogakaya to nirmanakaya to incarnation, also his view of the bardo and “incarnation” as a process of “involution of consciousness” is a misconception—which, by the way, is characteristically antisomatic (as is to be expected in a system of apparent Orphic roots, as below I will show Wilber’s to be). This may be illustrated by considering “incarnate” and “discarnate” varieties of the dang form of manifestation of the energy of the thukje aspect of the Self-qua-Base: both the manifestation of the clear light in the chikhai bardo\(^c\) and that of ordinary thoughts in this life are instances of this energy, and the latter may not be seen as an involution of the former, for both of them may either be delusively perceived, or serve for the recognition of the true condition of dang energy—a recognition that, as we have seen, is the manifestation of the dharmakaya.\(^{497}\) Moreover, none of the three modes of manifestation of energy is transcendent: all of them manifest in human experience.\(^{498}\)

The root of Wilber’s confusions seems to be betrayed by what he declares to be his “philosophical lineage,” which Roger Walsh describes as follows:\(^d\)

This lineage has its origins in the work of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and then passes through Augustine and Aquinas, Maimonides and Spinoza, Hegel and Heidegger.

At this point Walsh has not yet mentioned Plotinus, but whether or not we include the latter, we find that the “lineage” in question is in its greater part of Orphic origin—or, what is the same, that it has dualistic and antisomatic roots, and that it is based on the mistaken belief that the delusorily valued-absolutized contents of knowledge, and hence limits and differences, are given, absolute and most precious—rather than on realizing them to be the essence of the relative sphere that in Buddhism is referred to by the Sanskrit term samvriti satya (which, as Gendün Chöphel reminded us and as noted in vol. I of this book, has the etymological meaning of “obscuration to correctness” or “thoroughly confused”\(^e\)) and as such to be the most elemental hindrances introduced by delusive perception (i.e., perception conditioned by the second and third types of avidya or marigpa in the Dzogchen classification adopted here), which must be dissolved by the recognition of the Self-qua-Base

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\(^a\) sprul sku.

\(^b\) Wilber (1980).

\(^c\) ‘chi kha’i bār do.

\(^d\) Walsh (1998).

\(^e\) Gendün Chöphel (2005).
(Socrates could be an exception to this, but only in case the true Socrates had been that of the Cynics, and Plato’s Socrates had been the result of the former ascribing his own ideas to his teacher500). The views of the Orphic tradition, which seem to be of Kurgan (Proto-Indo-European) origin, 501 are at the extreme opposite to that of the contending, pre-Indo-European Dionysian tradition, which seems to be the source of the views of Heraclitus, the different Skeptic schools and philosophers, some of the so-called “sophists,” and the Cynics, among others, 503 and which, insofar as Alain Daniélou has seemingly demonstrated the identity of Shiva and Dionysos and of the spiritual traditions associated to these deities, is to be identified as one of the traditions having their source in the nondual Dzogchen teachings and the rest of the teachings Shenrab Miwoche gave at the foot of Mount Kailash, probably around 1,800 BCE, 504 and which had a practice that consisted in the dissolution of all illusory boundaries, often by using to this end the impulses of the sacred human body (as in the Bacchanalia).

In fact, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans drew from the Orphics, whose dualistic, antisomatic system posited a soul inherently separate from the body, viewing the latter as the jail or tomb of the former and the soul as an originally pure entity that is contaminated upon being cast into the body—and as recovering its original purity only through initiation into the Orphic mysteries. 505 The Pythagoreans replaced the mysteries as the vehicle of purification with the contemplation of mathematics and music—possibly because they believed the “soul’s contamination by the corporeal” to be purified by contemplating the incorporeal, and disharmony to be healed by contemplating the harmonic. 506 They equated limits—which are introduced by thought, and the delusory valuation-absolutization of which is the source of samsara—and the male with Good, while equating the limitless—and by implication the dissolution in Communion (as noted in a previous chapter, not in the Gilligan-Tannen-Wilber sense of the term) of the boundaries resulting from the delusory valuation-absolutization of limits—and the female with nongood (which to the Greeks amounted to Evil 507). As shown in the notes to vol. 1 of this book, historians of philosophy agree that the system of Parmenides had an Orphic origin as well; 508 his valorization of limits manifested as his equation of thought with truth and being, and his contempt toward the corporeal expressed itself as a total negation of reality to the material, corporeal world. As I showed elsewhere, 509 Plato synthesized the systems of the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics, giving rise to the first openly proclaimed ontological dualism of ancient Greece: for the first time there were, on the one hand, absolutely nonmaterial, ontological entities such as the eidos, the demiurge and the souls, and, on the other hand, formless matter. Although all of these “realities” were eternal, they pertained to diametrically opposite categories: (eternal) matter constituted nontruth, nonbeing, nonbeauty and nongoodness itself, whereas truth, being, beauty and goodness lied in the (eternal) nonphysical world of eidos, which replaced Parmenides’ world of thought as the true reality, but which, seemingly unlike Parmenides’ thought, was external to the soul. In its turn, nonbeing no longer consisted in the physical world, as in Parmenides, but in unformed matter: the physical world, insofar as it was made of matter, partook of the latter’s untruth, nonbeing, nonbeauty, and nongoodness, yet insofar as it had been given form (eidos), it partook of the latter’s truth, being, beauty and goodness—thus lying half way between truth and untruth, being and nonbeing, beauty and its lack (ugliness), and good and its lack (evil). 510 Plato drew his immortal souls from the Pythagoreans, and incorporated the Pythagorean view

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500 Capriles (2000b). The definitive discussion of this will appear in Capriles (work in progress 3).
that the soul was corrupted by the body; however, he made of perception through the senses the source of this corruption, insofar as the knowledge thus obtained replaced the true knowledge (noein) of eidos the souls of the would-be philosophers had before birth, for the half-true, half-false knowledge of the half-true, half-false physical reality—which was mere opinion or doxa, involved contamination by the corruptible, and may be said to have involved error insofar as it took the half true to be absolutely true—and as a result of this the memory of the eidos and therefore of Truth, Good and Beauty became inaccessible (which, insofar as Plato believed that the awareness of Truth, Good and Beauty made the individual true, good and spiritually beautiful, implied the impossibility of achieving these qualities). As we have seen, just like Parmenides’ physical world, matter was nonbeing and falsehood (absence of truth), but it also was, just like for the Pythagoreans, absence of Good (evil) and absence of Beauty (ugliness). In the noted allegory of the cave, the world of shadows represents the half true, half false physical world: it contains the forms projected by the eidos (i.e., cast by the Demiurge taking the eidos as models), yet these appear on the cave walls, which represent matter. In this allegory, turning toward the source of light, which was the eidos of Good, rather than representing the spontaneous liberation of knowledge, represented the reminiscence of the eidos would-be philosophers had supposedly grasped before birth by means of noein—an exclusively intellectual intuition not involving the senses (i.e., not involving aisthesis) in which the eidos were presumably apprehended as absolute truth, and which as such according to the system put forth in the three volumes of this book would have clearly involved the delusory valuation-absolutization of knowledge. In fact, Plato developed the theory of eidos in order to destroy the relativism of the so-called “sophists”—at least some of whom seem to have shown the relativity of the relative as a medicine against the illness of taking the relative as absolute, and by the same token as a means for allowing people to See through the relative into the absolute (this may have been the intent of both Protagoras and Gorgias, but in his turn, Cratylus raising his finger as a reply whenever he was questioned, may have been exactly the same skillful means as those of Ch’an Master Chu-ti, successor to T’ien-lung).

Plato’s Orphic lineage is evident in Gorgias, which speaks of “one of the wise, who holds the body to be a tomb;” furthermore, Plato condoned the malevolent Orphic myths concerning the afterdeath, telling us approvingly how in the Hades or underworld the souls of the initiated into the Orphic mysteries tortured the souls of the uninitiated. However, it seems that Plato (as the Pythagoreans before him and perhaps the Orphics themselves) incorporated into his works earlier, pre-Indo-European myths and views associated with the Dionysian tradition, which he reshaped so as to make them fit his Orphic-inspired worldview. A Platonic myth that seems to be an example of this is that of the inverted cycles or of “the statesman,” which combines the ancient cyclic, degenerative vision of human spiritual and social evolution shared by Heraclitus and the Stoics (who might have received it from Heraclitus via the Cynics), with the germ of Orphic antisomatism, theism and so on. In its turn, the allegory of the cave could be a modification of a Dionysian parable in which the source of light represented the Self-

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a Plato (1979 [Republic], VII, 514a-517a).
c Plato (1973, 493B).
e Plato (1957 [Statesman], 268d-273c).
Base, so that turning to the former represented the latter’s unconcealment, and the perception of shadows represented perception in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized thoughts. With regard to philosophical views, a characteristic Platonic notion that seems to have resulted from the same type of operation is that of the identity of Truth, Good and Beauty: at the end of *Hippias Major* Plato discussed at length the identity of Good and Beauty (which the Pythagoreans called kalokagathia); in *Republic* 502c-509c he posited the Good as supreme *eidos* and thereby as supreme Truth; and in *Symposium* 211E—where he also discussed the indivisibility of Beauty and the Good—he asserted Beauty to be the supreme *eidos*.\(^5\) These views might have derived from ancient Dionysian wisdom insofar as in the state of rigpa (Skt. *vidya*), of which *avidya* or marigpa\(^d\) is the concealment and distortion, and which therefore constitutes Truth in the sense of absence of delusion (rather than truth *qua adequatio*), the world is apprehended in an immediate way, without the interposition of the filter of the known that “closes the doors of perception” and thus dims the perceived, making everything dull\(^5\)—so that this immediate apprehension could from one perspective be understood as supreme Beauty—and we are free from selfishness and from the dynamic of the shadow, so that there is no seed of evil—which in its turn could be understood as supreme Good. If this interpretation were correct, it could be Plato’s assimilation of Dionysian myths and views of high antiquity that has misled scholars into taking him for a nondual mystic.\(^5\) At any rate, it is clear that Plato’s *eidos* could not be the reGnition of the Self-*qua*-Base, for as shown below they are grasped by *noein*, which is arrived at by means of the reasoning Plato called *noesis*—and although as we have seen the supreme *eidos* coincide, there is a multitude of other, lower *eidos* that do not coincide with each other. Finally, the communism Plato posited for the guardians (and for the magistrates and philosopher-kings that would be chosen among the aptest of guardians) in his allegedly utopian, actually dystopian *Republic* seems to have been inspired by the egalitarian ideals of the Dionysian tradition—shared by all traditions originating in Mount Kailash\(^5\)—and the egalitarian character of pre-Indo-European societies espousing Dionysian religion (what Riane Eisler [1987] calls the “Old Europe”)—yet it was proposed for utilitarian reasons as part of a system that was intended to reproduce the three-tiered cast system of the Indo-Europeans, with the only difference that a person’s place in that system, rather than being determined by his or her parents’ place, was to be decided on the basis of spiritual character and intellectual capacity. In fact, the political ideal of Plato’s *Republic* was that of the rule by a few over the vast majority of the people, and the ideal of justice in the text, rather than consisting in a reasonable degree of socio-economic and political equality, was that each citizen should occupy the place in society that allegedly corresponded to his or her spiritual character and intellectual capacity, thus justifying sharp social and political differences.\(^5\)

To sum up, on the spiritual-epistemological-ontological plane, rather than calling for us to See through divisive, delusorily valued knowledge into the limitless, undivided, unthinkable, absolutely true Self-*qua*-Base, Plato called for potential philosophers to attain the *anamnesis* or reminiscence of the *eidos* or Forms that their souls were supposed to have perceived directly before being cast into a material body, and which they supposedly forgot as memory of the *eidos* was concealed by the subsequently established memories of the

\(^{a}\) Plato (1975/1988 [*Hippias Major*]). (Identity or father-son relationship?)

\(^{b}\) Plato (1979).

\(^{c}\) Plato (1995).

\(^{d}\) *ma rig pa*. 

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half true, half false knowledge received through the senses. Since this *anamnesis* was reached through *noesis* or thinking that takes its premises as hypothetic but that concludes in an instance of *noein* or intellectual intuition that is experienced as the apprehension of absolute truth (and which both to Plato and to the Eleatics was absolute truth),\(^{522}\) it is clear that it occurred in the realm of delusorily valued knowledge, and therefore that Plato was an advocate of delusion. In fact, *neither* Buddhism in general, *nor* the Dzogchen teachings in particular, *nor* common sense, do posit immaterial, eternal, absolutely true *eidos* existing outside the mind, and Buddhism in general and the Dzogchen teachings in particular, which do not posit immaterial entities, outright reject the supposed existence of eternal individual souls (which may have grasped or not grasped anything before birth); therefore, in terms of Buddhism and Dzogchen the *noein* posited by both Parmenides and Plato must necessarily be a perception in terms of delusorily valued subtle and supersubtle thoughts, and as such a manifestation of *avidya* or mariga in all three senses these terms have in the teachings in question. Since true knowledge involved perfect awareness of the distinctions between the different *eidos* and excluded Communion in the unconcealment of the single true condition or ourselves and of the whole of reality, Plato’s epistemological-ontological-spiritual ideal was inherently divisive, and thus it is apparent that his divisive ideal of society responded to his spiritual-epistemological-ontological ideal, and that both ideals arose from the experiential perspective of *avidya* or mariga.

Plotinus, in his turn, on the premise that the absolute could not be finite, and aware that *being* is negated or limited by *nonbeing*, established that the absolute could not lie in *being*, and concluded it had to consist in the One. However, this was no solution, for the One is, just as much as being, a concept defined in relation to other concepts (it is relative to those of nothing, two and manifold)—and his assertion that it is the One that makes the oneness of each and every entity possible,\(^{523}\) does not atone for the error of positing as the absolute a concept that as such is relative to other concepts (elsewhere I compared these views of Plotinus with those of Shankaracharya’s\(^{524}\)). At any rate, the true problem with Plotinus is that he betrays his Orphic-Platonic roots by retaining, underneath his assertion of oneness, the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic dualism between *spiritual* and *material*, and although he attempts to conceal this dualism by positing a continuum of manifestation, he asserts the continuum in question to extend itself from the One, conceived as transcendent, to matter and the manifest in general, to which the One remains in contrast and subtly alien. In fact, although the manifest is considered to be the radiance of the One, which attenuates itself as it goes farther from its source yet remains the One, matter is in itself formless and indeterminate, like the limit where the radiance of the One, and therefore of the Good, has become exhausted. In this sense, it represents the lack of Good (i.e., *evil*). And, since Beauty is the radiance of the Good / the One (this being Plotinus’ revised version of the Pythagorean *kalokagathia* and of Plato’s indivisibility of Truth, Good and Beauty), matter is also lack of Beauty (i.e., the *ugly*).\(^b\) Thus Plotinus’ strategy for denying his dualism is the same as Parmenides’:\(^a\) since matter is nonbeing, it is not a second reality apart from the One, and therefore matter and the One cannot constitute a duality. However, this is a specious argument, for he speaks of matter as having specific characteristics, such as formlessness and indeterminacy, and as being, by contrast with the One, *ugly* and *evil*, and as therefore...

\(^a\) Capriles (1994a, Chapter One, Appendix II, pp. 136-146).

\(^b\) Cappelletti (2d. Ed., 2000, p. 252); Bréhier (1961, pp. 47 *et seq.*).
having the power to contaminate the soul; therefore, matter is the concept that constitutes the *differentia specifica* of the One, and Plotinus’ claims of nonduality are spurious.

However, the worse is that Plotinus’ views elicit contempt toward all that may be characterized as material or sensual, reinforcing the antisomatic attitude that is a central element of ecological crisis. In fact, though Plotinus views the desire for a beautiful body with the aim to procreate as licit, the noblest love is the one that, rather than involving carnal desire, has the *incorporeal* as its object and comprises the thirst to break the body and live in the depths of one’s “I.”

The material pervers the soul and is therefore to be overcome, for it is an *extraneous agent* (i.e., as noted above, it is alien to the One and to the soul that is the lowest level of the One, and therefore the One is not the One that includes all insofar as there is something extraneous to it) that overpowers it and degenerates it, corrupting it and inducing it to all kinds of perversion and impurity—whereby it abjures its very essence and falls into the body and matter. Plotinus’ view of the soul’s contamination by the body is thus like the Pythagoreans’: the soul’s disgrace lies in ceasing to be alien to the material, because just like gold loses its beauty when mixed with particles of earth and recovers it when these are removed, the soul loses its beauty when mixed with the body and recovers it when freed from it (which, again, proves the One not to be the One that includes all insofar as it shows that in Plotinus’ view there is something alien to it that may become mixed with it). Plotinus views so-called “physical” pleasure as dirty and impure, and Wisdom as the act whereby intelligence takes the soul away from the inferior region of the sensitive to elevate it so the summits of the spiritual.

Positing and asserting the existence of a transcendent spirit is so crucial to Wilber that he disqualifies deep ecologists for supposedly failing to postulate it, and he is ready to close his eyes to the above-demonstrated subtle dualism of Plotinus just because he likes so much the idea that the One is transcendent (so that he can see it as *spirit*) and that the world is the radiance / manifestation of the One—even though this is not truly so insofar as in Plotinus’ view matter, which is the basic constituent of all entities, is alien to the soul and is the limit at which the radiance of the One has been exhausted. Contrarily to Wilber’s preferences, the Buddhist teachings, both in their original form and in all their presently existing forms, keep the [meta]phenomenological *epoche*, asking us to suspend judgment and abstain from speculating about the existence or nonexistence of something prior and / or posterior to manifestation and as such transcendent. To begin with, the Pali Canon, containing the reconstruction of Shakyamuni’s discourses, asserts the origin of the world to be un conjecturable, and warn that conjecturing about it brings about madness and vexation; it lists among the fourteen *avvayakravastunī*—i.e., the *avvayakrița* questions, which are those before which Shakyamuni remained silent—the four questions regarding the “origin of the universe” (the other questions being the four that concern the universe’s extension, the two regarding the relationship between the human body and what common sense views as a *jīva* or soul [but which we could view either as consciousness or as the body’s animating principle], and the four concerning what follows after the *parinirvāṇa* [decease] of a Tathagata), and compares those who demand replies to these questions as

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*b* Cappelletti (2d. Ed., 2000, p. 257-258); Plotinus (1966, *Ennead I* 6, 5). My definitive criticism of Plotinus is to be found in Capriles (work in progress 3); there is a less elaborate one in Capriles (1994a, work in progress 2).  
*c* Anguttara Nikaya 4.77: *Acintita Sutta*.  
*d* Khuddaka Nikaya, III: *Udaana*, VI, 4-5 (“The various sects,” 1 and 2).

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a condition for setting foot on the Path, to one who, being wounded by an arrow, refuses to let the surgeon remove the shaft until he is told everything concerning the man who shot it, the bow with which it was shot, the arrow itself, and so on.\textsuperscript{a} Buddhism not only acknowledges such questions to go beyond the sphere of valid human knowledge, hence shunning metaphysical speculation about them, but views them as distracting people from the fundamental aim of Buddhism, which is that of quenching suffering. This applies to the Mahayana as well, which beside shunning speculation concerning the origin of the world, views Buddhist systems that may seem suspicious of positing an everlasting universal spirit, a personal soul and so on, as instances of the extreme view that Buddhist philosophy calls “eternalism” and regards as a deviation from the Middle Way: both the Nirvana School\textsuperscript{b} of the Mahayana in China and the Jonangpa School of the Vajrayana in Tibet were accused of heresy because their opponents read in their tenets what they saw as eternalist, substantivalist or theist elements. H. H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama has said that:\textsuperscript{c}

On the philosophical level, both Buddhism and modern science share a deep suspicion of any notion of absolutes, whether conceptualized as a transcendent being, as an eternal, unchanging principle such as soul, or as a fundamental substratum of reality. Both Buddhism and science prefer to account for the evolution and emergence of the cosmos and life in terms of the complex interrelations of the natural laws of cause and effect.

It is worth mentioning that the Madhyamaka philosophical school of the Mahayana discards, (1) production from a self-existing self, (2) production from a self-existing other, (3) production from both a self-existing self and a self-existing other, and (4) production from neither a self-existing self nor a self-existing other.\textsuperscript{529} Rather than being specifically a negation of all possible myths of creation, this expresses the view of voidness with regard to all possible instances of what we conceptualize as production; however, Buddhism has always discarded all myths of creation as instances of these extremes. Therefore, none of the following would be admissible to Buddhism: (a) that of creation of the universe by a God that is and remains foreign to it (like the one in orthodox Judeo-Christian-Muslim belief); (b) that of creation of the universe as the manifestation of a transcendent spirit that is in no way separate from the latter (as in Wilber’s understanding of Plotinus); and (c) that of the infusion of forms in matter by the demiurge on the model of the eternal \textit{eidos} (as in Plato).

In the Vajrayana we find cosmogonies and cosmologies, but none of them posits an everlasting transcendent universal spirit or a personal soul. For example, the \textit{Kalachakra Tantra} lays out a theory of the formation of reality, yet it does so without any reference to a transcendent spirit, a creator, etc.\textsuperscript{d} Also the Dzogchen teachings have a cosmogony, but rather than positing the manifestation of the universe out of a transcendent spirit, it explains the Base (i.e., what I am calling the Self-\textit{qua-Base})—which may not be viewed either as transcendent or as immanent insofar as it is the true condition of all reality that as such has neither \textit{genus proximum} nor \textit{differentia specifica}, thus being beyond conceptual extremes and as such being unthinkable—to be beyond time and hence not subject to creation or

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{Majjhima Nikaya} 63: \textit{Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta}.
\textsuperscript{c} Cited by Theravada monk Punnadhammo Bhikkhu in the Toronto Star, Dec 3, 2005, and reproduced in the URL \textit{http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=8,2026,0,0,1,0}
\textsuperscript{d} For a brief outline cf. Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé (1995).
destruction, and to manifest as the universe through its own internal dynamic on the basis of karmic traces: the dang\(^a\) form of manifestation of the Base’s energy—which rather than being transcendent is the basic constituent of thought and of the luminosity that shines forth in the chikhai bardo\(^b\), among other realities that appear through the senses (the dharmakaya being, as we have seen, the reGnition of the true condition of this form of manifestation of energy)—gives rise to rölpa\(^c\) energy—which is the basic constituent of the visions of the chönyi bardo\(^d\), as well as of the colored light that constitutes the subtle essence of each of the five coarse elements (the sambhogakaya being the reGnition of the true condition of this form of manifestation of energy)—which in its turn gives rise to tsel\(^e\) energy—which is the basic constituent of the physical or material world that we perceive as external to the dimension of dang energy—as a result of which we experience dang energy as an internal dimension (the nirmanakaya being the reGnition of the true condition of tsel energy).\(^530\) It is thus clear that none of the elements of this cosmogony is a transcendent spirit: all is the play of the Self-quâ-Base, which from its own perspective is beyond time and therefore beyond creation and destruction, and which being beyond conceptual extremes is beyond transcendence and immanence.\(^531\)

Furthermore, those intelligent, informed interpreters of Buddhist philosophy who have understood Buddhist teachings as taking a position in the above regard have read them as positing immanence rather than transcendence. For example, the student of Mahayana, Vajrayana and Dzogchen Ati Buddhist philosophy John Whitney Pettit has written:\(^f\)

Vajrayana meditation is based on the principle of the immanence of ultimate reality, which is a coalescent continuum (tantra, rgyud) of gnosis (jñana, ye shes) and aesthetic form (rupa, gzugs, snang ba). Exoteric Buddhist scriptures (sutras) know this immanence as Buddha nature or tathagatagarbha, while tantric scriptures describe it as the pervasive, unfabricated presence of divine form, divine sound, and gnosis-awareness.

All of the above demonstrates that by disqualifying those who fail to postulate a transcendent spirit, Wilber unwittingly disqualified the Buddha and all Buddhist Masters—as well as the founding fathers of Taoism, who did not posit such transcendent spirit either. Wilber may think the dharmakaya posited by the Mahayana and the other higher forms of Buddhism to be transcendent, but as we have seen the Dzogchen teachings make it crystal clear that the dharmakaya, rather than a transcendent reality, is the realization of the true condition of dang energy, which is the basic constituent of thought and of the luminosity the Dzogchen teachings call tingsel\(^g\), among other events in our experience. In fact, what is essential for attaining the spiritual Awakening on which both the survival of life on this planet and the transition of our species to the next stage of its evolution depends, is the direct reGnition of the Self-quâ-Base that instantly results in the spontaneous liberation of thought. As shown throughout this section, Wilber’s system sows confusion with regard to the structure and function of the Path, thus hindering the reGnition of the Self-quâ-Base;

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\(^a\) gdangs.
\(^b\) 'chi kha’i bar do.
\(^c\) rol pa.
\(^d\) chos nyid bar do.
\(^e\) rtsal.
\(^f\) Pettit, John Whitney (1999).
\(^g\) gting gsal.
now it has been shown that the system in question also falls into what Buddhism views as the error of positing metaphysical theories asserting the transcendence or immanence of a “spirit,” which can hardly have a function different from that of keeping us in the prison of delusorily valued-absolutized thought. Buddhism refers to those who assert the existence of transcendent realities as *tirthika* (Tib. *mutegpa*), and those who assert the material to be the only reality and/or deny the law of cause and effect, Awakening and so on as *charvaka* or *lokatayata* (Tib. *gyangphenpa*)—which are two of the extreme views refuted by scholars representing the Buddhist Middle Way.

At any rate, it is clear that Wilber incurred in a transphilosophical / transmystical fallacy when he mentioned Plato and Plotinus as examples of dharma kaya mystics: he was unwittingly implying the kaya in question to be equally realized by Seeing through the contents of thoughts into the latter’s true condition (as occurs in the Tekchö practice of Dzogchen), and by remembering, in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized *noein* / subtle thoughts, the supposed vision of immaterial Forms that according to Plato potential philosophers had previously to birth. If the dharma kaya is the direct realization of the true condition of the dang energy that is the constituent of thought and if this realization instantly results in the spontaneous liberation of thought, then it *could not be* the reminiscence, in terms of thoughts, of some supposed extrasensory, immaterial reality that was supposedly perceived before birth by some would-be philosophers. The ideologies of the Pythagoreans (who were first to engage in a spree of development of science and technology and Plato, amalgamated with the literal interpretation of the Old Testament by Christians, constitute one of the principal elements at the root of the course taken by “Western” civilization that led to the current ecological crisis—which threatens to disrupt human society, possibly destroy human life, and perhaps even put an end to all life on our planet, but which by the same token, insofar as it has achieved the *reductio ad absurdum* of delusion, for the first time since *avidya* or marigpa became predominant has opened up the possibility that this delusion may be disconnected at the level of the species and hence that Communion may become generalized. (It would take too much space to discuss or even list the other thinkers Wilber sees as having achieved one or another type of realization, but whom I view as having achieved something quite different from Buddhist realizations that is often noxious rather than healing.)

Thus there seems to be no doubt that, as suggested above, Wilber’s descriptions and classifications resulted from mixing the accounts different traditions provide regarding the sequence of their respective paths and/or the essence of their respective views. However, some Paths lead to *nirvana*, others lead to higher realms of *samsara*, still others may allow us to establish ourselves for some periods in the cessation (*nirodha*) constituted by the neutral condition of the base-of-all—and others, like Plato’s, by the same token sustain delusorily valued-absolutized knowledge and reinforce antisomatism, both of which are at the root of ecological crisis. Among Buddhist Paths, some lead to the realization of a *shravaka*, others lead to the realization of a *pratyekabuddha*, others lead to the realization of a bodhisattva, and still others may lead to the realization of a yogi, to that of a siddha, to that of a mahasiddha or to that of a Buddha. Besides, in Buddhism there are gradual Paths and nongradual Paths. How could a single map be drawn that would apply to all of these paths? Only someone who has successfully trodden a given Path can produce an accurate

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*a* *mu* *ste* *gs* *pa*.

*b* *rgyang* *'phen* *pa*. 

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description of it, and such description will apply to the Path on the basis of which the
description was drawn, and at best to other Paths based on the same principle, but not to
Paths based on utterly different principles and leading to totally different fruits. Therefore,
it would be absurd to try to derive a “universal map of the Path” from one’s experience of
the Path one has followed, and it would be even more absurd to fabricate such “universal
map” by piecing together accounts belonging to different traditions: if we put together the
trunk of a mammoth, the teeth of a saber-toothed tiger, and the body of a dinosaur, what we
obtain is a monster existing solely in our own fantasy. Such concoctions, rather than
expressions of “aperspectival freedom” understood as the capacity to view phenomena and
events from different, mutually contradictory perspectives with awareness of what each
and every perspective responds to and may apply to (which as we have seen according to
Wilber manifests in the sixth fulcrum, but which in truth is a consequence of the repeated
disclosure of the Self-qua-Base), are monstrosities springing from confusion and lack of
perspective (thus being aperspectival only in the sense in which at night all cows are
black).

At any rate, it is a fact that Wilber’s descriptions and classifications fail to provide a
clear criterion for distinguishing samsara from nirvana, and both of these from the base-of-
all, such as the criterion found in the Dzogchen teachings.

The “Pre/Trans Fallacy,” the “Ascender/Descender Debate”
And a Brief Appraisal of the Psychology of Michael Washburn

It is well-known that Ken Wilber imputed to Stanislav Grof and Michael Washburn
what he calls the “pre/trans fallacy”, a which is directly related to what the same author
referred to as the “ascender/descender debate,” b and which is supposed to consists in the
“confusion of early, preprenatal life experiences for transpersonal experiences of higher
consciousness.” c It is equally well known that Grof d and Washburn e deny the existence of
such fallacy, and that the former defends the view that Wilber criticized by asserting early,
prenatal life experiences to be legitimate sources of transpersonal experience that can be
interpreted as instances of deeper consciousness.

The polysemic character of the ascending/descending metaphor has made room for
different interpretations among transpersonal theorists: (1) Wilber and other theorists have
understood it as a disjunctive between a spirituality that views and seeks the sacred or the
spiritual in a “beyond” to which it is oriented, and a worldview that favors immanency and
values nature, including the body, and, often, its natural impulses—some varieties of which
see the latter as sacred and as means for achieving spiritual realization, and therefore seek
to put an end to the current alienation of consciousness from the body and the latter’s
feelings and impulses (however, Wilber f wrongly asserts the former to posit inherent
oneness and the latter to posit inherent plurality, when in truth most otherworldly religions
see the universe as separate from their supposedly transcendent divinity and as constituted
by a plurality of substances [and some of them go so far as to posit and worship manifold

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a Wilber (1993b).
c Grof (1985, 2000).
deities], whereas many thisworldly believers assert the universe to be a single substance—sometimes trying to validate this view with the theories of the new physics—and assert the unconcealment of this single substance to be the remedy for ecological crisis and most other evils of our time). (2) Wilber also understands it as the disjunctive between his view of spiritual development as a process of producing successive structures, each of which is founded on the preceding one and cannot be produced before the preceding one has been established, and the contending view of the same process as a dissolution of ego structures and so on. (3) Another way in which some of the same theorists have understood it, which is intimately related to the first, is as the disjunctive between an après moi le déluge\textsuperscript{538} spirituality bent on achieving liberation on the individual plane while totally disregarding ecological, social, economic, political, gender, generational, cultural and related issues, and another one that is deeply concerned and engaged with the latter (Wilber, in particular, seems to have in mind Plato’s assertion in Republic VII 540B that philosophers must at some point take on official posts in order to serve the polis—which amounts to a “descent” from the contemplation of eidos—and the idea that compassion “embraces from above”—where Wilber understands “above” as referring to his idea of the end-term of evolution). (4) I myself use it metaexistentially and metaphenomenologically as the disjunctive between a spirituality intent on producing or building states that as such Buddhism characterizes as arisen / produced / caused (Pali bhēta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepa\textsuperscript{a}), born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kye\textsuperscript{b}), and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhata; Skt. samskrita; Tib. düjai\textsuperscript{c}), and thus leading to what Buddhism calls higher samsaric realms while pretending to lead to nirvana, and one that lies in Seeing through all conditioned / constructed / caused / produced / born / fabricated / arisen experiences into their nonarisen / unproduced / uncaused [Pali abhēta; Skt. anutpada or anutpatti; Tib. makyepa\textsuperscript{d}], unborn [Pali and Skt. ajata; Tib. makyepa\textsuperscript{e}], and unconditioned / uncompounded / made / unproduced / uncontrived / unconditioned / unconditioned [Pali, asankhata; Skt., asamskrita; Tib., düjai\textsuperscript{f}] true condition—on the occasion of which the delusive experiences in question spontaneously liberate themselves. Each time this occurs, conditioning and delusive propensities are neutralized to some extent, and hence repetition of this gradually undoes conditioning and delusion (thus undoing the serial simulations that Laing\textsuperscript{g} described in terms of the diagram of a spiral of pretences,\textsuperscript{539} which are secondary process / operational cognition elements both in the construction of self-identity and in the implementation of the unauthentic project of ascent to higher levels of samsara) until the Self-quaque Base—i.e., the true condition of reality—is never again concealed and hence the Self-quaque-Fruit—i.e., full Awakening—is attained. Insofar as the unmade, unborn, unconditioned, nondual Self-quaque-Base is concealed by our dualistic, conditioned interpretations of it in terms of concepts such as thisworldliness / otherworldliness, oneness / plurality and so on, and since this nondual condition can only be realized by Seeing through all conceptual—and as such conditioned—interpretations,

\textsuperscript{a} skyes pa.
\textsuperscript{b} skyes pa.
\textsuperscript{c} 'dus byas.
\textsuperscript{d} ma skyes pa.
\textsuperscript{e} ma skyes pa.
\textsuperscript{f} 'dus ma byas.
\textsuperscript{g} Laing (1961). Reproduced in chapter VI of this volume, as well as in Capriles (1977, 1986, 2000a, 2000c).
truly nondual Paths are necessarily descending in the metaphenomenological and metaexistential senses of the term.

According to Buddhism in general, the true Path is the one based on the realization of what is nonarisen / unproduced / uncaused, unborn, and unconditioned / uncompounded / unmade / unproduced / uncontrived / unfabricated; whereas the Theravada claims these adjectives apply only to nirvana, the Mahayana applies them to the true condition of ourselves and the whole of reality, which the Essence-Sutras of the Third Promulgation call the Buddha-nature, and therefore to the true condition of all phenomena as different from our perception of them, which from the conventional standpoint is arisen / produced / caused, born, and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated. Most significant, the Dzogchen teachings stress the fact that Awakening is the nonarisen / unproduced / uncaused, unborn, and unconditioned / uncompounded / unfabricated / unmade / unproduced / uncontrived disclosure of the Buddha-nature, and that as such it is beyond cause and effect (and, in fact, were the disclosure of the Buddha-nature produced by causes and conditions, true, irreversible Awakening would simply be impossible). The truly nondual traditions are those that do not view the material world as separate from the divine; that rather than regarding the body’s impulses as evil or as running against the highest human aims, know them to be sacred impulses to be employed for realization of the divine; that do not contrast oneness and plurality; and that acknowledge that the true condition of all of reality cannot be understood in terms of any concept—for example, as oneness or as plurality—but must be realized directly beyond conceptual interpretations. Since dualistic beliefs arise from grasping at concepts that are defined by genus proximum and differentia specifica; since from a conventional standpoint all concepts and concept-tinged experiences are arisen / produced / caused, born, and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated; and since the true condition of all reality can only be correctly apprehended by seeing through the arisen / produced / caused, born, and compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated and hence through conceptual interpretations, into what (is) nonarisen / unproduced / uncaused, unborn, and unconditioned / uncompounded / unmade / unproduced / uncontrived / unfabricated, as suggested above all spiritual Paths transmitted by genuinely nondual spiritual systems are descending in the senses I am calling [meta]phenomenological and [meta]existential.

Buddhism includes within what it characterizes as produced / caused (Pali bhèta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepa\(^a\)), as born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kyepa\(^b\)), and as compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhata; Skt. samskrita; Tib. düjai\(^c\)), whatever originates from the conjunction of causes and conditions, or from interdependent arisings.\(^{540}\) Wilber views spiritual growth as the production of successive structures, each of which is founded on the preceding one and cannot arise before the preceding one has been established, and classifies them into, (a) basic structures—which result from a multidimensional learning process and which are conserved when development proceeds to a higher psychic level, being integrated into the subsequent basic structures—and (b) transitional or replacement structures—defined as “ways in which the world is experienced through the basic structures of a psychic level” and which unlike the former are not preserved when development proceeds to a higher

\(^a\) skyes pa.
\(^b\) skyes pa.
\(^c\) 'dus byas.
psychic level.\(^a\) Therefore, each structure arises from the conjunction of causes and conditions. Besides these structures Wilber posits the “self,”\(^b\) which identifies with the successive basic structures, producing what Wilber calls fulcra (and, needless to say, giving rise to a sense-of-self—which in Buddhist terms is false insofar as senses-of-self are false). Since identification involves the conjunction of the subject that identifies and that with which it identifies, the self’s identification with basic structures is produced and conditioned. Since according to Buddhism all that is produced and conditioned pertains to samsara, Wilber’s view of spiritual development applies to paths to higher samsaric realms, but in no way can it apply to Paths of Awakening.

According to Wilber\(^b\) at the end of the spiritual process the self goes beyond identification; in order to evaluate this claim, we must revert to the hermeneutical analysis of Wilber’s description of the two highest fulcra carried out in the preceding section of this chapter and elsewhere,\(^c\) remembering that he claimed that one pursued the observing self, which he identifies with the disinterested witness or sakshin, to “its very source in pure emptiness,” and that then no objects arose in consciousness at all. He noted that this was a discrete, identifiable state of awareness—namely, unmanifest absorption or cessation, variously known as nirvikalpa samadhi ... nirodh, classical nirvana. And he wrote that this was the causal state, a discrete state, which is often likened to the state of deep dreamless sleep, except in that this state is not a mere blank but rather an utter fullness, and it is experienced as such... Because it can never be seen as an object, this pure Self is pure Emptiness.\(^d\) In fact, as we saw, this was for Wilber the first of the two meanings of emptiness.

As shown in the preceding section, the witness or sakshin is a Brahmanic concept shared by Patañjali’s Yoga darshana, the Upanishads, the Vedanta Sutra and Shankara’s Adwaita Vedanta. It is a pure observing self that as Wilber himself notes is different and separate from the observed, and which, Wilber claims, in this fulcrum does not identify with the latter. The hermeneutical analysis, carried out in the preceding section, of Wilber’s descriptions of this fulcrum and of the “pith instructions” he gave as a means for realizing the witness or sakshin, proved it not to be the recognition of the dharmakaya aspect (or of any other aspect, for that matter) of the nondual primordial awareness of the Dzogchen teachings—which, like the witness or sakshin, is not one with or equal to the phenomena that in samsara appear as object, but which unlike the witness or sakshin is not separate or different from these phenomena—for the unconcealment of the nondual awareness in question puts an end to the duality of subject and object, observer and observed. The fact that Wilber refers to the witness or sakshin as “the observing self,” thus showing it to be the observer that seems to be different and separate from the observed and which is relative to the latter and cannot exist without it, and in general the whole of the analysis, showed the witness or sakshin to be the illusory mental subject that arises interdependently with its objects by virtue of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle threefold thought structure (Tib. khor sum\(^e\)) as samsara develops from the neutral condition of the base-of-all—which is the only observer that appears to be different and separate from the

\(^a\) Wilber (1990).
\(^c\) Capriles (2006a, revised in a note to 2009b).
\(^e\) 'khor gsum.
observed; which, insofar as it is an interdependent arising, is produced and conditioned; and which is one of the poles of the dualistic structure that is the pivot of samsara and that constitutes the second sense of avidya or marigpa in the division favored by Longchenpa and a central element of the second sense of avidya or marigpa in the classification adopted in this book. However, in this fulcrum the subject has detached itself from its objects through the practice of mental pacification (in Buddhism referred to by the Pali samatha, the Sanskrit shamatha, the Tibetan zhinag and so on), thereby obtaining an experience of emptiness—which as such is a produced, conditioned state of the kind that the Dzogchen teachings compare with a reflection in a mirror and call the state of the reflected, which they contrast with the state of the mirror representing the Recognition of nondual awareness called rigpa.

As substantiated in the preceding section with abundant scriptural quotations, the Mahayana, Vajrayana and Dzogchen Atiyoga forms of Buddhism assert the condition of nirvana, whether transient on the Path or definitive as the Fruit, not to involve the subject-object duality (a duality that as we have seen does not occur even in the neutral base-of-all), and hence not to involve a mental subject that may either identify with this or that, or—like the witness or sakshin in this fulcrum—not identify with anything and therefore keep aloof from the movements of prakriti (i.e. of whatever in samsara appears as object). The fact that this fulcrum is defined as involving the witness or sakshin that all traditions define as a subject different from objects, and therefore features the subject-object duality, and that we identify with this witness or sakshin (ratified by Wilber’s assertion that in fulcrum-10 we disidentify with the witness—which implies that in fulcrum-9 we identified with it—and attain the nonduality of awareness and forms, which in his view constitutes the swabhavikaya), contradicts the assertion that fulcrum-9 was objectless, the qualification of this fulcrum as nirodha (for conditions of plain nirodha do not involve the subject-object duality), and its comparison with deep sleep—which, let it be said, in combination apply only to one class of absorptions of the neutral base-of-all (all classes of which are devoid of the subject-object duality and hence involve no identification). In fact, though the inclusion of the witness or sakshin and other of Wilber’s assertions shows that this fulcrum involves the subject-object duality and as such is within samsara, Wilber also suggests that it is free from the duality in question, as is actually the case with the states of nirodha or cessation that Wilber associates to this fulcrum and in particular with the samadhi that is the fruit of the Yoga Darshana and that is compared with dreamless sleep—which rather than the dharmakaya (which is not comparable to dreamless sleep and does not involve nirodha) or other instances of nirvana, are cases of one particular variety of absorptions of the neutral base-of-all.

Thus Wilber’s description of this fulcrum is self-contradictory and the only thing that is clear about it is that it is not any instance of nirvana, for all such instances are free from the subject-object duality, yet may not be compared with deep sleep and no higher teachings characterize them as nirodha / cessation insofar as they involve an absolute freedom of awareness and do not comprise the obliteration of the sensory continuum or the arrest of motility / spontaneous activity. In particular, as the excerpt from the Vajrasamadhisutra cited in the preceding section made it clear, nirodhasamapatti, which involves the disconnection of the four mental skandhas but not the obliteration of form, is

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a zhi gnas.
not predicated of the dharmakaya; on the contrary, it is viewed as a deviation from the true Path that leads to the highest of the realms of formlessness, in which there is neither perception nor lack of perception, and which is the peak of samsara (bhavagra).

It is in the formless samsaric absorptions that as a rule follow the occurrence of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, that there is a subject-object duality and the mental subject identifies with the pseudo-infinity appearing as object—or, in the absorption called infinitude of consciousness (Skt. viññānānantyayatana; Tib. namshe thaye kyeche a), which is the second of the formless absorptions, identifies with the idea of itself as an immutable, detached perceiver of phenomena, which may seem to be what Wilber’s characterization of his ninth fulcrum reflects. And if fulcrum-9 involves a confusion of formless samsaric states with neither-samsaric-nor-nirvanic states of nirodha, fulcrum-10 cannot be the swabhavikayā, for in Wilber’s system, which in this regard is based on the Tantric Path of Transformation, this kaya must go after the dharmakaya. All of this shows Wilber’s view to be ascending in the metaphenomenological and the metaexistential senses of the term, and as such to reflect unauthentic spirituality.

At any rate, we must conclude that true Paths are descending, not only in the sense I give the term, but also in meaning (2) of those listed above (which is one of the senses in which Wilber uses the term, except in that he wrongly attributes regression to descending paths, whereas as shown below true Paths need not involve regression, which only occurs exceptionally in unprepared individuals)—whereas Wilber’s view is ascending, not only in sense (2) of those listed above, but, as shown above and what is more significant, also in the metaphenomenological and metaexistential senses, and as such it reflects unauthentic spirituality. Though some authentic Paths are gradual and as such coincide with Wilber’s view, and the Fruit of all authentic Paths is stable and as such also coincides with Wilber’s descriptions, the same applies to the ascent to the formless realms and beyond, into the base-of-all, which is gradual insofar as inducing the absorptions of the neutral base-of-all and climbing to the formless realms requires systematic practice of mental pacification over a very long period, and which produces a stable result insofar as the absorptions of the formless realms and the base-of-all can last for periods subjectively experienced as aeons—but at some point they come to an end, as a result of which the meditator falls into lower realms.

The spiritual systems I practice and propound, as all metaphenomenologically / metaexistentially descending Paths, are perfectly nondual; yet in terms of the definitions given above it might be possible to classify them as descending in other two of the above senses as well, for: (1) rather than being antisomatic, they view the body and its impulses as sacred and use them as means of Awakening; and (3) they have always been profoundly concerned with ecological, social, economic, political, gender, generational, cultural and other related issues (a fact that has occasioned murders, persecutions and incarcerations: Tibetan King Mune Tsampo was murdered by his mother in complicity with his country’s nobility because of his attempts to implement his teachers’ social doctrines, various twentieth century Masters and many teachers of older times were jailed for socio-political reasons; etc.). The same applies to my own writings, which include a series of books, papers and book chapters devoted to the issues in question, which I view as being

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a rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched.
of central importance—especially in our time, in which the transformations that formerly were impossible to implement are not only about to become possible, but have become the condition of possibility of the continuity of life on this planet.\(^a\) (However, it is important to note that a descent in sense \([3]\), if divorced from a descent in the other senses of the term, would be counterproductive, for, as shown in my book Individuo, sociedad, ecosistema\(^b\) and other writings,\(^c\) unless progress on the Path of Awakening dissolves the vertical, oppressive structures and relationships in our own psyche, the latter will be reproduced in whatever new order we establish—and, furthermore, we are likely to project our Jungian shadows unto the former rulers and other members of the former ruling class, punishing and destroying the former by punishing and destroying the latter.)

As commented above, descent in the metaphenomenological, metaexistential sense indicated as (4) does neither involve regression to prepersonal states (even though in some unripe individuals it may derail into such regression), nor result in some kind of “return to nature” (from which, by the way, in truth we never became alienated). In the definition of (4) it was made clear that I characterize the process in terms of descent because its basic principle is to repeatedly See through conditioned phenomena into the unconditioned Self-qua-Base that these phenomena conceal, until all conditioning and delusion are undone and the Self-qua-Fruit is established. In a previous chapter it was shown that this process involves what the Divine Comedy represents as a descent through Hell to its bottom and a subsequent “ascent” through Purgatory and Heaven toward the Empyrean; however, from a [meta]phenomenological perspective, this subsequent ascent is a descent as well, for it also consists in Seeing through all that is conditioned so that it spontaneously liberates itself. Thus any ascent that is not a descent in the [meta]existential and [meta]phenomenological senses is a flight from authenticity whereby we climb through the levels of samsara toward its summit—and possibly beyond, into absorptions of the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active. Likewise, insofar as nirvana is the condition of absolute equality and only samsara has up and down, levels are delusive phenomena that must be surpassed if we are to attain Awakening. It was mainly for these reasons that in the preceding section and elsewhere\(^d\) I objected to Wilber’s characterization of the process of Awakening as a progressive ascension through levels in a hierarchy or so-called “holarchy.”

Furthermore, the above view of the Awakening process as a successive, ladder-like production of structures, each of which requires the preceding one as its support, is what Wilber\(^e\) refers to as the “front-door entry into the transpersonal,” which he contrasts with a “back-door entry” that Grof\(^f\) interpreted as referring to access to the transpersonal through so-called “nonordinary states of consciousness” (NOSC)—an interpretation Wilber\(^g\) did not explicitly reject in his reply to Grof. The latter\(^h\) is quite right in noting that if this were

\(^{b}\) Capriles (1994a, work in progress 2).
\(^{d}\) Capriles (1999a, 2000c, 2003).
\(^{e}\) Wilber (1995).
\(^{f}\) Grof (1998c).
\(^{g}\) Wilber (1998, pp. 319-327).
\(^{h}\) Grof (1998c, pp. 106-114).
understood to mean that true spiritual development must exclude “NOSC” and that major breakthroughs must occur outside the context of “NOSC,” then most of the mystics with whom Wilber illustrates the higher fulcra would be fakes rather than authentic mystics. Whether or not Grof’s interpretation of Wilber is correct, it is a fact that Shakyamuni Buddha attained Awakening after a NOSC involving visions of the apsaras seducing him and of demons attacking him; that Jesus was tempted in the desert; that Milarepa had his initial reGnition of Dzogchen qua Base after being attacked by the female guardian Tserinma—and that as a rule great mystics went through experiences of the kind, which provided the setting for the initial occurrence of a major spiritual opening. In the same way—and what is even more significant—the most direct, and in this sense “highest” Buddhist practices, such as Chöa and the supreme practices of the Menngagde b or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings—Thögel and the Yangthik—are based on NOSC, which they induce by means that are among the most powerful and direct to this aim. Since Wilber studied Dzogchen under at least one important Master and regularly uses the Dzogchen terms rigpa (nondual Awake awareness) and Great Perfection to refer to the true condition, if his dichotomy between a “front door” and a “back door” spirituality were understood to mean that true spiritual development must exclude NOSC and that major spiritual breakthroughs must occur outside the context of NOSC, we would be facing a paramount contradiction. At any rate, Stan Grof is quite right when he notes that:

If [Wilber’s front-door entrance] is something resembling William James’s “educational variety” of spiritual development, where one would gradually open to the mystical dimension over a long period of time, in the way in which one learns to speak or develops an ego, it does not seem to be the mechanism driving the spiritual evolution of humanity... the spiritual opening of most famous mystics involved dramatic episodes of NOSC.

However, as made clear in the section on Grof in the preceding chapter, the Czech-born psychiatrist failed to realize that “NOSC” are supremely useful only when used as an opportunity for applying the instructions that are a condition of possibility of the reGnition of the Self-quata-Base. Otherwise, though they may be inconsequential, in many cases they may have rather good or seriously bad consequences: they may either result in an episode spiritual openness—which could as well be an instance of the Self-quata-Path (i.e., a transient reGnition of the Self-quata-Base while on the Path) but that is most likely to remain within the bounds of the relative, deluded realm—or trigger a “psychotomimetic episode” or a psychosis, which given the prevailing disorientation with regard to these processes and experiences would most likely be ravaging.

Wilber’s ascending, stratified vision is not limited to his conception of the process of Awakening; throughout his career he has viewed the whole process of ontogenesis in an extremely stratified way, and until a rather late period he did not consider the possibility that “genuine transpersonal experiences” (whatever this means, since as repeatedly noted throughout this volume and elsewhere, he does not discriminate between instances of nirvana, transpersonal states within samsara and instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all) and key spiritual breakthroughs having a decisive repercussion on spiritual

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a gcod.
b man ngag sde.
development could occur while progress on developmental lines other than the spiritual is incipient. The Wilber that he himself calls “Wilber III”a posits nine or ten basic structures of consciousness as a type of central skeletal frame, incorporating to his previous system the thesis that through these structures there move at least a dozen distinct developmental lines that, beside going through these enduring structures, involve other ones that he calls “transitional structures.” The late Wilber that Stan Grofb calls “Wilber IV” asserted these lines of development to be relatively independent (quasi-independent), being loosely held together by the “self-system,” and admitted that often “the self is all over the place.” Wilber has explained this as follows: c

…development doesn’t somehow proceed in some simple way through a series of a few comprehensive stages which unify all aspects of growth …. The developmental lines may in fact be in tension with each other at times. Furthermore some lines do not typically show evidence …. of coherent stages … There might be a high level of development cognitively, a medium level interpersonally or morally, and a low level emotionally… These disparities of development seem especially conditioned by general cultural values and styles.

However, the idea of all-encompassing basic structures or fulcra implies that higher levels of spirituality can only be reached in a stable way and gone through, after significant advancement has been reached along all developmental lines. And, in fact, this implication has been stated explicitly throughout Wilber’s writings; for a sample, consider the following passage by Wilber IV: d

…each time the self identifies with a developmentally-unfolding basic structure, that exclusive identification generates (or is the support of) the corresponding set of transitional structures. Thus, for example, when the self identifies with preoperational thought (symbols and concepts), this supports a preconventional moral stance (Kohlberg), a set of safety needs (Maslow), and a protective self-sense (Loevinger). When higher basic structures emerge (say, concrete operations rules), then the self (barring arrest) will eventually switch its central identity to this higher and wider organization, and this will generate a new moral stance (conventional), a new set of self-needs (belongingness), and a new self-sense (conformist persona)—and so forth.

Viewing the spiritual as the culminating stages of all lines of development, or as one of the twelve or so developmental lines that would be defined in terms of “trans-” or of “higher than,” would amount to the same, for as Wilber remarked in the same renowned response, in both cases it would be available only to those having attained a rather high stage of overall ontogenetic development and thus having reached higher domains. e Whereas the reason for the latter is self-evident in the context of Wilber’s system, the reason for the former is that, if we define the spiritual as “higher than” this or that, or as “trans-” this or that, then clearly this or that must have developed before this “higher than” or this “trans-.” In Wilber’s words: f

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a E.g., Wilber (1998).
b Grof (1998d).
If... we define *spiritual* specifically as transmental, then clearly the transmental cannot stably emerge until the mental has in some rudimentary sense solidified. Likewise, if we define *spiritual* as transverbal, or as transegoic, or as specifically transpersonal, then the spiritual domain cannot stably emerge until there is a verbal, mental, egoic self to transcend in the first place.

Although the conclusion that transpersonal realms are open (at least in a stable way) only to those who have become established on higher domains is consistent with Wilber’s view of spiritual development as an “ascending” process occurring in terms of rather rigid stages, defining the spiritual as corresponding to the higher stages of various developmental lines would cause it *not* to be a line of development like the other ones he posits, which are supposed to extend along the whole process of ontogenesis. In order to make the spiritual be like the rest of the lines of development he posits, and by the same token maintain his evolutionist schema of spiritual development as occurring in terms of a succession of rather rigid states, he opted for a conception of the spiritual as a separate line of development defined in terms borrowed from theologian Paul Tillich: as consisting in an individual’s ultimate concern at each stage of her or his life, on each of the “transitional structures” Wilber posits (among which, as it is widely known, some of the most important ones are: worldviews, self-needs, self-identity, and moral stages"). This ultimate concern:

…unfolds through the general expanding spheres of consciousness, from preconventional concern (egocentric), to conventional concern (sociocentric), to postconventional concern (worldcentric), to post-postconventional concern (bodhisattvic). Or again, in more detail, using the names of the associated worldviews: archaic concern to magical concern to mythic concern to mental concern to psychic concern to subtle concern to causal concern.

In a previous section of this volume and in Capriles (2006a) I showed that the fulcra Wilber calls psychic, subtle and causal do not correspond to the higher levels of realization on gradual Buddhist Paths. With regard to the concerns Wilber associates to his fulcra, it is true that nowadays as a rule egocentric concern prevails in the very first stages of life and the concern Wilber calls bodhisattvic can only prevail at a later stage. However, as shown in Taylor (2003, 2005) and Capriles (2007a vol. III), the same cannot be said with regard to human phylogenesis, in which development does not go right through the same stages as in ontogenesis. Moreover, with regard to ontogenesis, the rigid succession of concerns Wilber posits does not occur even in gradual Paths. In fact, in all systems involving bodhisattvic concern the latter begins to develop at a rather early stage of the Path: (a) in the gradual Mahayana, which belongs to the Hetuyana or causal vehicle, it is held that the rupakaya aspect of Buddhahood will result from the accumulation of merits and the dharmakaya aspect will result from the accumulation of wisdom, and hence we must set to develop the qualities of the bodhisattva from the onset of the Path; (b) on the Dzogchen Path, which is beyond cause and effect and in which the qualities of bodhisattvas need not be cultivated, the latter begin to arise spontaneously the moment we enter the Path in the real sense of the term (i.e., when the Self-qua-Path manifests for the first time).

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To finish with the consideration of Wilber’s amplified lamrim model, let us ponder on Sean Kelly’s brilliant denunciation of some of its contradictions. Wilber claimed that human experiences of the transpersonal domain could not occur before what he calls the magical-typhonic phase of consciousness in the process of phylogenesis, and that the first such experiences occurred in some special “typhonic” individuals. Kelly objects:

Apart from throwing into question the whole notion of the prepersonal, the fact that “the first true psychics [i.e., individuals at the first transpersonal stage] … emerge[d] in the magic period” [a so-called prepersonal collective stage] (Wilber 1995, 322) also renders highly problematic the general principle of linear continuity ([according to which] levels/stages cannot be bypassed) implied in the metaphor of the Great Chain of Being. For if it is possible for typhonic individuals to experience a transpersonal epiphany or “influx” (i.e., the psychic or low subtle realm) prior to the emergence of the mental ego, then it clearly makes no sense to conceive of the transpersonal as following the mental egoic (Wilber’s “personal” consciousness) in the same manner that the mental egoic follows the membership and typhonic. Again, to do so would require an explanation of how it is possible for a supposedly holarchically “higher” structure—in this case the psychic—to transcend as it includes a lower structure—in this case the mental-egoic—that had not yet emerged. Wilber himself recognizes that “at any of its stages of stable growth and development, the self has access to temporary experiences (‘influxes’ or ‘infusions’ or ‘transfusions’) from the transpersonal domains (1995, 743). But if all levels of the Great Chain manifest the same principles of holarchical integration, why is it possible for transpersonal influxes to occur at virtually any lower level of organization (even if they don’t attain to enduring traits), whereas it is impossible for someone at, say, cognitive stage 2 (preop) to experience, again however fleetingly, an influx from cognitive stage 4 (formop)? Clearly, the transpersonal “levels” as a whole are of a completely different order than the ones that “precede” them.

Also Washburn’s highlighting of crucial contradictions in Wilber’s system is very much to the point; however, since Washburn’s discussion is too long to be reproduced here, I direct the reader to his text.

The problem with Wilber’s system is not his lamrim model, for lamrim Paths are perfectly legitimate so long as there is awareness that they are defined by contrast with nongradual Paths, that development along the former is radically different from development along the latter, and that the former are “lower” than the latter. The problem with Wilber in this regard is threefold: firstly, as shown in the preceding section, his schema of stages outright contradicts that of the gradual Mahayana and those of higher Buddhist Paths, with which he explicitly or implicitly claims agreement; secondly, he carries stratification much farther than traditional lamrim outlooks; and thirdly, he gives to understand that his views express universal truths that as such apply to Dzogchen—which as noted above and in Beyond Mind II he has studied with at least one important Tibetan Master—and other Paths that cannot be characterized as gradual, whereas in fact the views he expresses negate the very essence of Paths such as Dzogchen.

However, Buddhism is the Middle Way, not only between hedonism and asceticism, existence and nonexistence and so on, but also between descending and ascending. Though as a whole Buddhist Paths are descending in the metaphenomenological and metaexistential senses of the term, all Buddhist Paths involve practices that induce one or

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Washburn (1998).*
another kind of ascent. For example, in gradual Paths—and almost invariably in nongradual Paths as well—before setting out to apply the practice of insight meditation (Pali vipassana; Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhartong [lhag mthong]; Chin. kuan; Jap. kan; Viet. quán), the practice of mental pacification (Pali, samatha; Skt. shamatha; Tib. zhinai [zhi gnas]; Chin. Chih; Jpn. shi; Viet. tam) is applied, which may result in experiences of the formless absorptions or even of the neutral base-of-all. In higher Tantric Paths, practices are applied that induce experiences of clarity and of total pleasure that, if clung to, result in birth in the realm of form or in the realm of the gods of sensuality, respectively. In these and similar cases, the experiences in question, rather than being clung to, are to be used as images in a mirror that provide us with a precious opportunity to reGnize the true condition of the mirror—which here represents the primordial, nondual, nonconceptual, unconditioned awareness in which experiences arise and which is the true condition of all experiences. Therefore, the ascent has the sole purpose of providing opportunities for metphenomenological, metaexistential descent.

Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, Buddhist Paths are not descending in the ontogenetic sense, as in this sense they take for granted we will go forward rather than backward. In the initial stages of development of infants, the development of ever greater skills is achieved at the expense of the relative wholeness characteristic of infancy: the phenomenological and existential ascent inherent in developing a self-identity, which goes along with and is inseparable from the development of skills, gives rise to a descent into fragmentation. However, if at a later stage in life we set foot on a higher Buddhist Path, our metaexistential and metphenomenological descent toward the absolute wholeness of Awakening will go along with an ascent in both wholeness and skills (even though in some stages we may be obstructed by self-consciousness and torn by conflict). And then, when we finally attain Awakening, absolute wholeness will manifest coincidently with consummate skillfulness. Because of this, and because on gradual Buddhist Paths each stage of realization depends on the achievement of the former, the gradual Paths in question may also be seen as ascending in a sense that is neither the metphenomenological, metaexistential one we are concerned with here, nor that of moving toward an otherworldly reality, nor that of lack of concern with ecological, social, political or economic issues (the last two senses being points of contention in the noted “ascender-descender debate”).

The above is reflected by some of the Buddhist schemas of development along the Path, which “verticalize” the division into samsara and nirvana, placing nirvana in a superior plane and samsara in a lower one—thus spurring seekers on the Path and by the same token instilling respect for the Buddhas, higher bodhisattvas and so on. In particular, gradual vehicles such as the Shravakayana and the Bodhisattvayana or gradual Mahayana depict the gradual Path of Awakening as a progressive ascension through five successive paths, each of which is more advanced—in the sense of being less deluded and thus involving greater truth—than the preceding. Furthermore, as we know, the Bodhisattvayana or gradual Mahayana explains the last three of its five successive paths in terms of the ascension through eleven levels (Skt. bhumi; Tib. sa). Thus it must be reiterated that it is only from the metphenomenological, metaexistential standpoint we are concerned with here, that spiritual development in all Buddhist Paths is always a process of descent. In fact, in all of them we must face duhkha (unhappy consciousness), mortality and so on, and See through all that is conditioned into the unconditioned true nature of all phenomena.
Furthermore, as shown here, development along the Path in the vehicles in question does not at all follow the developmental schema Wilber set forth. The gradual vehicles in question arose through the skillful means of a Buddha, who was fully aware that the Path was descending in the senses I call metaphenomenological and metaexistential. In fact, the condition of adult human beings in samsara results from the interaction of inborn propensities with a process of social conditioning that establishes countless illusory divisions, giving rise to an experience that Shakyamuni characterized in terms of the Pali term sankhata and the Sanskrit term samskrita (corresponding to the Tibetan term ‘dus byas)—which have the acceptations of conditioned, compounded, made up, intentionally contrived, configured and born. And the whole of the Buddhist teachings make it crystal clear that, as noted above, the Path consists in Seeing through all that falls under the category designated by the Pali term sankhata, the Sanskrit term samskrita and the Tibetan term düjé (‘dus byas), into the original condition Shakyamuni characterized in terms of the Pali term asankhata and the Sanskrit term asamskrita (corresponding to the Tibetan term ‘dus ma byas), which are rendered by terms such as unconditioned, unmade, uncompounded, unborn, unconfigured and not intentionally contrived—a condition that, as shown below, in ordinary individuals is concealed in the newborn, in perinatal experience, and throughout the intermediate state (Skt. antarabhava; Tib. bar do) between death and rebirth. Thus there can be no doubt that, from a metaphenomenological, metaexistential ontological standpoint—yet not so from an ontogenetic perspective—the Path is to be characterized as “descending.” And, as evidenced by the fact that the Atthasalini emphasizes the apachayagami or tearing down meditation, this applies even to the Shravakayana, which Tibetan tradition views as the lowest vehicle.

Wilber’s extreme lamrim (lam rim), ladder-like model of the Path—according to which spiritual progress unfolds through successive, mutually corresponding concerns and worldviews, understood as transitional stages that build upon previous competences and that as such can neither be bypassed nor jumped over—even in watered down versions such as Wilber IV, in which the stages are said to be so in a “soft” sense and the self is said to be often “all over the place,” fails to correspond even to gradual (lamrim) Buddhist Paths. Far less could it then correspond to a Path such as Dzogchen, which, as so many teachings and testimonies attest, does not involve rigid stages of development. Wilber should be aware of this insofar as he has studied Dzogchen, yet he views his model as a universal map applying to all Paths, whether gradual, nongradual or neither-gradual-nor-nongradual—and consequently to Dzogchen as well, even though his model negates the very essence of this Path. As The Heart Mirror of Vajrasattva, a Tantra belonging to the Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings puts it:

Kye! Friends! The Fruit of authentic, perfect Buddhahood does not depend on maturity or immaturity.

No doubt, most of those who enter the spiritual Path in the truest sense of the term, which is that of the initial occurrence of the Self-quà-Path, do so as adults; however, it is not rare for true tulkus to enter the Path in this sense during infancy or adolescence. Among the very many examples of this found throughout Tibetan history, let me quote just the

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following: (1) our contemporary, the late high Master, Urgyen Tulku, a told Marcia Schmidt that his meditation as a child was not different from what manifested in his mental continuum upon being introduced to the state of rigpa. (2) The same Master told the same lady that Ngaktrin of Argong, of whom his own root Master, Samten Gyamtso, was recognized as the immediately following incarnation, at the age of eight realized the nature of mind when a gönla (monk in charge of the chants for the guardians) who was doing his job while Ngaktrin and other kids played boisterously around him, upbraided the child for his misbehavior, telling him, “Don’t let your mind wander.” The child asked, “How does one not wander?” Whereupon the monk told him, “Look at your own mind!” It was as he automatically applied this unintended instruction that the Self-qua-Path manifested in his continuum. (This example is so much to the point because the child not only was eight years old, but also was behaving—in the words of the monk scolding him—as a “spoiled brat.”) (3) The previous examples do not conclusively refute Wilber IV insofar as we do not know for sure that the realizations of the Masters involved were stabilized at a very early age. The case of Treasure-Revealer (tertön) Namchö Mingyur Dorje is wholly different in this regard, for it is well-known that his realization soared in such a way between the age of ten and his death at the age of twenty-one, that from the age of eleven through thirteen he dictated thirteen volumes of termas of the extraordinary kind called “appeared in space” (namchö), which only manifest through Revealers who are firmly established in the state of rigpa—a feat that conclusively demonstrates that he achieved a stable realization since a very early age, while being still a playful, probably boisterous child.

In fact, what is characteristic of nongradual Paths is that individuals can enter them in the true sense at any stage of their life, independently of their development in one or another field. Then the repeated occurrence of the Self-qua-Path bears a strong influence on all areas of their life, inducing a spontaneous, swift yet gradual transformation in all of them, so that the virtues proper to bodhisattvas spontaneously arise without the individual applying the relative practices the gradual Mahayana employs to this end, intelligence often soars to unforeseen heights, all-encompassing learning sometimes arises spontaneously in people who have not carried out systematic studies (as in the astonishing case of the “all-knowing” Jigme Lingpa), and skills become consummate. Were it necessary to wait until developing structures and skills that can only arise late in life for people to begin developing spiritually, it would be hardly possible to attain Buddhahood in a single lifetime, and the realizations proper to Dzogchen that result in special modes of death or even in deathlessness could be simply out of the question.

We have seen that it is Dzogchen Ati—the Path Tönpa Garab Dorje bequeathed us, which is neither gradual nor sudden, and which is the one I have recurrently illustrated with the symbolism of the Divine Comedy—that embodies most perfectly the principle of the Path as Seeing through all conditioned phenomena manifesting in our experience, into the

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a Urgyen Tulku (2005).
b ngag phrin [ngag dbang phrin las] from… ar gong?
c bsam gtan rgya mtsho.
d mgon la.
e Urgyen Tulku (2005).
f nam chos mi ’gyur rdo rje.
g nam chos (nam mkha’i chos).
unconditioned the Self-qua-Base. The fact that the vehicle in question does not involve a clear sequence of stages of realization, as realization may arise beyond stages, or without any particular order of stages, is clearly stated by the late Dudjom Rinpoche (1979, p. 28):

(In the practice of the Dzogchen Menngagde [man ngag sde or man ngag gyi sde; Skt. Upadeshavarga]) the stages of experience and realization may appear either progressively, or without any particular order, or all at once, according to the capacities of different individuals. But at the time of the Fruit there are no differences.

Although the Dzogchen teachings, in order to make the point that they lead beyond the realizations of other vehicles and show exactly the way and the sense in which they do so, occasionally posit a sequence of sixteen levels (Skt. bhumi; Tib. sa)—a higher number than those found in any other vehicle—what is characteristic of Dzogchen Atiyoga is the presentation of the Path as a single level (Skt. ekabhumi; Tib. sa chik) and hence as having neither bottom nor summit: both Dzogchen and Ch’an or Zen stress the fact that realization does not involve any kind of ascending progression, for it consists in the sudden, instant unconcealment of the original, unconditioned condition of absolute equality that involves no high or low, no up or down, which the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen-qua-Base, and which in no sense whatsoever may be viewed as the pinnacle of a process of ascent. The Dzogchen teachings use the example of the garuda bird that is mature and in the full possession of its qualities from the moment it breaks out of the egg, to illustrate the noted fact that Dzogchen-qua-Path is not essentially different from Dzogchen-qua-Fruit—even though the former’s duration is limited because, since the propensities for delusion to manifest have not been purged, this delusion is bound to arise and conceal Dzogchen-qua-Base again. In fact, though there is a Dzogchen Atiyoga sequence of realization, which begins with the dharmakaya, continues with the sambhogakaya, and concludes with the nirmanakaya, each of these successive dimensions, rather than being a higher rung in a ladder, constitutes, on the one hand, a more thorough unconcealment, and on the other, a different dimension, of the unborn, unproduced, unconditioned trikaya qua Base that is characterized by absolute equality rather than by hierarchies or holarchies.

In fact, all Buddhist Paths and vehicles that define themselves as nongradual, and not only Dzogchen Atiyoga, abstain from positing Paths and stages of realization: this is the case with the Pratyekabuddhayana of the Hinayana and with the Sudden Mahayana, which is Ch’an or Zen Buddhism. Among these, Ch’an or Zen, just like the Dzogchen teachings, places the strongest emphasis on the fact that the unconcealment of the Self-qua-Base (whether as the Self-qua-Path or as the Self-qua-Fruit) is just as uncaused, unproduced and unconditioned as that which is so unconcealed, and that therefore, as so many Ch’an or Zen stories and Dzogchen teachings show, it cannot be caused, produced or cultivated—this being a most basic reason why it is utterly wrong to believe the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit to be attainments obtained through a process of ascent, and why, unlike all that is attained by ascending (which is subject to the law of gravity according to which whatever ascends sooner or latter will fall), the Fruit of these Paths is not impermanent and

\[ a \] This has been shown throughout this volume and in Capriles (1977, 1986, 1990a, 1990c, 2000a, 2000c, work in progress 4, work in progress 5).

\[ b \] sa gcig.
as such provides a definitive solution to our problems rather than a temporary escape from them.

Therefore, although Buddhist Paths, and particularly so Buddhist gradual Paths, may be ultimately viewed as the Middle Way between ascent and descent, as shown above all Buddhist systems make it clear, in their respective terminologies, that from what I call a [meta]phenomenological standpoint and from what I call a [meta]existential standpoint, the Path of Awakening is one of descent: it can never be repeated too much that the Self-quaquapa-Path consists in nondually, nonconceptually Seeing into the unconditioned the Self-quaquaque-base through the conditioned experiences that cover and conceal it, which on the occasion of this Seeing liberate themselves instantaneously, and that the creation of a deficiency in the mechanisms whereby we elude duhkha is the catalyst that precludes distracted clinging to conditioned experiences and forces us to apply the instructions which are the condition of possibility of this Seeing and concomitant spontaneous liberation—the Self-quaquaque-fruit being the consequence of the total neutralization of the propensities for conditioned experiences to manifest as a result of the repeated spontaneous liberation of such experiences. However, this is not what Grof, Washburn and other advocates of descending in the “ascender / descender debate” propose, for they at no point insist on the need to reGnize the Self-quaquaque-base or outline means whereby this may be accomplished, but, contrariwise, like the rest of transpersonal theorists, they fail to distinguish nirvanic transpersonal states—those in which the reGnition in question takes place—from samsaric ones and from instances of the neutral base-of-all. Grof, in particular, seems to take occurrences that fall into the last two categories for instances of the first. Although as will be shown below the same is the case with Washburn (though seemingly to a lesser degree), at least he makes it clear that he is referring to a long-term process that leads to the relative condition he calls “integration” and as a rule does not result in what he calls mystical illumination. Furthermore, Washburn implicitly coincides with the higher Buddhist view of being and value as subjective experiences rather than as the true condition of reality (Capriles, 1994, 2000b, 2003, 2006a, 2007a vol. I), insofar as he discusses some of the means whereby we “conquer being and value” at different stages of life (Washburn, 1995, ch. 4, The Mental Ego, pp. 97-118. Spanish Ed. pp. 147-178).

In short, there is no universal map that may apply to all Paths, and Wilber’s map in particular, with its strict succession of rigid stages, does not apply even to gradual Buddhist Paths—so that pretending that it applies to the Dzogchen Path is like trying to make a cylindrical piece of wood fit into a square whole. Furthermore, those of us who do not posit basic structures of consciousness as a skeletal frame and manifold developmental lines involving both enduring and transitional structures, need not define the spiritual as a Wilberian line of development—which at any rate would be too wide a category including all types of needs and endeavors (shamans healing with elemental spirits, witches doing black magic against enemies, common folks hoping to avoid hell and enter heaven, old ladies interceding before god or the saints on behalf of their grandsons, nuns spiritually married to Jesus, soccer fans praying for their team to win a contest, Indian fakirs standing on one leg for years, hatha yogis practicing asanas, advaita vendantists applying jñana yoga, Buddhist monks keeping vows, Tantrics uniting with consorts or engaging in Bacchanalia, Chö [gcod] practitioners offering their bodies in terrifying charnel grounds, yogis in dark rooms practicing the Yangthik, etc.). What we need to define is supreme spirituality, and do so in such a way as to prevent the confusion between what Buddhism views as genuine spiritual development, on the one hand, and the mere induction of
transpersonal, holotropic states either pertaining to \textit{samsara} or being instances of the neutral base-of-all, on the other. And to do so in such a way that our definition will equally apply to gradual Paths, to nongradual ones, and to Paths that, like Dzogchen, are neither gradual nor sudden. I believe a definition of supreme spirituality as “all that is involved in the transition from \textit{samsara} to \textit{nirvana}” does this.

\textbf{Three Paradigms and the Conception of the Base}

Washburn contrasts two paradigms in transpersonal theory: (1) the one developed by Wilber, which Washburn calls structural-hierarchical, and which combines evolutionary theories in the fields of psychology and theory of human social and spiritual evolution, with a hierarchical, stratified classification of psychical states that is essentially based on the \textit{Upanishads} and on \textit{Vedanta} but that Washburn asserts (as Wilber wrongly suggests) to be equally based on Buddhism, and (2) the one Washburn calls dynamic-dialectical, which in his view has as its initial exponent the system produced by Carl \textit{Jung} and presently includes the systems of Stan Grof, David M. Levin and his own. (\textit{Assagioli}, \textit{Norman O. Brown}, and most of the authors I subsumed under the label antipsychiatry, among others, posit “descending” paths as well; however, seemingly because of the way he defines the dynamic-dialectical paradigm, Washburn does not include them within it.) Let us ponder on Washburn’s words:

Similar to the views of \textit{Jung}, Grof, and Levin, the view presented here is one that postulates the existence of an original dynamic, creative, spontaneous source out of which the ego emerges, from which the ego then becomes estranged, to which, during the stages of ego transcendence, the ego returns, and with which, ultimately, the ego is integrated. \textit{Jung}, Grof, Levin, and I differ in the specific ways in which we describe the basic source of the ego’s existence and the ego’s spiral journey of departure from and higher return to this source; nevertheless, the underlying paradigm is substantially the same.

Basically, I think Wilber loses sight of the transpersonal potentials of the deep unconscious and consequently mistakenly conceives of the course of [ontogenetic] development as a straight ascent to higher levels rather than as a spiral loop that, after departing from origins, bends back through origins on the way to transpersonal integration.

The ego—in most senses of the term, and certainly in all senses relevant to this discussion—involves the illusion that we are an entity inherently separate from the rest of the original dynamic, creative, spontaneous \textit{Supreme Source} and true condition of both ourselves and all other phenomena I am calling the \textit{Self-qua-Base}—which includes both those aspects of \textit{our experience} that we regard as an external reality and the psychological and somatic contents we make unconscious. Washburn asserts the development of ego—which he seems to understand mainly in the late \textit{Freudian} sense of the term, in which it comprises functions such as judgment, tolerance, reality-testing, volition, control, planning, synthesis of information, intellectual functioning, defense, memory and so on—to give rise to an illusory alienation from the source of our own energy and experience, and notes

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{a} \textit{Jung} (1928, 1968, 1972, 1975).
\item\textsuperscript{b} Washburn (1995, Introduction and ch. 1).
\item\textsuperscript{c} \textit{Assagioli} (1965).
\item\textsuperscript{d} \textit{Brown, Norman O.} (1968).
\item\textsuperscript{e} Washburn (1995, p. 4; Spanish Ed. p. 21). Quoted in Daniels (2004, p. 76).
\end{footnotes}
that (in his view, once the ego is fully developed and at a rather mature age) some individuals may undergo a process of reintegration susceptible of dissolving the ego’s alienation from the source in question. However, he does not posit a round trip from egolessness to ego and then back to egolessness, as would someone who, unlike Freud, realizes the ego’s alienation from the source of experience and from somatic impulses to be pathological, but who nonetheless adheres to the Freudian view of the infant as completely lacking an ego, and to the Buddhist view of Awakening as an utterly egoless condition: firstly, he cites the psychological and cognitive research carried out in the last decades suggesting that infants possess an embryonic ego; secondly, he does not assert reintegration to involve the dissolution of the ego (in which, as already implied and as will be shown below, he contradicts Buddhist views and introduces an obstacle to Awakening).

Above, I noted that ego in most senses of the term involves the illusion that we are an entity inherently separate from the rest of the original dynamic, creative, spontaneous Supreme Source and true condition of both ourselves and all other phenomena I am calling the Self-qua-Base, and what followed could have caused the reader to understand this to coincide with Washburn’s view. However, as shown below, what Washburn calls Dynamic Ground excludes what deluded beings regard as an external world, as it is no more than an energetic and psychological aspect of the Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base within the individual, which he asserts to have become alienated and concealed from the ego as a result of the “act of primordial repression” that occurred at a rather early stage of our present life and that he deems to represent a decisive step in the development of the ego (for it is the condition of possibility of the development of what Wilber and Washburn call the “mental ego,” and that Washburn also calls “Cartesian ego”557). In contrast, as advanced above, the original dynamic, creative, spontaneous, undivided Supreme Source I call the Self-qua-Base involves the totality of what manifests in our experience, including both those aspects of our experience that as deluded beings we view as aspects of an external world, and those aspects of our experience we regard as part of ourselves (since both what we view as aspects of an external world and what we see as aspects of ourselves are aspects of our experience, contrarily to Washburn’s belief this view does not breach the phenomenological epoche he is so keen on maintaining558).

Furthermore, illusory alienation from the Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base is neither a result of an “act of primordial repression” that occurred at a rather early stage of our present life, nor a consequence of the associated arising of the ego. Ordinary beings have ignored the true condition of the Source or Base in question during beginningless samsara as an effect of avidya in the first of the senses the term has in all Dzogchen classifications—which is that of the unawareness of our true condition produced by the beclouding element of stupefaction indicated by the Tibetan term mongcha⁵, which has always been flowing with the continuum of beings who have never realized their true condition, and which is the subtlest kind of estrangement from the Source or Base—and hence our illusory alienation from the Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base is both [meta]phenomenologically and chronologically previous to the development of the ego in all senses of the term. Likewise, since earliest infancy a proto-subject-object-duality and a protoillusion of self-being arise each and every time consciousness awakens, and these

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⁵⁵⁸ rmongs cha.
phenomena gradually develop as the infant grows up, producing the increasing illusion that he or she is at a distance from the rest of the Source or Base. Furthermore, according to the energetics of the Buddhist Paths of Transformation and Spontaneous Liberation, as infants grow up, punishments induce muscular contractions that in the long run produce knots in the focal points of experience called chakras, which reduce the volume of energy entering higher centers and thus reduce the scope of awareness—resulting in the figure-ground mind that is the condition of possibility of the illusion of there being a multiplicity of entities possessing self-being, on the one hand, and of both self-identity and repression / elusion / bad faith, on the other.559 As a result of all of this, and especially of the mental subject repeatedly becoming (in Sartre’s sense of establishing a link of being with\$a \$556\$d\$\$) the projections others make on the infant, the experience of being a separate, autonomous self progressively consolidates, and a self-image the mental subject regularly becomes or identifies with is formed—all of which has to do with the development of the ego in the early Freudian conception as sense-of-self (which is not excluded either from the late Freudian concept of ego, or from Washburn’s concept of ego—the body ego and the mental ego being different senses of self, as is also what Washburn refers to as the worldly identity of the mental ego,\$b \$561\$d\$\$ which depends on the mental subject becoming a self-image). As this process develops, in connection with the infant’s interpersonal experiences what Wilhelm Reich called the body armor is produced.\$c \$561\$d\$\$

However, primordial repression constitutes a turnabout in the process of alienation that develops over the first stages of ontogenesis, for it introduces a further dimension in the estrangement of consciousness by causing the latter (or, in terms of the second Freudian topic, the latter’s ego aspect) to become alienated from phenomena that are regarded as “internal” to the individual, such as sensations, vital energies, tropisms, drives and psychic contents, and re-structuring the individual’s experience in terms that roughly correspond to the second Freudian topic’s ego-cum-superego / id dichotomy, etc. Washburn underlines primordial repression because his concern is the ego’ alienation from what he calls the Dynamic Ground (which as shown below he places at the base of the spine and associates with kundalini, the Freudian id and so on) rather than its alienation from the much wider Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base. Yet he should also be concerned with the alienation produced by the types of avidya / marigpa distinguished in the Dzogchen teachings (some of which, as I have shown in vol. III of this book and elsewhere\$d \$depend on the reduction of the volume of energy entering the higher centers in the organism) insofar as this alienation is of primordial importance to transpersonal theory in that it is responsible for “closing the doors of perception” and thereby barring access to transpersonal and holotropic realms.

Freud and Jung viewed the ego as being somehow inherent in the psyche and as not being able to dissolve at any stage of life: though in Freud’s view infants were egoless, the Viennese analyst assumed the existence of an inborn tendency to develop an ego which, once developed, would be ineradicable (though of course its functioning could be seriously impaired, as occurs in the various kinds of psychoses). As noted above, research carried out

\$a \$Sartre (1980).
\$c \$Reich (1969).
\$d \$Capriles (2000b, 2003).
in the second half of the twentieth century contradicted Freud’s view of infants as egoless, suggesting the ego to be operational since earliest infancy. It is not surprising that Washburn, as a spiritual heir of Freud and Jung who assimilated the “findings” of the research in question, in spite of admitting (against Freud’s warnings and ignoring Jung’s reservations with regard to yoga and Asian Paths of Awakening) the validity of spiritual paths that present themselves as means for the dissolution or eradication of the ego, should view the ego as a functional structure that does not and cannot dissolve even in Awakening, and the psyche as a bipolar structure featuring two ineradicable selves—a superior one that he calls Dynamic Ground and that in his view has its seat in the lower part of the body, and an inferior one that at some point in the process of ontogenesis comes to appear to be located within the head, somewhere behind the eyes and between the ears (which as such corresponds to what I call the mental subject). At any rate, what we are concerned with here is that, as shown below, the ego involves avidya and marigpa in all senses these terms have in the Dzogchen teachings, Washburn’s view of the ego as ineradicable and hence as persisting even in the ultimate spiritual attainment, implies that Awakening, at least as explained by Buddhism, is impossible (even though I believe Washburn does not realize this implication of his theory).

In fact, Washburn’s division of transpersonal psychology exclusively into the two alternatives represented by the dynamic-dialectical paradigm and the structural-hierarchical one amounts to the negation of the possibility of Awakening. The structural-hierarchical paradigm cannot lead to Awakening because, as made clear throughout this volume, the process of Awakening is, from a [meta]phenomenological standpoint, a descending process insofar as it consists in undoing the [meta]phenomenological concealment of our original condition—the Self-qua-Base, which consists in the trikaya of Buddhahood qua Base. Furthermore, in the preceding section of this chapter Wilber’s conception of the fulcrum or stages of the Path was shown to contradict the views of all Buddhist Paths. However, as advanced above, Washburn defines the dynamic-dialectical paradigm as conceiving the ego as an “inferior self” that is neither an illusion (which is how Buddhism views the ego qua illusion of selfhood, the ego qua sense of self [and hence how it would view the ego of the second Freudian topic], etc.) nor a delusion-inducing functional structure (which is how Buddhism would view the ego in the late Freudian sense and to some extent in all other senses of the term) and that must persist at least so long as the individual is alive. In Washburn’s view, the ego that is our “inferior self,” by achieving a reconnection and a fusion with the nonegoic pole of the psyche that he calls Dynamic Ground and views as the superior Self, and thus overcoming the mistaken belief about itself as autonomous and independent from the Dynamic Ground, can overcome the problems and suffering that derive from the belief in question. This paradigm could perhaps work for achieving some integration, which at any rate is the avowed end of the self-healing process Washburn describes, but it bars Awakening—which probably corresponds to what the author in question calls “mystical illumination” and views as a very rare outcome of the process he is concerned with.

Furthermore, both the dynamic-dialectical paradigm and the structural-hierarchical one, as the rest of transpersonal and “integral” systems, fail to make the key distinction that has to be made in order to avoid the deviations consisting in, (a) ascending in samsara for

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*Washburn (1995, ch. 1, section The Transegoic Stage: Are There Two Egos or None?, pp. 43 et seq. Spanish Ed. Pp. 73-76).*

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its own sake, and (b) squandering one’s precious human existence in neutral absorptions: the one between, (1) nirvana, in which liberation and genuine harmony lie; (2) the neutral base-of-all or kunzhi lungmaten in which neither nirvana nor samsara are active, which is no more than an oasis on the Path that will become a jail if taken for the final destination; and (3) higher samsaric experiences such as those pertaining to the formless sphere and some of those pertaining to the sphere of form or to the higher regions of the sphere of sensuality—which, as we have seen repeatedly, are but more pleasant instances of delusion that will sooner or later give way to more unpleasant states. It is insofar as Wilber does not distinguish among these types of occurrences, that he can disregard the fact that those transpersonal experiences that may occur on the ascending path are as a rule non-nirvanic, and taking them to be instances of realization, disparage Washburn and Grof on the grounds that the latter “confuse early, prepersonal life experiences with transpersonal ones” (which from his own confused perspective is like saying “mistake them for realization”)—when the truth is that non-nirvanic transpersonal experiences are just as trivial when they are prepersonal as when they are postpersonal. It is because Grof also fails to discriminate among the three conditions in question that he can take his “good” BPMs for realizations susceptible of radically altering subsequent hylotropic experience. And it is because Washburn equally fails to discriminate among them that he asserts realization not to put an end to the ego and in general incurs in the errors discussed below.

Washburn tells us that infants have an embryonic ego that develops into a body ego and then, in adolescence, becomes a mental ego that in his view is located behind the eyes and between the ears, thus corresponding to the mental subject—presenting this view in the context of a theory of ontogenesis I view as being to a considerable extent sound (even though it includes elements of psychoanalytical theory with regard to which I keep a cautious epoche, and explains the process of regression-regeneration-integration with a proficiency of detail that might go beyond what may be univocally ascertained). Though the body ego and the mental ego are mainly senses of self and hence egos in the earlier Freudian sense of the term, as noted above it seems evident that Washburn’s use of the term ego privileges the sense it acquired in the second Freudian topic, in which the psyche is geographically viewed as though it were a territory, and the ego is the “part of the mind” which “contains” the consciousness (although it may not be equated with it, which is the reason why maps have been drawn showing the relationship between the elements of the two successive Freudian topics)—which works in terms of secondary process / operational cognition; which has the function of mediating between the id, the superego and the world so as to find a balance between what Freud miscalled “primitive drives,” morality and reality; which as already mentioned comprises psychic functions such as volition, judgment, tolerance, reality-testing, control, planning, defense, synthesis of information, intellectual functioning, and memory; and which is responsible for producing and maintaining the ego qua sense of self based on a self-image. This is the sense in which the ego was compared to the rider that, operating on a reality principle and standing for reason and caution, guides the horse of id—the former controlling the direction in which he wants to go (yet often having to let the horse go where it wants to go), and the latter providing the energy and the means for obtaining the necessary information. Since all of the functions of the ego in this sense are dynamic attitudes of the mental subject to an

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b Grof (1985, 2000).
object, it has as a precondition the subject-object duality. The same applies to the early Freudian sense of “sense of self:” for example, the mental ego has as a precondition the subject-object duality because in this case we are speaking of the mental subject itself (which is the perceiver that cannot be perceived directly: in terms of a Madhyamika definition, it appears “implicitly and indirectly”). And it applies also to what Washburn calls the “worldly identity of the mental ego,” which has as a precondition the subject-object duality insofar as it consists in the mental subject’s identification with self-images that were synthesized on the basis of those projections that others made on the individual and that the latter embodied in different occasions throughout his or her life.

Therefore, so long as the ego persists, the subject-object duality cannot dissolve—and since in Beyond Mind II it was demonstrated that, according to the higher Buddhist Paths and schools, Awakening involves the dissolution of the subject-object duality, this means that so long as the ego persists, Awakening cannot be attained. Furthermore, the three senses of avidya in the different classifications found in the Dzogchen teachings are preconditions of the ego in the earlier Freudian sense, for among the requisites for developing a sense of self some of the most significant ones are: that we ignore our limitless, undivided, unthinkable true condition; that we perceive reality as fragmented; that we take the contents of thought as absolutely true or false; and that we manage to keep unaware of the fact that our experience does not give us the way things are in themselves.

As we have seen, Michael Washburn asserts the process of regression-regeneration-integration he is concerned with, to result in the relative condition called integration and only rarely to lead to what he has called mystical illumination—which I assume he intends to be a category subsuming what Buddhism calls Awakening and the final realization of other spiritual systems as well. However, he asserts the ego not to dissolve even in these unlikely cases. Though he does not make his concept of ego explicit and does not expose the grounds for his claim that the ego persists even in what he calls mystical illumination, I tend to believe the reason for this to be that Awake individuals continue to talk and teach, judge whenever necessary, synthesize information, and function intellectually—which are functions of operational cognition and therefore of secondary process, and which Freud viewed as ego-functions in the later sense he gave the term ego. However, in Awake individuals all of these functions are performed in the absence of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and without the manifestation of the subject-object duality that as we have seen is the condition of possibility of the ego in all acceptations of the term.

Moreover, just as according to Washburn occurs in integration, the functions in question are performed in a condition characterized by the coalescence of secondary process and primary process. (If we reduced ego to secondary process and Dynamic Ground to primary process, insofar as Awake individuals continue to have two cerebral hemispheres, and the one on the right continues to work analogically and therefore in terms of primary process, whereas the one on the left continues to function digitally and thus in terms of secondary process, in spite of the coalescence of these processes—which consists in the functioning of the process proper to each hemisphere in concerted integration with the process proper to the other, so that no positive feedback loops occur and no energy is wasted, and thus operational efficiency is optimal—we would conclude that in Awakening there continues to be an ego and a Dynamic Ground; however, in psychoanalysis the ego-cum-superego is much more than secondary process, and the id that Washburn identifies at least in part with the Dynamic Ground is much more than primary process.) Furthermore, Awake individuals do not need and do not possess a functional structure to mediate between an id, a superego
and the world so as to find a balance between “primitive drives,” morality and reality, for they no longer have an id involving Freud’s miscalled “primitive drives,” and rather than exerting volition and, on the basis of a superego, organizing behavior in terms of moral rules (all of which would require a mental subject and an object), they manifest a totally unrestrained spontaneity that naturally benefits all. This amounts to the eradication of the functional structure involving a rider (that stands for reason and caution and operates on a reality principle) and impulses and drives that must be controlled as though they were a horse: the teachings of Vajrayana Buddhism in general and those of Dzogchen Atiyoga in particular use the analogy of the rider and the horse for mind and energy (two of the three aspects of the individual, the other being body), and make it clear that the Self-quation and the Self-ququa-Fruit involve the dissolution of this duality in the condition of spontaneity or lhundrub that naturally benefits both self and others. Insofar as most functions Freud attributed to the ego have ceased to operate, insofar as there is no experience of the rest of the Self-ququa-Base—including what Washburn calls the Dynamic Ground—as other with regard to any aspect of conscious awareness, and insofar as there is no duality of controlled and controller, it is not legitimate to view the persistence of the various functions of operational cognition as the persistence of the ego, or that of the two mental processes associated with the two mental hemispheres as being a persistence of the ego and the Dynamic Ground—or to hold for whichever reasons that these two poles subsist. Thus it is clear that not only in Buddhist senses of the term is the ego an illusion that temporarily dissolves in the occurrence of the Self-qu-path and irreversibly dissolves in the Self-ququa-Fruit: also the ego in both the late Freudian sense and the early Freudian sense are illusions and functional structures that totally dissolve in these conditions. The point is that the psychoanalytic concepts of superego, ego and id were not intended to apply to the Buddhist and similar conceptions of reality or to the spiritual Path and Fruit, but, on the contrary, to sustain repression and a sense of ego, preventing mystical exploits; therefore, if we accept the existence of such functional structures and also accept the possibility of what Buddhism calls Awakening and of Paths like the Buddhist ones, we cannot expect the functional structures in question to persist either in the Fruit, or in the Contemplation state while on the Path.

Furthermore, Washburn explains the reconnection and fusion of the ego or inferior self with the Dynamic Ground or superior self in dialectical terms as a “superior synthesis” of the egoic and nonegoic poles of the psyche. He does not explain what he understands by “dialectic,” but since he is speaking of a synthesis of two aspects of the psyche it is clear that what he has in mind is not the laws that rule abstract thinking understood as something different and independent from the changes occurring in reality, and insofar as he posits a position (often called thesis), a counterposition (often called antithesis) and an unification (often called synthesis), it is apparent that he has in mind Hegel’s model of dialectic. The adoption of this model (or that in Engels, which is not substantially different in this regard) implies the abolition of the crucial map / territory distinction, the existence of the negation Hegel called Aufhebung or sublation (which, as shown in vol. III of this book and other of my works, is not found in any process, logical or phenomenological; it may seem to occur in non-phenomenological processes such as scientific development, in which new theories often negate older ones while retaining a great deal of what the older ones

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posed— as in the case of the negation / incorporation of Newtonian physics by Einsteinian physics cited by Washburn—a— but what actually happens in these cases is that ordinary logical negation is applied to some aspects of the older theory but not to other aspects), and the view of the spiritual and social evolution of our species as a process of perfecting (all of which go together insofar as sublation was invented because Hegel viewed the territory of reality as a projection of thought that was inseparable from the latter and was ruled by the latter’s laws, so that the arising of a new state in the territory amounted to the negation of the former one, and since he wanted spiritual and social evolution to constitute a process of perfecting, he had to invent a negation that, rather than canceling former negations, or incorporating them and in this way increasing fragmentation and delusion, incorporated them in such a way as to give rise to an increase of wholeness and truth). However, as shown in detail in vol. III of this book and other works of mine, the only existing negation that incorporates the preceding negation, rather than canceling or annulling it as logical negation does, is the phenomenological negation that occurs in Sartre’s bad faith and that Laing explained in terms of a spiral of pretenses, and Hegel’s Aufhebung / sublation is a misrepresentation of the phenomenological negation in question that he fancied with the aim of expounding and validating his inverted view of spiritual, social and political evolution. Since the phenomenological negation discussed by Sartre and Laing that Hegel misrepresented as Aufhebung / sublation and that is the one involved in phenomenological dialectical development, increases unauthenticity, fragmentation and delusion rather than increasing wholeness and truth, the achievement of a unification (or synthesis) of ego and Dynamic Ground could not give rise to a truer, more whole and more authentic condition. In fact, the only possible integration giving rise to wholeness and truth would lie in the dissolution of dialectic and its elements (i.e., position [or thesis], counterposition [or antithesis], and unification [or synthesis]), which is what is put forth in my own philosophy of history; the phylogenetic deactivation of delusion and of the dialectic inherent in it that would take place as a result of the reductio ad absurdum of delusion cum dialectic in the current planetary ecological crisis, is analogous to the ontogenetic deactivation of delusion and the dialectic inherent in it as a result of the reductio ad absurdum of delusion cum dialectic in the disintegration of normal ego-function and subsequent dissolution of delusion and of the illusory alienation with regard to the Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base it implies.

Thus we must reject both the paradigm that Washburn calls structural-hierarchical and the paradigm he calls dynamic-dialectical, and assert the true Path, as discussed here, to be properly understood only in terms of a paradigm which is different from these two, and which nonetheless shares Wilber’s conception of the ego as being at the same time an illusion and a functional structure (which does not amount to reducing the illusion of ego to a structure that should be regarded as not being itself illusory, nor does it imply the view that the illusion in question is to be replaced by a new identification—in this case one having as its object a supposedly ultimate unity), and Washburn’s view of human ontogeny

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b Capriles (1992, 1994).
c Sartre (1980).
d Laing (1961).
in terms of the emergence of ego from an original dynamic, creative, spontaneous Source (which, however, rather than consisting in what he called the Dynamic Ground, is what I am calling Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base) and a growing experiential estrangement of the ego from this Source. However, this paradigm acknowledges that the illusory estrangement from the Source does not arise in the process of ontogeny, for the beclouding element of stupefaction indicated by the Tibetan term mongcha (rmongs cha) has always been flowing with the continuum of those beings that have never realized their true condition. Likewise, it negates the idea that the ego can return to the Source during some supposed stages of transcendence and finally integrate with it without ceasing to be a [separate] ego, and asserts that it has to dissolve, together with the subject-object duality on which it depends, in the unveiling of the nondual Supreme Source—while on the Path, repeatedly for limited periods corresponding to the Contemplation stage, and finally in an irreversible way as the Fruit (which it would be legitimate to call “reintegration” only in case we made it clear that this term is used in a figurative sense, to refer to the dissolution of the ego—so that no entity reintegrates—and of the subject-object duality in the patency of the Base). The ego is not an a priori functional structure involving the belief of being separate from its source that, incapable of dissolving at any stage of ontogenesis, finally reidentifies with the source in question, but the most elaborate and extreme aspect of an illusory alienation from the Source that at the end must dissolve in the patency of that Source—and this applies to all senses of the term ego having a referent, including the late and the early Freudian senses (though, it must be noted, all such referents are effects of delusion). 572 This is how the Path that is descending in the [meta]phenomenological and [meta]existential senses of the term is to be understood (the gradual varieties of which, as we have seen, in some senses may be said to constitute the Middle Way between ascending and descending)

The paradigm we are concerned with, despite being listed third in the preceding paragraph, is in reality the first, for it is the one which in the primordial age Khyeu Nangwa Samgyi Mikhyappa—a—meaning “Supreme Child Inconceivable Vision”—expounded in the root Tantra of the Dzogchen Menngagde (Skt. Upadeshavarga), the Drataljur Chenpo Gyü or Shabda Maha Prasamga Mula Tantra. Then around 1,800 BCE (according to some accounts, 16,000 BCE) Tönpa Shenrab Miwoche reformulated this same paradigm in the Bönpo version of the Dzogchen teachings, and finally Tönpa Garab Dorje reformulated them during the first years of the Christian era in the Buddhist version of these same teachings.

As noted above, this paradigm, rather than positing the Dynamic Ground conceived by Washburn, is based on the reGnition of what the Dzogchen teachings call the Supreme Source, Dzogchen-qua-Base, or simply the Base (zhi). Michael Washburn’s inclusion of David Levin among those who posit a Ground and avow for recovery of awareness of this Ground makes me suspect he may have taken from the latter the noun “Ground” he

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a khye’u snang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa, “Supreme Child Inconceivable Vision.”
b sgra thal ’gyur chen po ’i rgyud.
d ston pa gshen rab mi bo che.
e ston pa dga’ rab rdo rje.
f gzhi.
g Washburn (1995).
h Levin (1985).
combined with the adjective “Dynamic”—in which case the compound term “Dynamic Ground” would derive from Herbert V. Guenther’s translation of the Tibetan term zhi⁵ as “Ground,” which, together with Heidegger’s Grund, was one of the disparate sources for David Levin’s usage of this term. However, we have already seen that Washburn’s Dynamic Ground is not at all the same as the Self-qua-Base, for the latter is the true condition of the whole of reality, consisting in the trikaya of the Buddha-nature qua Base, whereas in Washburn the Dynamic Ground corresponds to kundalini⁵⁷⁵ (which he oddly identifies as a discrete entity “located” literally in the anal-genital region at the base of the trunk, where the source and potentiality of kundalini is as a rule said to reside), and partly to the Freudian id (which, strangely enough, must therefore be a discrete entity literally located in the base of the trunk), and is supposed to be the nonegoic pole of an ego-id bipolar structure that he views as being inherent in the psyche and ineradicable. The reason why I say the identity of Dynamic Ground and id is partial, is that Washburn criticizes the Freudian conception of the id for responding to what the latter has supposedly become as the result of repression in civilized societies—which he oddly calls a “partly preegoic or subegoic” conception, despite the fact that there could not be a pre-egoic id insofar as most characteristics Freud attributed to the id resulted from the development of the ego in civilized societies, and insofar as the id is id only with regard to the illusory ego.⁵⁷⁶ In fact, positing an a priori id, which as such would exist both previously to the development of ego in civilized societies and posteriorly to an individual’s Awakening, implies accepting the concept of instinct, which as Gregory Bateson has noted, comes from the Bible, which leading scientists have discarded (for decades they have been speaking of tropisms rather than instincts), and which is particularly inadmissible in a contemporary transpersonal paradigm, which as such should be nonreductionistic. In fact, the Supreme Source clearly could not be reduced to libido, kundalini energy, somatic / sensual experience, instinctuality (which I assume Washburn uses solely in the sense of Freud’s Instinkt rather than, as in James Strachey’s translation of Freud’s Complete Works, as including that of the German Trieb), affect, emotion, imaginal / autosymbolic cognition, collective memories, complexes, and archetypes.

Since the Self-qua-Base is the true condition of the whole of our experience, insofar as he posits a dualism as inherent in our psychic structure, Washburn has a dualistic conception of the Base, and insofar as he asserts this dualism not to dissolve even in the rarely attained state of mystical illumination, he has a dualistic conception of the Fruit. The hypothesis that a dualism is inherent in the Base and that it is retained in the Fruit is proper to the Yoga darshana of Patañjali’s and its counterpart, the Samkhya darshana of Kapila’s, in which consciousness is passive, male Purusha, and the world of experience is active, female Prakriti, and these constitute an insurmountable duality, so that the best Purusha can do is to be faithful to its own nature and remain passive in the sense of keeping aloof before the movements of Prakriti. Though the fact that Washburn shares with Patañjali and Kapila the belief in an unsurpassable duality between consciousness-ego and an ampler dynamic principle could lead to the conclusion that Washburn’s system is a form of neo-

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⁵ gzhi.
⁷ Bateson (1972).
⁸ Freud (1953-1974).
Samkhya or neo-Yoga, this conclusion would be wrong, for his model is radically different from those of the Indian dualists (to begin with, because Washburn’s dualism is not the one between consciousness and the “external world,” but the one between ego and id).

In general Buddhism, the Base, the Path and the Fruit must be congruent with each other, and the same applies to the three aspects of the Path—the view or tawa\textsuperscript{a}, consisting in the theoretical understanding of the true condition and functionality of reality; the meditation or gompa\textsuperscript{b}, which is the application of a practice congruent with the view; and the behavior or chôpa\textsuperscript{c}, consisting in the maintenance of a conduct congruent with the view and the meditation. As we have seen, in Dzogchen, the Base, the Path and the Fruit are more than congruent with each other: they are in a sense the same insofar as the Base is the true condition of reality, the Path is the repeated, temporary patency of this condition, and the Fruit is the continuous, irreversible stabilization of this patency so that practice is no longer necessary. In these teachings the same occurs with the three aspects of the Path: rather than merely being congruent with each other, they are the same condition, for the Vision or tawa\textsuperscript{d} is the unconcealment of the true condition of the whole of reality; these teachings call the Base, the Contemplation or gompa\textsuperscript{e} consists in the continuity of the Vision during sessions of meditation, and the Behavior or chôpa\textsuperscript{f} consists in the continuity of the Contemplation beyond the sessions of meditation and as much as possible throughout a practitioner’s life. Given the congruency (in general Buddhism) or identity (in Dzogchen) that must exist between Base, Path and Fruit, and between view, meditation and behavior, it is an insurmountable contradiction to view Buddhist types of meditation as valid, effective means of inducing and catalyzing the process of regression-regeneration-integration Washburn is concerned with—as below he is shown to do—and nevertheless deny that the Fruit of the Path is as explained by Buddhism.

As shown above, in Washburn’s paradigm the view involves the error of asserting the Base to involve two selves as innate, unsurpassable poles of the psyche, which subsume but are not limited to the elements of the second Freudian topic (criticized in a previous chapter for not acknowledging the elements in question to be functional structures that arise in the processes of human phylogenesis and ontogenesis, and which in Dzogchen yogis and other practitioners of genuine Paths dissolve both in the Self-qua-Path and as the Self-qua-Fruit)—the nonegoic pole that Washburn calls the Dynamic Ground involving the id yet having spiritual potentialities that Freud never acknowledged in his descriptions of that “region” of the psyche, and the egoic pole involving the superego and ego. As we have seen, according to Washburn also the Path and the Fruit involve these two poles; although this means that, as Buddhist systems demand, the Path and the Fruit are congruent with the Base, the dualism that Washburn posits in the Base is false, and so is the dualism he posits in the Path and Fruit. Therefore, Washburn’s system is apt for illustrating the Surangama Sutra’s assertion, in terms proper to the Hetuyana or cause-based vehicle, that if the causal basis is false, its fruit will be false, and the search for the Buddha’s Awakening will lead to failure.\textsuperscript{g} And indeed it is hardly possible that Awakening, which consists in the dissolution

\textsuperscript{a} Lta ba.
\textsuperscript{b} Sgom pa.
\textsuperscript{c} Spyod pa.
\textsuperscript{d} Lta ba.
\textsuperscript{e} Sgom pa.
\textsuperscript{f} Spyod pa.
\textsuperscript{g} Luk (trans., 1966).
of the illusory functional structures inherent in samsara—for as we have seen, the ego can only reintegrate itself into the Supreme Source / the Self-qua-Base in a figurative sense: through the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base, which dissolves the ego together with the subject-object duality that is by the same token its condition of possibility and pivot, rather than reintegrating itself into it properly speaking—may be attained on the basis of a system that asserts such functional structures to be inherent in the true condition of reality and to be unsurpassable. Since the ego and the subject-object duality / phenomenon of being that is the ego’s condition of possibility and pivot, encumber the individual’s performance, in the long run the dissolution of the illusory functional structures inherent in samsara can result in a consummate, unhindered performance. Since they are at the root of egotism and of the Jungian shadow, their dissolution results in the individual spontaneously achieving the good of both self and others. Etc.

Thus it is clear that in the above regard David Cooper’s position in The Death of the Family is sounder than Washburn’s, for Cooper realizes that the superego and the ego must dissolve in anoia, and that when superego and ego are not manifest what remains can no longer be called id, insofar as there is nothing with regard to which all that it formerly comprised may be regarded as other. In fact, Awakening is by definition a condition in which action (Skt. karma) is no longer active. This is due to the fact that there is no positional, thetic, reflexive consciousness to conceive an intention and carry out an act, or to judge the intention and the action in terms of an internalized moral code: what there is, is the perfect spontaneity beyond action of nondual, nonreflexive Awareness that Ch’an Buddhism calls wei-wu-wei or action through nonaction, and that the Dzogchen teachings refer to by terms such as lhundrub, thinle and dzepa. How could then Awakening involve a superego, an ego and an id?

The Three Paradigms on the Path and the Fruit

As shown in a previous chapter, the Chuang Tzu compares the earliest stages of infancy with Awakening, stressing the fact that both conditions involve panoramic vision and spontaneous motility free of self-hindering, and Dudjom Rinpoche’s Richö features a characteristic Dzogchen comparison of these two states, which stresses the fact that in both of them sensory perception (so to say) is characterized by freshness, naturalness, vividness and unspoiledness. However, we have also seen that infants have not achieved the learning necessary for dealing with reality effectively, and that, what is worse, they are born with avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses of the terms in the Dzogchen classification adopted here—that of unawareness of the true condition of reality as an effect of the beclouding element of stupefaction called mongcha—and with a deep-seated propensity to develop avidya / marigpa in the other senses of these terms (and in fact the true condition of reality has been perceived in an “inverted way” each and every time samsara has arisen from the base-of-all: the phenomena that are the function of the energy or thukje aspect of the Self-qua-Base [i.e., of the nirmanakaya-qua-Base in a wide sense of the term] have

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a lhun grub.
b phrin las.
c mdzad pa.
d Cf. also Capriles (1977, 1986, 2000a) and Dudjom Rinpoche (1979).
e rmongs cha.
f thugs rje.
been perceived as though they were self-existent and as such were in themselves different from the essence or ngowo\(^a\) aspect of the Self-qua-Base [i.e. of the dharmakaya-qua-Base], which is no-thing-ness and which implies the emptiness of self-existence of all entities\(^b\), whereas Awake individuals, on the contrary, manage reality far more effectively than deluded beings, and have become totally free from avidya or marigpa in all senses of the terms and from the propensities for it to develop once more.

In their turn, those intrauterine states that are totally free from differentiation, in spite of being prepersonal, are virtually identical to some transpersonal states, and therefore there is no reason why the conditions in which these are relived should not be validly regarded as transpersonal. However, such conditions are instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all rather than cases of nirvana, for the basic shortcoming of the prepersonal states of early infancy is involved in all intrauterine states and in the bardo or intermediate state that precedes intrauterine states: ordinary sentient beings do not reGnize the Buddha-nature in these conditions, for avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses the term has in all Dzogchen classifications prevents this reGnition.

For example, as shown above, when the clear light that is the expression of the dang form of manifestation of the energy or thukje aspect of the Buddha-nature shines forth in the intermediate state of the moment of death or chikhai bardo\(^c\), as a rule ordinary sentient beings fail to reGnize the true condition of the form of manifestation of energy in question, which is the dharmakaya, and hence what obtains is merely an instance of the condition of unawareness of the Buddha-nature the Dzogchen teachings call the base-of-all (kunzhi\(^d\)) or rigpa-qua-Base. In the Vajrayana Paths of spontaneous liberation and transformation, in order to attain liberation in the intermediate state rather than being reborn by the power of the passions as a deluded sentient being, practitioners undergo a training that prepares them for reGnizing the true condition of the shining forth in question, realizing the dharmakaya, and for reGnizing the true condition of the visions of non-Jungian archetypes that arise thereafter and that are expressions of the rölpa form of manifestation of energy, thus realizing the sambhogakaya. Moreover, even in the case of those who reGnized rigpa when the clear light shone forth after the moment of death, or in subsequent stages of the intermediate state (or in “previous lives,” for that matter), it would not be precise to assert rigpa-qua-Path to obtain by retroceding and undoing: the reGnition of Buddha-nature is beyond reflexive memory, for reflexive remembrance is a function of mind understood as that which conceals the true condition of primordial awareness, and the reGnition of the Buddha-nature is always a new event that in general requires the application of a specific instruction in the present (which, by the way, might be difficult to achieve in a state of regression in which we become like babies, or in which we relive stages of the perinatal process rather than having experiences analogous to these—unless someone having great confidence in this reGnition and being a holder of the traditional instructions is present to help us).

As we have seen, the concealment of the Self-qua-Base is not a chronological process, and the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit cannot obtain merely by undoing the illusory divisions and wayward habits resulting from the process of socialization so as to

\(^a\) ngo bo.
\(^b\) Capriles, 2004, 2007a vol. I.
\(^c\) 'chi kha'i bar do.
\(^d\) kun gzhi.
discover a pre-existing condition that at some point was concealed by them, in some sense regressing to it, or by carrying this regressing and undoing further, to intrauterine life, the intermediate state or “previous lifetimes;” as shown in the discussion of Grof in the preceding chapter, the Self-quaque-Path and the Self-quaque-Fruit do not consist in the recovery of the greater wholeness of prepersonal stages in early infancy, in reviving the supposed “liberation” of the moment of birth in a BPM 4, or in cozily resting in absorptions of the neutral condition of the base-of-all such as those that obtain through the stabilization of a BPM 1 (i.e. of an experience of undifferentiation like those that occur in intrauterine life), or through the stabilization of a state like the one that obtained when luminosity shone forth in the chikhai bardo\textsuperscript{a} or intermediate state of the moment of death without the true condition of this luminosity being reGnized. In the best of cases, such regressions could make us relive more wholesome states experienced in infancy, in intrauterine life, in the intermediate state between death and rebirth, or perhaps even in “previous lives,” but by no means could they result in the manifestation of the Self-quaque-Path and/or of the Self-quaque-Fruit. As stated repeatedly in this volume, both the experiences that obtain in the course of the process of reintegration and the reGnition of the Self-quaque-Base are new, unprecedented occurrences, and the latter, in particular, is of a kind that most of us never went through in the past. The Self-quaque-Path and the Self-quaque-Fruit may be validly viewed as a “Pre” condition from the [meta]phenomenological and [meta]existential perspectives, but not so from a chronological one: [meta]phenomenologically they are “Pre” insofar as they consist in the patency of the Self-quaque-Base, which is our true, original unaltered condition that is illusorily concealed by avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses of the term in all Dzogchen classifications, and [meta]existentially they are “Pre” because the Path to the patency in question (particularly in the case of the Self-quaque-Fruit) goes through the hellish experiences that existential thinking deems authentic and that as a rule we elude by means of bad faith. This is a fact that can never be emphasized too much.

This is why above it was made clear that the Dzogchen Path and its paradigm as presented in this book may not be characterized in terms of the spurious dichotomies that Wilber posited by coining the concepts of a “Pre / Trans Fallacy”\textsuperscript{b} and an “Ascender / Descender Debate,”\textsuperscript{c} or of the one Washburn introduced by contrasting what he called the dynamic-dialectical paradigm with what he called the structural-hierarchical one. In fact, from the standpoint of Dzogchen, both factions of the current debate are equally off the mark. Wilber is wrong in positing a “higher self” and a process of gradual climbing to it that at the end results in Awakening, for the process of Awakening simply consists in the repeated unconcealment of the Self-quaque-Base (note that in this case the term Dzogchen is qualified as “qua Base” rather than as “qua Summit”), which is both the foundation and the \textit{prima materia} of all conditioned constructions that in \textit{samsara} conceal that very Self-quaque-Base—and, as we have seen, spiritual ascents, unless they are stages of a descent in the [meta]phenomenological and [meta]existential senses of the term (as is the case with the ascent through the Heavens toward the Empyrean in the \textit{Divine Comedy}, which is part of the process of purging all that conceals the Self-quaque-Path), will always constitute a flight from more authentic yet more painful states toward higher samsaric realms. Moreover, in the preceding section of this chapter it was shown that Wilber’s description of the

\textsuperscript{a} 'chi kha'i bar do.
\textsuperscript{b} Wilber (1993b).
\textsuperscript{c} Wilber (1995).
successive levels or fulcra in his map is mistaken, at least with regard to the various forms of Buddhism, and that he is simply wrong in asserting Awakening to involve the subject-object duality. For their part, adherents of “descending” paths would be mistaken if they believed the aim of genuine spiritual Paths to be the mere undoing of the constructions established in the process of ontogenetic evolution in order to discover a “deeper self,” failing to realize that before those constructions were established avidya or marigpa in the first of the senses the terms have in all Dzogchen classifications was already preventing the reGnition or our true condition; they would be equally mistaken if, like Grof, they believed “good” BPMs to be instances of realization capable of influencing subsequent hylotropic experience so that we no longer take its events as absolutely true, extremely serious and important, and develop a feeling of apparitionality, playfulness and lack of compulsion to control experience; and they would also err if, like Washburn, they posited two self-existent selves that do not dissolve at any stage in life or under any conditions, one of them being “superior” and the other one being “inferior” and in need of reintegrating with the former—or functional structures of any kind that would be inherent in the psyche and could not be undone even by Awakening, for that matter.

The dispute seems to stem from the fact that both sides are based on seemingly contrary errors, which may have ensued from the methods each employs. Grof’s approach, which a writer characterized as one of “descent into chaos suggesting the symbolism of a regression from the ego and the concomitant inhibition (repression / bad faith) that allows entrance into the sphere Freud referred to as the id as a precondition for reintegration and sanity,” is mainly based on the observation of psychedelic experiences (not only induced by drugs, but also by other means) that Grof interprets as often involving a regression from personal states to so-called perinatal states that are prepersonal but that he asserts to be genuinely transpersonal as well. Furthermore, according to Grof, holotropic consciousness is incapable of managing reality effectively, and hence he cannot assert superior sanity / true mental health to be a holotropic condition. Apparently on the basis of the fact that in those who make progress on the Buddhist and similar Paths, repetition of nirvana in the Contemplation state affects their post-Contemplation experience, mitigating the samsaric illusion of self-existence, seriousness, importance and heaviness, as well as the drive to control experience, he views superior sanity / true mental health as consisting in a relative condition in which this illusion and this drive have been mitigated, and a feeling of playfulness and apparitionality obtains—which, however, cannot be an outcome of transpersonal, holotropic experiences that are not instances of nirvana. It is clear at this point that Awakening, which alone is truly liberating, is not a condition involving the subject-object duality and as such relative and dualistic, which has become lighter as a result of the a posteriori influence of holotropic states in which we were unable to manage reality (as occurs to some people in psychedelic experiences), but an absolute condition free from the relativity of subject and object and from delusorily valued-absolutized concepts in general, in which reality is managed far more consummately than in relative, samsaric deluded conditions.

Wilber, on the other hand, views the Path as a meditation-based, gradual process of ascension that, as his ladder-like view of relatively harmonic development along manifold lines implies, involves developing the ego-mechanisms far beyond the degree they reach in

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a Daniels (2004).
b Goals and Results of Psychotherapy, in ch. 7 of Grof (1985).
normal adults (he has claimed that in his everyday life he does not even for a moment lose presence or mindfulness—which, being based on the subject-object duality, is a samsaric phenomenon, and which as we have seen in the Dzogchen practice called Tekchö [“spontaneous breaking of tension”] or Tenchö [“spontaneous breaking of mindfulness or presence”] is to dissolve repeatedly until the propensity for it to arise is neutralized), and that as such, rather than leading to Awakening, produces higher samsaric transpersonal states—this being the reason why he views the Fruit as lying far beyond the normal condition of adulthood in a process of progression. I believe the denunciation of the confusions in Wilber’s views throughout this series of papers has made this distortion sufficiently clear. (It has been claimed that also through this approach there may be a surpassing of repression, the difference being that in this case repressed contents gradually enter the spheres of ego and consciousness, rather than the latter dissolving into chaos as in the approaches of Washburn and Grof.\textsuperscript{b} \textsuperscript{579} Firstly, we have seen that Washburn does not propose ego and consciousness should dissolve into chaos. Secondly, as shown below, not all types of meditation lead to the reintegration of repressed contents—and certainly those types which are intended to make us ascend in \textit{samsara} for the sake of dwelling in higher samsaric states rather than in order to use the ensuing conditions as a platform for questioning dualistic experience on the basis of secret oral instructions such as those of Dzogchen, only as an effect of the samsaric law of inverted effect or “reverse law” could possibly let repressed contents enter consciousness.) At any rate, Grof and Washburn overtly speak from emergent perspectives of Western psychology, and though they believe their views to partly coincide with those of traditional Wisdom traditions, they evaluate the traditions in question on the scale of their own psychological perspectives; on the other hand, Wilber claims to be expressing the views of Buddhism and other traditions that he characterizes as nondual—yet as shown throughout this chapter (and as will be further demonstrated in vol. III of this book) his views outright contradict those of all Buddhist schools and traditions, and therefore rather than helping repair what The Legend of the Great Stupa\textsuperscript{c} calls the \textit{machinery [giving rise to] Buddhahood}, outright damages this “machinery.” This is why Wilber is the transpersonal author with whom I can identify the least, and whose doctrines I feel a greater urge to refute.

In conclusion, although the transpersonal and holotropic states achieved through both methods are indeed genuinely transpersonal and holotropic, there is no point in setting out to induce “peak experiences,” “transpersonal states,” “holotropic conditions” and so on for their own sake, for samsaric holotropic conditions sustain \textit{samsara}, and absorptions of the neutral base-of-all squander the precious human existence. As we have seen again and again, only the spontaneous liberation of delusion in the nirvanic condition of the Self-\textit{qua-Path} neutralizes \textit{karma}, and does so in an extremely powerful way, thus allowing practitioners to, in the long run, become established in the Self-\textit{qua-Fruit}.

The capital errors common to Wilber and Grof may be classified into, (1) those concerning the nature of the Path, and (2) those concerning the nature of the Fruit—both of which are interdependent insofar as the nature of the Fruit depends on the nature of the Path. With regard to (1), both Wilber and Grof seem to neglect the fact that supreme sanity cannot be achieved by taking holotropic conditions, states of seeming oneness and other

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{khregs chod} or \textit{dran chod}.
\textsuperscript{b} Daniels (2004).
\textsuperscript{c} Padmasambhava (1977).
special experiences as aims in themselves, or by inducing journeys of regression-regeneration-integration without providing those who set out on these journeys with the means for recognizing the true condition of the experiences they go through: it can only be achieved by treading genuine Paths of Awakening possessing the methods whereby we can recognize the true condition of all experiences—including holotropic ones, hylotropic ones, personal ones, prepersonal ones, postpersonal ones, transpersonal ones, perinatal ones and whatever other kinds there may exist—that here I am calling the Self-qua-Base, so that all that is born, caused, made, produced, conditioned or intentionally contrived spontaneously liberates itself. With regard to (2), both of them fail to acknowledge Awakening to be a holistic condition free from the subject-object duality and involving the consummate handling of reality. As we have seen, in his late period Wilber was wrong in asserting Awakening to be an experience involving the subject-object duality but which has been impregnated by the “single taste” of the true condition of reality.\textsuperscript{580} We have also seen that Grof incurred in a similar error by picturing superior sanity / true mental health as a dualistic, relative experience—diverging from Wilber in that he views this condition as the after-effect of performance-impairing holotropic states, yet coinciding with him in believing it to be the result of states that in terms of Buddhism, the Dzogchen teachings and this book are not instances of nirvana. Having clarified both Wilber’s and Grof’s misconceptions of the Path and the Fruit, it is time to consider Washburn’s views in these regards.

(1) With regard to Washburn’s conception of the Path, it must be noted that despite his failure to realize that we are born with fully fledged avidya in the first sense the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, and with fledging avidya in the second sense of the term in the same classification, and despite his misconception of the Base, Path and Fruit as involving the duality of ego / Dynamic Ground, his system may seem to be in harmony with the principle of Buddhist Paths to a greater extent than the other main system in the field of transpersonal psychology positing a “descending” conception of the Path, which is Stan Grof’s.

To begin with, although Washburn speaks of a return to the origins, uses the term regression to refer to it, and claims that it is necessary to return to the preegoic as a preparation for a regenerative ascent to the transegoic, he does not reduce what he calls regression to a reverse reliving of one’s personal and prepersonal history, and does not ascribe a special value to the reliving of the “positive” varieties of Grof’s BPMs. Washburn does not see the return to the origins as being merely a regressive process, for in his view, though the process may abort into a pure and simple regression, this is not the normal consequence for an ego in condition of sailing through what Jung\textsuperscript{a} called “the night sea:” in his view, the lifting of “primordial repression” leads to a regressive reopening of the egoic pole of the psyche to its nonegoic pole, or of the ego to the Dynamic Ground, whereby the ego returns to the sources from which it emerged and from which it had alienated itself, and this process may be viewed as involving regression only in the sense that the ego loses its power, is bared of its defensive isolation, and is put in contact with the resurgence of nonegoic life—which amounts to the return of the repressed. In a symbolism reminiscent of the Divine Comedy’s (to which, like Claudio Naranjo\textsuperscript{b} [1973] before him, he makes explicit reference), he tells us that this descent is followed by an ascent, consisting in

\textsuperscript{a} Jung (1967b).
\textsuperscript{b} Naranjo (1973).
regeneration in the spirit, or, which is the same, that it is followed by a regenerative transformation of the ego by the power of the Ground. More important, rather than dissociating the different experiences occurring in this journey back to the origins, dichotomously classifying them into “positive” and “negative” BPMs, and appreciating the former while deprecating the latter, Washburn emphasizes the continuity of the process through experiences Grof would view as positive and experiences he would view as negative, and says that the process in question must continue to develop through its endogenous stages until it radically transforms the ego, making it become a faithful instrument of the Dynamic Ground.a

Thus Washburn seems to agree with this book in that it is exclusively in an ontologically-[meta]phenomenological sense (i.e., not in a chronological one), that the journey back to the origins involves a “going back”—even though in the process repressed experiences may be relived and repressed contents may be met. He also agrees with this book in describing the journey in question as having to follow its endogenously determined course through both pleasant and unpleasant experiences until the habits and dispositions that make the ego assert itself as an entity independent from the Source has been purged—even though, as we have seen, this source is not for him the Self-qua-Base, but what he calls the Dynamic Ground (a point that has been discussed sufficiently). We have also seen that the scope of the journey Washburn posits is limited, for the “reintegration” it aims at is a relative, dualistic, samsaric condition, and in his view only exceptionally does it result in what he calls “mystical illumination,” which I assume is his name for Awakening, but which he describes in a way that does not fit Awakening. This is congruent with the way he describes the journey in question, which in his view begins with the lifting of primordial repression and consequent recovery of awareness of the Dynamic Ground, and consists in the spontaneous occurrences and transformations spontaneously brought about by having become open to the Ground. As such, it is a journey belonging to the same ample category as those discussed and induced by antipsychiatry in the wide sense of the term, which as such will, like the latter, have limited, relative results, rather than being a journey like the one that is undertaken in the context of the practice of the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings. In fact, as we have seen, the latter consists in the repeated, constant reGnition of the Self-qua-Base, which is the Buddha-nature involving the three kayas, and requires that those undergoing it be provided with the means for achieving this reGnition (which in its transitory manifestations I call the Self-qua-Base, and which, when irreversibly stabilized, I call the Self-qua-Fruit)—namely Direct Introduction, secret oral instructions, and the blessings of the Master, the Lineage, and through these of the Supreme Source.581 As shown in the discussion of the symbolism of the Divine Comedy, the initial reGnition of the Self-qua-Base marks the beginning of the process of ascent that follows that of descent (an ascent that, as we have seen, in the metaphenomenological and metaexistential senses is still a descent): it marks the transition from the bottom of Hell to Purgatory, through which we must climb to Heaven, so that then we may climb through Heaven to the Empyrean.

Thus with regard to the Path the main flaw I find in Washburn is roughly the same I find in antipsychiatry in the wide sense of the term: that it acknowledges the value of self-healing “descending” journeys—which is a great exploit insofar as this process, under the appropriate conditions, may result in a more integrated and harmonic relative condition—

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yet does not provide us with the means for making this process become a means for catalyzing the repeated, constant occurrence of the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base I call the Self-qua-Path, so that it may progressively neutralize karma until the point is reached at which nothing prevents the reGnition in question from persisting uninterruptedly as the Self-qua-Fruit—and yet he implicitly presents the process as being analogue to the Paths of Awakening of traditions such as Buddhism and so on.

The above does not imply that Washburn obviates the need for meditation practice; as will be shown below, unlike Jung he believes meditation to be an important element in activating the self-healing process and keeping it on track so that, rather than aborting, it may reach what he views as its optimal conclusion. However, the main types of meditation he lists are not the most effective for inducing the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base that would make of the journey the swift Path to Awakening; therefore, it is not surprising that Washburn asserts the attainment of what he calls mystical illumination to be so rare: Awakening is the rarest Fruit unless one practices a system such as Dzogchen Atiyoga, which has the most direct and swiftest means for activating the spontaneous descent journey, but also creates the ideal conditions in which the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base can easily occur, and in which this reGnition can immediately take place each and every time delusion manifests. The point is that, just as a process of ascent that is not preceded by a process of descent is necessarily a process of climbing in samsara that in all cases leads us farther away from the patency of the source, a descent to deeper consciousness, though it offers most valuable opportunities for reintegrating projections, facing the Jungian shadow and so on, will only lead to irreversible Awakening if we profit from the greatest opportunity that it offers us: that of reGnizing the Supreme Source (i.e., the Self-qua-Base) by the means traditional systems always used to this end, and of creating the conditions for this reGnition to occur each and every time delusion arises anew, the very moment it does so.

With regard to the problems I find in Washburn’s conception of meditation, firstly it must be noted that he classifies meditation into two main types, consisting in what he calls Receptive Meditation (RM) and defines as a sustained practice of nonselective awareness in which the meditator maintains the attitude of a receptive and unmoving witness (the sakshin that, as we have seen, implies the subject-object duality, sustaining it so long as it persists), and what he refers to as Concentrative Meditation (CM), which is in a sense opposite to RM, for whereas RM is supposed to involve a totally nonselective focus, CM maintains a singular and concrete one: we select a specific object—an image or any other reference point—and fixate our undivided attention on it (which, insofar as it involves the mental subject’s fixation of attention on an object, also sustains the subject-object duality).

(A) The first problem I find with this taxonomy lies in the fact that the distinction between two types of meditation it posits does not seem to be the one that determines what type of states may be achieved through the practice—the essential classification of such states being, as we have seen, the one dividing them into samsaric, neither-samsaric-nor-nirvanic, and nirvanic conditions, yet another important one being the one classifying them into states involving awareness of and responsiveness to sensa, and insentient conditions excluding awareness of and responsiveness to sensa. Insofar as the classification under consideration is binary, so that all types of meditation have to fall into one or another of the

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\(^a\) Jung (1977b).
categories it sets up, types of meditation leading to fruits which lie at opposite extremes of the spectrum are classified into the same category, whereas types of meditation leading to analogous or identical results are classified into opposite categories. Thus the raja yoga of Patañjali’s is absurdly placed in the same category as the visualizations of the Inner Tantras of Vajrayana Buddhism and the koan (Ch. kung-an) study of Ch’an or Zen Buddhism, whereas the practice of sitting meditation of Ch’an or Zen (Ch. tso-ch’an; Jap. zazen) and the type of insight (Pali vipassana; Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhantong; Chin. kuan; Jap. kan; Viet. quán) proper to the Burmese Theravada are placed in the opposite category—even though Patañjali’s Yoga darshana considers subject and object as two inherently different substances constituting an ineradicable duality, and the ultimate attainment of the raja yoga it teaches consists in insentient, blank absorptions of the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are manifest, whereas the rest of the meditations listed may result in some type of nirvanic realization of the nonduality of awareness and appearances (which, however, even in the case of practices belonging to the same tradition, should not be taken to mean that they have the same potential in this regard; for example, in Ch’an or Zen Buddhism, the shikantaza or “simply sitting” of zazen often results in absorptions-of-the-neutral-base-of-all-involving-sense-data that are likely to be mistaken for Awakening, whereas koan study is most unlikely to lead to such a state and on the contrary is very likely to result in instantaneous satori—i.e., in an instance of nirvana).582

If we resort to binary divisions, in order to avoid the blunder of classifying together types of meditation that result in utterly different conditions, the more divisions we use, the better. I think as a minimum the following binary distinctions should be employed if we are to obtain meaningful results: (a) the one between meditations that take the production of extraordinary experiences as aims in themselves, and those that induce such experiences in order to reGnize the nondual awareness that is their true condition and in which—as in a mirror—they manifest; (b) that between meditations that are based on dualistic ideologies and that maintain dualism, and those that are based on nondualistic realizations and that are effective for facilitating the dissolution of dualism; (c) the one between those involving openness to the senses, and those involving withdrawal from the senses and resulting in absorptions in which one is dualistically cut off from sensa and life experiences; (d) the one between those that increase control and build up states of the higher spheres of samsara without employing them as a platform for achieving the dissolution of the subject-object duality and realizing the Self-qua-Base, and those which, like the one that Buddhaghosha called apachayagami, have the function of undoing all that is constructed or built up; (e) the one between those designed for fulfilling their avowed aim, and the more sophisticated ones that are self-defeating:583 (f) the one between those that, like the Tekchö (khregs chod) of the Menngagde (man ngag sde) or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings, are skillful means for instantly Seeing through the contents of thought into the stuff of which thought is made and thus realize the dharmakaya, and those that lack such instantaneous skilful means; (g) the one between those that, like Thögel or the Yangthik, place delusion in an untenable position so that it spontaneously liberates itself as soon as it arises, and those that give delusion space to manifest; (h) the one between meditations that induce runaways of vibratory rates that lead the latter to the threshold at which, under the right conditions, the spontaneous liberation of delusion may occur (such as kung-an / koan study in Ch’an/Zen and the practices of the Menngagde or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen

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teachings), and meditations that slow down vibratory rates in order to induce mental calm and potentially those instances of the base-of-all that may be wrongly taken for realization; etc. Washburn’s failure to made these distinctions is directly related to his failure to refer to those types of meditation that may result in the instant dissolution of the subject-object duality and the concomitant unconcealment of the true condition of Dzogchen-quae-Base (such as, for example, the lhantong\(^a\) [Skt. vipashyana; Pali, vipassana; Chin. kuan; Jap. kan; Viet. quán] of the Mahamudra tradition of the Tibetan Kagyupas, in which one applies ways of looking at the mind that create conditions in which the dharmakaya may instantly be unconcealed, or the more abrupt and radical Tekchö practice of the Upadeshavarga / Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings, in which one deals with thoughts in such a way that these instantly liberate themselves spontaneously in the patency of the dharmakaya and tensions instantaneously free themselves, etc.).

(B) The second problem I find consists in the fact that Washburn asserts both types of meditation (though to a greater extent RM) to have the potential of lifting primordial repression and thus inducing the “journey back to the origins” briefly discussed above. It is well known that Jung\(^b\) believed Eastern practices of yoga, meditation and so on to be unsuitable for Westerners because in his view the principal item in the Western spiritual agenda consisted in gaining access to the unconscious, and he believed the practices in question to exclusively involve the conscious mind and volition and thus to be ineffectual to this aim. Though Washburn is right in contradicting Jung in this regard, he is wrong in asserting all types of meditation (though to a greater extent RM) to have the power to lift primordial repression and induce the process of regression, regeneration and integration he is concerned with. In fact, Patañjali’s raja yoga, not being one of the types of meditation that may be characterized as self-defeating, would lift primordial repression and induce the journey back to the origins only in the most unlikely case that for fortuitous reasons it derailed and backfired. Furthermore, by asserting systems involving mutually contradictory principles such as Patañjali’s raja yoga, on the one hand, and various types of Buddhist meditation, on the other, to have the potential of bearing the same fruit, Washburn was unwittingly implying that the reason why Buddha Shakyamuni, Garab Dorje and other great sages of old (re)introduced practices that had become unknown in the times in which they lived, and rejected the distortions arisen in the immediately preceding centuries on the grounds that they led to fruits wholly different from the ones sought by their own systems, was that they were entrenched in frog-in-a-well perspectives—and that he himself rose over the conflicting frog-in-a-well perspectives of those sages and realized that the practices they rejected led to the same results as the ones they taught. (Washburn is to a considerable degree right, however, in claiming that after crossing the threshold of primordial repression, meditation may become something that happens to us rather than being something that we do, and that in this stage we are most likely to face illusory experiences of the kind that in the context of the vipassana practice of the Pali Canon are called the “ten corruptions,” which Ch’an/Zen calls by the Mandarin term mo-ching and the Japanese makyō, and which Dzogchen calls nyams\(^c\)—which, however, will subside with the passing of time, provided we deal with them in the right way.)

\(^a\) lhag mthong.
\(^b\) Jung (1977b).
\(^c\) nyams.
(C) Finally, the third problem I find lies in the fact that the author does not distinguish those Paths in which it is enough to know the rudiments of a practice, from those requiring would-be practitioners to receive both transmission and traditional oral instructions from a Master holding a genuine lineage having its source in the Tönpa or Primordial Revealer who introduced in the human realm the Path they intend to tread—which are the most direct, powerful Paths. On such Paths, and especially on the Path of Spontaneous Liberation of Dzogchen Atiyoga, the transmission and instructions in question, in interaction with the blessings of the Master and of the Lineage, and through these of the Supreme Source, are the conditions of possibility of the reGnition of the Self-quaque-Base and the concomitant spontaneous liberation of delusion. When this reGnition and liberation occur in such a way as to endow us with a capacity of spontaneous liberation, the journey toward reintegration can become a process of constant repetition of this reGnition-cum-liberation, and therefore it can neutralize in record time the propensities for avidya or marigpa in all senses of the term and ultimately result in the Self-quaque-Fruit.

It is apparent to me that all of the problems discussed under the above three headings seem to be a consequence of the lack of first hand experience of the spontaneous liberation that instantly puts an end to the subject-object duality and that by the same token makes the dharmakaya patent.

Washburn asserts mystical illumination, which he views as the most thorough yet most unlikely fruit that may be attained, to be a gift conferred by the grace of the Dynamic Ground, which the latter may bestow on us if we entrust ourselves to it and, by means of prayer, open up to it and thus unite with it (regardless of whether we address this Dynamic Ground as god or goddess, Tao, Buddha-nature, logos, nature or whatever); therefore, he concludes that prayer is more in tune than meditation with systems which, like his own, posit a Ground that is the source of both the ego and transpersonal experience. In order to discuss the view of prayer as more effective than meditation, we must replace Dynamic Ground with Supreme Source (i.e., Self-quaque-Base) and mystical illumination with Self-quaque-Path. Since the ego is a collection of functions of the Supreme Source in an individual rather than the source of all experience, the Self-quaque-Path is a condition in which ego has dissolved (which, moreover, cannot be produced by causes and conditions), and all actions that seem to be carried out by the ego assert the illusion the ego is and sustain its existence, the ego certainly could not induce the manifestation of the Self-quaque-Path through its own operations. This does not mean, however, that prayer is the best means for achieving the manifestation of the Self-quaque-Path. In the Buddhist Paths of Spontaneous Liberation of Dzogchen Ati and of Transformation of the Inner Tantras, the function Washburn attributes to prayer is played by transmission, practices of guru-yoga-with-form (which strictly speaking belong to the Path of Transformation, but which are universally applied by practitioners of the Path of Spontaneous Liberation), and guru devotion. Transmission is based on the fact that a Master’s certitude with regard to the true condition of reality and confidence on realization allows him or her to somehow empower his or her disciples so that they may have an initial instance of realization (which on the Path of Transformation goes along with the transmission of the power of a mantra by one who has received that transmission from his or her Master and who has obtained the fruit of its application). The guru yogas in question feature the visualization of our teacher, in the form of the Master

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who introduced in our world the teaching we practice, sending rays of light (or thigles in some Nyingthik systems) to us, which represent the Supreme Source’s empowerment for realization—often in combination with mönlams or wish-paths having a function roughly analogous to that of prayer. Furthermore, as a rule Tantric practices of Transformation involve mantra recitation, which also addresses a power not residing in the ego that is ultimately the Supreme Source’s—even though in this case the latter is addressed as the sambhogakaya form personifying the pertinent aspect of the Source in question. Also the recitation of a Buddha’s name (Skt. buddanusmriti; Ch. nien-fo; Jap. nembutsu), which in the Pure Land School of Buddhism (Ch. Ching-t’u-tsung; Jap. Jodo-shu) is that of Buddha Amitabha, addresses a power that is acknowledged not to reside in the ego and to be in truth the Supreme Source’s—and, according to D. T. Suzuki, in Japan this simple practice allowed more people to have a first satori (i.e., an initial manifestation of the Self-qua-Path) than the various practices of Ch’an or Zen. However, prayer / wish-paths, mantra recitation and guru-yogas with form, alone or in mutual combination, unless used as an aid for a main practice consisting in one or another type of meditation, can hardly take us beyond the initial manifestation of the Self-qua-Path—and, moreover, in the Paths of Transformation and Spontaneous Liberation, they are rarely the occasion for the initial manifestation of the Self-qua-Path. This is the reason why these Buddhist Paths are not circumscribed to transmission, practices of guru-yoga-with-form and generation and cultivation of devotion to the Master; beside these elements, all of them involve intensive practice of types of meditation which are self-defeating in the sense that they make the ego act on the basis of its illusion of separate agency, yet by the same token trip it so that its own action makes it collapse—which in this case symbolizes by the same token the realization that the ego cannot cause or induce the occurrence of the Self-qua-Path, and the dissolution of the illusion of separate agency and hence of the ego in the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path by the grace of the Supreme Source. Therefore, it is incorrect to view prayer as mutually exclusive with meditation, and to claim the former to be more in tune with Paths that posit a source from which the ego has alienated itself and to which it must return.

In its turn, the Self-qua-Fruit—at least in our time—can only manifest as a result of the neutralization of all propensities for delusion through the latter’s repeated, constant spontaneous liberation in optimal conditions (which are those discussed in the preceding chapter, and which include a high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, the transformation of contradiction into conflict and so on). When in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings, a practitioner who has received transmission / direct introduction applies the secret oral instructions of Tekchö, spontaneous liberation may take place through the blessings of the Master, of the Lineage, and through these of the Supreme Source. Once repetition of this has endowed the practitioner with a good capacity for spontaneous liberation, he or she must begin to apply the more advanced practices, which as we have seen have a principle totally different from those of the types of meditation Washburn reviews, which consists in placing the practitioner in a situation in which the basic contradiction consisting in the three tiered delusion called avidya or marigpa turns into conflict, he or she becomes like the eye in which the hair of duhkha (the

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a snying thig,
b smon lam.
First Noble Truth, usually rendered as “suffering”) stings, and the mental subject’s attempts to control experience backfire, so that the only alternatives are the spontaneous liberation of the ego and the subject-object duality that is its pivot, or hell and psychotic disintegration—so that obtaining the desired outcome depends on receiving the blessings of the Supreme Source through those of the Master and the Lineage, as well as on the Master’s guidance and supervision. The most powerful examples of practices of this kind are Thögel and the Yangthik, which have been considered in some detail in this volume and which have the function of carrying the spontaneous self-healing process that Washburn describes in terms of the three stages consisting in regression, regeneration and integration, far beyond the point it could reach without the help of these practices—and thus attain the degrees of integration that result in special modes of death and even in deathlessness.

(2) With regard to the conception of the Fruit, Washburn is not very ambitious and contents himself with a reintegration that remains within the relative realm—which as such fulfills the Buddhist requisite of being congruent with the path, for no more than a relative integration is likely to be attained in a single lifetime in the absence of means facilitating the instant reGnition of the Self-qua-Base. In fact, as we have seen repeatedly, our author claims that the ego cannot be dissolved and must remain forever one of the two poles of a bipolar psyche, even though it must open up to the Dynamic Ground and in some sense unite with it: Washburn defines what he calls the “highest state of psychic organization” as a condition in which the ego, totally developed and responsible for itself, has become a faithful instrument of the Dynamic Ground, and describes this state as a reintegration consisting in the “totally harmonious duality” that he refers to by Nicholas of Cusa’s term concidentia oppositorum, and that in his view involves the reconciliation and unification of poles that formerly were to a great extent in opposition—mind and body, thought and senses, logic and creativity, civilization and instinct, ego and Dynamic Ground—so that these come to work in a completely unified and complementary way. Since I assume he believes what he calls mystical illumination to be the same as what Buddhism calls Awakening, I believe he is right in claiming the Fruit in question to be very rarely obtained, for it can hardly be attained in a single lifetime through means like the ones he describes.

However, as we have seen, he explains mystical illumination in a way that does not fit Awakening. Firstly, he explains what he calls reintegration as the recovery “as spirit,” and without losing the learning achieved throughout ontogenesis, of awareness of what he calls the Dynamic Ground and in general of all that was concealed by the “act of primordial repression,” yet he does not explain the meaning of recovering this awareness “as spirit” or how is the ensuing condition different from the original condition of the infant; therefore, it seems apparent that such a recovery would involve avidya in the first of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen classification adopted here and the propensities for the other types of avidya to develop—which, as we have seen, are inherent in infants. Secondly, he claims that in this ultimate realization the ego persists rather than dissolving; since, as shown repeatedly, the threefold avidya or marigpa that involves the beclouding element of stupefaction called mongcha, the subject-object duality and the illusion of self-existence, is inherent in the ego—both in the sense of the body ego and in that of the

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mental ego, both in the early and the late Freudian senses, and in general in all senses of the term—this implies that according to Washburn threefold avidya of marigpa persists in Awakening, and as such our author’s view outright contradicts the Buddhist teachings in general and the Dzogchen teachings in particular. In the same way, asserting the ego to have become at this point responsible for itself amounts to positing a more effective dualistic self-consciousness and self-control, which as shown throughout this book are based on the most basic manifestation of avidya or marigpa in the second of the senses of the term in the Dzogchen classification adopted here, consisting in the subject-object duality and the phenomenon of being—and therefore contradicts the Awakening of Buddhism, which involves the end of self-consciousness and self-control, and the arising of a host of spontaneous, actionless activities (Tib. thinle\textsuperscript{a} or dzepa\textsuperscript{b}, Ch. wei-wu-wei or tzu-jan), and therefore by no means could involve responsibility.

Furthermore, Washburn identifies what he calls “saintly compassion” with moral consciousness, and although he does not understand this concept in the Kantian-Freudian way, but rather as F. J. C. Schiller\textsuperscript{c} conceived the possibility of moral behavior—as the rooting of the moral imperative on the natural tendencies so that morality may become a second nature to human beings rooted in their sensibility—it is clear that he is speaking of something that, congruently with his ideal of integration, occurs in the relative realm and involves the subject-object duality, and hence is not the compassion that according to the Mahayana and higher forms of Buddhism may manifests in the Self-qua-Path and which characterizes the Self-qua-Fruit: a nonreferential compassion that is free from relativity and from the subject-object duality. In fact, Washburn’s “saintly compassion” resembles the compassion that in the gradual Mahayana manifests as a result of the development of relative bodhichitta rather than the one that may spontaneously arise in the Contemplation state of the superior bodhisattva, or than the one proper to Buddhas. And yet in the view of our author, congruently with his conception of the path and the fruit, it is something that—just like “prophetic vision” and “mystical illumination”—arises only exceptionally (in his discussion of saintly compassion Washburn speaks of egoless spirits; since he explicitly asserts this condition to involve the persistence of the ego, I assume that in this context he is using the term “egoless” in the sense of “unselfish”). For all of the reasons reviewed we must conclude that Washburn’s conception of reintegration does not correspond to the Awakening of the higher forms of Buddhism, and that if we aspire to Washburn’s ideal and set to achieve it we will hardly have any possibilities of achieving Awakening in this lifetime.

Furthermore, Washburn’s concepts do not seem very clear or distinct. He defines mystical illumination as an objectless condition—which, since the absence of an object implies the absence of a subject, is by implication a subjectless condition—that, unlike the other four “objectless conditions,” is a gift only grace can confer. However, he says of this condition that in it the ego is infused, illuminated and exalted by spirit, and that it is thus infused, illuminated and exalted to a greater degree than in any other condition—whereby he contradicts his assertion that the condition in question is objectless, for as we have seen there can be no ego without the subject-object duality. It must be noted that beside mystical illumination Washburn posits other four supposedly “objectless” states (which, however,

\textsuperscript{a} phrin las.
\textsuperscript{b} mdzad pa.
\textsuperscript{c} Schiller (1985).
he claims are less perfectly so), namely, (1) those of “inert voidness” that occur in the mental-egoic stage, (2) the empty trances occurring in the second period of regression in the service of transcendence, a (3) the undifferentiated ecstasies and inflations occurring during the regeneration in the spirit, and (4) the objectless contemplations that obtain in the last stage of the regeneration in the spirit and throughout the integrated stage. Though some of these may be instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all that Washburn has the merit of distinguishing from the final stage of mystical illumination,690 in the case of (4) objectless contemplations, he uses as synonyms the terms asamprajñata samadhi, which Patañjali regards as the final, seedless (nirbijja) samadhi and which is an extremely deep instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all excluding sensory data that as such is really objectless (even though from a Buddhist standpoint is not an instance of realization, for it is neither samsara nor nirvana, and the Dzogchen teachings warn against remaining in it), and arupa jhana, which is the Pali equivalent of the Sanskrit arupa dhyana and which indicates the formless meditations that pertain to samsara and that as such involve the subject-object duality—the object being, as we have seen, a condition free from the figure-ground distinction that as such may be experienced as an infinitude (even though it may involve the form of a sensory continent lacking the figure-ground distinction, which is what it is and can only be conceptualized as such in contrast with the form of conditions involving the distinction in question), or the concept of a limitless subject that cannot be affected by experiences, or the concept that this condition one has achieved cannot be conceptualized, etc. At any rate and as just noted, no state can be objectless if it is not subjectless, and since the ego in all senses involves the subject-object duality, there is no way an objectless condition may involve ego (as according to Washburn is the case with mystical illumination and with what he refers to as the four objectless contemplations).

I believe that, had Washburn’s books traveled across time and reached me during my youth, probably I would have liked them considerably (which is something I could by no means say of Wilber’s works). Furthermore, I am sympathetic to the fact that Washburn had Herbert Marcuse as the tutor of his doctoral thesis. However, presently I cannot avoid realizing how his views of the Base, Path and Fruit fail to correspond to those of the Path I practice and in general to all Paths having the same basic principle. Hence my critique of Washburn’s theory.

To conclude, the way Washburn presents the process of regression-regeneration-integration gives the impression that it is excruciatingly painful. Though spontaneous self-healing processes are indeed painful, their Dzogchen variety, despite involving difficult passages, is far from being painful in the sense and in the way Washburn’s descriptions present such processes, and on the contrary involves a great deal of supreme bliss.

Conclusion

Now that Washburn’s system has been briefly discussed, we can more thoroughly place in perspective the positions of both sides in the so-called ascender-descender debate and the supposed pre/trans fallacy, comparing them with the varieties of the Buddhist Path. If Wilber’s views had truly derived from the practice of meditation, the methods on which he based himself would be of the same general kind as those of the Buddhist Paths in general; however, in genuine Buddhist Paths, when higher states of the three samsaric

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spheres are pursued and attained, this is done with awareness that they are samsaric states and with the sole purpose of reGnizing their true condition—and it is deemed extremely harmful for a practitioner to take them as ends in themselves or to establish him or herself in them in the belief that they are a genuine refuge. Likewise, if rather than “descending” merely in order to relive basic perinatal matrices wrongly taken to possess a transforming power (as in Grof’s system), or in order to meet the unconscious and ultimately reintegrate the ego with a misconceived “Dynamic Ground” without this involving the dissolution of the beclouding element of stupefaction that prevents reGnition of our true condition, as well as that of the subject-object duality and all delusorily valued absolutilized thoughts and therefore of the ego (as in Washburn’s system), “descent” were undertaken after receiving transmission and oral instructions from the holder of a lineage of a tradition such as Dzogchen and obtaining the necessary capacity of spontaneous liberation, with the aim of turning contradiction into conflict and thus facilitating the reGnition (of) the true condition of all concepts and all concept-tinged experiences the instant they arise (the reasons for this being, as we have seen repeatedly, that if delusion becomes pleasant we will neither detect its existence nor be forced to apply the instructions that are the condition of possibility of its spontaneous liberation, and that conflict and a heightened energetic volume determining the scope of awareness make the spontaneous liberation of delusion neutralize karma to a greater degree), this would be the approach of Dzogchen Ati and of this book. It is clear, therefore, that the dispute arises from the fact that neither of the parts is firmly rooted in a genuine Wisdom tradition and neither of the parts has obtained the realizations that are the essence of the Path in such traditions—and therefore both of them are off the mark. This means that the basic error of Washburn and Grof is the same shared by most of humanistic psychology and antipsychiatry in the wide sense of the term, which set out to undo repression in the absence of the means that facilitate the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base.

We have seen that in the Dzogchen teachings the highest and supreme realization possible is the one attained through the practices of Thögel and/or the Yangthik, which are carried out in the intermediate state between death and rebirth (which, as we know, does not imply the death of the organism, for we enter the state in question while our physical body is alive), and in which we must deal with bardo experiences the Dzogchen way, so that all that manifests liberates itself spontaneously and in this way the propensities for delusion are progressively neutralized, until they no longer have any hold on us. Although the intermediate state between death and rebirth may equally be seen as lying in the past, which is the direction in which Grof leads us (and inadvertent readers may think Washburn takes us in the same direction), or as lying in the future, which is the direction in which according to Wilber realization lies, ultimately realization does not lie merely in accessing the intermediate state, but in the spontaneous liberation of all experiences that manifest in this and in all other states, which can only take place by reGnizing their true condition. Furthermore, Awakening is neither the summit of a mountain nor the bottom of an ocean, but the condition of absolute equality in which there is neither high nor low, neither upwards nor downwards, and which consists in the spontaneous liberation of the experiences of the summit, the bottom and the middle.

Sean Kelly asserted that, a “an essential task for transpersonal theory will be to set Wilber’s paradigm in dialogue with those of Grof b and Washburn, currently the two most

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substantial alternatives to Wilber’s paradigm.” Though in my view Grof’s explanation of
the genesis and character of COEX systems needs to be completed and set in perspective, I
believe the concept of such systems might be part of a future, synthetic metatranspersonal
psychology; likewise, as noted in the preceding chapter, in spite of the Grofs’ misleading
views with regard to what they call “spiritual emergencies,” their “Spiritual Emergency
Network” (SEN) could help people who unwillingly and unknowingly face psychotic (or
“psychotomimetic”) episodes or set out on psychotic journeys (at the very least, it could
save them from psychiatrization). As we have seen, though these journeys are not in
themselves Paths of Awakening, in the right setting and with the right guidance and
support they can become spontaneous healing processes, which is most likely what they
were in Paleo-Siberian Shamanism (so that what Washburn called “regression in the
service of transcendence” is actually “regression in the service of a more balanced ego
open to transpersonal realms”). I think for his part Wilber is right when he suggests that the
states found in processes of descent like the ones discussed by Washburn and Grof may be
mistaken for the realms of highest aspiration, and hence those who become content with
them may forsake the quest for true Awakening; however, exactly the same may occur with
the states Wilber posits in his maps of spiritual ascension, which, as we have seen, in
Buddhist terms are not instances of nirvana—and, even worse, if we follow him and
conserve the subject-object duality and the illusion of self-being there is no way we may
attain Awakening. Furthermore, I believe that for the dialogue in question to be fruitful it
should include Jungian psychology, antipsychiatry (in the ample sense of the term that
includes Laing, Bateson, Basaglia and the many others listed in the preceding chapter),
Freudian psychoanalysis, some trends of British psychoanalysis, existential
psychoanalysis (and in particular a reinterpretation and fine-tuning of Sartre’s theory of
bad faith) and other relevant systems. At any rate, for such a dialogue not to be dry
speculation begetting wrong views, it must be undertaken in the context of a genuine
understanding of Awakening or nirvana and of the means wisdom traditions have always
used to achieve this condition, on the basis of personal practice of at least one such
tradition.

The above is partly what I have attempted in this volume—though I have failed to
cover important areas of psychological theory that I deem relevant for such a synthesis to
be truly exhaustive. I hope in the future what has been presented here may be integrated
with those of the factors mentioned above that I had no space to discuss in this volume.

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APPENDIX

Some Preliminary Reflections on Wilber V
A Critique of My Beyond Mind Papers

I wrote the initial Beyond Mind paper (Capriles, 2000c) in 1999, before the ongoing turnabout that is giving rise to the system Wilber (e.g. 2010) refers to as Wilber V, which he has been expounding in works published since the onset of the twenty-first century. And even at the time of writing the last of those papers (Capriles, 2009b)—years before publication, as its unprecedented length was a serious challenge for the Editors of the *International Journal of Transpersonal Studies (IJTS)*, which caused it to wait in the queue for years—I had not yet read any of the writings Wilber produced after 2000.

The critique of Wilber’s twentieth century works presented both in the Beyond Mind papers and in the main body of this book was written because, upon reading the works in question, I felt compelled to correct the serious misunderstandings concerning the theory and practice of the higher Buddhist teachings in general and of the Dzogchen teachings in particular they involved. As to future Wilber works, I had no plans of addressing them, partly because I was not inclined to read further works by our author (so many of his subjects are foreign to my interests—in particular, I don’t find developmental psychology relevant for spiritual and/or transpersonal development—and I find his construal of Buddhism and many of his views on subjects of my interest rather annoying), partly because I did not foresee the turnabout that is currently giving rise to Wilber V, and partly because in recent years Venezuelan policies have made it quite difficult for me to buy books in English and so I had to choose to procure those books that it was imperative for me to read in order to complete the various long works on subjects not directly related to Wilber that I have been preparing since the turn of the century.

However, during the years between completion of the last paper in the Beyond Mind series and the email announcing that the paper was about to go through the final editing by *IJTS* staff for it to go to press, I read a series of works by different authors—including two Wilber works published in 2000 and one published in 2009—and therefore upon receiving the announcement in question I decided to partially update the article, making various additions and corrections, and inserting the references for these. Even though I was aware that Wilber was undergoing a turnabout, as already noted I had not read most of the resulting works, and I made no moves to overcome difficulties and procure them so as to be able to assess them, as I had no intention of intellectually persecuting Wilber—and, even if I had been intent on continuing to refute him, to procure and read his relevant newer works (provided that I would manage to acquire them), and then carry out the required, major overhauling of the paper, would have been impossible in the short time at my disposal.
Then, shortly after publication of the final paper of the series, author and Webmaster of the Webpage Integral World Frank Vissera cautioned me that the Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000c, 2006a, 2009b) and the books based on them could be dismissed for failing to address the current Wilber. In response, I prepared the preliminary discussion of Wilber V Visser published in his Website (Capriles, 2010c). A few months after that, Glenn Hartelius, current Editor of the IJTS, emailed me a reply to the Beyond Mind papers by a reader called John Abramsonb in which I was criticized for failing to address Wilber V, and urged me to prepare a reply to Abramson for a future issue of the journal in question. These two facts made me aware of the need to produce an Appendix on Wilber V for this book as well. However, a thorough assessment of Wilber V would have filled a significant number of pages (perhaps less, perhaps more than the assessment of the earlier Wilber in the main body of this book), and hence it would have made this volume much longer than any Publishers would find publishable. Thus this Appendix will only address general issues in Wilber V and specific points of Abramson’s (undated) reply to my papers, by synthesizing the piece published in Integral World and the most relevant parts of my as yet unpublished reply to Abramson.

Finally, I duly thank Mr. John Abramson for offering me the possibility to confine myself to precise themes of Wilber V, as well as for the tone of his valuable reply (which is kinder and more respectful than that of my objections to Wilber). I extend my thanks to author-editors Frank Visser and Glenn Hartelius for their roles in eliciting the production of this Appendix.

A Reply to Abramson and  
A Preliminary Discussion of Wilber V

The first thing to note is that, although Wilber allegedly abandoned his former pantheistic emanationism,593 he still posits a transcendent reality (which, as shown in the main body of this book and in Appendix I to Beyond Mind III, no Buddhist school or vehicle has ever posited)—insisting that it should flavor the immanent while at the same time being flavored by it. This is apparent in the following passage by Wilber (Wilber & Cohen, 2002, p. 2), which Abramson (op. cit.) cites:

... the real key to this discussion, I think, is when you understand that the only way you can permanently and fully realize emptiness is if you transform, evolve, or develop your vehicle in the world of form. The vehicles that are going to realize emptiness have to be up to the task. That means they have to be developed; they have to be transformed and aligned with spiritual realization. That means that the transcendent and the immanent have to, in a sense, flavor each other ..... The best of a nondual or integral realization is that we have to basically work on both [the world of time and ‘the timeless’]. We have to polish our capacity, in a sense, to fully realize emptiness, moment to moment. But it's the emptiness of all forms arising moment to moment. So we have to have a radical embrace of the world of samsara as the vehicle and expression of nirvana itself.

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a Visser (2003) is the author of Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion. His Website’s Internet address is http://www.integralworld.net/.
b The name is the same as that of the author of Overdo$ed America, but I assume this to be no more than a coincidence.
Moreover, here Wilber continues to incur in an error pointed out in the papers that Abramson reviewed (which, however, Abramson overlooked in his review) and again in the main body of this book—namely that of identifying *samsāra* with the world of form, thereby implying *nirvāṇa* to be a formless condition. The term *world of form* may be understood in at least three different senses: (1) as whatever is configured, including, (a) the tsel\(^a\) mode of manifestation of energy involving the ever-changing configuration that beings in *samsāra* experience as phenomena of the physical universe, which is manifest in most experiences of all three realms of *samsāra* (in all experiences pertaining to the realms of sensuality and form, and in most of those pertaining to that of formlessness), but also in most events of nonstatic *nirvāṇa*; (b) the rölpa\(^b\) mode of manifestation of energy involving Thögel and Yangthik visions; and (c) phenomena of dang\(^c\) energy such as the mental images involved in fantasy, imagination, visualization and so on;\(^{594}\) (2) as all that involves the figure-ground division, which is manifest in two of the three realms of *samsāra*—those of sensuality and form—but which may repeatedly arise in the *nirvāṇa* of higher vehicles as well; and (3) as the samsaric realm of form, which excludes all types of *nirvāṇa*, but which may not be identified with *samsāra*, for as just noted, the latter includes the other two samsaric realms as well.

For its part, and as noted above, the *nirvāṇa* of higher vehicles does *not* exclude configurations of any of the three types subsumed under (1), not does it need exclude the arising of the figure-ground division discussed under (2). In fact, the supreme *nirvāṇa* while on the Path, rather than a formless condition, is the reGnition of the true condition and basic stuff of the thoughts conditioning experience at a given moment, no matter to which samsaric realm the experience pertains (i.e., it is the reGnition of the Self-qua-Base that, as noted repeatedly, is called Dzogchen-qua-Path and that here I call the Self-qua-Path), which results in the instant spontaneous liberation of the thoughts in question, which instantly dissolve without this affecting in any way the continuity of the experienced configurations that, previously to the self-liberation of thought, our thoughts had been conditioning. Likewise, higher *nirvāṇa* as the Fruit—including the supreme *nirvāṇa* that is Dzogchen-qua-Fruit, the Buddhahood that is the Fruit of the Path of Transformation, and the one that is the Fruit of Mahāyāṇa—most of the time involve that which I listed as (1): what from one samsaric perspective I called the world’s dynamic configuration.

Consequently, Wilber is right in asserting emptiness to be the emptiness of all the forms that arise from moment to moment, yet he is outright wrong in identifying the forms in question with *samsāra*—just as he is wrong in implicitly identifying *nirvāṇa* with the absence of forms, for as noted above that which disappears in supreme *nirvāṇa* is the threefold avidyā that in *samsāra* conceals and distorts the true condition of what samsaric beings experience as the world’s configuration, and not so the latter. Finally, both Dzogchen and Chán deny that in order to permanently and fully realize emptiness we must transform, evolve or develop what Wilber calls “our vehicle”—a term Buddhism as a whole would reject, for if *one has* a vehicle, then there must exist someone different from the vehicle who owns it, drives it, etc., and one of the premises of Buddhism is that there is no such owner, driver, etc. (an assumption it refutes with sophisticated, compelling arguments which include Candrakīrti’s Sevenfold reasoning). In fact, in the vehicles in question, it is

\[^a\] rtsal.  
\[^b\] rol pa.  
\[^c\] gdangs.
the recurrence of realization that progressively transforms us—making selfish action gradually dwindle and selfless activity benefiting others gradually increase; making the psyche constantly gain in self-consistency; progressively neutralizing the proclivity for evil, self-encumbering and so on; and in general neutralizing the propensities for delusion and concealment until these are burned out and Buddhahood obtains. In fact, in Atiyoga-Dzogchen, such is the function of the repeated reGnition of Dzogchen-qua-Base referred to as Dzogchen-qua-Path—just as in Chán it is the function of the repeated realization of the dharmatā, the dharmadhātu or however we call the absolute truth of the Mahāyāna (which, as made clear in the main body of this book and more carefully explained in a note to it, for Tibetan Buddhists other than Tsongkhapa and his followers is not emptiness).595

Another of Abramson’s (op. cit.) objections is the following:

Capriles presents a definition of ‘supreme spirituality’ that he believes includes all authentic traditions and overcomes the problems presented in Wilber’s model i.e. “all that is involved in the transition from samsara to nirvana” (Capriles, 2009, p. 15). But this could be understood as an ‘Ascending’ definition in that it apparently fails to incorporate a uniting of nirvana with samsara, at least in the way Wilber understands the necessity of such coming together i.e.

“But the basic rule is: resting as emptiness, embrace the entire world of form. And the world of form is unfolding. It is evolving. It is developing. And therefore resting as blissful emptiness, you ecstatically embrace and push against the world of form as a duty.” (Wilber, 2002b).

The above is related to the same problem of identifying samsāra with the world of form and implicitly identifying nirvāṇa with the absence of forms. The truth is that for nearly all Tibetan Buddhists who are not Tsongkhapa followers, in the context of the Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna, samsāra consists in relative truth and nirvāṇa in absolute truth, and relative truth (the etymology of which is, as shown above, obstruction to correctness or thoroughly confused) absolutely lacks existence and truth—absolute truth being the only truth there [is] (the concept of the two truths is not widely used in the Dzogchen teachings, which nonetheless agree that what the Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna call relative truth is untrue and nonexistent). As Gorampa puts it (corresponding yet not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 144-145).596

The relative truths enunciated in those contexts [e.g., in the texts of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti] are nonexistent. Since [in absolute truth] there is no erroneous apprehending subject, this subject’s corresponding object—[relative truth]—does not exist.

Thakchoe (2007, p. 145) rightly asserts this view to be shared by Indian Master Jayānanda and Tibetan Masters Rendawa, Shakya Chogden, Taktsang Lotsawa, Kunchen Pema Karpo, Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, Ju Mipham and Gendün Chöphel. However, the view in question is not only an interpretation by these Masters, for it is the original view of

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a dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal, p. 446b. In The Complete Works of the Sakya Scholars, vol. 12. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969. Thakchoe’s translation had conventional instead of relative. Here one of the phrases in brackets inserted by Thakchoe was deleted and another one inserted instead, as I felt his view as a Tsongkhapa follower was affecting his interpretation and hence his translation of Gorampa’s words. For evaluating this translation, cf. the Tibetan original in the endnote the reference mark for which is at the end of the paragraph.
Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti—Jayānanda having obtained it from the latter—as well as of the Tibetan Master Dölpopa and of nearly all Tibetans who do not follow Je Tsongkhapa—and, most important, it is the one found in the Dzogchen teachings.

At any rate, the relative, albeit nonexistent, certainly produces suffering, and although both suffering and the one who suffers are untrue and nonexistent, in samsāra both suffering and the one who suffers are experienced as absolutely true and important—the very raison d’être of Buddhism thus being that of putting a definitive end to suffering. And it does so by the only way possible: by realizing, in nirvāṇa, the absolute truth that is the only truth there is, in which neither suffering nor one who suffers are experienced, and then coming to the point at which the individual no longer departs from this truth—never again having the delusive experience of relative truth. In fact, since the relative truth that only manifests in samsāra and that is a thoroughly confused perspective and an obstruction to correctness is utterly nonexistent and as such untrue, there is nothing different from nirvāṇa for the latter to embrace: though in samsāra a duality between samsāra and nirvāṇa is perceived by those who have embraced the Buddhist or other similar teachings, in nonstatic nirvāṇa—both as it manifest on the Path and as the Fruit of Buddhahood, which consists in the uninterrupted manifestation of the svābhāvikāya—nothing that is not the absolute truth is apprehended and hence no relative truth or samsāra—and thus no duality between samsāra and nirvāṇa—is perceived. In the words of Kunkhyen Pema Karpo (corresponding yet not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 145-146):

To the extent that remaining obstructions subsist, to that extent multifaceted appearances are perceived during post-Contemplation as illusory, etc. However, from the moment all latencies [of previous defilements] are totally [eliminated], relative phenomena are never again perceived. Instead, one ceaselessly dwells on the essence of Contemplation.

However, understanding that the only means whereby suffering may be definitively quenched is by attaining nirvāṇa is likely to give rise to the samsāra-sustaining craving° called vibhavārṣṇā—i.e., the turning of other forms of craving into craving for self-annihilation in nirvāṇa—and hence it was as a merely intellectual means to neutral this samsāra-sustaining craving that, in the Prajñāpāramitāśūtras Śākyamuni Buddha, and then Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamaka philosophy, expressed in language to beings in samsāra—and hence in relative terms—the perspective of nirvāṇa, emphasizing the nonduality of samsāra and nirvāṇa.

Abramson’s objection is very similar to the criticism of my position that a Nepalese spiritual teacher made in the “Transpersonal Psychology” entry of Wikipedia, which objected that:

They (Elias Capriles and others) too misses the game ’cause don’t they know what Nagarjuna among many buddhist siddhas say “Where there is neither an addition of nirvana nor a removal of samsara; There, what samsara is discriminated from what nirvana?”

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° kun mkhyen pad ma dkar po, dbu ma’i gzung gsum gsal byed, p. 121. Saarnath: Kargyud Student’s Welfare Committee. For evaluating this translation, cf. the Tibetan original in the endnote the reference mark for which is at the end of the paragraph.

°° trṣṇā.

°°° Pāḷi, vibhava-taṇhā.

°°°° The grammatical errors were in the Wikipedia text as accessed on September 2, 2010.
The only truth has always been the absolute truth, and hence realization of this truth does not add anything to what (was) there from beginningless time, whereas relative truth never existed in truth and hence its elimination could not remove anything to whatever (was) there from beginningless time. Likewise, since relative truth / saṃsāra never existed, and nirvāṇa is so only in relation to saṃsāra, there is nothing to discriminate. However, Nāgārjuna was a Buddhist, and as such he wrote all that he wrote in order to lead beings from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa and thus to put an end to the excruciatingly painful illusion of suffering and one who suffers—rather than going to sleep because, since all beings had always been in nirvāṇa, there was simply nothing to do. Therefore, he fully agreed that if we mistake for nirvāṇa the higher realms of saṃsāra—or the base-of-all where neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa are active but that technically pertains to saṃsāra, for that matter—we will not have even the slightest chance to “attain” nirvāṇa and thus to put an end to illusory saṃsāra with the equally illusory yet excruciating suffering and pain inherent in it. In fact, Buddhism arose because Siddhārtha Gautama realized that his teachers ascended to high samsaric realms—the second, Udraka Rāmaputra, reached to the highest realm of saṃsāra—but did not go beyond saṃsāra, and aware that this did not represent a true liberation he went on to seek the way to put an end to saṃsāra, “attaining” higher nirvāṇa—which then made him realize that there was neither a saṃsāra to transcend nor a nirvāṇa to attain.

After becoming the Buddha Śākyamuni, Siddhārtha Gautama expressed the latter understanding in his Mahāyāna teachings, which are those collected in the Sūtras of the Second and Third Promulgations, among which most relevant with regard to both the Nepalese teacher’s and Abramson’s objections are those of the Second Promulgation—the aforementioned Prajñāpāramitāsūtras—both because of the emphasis they place on the nonduality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and because they are the basis of the Mādhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna. The teachings and philosophy in question involve a therapeutic use of logic that as such is mainly intellectual, and hence contrast with the Dzogchen teachings, which offer those who have already recognized saṃsāra as such, special yogic skillful means that allow samsaric experiences to liberate themselves spontaneously in nirvāṇa—upon which we realize the nonduality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa that is realized in nirvāṇa only, and which therefore for those in saṃsāra cannot be more than an intellectual realization pertaining to relative truth that as such is delusive (i.e., it is an obstruction to correctness in one who is thoroughly confused).

May the above view be categorized as ascending, as Abramson claims? Throughout the papers he was replying to, as throughout this book, I made it crystal clear that the sense in which Wilber uses the terms ascent and descent is, to say the least, decidedly secondary with regard to both the metaphenomenological and the metaexistential meanings I give these terms, yet my critic does not seem to take into account all of the reflections I offered in these regards. Moreover, not even in Wilber’s sense may the view I have expounded be characterized as ascending, for it does not urge beings to set to climb toward nirvāṇa in order to escape from saṃsāra: whereas in the relative truth of saṃsāra there seems to be something to escape from, an escape and something to which to escape—the attempt to escape from saṃsāra, since it sustains the experience of relative truth that is the essence of saṃsāra, having the effect of sustaining saṃsāra—the point in applying the methods that

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a Or Udrako Rāmaputro.
make it possible for us to realize absolute truth / nirvāṇa is that by attaining the latter we realize there was never a relative truth / samsāra to escape from or a nirvāṇa to attain. Since as shown above there is no relative truth / samsāra to embrace, this is the only occurrence that may validly (albeit metaphorically) be referred to as “embracing samsāra.”

Besides trying to show the view I expound to be ascending in Wilber’s sense of the term, Abramson (op. cit.) attempts to show Wilber V’s position not to be ascending in the senses I give this term:

Wilber’s end note 1 in Sex, Ecology and Spirituality (Wilber, 2001) … is concerned with Wilber’s explanation of the Buddhist ‘no-self’ but its relevance here is the way Wilber weaves some of his theories with an explanation of the Tantric and the Dzogchen Buddhist concepts of emptiness, and how this relates to the ‘nondual’ state. For example, in relation to Dzogchen, and seemingly in accord with Capriles’ work, Wilber comments:

“Different meditation practices engineer different states and different experiences, but pure Presence itself is unwavering, and thus the highest approach in Dzogchen is ‘Buddhahood without meditation:’ not the creation but rather the direct recognition of an already perfectly present and freely given primordial Purity…” (Wilber, 2001, pp. 730-731)

As to how Wilber weaves some of his theories with an explanation of the Tantric Buddhist and the Dzogchen concepts of emptiness, below, in the discussion of Abramson’s (op. cit.) defense of what were previously Wilber’s last four fulcra and which are now his final four stages of cognitive development and some of the notes to it I show Wilber not to distinguish the different understandings of emptiness. In particular, the author Wilber cites as his source for his explanation of the successive attainment of the four kāyas and hence of the last four fulcra of his former system and of what now are the last four stages of the cognitive line of development, purportedly follows Je Tsongkhapa, whose understanding of emptiness was radically different from Wilber’s, as well as, (a) from that of Tibetan Masters who are not Tsongkhapa’s followers, (b) from the two senses of emptiness in the Dzogchen teachings (namely that of emptiness as the Base’s primordial purity and that of emptiness a mere illusory experience), and (c) from zhentong emptiness.⁵⁹⁸ (I will briefly touch upon this point once more below in this Appendix.)

As to the Wilber passage cited by Abramson and reproduced above, it no doubt acknowledges that realization cannot be produced or constructed, yet this understanding is in diametral opposition to Wilber’s structural paradigm and metaphenomenologically ascending view, which as shown in the main body of this book is incompatible with the metaphenomenologically descending stance of Buddhism in general and of Dzogchen in particular—and which, as shown here, Wilber continues to uphold. Thus if it proves anything, it is the fact that Wilber continues to contradict himself—as evinced in Abramson’s (op. cit.) reply, for the passage he cited outright contradicts the following assertion he makes:

It is certainly illuminating to consider further why Wilber feels stage development is important, beginning with one way he feels it can be achieved. Wilber muddies the water by claiming that practising meditation is the best, or among the best, means of achieving stage

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⁵⁹⁸ gzhān stong; Skt. paraśūnya: emptiness (i.e., lack) of extraneous substances, meaning zhengyi ngöpo tongpanyi (gzhān gyi dngos po stong pa nyid) or emptiness of substances extraneous [to the single true nature of reality]. To Dölpopa, this meant the absolute’s lack of paratantra.
development; in which case following an authentic spiritual path involving meditation practice would automatically result in stage progression, and the issue of pursuing stage development would be redundant.

In fact, Awakening is attained without meditation yet meditation is the best way to achieve stage development, which is indispensable for being able to “attain” Awakening: the contradiction is blatant. Furthermore, although the fact that Wilber acknowledges that stage development may occur as a by-product of meditation seems positive, in a passage cited above he explicitly wrote that, “the only way you can permanently and fully realize emptiness is if you transform, evolve, or develop your vehicle in the world of form”—which seems to imply that we must contrivedly undertake specific actions in order to transform “our vehicle” (the expression “our vehicle” having been criticized above), rather than waiting for it to take place spontaneously as a by-product of meditation. At any rate, the core problem for me continues to be his strong overvaluation of stage development—which outright conflicts with the metaphenomenological and the metaexistentia l approaches, and fails to account for the cases of child prodigies like Mingyur Dorje (the Namchö Tertön in whom the Self-qua-Path initially manifested in his childhood and whose realization soared during his early teens). Most important, though now he claims that Buddhahood is “not the creation but rather the direct recognition of an already perfectly present and freely given primordial Purity,” he continues to explain it as the creation of a structure—which, being created, according to Buddhist doctrine must necessarily be impermanent and must necessarily pertain to samsāra.

Furthermore, I am surprised that, right after trying to show that Wilber does not consider that stage development should be pursued in addition to following an authentic spiritual Path, for it will be furthered by the meditations practiced in most spiritual Paths, Abramson questions himself as to whether I consider “stage development should be pursued in addition to following an authentic spiritual Path.” My surprise does not arise so much from the fact that the words in addition to outright contradict the above claim that the best way to achieve stage development is through the practice of meditation, as from the fact that throughout the three papers Abramson reviewed, as throughout this book, I have emphasized the metaphenomenological, metaexistentia l view, repeatedly making the point that so-called “stage development” has little to do with Awakening, and that in Dzogchen Atiyoga and other Paths that are not gradual there are no rigid stages of realization (as noted above, in Dzogchen practice the recurrence of Dzogchen-qua-Path brings about a most significant transformation that occurs in a totally spontaneous way).

With regard to the change undergone by Wilber’s structural approach to cognitive and spiritual development, Abramson (op. cit.) cites Michael Daniels’ (2009) account:

... what [Wilber] is saying is [that he was] wrong [in] that he made the mistake – and he admits this very explicitly in the book – of simply adding the stages of the Eastern meditation techniques on top of the stages of the Western psychological model. And he says it almost flippantly in the book:
‘So … what we did was simply to take the highest stage in Western psychological models … and then take the three or four major stages of meditation (gross, subtle, causal, nondual) … and stack those stages on top of the other stages … East and West integrated!’ (Wilber, 2007, p. 88)

\(^a\) nam chos gter ston (in full, nam mkha’i chos gter ston).
However, Wilber V retains and further develops his and Don Beck’s version of spiral dynamics as a paradigm of human evolution that supposedly works for ontogenetic development as much as phylogenetic evolution, and thus his new system does not radically break away from the structural developmental paradigm criticized above. The paradigm in question is based on the theory of memes as defined by biologist Richard Dawkins, with regard to which biology Professor H. Allen Orr (2004) writes (in Carlson, undated): a

…the selfish meme view hasn’t led anywhere. Where are the puzzling phenomena that have been explained by memes? Dawkins provides no examples and I suspect there aren’t any. The truth is that the meme idea, though a quarter-century old, has inspired next to no serious research and has failed to establish a place for itself in mainstream cognitive science, psychology, or sociology. Though laymen often have the impression that scientific ideas die in decisive experiments, far more often they die because they didn’t suggest many experiments. They failed, that is, to inspire a rich research program. Though I could obviously be proved wrong, and while I have no problem with the notion that some science of cultural change may be possible, I’m far less confident than Dawkins that memes will play an important role in any such enterprise.

As Richard Carlson (undated) has suggested (substantiating his view in a most informed manner), Wilber’s and Cowan’s evolutionary views seem to stem from their right wing, elitist political stance—which as such, I feel compelled to add, could hardly be more anti-ecological. Since this is not the place to carry out a detailed discussion of this subject (a longer one, though not exhaustive, will appear in the upcoming definitive version of Vol. III of this book, Beyond History—a volume expounding a scrupulously green philosophy of history and political philosophy). Suffice to note that Wilber’s paradigmatic example of an “integral politician” is Tony Blair, whose “integrity” revealed itself in his lying to the UK Parliament in order to falsely substantiate his plans to invade Iraq and unleash the spree of destruction that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and greatly affected our planet’s ecosystem (not only through the CO₂ added to the atmosphere, but mainly through the use of depleted uranium warheads that has multiplied cancer incidence among Iraqi children). Moreover, Wilber speaks of George W. Bush (“even if one does not agree with him”) and the (less extremist) General Collin Powell approvingly—in this way implicitly justifying the aggression to the Iraqi people that they engineered, Bush’s environmental policies (including his drive to drill in Alaska and all the rest), and so on. And, instead of outlining a green political program, he favors the achievement of a synthesis of the views of two of the US Presidents who refused to sign the Kyoto Treaty (one of whom, besides, was responsible for unleashing the Iraq war) and those of Blair’s and of politicians from other countries in order to (Wilber, 2000c)…

…find a “Third Way” that unites the best of liberal and conservative—President Clinton’s Vital Center, George W. Bush’s Compassionate Conservatism, Germany’s Neue Mitte [uniting Gerhard Schroeder and Angela Merkel], Tony Blair’s Third Way, and Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, to name a few…

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a H. A. Orr is Shirley Cox Kearn’s Professor of Biology at the University of Rochester.
How can Wilber, in spite of the Bush administration’s environmental, social and international record, reproduce Bush’s Newspeak categorization of his own stance as “Compassionate Conservatism? Wilber ads refer to him as the “Einstein of consciousness;” it seems to me that the above suggests that a more correct label for him would be that of the “[Yoshihiro Francis] Fukuyama of consciousness.”599

As to Wilber V’s structural developmental and evolutionary paradigm, in his diagram and exposition of his view on ontogenic unfolding (Wilber, 2007), the first line of development is the cognitive one, which has as its lowest rung the sensorymotor; as its second rung, the preoperational / symbolic; as the third, the preoperational / conceptual; as the fourth, the concrete operational; as the fifth, the formal operational; and as the sixth, that of early vision-logic, which he categorized as metasystemic—these six, and the stages at the same level in all other lines, occupying the diagram’s first tier. Then the seventh rung is named middle vision-logic, categorized as paradigmatic, and the eighth is labeled late vision-logic and declared to be cross-paradigmatic—these two filling the second tier. And following that—in the third tier—what we find is no more than a reedition of the preceding Wilber, for the ninth, called global mind, is no other than what Wilber previously called the psychic level; the tenth is meta-mind, which is what he formerly called the subtle level; the eleventh is overmind, which is no other than what he previously called the causal level; and the twelfth is the supermind, which is what he formerly called the nondual (the names of the last two rungs having been used by “integral” Master Śrī Aurobindo—to whose left-wing social concerns and proposals, as Carlson (undated) has noted, Wilber has never alluded).

So it is clear that, as noted above, in spite of the greater flexibility of his newer model, and in spite of the above-quoted self-criticism of admitting that he had taken the highest stage in models of Western developmental psychology and then stacked the three or four major stages of meditation on top of it, Wilber is still positing a schema of hierarchical structures of the kind denounced in this book, and is still adding what he mistakenly believes to be the final stages of realization in higher Buddhism, Vedānta, Integral Yoga and so on, to what he takes to be the standard stages of cognitive ontogenic development. Moreover, he continues to wrongly identify the final four levels in the ontogenic, cognitive line of development—which as noted above are the same as the last four fulcra in his preceding schema—with the four kāyas as these are said to successively occur in vehicles of the Path of Transformation, and to reproduce the mix-ups denounced in the assessment of these fulcra, which thus fail to correspond to the stages in any of the ancient, traditional systems directed at Awakening—whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist—and in particular in Buddhist systems, as Buddhism has never asserted its successive stages of realization to necessarily manifest after the attainment of the higher stages of psychological development or, even less so, posited all-embracing developmental schemas (indeed, it has not even been concerned with that which is nowadays called developmental psychology). (Wilber V’s other lines of development are briefly described in the note the reference mark for which is placed at the end of this paragraph.600)

In the last pages of Abramson’s (op. cit.) paper, the author recurrently reiterates the assertion that the previous last four fulcra that are now the last four levels of the cognitive line of development, do correspond to the four kāyas as progressively realized on the Tantric Path of Transformation. True enough, as stated in the main body of this book, a sequence of realization beginning with the nirmānakāya, continuing with the
Appendix with a quotation from Kunchen Pema Sakya and Kagyu teachings as a whole, for according to these surely does the Tibetan character he takes as his source, and should reject the Nyingma, realization he posits, then he should flatly reject the validi

book, if Wilber follows the Tibetan monk he mentions as his source for the sequence of those descriptions are blatantly self

his descriptions of the nirodha dharmakāya as a condition of nirodhasamāpatti some Hīnayānists identify with nirvāṇa, and with many other aspects of his descriptions of the kāyas. Moreover, as clearly shown throughout the present section, those descriptions are blatantly self-contradictory. (Finally, and as noted elsewhere in this book, if Wilber follows the Tibetan monk he mentions as his source for the sequence of realization he posits, then he should flatly reject the validity of the Dzogchen teachings, as surely does the Tibetan character he takes as his source, and should reject the Nyingma, Sakya and Kagyu teachings as a whole, for according to these—as illustrated above in this Appendix with a quotation from Kunchen Pema Karpo and another one from Gorampa—

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a gsar ma; the followers of these Tantras are called the Sarmapa (gsar ma pa) or New.

b rnying ma; the followers of these Tantras are called the Sarmapa (rnying ma pa) or Ancient.
Buddhahood involves solely the absolute truth, excluding perception of the relative—which evidently does not mean that sensory configurations are excluded.)

(2) That since, as noted above, the controversial character Wilber took as his source follows Je Tsongkhapa’s peculiar understanding of Mādhyamaka Prāsaṅgika, the former’s understanding of emptiness is outright contradictory with his source’s. In fact, like Wilber and the Cittamātra School, yet contradicting the understanding of higher Mādhyamaka by nearly all Tibetan Masters except for his followers,603 and contradicting the Dzogchen teachings as well,604 Je Tsongkhapa regarded emptiness6 (understood as emptiness of self-existence6) as the ultimate truth.605 However, contrarily to Wilber, to nearly all Tibetan Masters who are not his followers and to the Dzogchen teachings, he defined emptiness as the absence of that which he labeled inherent existence—his term for the mistaken mode of existence that deluded beings project on what he called merely existing phenomena (a concept that was not found in the original Prāsaṅgika),606 thereby experiencing the latter as existing intrinsically, in their own right—and claimed that the ultimate truth as it manifests on the Path consists in getting this absence of inherent existence to become present to the meditator (i.e., to become an object of cognition) in the practice of his own brand of insight meditation. Furthermore, this view frontally contradicts Wilber’s view of emptiness as a creative principle that generates all there is and as being the same as Ayin—a view he reiterated in the following passage (Wilber, 2007, p. 268; note that this passage belongs to Wilber V):

…the signifier Ayin or Emptiness has a real referent as disclosed by injunctive paradigm. That is, those who are qualified to make the judgment agree that it can be said that, among other things, Spirit is a vast infinite Abyss or Emptiness [experienced through first-person perspective in a causal state],6 out of which all things arise.

That out of which all things arise (including the phenomena of samsāra and the qualities of nirvāṇa) cannot be a mere absence (of inherent existence or whatever), as is the case with Tsongkhapa’s emptiness. Moreover, Wilber wrote (Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3), “…emptiness or the unborn or the changeless ground…” thus seemingly implying emptiness and what he calls the “unborn changeless ground” to be the same. This is a problem, for changeless ground seems to be Wilber’s term for Dzogchen-quai-Base, which is not voidness, for voidness—and this solely in one of the various senses of the term—is only one of the Base’s aspects (in the twofold classification, it is the primordial purity aspect,7 which in the threefold classification corresponds to the essence7 aspect, and which is the only one of its aspects that may be said to be changeless—the other aspect being spontaneous perfection,8 which subdivides into the nature8 and energy8 aspects). Moreover,

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6 Skt. śānyatā; Tib. tongpanyi; Chin. 空 (Hānyǔ Pīnyīn, kòng; Wade-Giles, k’ung); Jap. kū.
7 Skt. svābhāva śānyatā; Tib. rangzhinggyi tongpanyi (rang bzhiṅ gyis stong pa nyid)—except in Je Tsongkhapa, who preferred to render it as rangzhinggyi madrubpa (rang bzhiṅ gyis ma grub pa—a term criticized in Gendün Chöphel [2005]); Chin. 自性空 (Hānyǔ Pīnyīn, zìxìngkūng; Wade-Giles, tzu-hsing-k’ung); Jap. jishōkū.
8 Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong (lhaṅ mthong); Chin. 观 (Hānyǔ Pīnyīn, guān; Wade-Giles, kuan); Jap. kan.
9 The words within the brackets express my explanation of an abbreviation Wilber uses instead.
10 Tib. katak (ka dag).
11 Tib. ngowo (ngo bo).
12 Tib. lhundrub (lhuṅ grub).
13 Tib. rangzhin (rang bzhiṅ).
Tsongkhapa rejected the concept of a Base, and therefore his ultra-orthodox followers (which is surely how the controversial character Wilber gives as his source for his last four fulcrum sees himself) should wholeheartedly reject it as well. Therefore, Wilber is clearly at odds with his sources—including both the Dzogchen teachings and the controversial Tibetan character. In fact, Wilber’s emptiness is in tune with the Taoist concept of nothingness and the Ch’an / Zen concept of the Great Void—which are anathema to Tsongkhapa and hence must be so to Wilber’s source as well—and to some extent with the concept of the primordial purity or essence aspect of the Base in the Dzogchen teachings, which Tsongkhapa outright rejected (as shown in the Introduction, the teachings in question compare the Base’s essence aspect to the no-thing-ness of a mirror in the sense of being that allows awareness to fill itself with appearances and nonetheless continue to be no-thing-ness—which on its part implies that phenomena that manifest in this way are no-thing-ness, thus being empty of self-existence). The point here is that if one disagrees with someone as to what the ultimate truth and the Fruit of Buddhahood are, it is absurd to take him or her as an authority with regard to how realization develops, for there is no reason to assume that two different kinds of realization must develop in the same way. Moreover, Wilber does not even follow his source faithfully, for as he quotes from the latter, he adds his own terms within brackets, seemingly in order to twist the controverted author’s assertions in order to make them fit his own views.

Abramson (op. cit.) goes on with his attempts to vindicate Wilber:

While Capriles points out that the Nirmanakaya, the Sambhogakaya, and the Dharmakaya do not fit Wilber’s model, it is interesting to note that Wilber’s definition of the Subtle and Causal levels provide a possible explanation for this being so. For example, in Capriles’ critique of Wilber’s inclusion of Nirmanakaya in his psychic (i.e. lower subtle) level, Capriles implies that while Nirmanakaya may manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic level relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the sense it is Buddha’s body. Similarly this applies to the Sambhogakaya, and the Dharmakaya. Cosmic consciousness is another example of a spiritual state that Wilber asserts to be in his psychic level, but does not, for the same reason as above, appear to fit there. This can be deduced from Daniels’ (2005, pp. 200-202) discussion of its apparent misfit where he points out that, although cosmic consciousness may manifest in the psychic level in the sense that it relates only to gross phenomena and not to the subtle or causal domains, it is otherwise indistinguishable from ‘One Taste’ or ‘Ultimate’ nondual consciousness which is of the nondual. Thus Capriles’ objection to Wilber’s ascribing Nirmanakaya, the Sambhogakaya, and the Dharmakaya to the psychic, subtle and causal realms respectively can be reframed as a critique of the inherent limitations of Wilber’s definition of these levels. But equally, Wilber might claim that most of the spiritual states that he asserts belong to these realms are correctly placed because they do relate to his definitions of those realms i.e. the above examples appear to be the exception.

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a Tib. thukjé (thugs rje).
b 萬 (Hányù Pinyin, wù; Wade-Giles wu); Jap. mu.
c 大無 (Hányù Pinyin, dà wù; Wade-Giles, ta-wu). This concept seems to roughly correspond to the one expressed by the Skt. mahāśānta (Tib. tongpachenpo [stong pa chen po]), as well as to that of the dharmadhātu (Tib. chöjing [chos dbyings] or chökyijing [chos kyi dbyings])—which, however, in Chinese is 法界 (Hányù Pinyin, fājiè; Wade-Giles, fa-chieh).
d Tib. katak (ka dag).
e Tib. ngowo (ngo bo).
In what regards the correspondence or lack of it between Wilber’s last four fulcra and that which the Anuttarayogatantra sees as the four kāyas, readers are encouraged to go back to my assessment of this disjunction in Wilber IV to judge whether Abramson is right in reducing my exhaustive, long critique of these fulcra to a rather insignificant assertion such as, “while Nirmanakāya may manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic level relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the sense it is Buddha’s body, [and] this applies to the Sambhogakāya, and the Dharmakāya.” (In the main body of this tome, I underlined a series of most significant discrepancies between Wilber’s description of his last four fulcra and the understanding of the four kāyas in both the Anuttarayogatantra and Dzogchen Ati; since I cannot reproduce here all that I wrote in the discussion of those fulcra, I encourage whichever reader does not clearly remember my discussion of them to reread the pages where I carried it out.) As to Wilber’s citations of his most controversial Tibetan source (including those reproduced in Abramson, op. cit.), I decided to abstain from commenting on them, as this would require me to read the books by the character in question—which I will not waste my time in doing, and which I do not advise others to do—and then try to evaluate his understanding of Tsongkhapa’s views on the Anuttarayogatantras’ sequence of realization.

Moreover, Abramson oddly overlooked the fact that in two of the articles he discussed (Capriles, 2006a and 2009b)—as in the main body of this volume—I clearly showed the kāyas of Dzogchen Atiyoga not to be the same as what goes by the same names in the Anuttarayogatantra, and that the order in which the Ati Dzogchen kāyas manifest is the opposite of the one the Anuttarayoga posits for its own kāyas. The fact that Wilber completely overlooks the Dzogchen kāyas and the sequence in which they manifest, even though he seems to acknowledge Atiyoga to be the highest Path, is most strange, to say the least. His omission will be all the more surprising when viewed in the light of the already noted fact that in Dzogchen Ati that which the Anuttarayoga calls svābhāvikāya and which Wilber posits as the highest stage of realization possible, is no more than the entrance to the Path, as it is the same state as that of the Direct Introduction that is the precondition of Dzogchen practice (Namkhai Norbu, unpub. ms.; Capriles, 2000a, 2003, 2006a, 2009b, and discussion of Wilber’s last four fulcra in the main body of this book): subsequently, intensive Tekchö practice is needed for the dharma-kāya as understood in the Dzogchen teachings to consolidate, and then intensive Thögel practice is on its part needed to consolidate the sambhogakāya and then the nīrmanakāya, so that the unique svābhāvikāya of Dzogchen Ati will manifest. Thus it is evident that Wilber continues to piece together elements from different traditions—not only from different religions, but also from different Buddhist vehicles and schools, thus being comparable to one who, by piecing together the head of an elephant, a snake’s body and a human intellect, produces a monster existing solely in his or her imagination.

Wilber also continues to maintain the supposed equivalence between the “three great states of consciousness” which are waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and the “three great realms of being” he posits, which are gross, subtle and causal—and in general he continues to overlook the crucial difference between the samsaric formless realms, the neutral condition of the base-of-all and the nirvāṇa of higher Buddhist vehicles. In fact, as

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*a khregs chod.  
*b thod rgal.
shown in the discussion of the preceding Wilber’s last four fulcra, the concept of gross mysticism does not at all correspond to what the Anuttarayogatantras call the nirmanakāya; to begin with, the latter is not an event that in general occurs—or even that may occur—spontaneously while taking a walk through nature, as Wilber claims; moreover, Wilber’s description of it partly corresponds to the experiences of the samsaric formless realms and partly corresponds to the neutral condition of the base-of-all that immediately precedes the former in the arising of samsāra—both of which, in spite of not corresponding to any level of realization in Buddhism, are very often mistaken for the dharmakāya (for the confusion of the experiences of the formless realms with the dharmakāya, cf. Kyemé Dechen’s and Karma Thinlé’s notes to Saraha, in Guenther, 1973; as to the confusion of the dharmakāya with the base-of-all, Kunkhyen Jigme Lingpa prophesied that this would become a common error in our time), but never so for the nirmanakāya, for which people tend to mistake specific experiences of higher regions of the samsaric realm of sensuality (cf. Kyemé Dechen’s and Karma Thinlé’s commentaries to Saraha, in Guenther, 1973) or of the consciousness of defilements (in the sense Dzogchen teachings give the term in this context) that precedes experience of the realm of sensuality in the arising of samsāra from the base-of-all. On its part, Wilber’s concept of subtle mysticism fails to distinguish between the sambhogakāya, the experiences of the samsaric realm of form (ibidem), and the consciousness of the base-of-all that immediately precedes the latter in the arising of samsāra from the neutral base-of-all (the term consciousness of the base-of-all being given here the sense the Dzogchen teachings give it when discussing that arising). And the concept of what Wilber calls causal mysticism (a term that could hardly be more absurd, as the dharmakāya has no cause and cannot be itself a cause), which he categorizes as formless, fails to distinguish between the dharmakāya, the experiences of the samsaric formless realms, and instances of the base-of-all in the Dzogchen sense in which the term refers to the condition immediately preceding entrance into the realm of formlessness—to which, as shown in the discussion of these fulcrum in the regular body of the book and as implied by a passage from a Mahāyāna scriptural source quoted in it, the nirodhasamāpatti (just as many nirvikalpa samādhis) he gives as instances of this fulcrum pertain. (In what regards Wilber’s categorization of the dharmakāya as a formless condition, I concede that it may derive from Anuttarayogatantra descriptions of the arising of the clear light that may follow the dissolution of the winds in the central channel—which Tsongkhapa understood as the emergence of what he called “the most subtle mind of clear light”—right after the stopping of coarse levels of consciousness. However, that in Anuttarayogatantra the kāya in question may initially manifests in a formless, luminous condition does not mean that it may be reduced to a formless, luminous condition—just as the fact that satori may occur following kōan study does not mean it may be described as an event that occurs following kōan study. Likewise, that coarse levels of consciousness stop in the Anuttarayogatantras’ realization of the dharmakāya does not at all mean that the latter may be reduced to the nirodhasamāpatti of the Hīnayāna.)

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a skye med bde chen, kar ma phrin las.
b kun mkhyen ("all-knowing") jigs med gling pa.
c kun gzhi rnam shes or kun gzhi rnam par shes pa; Skt. ālayavijñāna.
d Chin. 智; Hányū Pinyin, wù; Wade-Giles, wu.
e Chin. 公案; Hányū Pinyin, gōng’ān; Wade-Giles kung-an.
Because of all of the above, Wilber readers who take him seriously are bound to mistake samsaric experiences for nirvanic levels of realization, and therefore to be unable to proceed on any Buddhist Path. Consider Abramson’s (op. cit.) explanation of Wilber V’s view in these regards:

Wilber’s explanation for being able to access any state from any stage of development starts with pointing out, “… the three great states of consciousness (waking, dreaming, sleeping) are said to correspond with the three great realms of being (gross, subtle, causal) … an idea found in … Vajrayana” (Wilber, 2002a, p. 1). According to Wilber, different worlds i.e. the three realms of gross, subtle and causal are disclosed by different states of consciousness, and any different state of consciousness is potentially available at any time and to anyone at any stage of their development, because all humans have access to the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states. But, Wilber explains “stages CANNOT be skipped, because each stage is a component of its successor (this would be like going from atoms to cells and skipping molecules)” (ibid). Going from first person perspective (magical/typhonic stage) to second person perspective (mythic stage) to third person (rational stage) is a process of development where, according to Wilber and supported by researchers such as Jane Loevinger, Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter, stages cannot be skipped. (Italics my own)

Moreover, the above passage demonstrates the fact, repeatedly referred to in this Appendix, that Wilber is still positing a very rigid schema of hierarchical structures of the kind denounced throughout this book, for he continues to affirm that stages cannot be skipped, precisely because each stage is a component of its successor—which he compares with going from atoms to cells while skipping molecules. Since the structure of each of the stages is arisen and produced (as all structures necessarily are), as noted in the original discussion of Wilber’s last four fulcra—and no matter how many times he may echo the Dzogchen teachings’s assertion that Buddhahood, rather than a creation, is the direct recognition of an already perfectly present condition—in Buddhist terms his last four fulcra or stages are produced / conditioned, and as such are impermanent and pertain to saṃsāra.

Abramson notes that Wilber V relinquished the whole idea of an independently existing Great Chain of Being involving different, self-existing planes of existence, as well as that of eternal or timeless structures of human consciousness. However, he continues to posit a correspondence among the rungs in various lines, which seems to imply that he views them as stages in an overall, integral type of development—and, what is far worse, he now presents this development as a transition from lower to higher focal points (cakra) that he associates to different colors in a schema that, as M. Alan Kazlev (undated) notes, is not found in any traditional system. Kazlev writes (ibidem):

[The schema in question] is not much more that about thirty years old; the earliest reference I know of is Christopher Hills’ (1977) Nuclear Evolution; an elaborate Integral theory that predates Wilber’s AQAL by several decades… Hills’ book seems to have had little or no influence on the wider world, so Wilber’s rainbow chakras are probably based on pop-Osho New Age websites.

Abramson (op. cit.) also notes that Wilber V no longer claims that higher spiritual levels can only be steadily attained and gone through after considerable progress has been reached along different lines of development, or that it is impossible to “jump” from a low
to a high spiritual level. In fact, he makes the point that by 2006 Wilber had embraced the Wilber-Combs lattice according to which in our present age people can “advance” to any spiritual state at any stage of development—thus implicitly disavowing the theses just mentioned. Abramson (op. cit.) cites Wilber (in Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3):

…if people get the evolutionary unfolding, they usually haven’t had that experience of prior emptiness or of the unborn or the changeless ground. And because of that, they tie their realization to an evolutionary stage. “I have to be at this stage; then I can realize.” And that’s not it at all, because that ever-present state is ever present, and you can have that realization virtually at any point. But in order to stabilize and ground it, you do indeed have to then grow and develop. So they just understand the evolutionary side of form, and the other folks tend to have the emptiness understood, but very rarely do you get emptiness together with evolutionary form.

The phrase, of prior emptiness or of the unborn or the changeless ground was already discussed above, in relation to Wilber’s source for his last four fulcra, where it was noted that the source in question would not accept an identity between emptiness, the unborn, Ayin, a vast infinite Abyss, and what Wilber imprecisely calls the “changeless ground,” or his assertion that it is out of emptiness that all things arise (some of the meanings of emptiness having been discussed mainly in endnotes). As to Wilber’s assertion in the quoted passage that in order to stabilize and ground realization one has to then grow and develop, it implies that in a matter of months, or at most a few years, child prodigies like Mingyur Dorje should have grown and developed along the various Wilberian lines of development as much as a normal individual does over many years. Above it was noted that in any individual who nongradually attains a true spiritual realization of higher Buddhism, egotistically-motivated actions gradually diminish, while selfless activity for the sake of others increases; the psyche gradually gains in self-consistency; the propensities for evil, self-encumbering and so on are gradually neutralized; etc.—yet none of this implies that in all Wilberian quadrants the individual rapidly progresses through all the stages Wilber posits, or that child-prodigies like Mingyur Dorje will not retain any infantile traits in any Wilberian quadrant.

As noted above, the newer Wilber admits there may be a somewhat freer transit between lower and higher levels in ontogeny as well as phylogenesis, and that development along one line of development does not need to strictly depend on development along the other lines. As Abramson (op. cit.) puts it:

The Wilber-Combs lattice separates states (e.g. psychic) and stages (e.g. typhonic-magical, mental egoic) into different dimensions. The psychic state is not therefore a higher structure of mental egoic, typhonic or any other stage and consequently does not incur the objection Kelly ascribes to it.

This is an important development, which probably resulted from the huge amount of criticism his phylogenetic views have received (not only from Kelly [1998a], but also from Taylor [2003, 2005] and many others). In fact, Wilber’s view on the phylogenetic evolution of both the psyche and society has shifted to a rather here-now perspective based on Rupert Sheldrake’s (1981) theories of morphogenetic fields and formative causation, which he formerly rejected—yet to a certain degree he continues to establish a parallel (which is now far looser) between ontogeny and phylogenesis. And, what is worse, he recently introduced
a new evolutionary concept that is absent in all traditional spiritual systems—namely that a fully Awake individual in previous stages of human evolution would not be fully Awake today. His argument is as follows (Wilber, 2007, p. 247):

…the same structure that 6000 years ago could be said to be fully Enlightened, is no longer so today. Somebody at mythic-membership today is no longer one with the Totality of all Form, because there are “over the head” of amber, the orange and green and teal and turquoise structures. Those are now real, “ontological,” actually existing structures in the Kosmos, as real as if they were Platonic eternal givens (except that they aren’t), and if a person has not transcended and included those levels in their own development, then there are major levels of reality that they (the amber individuals) are not one with. Even if they master nondual states of a perfect nondual union of Emptiness and Form, even if they master Ati Yoga and thögal visions and the 5 ranks of Tozan, even if they master centering prayer and the deepest contemplative states, even if they rest constantly in Ayin, they are not fully Enlightened: there are aspects of Form that never enter this person’s world, and thus—exactly as we were meant to explain—this person’s satori is oneness with a partial world.

The fact that Wilber mistakes the transient freedom from conditioning Japanese Zen calls satori\(^b\) with Awakening,\(^c\) which is an irreversible condition, is irrelevant to the thread of the present discussion. What is important is that the above is an example of the extreme structural paradigm criticized throughout both the Beyond Mind papers and this book, for Awakening, rather than a structure, is absolute freedom from conditioning by structures, and it does not consist in including all structures arisen in human beings at a particular time (provided that we accept the thesis that at each new stage of the cognitive or spiritual evolution of our species new structures arise), but in having come to See through all that is arisen, into the absolute equality of the unborn in which arisen structures are irrelevant— for one is no longer conditioned by any such structure—and having come to remain in this realization irreversibly and uninterruptedly. Although here is nothing wrong in comparing Awakening as it manifests in different ages in which people’s psyches are differently structured, this would by no means lead to the conclusion that one who is Awake in a less structured age will not be Awake in a more structured era just because in the more structured epoch there are aspects of Form that never enter her or his world. In fact, for someone who is fully Awake today there will be aspects of Form that never enter his or her world, such as forms manifesting in other planets (whether in our solar system or in those solar systems that have been recently discovered): will he or she not be fully Awake just because those aspects of Form do not enter her or his world? Awakening consists, not in being one with the whole of Form existing in one’s lifetime—even though it no doubt involves nonduality with whatever manifests in experience (including all that may have to do with the imagery characteristic of the individual’s time), and freedom from conditioning by it—but simply in being free from the three types of avidyā listed in Dzogchen teachings. Thus also this Wilber thesis reveals his outlook to be metaphenomenologically ascending and as such to be a case of that which Trungpa Rinpoche called spiritual materialism, for it asserts Awakening to lie in embracing produced, conditioned structures, rather than acknowledging it to consist in the irreversible realization of the unproduced, unconditioned

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\(^a\) i.e., thögel (\textit{thod rgal}).
\(^b\) Chinese, 妙; Hányǔ Pīnyīn, \textit{wù}; Wade-Giles \textit{wu}.
absolute nature. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume to existence of the structures Wilber posits—yet I do not intend to evaluate each of them in order to accept it or reject it.

It seems to me an outrageous expression of modern *hubris* to believe that one who becomes Awake today is better or more complete than one who became Awake 6000 years ago. Moreover, as it follows from Carlson’s (undated), most valuable reflections, in Wilber’s case it seems to be—just as the rest of his rigid evolutionary schema—motivated by a pronounced right wing political stand. I was shocked and surprised that Wilber (2007, p. 98), rather than trying to guess what were the reasons that led the Dalai Lama to make a certain statement that in all lights was made from the standpoint of some specific others and in order to respond to what he felt were their needs, and thus without what Gorampa called own-mind (i.e., without himself adhering either to his own assertion or to another view; cf. Capriles, 2005), dared to assert the lofty spiritual and political leader to have an ethnocentric worldview,\(^{612}\) for by so doing he implicitly placed himself in a spiritual place above his, from which he can accurately judge him. I wonder whether this has to do with the fact that the Dalai Lama’s political stance as an engaged Buddhist conflicts with Wilber’s right wing stance, or whether the latter was conditioned by the anti-Dalai Lama drive orchestrated by the controverted character who is the source for his sequence of realization.\(^{613}\)

The same modern *hubris* and his right wind stance seem to be patent in Wilber’s claim that true ecological awareness can only result from attaining a “high stage of evolution” like the one that in his view humans can finally attain in our time. As Abramson (*op. cit.*) admits, Wilber (2007) continues to hold that:

> …the comprehension of more complex aspects of samsara will require correspondingly higher stages of development e.g. the appreciation of ecosystems will only ‘appear’ to someone at a high enough (i.e. post-conventional) stage of development. Thus only people at post-conventional stage development will be prone to make sacrifices to tackle the ecological crisis because people at ‘lower’ stages will not recognise the problem.

Realization has nothing to do with making sacrifices (whether in order to tackle the ecological crisis or with any other purpose); what it does is to dissolve the perceptions and attitudes at the root of ecological crisis, so that the individual spontaneously, actionlessly works toward the changes necessary for healing the ecosystem. In the same way, as research by Descola (1986, 1996) cited above suggests, primal human beings cared for the environment for hundred of thousands of years—at least until the time of the earlier registered ecocides—without this involving a sacrifice, for they seem to have neither objectified the physical reality nor experienced it as alien to themselves, and to have been keenly aware of interconnections, and hence their spontaneous responses to that reality improved biodiversity rather than destroying it—and the same would be the case after the spiritual and social regeneration that I hope will result from the *reductio ad absurdum* of delusion brought about by ecological crisis. There is no phylogenetic progress over the ages, just as ontogenic development need not amount to betterment. Abramson (*op. cit.*) writes:

\[^{612}\text{For understanding the reasons for this, cf. Clifton \\& Miller (1997) and Bultrini (2008).}\]
Capriles points to the central premise of Wilber’s theories of spiritual attainment i.e. they are based on developmental steps leading to Nondual state of Suchness, where some minimum level of attainment of each development step must occur before one can move to the next step. Capriles powerfully refutes this throughout his three part ‘Beyond the Mind’ work (that commenced publication in 2000 and concluded in 2009). This refutation draws on the doctrines of Dzogchen Buddhism according to which true Awakening results only from the spontaneous liberation of delusion. This spontaneous liberation, Capriles explains, will manifest generally among humans at the end of the current cycle of evolution by the mechanism of reductio ad absurdum. Prior to this the only mechanism for true Awakening is an authentic spiritual path such as Dzogchen. The spontaneous liberation of delusion which can manifest in practitioners of an authentic path can occur at any stage of development and Awakening, which can follow repeated occurrences of spontaneous liberation of delusion, can also occur at any stage of development.

Remarkably, considering Wilber had held the above view for at least two decades, by 2006 he had admitted it was wrong and his current theories, which make use of the Wilber-Combs lattice, imply he is in agreement with Capriles insofar as people in our present age can advance to any spiritual state at any stage of their development.

Abramson implies that I claim that spontaneous liberation will manifest generally among humans at the end of the current cycle of evolution as a result of the mechanism of reductio ad absurdum, without there being a need for them to follow an authentic spiritual path such as Dzogchen—which I have never claimed, as to do so would amount to making a prophesy, which is something I leave to those who consider themselves prophets. And, what is worse, his words give the impression that Wilber and I share the same view on human evolution, when in truth he enthusiastically adheres to the version of the myth of progress that modern hubris (in this case in its right wing version) uses to sustain its structured belief-system, whereas I spouse the contrary, traditional view of social and spiritual human evolution as degeneration common to Dzogchen and Tantric Buddhism. Likewise, Abramson seems to assume that Wilber has a genuine ecological concern, implying I share this concern with him. He writes:

Capriles’ concern with ecological issues is clear:
The spiritual systems I practice and propound, as all metaphenomenologically / metaexistentially descending Paths, are perfectly nondual; yet … [also] descending in … [the senses that]… they have always been profoundly concerned with ecological, social, economic, political, gender, generational, cultural, and other related issues (Capriles, 2009 pp. 7,8)

Wilber and I may coincide in claiming that at some point humankind will have a relatively free, easy access to the unconcealment of our true condition, yet he views this as an unprecedented occurrence, whereas I view it as the recovery of a capacity that probably was common to human beings of high Antiquity—and our divergence with regard to the conditions that would make this possible and the time at which it would become possible could hardly be more pronounced. In fact, I claim that, due to the discrepancy between the digital, secondary process code of the left cerebral hemisphere, and the analog, primary process code of the right cerebral hemisphere, the interaction of our two cerebral

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a The actual title is “Beyond Mind,” for the term “mind” is used to refer to a functioning or a condition (as in “beyond fear”) rather than to a substance (as in “beyond the sea.”)
hemispheres causes delusion to gradually increase in the course of the time cycle, making it ever more difficult for delusion to dissolve in Communion and making its evil effects ever more pronounced, until the point is reached at which it becomes evident that the effects of our actions on the ecological, social, psychological and other planes are the opposite of those we intended, and hence that the actions in question stem from delusion. By the time the ecological crisis is near from reaching the point on no return, psychological functioning in terms of the basic human delusion has been impaired in our species as a whole to a considerable degree, and hence the empirical reductio ad absurdum of delusion has been achieved—as a result of which an easier, freer access to the state of Communion is restored and hence the structures and functioning that developed in the course of degenerative evolution can repeatedly dissolve in the Self-qu-Path, being progressively neutralized. Now, since there is no guarantee that the chaos that the exacerbation of delusion will produce in all fields, rather than bringing about the extinction of our species, will restore our access to the state of Communion and thus bring about our regeneration, we must keep from turning speculation into prophesy. The only thing we know for sure is that, given the current degree of disruption of the global ecosystem, the disjunctive between regeneration and destruction is presently being reached.

The Fukuyama of ecological (?) thinking, on the contrary, claims that the restoration of a freer, easier access of our species to the unconcealment of our true condition, will happen when our spiritual evolution makes us develop the “required structures,” and that this will occur in the far future—overlooking, in a seeming purposeful way, the fact that, if the radical, total transformation that is the condition of possibility of human survival and of the beginning of a new era of spirituality, wisdom, harmony, fulfillment and equality, fails to occur in the very near future, in the short term human society will disintegrate, we will face unprecedented calamities and, most likely, our species will put an end to its own existence. One may even come to suspect the aim behind this point in Wilber’s system to be simply that of forestalling the radical restructuring of the economy, of the social and political order, and of technology, which necessarily will have to be a central aspect of the total transformation in question if the it will allow us to survive—not caring the slightest bit for the fact that maintaining the status quo with its privilege system and overconsumption would ensure our self-annihilation. Has not the reader ever wondered why does Wilber charge so rabidly and furiously against so many green authors and trends?

Unaware of all that has been written in this Appendix, immanentists could think that it is praiseworthy that Wilber is trying to correct at least one of his fundamental errors, by calling for a naturalistic turn to religion and introducing the concept of intra-physical. I fully agree with the call in question, yet in my system (certainly not in Wilber’s rigid, modern, progress-oriented view of our spiritual and social evolution) this naturalistic turn would return religion to what it was before the otherworldly turning that gave birth to the gods, and as such it would necessarily imply ceasing to posit a transcendent reality—which, as shown above, Wilber has not done, for he continues to assert the existence of such reality, by calling for “the transcendent”—which, as clearly shown in a previous section, is a concept that Buddhism has never posited, and that it outright rejects, outright branding as extremists those who posit it—and the immanent to, “in a sense, flavor each other.” As to the concept of intra-physical, Frank Visser (undated) questions:

Is intra-physical a physical concept? Then no physicist would subscribe to that notion. Or is it metaphysical? Then what’s the point of calling all this “post-metaphysical”? Isn’t all
science supposed to be “post-metaphysical”? So what’s the big deal then? And if he introduces the notion of “intra-physical”, that surely introduces ontology in its wake? For Wilber, “post-metaphysical” primarily seems to refer to “evidence-based”, compared to speculative. If that’s the case, it’s an unfortunate label for a view that explores other experiential avenues than the bodily senses alone.

The last important feature of Wilber V to be discussed here will be his own characterization of his current philosophical position. To begin with, he has claimed that he has gone beyond metaphysics by no longer asserting anything to exist independently. However, as Magnus Riisager (undated) notes, Wilber still asserts spiritual realities to exist independently in the levels he posits:

…Wilber wishes to hold on to the hierarchy (or holarchy) of developmental levels (structure-stages). As Wilber presents it, we are not just dealing with an arrangement of levels according to how including they are. Wilber assumes that the things and occasions found on the more including levels are more real than the things and occasions found on the less including levels. This becomes obvious when Wilber talks about the spiritual realities found on different levels:

“The problem is not that spiritual realities don’t exist or are hard to prove; it’s that their earlier forms exist on lower levels and hence are not as real as some of the later levels, but those higher levels have their own spiritual realities” (ibid., p. 266 - my emphasis).

So Wilber apparently operates with a non-relative measure (of realness) in the Kosmos that is not pre-given.

Riisager (undated) also notes that:

… Wilber appears to believe that Spirit—in one form or another—will be found (i.e. will exist) on all (not yet evolved) levels; in other words, he doesn't question the presence of Spirit but only the “look” of Spirit (cf. Wilber 2003, note 26). In addition to this, Wilber postulates the absolute existence of Eros and Agape (Wilber 2006, p. 236, note *).

So Wilber's unavoidable metaphysics includes:

The hierarchy (holarchy) of structure-stages (i.e. a measure of realness),

Spirit,

Eros,

Agape,

A morphogenetic gradient in the manifest realm; a morphogenetic field of potentials, and

Certain prototypical (“archetypical”) forms or patterns (e.g. mathematical-physical laws) (cf. Wilber 2003, note 26).

In order to place the discussion of this point in context and then introduce the final bone of contention in this brief assessment of Wilber V, let me briefly review the way in which metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophical trends have interacted since René Descartes. The French philosopher elaborated his metaphysics in reaction to the objections to the supposed certainty of knowledge raised by the modern skeptics, and in particular by the nouveaux pyrrhonionsa (Popkin, 1979), which challenged his religious and metaphysical certainties—possibly to the point of making him experience ontological anxiety and even

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a New Pyrrhonics.
panic—and which could undermine the project, so dear to him, of achieving technological
dominion over the universe through the development of science and technology (Capriles,
1994). His strategy for trying to make his metaphysics immune to skeptic criticism lied in
applying the skeptic procedure of methodic doubt, not for achieving the skeptic aim of
realizing it was not even possible to know whether or not it was possible to know, but in
order to find an objective truth that could not be doubted—which he wrongly believed to
have found in the intuition of what he called the cogito, even though the latter is no more
than an illusion produced by the delusory valuation of the threefold thought structure and
one of the poles of the structure that is the second aspect of avidyā in the division favored
by Longchenpa. The French metaphysician then unwarrantedly asserted the phenomenon in
question to be a God-created, nonspatial substance—and, since the intuition of the cogito
could not found the world’s external existence, he had to breach the principle of the method
he had assumed, and resort to the Christian God to found it.\footnote{17}

Among the resurgences of skepticism after Descartes, an important place is to be
allotted to Scottish, moderate skeptic David Hume, who deconstructed central categories of
Continental metaphysics such as substance—one of his fundamental contributions being the
deconstruction of the supposed substantiality of the mind—and causality, among others.
Immanuel Kant claimed that his reading of Hume had shaken his convictions, “awakening
him from his dogmatic dream” and leading him to rethink his philosophy on the whole and
produce a totally new system. Though this is partly true, for Kant was obliged to rethink
much of what he had taken for granted, what was mainly shaken by the reading in question
seems to have been his former, naïve substantiation of his metaphysical convictions
(provided these were really his convictions\footnote{18}, for he seems to have kept the most essential
ones among them—such as the belief in the Christian God, in a substantial mind and in
substance in general, in objective beauty and goodness, in the possibility of a correct
knowledge of most parcels of reality, etc.—which he substantiated by positing a prioris in
all of the compartments into which he divided the psyche, and claiming that the existence
of these a prioris implied the objective, true existence of a substantial mind and substance
in general, and of objective truth, beauty and moral law. Thus what his reading of Hume
actually did was to force him to express his dogmatic metaphysics in a new way, so as to
give the false impression that he was respecting the limits of knowledge and producing a
non-dogmatic system (for an explanation of how he breached the limits in question, cf.

The widespread realization of Kant’s failure in his purported attempt to produce a
metaphysics that would respect the limits inherent to knowledge, thus avoiding dogmatism,
is at the root of the characteristically modern project of positivism, the best-known forms of
which intended to surpass metaphysics (and even ontology and all that has traditionally
gone under the label philosophy), by keeping to supposedly verifiable evidence of the kind
the positive sciences find admissible. In fact, among the different brands of positivism,
August Compte’s claimed that ontology and the rest of what traditionally went under the
label “philosophy” had to be replaced by an encyclopædia of the positive sciences; much
later, at the turn of the twentieth century, the Austrian empirio-critics produced a science-
based critical philosophy that, like the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead (which was
intended to surpass, by the same token, the whole of the classic dualisms of metaphysics,
and substantialistic monism), involved an ontology free from the mind-matter dualism;
time after that, the neopositivists, including those in the Vienna Circle, circumscribed
philosophy to a critical philosophy of science, thus turning into a servant and handmaiden of science; some trends of philosophy of language (not Ludwig Wittgenstein’s final system, as it asserted language not to match reality and to be a source of delusion⁶¹⁹) circumscribed the ambit of philosophy to determining whether or not statements are meaningful; etc.

However, in our time all forms of positivism are widely seen as obsolete remnants of the enthusiasm with science proper to early modernity; in particular, even though most of those philosophers who define themselves as postmodern continue to implicitly uphold the myth of progress that is the root and essence of modernity, as a rule they outright negate that science and philosophy discover truths or that the discourses they produce can achieve an *adæquatio intellectus et rei* (i.e., a concordance of knowledge with reality—the latter being conceived as independent and factic). In fact, this idea runs counter, not only to those trends of philosophy that define themselves as postmodern, but in general to the views of a long list of thinkers that includes philosophers, scientists and philosopher-scientists, and that goes at least as back as the Greek Skeptics.

It was noted that Kant claimed that the Scottish critical empiricist, David Hume, had awakened him from what he referred to as his “dogmatic dream.” Among Hume’s alleged discoveries, most relevant to us at this point is the universally accepted objection to empirical science as the source of “scientific laws,” which nowadays is widely referred to as Hume’s law, and which may be enunciated as follows: “we are not entitled to extrapolate the regularities observed in a limited number of cases to the totality of possible cases, thus making it into a law, as one or more of the unobserved cases could contradict the observed regularity.” Moreover, science claims to derive its alleged laws from the observation of objective facts, when in truth the scientists’ observations are, as Bachelard made it clear (1957) and as so many others have reiterated, utterly conditioned by their expectations—and therefore by their ideologies and wishful thinking. An anecdote from Edgar Morin (1981) clearly illustrates the extent to which observational judgments are conditioned by ideology: while driving his car into a crossroads, he saw another car’s driver disregarding the traffic light and with the front of his car hitting a moped that was moving with the green light. Morin stopped his car and stepped down in order to testify in favor of the moped driver, yet when he did so he heard the latter admit that it was him who overlooked the red light and hit the car on the side. Incredulous, the famed thinker examined the car, finding the dent the moped made in the car to be on the latter’s side, and concluding that his thirst for social justice and socialist ideology caused him to perceive the event wrongly and invert the facts, even though he had not drunk any alcohol and no other conditions were present that could have distorted his perception. In the case of an experiment planned beforehand, the results are far more doubtful, for the way in which the experiment is set and the criteria in terms of which the data it yields are evaluated are arranged to satisfy the researcher’s expectations, as he / she intends to corroborate a theory put forward beforehand.

The above explains why such a conservative thinker as Karl Popper (1961) noted that, if no experience contradicts a theory, scientists are entitled to adopt it provisionally as a probable truth (thus open-mindedly acknowledging that no scientific theory can be fully substantiated, yet closed-mindedly clinging to the belief in truth *qua adequetio*), and that the acceptance of a new theory gives rise to as many problems as it solves. Moreover, as it is well-known, on going through the history of science, Thomas Kuhn (1970) noted that from the moment a scientific theory or paradigm is accepted as true, scientific observations begin to contradict it, yet the scientists consistently overlook these contradictions until the
point is reached at which contradictions become so abundant and conspicuous that they can no longer ignore them, and hence they set out to devise new theories and paradigms in order to account for these observations—yet new observations will contradict the new theory or paradigm as well, and the process in question will repeat itself again and again.

In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Friedrich Nietzsche (1999) had already surpassed the above-discussed idea that our interpretations often do not reflect facts, and had gone so far as to claim that there are no facts that may be or not be matched by our interpretations. In his allegedly “postmodern” period, in which he propounded the active radicalization of nihilism, Gianni Vattimo (1995, p. 50) wrote in this regard:

Nihilism means in Nietzsche “de-valORIZATION of the supreme values” and fabulation of the world: there are no facts, only interpretations, and this is also an interpretation.

All of the above shows that Georges Sorel (1922, 1906, 1908) was right in claiming, between the last years of the nineteenth century and the onset of the twentieth century, that human beings act under the influence of myths, that the sciences are myths, and that the scientific pretensions of Marxism—a focus of his criticism—responded to the force of the myth of science, which prevailed in Marx’s time. And that Antonio Gramsci (1998, p. 63) was equally right in pointing out, in 1948, that to the extent to which we take the “discoveries” of the sciences as truths in the sense of *adequatio* of a scientific map to an interpreted territory, the sciences are ideologies. The point is that science and technology are indivisible from the ideological project of modernity, which was initially associated with the ascending bourgeoisie and at a later stage, through the influence of Marxism, also became associated with the ascending proletariat: as Marcuse (1964) noted, science is by its nature instrumental, and hence it naturally delivers the means for the domination of the natural environment and other human beings. Thus it is not difficult to see why Michel Foucault (1976, 1978) and Gilles Deleuze (1980) asserted philosophy and science to be *more than ideologies*: for a very long time philosophical systems, and for a shorter time scientific disciplines and theories (according to Deleuze, psychoanalysis played this role at the time he wrote the book in question), have functioned as an “abstract machine or generalized axiomatic” that works as the matrix that makes possible the very existence of power—having the function of providing power with the forms of knowledge necessary to sustain the models on the basis of which it will have to structure itself in each period.

As to the logic in terms of which the sciences function, it is evident that from one standpoint a given entity is that entity, yet from a different viewpoint (belonging to a different logical type) it is not that entity (e.g., from a certain standpoint a wooden table is a table, but from other standpoints it is not a table but the assembly of pieces of wood, a conglomerate of atoms, a singled-out-for-perception piece of the *continuum* that according to Einstein’s Field Theory the universe is, etc.)—and that this may seem to contradict Aristotelian logic (in particular, the conjunction of the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of noncontradiction that Peter Suber [1997] refers to as Exclusive Disjunction for Contradictories [PEDC]). In their noted Theory of Logical Types Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead (1910-1913) seemingly intended to solve apparent problems of this kind by asserting contradictions between terms to be “real” only when both terms belong to the

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a “From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination,” ch. 6 of Marcuse (1964).
same logical type, hence affirming that no element belonging to a logical type different from that of the class under consideration may either be included in the class or be excluded from it. Gregory Bateson (1972) retorted that in order not to include or exclude items that do not belong to the logical type being considered, one had to exclude all such items from consideration, which meant that one was excluding them in order not to exclude them and thus was violating the principle one was intent on respecting. Furthermore, this implies that, when dealing with the class to which $x$ belongs, whatever does not belong to the same class as $x$ cannot be considered either as $x$ or as non-$x$—which outright violates the principle of Aristotelian logic that the theory in question was intended to save. Of course, if we regard the theory of logical types as a mere convention necessary for resolving practical problems, rather than as an attempt to substantiate the supposedly ultimate character of Aristotelian logic, then it will fulfill its purpose—and, at any rate, the problems just discussed may be deemed irrelevant with regard to the validity or invalidity of the empirical sciences.

However, there will still be a major problem for deductive systems—which, since the time when induction was shown to be nonexistent, has been acknowledged to include all of scientific systems—for, as is now universally admitted, Kurt Gödel’s (1962, 2001) incompleteness theorem showed all logical systems without exception to necessarily contain at least one premise that cannot be proven or verified without the system contradicting itself, from which it follows that it is impossible to establish the logical consistency of any complex deductive system without assuming principles of reasoning the internal consistency of which is as open to questioning as the system itself. At any rate, in our time the belief that science discovers truths (whether through supposed induction, or deductively) has been demystified to such a degree, that Paul K. Feyerabend (1982, 1984, 1987)—who showed scientists to often arrive at their discoveries and theories by breaking the established procedural rules of science—placed Western reason and science on the same plane as magic and sorcery.

I would not deny that, in spite of Hume’s law and the whole of the above objections, the sciences are as a rule capable of predicting some types of events with a considerable degree of reliability, as well as of producing predictable immediate effects. However, in the long run they produce effects that altogether contradict the ones they claim to be intent on producing. In fact, as noted in the main body of this book, in terms of Korzybski’s (1973) semantics, according to which sanity is determined by the structural fit between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world, and insanity by the lack of such fit, we must conclude that Śākyamuni Buddha was right when he compared fully fledged avidyā to an illness, and that Candrakīrti hit the mark when he compared this fully fledged avidyā to insanity, for it gives rise to a severe structural discrepancy between our reactions to the world and what is actually going on in the world: as stated again and again throughout this book, our attempts to achieve satisfaction yield dissatisfaction, our efforts to suppress pain produce pain, and our efforts to (allegedly) destroy death and all negative aspects of life and build a technological Eden have originated the ecological crisis that is producing major natural disasters and which threatens to disrupt human society and put an end to human existence in the course of the present century. It thus seems that Korzybski was wrong when noting, in terms of the famed map-territory analogy, that the map is not the territory, he nonetheless claimed that the map could be correct in the sense of having a structure similar to that of the territory that allows us to successfully deal with the latter, thus achieving the structural fit defining sanity.
Korzybski’s criterion coincides with the one that, in the face of Hume’s law and the accumulated objections of subsequent epistemologists (cf. Capriles, 1994, 2007a vol. III, 2007c), Alfred Julius Ayer (1981) devised with the aim of validating the sciences: the one according to which “we are authorized to have faith in our procedure, so long as it carries out its function, which is that of predicting future experience and thus control our environment.” However, in trying to control our environment with the purported aim of creating an artificial Eden and kill death and pain, the sciences and the technology based on them, rather than achieving their declared effect, have produced a hellish chaos and taken us to the brink of extinction—and, moreover, at no moment did they foresee this outcome. Therefore Ayer’s criterion, rather than validating, outright invalidates the sciences.

In fact, as already noted, the current ecological crisis has made it evident that the technological application of the sciences in the long run gives rise to effects contrary to the ones they are allegedly intended to produce. Thus to the extent to which the sciences involve a pretension of truth in the sense of an exact correspondence of their maps to the territory of the given, or the pretension of improving our lives and producing a technological paradise, it is clear that they are metanarratives involving the denial of their character as metanarratives, and as such they must be denounced as being both myths and ideologies: they are elements of modernity’s myth of progress, which ecological crisis has proved, not merely to be unrealizable, but to be outright deadly.

The above discussion of the limits of science makes it evident that the positivistic belief that metaphysics will be surpassed and truth will be attained by replacing philosophy with the positive sciences (etc.) could hardly be more misguided. However, in the first half of the twentieth century attempts began to be made to surpass metaphysics in ways radically different from ordinary positivism’s—among which at this point it is relevant to briefly refer to those made by Edmund Husserl, creator of phenomenology in the twentieth-century sense of the term, and some of the Continental philosophers that further developed the discipline in question. Rather than attempting to surpass metaphysics by rejecting ontology, as ordinary positivism had done, Husserl developed that which he referred to as an absolute positivism, which rather than dealing with the so-called “positive knowledge” produced by the sciences, was concerned with essences relevant to ontology—his intent being that of producing an ontology purportedly based solely on that which appears in experience, which, he believed, as such would be free from unfounded metaphysical theses. In this he was followed by the rest of twentieth-century phenomenologists, whose discipline for decades enjoyed the highest prestige. However, nowadays it is widely acknowledged that the discipline in question fell short of its purported aim.

One of the noted philosophers whose denunciation of this fact made the greatest impact was Jacques Derrida (1967), who asserted phenomenology to be no more than a [crypto]-metaphysics, while branding the phenomenological emphasis on the supposed immediacy of experience as the “new transcendental illusion.” I endorse Derrida’s assertion, except for one detail, which I discuss in the note appended at the end of this sentence. However, the reason why I agree that phenomenology is a cryptometaphysics and the belief in the immediacy of experience is an illusion springing from an error analogous to the one that, according to Kant, gave rise to the “transcendental illusion,” is particular to my own perspective. The problem, for me, is that basing ontology exclusively

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* Universally accepted sense of the Greek term phainomenon (φαινόμενον).
on *that which appears* in experience is no guarantee that metaphysical constructs will not slip into it, for in *samsāra*, to which our experience pertains, fully-fledged *avidyā* causes us to experience *being* as *given, unquestionable, uneradicable, and somehow absolute*; to experience the *mental subject* as being *in its own right* and hence as a *substance*, and as *being the thinker of thought, the doer of action and the experiencer of experience*; to experience the *essents* we face as being *substantial* in Heidegger’s (1996) sense of *making resistance to us* and so on, and as *being in their own right* and thus as *self-existent*; etc. Hence an ontology elaborated on the basis of samsaric experience alone would not be really free from metaphysical fictions, as it will most likely feature *at least some* of the ones just mentioned (i.e., *given, inherent, somehow absolute being*; a substantial *cogito* inherently separate from the physical world and even from the human individual’s experiences, thoughts and acts, which thinks thoughts, carries out acts and receives experiences; countless external, physical, substantial and self-existent essents) and probably many other ones.

The above is what, as a rule, occurred with twentieth-century phenomenology. The most outstanding, core phenomena of fully-fledged *avidyā or lethe* that Edmund Husserl wrongly viewed as *given*, ineradicable, self-existent substances, inadvertently turning them into unfounded metaphysical foundations of his system, were the pseudo-absolute Cartesian *cogito* and the noetic-noematic (mental subject / experienced object) schism that is the condition of possibility of the *cogito* and the axis of all dualistic, allegedly immediate yet actually mediated samsaric experience. Martin Heidegger found Husserl’s departure from metaphysics insufficient and set to carry it as far as he deemed it necessary, whereas Jean-Paul Sartre and others of those who received Heidegger’s influence decidedly set to go beyond Heidegger—yet both Heidegger and Sartre, like the bulk of phenomenologists of the last century, failed to go beyond metaphysics, for both of them failed to realize that we samsaric, humans beings are completely deluded, and that the *phenomenon of being* that pervades our experience is no more than a deceptive appearance manifesting in our experience that constitutes a pivotal aspect of our delusion, and thus kept taking *being* to be *given, somehow absolute, unquestionable and uneradicable*.

Heidegger, in particular—as I have shown in depth elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a Vol. I)—wholly misunderstood Heraclitus’ concepts of *lethe / aletheia,* and reduced the dialectics between the respective conditions to such a shallow level as to make it insignificant (Capriles, 2007a Vol. I.636). In the same way, under the spell of delusion, he overlooked the fact that the true nature of reality, since it cannot be included in a class wider than itself and does not exclude anything, has neither proximate gender nor specific difference, and hence cannot be contained in any concept, including those of being (which, as he himself acknowledged in the Introduction to *Being and Time* [Heidegger, 1996] by citing Pascal, has its specific difference in the concept of nonbeing), nonbeing (which has its specific difference in the concept of being), both (a position excluded by logic) and neither (which is still a concept having a specific difference). Although he rightly identified being with the *phenomenon of being* that pervades the whole of the experience that twenty century phenomenologists deemed immediate but that is actually mediated, he simply failed

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*a Sense of the Greek term *phainomenon* (φαίνομενον).

*b ληθή.

*c ἀλήθεια.

*d *genus proximum / differentia specifica.*
to realize the phenomenon in question to be one of the most basic erroneous appearances of the basic human delusion, and taking it to be given and undeluded, he went as far as to make the logical mistake of identifying it with the arche\(^a\) or true nature of reality.\(^631\)

On his part, Sartre seemed to have mistakenly, metaphysically assumed that there was a given, absolute being distinct from the phenomenon of being,\(^632\) and, like Husserl, to have assumed the subject-object duality in experience—as well as the duality of their respective modes of being—not to be eradicable. However, in spite of this, and of Derrida’s charges that in his interpretation and usage of Heidegger’s concepts he incurred in a psychologism as well as an anthropocentrism, the noted French existentialist had invaluable insights that can greatly contribute to the philosophy required by our time. Among other things, he clearly showed the cogito not to be a substance (as I have shown elsewhere,\(^633\) by the same token providing us with the tools for elucidating the Dignāga-Dharmakūtī concept of svasaṃvittih / svasaṃvedana / rangrig\(^b\) / awareness [of] consciousness, and determining how does it relate to the Dzogchen usage of rangrig / svasaṃvedana); he asserted human existence to be drawn toward the holon\(^c\)—his definition of which may be validly applied to Awakening (indeed, the meaning he gave the term is radically different from the one given it by Koestler [1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1970])—as telos,\(^d\) in such a way that all human actions, thoughts and so on were carried out in the hope of achieving the condition in question (which, however, he deemed it impossible to attain),\(^634\) and he dismounted the pseudo-unity of the Dasein into its constitutive elements, in a way that may be most profitable to Dzogchen practitioners and, in general, to Buddhist practitioners. (For an in-depth discussion of all of this cf. Capriles, 2007a Vol. I.)

The above sufficiently demonstrated the pretence of twentieth-century phenomenology of having gone beyond metaphysics to be no more than that—a pretence. Wilber V carried his pretences much farther than the phenomenology in question, for beside pretending to have gone beyond metaphysics—which as Riisager (undated) showed, he simply has not—he pretends to have gone beyond ontology—on which he, just like some of those who have discussed him so far, seemingly under the spell of so-called postmodern thought, decidedly frowns. In fact, after phenomenology’s abortive attempts to produce a nonmetaphysical ontology, Jacques Derrida, claiming to have found the sketching of an end of ontology in Nietzsche, Lacan’s Freud and Levinas, undertook what he deemed to be a destruction of metaphysics which, unlike the one Heidegger pretended to have achieved, would be genuine and thorough, and which would bring ontology to an end and by the same token open a perspective in which that which he called différance\(^635\) would find a place. He believed the way to achieve this to consist in doing away with ontological elaborations and circumscribing the task of philosophy to the deconstruction\(^e\) of existing discourses—and in particular of all totalizing metanarratives, which had been a target of so-called postmodern thought ever since Jean-François Lyotard’s (1979) La condition postmoderne introduced this defective label. However, in the first place, Derrida’s writings have significant ontological assertions, so that they may be seen as outlining an ontology.\(^636\)

\(^{a}\) \(\alpha\rho\chi\hat{\eta}\).
\(^{b}\) rang rig.
\(^{c}\) \(\hat{o}\lambda\omega\nu\).
\(^{d}\) \(\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\omicron\).  
\(^{e}\) The French déconstruction translates Heidegger’s use of Destruktion and Abbau (in non-Derrida contexts, often rendered in English as debuilding).
Moreover, at any rate, simply to do away with ontology would be of no use, for as noted above, fully-fledged avidyā gives rise to an experiential ontological confusion that consists in perceiving those phenomena-that-are-in-the-process-of-being (i.e., essents\(^a\)) as being-inherently-and absolutely, in-their-own-right (i.e., without depending on anything else), and that causes us to experience the being of essents as a given, somehow absolute reality—all of which has terrible consequences, for not only is it at the root of the dukkha that constitutes the First Noble Truth, but its exacerbation, together with the intensification of the figure-ground split that hampers the apprehension of interdependences, is the ultimate root of ecological destruction. Although this experiential, ontological confusion cannot be eradicated by merely intellectual means, in the case of formally educated people, or of people having an intellectual disposition, the capacity to decidedly and unwaveringly undertake the practices necessary for eradicating the confusion in question, will depend on understand it beforehand to be a confusion rather than the undistorted experience of the true condition of reality, as it is ordinarily taken to be—for only thus will doubts be dispelled and conviction be obtained, at least to the point to which this is feasible by merely intellectual means. This is the reason why ontology has been a central element in all authentic forms of Buddhism, Taoism, Shaivism, Sufism and the other systems I deem conducive to Awakening, and ineluctably must continue to be so. (On the contrary, evolutionary psychology has no role on the Path—this being one of the reasons why I find Wilber’s writings so heavy: because he devotes so much of his reflection to questions that are even more distractive and irrelevant to Awakening than the fourteen unconjecturable\(^b\) questions before which Śākyamuni Buddha remained silent\(^637\)—which were very briefly discussed in a previous section and its notes).

The above is one of the main reasons why in various of my works (most thoroughly in Capriles, 2007a Vol. III, under evaluation) I have asserted totalizing metanarratives to be vital, though preliminary, aspects of the spiritual therapy needed for healing the mind, society and the ecosystem. However, in order to play this role, they must be structured in such a way as to fulfill the dual purpose of showing the baselessness of the assumptions of common sense—including the assumption that conceptual systems can precisely match reality—and helping us develop the faith necessary to, (1) set to apply the practices that lead beyond understanding in terms of thought, into the immediate, direct, nonconceptual realization of the true condition of ourselves and the whole of reality, and (2) set to work toward the technological, economic, political, social, cultural—in one word, total—transformation that would help heal the ecological crisis we have produced (which as noted repeatedly has put at stake the very continuity of human society and even of human existence) and achieve what Tibetan Lama Chögyam Trungpa (1984) called an enlightened society. This is why the value of metanarratives depends on their explicit acknowledgement that they are Āśvaghoṣian uses of language arisen spontaneously from a perspective that does not confuse the maps of words and concepts for the territory, which exhort us to get rid of the delusory valuation of words and concepts, and explain how can this be achieved—as such being comparable to fingers pointing to the moon that we must not confuse with the satellite, or to rafts for crossing to the other shore (that of nirvāṇa) to be left behind as we reach it. Furthermore, in order to fulfill their aim, they must make it clear that the task they indicate cannot be fulfilled by playing word games or by merely

\(^{a}\) German, Seiende; French, étants; etc.

\(^{b}\) avyākṛta. As previously noted, the questions are called avyākṛtavastūni.
achieving an intellectual understanding of reality, for it requires us to wholeheartedly devote ourselves to a spiritual practice of the kind discussed in this book—which cannot be learned in books or Internet courses, for it will work only if we receive its transmission from a Teacher holding a true, genuine, uninterrupted lineage originating in the source of the teachings, and set to apply his or her instructions for going beyond the intellect.

A major drawback of Derrida’s philosophy is that, as David Loy (1987) noted, it deconstructs identity and the pairs of opposites, yet fails to deconstruct that which he called *différance* and which for him the condition of possibility of all differences—whereas Nāgārjuna, creator of Mādhyamaka philosophy, as early as the beginning of the Christian era, by the same token deconstructed the basis of identity and difference, thus leaving no ontological assumption or basis for ontological assumptions unchallenged. In fact, as shown elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a Vol. I), the highest systems of Buddhist philosophy—Mahāmādhyamaka, and Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Mādhyamaka Prāsaṅgika—and the Dzogchen teachings are totally free from such metaphysical assumptions and thus need not undergo either deconstruction or reconstruction. As I see it, these systems are by the same token antecedents, and keys to the production, of an ontology free from the metaphysical assumptions of phenomenology that would perfectly respond to the needs of our time. The latter is that which I set to elaborate in some of my works and which I refer to as *metaphenomenology*—which can only be achieved by means of a method of inquiry which, rather than basing its hermeneutics of experience exclusively on the phenomena of *samsāra*, considers and privileges the metaphenomenon/a of *nirvāṇa* that show all of the phenomena of *samsāra* and derived, reified metaphysical assumptions to be baseless illusions.

The *metaphenomenology* in question is also a *metaontology*: an ontology that discerns the nature of being and of the entities which are in the process of being (*essents*), as well as of nonbeing and so on. Whereas Western ontology so far has been based solely on the experience founded on the *phenomenon of being* that is proper to *samsāra*, what I refer to as *metaontology* is so called because it is principally based on the nirvanic unconcealment of the true condition of both ourselves and the rest of reality, in which the *phenomenon of being* has dissolved and thus it has become evident that it was no more than a baseless appearance pervading all experience conditioned by the basic human delusion that, as the Mahāyāna version of the Four Noble Truth makes it clear, constitutes the root of suffering—and which, as I have explained in so many works (Capriles, 1986, 1994, 2007a Vol. III and minor works), is the root of ecological crisis as well. Therefore, rather than taking *being* to be *given* or to constitute the true nature of reality, it denounces it—together with the rest of the phenomena at the root of the assumptions of metaphysics—as one of the most basic deceptive appearances that issue from fully-fledged *avidyā*.

The above-discussed metaontology is in stark contrast with the nihilistic façade put on by many of the philosophical trends that, pretending to radically surpass the project and ideology of modernity, label themselves postmodern—including those that purport to surpass ontology by circumscribing themselves to the deconstruction of discourses. In fact, the root and essence of modernity is the myth of evolutionary progress, which, together with many of the metaphysical illusions and mistaken assumptions proper to mainstream Western philosophy, continues to underlie a great deal of so-called postmodern thought—including most works that, some times on the basis of Heidegger-inspired hermeneutics, have attempted “postmodern” reconstructions of the deconstructed. This is also the case
with Wilber V, who claimed to have produced a post-metaphysical reconstruction of primordial traditions that in his view can salvage the latter’s essence while shedding their ontological baggage, yet continues to be under the spell of the modern myth of progress and of so many of his former metaphysical assumptions.

Moreover, the task Wilber undertook could hardly be more pointless and futile, for as show above, millennia ago the higher forms of Buddhist philosophy and the top Buddhist Path deconstructed whatever needed to be deconstructed—unlike Derrida, including not only identity and difference, but the condition of possibility of difference as well. If there remained anything to do in our time, it would be to express the viewless view of the systems of Buddhist philosophy and the Buddhist Path in question in an actualized, reeledaborated way, as a result of confronting them with the concepts and views of Western philosophy from its onset until our time—which is precisely what I attempted in many of my works (for a thorough exposition of my *metaphenomenological, metaexistential metaontology*, cf. Capriles [2007a Vol. I]; for an in-depth discussion of the blemishes of so-called postmodern philosophy and a thorough explanation of what I view as genuinely postmodern, cf. Vol. III of the same work [Capriles, 2007a Vol. III] and a recent book in Spanish [Capriles, under evaluation]).

As to overly metaphysical spiritual traditions—including Perennialism, which by contrast with the above-refuted, wrong use of the term postmodern by a whole philosophical fauna, Wilber now views as premodern—Visser (*op. cit.*) deems it extremely doubtful that the essence of the traditions in question will come across in Wilber V’s version, which the hairless author claims has been freed of untenable teachings and categorizes as post-metaphysical. With regard to the same traditions, Visser (*op. cit.*) says as well that Wilber’s latest writings obliterate the difference between (exoteric) standard mythical religious beliefs, and their (esoteric) mystical or so-called occult reformulations, making the point that the reasons why modernity rejects most of the premodern heritage must be carefully weighted—even though he views the attempt to reframe perennialism into a form that is not offensive to either modernity or postmodernity as an interesting exercise.

Even though the fact that Wilber carried out this radical reshaping of his system amounts to acknowledging that he was altogether wrong in so much of what he formerly asserted, in one of the Integral Life Newsletters of the last months of 2010 he wrote that in spite of it he has *always been right!* Since among the views that have remained unchanged through the successive Wilbers, some of the central ones are his view of our phylogenetic spiritual and social evolution as betterment and progress, and his view of our ontogenetic development as occurring along different lines in a rigid structural schema where advancement along the various lines is to a considerable extent interdependent—and, for almost two decades, also his association of the four highest levels to the four *kāyas* of higher Buddhist systems—it is to be assumed that it is these views (which were shown throughout this book to be wrong) that have always been right.

As given to understand above, a thorough assessment of Wilber V would require an altogether new work, as its intent is so ambitious—yet it would be currently impossible to produce it because the new system by our author is in the process of being built (one of the few works publicly published in what is presumably its definitive form being *Integral Spirituality* [Wilber, 2007]). At the time of writing this, the reader interested in exploring Wilber V may consult Wilber (2001a, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003, 2007, 2010), Wilber &
Cohen (2002, 2005), all the works cited in this Appendix and many of those posted in Visser’s Site, *Integral World*, and Reynolds’ (undated) eulogy of Wilber.
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1 (1) The first of the three meanings of the terms avidya and marigpa (ma rig pa), corresponding to what in the Dzogchen division adopted here is called lhenkye marigpa (lhan skyes ma rig pa) or lhenchik kyepai marigpa (lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa) and which in the alternative Dzogchen threefold classification of avidya favored by Longchen Rabjampa is called gyu dagnyi chikpai marigpa (rgyu bdag nyid gcig pa’i ma rig pa; cf. Longchenpa [1976, p. 24] and Cornu [2001, p. 62]), is that of “unawareness of rigpa’s-inherent-nondual-self-awareness” or “unawareness of the unthinkable (Skt. achintya), true condition of nondual-primordial-gnosis / Base / whole-of-reality” as the effect of a beclouding element of stupefaction (Tib. mongcha [rmongs cha]) that has always been flowing with the continuum of those beings who have never realized the true condition in question and that prevents the latter’s recognition—thus preventing rigpa from making patent its own face in the manifestation of rigpa-qua-Path and rigpa-qua-Fruit. Thus in this case the terms avidya and ma rig pa are properly rendered as “unawareness” or, more precisely, as “beclouding of primordial awareness” (for nondual awareness is still there, the problem being that its Awake manifestation has been beclouded) and should not be translated as “delusion” (which, as the reader knows, is how I have translated the terms avidya and ma rig pa consistently in the regular text of this chapter). Avidya or marigpa in this sense pervades all that is not nirvana: (a) It is manifest in the neutral condition of the base-of-all (kunzhi lungmaten [kun gzhi lung ma bstan], which according to circumstances may be called “primordial, profound base-of-all” or yedön kunzhi [ye don kun gzhi]; “dimension of the base-of-all” or kunzhi kham [kun gzhi khams]; and base-of-all carrying propensities or bagchagkyi kunzhi [bag chags kyi kun gzhi]), which, as shown in vol. I, may be a nonconceptual (Skt. nishprapancha) and nondual (Skt. adwaya) condition in which avidya or ma rig pa has not yet manifested as active delusion giving rise to dualistic appearances and hence samsara is not manifest—yet the true condition of all of reality is concealed and therefore nirvana is not manifest either. (b) It underlies the whole of deluded, samsaric experience. This type of avidya or marigpa it the first one to arise in the process that produces samsara (in superior bodhisattvas and so on when they move from Contemplation to post-Contemplation, for the teachings hold that it has been manifest since beginningless samsara in the
continuum of those beings who have not recognized the true condition), and, as just noted, continues to be manifest when \textit{samsara} actively arises.

(2) In our classification, the second type of \textit{avidya} or marigpa is the confusion of categories referred to in the sentence of the regular text of this book to which the reference mark for this note was appended, whereby the relative is taken to be absolute, the insubstantial is taken to be to be substantial, the dependent is taken to be independent and to involve self-being, and so on. It involves grasping at appearances (\textit{phyin ci log par dzin pa}), and therefore comprises the manifestation of the grasped and the grasper (Tib., \textit{gzung dzin}), which introduces dualistic appearances. It may also be said to involve an inverted cognition insofar as the three aspects of the Base, which are ngowo (\textit{ngo bo}), rangzhin (\textit{rang bzhin}) and thukje (\textit{thugs rje}), seem to be inherently separate from each other (in fact, the phenomena manifested by the thukje aspect seem to be substantial rather than void, and therefore seem to have an essential nature different from the ngowo aspect, which is voidness and that is completely ignored). Furthermore, it may be said to be compounded of the second and the third senses of \textit{avidya} and marigpa in the alternative classification favored by Longchen Rabjam(mod, which are: (2a) the failure to recognize the shining forth of primordial gnosie as the expression of the Base and the concomitant error of taking it to be an external reality, which involves the arising of the subject-object duality, and which in the classification in question is called spontaneous illusion or lhenchik kyepeai marigpa (\textit{lhun cig skyes pa'i ma rig pa}; cf. Longchenpa [1975a, p. 51; 1976, pp. 24 and 122 note 10, taken from \textit{Kandro Yangthik}, part III, p. 117] and Cornu [2001, p. 62]), and (2b), the fully-fledged illusion of selfhood in the individual and of self-existent plurality in the world, which in the classification in question is called imaginative delusion or kun tu tagpai marigpa (\textit{kun tu brtags pa'i ma rig pa}; cf. Longchenpa [1976, pp. 24 and 123 note 11] and Cornu [2001, p. 62]); since Longchenpa favored the usage of Third Promulgation terminology in explaining the Dzogchen teachings, the term for this sense of \textit{avidya} or marigpa alludes to the third truth of Mahamadhyamaka. (2b involves the singling out, by a divisive, hermetic focus of conscious awareness, of segments of the continuum that manifested as object when spontaneous illusion occurred, and the perception of what has been singled out in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized digital, fragmentary maps of thought which are incapable of matching the analog, holistic territory of the \textit{given}; therefore, it involves the illusion of there being manifold entities existing inherently, independently and disconnectedly. Likewise, it involves the superimposition of the idea of an “I” on the illusory subject that is one of the poles of dualistic consciousness and the drive, inherent in this illusion, to confirm that subject’s existence and gratify its acquisitiveness by means of contacts with the seemingly self-existing, seemingly external entities that are perceived at this stage.)

(3) In our classification, the third sense of \textit{avidya} or marigpa denotes the seal of delusion that makes it impossible to realize the illusions indicated as (2) to be such, and that is the condition of possibility of the maintenance of \textit{avidya} or marigpa in general and therefore of \textit{samsara}. It consists in ignoring (mishepa (\textit{mi shes pa}) that the dualistic appearances that arise by virtue of the second type of \textit{avidya}, are false and baseless, and in normal individuals it always accompanies this second type of \textit{avidya}.

\textbf{2} The most general character of existential philosophy (\textit{Existenzphilosophie}) and existentialism is the urge for an “existential thinking” in which the thinking subject includes him or herself in the thinking, rather than pretending to reflect reality in an objective way. It was Kierkegaard who for the first time proposed: “Against speculative philosophy (by which he meant mainly that of Hegel), existential philosophy.” It is mainly in this sense that Nietzsche has been viewed as an existential philosopher. Emmanuel Mounier (1966, p. 11) compared existentialism unto a tree the roots of which are fed by Socrates, Stoicism and Augustine of Hippo; the roots produce philosophies such as that of Blaise Pascal and F. P. Maine de Biran. The tree’s trunk represents the philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard. And from the trunk a wide crown opens in which we find, in a very complex ramification, phenomenology, Karl Jaspers, personalism, Gabriel Marcel, Vladimir Soloviev, Lev Isakovitch Chestov, Nikolay Aleksandrovitch Berdaiev, dialectical theology (including Martin Buber’s transcendental Judaism), Max Ferdinand Scheller, Paul Ludwig Landsberg, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel, Lucien Laberthonnière, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre (who represents the left term of the movement). This classification has been considered too wide, for it classifies within the “movement” authors who cannot be considered as existentialists (such as Henri Bergson) and others who have themselves rejected the label for their own systems (such as Martin Heidegger and Jose Ortega y Gasset).

\textbf{3} Slavoj \v{Z}i\v{z}ek (1999, Part I [The ‘Night of the World’], ch. 1 [The Deadlock of Transcendental Imagination, or, Martin Heidegger as Reader of Kant], last section [Kant’s Acosmism]) pretended to have surpassed
Thus there arises the illusion of a mental subject separate from the spatial continuum of

In these terms we could say that avidya or marigpa implies an illusory sundering of the indivisibility of Total Plenitude can only be [disclosed] in [awareness (of)] the undivided completeness of our true condition, in

At any rate, with regard to the claim that space and time arise together with the subject

Of course this is precisely what Žižek is charging against: the various paradigms, approaches and theories that assert the subject to be a mere illusion, or that announce its death, etc. Among these, Žižek exhibits the greatest contempt for what he calls “New Age,” within which he includes transpersonal studies, and which he characterizes as “obscurantist.” It is very easy to use epithets against a category including ways of thinking one dislikes, even though one does not know all that may be included within that category; however, as Buddhist philosophy has shown, it is simply impossible to substantiate the claim that the subject, however understood, is a self-existent entity—and, if it is not a self-existent entity, it cannot possess an inherent freedom (even though the illusion of separate agency is the source of karma that will condition future experience). Unfortunately I do not have space for discussing this in specific terms in this book, but the reader can find relevant arguments in its first and second volumes, as well as in Capriles (1986, 2003, 2004, 2005). I hope to have time to treat this point more specifically in the future.

At any rate, with regard to the claim that space and time arise together with the subject-object duality as the result of the delusory valuation absolutization of the threefold thought-structure, the following excerpts from my book Buddhism and Dzogchen (Capriles, 2003) may be considered:

“…Plenitude can only be [disclosed] in [awareness (of)] the undivided completeness of our true condition, in which the continuum of Space-Time-Awareness is uninterrupted, for there is no illusory subject to feel at a distance from its objects, and the now is not divided into past, present and future. However, the moment there arises the subject-object duality, the undivided completeness of our true condition is illusorily sundered, and the subject is doomed to experience the lack of the plenitude of completeness (...) Thus arises the present (the etymological meaning of which is ‘being before’), for the illusory mental subject experiences itself as being at a distance from the undivided now...

“In these terms we could say that avidya or marigpa implies an illusory sundering of the indivisibility of Total Space-Time-Awareness that is our original condition of total plenitude and completeness (Dzogchen, when the emphasis is placed on its katak aspect), by means of the illusory cleavage of our nondual awareness or nondual gnosis into the two poles of dualistic knowledge, which are the subject and the object.

“Thus there arises the illusion of a mental subject separate from the spatial continuum of potential objects and from the temporal continuum that properly can be called nowness: the mental subject that, as Heraclitus rightly noted, we erroneously regard as a separate source of cognition, thought and action.

“Upon referring to our original condition of total plenitude and completeness, we have spoken of total space-time-awareness. This is not intended to imply that there are three aspects of this condition different or
Paradoxically, it is the basic delusion at the root of the feeling of lack that issues from experiencing ourselves as if we were at a distance from the uninterrupted plenitude of the spatial continuum in which all entities manifest and that all entities are, giving rise to the spatial dimension and the illusion of ‘being before the universe,’ and we experience ourselves as though we were at a distance from the absolute completeness and plenitude of the indivisible ‘now,’ giving rise to the temporal dimension and the illusion of being in an inapprehensible moment that seems to separate the future from the past. Plato remarked that the etymology of the term ‘present’ is ‘being before,’ and in fact the illusory hiatus, break or gap that arises when the illusory fracture of total space-time-awareness occurs, manifests in the temporal plane as the present that artificially separates the future from the past, whereas in the spatial plane it manifests as the illusion of being before the ‘physical’ world. This is the reason why I have chosen to use the term ‘present’ only when the illusion of being at a distance both from the ‘now’ and from the ‘physical universe’ is manifest.

Thus, from a temporal perspective it may be said that the present is the illusory nothingness consisting in the mathematical instant (that is, an instant without any duration) that separates the past from the future, and therefore that it is nothing but the illusion of a nothingness, a vacuum or a lack; conversely, the ‘now’ is the absolute plenitude and completeness of nonseparation between the past and the future. In fact, if we were to fully realize the now, ceasing to experience ourselves as though we were at a distance from it, we would find that it is absolute plenitude and completeness—just as is the case, spatially, with the totality of our own true condition. Contrariwise, the present, being an illusory distance with respect to the now, is the experience of lack that results from experiencing ourselves as separate from our own condition of total plenitude and completeness.

The illusion of a hiatus or gap corresponds to the ‘crossing point’ of the lines of the three spatial dimensions (‘place’) and the line of the dimension of time (‘moment’) in the experience of any given individual—that is, to the point where there seems to be found the illusory, apparently separate, mental subject. This ‘crossing point’ does not occupy any space or time, but qua reference point it is the conditio sine qua non of spatiotemporal perception (Descartes conceived the res cogitans as a soul that did not occupy any space, precisely because he took the illusory mental subject, which does not occupy any space, to be a substantial and immortal soul).

The feeling of lack that issues from experiencing ourselves as if we were at a distance from the uninterrupted plenitude of the continuum of total space, as well as from the uninterrupted plenitude of total time manifesting as the ‘now,’ is the root of trishna (craving, avidity and thirst), which consists in the urge to fill up the lack—a task that, as we have seen, we attempt to accomplish through a plethora of means that prevent us from achieving our goal, insofar as all of them affirm and sustain the illusion that we are intrinsically separate entities, which is the very root of the sensation of lack.

Paradoxically, it is the basic delusion at the root of trishna that gives rise to the need for the mental subject to assert itself as an existent, for it is upon experiencing the ‘crossing point’ of the lines of the three spatial dimensions (‘place’) and the line of the dimension of time (‘moment’), which is nothing at all, as though it were an apparently separate mental subject, that the compulsion comes forth for the latter to assert itself as an absolutely true and important entity. This compulsion is known as ahankara or ‘self-preoccupation,’ which is a concept of the greatest importance in the Dzogchen teaching.”

4 As we have seen, the first Sartre is the Sartre of La transcendance de l’Égo (The Transcendence of the Ego); L’imagination (The Imagination); L’imaginaire: Psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination (The Imaginary: Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination); Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions (Outline of a Theory of Emotions); L’être et le néant (Being and Nothingness); etc.

5 To me, this seems to be a Sartrean idiosyncrasy, for I don’t think I have ever had an experience of nausea as an unveiling of being.

6 As we have seen, the first Heidegger is the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time).
We have seen that, according to Sartre, existentialism is the doctrine according to which existence precedes essence, which implies that the individual makes him or herself, instead of being predetermined by an immutable essence that would condition the characteristics of his or her existence. This view is developed by Sartre in terms of the concept of bad faith referred to above in the regular text, which explains how the individual can construct his or her own essence and yet believe that it is not something that he or she built, but that it is a changeless, innate essence inherent in his or her individuality. According to Sartre bad faith is determined by the impulse to elude the unpleasant experiences that reveal the being of the human individual; thus, according to the French author, our “constructing ourselves” and our believing that what we have constructed is an innate essence inherent in our individuality, is determined by the fact that the being of the human individual is anguish and reveals itself in various unpleasant experiences. Therefore, though Sartre defines existentialism as the doctrine according to which existence precedes essence, there is an ampler feature common to all existentialist and existential thinkers, as well to Kierkegaard (and in some sense to Pascal, who, as we have seen, is also a predecessor of the doctrine of bad faith): the idea that unpleasant experiences are inherent in the being of humans, and that authenticity lies in not eluding these unpleasant experiences.

Heidegger believed it was possible for human beings to be authentic; even after Heidegger totally gave up his “existential” concerns (as for example in Heidegger [1988]), he spoke of authenticity as being possible. Sartre also posits an authentic condition, which would consist in not evading anguish, nausea and so on by means of bad faith, but he makes it clear that it is impossible for human beings to surpass bad faith and uninterruptedly remain in the authentic state.

Hegel used terms such as Entäusserung, Entfremdung (which is the one that Marx reinterpreted in the 1844 Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts, giving it a radically new meaning—which, however, is not at all relevant to us here), Entzweitung, Trennung. In all cases, however, he viewed alienation as something that cannot continue forever: consciousness has to go through a reconciliation (Versöhnung), which is at the same time a reunion (Vereignigung) and an appropriation (Aneignung) insofar as it implies conserving self-consciousness—which, rather than dissolving in the Self (qua Path or qua Fruit), “recognizes itself in nature.” It is here that my understanding of the term alienation radically differs from Hegel’s: in my view, if self-consciousness recognizes itself in nature, this is simply a more subtle and as such much more dangerous instance of alienation, for the latter only disappears when self-consciousness—and with it the essential illusory division of the Self, and the illusion of a being-for-Self that is at a distance of a being-in-itself—dissolves altogether. To Hegel, however, this would amount to schwarze Kuhne!!!

One of the key concepts of the Path of renunciation is that of Refuge, which arose in the Hinayana but was incorporated by all Buddhist Paths and vehicles. In the face of the insecurity inherent in life and of the transitory problems that constantly occur in it, all human beings crave finding a stable refuge. The more naïve take refuge in religious beliefs and other ideologies, lovers, money, power, status, idolized personages (of pop culture, politics, religion, the academy, etc.), groups, fame and fans, drugs, and so on. However, it is not difficult to realize that these objects of refuge, instead of offering solace from insecurity, exacerbate our worries: if one takes refuge in one’s lover, this will increase the insecurity associated with the possibility that she or he may prize or love another more than oneself; if one takes refuge in money, one will be worrying that it may be stolen or somehow one may lose it, or that stock markets may crash, etc.; if one takes refuge in ideologies, one takes the risk that they may fail, be refuted, show their flaws or be abandoned by the masses—and something of the kind is true of all mundane objects of refuge. There are those who take refuge in spiritual states that, being produced, are impermanent—but, as we have seen, these also offer no more than a temporary solace that at some point will be followed by the shock of having to face new, undesirable experiences.

The only secure, stable, everlasting Refuge lies in the definitive and irreversible consolidation of the Awake state, for only in this state no vicissitudes can affect us: neither the sensations that normally would be experienced as pain, nor illness, nor old age, nor death, nor any other circumstance will be able to alter the immutable condition of total completeness/plenitude and perfection that, being beyond dualism, is beyond acceptance, rejection and indifference (and therefore beyond the ephemeral, petty pleasure that arises from the first, the pain that arises from the second, and the neutral feeling issuing from the third), beyond life and death, beyond hope and fear, beyond dexterity and clumsiness. The Mahayana and higher
vehicles refer to this condition of nonconceptual, absolute wisdom or primordial gnosis (yeshe [ye shes]), as absolute Refuge, or as the supramundane Refuge directly received from the true nature of phenomena (i.e., from the dharmata or chönyi [chos nyid]). So long as we have not attained this condition, however, in the Path of Renunciation we take relative Refuge: (1) in the Buddha as the nirmanakaya who, having obtained the true, absolute Refuge that one wishes to obtain, became the source of the teachings of this Path; (2) in the dharma or teachings of the Buddha as the Path for reaching the true and absolute Refuge; and (3) in the sangha or community of practitioners as the true helpers with the practice aimed at gaining access to the true and absolute Refuge and, henceforth, at becoming firmly established in it. In the Path of Transformation we take Refuge: (1) in our Master, who has obtained the true, absolute Refuge that one wishes to obtain, and who is the direct source of the Sample of Primordial Onosis or peyi yeshe (dpe yi ye shes) that set us on the Path; (2) in the Meditation Deity (Skt. devata; Tib. yidam [yi dam]) as the Path for reaching the true and absolute Refuge; and on (3) the dakini[s] or khandro[s] (mkha’ ‘gro) (and dharma-palas) as the true helpers with the practice aimed at gaining access to the true and absolute Refuge and, henceforth, at becoming firmly established in it. Finally, in the Path of Spontaneous Liberation there is no provisional, relative Refuge, for Refuge is taken: (1) in the Vision or tawa (ita ba), which is the true, absolute Refuge that one wishes to obtain, as unveiled in Direct Introduction; (2) in the Contemplation or gompa (sgom pa) which is simultaneously the true and absolute Refuge and the Path for consolidating this Refuge; and in (3) the Behavior or chöpa (spyod pa) as the true helper with the practice consolidating the true and absolute Refuge we have already gained access to. For an explanation of why all this is so, cf. Capriles (2003).

11 The order in which Atisha Dipankara Shri Jñana taught the famous “four reflections that turn the mind away from samsara” was: (1) the precious character of the human condition; (2) the impermanence of all that is conditioned; (3) the law of cause and effect, and (4) the sufferings and shortcomings of samsara. However, in Longchenpa (1975a) a Nyingmapa (rnying ma pa) view in this regard is expressed according to which, for the reflection on the law of cause and effect to fully bear fruits, we must have full awareness of the sufferings and shortcomings of samsara—and hence the sufferings and shortcomings of samsara should be the theme of the third reflection, whereas the law of cause and effect should be the theme of the fourth reflection.

For his part, Chögyal Namkhai Norbu consistently emphasizes the fact that what is essential is not that we carry out a reflection on each of these topics during a session (Tib., thun) of sitting meditation, but that we maintain awareness of all four of them during everyday life—so that those who have this capacity need not carry out the four reflections. However, in the case of those who lack this capacity and who are not very familiar with Buddhism, it is very useful to practice the reflections in meditation sessions—which in my view is best to do in the following order: (1) the reflection on the sufferings and shortcomings of samsara, for without awareness of these sufferings neither the precious character of the human condition (which is precious precisely because it is the only one that offers the opportunity of practicing the dharma and thereby putting an end to these sufferings in Awakening) nor the importance of the law of cause of effect (which determines whether these sufferings will be subtler or coarser) would be evident; (2) the law of cause and effect, so as to be aware of the way the coarser and most terrible among these sufferings are produced, and hence know how may the latter be avoided; (3) the reflection on the precious character of the human condition as the only state that involves the possibility of surpassing the sufferings of samsara and the confinement to the law of cause-and-effect inherent in it; and (4) impermanence, as that which spurs the horse of diligence so that we will not to put to waste the precious human opportunity of attaining Awakening.

12 Concerning Antisthenes and the Cynics, it is clear that the latter had an askesis that aimed at the liberation of conditioned perceptions and attain the apatheia or imperturbability, of which I provided a preliminary interpretation in the light of Eastern traditions in Capriles (1999b) and of which I intend to provide a more elaborate and precise interpretation in Capriles (work in progress 3). For a summary of the interpretation in question, see the relevant note to the seventh chapter of this book.

13 As already noted, in terms of the view of human social and spiritual evolution as a process of progressive degeneration, the shortcomings inherent in being-for-Self discussed in the last chapter of vol. I of this book, and in general the sufferings of samsara, have been increasing gradually during the process in question, out of a primordial condition of plenitude and fulfillment. For a discussion of this view see Vol. III of this book; for a more in-depth discussion of it cf. Capriles (1994a).
Though Pascal seems to be closer to mysticism than Kierkegaard (see below in the regular text as well as the pertinent endnote), the French philosopher asserted the “God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” to be the only one capable of unifying the opposites between which human beings are clenched and shattered, and that he proclaimed his submission to the Church against more extreme Jansenists such as Martin de Barros.

Arthur Schopenhauer noted that the knowledge of human beings, affected by illusion, is not in agreement with their Will (understood as the irrational force that blindly leads us through most of our lives) (Schopenhauer (1969, Book IV, § 54)—which I read as implying unauthenticity (which he explicitly acknowledged concerning love). Furthermore, the Will blindly seeks satisfaction through a plethora of means, and this endeavor, being inherently self- frustrating, brings about endless suffering, which can only be overcome when the Will dissolves in nirvana and which so long as it persists we are compelled to avoid—which implies unauthenticity to a far greater degree than the disagreement between the knowledge of human beings and their Will, and which implies that, ultimately, authenticity lies in the awareness clearly discovering the pain of living, which is the way leading to the suppression of suffering. Since his aim was the suppression of suffering in nirvana, his view was decidedly soteriological; however, since he did not teach any soteriological method except for the need to become aware of the suffering inherent in life as we normally live it and experience it, his soteriology was confined to a theoretical view and hence could not lead to any kind of liberation.

The system expounded here differs from Schopenhauer’s in that it keeps the metaphenomenological epoche, is far more clear and precise than the latter and avoids its contradictions, and responds to the needs of our time (which among other things implies prizing rather than disparaging the female element).

Kierkegaard established a contrast between the fear having a specific, identifiable object, on the one hand, and dread, on the other—which he viewed as an objectless fear or anxiety, but which he defined as a fear of nothing which in fact is a fear of Nothing (or somehow a fear of nonbeing)—and which therefore has this Nothing or nonbeing as its object. The dread of The Concept of Dread (Kierkegaard, 1970) is not so different from the despair of The Sickness unto Death (in Kierkegaard, 1968), for both force the individual to realize that he or she confronts a void and that he or she is responsible for his or her own sick, sinful condition. Despair, in particular, leads the individual to recognize that the reason for despair is not the contingent fact that is believed to be its cause, but the fact that one confronts an emptiness that cannot be filled by aesthetic pleasure or ethical rule-following.

Schopenhauer has been routinely characterized as atheist, pantheist and panentheist; however, I think the best categorization of his thought may be the one that in terms of which Buddhism is characterized: that of “nonheist.” Schopenhauer did not posit a God, yet viewed mystical experience as fundamental—to the extent of viewing the Will’s extinction in nirvana, as somehow the telos of human life. At any rate, the German thinker considered explanations of mystical experiences in theistic terms to be outright wrong, and criticized the German idealist philosophers on the grounds that their systems were based on Christian dogmas.

In Fear and Trembling (in Kierkegaard 1968) the author relates fear and trembling to the need to take a Sprung or Springet—i.e., a leap—to the religious realm, which would involve a “teleological suspension of the ethical,” but which, in the identity he adopted in this book, he simply cannot understand, and which would be impossible for him to take. Let it be clear that this “leap” does not amount to the dissolution of individual will in the power of God resulting in a state of Grace, as in the case of the great Christian mystics, or the sheer dissolution of the illusion of individuality, as in the case of Buddhist, Shaiva, Taoist and Sufi mystics, or in that of Schopenhauer’s dissolution of the Will in the ineffable condition of nirvana, but in Abraham’s deed of obeying God’s order to sacrifice his own son, which “determined his relation to the universal through his relation to the absolute”—"the universal” being here an ethical category, “the absolute” being religious, and the issue being the way the particular (i.e. Abraham) relates to the absolute (the final word/God). (Note that in the identity he adopted in this book, Kierkegaard makes it clear that, unlike the case of Abraham, he does understand Socrates’ sacrifice upon drinking the hemlock, for Socrates’ act is one of “infinite resignation,” resignation being “the last step before faith”, which in the case of Socrates involves renunciation of life as an outcome of philosophy rather than religion, for it results from hours of
reflection proving the immortality of the soul, leading him to his death is not an end, but only a
release. However, he emphasizes the Sprung or Springet precisely in that it is beyond the human
capacity to understand or decide on the basis of reflection.)

Therefore, Kierkegaard’s view is altogether different from the one expounded in this book, according
to which the answer to the human problem is the spontaneous liberation (i.e. the spontaneous
dissolution) of the mental subject in the mystical unveiling of the Self-qua-Base. Both views differ
from Sartre’s in that the French author is explicit in that despair, Angst and so on cannot be
surpassed, so that there is no alternative to eluding them by means of bad faith (and Heidegger
seems to implicitly hold a similar view).

I say Kierkegaard’s view is not soteriological insofar as I am understanding the term soteros in the
sense of “liberation” during life rather than in that of the “salvation” of the soul after death.

Among the Christian authors in question, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel and Louis Lavelle are included.
However, according to Louis Lavelle, anguish is only one aspect of the emotion of existence that gives
access to being: there is also a positive phase of this emotion, which is the émerveillement d’exister.

In “Contribution to the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” (1914), Freud noted that Otto Rank had
pointed to him a passage from Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation in which, in the
context of an explanation of madness, there was a reference to our repulsion to admit the painful aspects
of reality; Freud then acknowledged that he was able to “discover” the concept of repression because of
his failure to read Schopenhauer—who, like Freud, viewed the human individual as being moved by deep-
lying tendencies, urges or drives of which we are very often wholly unaware, while we continue to think
of ourselves as rational, free agents, and who noted that “consciousness is the mere surface of the mind, of
which, as of the earth, we do not know the inside but only the crust.” Furthermore, Freud admitted to have
taken the term “inhibition” from Nietzsche (whom he reported not to have read) to approach a mechanism
coinciding with his concept of repression.

Thus Freud, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche shared the idea that there is a source for many of the human acts,
which is other than consciousness. However, they were not the only ones who: the general concept that
Freud named “repression” was common in German nineteenth century philosophy, and was used by some
psychologist before Freud (Roudinesco & Plon [1997] tell us it was first used by Johann Friedrich Herbart
and later on by Theodor Meynert, one of Freud’s teachers; however, there were also British psychologists,
medical doctors and naturalists who developed the notion—including William Hamilton, H. Maudsley,
and W. B. Carpenter).

Furthermore, notions that somehow prefigured the Freudian conception of the unconscious have manifested
all through the history of philosophy: we find them in Plotinus, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas,
Ralph Cudworth, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johan Georg Hamman, Johann
Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Johann Paul Friedrich (the humorist Jean-Paul) Richter, Carl Gustav
Carus, Gustav Fechner, Eduard von Hartmann (who in 1868 published the work, renowned in the last
decades of the nineteenth century, Philosophy of the Unconscious). In the field of psychology, Theodor
Lipps, in the 1883 book The Principles of Psychic Life, developed this concept to such extent that in 1898
Freud wrote to Fliess “I have found in Lipps my own principles very clearly expounded, perhaps a bit
better than I would have liked.” However, in the 1899 work The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud defined
his concept of the unconscious in such a way as to distinguish it from that of philosophers and that of
Lipps. Then, in the 1915 works on metapsychology Freud (1963) ceased viewing the unconscious as
being instituted by repression and admitted that whatever manifested in the code of primary process was
and had to remain unconscious.

Though an authoritative, exhaustive study of the history of the unconscious before Freud does not seem to
have been produced, Whyte (1962) provides a most useful introduction to this history.

Freud used the word Trieb (which had precedents in Nietzsche, and, according to Roudinesco & Plon
[1997], p. 883, also had precedents in the psychiatric theories of Karl Wilhelm Ideler [1795-1860] and
Heinrich Wilhelm Neumann [1814-1884]), which implied the concept of a thrust, to refer to the drives or
urges proper to humans, and reserved the work Instinkt for what he regarded as “animal components.” In
his monumental translation of the complete works of Sigmund Freud called Standard Edition or SE
(Freud [1953-1974]), the British psychoanalyst James Strachey overlooked the linguistic distinctions
Freud himself made, seemingly in order to be faithful to the Freudian idea of an articulation between
psychoanalysis and biology. However, by so doing he made Freud’s work less sophisticated and vulnerable to criticisms that he did not really deserve.

For his part, Jung only used the term Instinkt, making no difference between thrusts in general and thrusts that depend on “animal components.”

Freud’s first topic, which he maintained between 1900 and 1920, distinguished between three topoi, which were the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious. Freud’s second topic, which he maintained between 1920 and 1939, distinguished between three topoi, which were the id, the ego and the superego. Popular explanations of Psychoanalysis often make the superego somehow correspond to the preconscious (or unconscious’ preconscious aspect), the ego somehow corresponds to the conscious, and the id somehow corresponds to the unconscious; however, this is far from being correct. Just one example: though in the early Freudian constructions the ego corresponded to the conscious, the transformation of the conception of ego as a result of the clinical analysis of mourning and melancholy led Freud to progressively abandon the conception of an equivalence between the ego and the conscious, replacing it for the idea of an ego to a considerable degree unconscious, which was divided, as one of its aspects seemed to detach itself from it in order to observe and then judge the rest.

As seen in a previous note, in Freud’s early works, the unconscious was the product of repression, and so it was paradoxical that repression was generally attributed to the unconscious: before there was repression there was not any topos that could be the agent of repression, and therefore repression could not have come into being. Furthermore, initially Freud did not specify that repression was the work of a specific region of the unconscious; however, quite early it became clear that repression was to be viewed as the work of a specific region of the unconscious: in the fifth section of chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams (1899 / 1900), Freud described repression as a dynamic process associated with the preconscious, which in his view is the aspect of the unconscious that functions in terms of secondary process:

“We firmly hold (this is the key to the theory of repression) that the second system [secondary process] can only invest a representation (i.e. to get hold of it in order to lead it to the unconscious) when it is capable of inhibiting the displeasure that may ensue.”

Then in 1915, in the five metapsychological exposés that he intended to publish together with seven other works and which were published as General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology, Freud (1963) ceased viewing the unconscious as instituted in its entirety by repression, and admitted that whatever manifested in the code of primary process was and had to remain unconscious—thus giving rise to the partial identification of the unconscious with primary process referred to in the regular text (which, as we have seen, excludes the “unconscious’ preconscious aspect,” which worked in terms of secondary process). Concerning the first of these points he wrote:

“All that is repressed must necessarily continue to be unconscious, but from the very beginning we want to point out that the repressed does not coincide with all that is unconscious. The unconscious has a greater extension; the repressed is one part of the unconscious.”

Thus we can see that these so-called topoi are conceived as self-existent regions or even entities. Repression is for Trieb (drive or urge; in Strachey’s translation, “instinct”) and its representatives “a point midway between flight [appropriate response to external excitations] and condemnation [which would be privative of the superego]. Finally, he distinguishes three different moments constitutive of repression: (1) Repression properly speaking, or repression qua deferred action; (2) originary repression; and (3) the return of the repressed in the formations of the unconscious.

At the time of the second topic, repression is linked to the unconscious aspect of the ego. In this sense, Freud can say that the repressed fuses with it, as that part of the ego. In The Ego and the Id he writes:

“The repressed is not sharply separated from the ego except for the resistances of repression, whereas it can communicate with it through the id.”

However, it is clear that though this repression is linked to the unconscious aspect of the ego, it is associated with the ego ideal, which in Freud’s later works was to a great extent replaced by the superego, but which important psychoanalysts still distinguish from the latter, to the extent of illustrating the difference between them in terms of the carrot and the stick: the ego ideal is compared to the carrot, whereas the superego is related to the stick (cf. Washburn, 1995). (After a process of conceptual elaboration of this concept that began in 1914 in the article “Introduction to Narcissism,” the concept of “superego” was posited in the work of 1923, The Ego and the Id. Its essence was expressed in 1924 in the phrase “Kant’s categorical imperative is… the direct heir of the Oedipus complex.”)
In *The Ego and the Id*, the superego was still not so clearly differentiated from the ego ideal, but was considered unconscious, as was a great deal of the ego. In 1930, in *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* or *Malaise in Civilization* (*Civilization and its Discontents*), the superego was a censor that social instances delegated before the ego. It was in 1933, in the 31st Conference of Introduction to Psychoanalysis, that he explained the genesis of the superego as being co-relative to the burial of the Oedipal structure. Originally, the superego is represented by parental authority, which established the rhythm of infantile evolution by alternating proofs of love and punishments, which generate anguish (insofar as one must choose the behaviors that will elicit rewards rather than those that may elicit punishments). In a second period, when the child renounces Oedipal satisfaction, he internalizes the external prohibitions. Then the superego replaces the parental instance by means of identification with the criteria in terms of which the parents dispense punishments and rewards. Freud made it clear that the development of the superego is different in males and females, but this goes beyond the aims of this book.

As will be noted below in the regular text of this section, this ideal of adaptation is actually Freudian, rather than being an idiosyncrasy of Ego-Psychology and Anna Freudism.

When we speak of the human entity, we may be referring to: (1) human “consciousness;” (2) the entity consisting in the combination of body, voice, mind, qualities and activities; (3) the entities that arise when consciousness becomes one or more of the aspects of the second of the entities listed here; etc. (for a longer list see Capriles [1986]). With regard to (3), consider the following: if at some point some part of our body becomes paralyzed and we try to move it, we feel we are the mental subject that is trying to move the body and the body is the object we are trying to move: at the time we are the mental subject and we are not the body. However, when we see our body’s reflection in a mirror we feel we are the body. If we try to achieve a state without thought we may feel we are the mental subject who is trying to stop the flow of thoughts, and the thoughts are the objects we are trying to stop: at the time we are the mental subject and we are not the thoughts. However, when we think our own name we feel we are this thought. Etc.

The point is that, though the phenomenon which is the core of our being is the being of the mental subject, we do not always experience ourselves solely as the mental subject, and though we refer to ourselves as “an entity,” we are not a single phenomenon, but a combination of phenomena—and, furthermore, these phenomena are not always the same. Another example to prove this is the food we eat, the water we drink and the air we breath: before we assimilate them, we experience them as being external to and other with regard to ourselves, but when we have assimilated them they have become part of what we experience as ourselves; then we exhale or go to the toilet, and a fraction of what was part of ourselves is no longer so. Etc.

Thus when we view the human entity as a stable unity, we are under delusion.

Heidegger did not explicitly refute Freud, as Sartre did later on; his refutation is implicit in the way he explained elusion of the uncanny or disturbing.

However, in the 1899 work *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1983), which belongs to this period, Freud established that the unconscious’ preconscious aspect, which functioned in terms of secondary process, was the agent of repression. This implies that in his views of this period Freud assumed the preconscious to be prior to the genesis of the unconscious, even though the preconscious was an aspect of the unconscious, for otherwise it could not have carried out its function before an unconscious was produced by the recurrent repression of contents.

What Freud called suppression (Ger. *Unterdrückung*; Fr, *répression*) would be a suppression that we do not have to elude in the very act of suppression, whereas what he called repression (Ger. *Verdrängung*; Fr. *refoulement*) would be a suppression that we do have to elude in the very act of suppression and that therefore here it has to be redefined as an instance of what Sartre called bad faith. Thus though we cannot keep the Freudian concept of repression insofar as we do not admit the Freudian view that elusion is the function of a preconscious, we must still distinguish between this the actual phenomenon Freud thus misrepresented and the actual phenomenon he called suppression.

As noted in Vol. I of this book, subtle thoughts are those that the Dzogchen teachings—and in a Mahāyāna context, ācāryas Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—call universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories (my translation of the Sanskrit term *arthaśāmāṇya* (Tib. dönchi [don spyī]), responsible for out instantaneous, mute comprehension of the essence of sense data or of the latter’s reproduction by the imagination in the form of mental images, coarse thoughts and so on, thus being responsible for conceptual knowledge and perception, including, (a) what Descartes, Locke and
other Western philosophers and epistemologists called “intuitive knowledge” (including the one that, according to both the Dzogchen teachings and some Western, twenty century epistemologists, occur repetitively in discursive thinking, allowing us to grasp the meaning of the reproduction of the sound of words by the imagination), but which, contrarily to the view of Descartes, rather than being a source of indubitable truth, if taken to be true give rise to delusion, and (b) what Locke called “sensitive knowledge,” which H. H. Price and others call “recognition,” and which is responsible for sensory perception.”

Subtle thoughts, called universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories (Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib. dönchi [don spyi]). In the view of non-Gelug schools and vehicles, general configurations or general collections of characteristics of this particular kind incorporate the meaning that a given society attributes to the specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics they reproduce, and hence subsequently serving to interpret and experience phenomena of the same kind—which, as noted in the discussion of specifically characterized phenomena, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics, so long as conceptual perception prevails, after the initial instant of presentation will no longer be perceived directly, for that which will be perceived will be the general configuration or general collection of characteristics in terms of which we interpret them, which in this case will involve a meaning, as the general configuration or general collection of characteristics experienced will be one of the subtle thoughts discussed in this paragraph—i.e., a universal concept of an entity [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category—and as such it will necessarily convey a meaning. (However, understanding in terms of a universal concept of an entity [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category does not occur solely in the moment immediately following the sensory perception [Greek, aisthesis: ἀισθήσις] of a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics, as it also may arise immediately after a coarse thought that is a word sound pattern [resulting from mental syntheses] that is an audio category in order to establish the latter’s meaning, and immediately after a mental image arising in fantasy [for the same purpose], and so on [the mental image’s raw material being, according to non-Gelug Sūtrayāna understanding, a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics]. To conclude, and most important, among phenomena of the imputational nature and hence among contents of the consciousness of defilements, the thoughts discussed in this paragraph are the ones that are directly responsible for the activation of defilements.

In the twentieth century the working of primary process was identified with the working of the right cerebral hemisphere. However, experiments carried out in 2000 showed that in special instances (say which) the left hemisphere can carry out the functions corresponding to primary process, and the right hemisphere can carry out the functions corresponding to secondary process.

According to Nietzsche (1888), who in this regard takes Euripides as a paradigm, in all productive men instinct is the truly creative and affirming power, and consciousness acts as a critical and cautioning reaction. In Nietzsche’s view, the opposite was the case with Socrates, in whom the instinct became the critic and consciousness became the creator—which in his view is truly a monstrous defect.

Though this was not so in the Project of 1895, which was previous to Psychoanalysis and therefore to the first topic, in another note it was pointed out that in 1915, in the five metapsychological exposés that he intended to publish together with seven other works and which were published as General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology, Freud ceased viewing the unconscious as in its entirety instituted by repression, and admitted that whatever manifested in the code of primary process was and had to remain unconscious (which, however, though Freud failed to acknowledge this, is so only in “normal” civilized individuals in “ordinary states of consciousness”). However, this should not lead us to conclude that Freud identified the “unconscious” with primary process: as shown above in the regular text, he also posited a “preconscious” aspect of the “unconscious” that worked in secondary process and that was responsible for repression. WHATEVER MANIFESTED IN THE CODE OF PRIMARY PROCESS IS REPEATED; IS THIS NOTE REPETED?)

For example, initially we are aware of the fantasies that manifest in primary process, but this awareness is fleeting insofar as immediately secondary process arises to reflect critically on them. For example, before a very authoritative and despotic teacher or professor, a pupil may be consciously aware of a fleeting fantasy in which he beats the teacher or professor; however, if the superego deems this fantasy inadmissible and thus demands that it be turned into unconscious
phantasy (this concept will be discussed in a subsequent chapter of the regular text), it will be immediately forgotten together with the fact that something was forgotten.

Now imagine that what manifests is a feeling that we cannot admit in ourselves insofar as it contradicts our own sense of identity. If this feeling has to do with a primary process relations with another individual, the moment secondary process manifests the feeling may attributed to the other individual, and so a stable secondary process conscious experience manifests in which we experience the feeling as being the other individual’s.

Hey, I am not sure this should go here, and if it goes the examples must be greatly improved!!! And, on the contrary, may even allow us to feel justified in acting out the impulses that manifested. For example, in the case of feelings of hostility, or in the case of erotic feelings a man may wants to feel justified in acting our for raping a woman, etc. In the first case, when the feeling of hostility arises, the individual attributes it to the other he or she wants to feel justified in attacking; when erotic feelings arise, the man attributes them to an invitation of the woman so as to feel justified in advancing her and should she refuse the advances, in sexually attacking her; etc.

The Yogachara School is based solely on the canonical texts of the Third Dharmachakra; the other three schools mentioned in the regular text are based on both those of the Second Dharmachakra and those of the Third Dharmachakra. Cf. Capriles (2004), the definitive, revised and corrected version of which will soon be available in print.

Alaya means “abode,” “house” or “dwelling” (as in “Himalaya,” formed by the combination of alaya and himal or “snow” and hence meaning “abode of snow”), and also “asylum,” “receptacle” or “storehouse.” The word is formed by the combination of the privative a (Indo-European prefix existent also in Greek and, as a derivative from this language, in many other European languages), and, according to one source, laya, meaning dissolution and deriving from the verbal root li, “to dissolve.”

Though the multiple meanings of the term alaya viññana were not the same in all of the schools or systems listed above, in general these schools assert the deep-lying processes that we cannot be aware of but that are the source of all conscious contents to take place in an alaya viññana. However, there is no need to posit an alaya viññana or an unconscious to account for those operations whereby we are aware of objects, but of which we cannot be aware (which Alan Watts illustrated with the example of a TV set, and which may also be illustrated with that of a personal computer, for if the operations necessary for the images to appear on the screen had to appear on the screen, no place on it for the images that must appear on it would be left—or else there would be so many irrelevant contents in the screen that they would always have to be ignored, and so only the images of which we must be conscious would be consciously perceived, so that, since the screen represents whatever is consciously perceived, only the latter would be “in the screen”). Nor is it necessary to posit such an alaya viññana or an unconscious to account for the operations that regulate our hearts’ beatings and other physiological processes, etc. (which, had we to be conscious of them for them to function, we would die immediately insofar as conscious awareness cannot control so many different operations at a time). In fact, all of these operations are unconscious in a sense similar to that in which we are unconscious of sensa that at a given time are not part of their sensory continuum—and hence to posit an unconscious in this regard is as unnecessary as positing it with regard to the sensa that at a given time are not part of their sensory continuum (which could only make sense on the grounds of a metaphysical theory positing a single awareness, and claiming that all that manifests in the experience of each human being is part of the contents of the single universal mind or awareness—a view that some might take to be implicit in the Yogachara interpretation of the concept of alaya viññana).

Is the alaya viññana, like Freud’s unconscious, both the agent of the exclusion of contents outside the scope of conscious awareness, and the “place” where these contents are confined? We have seen that Northern Buddhist traditions assert, and that observation of our own experience ratifies, that we human beings are always deceiving ourselves, rather than being deceived by a power external to our conscious awareness (insofar as the Yogachara School claims all manifestations of consciousness to be transformations of the alaya viññana, it is entitled to ultimately attribute to the latter all human acts, including self-deception; however, since self-deception is carried out by conscious awareness, it could not be attributed to a Freudian “unconscious” any more than any other of the actions that seem to be carried out by the mental subject). As to whether or not disturbing or ego-dystonic contents are confined to the alaya viññana, though so far as I know no Buddhist school ever considered this matter, the claim that, after doubly negating contents, these do not continue to unremittingly surface in our consciousness so as to prevent us
from concentrating on anything else, because they are confined to the alaya vijñana, does not seem far-fetched. However, the concept of alaya vijñana is not necessary for explaining these phenomena, either.

The six sensory vijñanas or namshe (rnam shes), often called the “six consciousness,” are the capacities for awareness of the five senses acknowledged by Western science and philosophy and common sense, plus the capacity for awareness of our own mental states (i.e., of dang [gdangs] energy or, which is the same, of the internal dimension or jing [dbyings] this mode of manifestation of energy conforms after tsel [rtsal] energy manifests). They have been interpreted as modes of awareness of a single vijñana or namshe, and this interpretation is the one that has been best received in the West due to the translation of the Sanskrit and Tibetan terms as “consciousness.”

Each instant of knowledge is comparable to a perfectly elastic billiard ball that, upon being hit by the former ball, were impelled with the whole of the force transmitted to it without losing any as a result of the absorption of the shock or of friction with the air or the table—hitting the next, which would equally be impelled with the whole of the force... Since each instant is comparable to a different ball, there is no continuous substantial entity, and yet there is a perfect sequence of balls that may be differentiated from all other sequences of balls and that is responsible for the illusion of continuity of the individual psyche. The energy of the sequence of balls may represent the force of karman, and as karman is transmitted from one ball to the next so are the vasanas or bijas associated with it—which form a perfect continuity without there being an entity that continues.

If we wish to explain the arising of samsara in more precise language, we may do so in terms of the three stages described in Capriles (2004; cf. the upcoming definitive version) and below in the regular text of this book, which successively produce birth in the three spheres of samsara (as stated in the note in question, if at any of these stages we let go of the drives that give rise to delusion, the development of samsara will be interrupted, but otherwise the corresponding samsaric realm will become established). Though the description of these three stages, which is exclusive to the Dzogchen teachings, may seem to some extent similar to the one carried out by the Yogacharas in terms of three “transformations” discussed in the immediately following note, the Dzogchen description, beside being far more precise, does not involve unwarranted metaphysical abstractions, hypostatizations or reifications, for it is carried out in the metaphenomenological way typical of Dzogchen. To begin with, an a priori consciousness of the base-of-all that then will go through three transformations is not gratuitously posited; an experiential development is described, starting from the condition of ignorance of the true condition of the Base as such (i.e. as ignorance of the true nature of both ourselves and the universe) called the base-of-all—in which, however, there is as yet no consciousness and therefore no dualism. As we have seen, the sudden shining forth of the ngowo aspect of the Base disrupts the dimension of the base-of-all, and only after this has happened there may arise the consciousness of an indeterminate, apparently total object, and thereafter the readiness to perceive that the Dzogchen teachings refer to as the consciousness of the base-of-all, etc.

In fact, Vasubandhu’s summary of Yogachara thought, the Trimshika (Tib. Sum chupa [sum cu pa]), explains the process that gives rise to the samsaric world of objects in terms of three “transformations of the experiencing process” (Skt. parinama; Tib. gyur [gyur]) whereby the consciousness of the base-of-all becomes increasingly conditioned and thus “gradually solidifies into the subject-object dichotomy.” The first transformation, whereby the consciousness of the base-of-all (and therefore the structuring of all experience) is modified by a process of habituation that conditions the experience of the present in the light of the past, gives rise to the awareness of being in an as yet unspecified situation. The second transformation, is explained in terms of a duplication of consciousness: it is said to consist in the formation of the seventh stratum, corresponding to the ego-centered consciousness or consciousness of passions, which is no more than a specification or transformation of the consciousness of the base-of-all, and which takes this consciousness of the base-of-all, which is no more than a momentary flow wherein the habituation tendencies are “built up” and “discharged,” to be an enduring, substantial entity, and considers it to be “one’s own self.” As K. Lipman (1983/1986, pp. 14-15) has noted, this shows that the basis of the delusive experience of “me, myself” that results from the second transformation, is the consciousness of the base-of-all, which after the first transformation became the “anonymously functioning,” prepersonal, fundamental structuring of all experience. Finally there comes about the third transformation, which consists in the development of ego-centered perception by means of the next six strata: the mode of consciousness that perceives thoughts and “internal” mental experiences, or “consciousness of thoughts” (Skt. manoviñana; Tib. yikyi namshe [yid kyi rnam shes]), plus the five modes of consciousness that perceive the data of the five so-called “external” senses or “consciousnesses
of the five senses” (Skt. pañchadwarajñana; Tib. gon-ki nam-shes). Thus Vasubandhu concludes: “nothing exists for ordinary people and noble ones apart from the continuum of their own experiencing.”

However, two important facts concerning the consciousness of the base-of-all must be emphasized: (1) The true nature of this consciousness and therefore of the whole of reality is the absolute nature that this school calls thatness (Skt. tathata; Tib. dezhinnyi [de bzhin nyid]), which explains why, as stated in the Vijñanamatra Shastra, the nirvana-qua-Base that is possessed by all sentient beings (even though they fail to realize it), is inherent in the consciousness of the base-of-all and corresponds to the “unchanging absolute truth”—a type of nirvana, corresponding to the dharmakaya-qua-Base, which is the first of the four types of nirvana posited by the Shastra. (2) The consciousness of the base-of-all is not solely the root of samsara; it is also the source of the “incontrovertible absolute truth” which, according to this school, results from the purification of this consciousness as it is restored to its original simplicity and radiant transparency, so that the absolute consisting in thatness (tathata) becomes fully evident in a nondual manner, and which subdivides into the three remaining types of nirvana posited by the Shastra, all of which are types of nirvana-qua-Fruit, which correspond to the three types of fruit of the Buddhist Paths of the Sutrayana: (a) upadhisthesha nirvana, which is a nirvana in which some residue is left; (b) anupadhisthesha nirvana, or nirvana without a residue; and, (c) the nirvana of the Mahayana, attained only by the Buddhas (and not by the Arhats of the Hinayana), which is the absolute nirvana that has as its aim the benefit of others.

This is the interpretation the Mahamadhyamaka and Madhyamaka Zhentongpa (dbu ma gzhon stong pa) makes of Prasangika philosophy, which has been defended by a series of philosophers-mystics ranging from the eighth Karmapa, Mikyo Dorje (mi bskyod rdo rje), to Ju Mipham (’ju mi pham ’jam dbyangs rnam rgyal). I refer specifically to scientific theses that seem plausible because, as will be shown in vol. III of this book, science does not discover (or at least so far does not seem to have discovered) what we call “hard facts” or “objective truth,” and indeed it should be regarded as ideology. However, the fact that “scientific [conventional] truth” does not necessarily reflect (or, even less so, reflect exactly) a supposedly objective structure and function of reality does not imply that it should not be admitted by Madhyamaka; the contents of ordinary everyday experience being impossible to establish as true, the difference between these and science is not so huge, and therefore, insofar as the sciences work to some extent, Madhyamaka should attribute some validity to scientific conventional truth—and, in the case of scientific conventional truth that is as self-evident as ordinary everyday experience, it should grant it the same degree of validity as the latter.

Notice: The following is the reproduction of a note to the Introduction to this book, which is part of vol. I: The assertion that the Madhyamaka may involve positing “autonomous” theses and syllogisms does not imply that the present book is written from the standpoint of the Madhyamaka Swatantrika (Tib. Uma Ranggyupa [dbu ma rang rgyud pa]) school. In fact, the Inner, Subtle Madhyamaka (Tib. Nang trawai uma [nang phra ba’i dbu ma]) in general and the Mahamadhyamaka (Tib. Uma chenpo [dbu ma chen po]) School in particular, just like the Dzogchen teachings, reject the Swatantrika views on voidness of self-existence and so on, and coincide with those of the Madhyamaka Prasangika (Uma Thalgyupa [dbu ma thal ’gyur pa])—and yet they posit “autonomous” theses and syllogisms. However, they make it clear that they do not do so as “interior-directed assertions” (Tib. rang rgyud du khes len pa) or assertions the propounder believes, but as what the Prasangikas call “other-directed” or “exterior-directed assertions” (Tib. gzhon ngo khas len) or assertions the propounder does not believe, making them as skillful means to lead others on the Path.

The Prajñāparamitashastra, unlike the texts conforming the Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings (Skt. Yuktikāya; Tib. Rigtsog [rigs tshogs] or Uma rigtsog [dbu ma rigs tshogs]), which are universally attributed to Nagarjuna, posits some autonomous theses and syllogisms, and some of its views seem to some extent similar to those of the Madhyamika Swatantrikas. However, the text in question makes it very clear that whatever an Awake individual posits is posited without what Chandrakirti called “own-mind” and as an “other-directed” or “exterior-directed assertion;” the Awake individual does not believe what He or She says, but says it as an expedient means for leading sentient beings of specific capacities to Awakening. This is a view rejected by the Swatantrikas and accepted both by the Prasangikas and the adherents of the Inner, Subtle Madhyamaka (Tib. Nang trawai uma [nang phra ba’i dbu ma]), and in particular by the Mahamadhyamikas. Thus despite the fact that it is not easy to assess the authenticity or
unauthenticity of the *Prajñaparamitāśāstra*, one thing is certain with regard to it: it was not concocted by late followers of the Madhyamika Swatantrika subschool.

Nagarjuna’s *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* (Skt. *Yuktikāya*; Tib. *Rigs sogs [rigs tshogs]* or *Uma rigs sogs [du ba rigs tshogs]*) is seen as the source of Swabhava Shunyata Madhyamaka or Uma Madhyamaka, which comprises the Madhyamaka Prasangika and Madhyamaka Swatantrika schools, whereas Nagarjuna’s *Collection of Eulogies* (Skt. *Stavakāya*; Tib. *Tōtsoṅ [bsloat tshogs]*) and in particular the *Eulogy to the Expanse of the True Condition* (Skt. *Dharmadhatustava*; Tib. Chöjyin Töopa *chos dbyings bsloat pa*) is seen as the source of the Inner, Subtle Madhyamaka (Tib. Nang trawai uma (*nang phra ba’i du ma*), which comprises the Parashunya Madhyamaka or Uma Zhentongpa (*du ba gzhan stong pa*) and the Mahamadhyamaka schools. Tibetans do not include the *Prajñaparamitāśāstra* in any of these two categories insofar as the book is not included in the Tibetan Buddhist Canons; however, if the work were truly by Nagarjuna, it could perhaps be seen as the source of *some of the views* of the Madhyamaka Swatantrika. However, insofar as it combines autonomous theses and syllogisms with the insistence that no thesis should be clung to, and that Awake Ones posit theses without own-mind, merely as other-directed assertions that may be useful to treads of the Path, it could be seen also as one of the sources of Mahamadhyamaka. In fact, in this case the *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* as it is known and conserved in Tibet would be mainly the source of Prasangika.

Hui-neng’s method of interrelated opposites (described in Capriles, 2004 and others of my works), which is at the root of many intellectual skillful means of Ch’ an and Zen Buddhism, insofar as it is based on the understanding that Buddhas have no own-mind and all they say are other-directed assertions having the function of leading beings to Awakening, would be based, among other sources, both in the *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* and in the *Prajñaparamitāśāstra*.

44 Venkata Ramanan (1966) writes:

The understanding that is the consummate point of criticism is appreciative of the unique nature and value of every specific standpoint, and yet is not confined to any point of view. This is a comprehensive understanding inclusive of the several standpoints on the same level as well as of the different levels of understanding. Levels and perspectives need to be distinguished and this distinction needs to be appreciated as a relative distinction and not an absolute division. This comprehensive understanding is sought to be conveyed in the philosophy of the Middle Way by *prajñā...* (p. 40)

The rejection of views which is an essential point in the philosophy of the Middle Way means that no specific view, being a view, is ultimate. The ultimate truth is not any “view.” “Silence is the ultimate truth for the wise (Sarvopalahopashamah prapañchopashamah shivah; na kwachit kasyacht kashchit dharma buddhena deshitaḥ: Karika, XXV:24).” And yet, the ultimate truth can be and needs to be expressed from the mundane standpoint. (p. 41)

...*drishti* (view) itself could be either wrong (*mithya*) or right (*samyak*) depending on whether it is clinging or free from clinging... [However, in the above passage, as always when] *drishti* [is] not qualified by *samyak*... [it] stands for false or wrong view. (p. 342, note 92)

To conclude, it must be noted that the *Atharvagīyasutra* (quoted in the *Prajñaparamitāśāstra*, 60c-61a; translation in Venkata Ramanan, 1966, pp. 128-129) reads:

Everyone takes stand on his own view and by his own constructions gives rise to disputes; “To know this is to know the truth,” he holds, “and not to know this is to be condemned.”

[Truly] one who does not accept the view of another is devoid of wisdom. He who clings to his own construction is devoid of wisdom.

To stand on one’s own view of truth and give rise to false constructions, if this is pure wisdom, then there is none who does not have it.

45 In the canonical texts of the Third Promulgation and the schools based on them, the terms *swasamvittih* and *swasamvedana* (Tib. *rang rig*) refer to what has been translated as awareness of consciousness, but which, as I show in this volume, as well as in Capriles (2003), is only understood correctly when it is explained to consist in nondual, nonthetic, nonpositional, nonreflective awareness (of) consciousness of object, in which, following Sartre, the preposition “of” goes in parenthesis to indicate that it is a requisite of language but that its usage betrays the true nature of what is being described insofar as “awareness of” implies a dualistic relation of knowledge, which does not exist in this case, for rather than being an object to nondual awareness, consciousness manifests in this awareness like a reflection in a mirror: though the reflection is not the mirror, it is not at a distance from the mirror, as in human perception are objects from the consciousness that is aware of them, and hence there is no dualistic relation of knowledge between the
mirror and its reflections. In the same way, even though lower Mahayana schools such as the Yogachara failed to understand this correctly, dualistic consciousness manifests in nondual awareness yet is not an object to this awareness that would be in a relation of knowledge with regard to it. At any rate, insofar as in this case svamśamviditiḥ or svamśamvedāna is the nondual awareness (of) a samsaric phenomenon (i.e., [of] dualistic consciousness of object), the term refers to nondual self-awareness-qua-Base, in which samsara has manifested.

In the Dzogchen teachings, svamśamvedana (Tib. rang rig) is most often understood qua Base and qua Fruit, as nondual self-awareness in which no samsaric dualistic phenomenon manifests. Furthermore, this self-awareness is the all-liberating single gnosis or chikshe kundröl (gcig shes kun grol), the patency of which results in the spontaneous liberation of whichever phenomena may manifest in it.

In the schools that make up the Subtle, Inner Madhyamaka (Tib. nang trawai uma [nang phra ba'i dbu ma])—Mahamadhyamaka (Tib. uma chenpo [dbu ma chen po]) and Madhyamaka Zhentongpa (the correct Tibetan term being “Uma Zhentongpa” [dbu ma gzan stong pa]), svamśamvedana (Tib. rang rig) refers both to nondual self-awareness-qua-Base—indelebly of whether of not samsara with its dualistic phenomena are manifest—and to this self-awareness-qua-Path and qua Fruit, but it is not asserted to be an all-liberating gnosis.

The founding fathers of Prasangika upheld many causal and other lower Mahayana views in a stark contrast with the teachings of Atiyogatantrayana, whereas the schools of the inner, subtle Madhyamaka, and in particular Mahamadhyamaka, upheld higher views, far more congruent with those featured in the teachings of Ati Dzogpa Chenpo. In particular, unlike Mahamadhyamaka, the treatises by the founding fathers of Prasangika do not posit a continuity of Base, Path and Fruit like the one posited both in Maitreya’s Ratnagotriṣṭhaga (Uttaratantra) and in the teachings of the Vajrayana, and therefore their view doesn’t make it quite clear that nirvāṇa is not produced by the practices of the bodhisattva, so that the rupakaya is viewed as a product of the accumulation of merits and the dharmakaya as a product of the accumulation of wisdom; as a method, it mainly emphasizes analysis; it involves elements of antisomatism and misogyny; etc. Therefore, a great number of Masters in the Ancient or Nyingmapa tradition, which introduced Dzogchen into Tibet, have stated that Mahamadhyamaka is the “highest” subschool of Madhyamaka and of the Mahayana in general: this subschool encompasses the view of Prasangika, which it places in an ampler framework that includes the totality of the Madhyamaka subschools, showing to which aspect of reality or stage of the Mahayana Path each of them responds, and validating it in its own particular context. (For an explanation of why this is accomplished, see the upcoming definitive version in print of Capriles [2004].)

With regard to the view shared by most texts belonging to the Phalayana (except for some of the so-called “Essence Sutras” of the Third Promulgation and fundamental associated texts such as Maitreyanatha’s Ratnagotriṣṭhaga or Uttaratantra) according to which the rupakaya is a product of the accumulation of merits and the dharmakaya a product of the accumulation of wisdom, which implies that Buddhahood is produced by contrived activities carried out on the Path, it must be objected that all that is produced / caused (Pali bhēta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyepa [skyes pa]), born (Pali and Skt. jata; Tib. kyepa [skyes pa]), or compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated (Pali, sankhāta; Skt. samskrita; Tib. dūjai [‘dus byas]) pertains to samsara and as such is characterized by threefold delusion and by the four true marks of samsara, among which the first three are suffering, impurity, and impermanence, and hence could not represent a definitive solution to suffering—or, far less, could it result in the capacity to help others: Buddhahood and its authentic qualities follow naturally from the complete, irreversible unveiling of the absolute truth that consists in the Buddha-nature containing the three kayas and the totality of the natural qualities of the Awake Ones—including the rupakaya aspect of Buddhahood that is fully active and that deals with countless beings and other phenomena. Dudjom Rinpoche (1991, vol. I, p. 146) writes:

“Whenever a Tathagata manifests his [or her] all-knowing level, the oceans of the myriad realms of the sentient beings who require training and all the distinctive attributes of the means of instruction, which are derived from his [or her] own essence, are but the display of total compassion. All [those requiring training and all means of training] are of a common savor and are spontaneously, effortlessly manifest, disregarding causes and conditions such as the provision of merit accumulated by those requiring training and distinctions of the Conqueror’s aspiration. Therefore, the natural expression of the mind of
all sentient beings, and the all-pervasive natural expression of the true condition, which is the primordial

consciousness of the Buddhhas and the nucleus of the Sugata, are inseparable from each other, without coming and

changing, as the oil that pervades the sesame seed. Enlightened activity is manifest

therein, pervading the fundamental nature of reality, and its uncompounded essence is characteristically

not-impermanent, pervasive and spontaneous.

“It says in the Shradddhabaladhanavataramadrasutra:

“Mañjushri, in all the myriad world systems of the ten directions, all the domains of the extremists and all

the mundane and supramundane activities that occur originate through the spontaneously manifest

primordial gnosis of the Tathagata. If you ask why it is so, it is because it possesses distinct attributes.”

In short, if the whole of the qualities of the Fruit were not inherent in the Base, then the Fruit would be

produced, and as such it would be conditioned and therefore spurious and impermanent. Sakya Pandita

wrote (Sakya Pandita (sas kya pan di ta), Answers to the Questions of Nyemo Gomchen (snyi mo sgom


203):

“In the exclusively empty aspect of mind, the Three Precious Jewels are incomplete. In the coalescence

of awareness and emptiness, the seed [of Buddhahood] is complete, and if the meaning of that coalescence is

well realized, [Buddhahood] is actualized completely.”

This leads beyond the range of the treatises by the founding fathers of Prasangika Madhyamaka into the

teachings of Maitreya’s Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra)—which, however, Tibetans often viewed as a

Prasangika treatise—and the Mahamadhyamaka School, which as advanced above make it clear that a

fruit that is produced / caused (Pali bhêta; Skt. nutpada or nutpatti; Tib. kyeapa [skyes pa]), born (Pali and

Skt. jata; Tib. kyeapa [skyes pa]), or compounded / conditioned / constructed / made / contrived / fabricated

(Pali, sankhata; Skt. samskripta; Tib. dūjai [‘dus byas]), is characterized by threefold delusion and by the four true marks of samsara, among which the first three are suffering, impurity, and

impermanence, and hence could not represent a definitive solution to suffering, or, far less, could it result

in the capacity to help others. Therefore such a fruit is necessarily different from Buddhahood, which is

unproduced / unbecome / uncaused (Pali abhêta; Skt. anutpada, anutpatti; Tib. makyepa [ma skyes pa]),

unborn (Pali and Skt. ajata; Tib. makyepa [ma skyes pa]) and uncompounded / unconditioned / unproduced / unmade / uncontrived (Pali, asankhata; Skt., asamskripta; Tib., dümaje [‘du ma byas]). All

Madhyamaka subschools agree that only the phenomena of samsara, being subject to the incontrovertible

principle of interdependent origination or pratiya samutpada and therefore being mutually conditioned

and interrelated, are sankhata, samskripta or ‘du byas, and as such are characterized by the four marks of

this type of phenomena: (1) production, birth or origination; (2) subsistence; (3) change, and (4)

dissolution or disappearance. According to Mahamadhyamaka, the whole of the phenomena that arise

from the conditioned perception at the root of samsara, are in their innermost nature the uncompounded,

absolutely or ultimately existing nature that is explained as the inseparability of appearances and

emptiness, and which according to this school is free of the “four conditions inherent in all that is

conditioned” listed here. Therefore, it is our perception that is conditioned, and that conditions our

experience of phenomena—which are themselves undivided segments of the uncompounded rupakaya or

“body of form” aspect of our Buddha-nature-qua-Base.

In fact, the provisional (Skt. neyartha; Tib. drangdön [drang don]) texts of the lower vehicles of Buddhism

assert that the rupakaya arises as the product of the accumulation of merits, whereas Mahamadhyamaka

asserts the rupakaya to be inherent in the Buddha-nature-qua-Base, which as we know is the indivisibility

of appearances and emptiness, and therefore this school affirms the rupakaya never to arise or cease, not
to be affected or modified by conditions, and as such to be uncompounded and uncompounded (and, since

all phenomena are aspects of the rupakaya-qua-Base, they are also said to be uncompounded and

uncompounded). Were the rupakaya the product of the accumulation of merits, it would be compounded

and conditioned, and hence subject to dissolution of disappearance (the fourth of the above marks); if this

were so, there would be no Buddhahood and no definitive end of suffering, but only a conditioned and

impermanent samsaric condition falsely appearing to be liberation.

It is the realization of the Buddha-nature in the Contemplation state of the superior bodhisattva that develops

into the Fruit of Buddhahood; not by means of a cause-effect relation, but as though the Contemplation

state of the superior bodhisattva were a hole in the veil made of delusorily valued thoughts concealing the

true condition of the Base, and subsequently this hole spontaneously increased in size until the whole veil
were shredded and nothing concealed the Buddha-nature (it is evident that a whole in a screen is not the cause of the subsequent shredding of the screen, even though it may be the first step toward it).

Nevertheless, I find later interpretations of Freud’s clinical cases to be often more correct than those Freud himself produced. A paradigmatic example of this is Freud’s misinterpretation of the genesis of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber’s derangement, as Freud (who came to know the case through Daniel Paul’s book on his own derangement) failed to relate it to the extremely harsh educative theories of Daniel Paul’s father, Daniel Gottlieb Schreber—a failure emphasized by Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter, who avowed for a Kleinian interpretation of the genesis of Daniel Paul’s derangement. Jacques Lacan attempted his own linguistic-oriented reinterpretation. However, in my view most brilliant is the reinterpretation expressed in Schatzman (1973), which goes beyond the straitjacket of the rigid and normalizing theories of psychoanalysis, and is far more plausible with regard to the genesis of the derangement in question. (Zvi Lothane’s [1992] takes on the title of Schatzman’s book to attempt a full rehabilitation of Daniel Gottlieb Schreber, which is outrageous besides being totally unwarranted.)

As stated in Vol. I of this book, paradigmatic coarse thoughts are those that, in discursive thinking, seem to be somehow pronounced inside our minds. In order to understand them properly, it is necessary to explain some categories shared by the Dzogchen teachings and the Indian pramāṇa (Tib. tsema [ṣhad ma] tradition. According to the Dzogchen teachings, and, in the context of the Sūtraṇāyāna, to the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti and his indirect teacher and inspirer Dignāga, there are two types of entity as such:

1. The particular phenomena they referred to as specifically characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent collections of characteristics (Skt. svalakṣaṇa; Tib. rangtset [rnga mthṣan]), which are real, actual and effective yet impermanent, and which pertain to the what Third Promulgation Sūtras refer to as dependent nature (Skt. paratantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhan dbang]) and the Mahāmādhyamaka philosophical school calls dependent patterns or dependent collections of characteristics (Skt., paratantralakṣaṇa; Tib., zhenwangi tsennyi [gzhan dbang gi mthṣan nyid]). The paradigmatic cases of this class of phenomena—which are so because they are the source of all other cases—are those phenomena that are constituted by that which the Dzogchen teachings call the tsel (rtsal) form of manifestation of energy; however, in the view expressed here, for reasons explained in the following paragraph, mere mental appearances (that as such pertain to the danga [gdangs] form of manifestation of energy and that Tibetan epistemology—an extension of the Indian Buddhist pramāṇa tradition—refers to as reflections [Skt. pratyibimba; Tib. zugnyen; gzugs brnyan] or aspects [Skt. ākāra; Tib. nampa: rnam pa], may also belong to this category. It is also important to keep in mind that in the Dzogchen teachings objects of the consciousness of the base-of-all (Skt. ālayavijñāna; Tib. kunzhidamshe [kun gzhi rnam shes] or kunzhidamparshepa [kun gzhi rnam par shes pa]), when this term, rather than referring to a so-called storage-consciousness, refers to a phenomenon that is a key stage in the arising of samsāra from the base-of-all, are phenomena of this class, which appear as such for an instantaneous moment as they are singled out for perception. And it is even more important to be mindful of the fact that, though these phenomena are said to be real and effective, this does not mean that they are self-existent; contrariwise, being dependently arisen phenomena—which depend on our perception to be singled out and separated from the rest of the sensory field, and even to have the form we perceive them as having—they are utterly empty of self-existence (the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra notes that they are empty of production because they do not arise from their own nature or by their own power, and empty of the absolute because when perceived as dependently arisen phenomena, they evidently conceal the absolute rather than revealing it).

2. The synthetic mental phenomena that they named general configurations or general collections of characteristics (Skt. śāmānyalakṣaṇa; Tib. khiṇtsen [ṣpyi mthṣan]), which are unreal and ineffectual, yet are permanent—and which pertain to that which Third Promulgation Sūtras call imaginary nature (Skt., parikalpita; Tib., kuntag [kun brtags]) and which the Mahāmādhyamaka philosophical school calls imaginary patterns or imaginary collections of characteristics (Skt., parikalpatalakṣaṇa; Tib., kuntagsi tsennyi [kun brtags kyi mthṣan nyid]), as such being the contents of the consciousness of defilements (Skt. klīṣṭamanovijñāna; Tib. nyönyikyi namshe [nyon yid kyi rnam shes], nyönmongkyi yikyi namshe [nyon mong kyi yid kyi rnam shes] or nyonmongpa chengyi yikyi gyi nampar shepa [nyon mong pa can gyi yid kyi rnam par shes pa]) that are responsible for the third type of avidyā in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjam and other Masters and therefore
for all defilements. Moreover, since imputational natures are projections made by the mind on specifically characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent collections of characteristics and as such exist and subsist only in the human mind, they do not subsist by their own nature and thus, as the Samdhinirmocanasūtra makes it clear, they are empty of own-nature. Each of these phenomena initially arises on the basis of the imprint left by the initial perception, right after directly apprehending a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics, of this phenomenon as whatever the individual’s society takes it to be—as such being a model, constructed by mental syntheses (Skt. prapañca; Tib. töpa [spros pa]: mental fabrication), of the specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics in question, rather than being merely the latter’s mental image. In conceptual cognition (a term that Dharmakīrti applied to cognitions involving a phenomenal appearance capable of being conjoined with a linguistic expression) a phenomenon of this kind, which is a mental representation (i.e., a pratībhā or nangwa [snaṅ ba] of the sixth sense, which perceives mental phenomena), is superimposed on a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics of the same type as the one that initially served as its basis, immediately after the phenomenon in question is directly perceived for an instant, and hence it becomes mixed and confused with the latter, in such a way that what is then perceived as that phenomenon is the general configuration or general collection of characteristics. It must be noted that the mental images that are the material basis of these general configuration or general collection of characteristics pertain to the mode of manifestation of energy the Dzogchen teachings call dang (gdangs), and as such may be compared to reflections of the phenomena surrounding a crystal ball that appear inside the latter in a somehow dimmer way (however, this does not mean phenomena of dang energy are always of this kind: as noted above, mere mental appearances, which pertain to this mode of manifestation of energy, may be specifically characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent collections of characteristics—the reasons for this being that [a] they can be apprehended in bare perception for an instant before being replaced by a general configuration or general collection of characteristics, and [b] in many cases they can produce effects). (Taking fire as an example of what was described in this paragraph, when upon perceiving a physical fire [i.e., a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics of fire], one learns that this phenomenon is a fire, a generic image of fire arises that will take part in obscured perception each and every time one intends to perceive, cognize by means of thought, or imagine or visualize a fire.)

Among (2) general configurations or general collections of characteristics, we are concerned with two kinds, the first of which is based on the perception of the sound of words, whereas the second may be based on a perception of any sense whatsoever, namely:

(2A) Those coarse thoughts called word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories, which is my own translation of the Sanskrit term śabdasāmāṇya (Tib. dracht [sgra spyi]), which Dignāga introduced into the Sūtrayāna but which Dharmakīrti did not use, but which is nonetheless widely employed by Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists, as it was introduced into Tibet seemingly through two different avenues: Śāntarakṣitśa introduced it in the context of the Sūtrayāna (being assimilated by practically all Tibetan epistemologists, as they found it indispensable in this field), and shortly thereafter it was reintroduced upon the arrival of the Dzogchen teachings, in which it is a very important concept as well. The material basis of these sound patterns are the acoustic mental images of words, phrases and sentences that take part in discursive thinking and that as such are temporal rather than spatial, which are reproductions by the imagination, on the basis of memory, of models of the acoustic patterns of the sound of words, phrases and sentences (which as such have been divested of the characteristics of an individual’s pronunciation—e.g., of an speaker’s pitch, softness or raspiness of the voice, pronunciation, volume, and so on) that speakers of a particular language have adopted as conventions (Skt. vyavahāra; Tib. thanyé [tha snyad]) to designate phenomena or, in general, to communicate meanings (an exception to this understanding of the term seems to be the Sakya Master Gorampa Sōnam Sengé [go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489], who seems to have understood the term śabdasāmāṇya or dracht as referring to the description of an essence [Thakchoe, 2007, p. 82], and thus roughly as what in Western terms could be called a definition). (In Alexander Berzīn’s [2001] understanding of Dzogchen categories, since these models have been divested of the characteristics of an individual’s pronunciation and thus
are imputable on sounds made in a variety of voices, pitches, volumes, and pronunciations, they are categories—according to him, collection mental syntheses [Tib. tsogchi: tshogs spyī; reconstructed Skt. samudāyasāmāṇya, though one scholar has given us saṅghasāmāṇya] and class mental syntheses [Skt. jātisāmāṇya: Tib. rigchī: rigs spyī]. Thus according to Berzin, word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories, rather than being imputed on the mere mental images of words, phrases, sentences and so on, are imputed on collection mental syntheses and class mental syntheses, thus pertaining to a logical type wholly different logical type than the latter—a view that, as shown in note after next, was objected by Gorampa, who claims that class mental syntheses are not a category different from the one discussed in the following paragraph of this note. Note that in Gelugpa epistemology—and according to Berzin [2001] also in the Dzogchen teachings—collection mental syntheses are the wholes imputed on spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts—such as the whole material entity table imputed on a sensory / spatial flat surface resting on four legs, or the whole word table imputed on the temporal sequence of phonemes that make up the sound pattern table, etc.—whereas class mental syntheses are the type of phenomenon a specific individual item is an instance of—such as for example a material, spatial configuration being validly a table, or a temporal sound pattern being validly the word table. Gorampa’s objection lies on the fact that these imputations are made by the thoughts discussed in the next paragraph, which are the true source of the imputational nature, for as shown below they are that which provide unity to collections of sensations and that understand the resulting unity as this or that entity with these or those characteristics. It is curious that the Dzogchen teachings should coincide with the Gelugpa view on this point, for as a rule the understanding of categories in the Dzogchen teachings diverges from that of the Gelugpa, and in many cases agrees with Gorampa’s.)

(2B) Subtle thoughts, called universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories (Skt. arthasāmāṇya; Tib. döñchi [don spyī]). In the view of non-Gelug schools and vehicles, general configurations or general collections of characteristics of this particular kind incorporate the meaning that a given society attributes to the specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics they reproduce, and hence subsequently serving to interpret and experience phenomena of the same kind—which, as noted in the discussion of specifically characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent collections of characteristics, so long as conceptual perception prevails, after the initial instant of presentation will no longer be perceived directly, for that which will be perceived will be the general configuration or general collection of characteristics in terms of which we interpret them, which in this case will involve a meaning, as the general configuration or general collection of characteristics experienced will be one of the subtle thoughts discussed in this paragraph—i.e., a universal concept of an entity [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category—and as such it will necessarily convey a meaning. (However, understanding in terms of a universal concept of an entity [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category does not occur solely in the moment immediately following the sensory perception [Greek, aisthēsis: αἰσθησις] of a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics, as it also may arise immediately after a coarse thought that is a word sound pattern [resulting from mental syntheses] that is an audio category in order to establish the latter’s meaning, and immediately after a mental image arising in fantasy [for the same purpose], and so on [the mental image’s raw material being, according to non-Gelug Sūtrāyāna understanding, a specifically characterized phenomenon, self-pattern or inherent collection of characteristics]. To conclude, and most important, among phenomena of the imputational nature and hence among contents of the consciousness of defilements, the thoughts discussed in this paragraph are the ones that are directly responsible for the activation of defilements.

As what regards the mere mental appearances of dang energy, in conceptual cognition occurring in imagination, visualization, fantasy, visual memory and so on, they may be spatial, principally visual appearances, or temporal auditory appearances that are word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories—both of which would have in common that, in order to have meaning, they must be understood in terms of a universal concept of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category—or, what is the same, of a subtle thought. Above it was noted that the paradigmatic coarse thoughts are the word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories. Whether or not spatial, mainly visual images (which in the Gelug view—which according to Berzin [2001] is also that of the Dzogchen teachings, though I have not verified
In discursive thinking, coarse thoughts of the kind called word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories may be classified as coarse thoughts, might be a point of contention, for as shown in note after next, Gorampa claimed that class mental syntheses may not be regarded as different from the universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories (Since, as noted above, Berzin [2001] implies that mere collection mental syntheses or class mental syntheses pertain to a wholly different logical type than what the Dzogchen teachings—as Dignāga in the Sūtrayāna—call word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories, he were right it would be illegitimate to place both in the same category—i.e., as coarse thoughts.) In reference to the discursive thoughts, and in general to the use of language and its interpretation, as stated in the preceding note, the reproduction of the sound of words would be mere mental images—reflections (Skt. pratībimba; Tib. zugnyen [gzugs brnyan]) or aspects (Skt. ākāra; Tib. nampa [rnam pa]). However, as in the context of the Sūtrayāna Dignāga made it clear, these are not enough for discursive thinking to be possible. Here the process is explained in terms of the Dzogchen teachings, which posit two categories indispensable for the thought process to be possible: (a) the category that they—and Dignāga in the Sūtrayāna—call word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories (Skt. śabdasāmānya; Tib. drachi [sgra spyi]), and (b) the category they—and Dignāga and Dharmakirti in the Sūtrayāna—called universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories (Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib. dönchi [don spyi]). Both categories were defined in the preceding note, and hence here it is sufficient to add:

(a) With regard to word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories, that unless one was talking to an orthodox brahim (Brāhmaṇa) holding the Vedic belief that meanings are inherent in the Sanskrit language, in our time it would be a platitude to note that no meaning is inherent in them, and that when in audial, temporal cognition—whether in sensory perception or in discursive thinking—mental aspects resembling the sounds of phonemes appear one after another in sequence, in an instant a conceptual mental cognition (i.e., a cognition involving a phenomenal appearance capable of being conjoined with linguistic expression) joins them together, mentally synthesizes the representation of words, phrases, and sentences, and superimposes on them audio categories of words, phrases, and sentences (which according to Berzin’s explanation at this point would have become the material basis of collection mental syntheses [Tib. tsogchi: tshogs spyi; probable Skt. samuḍāyasāmānya, though one scholar has saṅghasāmānya] and class mental syntheses [Skt. jātisāmānya; Tib. rigchi: rigs spyi], but which in Gorampa’s view is not the case, as it is not possible to distinguish between these categories and universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories [cf. the immediately following note]).

(b) In this context, universal concepts of entities [resulting from mental syntheses] that are meaning categories may be said to be patterns of significance of a language sound pattern that has been adopted as the meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence in a particular language by members of a specific society. In order to refute Mīmāṃsā and in general the Vedic belief that meanings are inherent in the Sanskrit language and that the latter is inherently sacred, Dharmakirti, like the Dzogchen teachings, stressed the nowadays commonsensical fact that meanings are not inherent in sounds or words, but are conventionally coined, assigned to words, and used as categories by the members of a society for thinking and communicating—and that even in the same society different people may assign slightly different meaning to a particular word, but still use that meaning as a category when reproducing that word in discursive thinking. Since most conceptual cognitions have a verbal support, as a rule they involve the superimposition of both audio categories and meaning categories onto mental aspects (Skt. ākāra; Tib. nampa: rnam pa). As stated in the preceding note, conceptual cognition, however, may also be nonverbal, in which case it only superimposes onto mental aspects a universal concept of an entity [resulting from mental syntheses] that is a meaning category, such as when visualizing or remembering what someone’s face looks like (according to Berzin [2001], in this case it also superimposes unto it collection mental syntheses and class mental syntheses [defined in the preceding note]; in the view of Gorampa, this is not the case).

In discursive thinking, coarse thoughts of the kind called word sound patterns [resulting from mental syntheses] that are audio categories succeed each other, yet this would not be enough for a line of thought to be meaningful, or even to have its continuity; for the latter to be possible, the patterns / categories in question must alternate with subtle thoughts, or, what is the same, universal abstract
This somehow implicit character of the intuitive, subtle thoughts that are involved in the operations whereby we deceive ourselves by means of what Sartre called bad faith may be interpreted as the not-being-fully-conscious of the concepts in question and of the operations involving them: this might have been what made Freud ascribe these operations to a topos to be called the "preconscious."
However, this fact does not imply the existence of a “preconscious” any more than the fact that when we perceive chairs as chairs and dogs as dogs the intuitive, subtle concepts in terms of which we perceive them do not appear explicitly, but are felt to be somehow implicit.

As shown in Vol. I of this book in terms of Heraclitus fr. 2 DK, and as reiterated in this volume, though it seems that we qua mental subjects are the agents of the actions attributed to us, in a truer sense all is the play of the logos. On the other hand, to say that we are the agents of the actions attributed to us, or that the true agent of these actions is the logos, are views belonging to two different levels of conventional, relative truth—which, as Gendün Chöphel rightly noted (Chöphel 2005) on the basis of the etymology of the Sanskrit term samvriti, is deluded truth, or, as I prefer to say, untruth. In fact, from the standpoint of absolute truth we may not say either that we are the agents of our actions, or that the true agent of our actions is the logos.

In the volume in question it is also shown that the sciences do not arrive at definitive, absolutely universal truths. However, weightier evidence should still lead us to consider that a hypothesis is more likely than another, and to this aim I refer to the evidence provided by paleopathology (Lochouarn, 1993; van der Dennen, 1995; Taylor, 2003, 2005), ethnoecology (Eichler, 1987; Descola, 1996), anthropology and ethnology (Clastres, 1974, 1985, 1987, etc.; Sahlins, 1974 and other works; and many other works by a host of authors); the archaeology of art and of religion (Lommel, undated; Cauvin, 1987, 1998/2000; etc.) and so on. For a compendium of evidence in this regard, cf. Taylor (2005).

The Latin term passio-passionis refers to the experience of suffering and the action of bearing suffering. It also refers to perturbations or commotions, especially of the “soul,” and to the passions or affections of the human aggregate.

This is my own modification of Tarthang Tulku’s (1977a) term “Great Space-Time-Knowledge.” The state of Total Space-Time-Awareness is the undivided condition of totality that has not been experientially disrupted either by the subject-object schism or by the figure-ground dichotomy, so that neither space, nor time, nor awareness is divided or restricted, and these three do not seem to be separate and different from each other. The state of small space-time-awareness is the one resulting from the illusory fragmentation of totality due to the arising of the subject-object duality and of a somehow impermeable focus of conscious awareness that apprehends figures, leaving the rest of the ground in some kind of “penumbra of attention.” Later on we will see that it is possible to enlarge an individual’s space-time-awareness in such a way that space, time and knowledge are still restricted, and yet she or he may gain the illusion that the state of Total Space-Time-Awareness has been attained: this is what occurs in the experiences of the summit of samsara, which Buddhism calls the arupya loka or “formless dimension,” and which it divides into the four arupa loka listed elsewhere in this book.

The principle of figure-ground segregation posited by Gestalt theory—“for a figure to be perceived, it must stand apart from its background”—means that dualistic minds are figure-ground minds having an innate tendency to perceive one aspect of an event as the figure or foreground and the rest as the ground or background (according to Gestalt theory, these laws not only apply to images, but to thought processes, memories, and our understanding of time). Once our minds function in this way, the principle of “multistability” or “multistable perception” consists in the tendency of ambiguous perceptual experiences to pop back and forth unstably between two or more alternative interpretations—as evidenced by the Necker cube, and by what may probably be regarded as the icon of this movement: Edgar Rubin’s pattern, which we may perceive either as a cup with nothing in the background, or as two faces eye-to-eye with nothing in the middle: we explicitly perceive as this or that what we take as figure, and not so whatever we turn into ground.

Gestalt theory—the German term that is usually translated as form, shape referring in this case to the way a thing has been gestellt—i.e., ‘placed,’ or ‘put together’—was developed originally at the beginning of the twentieth century by German psychologists Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka. In 1890 Christian von Ehrenfels had pointed out that to be aware of a melody we had to aware, not of single tones in isolation, but of the pattern in which they combine, so that if notes of the same pitch were presented in a different temporal order the melody would not be recognized, but if the same pattern were reproduced in a different key we would recognize it immediately, for—in Ehrenfels’ words—the melody had a Gestaltqualität independent of the qualities of the separate notes. Self-evident as this is, it was the preamble of the development of this movement, the basic principle of which is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: it carried a different and altogether greater meaning than its individual components (e.g., a picture
In its pristine condition, primordial awareness is all pervading and panoramic, and as such it cannot exclude the dog by successively watching its parts; it can only be apprehended as a whole, instantly and at once.

Klein, Jung, Piaget, Fairbairn, Mahler and Loevinger coincided in asserting the neonate to exist in a state of subject-object undifferentiation (where subject-object do not refer specifically to the duality of the mental subject and its objects, but more generally to the perception of a self-nonself schism) or primordial union. This, in fact, is what Klein called projective identification (even though it does not involve identification of a mental subject with an infinitude perceived as object), that Piaget called protoplasmic consciousness, and that psychoanalysis calls undifferentiated egoic or objectal libido. Cf. Rodríguez Bornaextea (1999, p. 14). However, as Michael Washburn (1995, p. 47; Spanish Ed. P. 77) has noted, Lichtenberg (1979, 1981, 1983, 1987) and Stern (1985) assert the infant in her or his earliest life period to involve an ego with its ego-functions.

Reich viewed the “oceanic feeling” (oceanische Gefühl) as the experience of the natural state of every healthy organism, which is one of connectedness to and engagement with the world around it, in which its energies radiate and flow in spirals from the center outwards, being part of a larger whole: it was a positive cosmic and “true religious” feeling of being connected to the infinite universe. He used the term “orgastic potency” to designate the ability to give up conscious control and surrender to waves of energy flowing within: when a couple allows excitement to build gradually, energy flows from the genitals into all areas of the body, giving rise to a melting sensation, which he called streamings and described as “oceanic” or wavelike in nature, claiming that when they are allowed to flow through the entire body, rather than just in the pelvis, the capacity to surrender is complete and results in “total orgasm,” involving involuntary pleasurable spasms of the musculature that envelop the entire body.

For his part, Herbert Marcuse’s theory of ‘repressive desublimation’ (One-Dimensional Man, ch. 3) commented with regard to Reich’s views on the need of a sexual revolution that if the latter was to break the cycle of domination and rebellion, it could not stop with the creation of a more permissive sexual morality, for a sexual revolution that confined itself to genital pleasure could easily lend itself to new forms of domination.

In short, in the twentieth century Western authors not involved with Tantrism, Dzogchen or related systems had insights into the fact that sexuality could trigger oceanic conditions, and that the mere obtaining of genital pleasure was not in itself liberating. The point in Dzogchen and Tantrism is that oceanic conditions of total pleasure are not ends in themselves, but experiences to be used as reflections in a mirror that may serve to discover the true condition of the mirror. This discovery is what the “New (Sarma) Tantras” call Mahamudra, and which the “Old (Nyingma) Tantras” of the Path of Transformation and of the Path of Spontaneous Liberation call Dzogchen (-qua-Path).

As we have seen, this is the Sartrean interpretation, in terms of what the French philosopher called “bad faith,” of what Freud explained as “repression by the unconscious’ preconscious aspect;” we negate what we cannot admit and in the same operation negate that we have negated something (and that we have negated that we have negated... ad infinitum).

The verb néantir, coined by Jean-Paul Sartre, was rendered into English as nihilate in Hazel E. Barnes’ 1984 version of Being and Nothingness; it was first used in English by Helmut Kuhn in his Encounter with Nothingness. (Wiktionary.)

As explained in vol. 1 of this book, the “energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness” is what Tantric bioenergetics refer to by the Sanskrit term kundalini and the Tibetan word thig le, and which is explained in terms of an energy flow going through a “central channel” into the superior centers associated to the brain. (In the modern West, there have been attempts to explain the same phenomena in terms of the brain’s biochemistry.)

In its pristine condition, primordial awareness is all pervading and panoramic, and as such it cannot exclude part of the continuum of sense data, turning it into ground. In fact, the condition of possibility of what Gestalttheorie calls figure-ground minds, which single out for perception of a segment of the continuum of what appears as object and the turning into ground the rest of the continuum, is the diminution of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the concomitant reduction of the scope...
In the second mode of spontaneous liberation, in the first mode or spontaneous liberation one looks at the thought that is already established as awareness that occur in the course of phylogeny as civilization develops and in the course of ontogenesis in civilized human groups as socialization takes place. This gives rise to a selective consciousness with ever less permeable limits and makes normal civilized adults unable to abstain from singling out segments of the continuum of sense data and thereby leaving the rest of the continuum outside the boundaries of consciousness. Therefore, rather then being a function of primordial awareness, the turning of most of the continuum of what appears as object into ground is a function of the diminution of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness.

Tantric bioenergetics explains this by saying that the reprimands and punishments necessary for making infants adapt to society induce muscular contractions, which give rise to “knots” strangling the central channel and thereby reducing the flow of energy entering the higher focal points of experience, and by implication the brain—which reduces the scope of conscious awareness, allowing normal adult experience to involve the split into figure and ground, as well as a great deal of the operations for the managing of self-identity that Sartre (1943; 31st edition, 1980) explained in terms of the concept of bad faith (which make up his existentialist alternative to Freud’s concept of repression by the pre-conscious aspect of the unconscious). Then the regular discharge of energy in ejaculation (in the man) or in both ejaculation and menstruation (in the woman) helps keep the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness relatively low.

However, so far Western science has failed to corroborate this interpretation, and hence it would be prudent to set it aside for the time being, except as a metaphor.

In fact, in the primordial age the average human being was oscillated between a condition of communion in which the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness was total or nearly total, and a state of post-communion in which the energetic volume in question was considerably reduced.

From this it may be inferred that in the primordial age the reduction of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness was due to physiological reasons—which in its turn could lead us to infer that in newborn infants of our time, even before the process of socialization begins, there is a physiologically-induced decrease of this energetic volume as well (for example, due to the sealing of the fontanel in the weeks and months following birth). I have no way to tell whether or not there is a physiologically induced reduction of the energetic volume in question, what I can tell for sure is that the Path involves progressively obtaining a stable condition of Total Space-Time-Awareness, through the repeated manifestation and posterior obliteration of this Total condition, until the obliteration in question no longer obtains.

Below in the regular text the explanation of the reduction in question by Tantric energetics and Rigdzin Changchub Dorje’s alternative Dzogchen explanation are considered.

Rigdzin Changchub Dorje was the nineteenth-twentieth century CE Dzogchen Master from Eastern Tibet who came to be the root Lama of contemporary Dzogchen Master Chögyäl Namkhai Norbu. It was the latter who conveyed to the West (including this author) his main teacher’s explanations in this regard.

According to the individual’s development of capacity, and to the latter’s fluctuations in different moments, spontaneous liberation may take place in one or another of the three capacities or modes described in the Dzogchen teachings; however, it is not possible to give one explanation that may apply to all three capacities of spontaneous liberation, which are as follows:

In the first mode or spontaneous liberation one looks at the thought that is already established as object—which, like all thoughts, is a manifestation of the ngowo aspect of the Base—in order to apprehend its true nature, and immediately the true condition of this aspect of the Base unveils, manifesting as the dharma-kaya. This happens as the self-reGnition of nondual Awake self-awareness that the Dzogchen teachings call rigpa makes the latter’s own face patent (rang-ngo shes-pa), whereby the true nature of this self-awareness is unconcealed in the manifestation of rigpa-qua-Path or rigpa-qua-Fruit, so that, as we have seen, the ngowo of the Base is realized as the dharma-kaya.

In the second mode of spontaneous liberation, there is an automatic movement of attention toward what seems to be the “source of thought,” so that the true condition of the arising thought is reGnized as the latter begins to arise, and hence there is spontaneous liberation upon arising: the movement of attention, attention itself, the subject of attention and the object of attention, instantly dissolve into the patency of the true condition of the ngowo aspect of the Base, which thereby manifests as the dharma-kaya.
In the third and last mode of spontaneous liberation, thought liberates itself spontaneously without there being a need either for an intentional movement of attention toward the thought, or for an automatic reaction as the thought begins to arise, and so all arising thoughts are like drawings on water, which liberate themselves spontaneously as they arise: at no point is the true condition of the ngowo aspect of the Base concealed, and thus the continuity of the manifestation of dharmakaya is not interrupted. Jigme Lingpa explained this as the coincident manifestation of emptiness and active thoughts.

Note that Sartre used the French term supprimer, and therefore he was not referring to suppression in the Freudian sense (Ger. Unterdrückung, which in French is répression) as different from repression (Ger. Verdrängung, which in French is refoulement).

This is the view of samsara—which is the reason why a fully samsaric individual such as Sartre called the mode of being of such entities by the term being-in-itself, and why another fully samsaric individual such as Heidegger asserted that we need no proof as to the independent existence of such entities (cf. the citation on the modern meaning of reality in the regular text of vol. I of this book). And, in fact, in this regard we can distinguish the objects of the physical world from the “products of imagination;” though neither of them is truly independent from us—for everything is interconnected and the Self-quâ-Base (is) an indivisible whole—insofar as the mental subject can to some extent steer the imagination, it is the first type of object that will be experienced by deluded consciousness (concomitant with being-for-Self) as being decidedly “independent” with regard to itself. While dreaming and not realizing that we are dreaming, deluded consciousness also experiences the dream world as being “independent” with regard to itself.

Sartre (1980) provides us with several examples of the difference between what he calls fear and what he calls anguish; for example, he tells us that giddiness before abysmal heights is not actually fear but anguish: what is experienced in such occasions is not fear of falling, but fear of jumping (however, in truth the fear we experience, rather than a fear of jumping, is a fear of stumbling, slipping or doing something wrong that may result in one’s fall into the abyss). The difference between what Sartre called fear and what he called anguish may have been validated by experiments with rats wherein these were exposed to punishments that did not depend on their own decisions, and others wherein the animals were exposed to punishments that did depend on their own decisions, yet the animals were not allowed to establish criteria that would allow them to avoid punishment: only in the second experiments did the rats develop behavioral derangements and physical illnesses resulting from extreme tension (such as gastric ulcers and heart problems).

A “feedback runaway” is the swift, out-of-control increase or exacerbation of a variable by the systemic action of a positive feedback loop.

Note that I am following Sartre’s usage of the French term supprimer as explained in note 61, and therefore I am not referring to suppression in the Freudian sense (Ger. Unterdrückung; Fr. répression) as different from repression (Ger. Verdrängung; Fr. refoulement).

If the object we intend to elude is a particular thought or chain of thoughts, the problem will be quite different, for thoughts are not discrete objects like the palm tree, or even like the sensation of anguish we experience in the center of the body at the level of the heart (and though the imaginary repetition of the sound of words that takes place in discursive thought may seem to be as discrete as the sound of words, we can gain degrees of control over thoughts that only mahasiddhas could possibly gain over “material” phenomena).

Sartre says we cannot do the same with the anguish as we would do with the beheaded corpse, insofar as we are anguish. However, the sensation of anguish appears as object, and thus we can do with it the same we do with the beheaded corpse—with the difference, emphasized in the regular text, that as soon as we elude anguish we must forget we had eluded it.

As asserted in Vol. I of this book, if a host of beautiful nymphs caressed my naked body with goose’s feathers all over, since the type of sensation that results from this action is of the kind we human beings tend to accept, and since I find attractive the individuals who induce it and thus also tend to accept them, as a result of my acceptance I would experience pleasure and so I would ascend in the wheel of samsara. However, if the nymphs went on with their activity uninterrupted for hours and days, at a certain point I would mentally yell, “stop it!”—whereby I would start to reject the experience, and hence I would begin to experience it as a torture and be taken to the bottom of samsara just as would have happened if I had been inflicted a type of sensation of the kind we human beings tend to reject. On the other hand,
masochists can enjoy sensations that are generally deemed painful, and the fact that this may have resulted from the association of erotic stimulation and physical punishment in early infancy does not contradict the fact that it is the acceptance of those sensations that allows the masochist to experience them as pleasure. Likewise, if a neutral sensation persists for too long, at some point I understand it as boring and thus reject it, whereby it becomes unpleasant.

71 Some people have reported to me that they experience feelings of anguish and so on most strongly in the chakra located right below the navel—which made me wonder whether this occurs some times in people having “sexual problems” and believing these to be the supreme problems of the human condition.

72 The “four worldly concerns” or jigten chögye (jig rten chod brgyad) are: gain-loss, fame-obscurity, praise-blame, and happiness/pleasure-suffering/pain.

73 This is what caused Kant (2001) to distinguish between simple “judgments of taste” and that specific variety of judgments of taste which we call “aesthetic judgments,” claiming that the latter are based on universal a priori principles and therefore are the corroboration of objective beauty and so on: he needed to believe his aesthetic tastes to correspond to universal principles in order to value what he happened to like, feel justified in liking it, and valuing himself for valuing what is objectively beautiful rather than what his own idiosyncrasies led him to value.

The same applies to moral judgments: a Muslim who has two wives may feel a Tibetan woman who has two husbands to be a moral monster. And it was this that led Kant (1909) to try to substantiate the supposedly universal and objective character of the moral views of his society and its religion.

74 In a previous note to this section I discussed the difference Sartre (1980) made between what he calls fear and what he calls anguish.

75 Since this dread will give rise to an equally painful sensation, and the dread will be continuous, the unpleasant sensation would likely become continuous.

It must be noted that all the different interpretations of the ultimate source of Angst, anguish, dread and so on are partially valid; however, ultimately the source of anguish is the delusory valuation-absolutization: it is the vibratory activity at the root of delusory valuation-absolutization that, when experienced in its nakedness, constitutes the mental sensation at the root of what we call Angst, anguish, dread and so on.

76 Unless the consumption of psychedelics triggers a durable psychosis, the increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness they trigger is limited to the duration of the effect of the substance. For a definition of the composite term chemical raisers of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness that have an epochotropic, non-dissociative, non-hypnotic, potentially “psychotomimetic,” consciousness expanding effect (CREV), cf. the section “Entheogens, Psychedelics or Consciousness Expanders” in a subsequent chapter of this volume.

77 The shravakas admit the voidness of the human individual but not that of entities which are not human individuals; however, as the Prasangikas correctly noted, they cannot thoroughly realize the emptiness of the human individual insofar as they do not admit the emptiness of the psychophysical constituents of this individual, insofar as they are not human individuals. This is why they can admit the voidness of the human individual, yet fail to experience the fear that this voidness induces in them.

78 Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf preferred the days of strong pain to those of continuous grayness: he found what Shantideva called “all-pervasive suffering” to be more difficult to come to terms with than what the Indian Buddhist philosopher called “suffering of suffering.” Or, more exactly, he found the suffering of suffering that issues from becoming aware of all-pervasive suffering to be more difficult to come to terms with than other forms of suffering of suffering.

79 The type of forgetting indicated as (1) is reminiscent of nonaffirming negation or absolute negation (Skt. prasajyapratisedha; Tib. meddgag [med dgag]), which negates the object of negation without implying the affirmation of anything else; the type of forgetting indicated as (2) is reminiscent of affirming or implicative negation (Skt. paryudasapratisedha; Tib. mayingag [ma yin dgag]), which negates the object of negation while implying the affirmation of something else.

An example of the latter is the voidness that is arrived at in analysis carried out according to method of the Shantaraksita-Kamalashila-Arya Vimuktasena tradition within Madhyamaka-Swatantrika-Yogachara philosophy, which is the presence of the object being analyzed as an existent though illusion-like phenomenon (which is said to be concordant with the actual ultimate truth and a non-metaphoric ultimate insofar as it involves the negation of true existence)—which is one of the reasons why these authors have
Heidegger seems to have believed that “forgetting and in the same occurrence forgetting one has forgotten something” was the only type of forgetting, for in Heidegger (1988), § 20, p. 411 of original German Ed. we read that “forgetting has the characteristic of forgetting itself. In the ecstatic nature of forgetting the fact is inherent that not only we forget what is forgotten, but we also forget that we have forgotten.”

IN A PREVIOUS NOTE I WROTE: Normally we are not conscious of the supersubtle threefold thought-structure insofar as its very structure implies that we see through it into the object this very structure introduces, so that the subject appears in a way that has been called “indirect” or “implicit,” and we take the subject-object structure to be a given, self-existent reality. Furthermore, when we are aware of the object we are not explicitly conscious of the fact that it appears as object, insofar we are by comparison explicitly conscious of the intuitive concept that established that the object is this or that.

Nonetheless, we are not really explicitly conscious of the intuitive, subtle concept that establishes the identity of the object, for normally we are explicitly conscious of the contents of discursive, coarse thoughts, and so intuitive, subtle thoughts seem to be somehow implicit rather than fully explicit.

Thus the explicit consciousness of discursive, coarse thoughts causes intuitive, subtle thoughts to be implicit; the somehow implicit awareness of intuitive, subtle thoughts causes the fact that something is appearing as object to be even more implicit—and the mental subject or the threefold thought structure simply cannot be seen insofar as it implies that we see an object rather than the structure that gives rise to the object.

And somehow that fact that we are only explicitly aware of discursive thoughts causes of to feel that the intuitive, subtle thoughts in terms of which we experience entities are not thoughts but the absolute, true nature of the entity. Descartes was able to realize intuitive thoughts to be thoughts, but he was unable to realize the supersubtle threefold thought structure to be a thought, and took the result of its delusory valuation-absolutization to be a given, self-existent reality—which, as shown in Vol. I of this book, led him to posit the two created substances which were the res cogitans and the res extensa.

This somehow implicit character of the intuitive, subtle thoughts that are involved in the operations whereby we deceive ourselves by means of what Sartre called bad faith may be interpreted as the not-being-fully-conscious of the concepts in question and of the operations involving them: this might have been what made Freud ascribe these operations to a topos to be called the “preconscious.”

However, this fact does not imply the existence of a “preconscious” any more than the fact that when we perceive chairs as chairs and dogs as dogs the intuitive, subtle concepts in terms of which we perceive them do not appear explicitly, but are felt to be somehow implicit.

SEE HOW TO REFER TO ALL OF THE ABOVE WITHOUT HAVING TO REPEAT IT COMPLETELY.

Since in nirvana—whether manifest as the Self-qua-Path or as the Self-qua-Fruit—the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is total, and so is Space-Time-Awareness, so that there is no dualistic, thetic, positional, reflexive consciousness of object, nirvana is beyond reflexive memory. However, it is also beyond forgetting, for the condition for forgetting is that there be memory, and that the neutral base-of-all may manifest—which cannot occur in nirvana, for the base-of-all is precisely the condition in which neither nirvana nor samsara are manifest.

However, despite the fact that nirvana is beyond reflexive memory, it is not utterly beyond memory. In fact, otherwise there would be no way “not to remain in doubt” after Direct Introduction. Furthermore, in the case of the Self-qua-Fruit, since the individual has attained the perfect capacity to live without reflexive consciousness, nonreflexive memory is more powerful than the reflexive memory of deluded beings. In fact, the lack of reflexive memory and of the capacity to establish reflexive mnemonic imprints in lower animals lacking a cerebral cortex must be characterized as subhuman; the lack of reflexive memory and capacity to establish reflexive mnemonic imprints in infants in whom this cortex is not fully mielitized is to be characterized as undeveloped human; and the lack of reflexive memory in Buddhas, who have a fully mielitized cerebral cortex yet have gone beyond the dualistic functioning that depends on that cortex, and the fact that they do not establish reflexive mnemonic imprints, are properly superhuman. However, this characterization of Buddhahood as superhuman does not imply in any sense a theory of evolution
viewing “primitive humans” as incapable of attaining Buddhahood: in this context the term is understood exclusively in the ontogenetic sense of something that some individuals attain after having developed their human condition—yet not in Wilber’s sense of having to establish successive structures until the supposed “structures of Buddhahood” are established, for “transitional structures” belong to samsara, and on the other hand it is possible for some special individuals to attain full realization at a rather early age without developing all of the structures Wilber, for example, takes for a precondition of Awakening and even of transpersonal experience.

A discussion of forgetting in general would be so complex that it would require a separate book—and at any rate is goes far beyond the aims of the present book.

83 We should not misunderstand the concept of the stunned unawareness of the neutral condition of the base-of-all and believe this condition is necessarily like a swoon in which no sense data manifest. Though some instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all do not involve the manifestation of sensa, the instances being referred to here involve the full manifestation of the continuum of sense data.

In terms of systems theory, the capacity to ignore something would be explained in terms of the instantaneous manifestation of a negative feedback loop.

84 Explanations of this kind are what Gregory Bateson (1972) illustrated with the explanation of the reason why opium and its derivates induce sleep by positing a “dormitive power” of these drugs, in a pun christening them “dormitive hypotheses.”

85 Sartre used to capitalize the term “other” when, rather than referring to a specific individual, he was alluding to an abstract instance that in practice might be filled by anyone who is not the person who is having the experience being considered. I am following Sartre’s usage of the term.

86 In most living languages children are not referred to as “it,” but as “he” or “she,” according to the case. I am reluctant to use the pronoun “it” to refer to children also when writing in English.

87 I have in mind the theory of the origins of autism developed in Winnicott (1974): if the original other reacts to the infant on the basis of her or his own moods rather than reacting to the infant on the basis of the latter’s behavior, and thus represses the infant when the latter should be rewarded or ignored, etc. and her or his reactions to the infant are too wayward and too intense, the latter will be unable to develop a coherent criterion allowing him or her to avoid the courses of behavior that will elicit the mother’s punishment, and therefore the infant will not be able to tell when it is “safe” to freely give way to her or his motility, when and how it is “safe” to communicate with the original other or other others—and hence it is possible that he or she decides that it is safer not to venture into any kind of action, or into any kind of communication with other human beings, no longer daring to come out into the world, to express him or herself, and / or to communicate: he or she would be reacting to an untenable life situation by developing the desperate “strategy” of autism.

88 It could be said that action in the strictest sense of the term arises once being-for-Self, involving the illusion that the mental subject is the source of motility, has manifested and developed, and the infant has learned to control motility as a result of experiences such as the one that is being described. In the same way, before an infant learns to control motility from the standpoint of the criteria of the original other, this motility may not be referred to as subjective in the strictest sense of the term, for it does not seem to have a separate, autonomous subject as its source. The illusion that actions “are carried out by” the mental subject—the noetic pole of experience—fully develops as a result of the inhibition being considered, once being-for-Self becomes the object that the original other perceives as the acting individual and thus becomes responsible for the individual’s behavior. However, at the early stage preceding self-control the infant’s behavior is unhindered (and in this sense free, though not free in the sense of involving “free will”) and spontaneous, as corresponds to one of the connotations of the concept of “subjectivity.”

89 Sullivan called his approach an interpersonal theory of psychiatry because he believed psychiatry to be the study of what goes on between people: rather than there being people who are this or that way and have these or those drives or urges, there is a relationship. This may be illustrated with the following excerpt from Bateson (1990) (retranslated from the Spanish by the author of this book):

“It is correct (and represents a great advance) to begin to think on the two sides that take part in interaction as two eyes, each of which gives a monocular vision of what goes on, but which together give a binocular vision [that permits the appreciation] of depth. This double vision is the relation.

“The relation is not interior to the individual person. It makes no sense to speak of ‘dependence’, ‘aggressiveness’, ‘pride’, etc.: all these words have their root in what happens between people, not in this-or-that-thing supposedly located inside a person.
“There is, no doubt, a learning in the narrowest sense. There are changes in A and changes in B that correspond to the dependence-protection of the relation. But the relation comes first: it is precedent.

“Only if one clings rigorously to the primacy and priority of the relation can one avoid dormitive explanations. Opium does not contain a dormitive principle and the human being does not contain an aggressive principle.”

This illustrates the essential difference between Sullivan and Freud: the latter viewed human being as quite autonomous monads having inherent urges or drives (especially sexual and aggressive ones) and who connect to others who happen to meet their needs in order to satisfy those urges or drives, and posited the dormitive hypothesis according to which the personality is inherently made up of three elements (which were different in the first and the second topic).

The term derives from the Middle English behaven and the Anglo-Saxon behhaban. According to the Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged Second Edition, behhaban means, “to hold” or “restrain,” and habban alone means “to have;” therefore, Watts’ interpretation of the etymology as “to be having oneself” seems plausible.

The individual’s genetic make-up will correspond (at least to a great extent) to the karmic propensities that, given the presence of contributory conditions, manifest in a given lifetime.

As will be shown in a note to the upcoming section on the Jungian shadow as an “unconscious phantasy,” when the original other regularly fails to grant the infant her or his admiration or acceptance for adopting courses of behavior society deems acceptable or praiseworthy, the infant may seek admiration or at least acceptance from deviants, and therefore will embody an identity that these deviants will admire or at least accept.

I am referring to the process Ronald D. Laing (1972) christened “family mapping;” the original other and other of our most important significant others see us as “taking after” one of their own siblings, and therefore project on us the orientation of energies (Skt. bija; Tib. sabön [sa bon]) characteristic of that sibling by means of what Laing called “attributions with force of injunctions” (see below in the regular text), causing us to embody a similar orientation of energies—which in turn may depend to a great extent on the propensities that are most evident in the child, which because of heredity may resemble those of one or more siblings... all of which will respond to the infant’s karmas and will work as secondary conditions for the manifestation of particular karmas in this life.

Cf. note 85, which makes reference to Winnicott’s theory on the genesis of autism.

This, in its turn, will have to do with the interaction between the original other’s genetic make-up and the conditions of her or his own upbringing: the extent to which she or he was subjected to pathogenic double-binds (the concept is defined in a note to this volume), the degree to which her own mother or original other responded to her behavior rather than to her own moods, etc.—her genetic make-up and the conditions of her own upbringing being contributory conditions responding to and interacting with her own karma. Gregory Bateson (1972) has explained how a mother who is irrationally driven by guilt may use the child as a receptor of guilt unto whom she may project it, attributing to the child the blame she feels is hanging on the situation, so as to elude it herself. This happens because mother herself was used as a receptor of guilt, but she is of the kind that for her part is compelled to project it and is able to do so, rather than being of the kind that absorbs it, being driven crazy by it. The matter under discussion is a very complex matter that cannot be explained so reductively as I have done in this note; I have dealt with it in greater detail in Capriles (1986) and other works.


It is worth noting that recent evidence that supposedly would have sustained the genetic and organic theories of what is known as schizophrenia has not undermined the double bind hypothesis. The point is that Bateson did not conceive his hypothesis as excluding genetic or organic elements: from the start, he showed how, if there were a genetic basis for the supposed nosological entity thus designated (and the same would apply if an organic basis of schizophrenia were proven to exist), its existence would be compatible with his own hypothesis. In contraposition, it has been claimed that Laing did explicitly and radically discard all genetic and organic theories (Boyers & Orrill [Eds. 1971])—and yet in his main books his words do not seem to be discarding them.
One example Bateson gives of these contradictory orders is the mother who tells the child: “kiss me,” and then when the child approaches her she tenses her muscles while slightly moving away from the child, which paraverbally conveys the order, “don’t approach me” or, “don’t kiss me.” This causes the child to detain himself before kissing her, upon which she recriminates him by telling him, “what happens, don’t you love me?,” with an intonation of the voice and an intensity intended to make the child feel extremely guilty. This type of double-bind makes the child utterly confused and unable to react, for whatever he or she does he or she will be punished. Needless to say, other examples of this type of double-bind may be far more insidious than this one.

Bateson gives the example of the Zen Master who, while showing his disciples a stick, tells them, “if you say this is a stick I’ll beat you; if you say this is not a stick I’ll beat you; if you don’t say either of these things I’ll beat you: TELL ME, WHAT IS IT?!!!!”

Consider the case of a mother who says to a group of people including her son, “he will...” The passage continues (Gibran [2000]; translation into English of the excerpt by the author of this book):
“...They neither understand the law of God, nor understand the purpose of true religion, nor distinguish the innocent from the sinner. They see only the surface of objects without knowing their secrets; they pronounce their verdicts with ignorance, judge with blindness, making equal the criminal and the innocent, the good and the bad. Pitiful those who prosecute and judge the people!”

However, among the different types of thought, some may become stronger and others weaker according to the type of elemental beings among the eights classes and their sub-classes, who rule the continent or the region, and according to the local guardians ruling over the more limited area where one where one finds oneself. Thus one may ask oneself, are these beings thoughts of our own minds, or entities associated with places in the physical world? The terms of the question themselves are mistaken, for they are based on the wrong assumption that there is a cleavage between mind and world, inside and outside, dang (gdangs) and tsel (rtsal) modes of manifestation of energy—which is not at all the case. What there is, is a continuum of the three modes of manifestation of energy, and there are very specific relations between places in the world of tsel energy and types of thought manifesting in dang energy. At any rate, the reGnition of the true condition of the Base in the manifestation of rigpa frees the individual from the power of the type of thoughts associated with a place, and repetition of this in the dynamic of the mandala that will be discussed in the regular text of a subsequent chapter may in the long run somehow turn them into guardians of the teachings.

Just as in human interaction consciousness establishes a link of being with the entity indicated by one’s name, on the plane of the individual’s “inner” relations consciousness establishes a link of being with the individual’s self-image.

As noted in the discussion of Freud’s concept of the “oceanic feeling,” in the newborn subject and object have not yet developed into a clearly defined duality, yet there is a disposition for this duality to develop, whereas in Awake individuals awareness the illusory separation between mental subject (the noetic pole of knowledge) and object (the noematic pole of knowledge) can no longer manifest as the disposition for it to do so has been neutralized or burned out.

Burton Watson renders the fragment differently; according to him (Watson, Burton, Trans, 1968, p. 253), the infant:

“...stares all day long without blinking its eyes—it has no preferences in the world of externals. To move without knowing where you are going, to sit at home without knowing what you are doing, traipsing and trailing about with other things, riding along with them on the same wave—this is the basic rule of life-preservation...”

The point is that the infant does not yet divide the sensory continuum into figure and ground.

The point is that the infant has not yet become the object that others perceive as him or her, and may not even have developed a clear distinction between mental subject (or noetic pole of knowledge) and object (or noematic pole of knowledge).

An individual may use spiritual methods in order to inhibit the tendency to know him or herself as object (which, as we have seen, by establishing a link-of-being between the mental subject and the object, hinders the individual’s performance). However, even the gods who have succeeded at this can be victims of the above tendency and thus end up encumbering themselves, for only those who have attained the Self-quaque-Fruit (i.e. who have become most firmly established in the unconcealment of the Self-quaque-Base) are totally free from self-hindering. (There is the story of the competition between Shakayamuni and a god who was a Master sitar player. Initially both performed so wonderfully, that there was no way to choose a winner. The god took a string off his sitar and kept playing masterfully, and so did Shakayamuni, with the same result; then, they took a second string off... until finally Shakayamuni took off all of the strings, and yet kept playing superbly. In this story, playing with strings represents conditioned playing, and playing without strings is a symbol for playing in a state that is totally free from conditioning.)

This is Sartre’s term for the phenomenon in question. Sartre speaks of Being-for-Itself, which corresponds to the apparently separate mental subject, and Being-in-Itself, which is the mode of being of all that appears as object. Being-for-Others arises when Being-for-Itself becomes that phenomenon of Being-in-Itself which is indicated by the individual’s name. Sartre’s says that this occurs, for example, when one “feels touched in the heart by the Other’s look” (for example, when one is looking through a keyhole and then one suddenly realizes one is being watched as one is in such a shameful act).
On the positive side, it is the “good impression” we all wish to present as we fill the roles society requires of us. The phrase originated in 1841, which reads, *Lupus est homo homini non homo*. Symmachus, fourth and fifth centuries AD, in one of his Epistles [IX,108] claimed that, *Homo homini deus est, si suum officium sciat* [Man is a god unto Man, if he knows his duty]. For his part, Francis Bacon [1881] claimed that *Iustitiae debetur quod homo homini sit deus non lupus* [“It is owing to justice that man to man is a god, not a wolf”], which synthesizes both assertions.

Of course we care for those who are dear to us, but also this we do out of self-concern, insofar as we are emotionally dependent on them and insofar as their misfortune would cause us pain. Thomas Hobbes (1970), who claimed that *homo homini lupus* (“man is the wolf of man”), wrongly viewed the war of all against all as being inherent in the state of nature preceding the social contract at the origin of the State: in his inverted view, because in the state of nature all had the natural right to enjoy all riches, all fought against all for these riches, and it was in order to put an end to this war that the need arose for a sovereign with a power of enforcing laws in order to put an end to this condition. It is thus clear that Jung believed current popular fantasies about fierce, competitive male taphragy dragging women by their hairs into their caves—which as shown below in the regular text are contradicted by the recent findings of paleopathology, which support the view expounded in this book and hence that of the Stoics and those of all wisdom traditions having their hub in Mount Kailash.

The persona is the individual’s public image. The word is, obviously, related to the word person and personality, which derive from a Latin word referring to the masks used in Greek theater (which as we know prevented the public from seeing the actor’s/actress’ expression and amplified his or her voice). So the persona is the mask we put on before we show ourselves to the outside world. Although it begins as an archetype, by the time we are finished making it actual and giving it a specific content in the course of our biographic development, it is the part of us most distant from the collective unconscious.

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On the positive side, it is the “good impression” we all wish to present as we fill the roles society requires of us, yet it becomes a problem—and it leads us to project the shadow on others, giving rise to evil—when we mistake it for our true selves or our true nature: in general (Jung failed to make of this a rule) we believe we really are what we pretend to be. However, the persona can also be the “false impression” we use to manipulate people’s opinions and behaviors—in which case it is less likely that we mistake it for our true selves or our true nature.

It is claimed that the source of evil is not the shadow, but the drive to project it on others. However, if the shadow is not the remnant of our animal ancestors, but a phantasy that we are compelled to elude (i.e., to “make unconscious”), then there is no difference between its existence and the drive to project it on others: it exists in the mode of unconscious phantasy and as such it involves the drive to project it on others, and the moment when this drive subsides is the moment when our delusory valuation of the unconscious phantasy and hence our belief in its true existence and our hatred toward it dissolves.

In Jung’s system, the shadow is the “dark side” of the ego, and the evil that we are capable of is often stored there, even though the archetype in question, like animals, is neither good nor bad, for it is amoral and thus innocent: it is capable of tender care for its young and vicious killing for food, but it doesn’t...
choose to do either. However, from our human perspective, the animal world looks rather brutal, inhuman, so the shadow becomes something of a garbage bin for the parts of ourselves that we can’t quite admit to. The animal is not merely a metaphor for Jung, for he viewed the shadow as derived from our prehuman, animal past, when, according to his Darwinist worldview, our concerns were limited to survival and reproduction, and when we weren’t self-conscious and thus could have no moral. Thus sex and the “life instincts” in general (which the view expressed in this book does not admit to be so) lie in the shadow. Symbols of the shadow include the snake (as in the garden of Eden), the dragon, monsters, and demons; it often guards the entrance to a cave or a pool of water, which is the image of the collective unconscious.

Jung's archetypes—which could be patterns, such as for example some kind of story, or figures embodying characters—were the contents of the collective unconscious, which Jung also called dominants, imagos, mythological or primordial images, etc. An archetype may be said to be a tendency, which is not derived from the individual’s biographical experience, to experience things in a certain way. Though Jung treated them almost as though they were psychological organs, analogous to physical ones in that both are morphological givens that arose through evolution, they differed from Freud’s instincts in that they were not really deemed to be biological things: they were more like spiritual needs. In fact, an archetype is like a need and at the same time an organizing principle that is previous to any specific form and that causes the individual to produce the archetype’s specific form in his or her psyche on the basis of biographical experiences. Jung listed four main forms of archetypes:

- The Self
- The Shadow (which has sui generis characteristics that cast doubts as to whether it is really an archetype)
- The Anima
- The Animus

Other important archetypes are the Syzygy (“Divine Couple”), e.g. Gnostic Aeons; the Child; the Übermensch (“Superman”, the Omnipotent); the Hero; the Great Mother, either good or terrible; the Wise old man; the Trickster or Ape; the Puer Ēternus (“eternal boy”) that does not grow up; the Cosmic Man. In the case of the archetype of the mother, for all infants have the need for a nurturing original other who takes care of her or his needs, physical and spiritual, and yet the particular archetype will depend on the infant’s type of mother and the character or her or his relationship with her. The mother archetype is symbolized by the primordial mother or “mother earth,” by Eve and Mary Judeo-Christian traditions, and even by symbols like the church, the nation, a forest, or the ocean: someone whose own mother failed to satisfy the demands of the archetype in the course of the relationship with the physical mother, may insistently seek comfort in the church, in identification with “the motherland,” in Mary, etc. A group of memories and interpretations associated with an archetype are a complex, e.g. a mother complex associated with the mother archetype.

The case of the father archetype is more interesting, for if we assume that in the ancient past infants did not know who their fathers were, we can see how the archetype in question developed with the development of social roles as society developed in the course of its degenerative evolution. Even when an archetype does not have a particular real person available, we tend to personify the archetype, that is, turn it into a mythological “story-book” character. This character symbolizes the archetype.

As seen in a previous note, in The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious (1928, Part I, Ch. 2, in CW, VII: 149n. In Jung [1972a]), we read:

“No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well.”

DeMeo’s (1998) theory, which Taylor (2005) endorses, is that violence and all of humankind’s wayward traits arose as a result of desertification in areas having a sufficiently dense population, which led people to fight among themselves for the scarce resources necessary for survival. Though it is true that in animals or prey drought and the scarcity of food gives rise to unpredictable outbursts of violence, there seems to be no evidence that the same occurs among humans (contrariwise, the images we see of people during famines in the Sahel is one of extreme passivity).
Furthermore, research has “shown” that in Mesopotamia—one of the areas of the wider region where according to DeMeo desertification gave rise to the Fall of human beings—desertification was brought about by the intervention of “fallen” humans on their environment; therefore, if desertification had an impact on the Fall, it was as positive feedback of the insidious interventions of Fallen humans on the environment. In fact, all traditional theories concerning the degenerative evolution of humankind take for granted that the evolution in question, rather than being a result of fortuitous “external” circumstances, is inherent in the human phenomenon; in the case of this writer, it has been related to the structure and function of the human psyche.

124 I am not referring only to morally reprehensible actions, but also to whichever courses of behavior, reactions or lack of reactions that may give rise to gibes, jeers and aggressions, inducing shame. For example, in school, children are always looking for others who may be made object of gibes, jeers and aggressions in order to avoid being themselves object of such courses of behavior. In fact, the dynamic of the shadow is quite evident among children as well—and perhaps more evident among them than it is among adults in normal conditions. Furthermore, the experience of being the object of such gibes, jeers and aggressions is a most important element in the development of the shadow. In Capriles (1986), pp. 249-250 we read:

“The infant has been moving spontaneously without anything inhibiting his or her free spontaneity (and without his or her experience of being an autonomous, separate doer having fully developed). Then the original other perceives in him or her a course of motility she or he has learned to view as inadmissible; immediately, she or he interferes, reprovingly looking at the infant and most likely shaking or beating her or him until the course of motility has been inhibited. Later on, it is possible that it may suffice for the original other to look at the infant with great emotional intensity, perceiving him or her as a shameful object, for the infant’s motility to be inhibited. Henceforth, if the original other is well adapted, she or he will resort to physical violence only if, according to the criterion dominating her or him, the infringement committed by the infant is really ‘terrible’; however, some have been conditioned to indiscriminately resort to violence, and thus may have recourse to it no matter the gravity of the infringement committed by the infant. The idea is to inhibit the infant’s motility, offering him or her a phantasy that she or he will always want to flee toward the identity mother approves or perhaps even admires in her or him. However, this diverts us toward the subject of the following section, which is the way in which the phantasy shadow and conscious identity interact. What we are concerned with at this point is that the infant has been forced to become the shameful object of the original other’s look, shaking or beatings (i.e. to become the object the original other perceives as her daughter or son). Once the infant has abandoned the course of motility mother intended to repress, and she is sure the infant has “learned the lesson,” if she is a well-adapted person she will leave the infant her or him alone, allowing her or him to freely express motility again—until she discerns a course of motility she regards as unacceptable. Later on we will see how this affects the infant’s experience.”

125 It is not easy to define the persona in a few words. It may be said to be a mask of the psyche; an agreement between the individual and society as to how to behave which has its own name, title and position, which pretends to have individuality, and which convinces itself and others of being an individual—although all situations are but intelligent scenes with dialogues recited by the collective psyche.

126 Whereas Gregory Bateson accepted the possibility that genetic propensities could interact with the double-bind he regarded as the trigger of “schizophrenia,” Ronald Laing believed they had no bearing on it, which in his view was unleashed exclusively by communicational patterns (double-bind, being put in an untenable position,” etc.). On the extreme contrary to Laing’s are those who reduce psychosis to genetic factors, or who do so with deviance and criminality (e.g., Eisenck in the nineteen sixties and seventies, and the physiological theories of “schizophrenia” in the nineteen nineties).

127 A hypnotist never tells the subject of hypnosis that he or she “must feel cold;” he says, “you are feeling cold; feel how cold it is getting…”

128 In Cooper (1971), the author notes that from very early age some children are trained to become “bad-vibe receptors,” which may allow mother or whoever the original other is to get rid of guilt and other unwanted feelings and related phantasies.

One example would be that of a child having a religious teacher who emphasized values such as voluntary poverty, nonviolence and “offering the other chick,” and parents belonging to the NRA and defending the death penalty.
Freud used two different terms: *Ichideal*, which is the one which, following the established usage, I am rendering as “ego-ideal,” and *Idealich*, which literally means “ideal ego.” Jacques Lacan (1975), in particular, sustains that the two terms designate two totally different functions: “The Ich-Ideal, the ego ideal, is the other qua speaker, the other insofar as he has a symbolic, sublimated relationship with the ego, which in our dynamic dealing is at once similar and different from the imaginary libido.” On the other hand, according to Lacan (1960), the ideal ego (*Ideal-Ich*) would be an essentially narcissistic formation that is built up during what he calls the stage of the mirror, and accordingly would belong to the register of the imaginary and become an “aspiration” or a “dream.” Cf. also Roudinesco & Plon (1997).

Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) assert the distinction between *Idealich (moi idéal)* and *Ichideal (idéal du moi)* not to be found in Freud’s writings; if this were actually the case, it would be a creation of Lacan on the basis of two different ways in which Freud expressed the same concept. Cf. Roudinesco & Plon (1997).

As stated in note before last, according to Lacan (1960) what becomes an “aspiration” (and a “dream”) is not the ego-ideal but the ideal ego, which as noted in the regular text the French structuralist interpreter of Freud contrasts with the former.

Freud only admitted conscious fantasies, but it is a fact that, while in fantasies we often idealize ourselves to some extent (we may fantasize that we are heroes, sages, or whatever), we also have fantasies in which we do exactly the opposite, and so in some case it is necessary to keep them unconscious: these are what Isaacs called “unconscious phantasies.” She wrote (Isaacs [1989]; Laing 1961):

“The concept of phantasy has gradually widened in psychoanalytic thought. It now requires clarification and explicit expansion in order to integrate all the relevant facts…

“a) Phantasies are the primary content of unconscious mental processes.

“b) Unconscious phantasies are primarily about bodies, and represent instinctual* aims towards objects.

“c) These phantasies are, in the first instance, the psychic representatives of libidinal and destructive instincts.* Early in development they also become elaborated into defenses as well as wish-fulfillment and anxiety contents.

“d) Freud’s postulated ‘hallucinatory wish-fulfillment’ and his ‘primary identification’, ‘introjection’, and ‘projection’ are the basis of the phantasy life.

“e) Through external experience, phantasies become elaborated and capable of expression, but they do not depend upon such experience for their existence.

“f) Phantasies are not dependent upon words, although they may under certain conditions he capable of expression in words.

“g) The earliest phantasies are experienced as sensations: later they take the form of plastic images and dramatic representations.

“h) Phantasies have both psychic and bodily effects, e.g. in conversion symptoms, bodily qualities, character and personality, neurotic symptoms, inhibitions and sublimations.

“i) Unconscious phantasies form the operative link between instincts* and mechanism. When studied in detail, every variety of ego-mechanism can be seen to arise from specific sorts of phantasy, which in the last resort have their origin in instinctual impulses.* ‘The ego is a differentiated part of the id.’ A ‘mechanism’ is an abstract general term describing certain mental processes which are experienced by the subject as unconscious phantasies.

“j) Adaptation to reality and reality-thinking require the support of concurrent unconscious phantasies. Observation of the ways in which knowledge of the external world develops shows how the child’s phantasy contributes to his learning.

“k) Unconscious phantasies exert a continuous influence throughout life, both in normal and neurotic people, the differences lying in the specific character of the dominant phantasies, the desire or anxiety associated with them and their interplay with each other and with external reality.”

Therefore according to Klein / Isaacs unconscious phantasy is an *experience*; Isaacs writes (1989):

“A mechanism is an abstract general term describing certain mental processes which are experienced by the subject as unconscious phantasies.

“Phantasy is (in the first instance) the mental corollary, the psychic representative, of *instinct,* There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy.”

*Note by E. C.: *Trieb: drive or urge. I think it useful to note that in terms of the interpersonal psychology of Harry Stack Sullivan (Sullivan, Harry Stack, 1953; 1962; 1964, Spanish 1968), or of the multidisciplinary theories of Gregory Bateson (in particular, 1972, 1990), and to a great extent of the psychology and [anti-

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In the former case, the original other’s inability to positively reinforce the courses of behavior she or he deems “correct” may lead the child to seek approval from deviants, as described above; in the latter case, even her reinforcing the courses of behavior she deems correct, insofar as these are the ones admired by deviants, will lead the child to later on seek approval from deviant peers (and, contrariwise, in this case the original other’s inability to do so may even come to be a force impelling the child to seek approval from “well-adapted people” and thus to become well-adapted to society). However, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter of the regular text, a deviant mother will have more than one mutually contradictory identity (what Jung called persona) with its respective shadow—which will make the situation far more complex.

However, the above make take place in various ways, depending on whether or not the behavior the original other deems desirable is the same that society in general deems desirable or is in contradiction with it. In the former case, the original other’s inability to positively reinforce the courses of behavior she or he deems “correct” may lead the child to seek approval from deviants, as described above; in the latter case, even her reinforcing the courses of behavior she deems correct, insofar as these are the ones admired by deviants, will lead the child to later on seek approval from deviant peers (and, contrariwise, in this case the original other’s inability to do so may even come to be a force impelling the child to seek approval from “well-adapted people” and thus to become well-adapted to society). However, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter of the regular text, a deviant mother will have more than one mutually contradictory identity (what Jung called persona) with its respective shadow—which will make the situation far more complex.

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In fact, elsewhere in this book, as well as in Capriles (1977, 1986), I referred to the ex-convict discussed in Goffman (1963), who loved good literature, but who made sure none of his fellow ex-prisoners were watching whenever he came in or out of the public library. Since no matter what course of behavior they adopt, they will be embodying one of their phantasy shadows, “criminals” will be doomed to conflict, and will have to project both phantasy shadows on others and try to punish and/or destroy the phantasy shadows by punishing and/or destroying those on whom they project them. Since criminals experience the traits of successful adaptation to society as a second shadow and obtain pride from fellow criminals through embodying to a greater extent than other criminals, the “criminal values” that are the embodiment of their first shadow (the one they share with well-adapted members of society), it is not difficult to understand why many criminals inflict unnecessary, gratuitous torments on their well-adapted victims. And since they experience the traits of criminality as their first shadow, they are ready to be equally harsh toward fellow criminals. Or may be ready simply to unchain their violence on anyone without any apparent reason. (All of this, however, is not explained by this alone; the common sense idea that only those who have been victim of gratuituous torments inflict such torments on others continues to be equally valid, and is explained in terms of the two process Freud described in the Project of 1895: one who learns to function in a primary process relation of torture may try to avoid the suffering of being tortured by adopting in the same primary process relation the secondary process relation of the torturer. However, this reinforces the primary process relation, reinforcing the need to adopt the identity of the tormenter in secondary process.)

(At any rate, once more it must be noted that the reactions of mother or whoever the original other is, in all cases will necessarily respond to the infant’s karma from “previous lifetimes” / genetic propensities, and thus will merely function as a contributory condition for one or another set of karmic traits and impulses to prevail.)

There is the story of the Tibetan practitioner of chö (gcod) who, each and every session of practice, had the experience of being attacked by a yellow-eyed, red-headed demon; since he was unable to liberate his vision, he grew increasingly terrified, and thus decided to see his teacher and ask for advise. The teacher gave him a sharpened, three-edged purbhu knife and a tablet of India ink, instructed him to keep the tablet moist, and told him that when the demon appeared he should use it to write a cross on the demon’s belly, and then stick the knife right in the center of the sign—warning him that, before stabbing the fearsome creature, he should pause and look well to see where was it that he had he drawn the cross. He did as instructed, and when he was about to stick the knife into the middle of the cross, he remembered his teacher’s instructions—upon which he realized the cross was drawn on his own belly. That very moment, the demon vanished and never again disturbed the practitioner.

Another interesting story is that of a lady who went to a Zen Master to ask him what to do in order to get rid of a ghost haunting her house. The Master told her to get a handful of beings and ask the ghost how many beans were in her hand: since ghosts can see through physical objects, if the recurring vision were a true ghost, it would surely be able to tell her how many beans she was holding in her hand (a number that she herself ignored). She did as the Master had told her, and the very moment she questioned the ghost the phantom vanished and never appeared again.

The reference is to Jesus of Nazareth, but it applies to Spiritual Masters in general. For example, a Kadampa (bka’ gdam pa) Geshe murdered the great Kagyüpa yogi, Milarepa; Bodhidharma, who introduced Ch’an in China, was repeatedly poisoned by two conventionalist teachers (Tripitaka Master Bodhirucci and a Vinaya master of Chinese origin), and his successor, Hui-k’o, was effectively murdered; the great Sufi master Mansur el-Hallaj was martyred and killed… Recently, members of a Tibetan demonic cult have repeatedly tried to assassinate the present Dalai Lama; in the last decades, important lamas have been jailed on trumped-up charges in different countries (e.g. Dudjom Rinpoche, the late head of the Nyingmapa School of Tibetan Buddhism and one of my direct Teachers, was jailed for years in India after being accused of being… a Chinese spy!!!)... And so on and on, in an extremely long list of heinous crimes committed in the name of purity, orthodoxy and so on.

Other excerpts show the remedy to this (lines from Chapter 19):

Would we discard knowledge and ingenuity
People would profit a hundredfold;
Would we discard duty and justice
Harmonious relationships would form;

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Would we discard industriousness, artifice, luxury and profit
Waste and theft would disappear.
[This may only be achieved through]
The unveiling of the simple, natural and unaltered
And the embracing of the uncut trunk (p'u) [of our original nature].

Though Freud did not discover this, development of the superego is wholly dependent on the tropism described by Brodey, which makes the infant cling to mother in case of danger, and which is not fully eradicated or surpassed in later life (Laing, 1961). Since Freud would link tropisms to the \textit{id}, this consideration could result in a reinterpretation of Freud's dictum.

According to Freud, an artist is “a man who turns away from reality because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play in the life of fantasy. He finds his way back to reality by making use of special gifts to mold his fantasies into truths of a new kind which are valued by men as precious reflections of reality. He can only achieve \textit{[hero status]} because of that dissatisfaction, which results from the replacement of the pleasure principle, is itself part of that reality.” In other words, only artists and beings of analogous genius can partly resolve the conflict inherent in social life.

Elements taken from \textit{The Golden Bough} by James George Frazer (1854-1941), from the works by William Robertson Smith (1846-1894), from \textit{Social origins} (1903) and \textit{Primal Law} by James Jasper Atkinson (d. 1899), and from those by Edward Westermarck (1862-1939).

I am not so sure Freud’s theses concerning the way the superego originates (which he expressed by the 1923 phrase “the superego is the heir of the Oedipus complex” [Freud, 1900]). MODIFY: According to Freud, the manner in which the superego arises is determined by the mode of identification, which occurs with the resolution of the Oedipus complex: the superego is the “heir of the Oedipus complex.” When the young boy gives up love for his mother he ceases to see his father as a threatening rival and begins to internalize his values. Freud considered the development of superego in girls to be much more obscure, indeed women seem to him not to have as exacting and objective a superego as men. The development of the superego, which Freud would have us believe is completely learned, is intimately related to sexual identity and would hence seem to be biologically determined. Hence, he may not be as far from a nativistic position as he would like. However, the emphasis on the learned aspect of the superego can be very helpful in understanding the development of conscience and ethical commitment.

For a discussion of the reasons why in Awakening there is no ego in either the earlier or the later Freudian senses of the term, cf. the last section of the last chapter of this book, where Michael’s Washburn’s views are discussed. In particular, the fact that in Awakening there is no ego \textit{qua} sense of self associated a self-image—and hence no Jungian \textit{persona}—also follows from the just discussed fact that in it the superego has dissolved: our self-images are built through \textit{becoming} what others see as us, and then making our own collage of the images of ourselves received through these others and becoming this collage through the internalized others; since there can be no \textit{ego} in the Freudian sense if we can no longer become the collage in question or in general what the internalized others see as us, it follows from this that in Awakening there is no \textit{ego} in this sense.

As noted in vol. III of this book in terms of a quotation from Steve Taylor (2003), Wilber nonetheless warns there are “many places that strict onto/phylo parallels break down” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 146). However, as Taylor (2003) rightly points out, Wilber nonetheless believes in the truth of the onto/phylo parallels, presenting an inverted view of human evolution.

According to the findings of ethnecology that Philippe Descola (1996) reported in an important paper, in the Amazon, where the topsoil is extremely poor, regions that have been inhabited for a longer time exhibit a higher degree of biodiversity than those that have been inhabited for shorter time or that are as yet uninhabited—which seems to show that the intuitive wisdom of the aborigines was such that their interventions on the environment optimized ecological relations. This is the very opposite of what happens with human civilizations, which, as Tom Dale and Vernon Gill Carter (1955) have shown, repeatedly destroyed themselves by irrationally preying on their environment, and which, in the case of Western civilization, at some point developed what Gregory Bateson (1968, 1972) called a “conscious purpose against nature.”

The essay in Bateson (1972) in which the author develops his levels of learning is “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication, and the Acquisition of World Views,” presented at the Werner-Green
Commemorative Symposium on World Views, their Nature and Role in Culture. The author posits four Levels of Learning, which go from 0 to III: delusion and its inverted dynamic result from Learning II, while (fully developed) Wisdom results from Learning III, which we can only achieve after we develop the previous levels of Learning. (For a description of these levels of learning, see Bateson [1972]; in Capriles [1986], they were explained as being associations, associations of associations, associations of associations of associations, and associations of associations of associations of associations of associations, but this may be a reductionistic explanation.)

In this case, the experience is one of anguish about anguish (i.e., of meta-anguish) rather than fear of anguish because it is not fear that anguish may come to us spontaneously, but that through our own thoughts and related impulses we may give rise to the experience of anguish. However, once anguish manifests, we experience the feeling tone of anguish and the whole experience of anguish as somehow being imposed on us.

For example, when a discursive thought about the possibility that we activate the experience of anguish manifests, we look at it right in its face, recognizing the dharmakaya, true condition of the dang (gdangs) energy that is the stuff of which thoughts are made. Alternatively, we look right into the subtle concept interpreting the present object (which, however, is more difficult, requiring greater acquaintance with the practice). However, the case under consideration is that in which, during the experience of anguish, we look toward the mental subject which is an aspect of the threefold thought structure that is the condition of possibility of anguish, and which complains about the anguish, in order to find whether there is actually such subject separate and different from the object—or to discover the awareness in which the experience manifests (as in a mirror).

In general, we mind the opinion of authorities and peers we respect (which in the case of deviants are the authorities and peers of the deviance we share), of those sharing our social milieu, and so on—but to a lower degree of those who lie under us in a hierarchy, and even of the general values and conventions of our society (which explains why criminals may be ashamed when exposed to the general public for what they are). This is too complex to be discussed here, but it may be worthwhile to explore it elsewhere.

Of course, this would be impossible if the individual thought that it is bad to feel proud, for upon becoming aware of pride, he or she would reject the object of consciousness and thus would reject the whole of what appears as object, including his or her sensations—and therefore the latter will become unpleasant.

In common language, illusion may be understood to refer to segments of the continuum of sensa lacking what Madhyamaka philosophy calls actuality or effectiveness (Skt. arthakriyashakti; Tib. dönche nüpa [don byed nus pa]); in Buddhism, typical examples of “illusion” are the perception of a falling hair by someone who suffers from cataract, seeing a shell as yellow while suffering from jaundice—to which we could add the vision of a pink elephant, the perception of something bidimensional as tridimensional, and so on. In its turn, I use the term delusion to refer to a confusion with regard to the mode of existence of something, such as believing that segments of the continuum of sensa lacking actuality or effectiveness have actuality or effectiveness; taking what lacks self-existence as being self-existent; believing the apparition-like to be concrete; taking the relative as absolute; thinking the interdependent is independent; taking what we value as inherently valuable, and so on. In terms of the example of the pink elephant, it may be said that illusion is the vision in question, and delusion lies in taking this appearance as being actual and effective.

So that the meaning of actuality or effectiveness in this sense may be crystal clear, ponder the four conditions of actuality of effectiveness in general Madhyamaka, as listed in a short book by Thinle Norbu Rinpoche (1985, p. 40 [1st. ed. p. 25]):

“Collectively perceived” (Tib. thunpar nangwa [mthun par snang ba]). For example, water, fire, sun and moon are perceived similarly by [all human beings];

“Capable of [producing] effects [or capable of] functioning” (Tib. dönje nüpa [don byed nus pa]). For example, the earth can support all human beings;

“Produced by root cause and condition (Tib. gyukyen gyi kyepa [rgyu rkyen gyis skyes pa]). For example, when a seed, which is the root cause, and [earth,] water, warmth, [light] and air, which are the contributory circumstances, come together, a plant grows; and

“Nonexistent when examined (Tib. tag na denpa [bri tag na dben pa]).
We have seen him come to life in the German Youth Movement. Jung was, in 1936, trying to figure out what was happening in Germany. The results of his considerations he produced by root cause and conditions' because of the realization of the illusory nature of phenomena. The root cause of this realization is the two accumulations of merit and wisdom. The contributing circumstance, or necessary condition, is the teachings of the precious teacher; and ‘Nonexistent when examined’ because, actually, there is not even illusion; all phenomena, existence, nonexistence, truth and untruth are total emptiness (in the original, ‘great emptiness’).

In the case of the perception of phenomena of tsel energy as external, the Dzogchen teachings view even this perception itself as an instance of the pathology in question. Madhyamaka Prasangika philosophy does not have the concept of tsel energy, nor does it have methods for totally dissolving the illusion of tsel energy as making up an external dimension; however, it sees it as a mistaken appearance that continues to manifest in the post-Contemplation state (Skt. prishthalabdha; Tib. jethob [rjes thob]) of superior bodhisattvas and which, though it does not manifest in their Contemplation state (Skt. samahita; Tib. nyamzhak [mnyam bzhag]) of the same bodhisattvas, only ceases to manifest in a definitive way in total Buddhahood.

What Laing means is that collusus requires two or more “physical” human individuals intending to deceive each other into believing stories both parts want to believe. In this it contrasts, for example, with elusion, which can be achieved by a single physical individual. However, in the case of elusion, an internalized interlocutor may also be necessary for achieving it.

Anguish and the hell Sartre called shame feed each other; when we are trying to gain the admiration or approval of those who matter for us in order to transform shame into pride, uncertainty as to whether our behavior will achieve its aim or will give rise to the opposite result, may give rise to anguish. In its turn, the detection of our anguish by others may give rise to shame, for anguish is regarded as a shameful occurrence—particularly in the case of anguish as to what kind of feedback we will receive from others. And if we manage to elude anguish and shame, we may experience fear that we may become unable to continue to elude them uninterruptedly. It is hardly possible to consider all possible ways in which unpleasant emotions feed each other or give rise to each other, but it is clear that it is impossible to dwell indefinitely in the paradises resulting from acceptance, for this attitude is interdependent with rejection and therefore there is no way we may sustain it uninterruptedly: when positive karma be exhausted or contributory conditions change, rejection will be reestablished.

It is paradoxical, to say the least, that Jung was so acutely aware of the dynamic of the shadow, and yet he believed that psychotherapy had to make use of the symbolism in the individual’s “racial unconscious,” so as to achieve what seems to have amounted to an almost mystical union between the self and its racial background, and, furthermore, seems to have somehow sympathized, and even collaborated, with the Nazis. In Brask (undated), we read:

Jung was, in 1936, trying to figure out what was happening in Germany. The results of his considerations he put down in an essay called “Wotan” (note by the author of this book: Jung, 1970a), in which he tried to understand the German situation by means of the mythology around the Germanic god Odin, a.k.a. Wotan:

“We have seen him come to life in the German Youth Movement, and right at the beginning the blood of several sheep was shed in honor of his resurrection. Armed with rucksack and lute, blond youth, and sometimes girls as well, were to be seen as restless wanderers on every road from the North Cape to Sicily, faithful votaries of the roving god. Later, towards the end of the Weimar Republic, the wandering role was taken over by thousands of unemployed, who were to be met with everywhere on their aimless journeys. By 1933 they wandered no longer, but marched in their hundreds of thousands. The Hitler movement literally brought the whole of Germany to its feet, from five-year-olds to veterans, and produced the spectacle of a nation migrating from one place to another. Wotan the wanderer was on the move’. (Collected Works 10: 373) Who is this Wotan? ‘He is the god of storm and frenzy, the unleasher of passions and the lust of battle; moreover he is a superlative magician and artist in illusion who is versed in all secrets of an occult nature’. (Ibid. 375) ‘Wotan disappeared when his oaks fell and appeared again
In fact, one could argue from the historical record that the unfathomable depths of Wotan’s character explain more of National Socialism than (Ibid. 385) all economic, political and psychological factors put together.

“The gods are without doubt personifications of psychic forces...” (Ibid. 387) And when one is possessed by such a god there is not much one can do about it and in the case of Wotan we’re talking about ‘a fundamental attribute of the German psyche’. (Ibid. 389)

“Because the behavior of a race takes on its specific character from its underlying images we can speak of an archetype Wotan. As an autonomous psychic factor, Wotan produces effects in the collective life of a people and thereby reveals his own nature’. (Ibid. 391) But we must remember, cautions Jung, that, ‘It has always been terrible to fall into the hands of a living god. Yahweh was no exception to this rule, and the Philistines, Edomites, Amorites, and the rest, who were outside the Yahweh experience, must certainly have found it exceedingly disagreeable. The Semitic experience of Allah was for a long time an extremely painful affair for the whole of Christendom. We who stand outside judge the Germans far too much as if they were responsible agents, but perhaps it would be nearer the truth to regard them also as victims’. (Ibid. 398 [original emphasis])

“The limitations of this view of human psychology seem glaring. Even so I would like, before pointing out its equally glaring dangers, to quote Otto Rank’s observations on Jung’s fundamental mistake:

“His early experiences with psychotic types, whose main characteristic is their complete withdrawal from reality and the building up of an inner world of their own, led him to believe that the individual’s fundamental problem lies in the feeling of isolation, regardless of what his environment may be. Consequently, he did not look for the individual’s salvation in his relation to reality either through rebellion or submission but in a sublimation of those inner forces which were frustrated. In this psychological process of sublimation, the individual, according to Jung, makes use of the symbolism in his racial unconscious, thus achieving as it were a kind of collectivity within its own self. Such a striving towards an almost mystical union between the self and its racial background is supposed to link the isolated individual with a bigger whole of which he can feel an essential part’. (Rank [1958], p. 36.)

“In other words, as far as Otto Rank is concerned, the process of being an individuated person in Jung’s psychology undervalues the person’s choice in relationship to the world in favor of sublimating frustration; i.e. Jung put the world into the person’s unconscious (whereas Freud had put it in the person’s super-ego), for him/her to make peace with it, as it were, solipsistically.

“Jung was not, of course, alone in considering the racial well springs of the human personality (for further evidence of the Volkish roots of Jung’s philosophy, see Noll [1997]) and in particular the figure of Wotan. Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler’s chief ideologist, seemed to be in agreement with Jung in the following quotes.

“Soul means race viewed from within. And, vice-versa race is the externalization of the soul.” (Pois, Ed. [1970], p. 34 [original emphasis].)

“A life-feeling, both young and yet known in ancient times, is pressing towards articulation...’ (Ibid. P. 35)

“The life of a race does not represent a logically developed philosophy nor even the unfolding of a pattern according to natural law, but rather the development of a mystical synthesis, an activity of soul, which cannot be explained rationally, nor can it be conceived through a study of cause and effect’. (Ibid. P. 84 [original emphasis])

“...once again there dawned an age when the Fenris wolf broke his chains, when Hel, exuding the odor of decay, moved over the earth and the Midgaard Serpent stirred the oceans of the world’. (Ibid. P. 96)

“Wagner understood, ‘That the Nordic soul is not contemplative and that it does not lose itself in individual psychology, but that it willfully experiences cosmic-spiritual laws and is architectonically constructed. [...] This inner beauty idea is developed in Wotan...’ (Ibid. Pp. 138-139 [original emphasis])...

“Jung’s philosophy, his outlook, his insights, his brilliance did not immunize him from proto-fascist thinking. (Even in the view of the Jungian analyst and scholar Andrew Samuels [1989. P. vii], Jung was, at the very least, misguided when he published on various racial psychologies ‘containing generalizations about Jewish culture and psychology’. Indeed, they may have caused his misguided inaction. Immunization against this particular form of oblivion may depend on a philosophy which includes individual agency and responsibility in its purview; that is on a psychology which resists a deterministic view of human behavior.

“In fact, one could argue from the historical record, that even though under his presidency of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy he did make it possible for Jewish analysts to continue their work by establishing an individual membership category, Jung was so intent on keeping his form of psychotherapy
alive over that of Freud’s that he talked of Freud’s as a Jewish psychology—and he must have known what that implied at the time—and by allowing well-known Nazi psychotherapists to use his name and his ideas because they were, after all, members of the largest and most powerful contingent in that Society. When Jung became president of the Society, June 21, 1933, he selected the declared Nazi-sympathizer Gustav Richard Heyer as his vice-president. (See Svend Aage Madsen ‘Psykoøerapi under Nazismen’ in C.G. Jung, Nazisme og Psykologi ed. by Svend Aage Madsen, Pia Skogemøn and Steen Visholm, Copenhagen: Forlaget Politisk Revy, 1990. P.17. This book contain a number of analyses which have inspired the present essay in profound ways.)

“So when it mattered for people—and especially for intellectual leaders—to take a stand 1933-1939, his voice was not heard among the protests. (Which I suppose is marginally better than Heidegger who joined the party and imposed the first Führer-rule on a German university).”

Likewise, in Jacob, Alexander, 1993, we read:

“It should not be surprising that, with the theory of the collective unconscious, Jung points not only to the relation between the Self and the ego in the unfolding of human civilization but also to the basic psychological differences between races and to the psychological influences that occur between them. An example of the exclusivity of racial archetypes is in fact offered by the modern history of Europe. Jung considers one of the chief causes of the wars, schisms, and strife of modern Europe as being due to the anomalous position of Christianity amongst the European peoples. As he sees it, German Christians are a contradiction in terms’. (‘Wotan’ [1936] in CW, X:19.)

“In ‘Wotan’ Jung explains the catastrophes of wartime Germany as due to the emergence, under stress, of the native spirit of Wotan, the ancient Germanic god of war and thunder, among the German people. The lesson to be learnt from this example is that the nationalistic awareness of a people is as essential as the self-awareness of its individual constituents: ‘Nationalism—disagreeable as it is—is therefore a sine qua non, but the individual must not remain stuck in it. On the other hand, in so far as he is a particle in the mass he must not raise himself above it either’. (Jung to Dr. James Kirsch, May 26, 1934 in C.G. Jung, Letters, ed. G. Adler, A. Jaffe, R.F.C. Hull, Princeton: PUP, 1975, Vol. I, p. 162. That Jung’s political views were always intimately related to his psychological ones, despite his public repudiation of the Nazi regime in 1946, is demonstrated by S. Grossman in his article ‘C.G. Jung and National Socialism’, Journal of European Studies, 9 (1979), 231-59.)

“Jung clearly insists on the need to apply different psychological categories in considering different racial groups. Thus in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, he declared that it is a quite unpardonable mistake to accept the conclusions of a Jewish psychology as generally valid . . . No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well’. (The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious [Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten], 1928, Part I, Ch.2, in CW, VII:149n.)

“Jung criticizes Freud’s mistaken application of Jewish categories ‘indiscriminately to Germanic and Slavic Christendom’ for ‘Because of this the most precious secret of the Germanic peoples—their creative and intuitive depth of soul—has been explained as a morass of banal infantilism’. He continues:

“[Freud] did not understand the Germanic psyche any more than did his Germanic followers. Has the formidable phenomenon of National Socialism, on which the whole world gazes with astonished eyes, taught them better? Where was that unparalleled tension and energy while as yet no National Socialism existed? Deep in the Germanic psyche, in a pit that is anything but a garbage-bin of unthinkably infantile wishes and unresolved family resentments. A movement that grips a whole nation must have matured in every individual as well . . . And that is why [the] scope [of medical psychology] must be widened to reveal to the physician’s gaze not just the pathological aberrations of a disturbed psychic development, but the creative powers of the psyche laboring at the future; not just a dreary fragment but the meaningful whole’.

(‘The state of psychotherapy today’ [‘Zur gegenwartigen Lage der Psychotherapie’, 1934], in CW, X:163.)

“Pointing out that neither Freud nor Adler is ‘a universally valid representative of European man’, Jung suggests that the Jewish psychology is a representation of ‘the shadow that accompanies us all’ for, he charges:

“The Jews have this peculiarity in common with women; being physically weaker, they have to aim at the chinks in the armour of their adversary, and thanks to this technique which has been forced on them

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through the centuries, the Jews themselves are best protected where others are more vulnerable. Because, again, of their civilization, more than twice as ancient as ours, they are vastly more conscious than we of human weaknesses, of the shadow-side of things, and hence in this respect much less vulnerable than we are’. (Ibid.)

“The psyche of the Germanic peoples contrasts with the predominantly rational ego-consciousness of the Jews, Jung argues, and that this accounts for the greater creativity of the former:

“‘The Aryan unconscious . . . contains explosive forces and seeds of a future yet to be born, and these may not be devalued as nursery romanticism without psychic danger. The still youthful Germanic peoples are fully capable of creating new cultural forms that still lie dormant in the darkness of the unconscious of every individual . . . The Jew, who is something of a nomad, has never yet created a cultural form of his own and as far as we can see never will, since all his instincts and talents require a more or less civilized nation to act as host for their development’. (Ibid.)

“While the archetypes of the collective unconscious are generally racebound, according to Jung, they can be distorted by chthonic influences on the lower soul, or the subconscious. Thus Jung points to the influence that the mind and manners of a conquered people have on their conquerors. In America, for example, the Europeans have inevitably developed Indian morphological characteristics as well as psychological symbolisms. Some of their culture, on the other hand, is derived from the Negro:

“‘American music draws its main inspiration from the Negro, and so does the dance. The expression of religious feeling, the revival meetings, the Holy Rollers and other abnormalities are strongly influenced by the Negro’. (‘Mind and Earth’ ['Seele und Erde', 1931] in CW, X:46. cf. also ‘The Complications of the American Psychology’ [1930] in CW, X:508: ‘The inferior man has a tremendous pull because he fascinates the inferior layers of our psyche, which has lived through untold ages of similar conditions—on revient toujours à ses premiers amours—The barbarian in us is still wonderfully strong and he yields easily to the lure of his youthful memories. Therefore he needs very definite defenses—the defenses of the Germanic man reach only as far as consciousness reaches. Below the threshold of consciousness the contagion meets with little resistance’.)

“Though Jung does not declare this mingling of racial characteristics to be entirely harmful, he extols the virtue of retaining one’s links with one’s native soil for ‘he who is rooted in the soil endures’. (‘Mind and Earth’ in Collected Works, X:49.) If we gloss this section of Jung’s writings with the description of the Archetypes as constituted both of a priori forms and residues of empirical experience, as well as the Schopenhauerian elucidation of archetypes or Ideas as levels of Self-knowledge, we will see that these interactions of racial archetypes indeed entail alterations of the capacity of the individual egos to apprehend the inner reality of life or Psyche.

“However, despite the racial and nationalistic dimensions of the Collective Unconscious, the aim of historical evolution, according to Jung, is indeed ‘individuation’. Individuation is the fullest development of personality, and is a ‘Passion des Ich’:

“…a conscious and deliberate self-surrender which proves that you have full control of yourself, that is, of your ego. The ego thus becomes the object of a moral act, for ‘I’ am making a decision on behalf of an authority which is supraordinate to my ego nature. I am, as it were, deciding against my ego and renouncing my claim… Hence it is quite possible for the ego to be made into an object, that is to say, for a more compendious personality to emerge in the course of development and take ego into its service. Since this growth of personality comes out of the unconscious, which is by definition unlimited, the extent of the personality now gradually realizing itself cannot in practice be limited either. But unlike the Freudian super-ego, it is still individual. It is in fact individuality in the highest sense’. (Jung, ‘Transformation Symbolism in the Mass’ ['Das Wandlungssymbol in der Messe’, 1954], IV, ii, in CW, XI:258. As Aniela Jaffe puts it, ‘Individuation muss, in religiöser Sprache, als Verwirklichung eines Goutlischen im Menachen verstanden werden’ [Aniela Jaffe, Der Mythus yore Sinn, Zurich: Rascher, 1967, p.89].)

“It is not the continued assertion of the individual ego against the external world but rather the subsumption of this ego in the higher consciousness of the Absolute Self:

“But again and again I note that the individuation process is confused with the coming of the ego into consciousness and that the ego is in consequence identified with the self, which naturally produces a hopeless muddle. Individuation is then nothing but ego-centeredness and autoeroticism. But the Self comprises infinitely more than a mere ego… It is as much one’s self, and all other selves, as the ego. Individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself’. (“On the Nature of the Psyche” in CW, VIII:226. cf. Jung’s letter, dated 23 August 1953: ‘Becoming conscious means

“The aim of individuation is the renewed participation of the individual self in the transcendent Self. For, the individual ego extends beyond consciousness to the realm of the spirit, or the Godhead. This Jung tries to illustrate by the example of the divinity of Christ:

“In the world of Christian ideas, Christ undoubtedly represents the self. As the apotheosis of individuality, the self has the attributes of uniqueness and of occurring once only in time. But the psychological self is a transcendent concept, expressing the totality of conscious and unconscious contents, it can only be described in antinomial terms (Just as the transcendent nature of light can only be expressed through the image of waves and particles) . . . As an historical personage Christ is untemporal and unique; as God, universal and eternal. Likewise the self, as an individual thing it is untemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God-image and therefore universal and eternal’. (Aion [1951], V, in Collected Works, IX,ii:62f.)

“Jung’s answer to the problem of loss of religion consequent on Freud’s theories of civilization was thus not the traditional Judaeo-Christian one of a God in Heaven but a more philosophical interpretation of the symbolic significance of Christ using the ideal archetype of the self as an image of divinity. Jung also uses as an illustration of his ethical goal the Hindu doctrine of the immersion of the Atman in the Brahman, terms which served as sources of his conception of the Ich and the Selbst. (See The Psychology of the Transference, in CW, XVI:264.) Jung insists that the ultimate consciousness of the Self is not the same as the ego, but rather a higher transcendent entity that is consequent on psychic evolution or the union of the individual ego with the unconscious anima. This higher reality is also the domain of real freedom, since the individual self is now integrated into the subject of the psyche which is the absolutely free and creative Self.”

The German people developed a collective shadow as a result of the Holocaust; however, for the same reasons why we are not allowed to speak of what Jung called the “racial unconscious,” this shadow may not be called a “racial shadow;” because research has shown that all races have mixed to such extent that no genetic characteristics can be found that define a “race.” Thus we may speak of a collective shadow but not so of a racial one.

Sartre suggests the champion of sincerity believes the pederast will achieve sincerity if he acknowledged he is a homosexual; however, the latter refuses to do so, and he would be right in refusing if he were just expressing the “undeniable comprehension of truth” that homosexuality as a complex of actions and first-order motives or attitudes is not “a destiny,” for “a homosexual is not a homosexual as this table is a table.” In fact, a waiter is in bad faith when he ceases playing at being a waiter and believes himself to be inherently a waiter, as though this were the whole of the human reality—rather than simply admitting he is a waiter insofar as he has this profession and no other profession whatsoever. The same applies to the pederast, who would not be in bad faith upon denying his homosexuality had he simply intended to qualify it with the point that “human reality cannot be finally defined by patterns of conduct.” However, if he slides surreptitiously towards a different connotation of the word “being” by claiming that he is not a homosexual in the sense in which this table is not an inkwell, and in the sense in which a male human being born in France is not a female born in England, then he is definitely in bad faith.

Holland & MacDonald (2006) clarify that this is not what common language calls “forgiveness;” the authors in question write (p. 75):

“The usual way of viewing forgiveness is to see it as an act that overlooks some fault or misdeed of another person, so that a prior condition of relationship is resumed. This usually implies that the other person committed some sin that the forgiver acknowledges but virtuously dismisses, instead of punishing in some manner. It is a “gracious lordliness” which disguises arrogance. Also, forgiveness as commonly exercised can become a bargain in which the aggrieved will overlook the sins of the offenders if the offenders accommodate to the needs of the offended; in effect, establishing a form of slavery. Finally, forgiveness can take the form of the forgiver recognizing the guilt they both share equally, thus making both ‘sinful’ and deserving punishment (Song of Prayer, 1977).

“ACIM views forgiveness in a very different manner. What someone sees in another that would normally generate some experience of separation (e.g., anger, condemning judgment), which could occasion forgiveness in the conventional senses as discussed above to maintain the separation, is, according to ACIM, my own self-hate or guilt, disowned through denial and projection, and then placed outside. The
disowned can now be viewed as an available choice for either attack or forgiveness in the present, as now is the only time that is real. In either event, it is my own condition that I am viewing, as in a mirror, and my anger or my judgment is really an indictment of myself. Therefore, forgiveness when it is effected through ACIM is really self-forgiveness; an undoing of the guilt upon which forms the basis of my entire ego. In seeing past the ‘faults’ of others, I render them guiltless because I have undone them in myself. Stating this in a slightly different way, when I lift my denial and reown my projection and then choose to forgive myself as an available choice in the moment, what I witness in the other is simply behavior which I observe, which informs me but arouses no separating anger or judgment since through self-forgiveness I am ‘sinless’ of what I see. It is only through my own guilt that I can see another as guilty. Others can be seen as behaving in error that may require correction but never in ‘sinning’ that demands an isolating punishment...”

I referred to this method as a “lower” one with regard to that of Dzogchen because it does not undo the dualism and the experiences of being-for-Self and being-for-others which are the ultimate root of the dynamic of the shadow. In fact, the ACIM is based on the premise that we separate ourselves from others when the latter’s behavior arouses anger or a negative judgment on our part; however, separation is introduced by the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure, which is already active when we perceive another and before we judge his or her behavior, which in its turn occurs before anger arises. Furthermore, by forgiving ourselves as assert and sustain the illusion of separate existence of the self that forgives and is forgiven. Thus this method is not the ultimate medicine for the ills under consideration—and yet it can be a most useful practice when we lack the conditions that would make the spontaneous liberation of being-for-others, the phantasy shadow, guilt, shame and dualism in general possible.

This is the Mahayana Buddhist principle for the development of the prajñaparamita (Tib. shes rab pha rol tu phyin pa) or wisdom leading beyond, which is the sixth paramita (Tib. phar phyin or pha rol tu phyin pa) or “[element] leading beyond:” to listen (and / or study), to reflect on what has been heard (and / or studied), and finally to apply it in meditation.

In the context of gompa (sgom pa) or Contemplation the Dzogchen teachings have many methods for increasing the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and turning into conflict the basic contradiction that human delusion is; just to give a couple of examples, there is the practice of Chö (geod), which can make our latent fears manifest so that we may deal with them, and there are the practices of Thögel (thod rgal) and the Yangthik (yang thig), which are used by individuals who have mastered the practice of Tekchö in order to radicalize and exacerbate the practice of Tekchö through the activation of rölpa (rol pa) energy and of the systemic activities called thindle drakpo (phrin las drag po), corresponding to the throwo (khro bo) dynamic of the dharmata that makes the slightest tensions exacerbate themselves and become extreme conflict, so that they may liberate themselves spontaneously (these practices and dynamic will be considered below in the regular text of this volume; I briefly considered them in Capriles, 2003 and I will consider them in greater detail in the upcoming Vol. III of Buddhism and Dzogchen).

The chöpa (spyod pa) or Behavior of Dzogchen also helps, in everyday life, the contradiction constituted by the basic human delusion to turn into conflict, so that its different manifestations may more easily liberate themselves spontaneously. (REVISE ORTHOGRAPHY OF TIBETAN TERMS USED IN THIS NOTE.)

Even if it were possible to cause all others, or at least those others whose opinions are important to us, to always see us in a positive light, it would be impossible for us to accept our sensations uninterruptedly: at some point acceptance would be replaced by indifference, and the ensuing mental sensation would be neutral. Then after a period of neutral sensation the concept of boredom would come into play, giving rise to subtle rejection and therefore to a subtle unpleasantness—which at some point could increase from its own feedback, turning into a coarser unpleasantness.

Beside the fact that pain is rejected sensation and pleasure is accepted sensation, there is fact that when we ascend we thereby become elated and when we descend we thereby become depressed. Since we accept elation and reject depression, our elation about elation propels us to higher states and our depression over depression leads us to even lower states and causes us to stick to them.

The beings of the six gati or loka are: humans, animals, preta or Tantali, beings of purgatory, asura or Titans, and divinities.
In the Hinayana the aim is individual liberation from suffering through the extinction of being-for-Self in _nirvana_; in the Mahayana and higher vehicles the aim is Awakening or Buddhahood, which involves that which is called “omniscience” (which, as we have seen, is not a type of ESP, but a special capacity for helping sentient beings responding to the aim of the Mahayana and higher vehicles, which is to lead all beings beyond suffering rather than going beyond suffering on one’s own).

In Ati Dzogpa Chenpo the term _nirvana_ is used to refer to all manifestations of the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit, even though the latter is the perfect manifestation of omniscience: in the Self-qua-Path there is not sentient being so long as this condition is manifest, but when it is no longer manifest there is a sentient being; in the Self-qua-Fruit the sentient being has irreversibly dissolved and therefore never manifests again.

Keep in mind that “metaphoric” is one of the characteristics of primary process, which may become patent in psychoses, but also that a metaphoric perception of reality may be a protection against a confrontation in which the victim would in all cases lose.

Just to give an example of what I mean, consider the case of “Jane” reported by Laing & Esterson, 1971, pp. 14-16. At the age of 17 she was absorbed in a continuous tennis match, as a result of which she was diagnosed as suffering from “early schizophrenia simplex.” She was seen as assuming the identity of all the elements of tennis: the crowd, the players, the court and especially the ball—which all had taken to be a delusion having nothing to do with reality. However, on investigating her family life, it became apparent that she was trapped within a series of family games in which she was the tennis ball hit back and forth between her parents (and often also the court where the match was played). Mother would turn to Jane and say, “Tell your father to pass the salt.” Father would turn to Jane and say, “Tell her to get it herself.” According to Laing, after three months of therapy she saw the connections between tennis and her family; two years later she left the family, and “has been active in the world for ten years.”

Another example of this is David Cooper’s assertion that _paranoia_ is always the perception of a persecutory reality, though the identity of the persecutors may be misplaced: for example, the individual may believe to be persecuted by aliens, when in fact the persecutors are his or her family; etc. In this regard, research by Lemert (1962) is most relevant.

Some trends of phenomenological and existential psychology—and in particular some of those that have been influenced by Eastern philosophy and psychology, such as the ones developed by R. D. Laing and D. E. Cooper—establish sanity or mental health to lie in the absence of delusion rather than in the adaptation to a deluded and delusional society, and define delusion in a way roughly coinciding with the usage of the term in this book.

However, according to existentialism authenticity lies in the non-elusion of Hell by means of the self-deceit Sartre called Bad Faith. The criterion I use here (explained in Capriles, 2007a vol. I and elsewhere), may be regarded as metaexistential insofar as it does not identify sanity with living in Hell, but proposes that we go through Hell—as Dante in the _Divine Comedy_—so as to become established in the Akanishta Heaven (Tib. Ogmim Tupko Kōpa Zhing [‘og min stug po bkod pa’i zhir]: the pure dimension of Awakening, the natural expression of the Awake condition, the dharmadhatu garden of the Primordial Buddha, which bears the suffix _ghanavyuha_ [Tib. stug po bkod pa] or “richly adorned” insofar as it spontaneously gives rise to the “offerings and adornments” of complete enjoyment, and which has not been created or produced and therefore will not dissolve or be destroyed), consisting in the Self-qua-Fruit, which represents the definitive unveiling of the true non-dual, non-pluralistic, and non-conceptual nature of reality, and hence the ultimate consolidation of true sanity I call absolute sanity, in which there is no parting from _nirvana_ and which involves total freedom from all delusive experiences—from the spurious paradises of the three spheres of the god realm (of sensuality, of form and or formlessness) down to the conflictive, pain-ridden hells and other lower realms. (The term “metaexistential” was originally defined in Capriles [1997a].)

It has been alleged that the project of modernity, rather than aiming to give rise to a technological Eden, was intended to allow the ruling class to increase its exploitation of the rest of human society, and that the ideal of the technological Eden was no more than a façade or a pretext. However, even if this were correct in the case of some of the promoters of the project in question, it could not be correct in the case of all of them—and in any case, since the powerful and their descendents would be destroyed together with the rest of society, the project’s effects would indicate delusion was at its root.

Because so-called “pesticides” kill all living organisms rather than killing only those we call “pests,” they have been called “biocides.” However, this term is redundant: since only living organisms can be killed, it
would be better to call them “omnicides.” However, since the last term would be incomprehensible to readers I kept the term “pesticides.”

170 The following is the reproduction of a note to vol. I of this book:

It is not easy to assess the authenticity or unauthenticity of the *Prajñaparamitashastra*. Unlike the texts conforming the *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* (Skt. *Yuktikaya*; Tib., *Rigtsog [rigs tshogs]* or *Uma rigtsog [dbus ma rigs tshogs]*) universally attributed to Nagarjuna, this text posits some autonomous theses and syllogisms, and some of its views seem to some extent similar to those of the Madhyamika Swatantrikas. However, the text in question makes it very clear that whatever an Awake individual posits is posited without what Chandrakirti called “own-mind:” the Awake individual does not believe what He or She says, but says it as an expedient means leading beings of specific capacities to Awakening. This is a view rejected by the Swatantrakas and admitted both by the Prasangikas (though not so by Tsongkhapa in his reinterpretation of Prasangika thought) and the adherents of the Inner, Subtle Madhyamaka (Tib. Nang trawai uma [nang phra ba’i dbus ma]), and in particular by the Mahamadhyamikas. Therefore, we may not conclude that the *shastra* was concocted by late followers of the Madhyamika Swatantrika subschool.

Nevertheless, just as Nagarjuna’s *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* is seen as the source of Swabhava Shunyata Madhyamaka or Uma Rangtongpa (dbus ma rang stong pa), and as Nagarjuna’s *Collection of Eulogies* (Skt., *Stavakaya*; Tib., *Tötsog [bstod tshogs]*) and in particular the *Eulogy to the Expanse of the True Condition* (Skt., *Dharmadhatustavā;* Tib., *Chöjing Töpa [chos dbyings bstod pa]*) is seen as the source of the Parashunya Madhyamaka or Uma Zhentongpa (dbus ma gzhan stong pa), in case the *Prajñaparamitashastra* were actually a work by Nagarjuna, it could perhaps be seen as the original source of the later Madhyamaka Swatantrika—and insofar as it combines autonomous theses and syllogisms with the insistence that no thesis should be clung to, and that Awake Ones posit theses without own-mind, merely as other-directed assertions that may be useful to treaders of the Path, it could be seen also as the original source of Inner, Subtle Madhyamaka and in particular of Mahamadhyamaka. In fact, in this case the *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* as it is known and conserved in Tibet would be the source of Prasangika only, rather than of the whole of Swabhava Shunyata Madhyamaka or Uma Rangtongpa.

Hui-neng’s method of interrelated opposites (described in Capriles, 2004 and others of my works), which is at the root of many intellectual skillful means of Ch’an and Zen Buddhism, insofar as it is based on the understanding that Buddhas have no own-mind and all they say are other-directed assertions having the function of leading being to Awakening, would be based, among other sources, both in the *Collection of Madhyamika Reasonings* and in the *Prajñaparamitashastra*.

171 One of the first authors to deal with this law was Lao-tzu in his *Tao-Te-Ching*. I myself dealt with it in Capriles (1990a [restricted circulation book]); later on the parts of the book involving no instructions that should be kept restricted were refined into Capriles (2001).

172 It is curious that, repression being a central aspect of all forms of culturally-sanctioned insanity, Erich Fromm (1966 [original pub. 1955]) opposed the theses of Herbert Marcuse’s (in agreement with those of Wilhelm Reich’s) according to which sexual repression will have to be done away for a truly free and egalitarian society to arise. These theses are briefly expressed by Jean-Pierre Famose [pseudo Thomas Münzer] (1966) as follows:

“In Communist society (Note: in the final stage of society according to Marx and Kropotkin, when government comes to an end and the distributive principle of society is “from each according to his / her capacity; to each according to his / her needs”), “when work will not be merely a means to gain one’s life, when it will become itself the first vital need” (Marx), productive activity will become play. The body, desexualized by alienated and painful work, will resexualize itself in a play-like activity. From the viewpoint of Psychoanalysis, this resexualization of the body can be but a “regression” of sexuality to a previous stage of its development. This “regression” from a higher stage of development to a lower one would consist in a reactivation of all erogenous zones, and hence in a recognition of polymorphous pregenital sexuality and a decline of genital supremacy.”

Though Famose is right in that Psychoanalysis would view such a transformation of sexuality as an instance of regression, in fact no such thing would be involved, for the sexuality of the unrepressed adult would be radically different from that of the infant, as is the case in realized Tantrics.

Marcuse replied to Fromm in Marcuse (1966 [original publication 1963]), and we must conclude that, though the theses of Reich’s and Marcuse’s in this regard are sounder than those of Fromm’s, and though (with the above expressed reservations) Famose is to a great extent right in his view of the
transformation of sexuality in the final stage of society, Reich (1968) is definitely wrong in his view that sexual liberation implied that the orgone (sexual energy) has to be “released (in ‘orgasm’) by means of rhythmic contractions agreeable to the body,” and that when the complete discharge of the orgone cannot be achieved in repeated occasions the libido gets stuck in the organism, having to find tortuous expressions as outlets. Unfortunately, Marcuse lacked the understanding of Tantrism that would have allowed him to clearly refute this view.

I will deal with this in detail in a book on Psychology I will write when I have the time.  

Perry, who had met Jung personally in Switzerland, already in Perry (1953, published with a foreword by Jung) developed the Jungian view that what is called “schizophrenia,” rather than an illness, could be an attempt at self-healing. However, later on he assimilated the works by R. D. Laing, and then founded his Diabasis center in which he corroborated the results Laing and his associates had obtained in Kinsley Hall in London.

This is not the view of Shankaracharya, who in his Introduction to his Commentary on the Brahma Sutras wrote:

“Owing to an absence of discrimination, there continues a natural human behaviour in the form of ‘I am this’ or ‘This is mine’; this is avidya. It is a superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another. The ascertainment of the nature of the real entity by separating the superimposed thing from it is vidya.” In his philosophy and in some other forms of vedanta, avidya is what affects the individual self (jivatman), mientras que maya es un principio universal que en cuanto tal puede atribuirse a Brahma o al paratman, pero que no afecta a estos últimos, para quienes la verdadera condición de la existencia no se oculta jamás.

Gendün Chöphel (2005) wrote:

“‘Relative’ is the word ancient scholars used for translating the Sanskrit samvriti, which means ‘obscuration to correctness’ or ‘thoroughly confused’. Because one is ‘deluded about the meaning’, we must also understand ‘relative truth’ as ‘deluded [pseudo-]truth’.”

R. D. Laing (1967) wrote:

“From the alienated starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not ‘true’ sanity. Their madness is not ‘true’ madness. The madness of our patients is an artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us, and by them on themselves. Let no one suppose that we meet ‘true’ madness any more than we are truly sane. The madness that we encounter in ‘patients’ is a gross travesty, a mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of that estranged integration we call sanity may be. True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated social reality: the emergence of the ‘inner’ archetypal mediators of divine power, and through this death a rebirth, and the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego functioning, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer.”

I am aware of the views of James Low because we met in Nepal, when he was studying Dzogchen under Chime Rigdzin Rinpoche, and I know that he continues to follow the Dzogchen Path. I assume that Noel Cobb still holds the views that led him to study with Khamtrul Rinpoche, but I have been unable to corroborate this.

The best way to grasp the difference between the three senses of avidya or marigpa in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjam and the three senses of these terms in the classification adopted here is by considering the arising of samsara after the shining forth of what the Dzogchen teachings call ngowo shi (ngo bo’i gshis)—which, when its true condition is reGnized, is the dharmakaya.

At the time of this shining forth, the beclouding element of stupefaction (Tib. mongcha [rmongs cha]) that has always been flowing with the continuum of those beings who have never realized the true condition and that is the core of the first type of avidya or marigpa in all Dzogchen classifications—the one that prevents the reGnition of our true condition and that precedes the process of origination of samsara, which in the threefold Dzogchen division adopted here is called innate beclouding of primordial, nondual awareness (Tib. lhenchik kyepai marigpa [lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa]) and which in the alternative threefold Dzogchen classification favored by Longchen Rabjam is referred to by the hardly translatable term gyu dag nyid gcig pa’i ma rig pa; cf. Longchenpa, 1976, p. 24, and Cornu, 2001, p. 62)—in ordinary individuals always prevents the reGnition of the true condition of that which shone forth, which would have made the dharmakaya patent, giving rise to an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all (in which there is
With the above, the illusion that constitutes the second type of avidya is manifest, yet there is no samsara insofar as the other types of avidya are not manifest.

If, immediately after failing to recognize the sudden shining forth in question and thus failing to realize it to be the (expression of the) Base, the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle threefold thought structure gives rise to the subject-object duality, and hence we take that shining forth for an external reality, this is the second type of avidya or marigpa according to the threefold classification favored by Longchenpa—which calls it spontaneous illusion or lhenchik kyepai marigpa ([lhan cig skyes pa'i ma rig pa], which is the term the other classification uses to refer to the first type of avidya; cf. Longchenpa, 1975a, p. 51; 1976, pp. 24 and 122 note 10, and Cornu, 2001, p. 62)—and the one that marks the beginning of the development of samsara. This gives rise to the illusory distance between the perceiver and the perceived necessary for the perceiver to subsequently cling to the perceived, giving rise to the grasper and the grasped at the root of grasping at appearances. In fact, it is after this that there manifests the delusiveness (Skt. kliṣṭamanas; Tib. nyön yi [nyon yid])—the propensity for which is inherent in the base-of-all-carrying-propensities (bagchagkyi kunzhi [bag chags kyi kun gzhi])—that, on the basis of the delusory valuation-absolutization of subtle (intuitive) thoughts, conceives the base-of-all-carrying-propensities as an independently existing “I” that rules over the skandhas, thus giving rise to the basic disturbing attitude referred to by the Sanskrit term ahāmkarā and the Tibetan ngadzin (nga ’dzin) that I render as self-grasping (but that as we have seen involves self-affirmation and self-preoccupation), which conceives an I or me as the experiencer, would-be controller and somehow owner of what is cognized. This will give rise to the third type of avidya in the threefold classification espoused by Longchenpa, which is termed kun tu tagpai marigpa (kun tu brtags pa’i ma rig pa; cf. Longchenpa, 1976, pp. 24 and 123 note 11, and Cornu, 2001, p. 62) or imaginative delusion, and which as the term suggests is related to the third truth of Mahamadhyamaka (for an explanation of the three truths of Mahamadhyamaka, cf. Capriles, 2004, last chapter; Longchenpa favored the explanation of Dzogchen with Third Promulgation terminology, interpreted in a way that is more similar to that of Mahamadhyamaka than to those of the Yogachara school of philosophy or of the Madhyamaka Swatantrika Yogachara subschools). This type of avidya involves the singling out of objects within the continuum that appeared as object the very moment spontaneous illusion (lhenchik kyepai marigpa as understood in the threefold classification adopted here) arose in the immediately preceding stage—thus presupposing the operationality of a figure-ground mind with it divisive, hermetic focus of awareness—and the perception of these objects in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized subtle (intuitive) thoughts (thus involving the confusion of the digital, fragmentary maps of thought with the analog, holistic territory of the given that such maps are incapable of matching)—which produces the illusion of there being a plethora of entities existing inherently, independently and disconnectedly. Since the idea of an “I” has been superimposed on the illusory subject associated with dualistic consciousness, a compelling drive arises to confirm its existence and gratify its acquisitiveness by means of contacts with the seemingly self-existing, apparently external entities perceived at this stage.

With the above, the illusion that constitutes the second type of avidya in the division adopted here becomes complete; insofar as a low energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the mechanisms of repression/elusion allow us to ignore (mi shes pa) this illusion to be no more than an illusion, we are under the power of the third type of avidya in the classification adopted here—and, as we thus become totally deluded, samsara consolidates.

However, contemporary physics, as well as brain science and other contemporary sciences, have come to conclusions regarding the structure of reality that are in harmony with the teachings of Buddhism and similar systems. With regard to the coincidences of physics and Asian mystical systems, see Capra (1983); Bohm & Hiley (1975); Bohm (1976, 1980, 1982); Zukav (1979); LeShan (1982); Bentov (1977), Bentov & Bentov (1982); Wilber (Ed. 1982, Ed. 1984); Ricard & Thuan (2004); etc. Concerning brain science, cf. Valera and Maturana: also see list in the other file.

In fact, Korzybski asserted that, “A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness.” Furthermore, the fact that all scientific theories so far seem to be proven [partially] wrong at some point and have had to be replaced by other theories, rather than leading him to reject the sciences’ pretension of truth, he claimed that since science is always trying to adjust its theories structurally to fit the facts, i.e., adjusts its maps to fit the territory, and thus advances in this regard more swiftly than any other field, he believed that the key to understanding sanity could lie in the study of the methods of
science (and the study of structure as revealed by science): the adoption of a scientific outlook and attitude of continual adjustment by the individual toward his or her assumptions was the way to sanity, so to speak. In his words, there were “factors of sanity to be found in the physicomathematical methods of science” (Korzybski, 4th Ed. 5th printing, 1973).

However, from different relative standpoints, different and even opposite maps may apply to the same territory. For example, from one relative standpoint a table is a table, but from another relative standpoint the table is not a table, but a segment of Einstein’s universal energy field singled out by our perception: both viewpoints are equally valid, but the basic human delusion causes us to take the territory, when our perception grasps it as a table, as being inherently a table and by no means to be not-a-table, and when our perception grasps it as not-a-table, as being inherently not-a-table and by no means a table. This is a result of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa that must be overcome in absolute sanity, in which the territory is not grasped as being inherently one or another map. Let me quote again the excerpt from Venkata Ramanan (1966) cited in an endnote to vol. I of this book:

The understanding that is the consummate point of criticism is appreciative of the unique nature and value of every specific standpoint, and yet is not confined to any point of view. This is a comprehensive understanding inclusive of the several standpoints on the same level as well as of the different levels of understanding. Levels and perspectives need to be distinguished and this distinction needs to be appreciated as a relative distinction and not an absolute division. This comprehensive understanding is sought to be conveyed in the philosophy of the Middle Way by prajña... (p. 40)

The rejection of views which is an essential point in the philosophy of the Middle Way means that no specific view, being a view, is ultimate. The ultimate truth is not any “view.” “Silence is the ultimate truth for the wise (Sarvpalambhopashamah prapañchopashamah shivah; na kwachit kasyachtish kashchit dharmo buddhena deshitah: Karika, XXV:24).” And yet, the ultimate truth can be and needs to be expressed from the mundane standpoint. (p. 41)

...drishti (view) itself could be either wrong (mithya) or right (samyak) depending on whether it is clinging or free from clinging... [However, in the above passage, as always when] drishti [is] not qualified by samyak... [it] stands for false or wrong view. (p. 342, note 92)

To conclude, it must be noted that the Atharvagiyasutra (quoted in the Prajñaparamitashastra, 60c-61a; translation in Venkata Ramanan, 1966, pp. 128-129) reads:

Everyone takes stand on his own view and by his own constructions gives rise to disputes; “To know this is to know the truth,” he holds, “and not to know this is to be condemned.”

[Truly] one who does not accept the view of another is devoid of wisdom. He who clings to his own construction is devoid of wisdom.

To stand on one’s own view of truth and give rise to false constructions, if this is pure wisdom, then there is non who does not have it.

I added to the name sphere of appreciation of pure forms the words “producing pleasure or displeasure” because this is one of the most outstanding and characteristic features of this sphere, and the reason why the manifestation of this sphere if the key to the contemplative experience of the aeon (Skt. kalpa) and to the Dzogchen Menngagde (Upadeshavarga) practices of Thögel and the Yangthik, in which it repeatedly liberates itself spontaneously into the sambhogakaya until the latter condition is firmly established—and, finally, it overlaps or mingles with the nirmnakaya.

Of these seventeen realms of form, the twelve lower ones, called “the twelve ordinary realms of the four concentrations,” are constituted by the three subdivisions of each of the four concentrations (Skt. chaturdhvaya; Tib. samten zhi [bsam gtan bzhi]): the first concentration, which is the one involving both ideas and scrutiny (Tib. rtog pa dang bcas shing dpyod pa dang bcas pa’i bsam gtan dang po), contains the three realms called after Brahma; the second concentration, which is the one involving no ideas but scrutiny alone (Tib. rtog pa med la dpyod pa bsam dang bcas pa’i bsam gtan gnyis pa), contains the three realms called after “radiance;” the third concentration, which is the one devoid of both ideas and scrutiny (rtog pa dang dpyod pa yang med pa yid la byed pa bsam gtan gsum pa), contains the three realms called after “virtue;” and the fourth concentration, which is the one of mental action united with delight (dga’ na sdud pa yid la byed pa’i bsam gtan bzhi pa), contains the three realms that are not all called after the same object. Beyond these twelve realms, there are the five pure bodes (Skt. Pañcashuddhanivasa; Tib.
The hot purgatories are the psychological states in which we express our aggression openly in outbursts of rage of open physical aggression, whereas the cold ones are those in which we express our aggression by refusing to communicate and by this and other means creating a very heavy, gelid atmosphere.

All four formless realms involve the illusion that the cleavage of the sensory continuum has been surpassed; however, the fact that this is no more than an illusion is proven by the following two facts:

(1) There is still the subject-object duality, and since the subject is a sensum of the sixth sense posited by Buddhism, despite the fact that the cleavage of the sensory continuum has been concealed by the subject’s identification with the object, the cleavage in question is still manifest.

(2) The pseudototality appearing as object is still subtly perceived as a figure, for it is recognized as a totality, and recognition is only possible with regard to figures. The difference with regard to other realms is that in what respects the sense of sight, in this case the figure embraces practically the whole of what at the moment is within our visual field: perhaps this is why the (heterodox) Mahasanghika school stated that arupa involves rupa in a subtle way.

The precise location of the passage in the text cited in Capriles (1977), as well as the former’s data, are presently unavailable. This is due to the fact that Capriles (1977) was not written according to current academic methodology, and I no longer have access to the bibliographic sources I used at the time.

This is the highest of all four formless realms or concentrations, and as such is called the “Summit of Existence” (Skt. bhavagra); the term “beyond perception and lack of perception” that here designates this concentration translates the Sanskrit term naivasamjñanasamjñha-samapatti; it responds to the fact that in this concentration gross discrimination is left behind and only the subtlest of discriminations obtains. This might well be what Wilber calls swabhavikaya.

Yung-chia Hsiian-chüeh (Japanese, Yoka Daishi), was one of the five spiritual heirs to Hui-neng (Cantonese, Wei-lang; Japanese, Eno), who was the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Ch’an.

The shadow becomes strikingly more blurred when the apparent size of the plane viewed from the floor becomes nearly the same as the apparent size of the sun, and disappears as it becomes clearly smaller than that of the sun. A visual record of this phenomenon is exhibited in the worldwide web at the URL http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap010129.html

It may seem contradictory that the state that in our societies is the statistical normality be characterized by a low energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, and that both the states of most extreme anguish that may be encountered by descending from the state of normality, and the most blissful states that may be encountered by ascending from the state of normality to the higher god realms, could be characterized by a higher energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness. The point is that, though both types of state may involve a higher energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, anguish and blissful conditioned states are part of samsara and thus are conditioned by karma—which is at the root of the difference between the two conditions, as it leads us either to accept or reject the experiences we have, also when the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is higher than normal.

In fact, within the sphere of karma, experience is dependent on the conditioning of the mental events (Skt. chaitta; Tib. semjung [sens byung]) during past experiences, as a result of our actions (karma) and reactions (karma) to experience. Tensions in the focal points of experience or chakra (Tib. tsakhor [rtsa 'khor]) develop by means of a self-catalyzing process of positive feedback, when secondary process rejects the sensations that manifest in those points; therefore, if an individual’s mental events have been trained through negative feedback not to reject sensations and neuromuscular tensions in the focal points of experience or chakra, they will not cause tensions to develop. Likewise, if mental events are trained not to try to forcefully impose on experience that which the conscious mind desires, consciousness will not experience itself as being “tossed about” by the mental events.

Contrariwise, if the mental events are untrained, or if the karma developed by training is exhausted, or if the contributory conditions on which a pleasant formless experience depended change, then it is possible that, while the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is high, conditioned by previous karma consciousness be driven by the mental events into rejecting the sensations in the focal points of experience and thus into having a most painful experience, the intensity of which increases from its own feedback. Moreover, the mental events may lead consciousness to reject the realization of insubstantiality furthered
by the increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, and thus to reject sensations, giving rise to the already described, self-catalyzing experience of ever-increasing pain. Else, the mental events may lead consciousness to encountering undesired contents that threaten the individual’s self-image, which would lead to the same result. And so on.

This irreversibility does not mean that whatever is built up by means of phenomenological negation cannot be undone; what it means is that it cannot be undone by means of further phenomenological negations: in order to undo it, negations have to be undone—which can only be achieved by Seeing through them into the Self—qua—Base.

I am understanding the term “phenomenological” in a wide sense in which it refers to the designates the logic characteristic of the occurrences that take place in human experience, rather than in the different senses thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger or Sartre gave the word. This is further discussed in Vol. III of this book.

As we have seen repeatedly, what Sartre regarded as authenticity is anguish in the case of being-for-Self, and the hell he called shame in the case of being-for-others. In the process of ontogenesis these two modes of being and their respective experiences develop interdependently; however, from an ontological standpoint, being-for-Self is previous to being-for-others, for the latter is the result of the former’s becoming what others view as the individual to which that particular being-for-Self belongs. Thus strictly speaking point B, insofar as it represents the concealment of the condition represented as A, should represent being-for-Self, the bare experience of which is, as we have seen, anguish; however, insofar as the being-for-Self and being-for-others develop interdependently, it may be permissible to identify point B with the latter as well. (Since Sartre viewed authenticity as lying in anguish and the hell he called shame, and bad faith is a means to elude these states, in a Sartrean framework the diagram could be understood as representing our being anguish and of our being hell as point A; however, in this case the diagram would not make sense, for it would be absurd for anyone to try to replicate point A thus understood by producing the imitation of it the diagram represents by point A1; what we elude by means of bad faith is the experiences of anguish and hell represented by point B, and in the case of the formless realms we do so by pretending that the latter are the Self represented as A—which is what point A1 stands for. At any rate, in Laing’s works it is clear that whatever he regarded as authenticity and as our original self, rather than being more unwholesome and conflictive than the “normality” that we build up by means of bad faith, as is the case with anguish and “shame,” is far more wholesome and harmonious; therefore A must stand for our natural way of being and A1 represent embodying a constructed identity and pretending that it constitutes our natural way of being. Furthermore, Laing quoted Buddhist and Taoist texts in his writings, spent time in a monastery practicing Buddhist meditation, and coincided with key Buddhist views. Therefore it is also possible that he intended point A to stand for what it stands in my reinterpretation of the diagram—which is what from a metaontological standpoint precedes concealment [as different from the initial point in ontogenesis, which is what from a chronological standpoint precedes elusion].)

I had to represent the transition from A to B as though it were a pretence, had to represent both the arising of being-for-Self and the achievement of a self-image by means of serial pretences with point B, and had to represent the serial pretences involved in the transition from A to A1 as though a single pretence were involved, because Laing’s diagram describes the process of serial pretences in terms of only three points. Though in previous works and also in previous drafts of this work, in order to achieve greater accuracy I introduced three more related diagrams involving a far greater number of stages, later I realized that these diagrams were not any more accurate than Laing’s, and therefore I decided to keep only the latter.

Also in Capriles (2000c) I only used Laing’s diagram, but point B only partly stood for the same it stands for in this book. In fact, in the paper in question it represented solely the pathological condition of statistical normality in contemporary societies, whereas as noted in the regular text here it represents both the bare experience of being-for-Self and being-for-others that we elude by achieving “normality,” the process of achieving “normality,” and the ensuing “normality.” (This implies that, just as in the sense I gave the letters in this book the movement from A to B is not a pretence—for pretence is only possible when there is being-for-Self, which has not yet arisen in the condition represented by A—in the sense I gave the letters in Capriles (2000c), the movement from A to B is not a single pretence but a process involving serial pretences. Thus it is clear that in both
Furthermore, the states of, (1) heedewa (had de ba) or mindless shock not involving fainting, (2) fainting, (3) meditative absorption not involving the reGnition (of) the Base called rigpa (rig pa), (4) dreamless sleep not involving the reGnition of the clear light, and (5) the first of the intermediate states after the moment of death not involving the reGnition (of) the clear light that shines in the chikhai bardo (‘chi kha’i bar do), are all different instances of the neutral base-of-all.

As will be shown in the next chapter, some or all of the states posited in these Upanishads seem to correspond to four of the intermediate states (Skt. antarabhava; Tib. bar do) discussed in Tibetan Buddhism, but classified in a hierarchical manner, as though they were levels of reality culminating in absolute realization. According to Tibetan Buddhism, no intermediate state or bardo is nirvana or Awakening, for these lie in the reGnition (of) the Base of the experience of whichever bardo is manifest.

Evidently, I cannot know whether the concepts of turiya ananda and nirvikapa samadhi were coined by people who mistook for nirvana the neutral condition of the base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, or by practitioners who had gone both through instances of nirvana and through instances of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, but who had failed to distinguish clearly between these two conditions. Wheat I know is that systems that fail to make this distinction in most clear terms cannot guarantee that, while seeking nirvana, those who practice them do not end up caught in the neutral condition of the base-of-all.

Jigme Lingpa (1730-1798) was one of the greatest Dzogchen Masters of the second millennium CE and a great tertön who had visions of Longchen Rabjampa, as well as of Mañjushrimitra and Padmasambhava, among others; his main terma (gter ma) system, received through the visions of Longchenpa and so on, was the Longchen Nyingthik (klong chen snying thig).

Ngowo shi (ngo bo’i gshis) is the term used to refer to this in a short terma revealed by Jigme Lingpa called rDzogs pa chen po’i gnad gsum shan ‘byed, which forms part of the klong chen snying gi thig le, and which was translated in Guenther [1977], pp. 142-147. Dr Guenther remarks that in Kagyüpa terminology the meaning of shi (gshis) is loosely the same as that of the term ngowo (ngo bo) in the teachings of the Nyingmapa (Guenther [1977], p. 144, note 11; for an explanation of the essence or ngowo aspect of the Base see the regular text of the chapter on the Path of spontaneous liberation in Capriles (2003) (the definitive, corrected version of which will soon be available in print), or the discussion of the three aspects of the Base in the upcoming Part Two of the same book; a more succinct explanation was provided in the Preamble of vol. I of this book). However, as witnessed in the brief Tantra revealed by Jigme Lingpa, in the Dzogchen teachings the combination “ngowo shi” is used when the ngowo aspect of the Base shines forth, as occurs the moment spontaneous awareness manifests, providing an opportunity for the reGnition (of) the Self-qua-Base that I am calling the Self-qua-Path.

In the inner Tantras based on the principle of transformation, the first level of realization is said to be the nirmanakaya, the second level of realization is said to be the sambhogakaya, the third level of realization is said to be the dharmakaya, and the final level of realization is said to be the swabhavikaya that consists in the indivisibility of the three kayas. Contrariwise, in the Dzogchen Atiyoga the first level of realization is said to be the dharmakaya, the second level of realization is said to be the sambhogakaya, and the final level of realization is said to be the nirmanakaya; it is when the nirmanakaya manifests that it can be said in the most thorough sense that the three kayas are simultaneously manifest (however, in some sense the three kayas are manifest in each of these three stages of realization).

One may wander how can there be two different, contrary sequences of realization of the same aspects of Buddhahood (i.e. of the kayas) in two different Buddhist Paths. This is so because the meanings of the terms swabhavikaya, dharmakaya, sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya are not understood in exactly the
same way in the Path of transformation of the inner Tantras and in the Path of spontaneous liberation of the Dzogchen Atiyoga. In fact, the final realization of the Tantric Path of Transformation, which in this Path is called swabhavikaya, corresponds to the initial realization of the dharmakaya in the Path of spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen Atiyoga; for their part, the sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya as these terms are understood in the Atiyoga are not reached in any other Buddhist Path.

The above is directly related to the fact that the highest level of realization in the Mahayoga (Inner Tantric Path of Gradual Transformation) of the Nyingmapa is the thirteenth level (Skt. bhumi; Tib. sa); that the summit of realization of the Anuyogatantra of the Nyingmapa (Inner Tantric Path of Instantaneous Transformation and highest vehicle of the Path of Transformation) is the fourteenth level; and that the final level of realization in the Atiyogatantra of the Nyingmapa, corresponding to the Dzogchen Path of spontaneous liberation, is the sixteenth level. In fact, in the Dzogchen Atiyoga successful practitioners may proceed further in the process of realization than in any other vehicle—including those of the Tantric Path of Transformation.

For further information in this regard, see Capriles (2003), or the upcoming publication in print of the definitive version of the book in question.

The first of the modes of spontaneous liberation, called cherdrol (ger grol) may be compared to a situation in which the water is flowing down a stream and making more enduring forms, and a mental subject seemingly at a distance from the stream identifying forms, and then the mental subject looks into the water that makes up the form and so the illusion of an experiencer different and separate from the water and of a substantial form instantly disappears, leaving the nature of the water patent.

The second of the modes of spontaneous liberation, called shardrol (shar grol), may be compared to a situation in which, as we are lying in the all-liberating gnosis as described in the regular text, suddenly the water seems to flow down a stream and to make a form, and a mental subject arises to perceive the form—yet as this begins to happen there is a movement of attention toward the source and so whatever was arising instantly dissolves, leaving the nature of the water patent.

The term gyu dagnyi chikpai marigpa (rgyu bdag nyid gcig pa’i ma rig pa; cf. Longchenpa, 1976, p. 24, and Cornu, 2001, p. 62), which is extremely difficult to translate, seems to imply that this beclouding of primordial awareness is inborn (which is no doubt the case) and teleologically oriented to give rise to the illusion of single selfhood. In other words, it would be the basis for taking the true condition of reality to be a universal self, as happens in various Hindu schools.

For an explanation of the three truths of Mahamadhyamaka, cf. Capriles (2004, last chapter). Longchenpa, in spite of favoring Madhyamaka Prasangika over Madhyamaka Zhentongpa in his Sutric philosophical works, favored the explanation of Dzogchen with Third Promulgation terminology, interpreted in a way that is closer to that of Mahamadhyamaka than to those of the Yogachara school of philosophy or of the Madhyamaka Swatantrika Yogachara subschools.

The explanation of these three stages was developed on the basis of the Longsel Khandro Nyingthik terma (pter ma) teachings of Chogyal Namkhai Norbu (klong chen ’od gsal mkha’ ’gro’i snying thig; the specific teachings were those of the lta ba blo ’das chen po’i gnad byang), of terma teachings of Jigme Lingpa (in particular, cf. the terma rDzogs pa chen po’i gnad gsum shan’ byed, which forms part of the klong chen snying gi thig le and which was translated in Guenther [1977], pp. 142-147 [the relevant parts appear in pp. 143-144]), and of the Kama teachings of Dzogchen—all of which were compounded in terms of my own observation of experience. Since the terma teachings of the Longsel Khandro Nyingthik are to be kept secret, I did not mention them in the note to Capriles (2003) (the definitive, corrected version of which will soon be available in print) in which I dealt with these stages; I decided to refer to them here because otherwise it could seem I was illegitimately appropriating those teachings.

When we try to pay attention to ngowo shi (ngo bo’i gshis), what is actually manifesting is the neutral condition of the base-of-all, and in order to take it as object there arises the conceptual structure called the threefold directional experiential structure. It is immediately after this that we supposedly recognize it in terms of concepts; however, at this stage the object of our experience is neither ngowo shi nor the neutral condition of the base-of-all, but the concept in terms of which we are interpreting it. In fact, if we admitted the most essential points of Dharmakirti’s epistemology, including the difference between ontological and epistemological objects, we would say that the object that is grasped here is an unreal mental image of ngowo shi, or—as explained in the regular text—of the illusory experiences or nyamṣ associated with the shining forth of ngowo shi. In more universal terms, we could simply say that at this
point an occurrence that is no longer present is understood in terms of a concept that could by no means correspond to it, and thus that this is a manifestation of the delusion called avidya or marigpa (ma rig pa).

Furthermore, the experiences associated with the shining forth of ngowo shi could persist for an instant after this ngowo shi has been beclouded by the occurrence of mongcha (rmongs cha), and so when the drive to take as object whatever is manifest could result in taking the experiences in question as object. In particular in mountain solitudes, when ngowo shi shines forth, the discursive thoughts that most of the time “are heard” in the mind (so to day) may be replaced by the “roar” called the “inner sound,” which in the state of spontaneous liberation would not allow discursive thoughts to establish themselves. However, if the experience of this roar persists for a moment after the occurrence of the neutral condition of the base-of-all, it could be taken as object, becoming the initial step in the arising and development of samsara.

Concerning all of this, cf. the terma rdzogs-pa chen-po’i gnad gsum shan-’byed revealed by Jigme Lingpa, which forms part of the kLong-ch'en snying-gi thig-le, and which was translated in Guenther, Herbert, 1977, pp. 142-147 (the relevant parts appear in pp. 143-144). As noted above, the explanation in terms of three stages was developed on the basis of the Longsel Khandro Nyingthik terma (gter-ma) teachings of Chögyäl Namkhai Norbu (kLong ch'en ’od gsal mkha’ gro’i snying thig; the specific teachings were those of the lta ba blo ’das chen po’i gnad byang) and so on—all of which were compounded in terms of my own observation of experience.

It is also relevant to reiterate that the fact that the mental subject is experienced as being other with regard to the “totality” appearing as object implies that there is something the latter excludes, and therefore that it cannot be a totality. Moreover, even though the division into figure and ground has not yet taken place, this pseudototality may not be properly considered to be formless, insofar as it is a result of the delusory valuation-actualization of the threefold projection, which gives rise to a most basic form of experience. Finally, formlessness may be deemed to be a form insofar as it is what it is in contrast with forms—and so also in this sense the Mahasanghikas might be right in that formlessness involves form. (The sensory totality may be compared to the totality of a photograph, and so if we consider that photographs involve a total configuration, then so does also the sensory totality—the difference between this totality and the photograph being that the former also involves function, for it is always changing.)

It is because in the condition of kunzhi (kun gzhi) memory does not work and because anyhow that condition is indescribable, that most of those who speak of the unconcealment of the absolute without having had the corresponding realization speak of it in terms of oneness—which is one of the main concepts in terms of which the pseudototalities of formlessness are understood.

Concerning the reference to the gnosia or wisdom of dharmadhatu in this context (which, by the way, should be self-evident), cf. the Longsel Khandro Nyingthik terma (gter ma) teachings of Chögyäl Namkhai Norbu (kLong ch'en 'od gsal mkha' gro'i snying thig) and specifically the Tawa Londe Chenpoi Nejang (lta ba blo 'das chen po'i gnad byang).

The segments of the continuum of sense data that can be singled out and taken as figure are those that correspond to a given name, and to the concept of the consciousness of mental phenomena associated with that name, and that therefore can be perceived in terms of that concept (which means that the existence of entities depends on the process of naming—i.e. on the process of associating a word, a concept and a configuration [of, in the more precise Kantian terminology, a schema]). In turn, the fact that the segments in question correspond to concepts and to the names associated with these concepts depends on the fact that, to a certain extent, they maintain a distinctive pattern within the ever-changing pattern that is the totality of sense-data (for example, the totality of form-and-color in our visual field is always changing, but within this change there are segments that, to some extent, maintain a continuity of form-and-color; therefore, we can have names and concepts for them and establish them as entities). In the West, Plato explained this in terms of the concept of articulations, and illustrated it with the example of the hand, the forearm and the arm: they may be considered to be entities, and there can be corresponding concepts and names, insofar as there is a joint or articulation between each of them and the others.

(I am not using the term “concept” in the Hegelian sense, nor I am using it in the more general sense in which a concept arises from the problematization of a notion, etc. but in the Kantian sense; i.e. as a specific type of “thought-conceived meanings.” The latter include concepts, which according to Kant belonged to the Understanding; ideas and ideals, which according to him pertained to Reason; and judgments, which according to him lay in the Faculty of Judgment, which was somehow “between” the Understanding and
Reason. Johann Gottfried Herder and others were right in rejecting the Kantian compartmentalization of the psyche and insisting that there is a single unitary psyche rather than a multiplicity of compartments.) It is also relevant to note that at this point the subject-object dichotomy goes along with a dichotomy of mind (Skt. chitta; Tib. sem [sems]) and mental events (Skt. chaitasika; Tib. semjung [sens byung]). Thought these two are indivisible and do not constitute a duality, a particular kind of jñeyavarana or shedrib (shes sgrig) called 'khor gsum rnam par rtog pa gang de shes bya sgrig par 'dod causes them to seem to be different and separate from each other (most special thanks are due to the accomplished translator and scholar Elio Guarisco for the extensive research he so kindly did on my behalf concerning the usage of the term 'khor gsum').

Different Indian Buddhist schools list different numbers of “omnipresent” mental factors or events (i.e. those that are involved in all cognitions); however, all of them acknowledge feeling-tone (Skt. vedana; Tib. tsortwa [tshor ba]); recognition (generally translated as “perception” or “conceptualization:” Skt. samjña; Tib. dushe ['du shes]); impulse (often mistranslated as “volition:” Skt. chetana; Tib. sempa [sens pa], which propels attention toward a potential object that then is singled out, or that propels the mind into action, etc.); attention (Skt. manasikara; Tib. yila chepa [yid la byed pa]; and contact (Skt. sparsha; Tib. regpa [reg pa]).

Let us take the example of impulse (Skt. chetana; Tib. sempa [sens pa]). If I am a good Buddhist monk and I set out to meditate on a statue of Shakyamuni, when I direct my attention toward the statue I get the impression that I am in control of the impulse that sets it on the object: there seems to be a duality between mind and this mental factor or mental event, but the mind seems to be in control of it. Then a very attractive girl dressed in a mini-skirt and a see-through blouse comes into the temple as a tourist and enters the periphery of my attention. At this point impulse automatically tends to direct my attention away from the statue of Shakyamuni and toward the girl, but since I am a good monk I struggle to keep it on the object: at the point when attention was automatically shifting toward the girl I was experiencing a duality between mind and this mental factor or mental event, but the mental factor or event was not fully under the control of the mind; contrariwise, it seemed to be behaving rather autonomously, and it almost managed to direct the mind toward the object against my wishes. However, then I managed to take control of the mental factor or event and concentrate on the statue, and therefore, though there was still the appearance of a duality between mind and the mental factor or event, again I felt the mind was in control of the mental factor or event.

(The above proves that it is a mistake to render the Sanskrit term chetana and the Tibetan term sempa as “intention” or “volition,” for it shows that the mental subject does not always feel in control of the event or factor in question.)

With regard to this metaphor, note that Saraha wrote in the King Dohas (Guenther [1973]):

When [in winter] still water is stirred by the wind
it takes [as ice.] the shape and texture of a rock;
when the deluded are disturbed by interpretative thoughts
what is as yet unpatterned becomes very hard and solid.

In Guenther (1993), p. 153, we find a slightly different translation:

When [in winter] still water by the wind is stirred
it [becomes ice.] taking the shape and texture of a rock;
when the deluded are disturbed by interpretative thoughts
that which is as yet unpatterned turns very hard and solid.

If, as a result of the development of healthy habits through negative feedback and constructive practices carried out over a long time on the ascending path leading to the summit of cyclic existence, we manage to make this condition stable, we take birth in the formless sphere. However, how one becomes established in this sphere will be considered later on.

This has been dealt with in the Longchen Ösel (Longsel) Khadro Nyingthik terma (gter ma) teachings of Chögyäl Namkhai Norbu (klong chen 'od gsal mkha’ 'gro i snying thig), and specifically in those of the lta ba blo ’das chen po ‘i gnad byang. I give no references in the bibliography insofar as these teachings are not for public diffusion.

Normally this condition lasts for a very brief instant only; however, if the individual manages to prolong the manifestation of the consciousness of an object of this type by means of a meditational training, and then fixes it through the identification of the subject with the object, this may become the basis for developing the absorptions with form (rupa).
Concerning the reference to mirror-like wisdom, cf. the Longsel Khandro Nyingthik terma (gter ma) teachings of Chögyäl Namkhai Norbu (klong chen ’od gsal mkha’ ’gro’i snying thig) and specifically the Tawa Londe Chenpoi Nejang (lia ba blo’ das chen po’i gnad byang).

Note copied from vol. I of this book: The phenomena Dharmakirti calls samanyalakshana or chitsen (spyi mtshan)—which following Dreyfus (1997) and in spite of the defects he himself acknowledged in these translation I have referred to as generally characterized phenomena—are “representations” in the sense given this term when used as a loose synonym of what Locke, Hume and some “ideologues” termed “ideas.” Dharmakirti contrasted them with what he called swalakshana (Tib. rangtsen [rang mtshan]), which, also following Dreyfus, I render as specifically characterized phenomena (but which etymologically could be translated by terms such as “inherent collections of characteristics,” “spontaneous collections of characteristics,” “self-phenomena,” etc.).

Even though the etymology of Dharmakirti’s term samanyalakshana or chitsen—rendered here as generally characterized phenomena—may be taken to mean that these phenomena are what Western philosophy called “universals,” this is not at all the case. In order to show why this is so, let me begin by discussing Hume’s usage of the term ideas (which he took from Locke and Berkeley but redefined for it to suit his own system). Hume insisted that the mental images he called ideas were particular insofar as they reproduced particular impressions (i.e., sensory perceptions of particular phenomena), and, somehow inverting Berkeley’s view (according to which a word becomes general by its relation to a particular but representative idea), he concluded that, because of the resemblances an individual finds in his or her experience between the different patterns or configurations (whether impressions or ideas) indicated by the same word, and the contrast between these patterns and the similar patterns indicated by different words, through custom the individual forms a concept, which Hume also called a “general idea” and which consisted in the combination of an individual idea—which as we have seen is a reproduction of an impression and as such is particular—with the appropriate associative dispositions, which allowed the individual to identify all of the patterns indicated by the same word.

This, however, did not solve the problem he was responding to, for words are learned by means of particular impressions, and learning to identify a sequence of sounds as being the same word on the basis of different impressions of sequences of sound—each of which is different from the others insofar as it involves slightly different tones and intonations of the voice, pronunciations of the word and so on—would be an operation of the same kind as learning to identify the essence indicated by a word on the basis of different particular, mainly visual impressions. In fact, Hume’s flaw lay, (1) in his failure to see that the words we use in discursing thinking are also mental images, in this sense belonging to the same category as our mainly visual images of corporeal entities, except in that the former are auditory, and (2) in his failure to acknowledge the existence of what I am calling comprehensions of essence, constituted by the intellective intuitions that Greeks called noem and that Descartes called intuitive thoughts (but which contrarily to Descartes’ belief, rather than being a source of indubitable truth, if taken to be true give rise to delusion) and that the higher Tantras and the Dzogchen teachings call subtle thoughts, which are what can ultimately account for the recognition (in the sense in which authors such as H. H. Price [1975] use the term) of a presentation: though it is true that we must compare our impressions with the mental images associated with words in order to recognize them, this comparison elicits a comprehension of essence that is abstract and that in no way could be reduced to the mental image used for comparison. Furthermore, in fantasy and hallucination we may have to recognize our mental images in the same way as we normally have to recognize our impressions. And, what is more important, in discursive reasoning, though we use the mental images of the previous impressions of words, the comprehension of the train of thought depends on the repeated occurrence of comprehensions of essence of the type that Descartes called intuitive thoughts and that the teachings of the higher Tantras and of Dzogchen call subtle thoughts.

Although Hume’s position is often deemed to be a conceptualism and as such taken to admit the existence of universalia post rem, these are not the mental images he called ideas, which are those that may be said to roughly correspond to Dharmakirti’s samanyalakshana, chitsen or generally characterized phenomena; in Hume’s flawed explanation, the universals are what he called concepts or general ideas, as defined in
The instant an individual initially perceives what Dharmakirti called a *swalakshana*, chitsen or *generally characterized phenomena* are not simple mental images, but the result of *associations*—between mental images and between mental images and words. The question would thus be whether or not we are entitled to ascribe to Dharmakirti’s *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or *generally characterized phenomena* the function Hume attributed to his ideas, and view them, not as the universals themselves, but as the *prima materia* used in the production of universal concepts. And the only possible reply is that unless we admit the existence of something of a nature wholly different to that of Dharmakirti’s *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or *generally characterized phenomena*—namely the abstract comprehensions of essence Descartes called intuitive thoughts and the higher Tantras and the Dzogchen teachings call subtle thoughts—we would be wrong in ascribing a role to *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or *generally characterized phenomena* in the genesis and functioning of universals. In fact, we have seen that Hume’s explanation fails to account for the genesis of universals and does not grasp the latter’s essence. Far less could Dharmakirti’s account for them, since he posits phenomena that are somehow analogous to Hume’s ideas, yet does not posit what Hume called concepts or general ideas. Universals—and this applies also to *universalia post rem*—must necessarily consist in abstract comprehensions of essence rather than in mental images which by their nature are particular—even if, as in Hume’s case, universals were taken to lie in the association of these images with words and with other images.

Dharmakirti’s *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or *generally characterized phenomena* could be of four different types: (1) generic images, (2) images of memory, (3) the posterior image of an object that was perceived through the senses, and (4) imaginary constructions. The first three of these could be loosely said to be “representations” in the sense in which this term was used in the preceding paragraph, and to be instances of something very much like Hume’s ideas. What Dharmakirti called (1) generic images (thought not so his [2] images of memory, or [3] the posterior image of an object that was perceived through the senses) first arise in early life, yet in general continue to be modified during the whole of an individual’s lifetime, so that the generic images we have at different stages of our lives are not the exact reproduction of the original perception, and at each different stage the image that will enter into play in cognition will be the one we have at that stage. For example, when a person, on the occasion of perceiving what Dharmakirti called a *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon* of fire (roughly corresponding to what Hume called an impression of fire) learns that this phenomenon is a fire, a generic image of fire is produced that—so long as it is not modified by subsequent perceptions—will take part in obscured perception each and every time the individual intends to cognize a *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon* of fire (which as we have seen roughly corresponds to what Hume called an impression of fire), or whenever he or she thinks of fire or imagines fire.

The instant an individual initially perceives what Dharmakirti called a *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon* of fire, there is an instant of perception in which an image of the object forms in the eye; however, it does so an instant after the existence reproduced by the image, so that by the time it is perceived the object has already changed—which implies that even in this circumstance the object is not directly apprehended as *it is in the precise moment* when the cognition takes place. Nonetheless, Dharmakirti still asserts that at the moment there is a bare, pure sensation of the effectual, ever-changing *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon* of fire, insofar as the image in the eye is not modified by the intervention of the ineffectual phenomenon that does not change during perception that Dharmakirti called a “subsequent image.” However, the next moment this bare, pure sensation is replaced by the perception of the “subsequent image” that formed on the basis of the former, and henceforth each and every time the individual perceives a fire, initially there will be an instant of bare, pure sensation of the effectual, ever-changing *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon*, but immediately thereafter a perception will occur (i.e., a mental knowledge will arise) having as its object the ineffectual and unchanging during perception *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or *generically characterized phenomenon* that was formed on the basis of the bare, pure sensation of the effectual, ever-changing *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon*—which will involve a grave confusion insofar as, on the occasion of thinking “this is a fire,” the latter object, which is ineffectual and does not change during its perception, will be mistaken for the effectual, ever-changing *swalakshana*, rangtsen or *specifically characterized phenomenon*. In short, in every cognition there is a first moment in which we apprehend the ever-changing, effectual *specifically characterized phenomenon*.
(even though we apprehend it *a posteriori*), and a subsequent moment in which what is apprehended is an ineffectual generically characterized phenomenon that does not change during perception, and which therefore could not at all correspond to the former. It is in this sense that the perception in question is deceptive. (This should make it clear that, although for didactic purposes I have compared Dharmakirti’s *swalakshana*, rangtsen or specifically characterized phenomena with Hume’s impressions, they are in fact very different from the latter: as noted below, Dharmakirti’s intent is very different from Hume’s and from those of most other Western philosophers, and hence his system could not correspond those of any of the latter. The reason for making the comparison in question was that, since Hume’s ideas are very similar to Dharmakirti’s *samanyalakshana*, chitsen or generally characterized phenomena, and since both of them were viewed as originating from a sensory perception, it seemed appropriate to expediently and provisionally relate with each other their respective conceptions of sensory perception—i.e., Hume’s impressions and Dharmakirti’s apprehension of a *swalakshana*, rangtsen or specifically characterized phenomenon.)

However, what we are concerned with is that what Dharmakirti called (1) generic images are not and could not be universals, because they are particular images, and they will continue to be particular images even if they are modified with the passing of time. Furthermore, they would be particular images even if they became a collage of different subsequent images of phenomena, for images are forms, and forms cannot be nonparticular insofar as they are collections of particular characteristics: also in the case of a collage of many different forms in which some characteristics came from one perception and others from other perceptions, these characteristics would be particular and so would be the collection of characteristics. Only the abstract comprehensions of essence that Descartes called intuitive thoughts and that the higher Tantras and the Dzogchen teachings call subtle thoughts, insofar as they necessarily correspond (to the limited extent to which there can be a correspondence between the abstract and the concrete, the digital and the analogue) to all entities indicated by the same name, may be deemed to be universal and as such nonparticular. (It must be noted that the difference between the mental images that constitute coarse thoughts and the comprehensions of essence that constitute subtle thoughts is not the result of abstract speculation; they are clearly distinguished in the experience of a Dzogchen meditator, who often has to deal with subtle thoughts lacking the support of mental images and has to create the conditions for their spontaneous liberation, and who clearly distinguishes between the presentation of coarse thoughts—whether auditory as in the case of discursive thoughts, or mainly visual—and the immediately posterior understanding of essence they elicit.)

(Concerning Hume, it must be noted that he distinguished between simple and complex ideas; the former always reproduced simple impressions with exactitude, but the latter did not always reproduce complex impressions precisely. Furthermore, according to Hume, besides the impressions of sensation there are impressions of reflection, which include the passions, and which in turn produce ideas of reflection (impressions of reflection arise in the following succession: impression of sensation > perception of sensation > copy of the former impression in the mind and permanence in the mind after the impression has passed > idea > return of the idea to the mind, producing new impressions > impression of reflection). Impressions of reflection gave rise to copies of these ideas by memory and the imagination, which in turn gave rise to ideas of reflection, which in turn produced new impressions and ideas. Therefore, it is clear that we cannot identify Hume’s ideas (or Locke’s, for that matter) with the conception of the Sautrantikas under discussion, for they are quite different from the latter insofar as they responded to interests different from those of the Buddhists. And the same applies to Quine’s conceptions and those of other twentieth century nominalists as well, whose interests are always different from those of Buddhist philosophers.)

For a lengthy, comprehensive, informed, intelligent discussion of Dharmakirti’s system—which, however, is partial to the Gelugpa interpretation—cf. Dreyfus (1997).

SEE WHETHER THE FOLLOWING SHOULD GO HERE OR ELSEWHERE (IT SHOULD GO IN THE EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COARSE AND SUBTLE THOUGHTS):

At any rate, our mental image of a word’s sound—that which Ferdinand De Saussure called the *signifier* (*signifiant*)—is what Dharmakirti called *sabdasāmānya* (Tib. drachi [sgra spyil]), whereas the mental image of a word’s referent—or, in De Saussure’s terms, the *signified* (*signifié*)—is what Dharmakirti called *arthaśāmānya* (Tib. dönchi [don spyil])—the association of which, which at first sight would correspond to De Saussure’s sign (*signe*) is, according to Gendün Drub (dge ’dun grub),
that which Dharmakūrti called śabdārtha (Tib. dradön [sgra don]) (Dreyfus, 1997, pp. 221-222), and which the great Master Gorampa (Gorampa Sōnam Sengé [go rams pa bsod nams seng ge], 1429-1489), just like De Saussure centuries later, considered to be the concept itself (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 82). However, as made clear in the regular text below, properly speaking the concept is the understanding of the signified’s essence that may be elicited either by the referent’s perception, by the perception of the referent’s mental image (śabdasāṃśa; Tib. drachi [sgra spyi])—i.e., of that which De Saussure called the signified (signifié)—or by the perception of the sound of the word that refers to the signified, or of that word’s mental image (śabdasāṃśa; Tib. drachi [sgra spyi]), which as just noted corresponds to De Saussure’s signifier (signifiant). In fact, whereas both what Dharmakūrti called śabdasāṃśa (Tib. sgra spyi)—i.e., of what De Saussure called the signifier (signifiant)—and what Dharmakūrti called arthasāṃśa (Tib. dönchi [don spyi])—De Saussure’s signified (signifié)—are coarse thoughts, concepts are comprehensions of essence and as such are subtle thoughts. (Apparently Gorampa used the term drachi [sgra spyi; Skt. śabdasāṃśa] roughly in the sense of “definition” and believed concepts to form by the association of these definitions with dönchi [don spyi; Skt. arthasāṃśa]—that is, with the mental image that corresponds to De Saussure’s signified (signifié) (which, as already noted and as it should be emphasized, is for Dharmakūrti a particular rather than a universal). In any case, it is true that concepts arise when comprehension occurs upon associating that which Ferdinand De Saussure called signifier (signifiant) and which Dharmakūrti called śabdasāṃśa (Tib. drachi [sgra spyi]) with that which De Saussure called signified (signifié) and which Dharmakūrti called arthasāṃśa (Tib. dönchi [don spyi]), thus having as their basis that which De Saussure called the sign (signe) and which, according to Gendun Drub (dge ’dun grub), Dharmakūrti called śabdārtha (Tib. dradön [sgra don]). However, in ontogenesis, concepts—except when they are complex and abstract—are not formed as a result of learning a signified’s definition and associating it with that signified.

(Above I defined signified as the mental image of a word’s referent, but as De Saussure insisted, it need not have an “external, physical” referent.)

213 The fields of presentation / modes of correspondence to the five senses (Skt. pañcādwarājñāna; Tib. gongai namshe [sgo lnga’i rnam shes], or gongai nambar shepa [sgo lnga’i rnam par shes pa]), and the field of presentation / mode of consciousness of mental images (Skt. manoviśajñana; Tib. yikyi namshe [yid kyi rnam shes], or yikyi nambar shepa [yid kyi rnam par shes pa]), are always nonconceptual, for it is the cluster of mental operations called “consciousness of defilements” that conceptualizes them. For example, in various of our five senses there manifest presentations that may be validly understood as being aspects of a certain entity (say, color-forms, sounds, smells, etc.); these presentations first manifest in a nonconceptual cognition that lasts an extremely small fraction of a second, and in which delusiveness (Skt. kliśṭātmanas; Tib. nyön yi [nyon yid]) does not function. Immediately, delusiveness manifests, giving rise to the sudden intuitive understanding that such-and-such entity is present to our senses. And the same happens with the presentation of mental images—whether they are mainly visual image, or discursive thoughts—the field of presentation / mode of consciousness of mental contents.

Take as an example the presentation of, say, a discursive thought in the field of presentation / mode of consciousness of mental contents: the thought may be compared to presentations of the consciousness of sound insofar as it consists of a succession of sounds—the only difference being that these sounds are not actually heard by the consciousness of sound, but appear only to the consciousness that is aware of mental contents in a way that is very similar to the imagination by this consciousness of data of any of the five senses. Just as would happen with a succession of sounds heard by the consciousness of sound, in an initial instant there is no understanding of what is manifesting, for the presentation occurs in a nonconceptual cognition in which delusiveness (Skt. kliśṭātmanas; Tib. nyön yi [nyon yid]) does not function. Immediately, delusiveness manifests, giving rise to the sudden intuitive understanding of the meaning of the thought: it is at that point that the thought has been conceptualized, and so it is at this point that we can speak of vikalpa or namtok (rnam rtog) properly speaking.

214 This also happens when we are dealing with images of fantasy or imagination appearing as dang (gdangs) energy in the so-called sixth consciousness (the manoviśajñana or yikyi namshe) insofar as we take these images to be reflections of a real world constituted by the images of tsel (rtsal) energy appearing through the five senses.
Furthermore, Jean
With regard to the categorization of
In the thi
In the second mode of spontaneous liberation, there is an automatic movement of attention toward what seems to be the “source of thought,” so that the true condition of the arising thought is reGnized as the latter begins to arise, and hence there is spontaneous liberation upon arising: the movement of attention, attention itself, the subject of attention and the object of attention, instantly dissolve into the patency of the true condition of the ngowo aspect of the Base, which thereby manifests as the dharmakaya.
In the third and last mode of spontaneous liberation, thought liberates itself spontaneously without there being a need either for an intentional movement of attention toward the thought, or for an automatic reaction as the thought begins to arise, and so all arising thoughts are like drawings on water, which liberate themselves spontaneously as they arise: at no point is the true condition of the arising thought concealed, and thus the continuity of the manifestation of dharmakaya is not interrupted. Jigme Lingpa explained this as the coincident manifestation of emptiness and active thoughts.

In the case of practitioners who are familiar enough with the manifestation of the dharmakaya and the spontaneous liberation that is the trademark of Dzogchen, a high energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness will catalyze the spontaneous liberation of thoughts, which in general will take place of itself (as the name “spontaneous liberation” indicates) each and every time he or she applies the instructions for the practice of Tekchö (khregs chod). As stated in the preceding note, in higher modes or capacities of spontaneous liberation there will be no need to intentionally apply an instruction for thoughts to liberate themselves spontaneously.

An explanation of the etymology of the term metaphenomenological, and of the reasons why it is used, was provided in vol. I of this book; it refers to whatever manifests in human experience, no matter whether or not it does so through the five senses, whether or not it appears as being spatial, or whether it appears as object or does so as subject. In fact, what I refer to by the term “metaphenomenology” does not posit (yet does not negate) non-phenomenal realities.

With regard to the categorization of nirvana, we can speak of the whole of what manifests in it as a single metaphenomenon or speak of different parts of it as different metaphenomena; at any rate, words can hardly give any clue as to the unspeakable nature of nirvana.

As noted in vol. I of this book, Existenzphilosophie and existentialism assert anguish and other unpleasant states to be more authentic than those states that are produced through the elusion of these unpleasant states. In this regard, the term metaexistential refers to any philosophical system that, in agreement with Existenzphilosophie and existentialism, acknowledge that anguish and other unpleasant states are more authentic than those states that are produced through the avoidance of anguish and other unpleasant states, but which show that the unpleasant states in question, insofar as they are inherent in the naked experience of ego-delusion, are spurious with regard to the absolute Truth represented by the dissolution of ego-delusion in nirvana or Awakening.

Furthermore, Jean-Paul Sartre (1982), defined existentialism as the doctrine according to which existence precedes essence. The metaexistential view does not accept either that existence precedes essence or that essence precedes existence, but explains existence and essence as co-emerging developments. For a longer discussion of the term “metaexistential,” see chapter I of this volume.

Whether as understood by Kierkegaard (1968, 1970), or as understood by Heidegger (1996) when he posited it as being inherent (together with uneasiness) in what called being toward the end.
Initially, a practitioner depends on the blessings of the Master from whom she or he receives transmission, which in their turn depend on the degree to which the Master in question has developed the conviction that arises from realization and the concomitant degree of her or his capacity of spontaneous liberation. Then, as the disciple him or herself develops a capacity of spontaneous liberation, he or she comes to depend on this capacity.

With regard to the meaning of the term “spontaneous liberation” see the corresponding notes to chapter I of vol. I of this book. The three capacities or types of spontaneous liberation to which reference is made below in the regular text of this section are also discussed in chapter I of vol. I of this book; for a more detailed discussion of them cf. Capriles (2000a, work in progress 4).

The different vehicles are classified into “cause-based vehicle” (Skt. hetuyana; Tib. tsennyi gyuyi thekpa [mtshan nyid rgyu yi theg pa]) and “Fruit-based vehicle” (Skt. phalayana; Tib. drebui thekpa [bras bu’i theg pa]). (Among other sources, cf. Thinle Norbu [1977]; Namkhai Norbu [1999/2001]; Capriles [2003] [the definitive, corrected version of which will soon be available in print]). Besides these two, there is the Dzogchen Atiyoga, which does not belong to either category, for it is beyond the cause-effect relation, insofar as in it realization is not attained as the effect of an action, but through the spontaneity (Tib. lhundrub [lhun grub]) of the Base.

The Sutrayana, which includes the two vehicles that make up the Hinayana (the Shravakayana and the Pratikabuddhaya) and the two sub-vehicles of the Mahayana (the gradual Mahayana or Paramitayana, and the sudden or abrupt Mahayana [Skt. Dhyana; Chin. Ch’an; Jap. Zen]), belongs to the cause-based vehicle. Therefore it may seem strange that the sudden or abrupt Mahayana, despite being classified as a causal sub-vehicle, makes it quite clear that Awakening cannot be caused. The basic point is that the conception of the Buddha-nature proper to this vehicle is based on texts of the Mahayana that identify it with emptiness rather than acknowledging it to be the Base posited by the inner Tantras of the Nyingmapa, and particularly by the Dzogchen Atiyoga, which according to these systems involves the indivisibility of what they refer to as katak (ka dag: primordial purity, corresponding to emptiness) and lhundrub (lhun grub: spontaneous perfection, which subsumes all that has to do with manifestation and its functionality, spontaneity, the systemic loops leading to spontaneous liberation, etc.). Moreover, the meditation applied in this vehicle privileges the emptiness that constitutes the katak (ka dag) or primordial purity aspect of the Base (which in terms of the threefold classification, is the ngowo or essence aspect), failing to place the due emphasis on the absolute potentiality represented by the lhundrub aspect of the Base (which in terms of the threefold classification of aspects of the Base is the sum of its nature or rangzhin [rang bzhin] aspect and its energy or thukje [thugs rje] aspect), and somehow involves dwelling in what the Dzogchen teachings refer to as the inner dimension of jing (dbyings), for it does not place the due emphasis on being totally open to the manifestations of the senses. (The fact that attention is somehow directed toward emptiness is the reason why its meditation has been compared to a hen picking grains or a lady threading a needle: the grains or the needle’s eye represent emptiness.) Therefore, it contrasts with the Path of spontaneous liberation corresponding to Dzogchen Atiyoga, and even with the Path of transformation of the inner Vajrayana, both of which emphasize the fact that the Base involves the indivisibility of katak and lhundrub and do not privilege either one or the other—and the first of which also emphasizes total openness to the amputs of the five senses normally dealing with tsel (rtsal) energy, as well as the complete surpassing of concentration. And yet, the sudden or abrupt Mahayana makes a skillful use of spontaneous liberation mechanisms, as exemplified by methods such as the kung-an (Jap. koan) and so on.

Mahayana texts dealing with the Buddha-nature (Skt. tathagatagarbha, sugatagarbha, bhutatathata or buddhata) conceive this nature in causal terms: they view it as the cause and actual Buddhahood as its effect, or view it as mere potency, which in order to become actual has to develop gradually by means of the practice of the Path in interaction with a set of contributory conditions—and in general in these texts we find the idea that something must be modified for Awakening to obtain. However, in Maitreya’s Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra), as well as in the Mahamadhyamaka School, the Buddha-nature (Skt. tathagatagarbha; Tib. dezhin shegpe nyingpo [de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po]) is explained as a continuum, in terms that are reminiscent of the Vajrayana notion of Tantra (Tib. gyü [r’gyud] qu’a continuum of Base, Path and Fruit (not in vain is the Ratnagotravibhaga or Uttaratantra viewed as a bridge between Sutra and Tantra). Of all Mahayana conceptions of the Buddha-nature, this is the one that seems to be to a greatest degree in agreement with the basic views of Ch’an or Zen—even though neither
the Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra) nor the Mahamadhyamaka school refer to Awakening as a sudden occurrence.

Nevertheless, all Mahayana conceptions of the Buddha-nature contrast with the view of the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen Atiyoga, for in the latter the Path and the Fruit are not attained causally, insofar as the Path is simply the spontaneous unveiling of the Base, and the Fruit is the definitive stabilization of the unveiling of the Base corresponding to the Path.

Despite the fact that both the Path of transformation of the inner Vajrayana and the Path of purification of the outer Vajrayana acknowledge that the Base is a Vajra-nature possessing all the qualities of the Fruit, so that the latter is no more than the total, definitive unveiling of the former, in neither of them does the Path simply lie in the unconcealment of the Base, or the Fruit in the stabilization of the Path thus understood. Among the methods of the two Paths in question, those of the inner Vajrayana, which are based on the principle of transformation, have the potentiality of leading to this realization, albeit in a far less direct way than the Dzogchen Atiyoga—and yet they are incomparably more direct than those of the outer Vajrayana, which are based on the principle of purification, and which have the potentiality of giving rise to the distortions pointed out below in the regular text of this chapter, when Jung’s criticism of the visualization of figures of light in Western theosophy is discussed.

In particular, whereas the Path of transformation of the inner Vajrayana involves a stage of creation in which constructive work must be carried out so as to produce experiences on the basis of which we may apply methods of the stage of perfection or stage of completion, which eventually may allow us to see through the experiences thus produced into the uncreated and unconditioned Base that is their true condition, in the Atiyoga there is nothing to construct, for the practice consists simply in the direct reGnition (of) the uncreated and unconditioned Base and true condition of whichever thought may naturally manifest in our experience—which signifies that in this Path the continuity of Base, Path and Fruit is more perfect than in the Path of transformation of the inner Vajrayana. If, in order to explain the Dzogchen Atiyoga in terms proper to the Path of transformation, we insisted in speaking of the two stages which are that of creation and that of perfection or completion, the former would consist in the spontaneous arising of thoughts (and possibly of nyams [nyams] and so on), and the latter would consist in the spontaneous liberation of the thoughts in question, which in the optimal manifestations of this practice is simultaneous with their arising—so that, if concerning this vehicle we admitted the duality of a stage of creation and a stage of perfection or completion, these would be simultaneous. (It must be noted that the spontaneous arising of thought and its spontaneous liberation are not totally simultaneous in the first and second of the three capacities of types of spontaneous liberation discussed in a previous note; it is in the third of the three capacities or types of spontaneous liberation, rangdröl [rang grol], which is the one that gives its name to this Path and is paradigmatic of it, that they are perfectly simultaneous).

In this passage, the terms “conditioned,” “unconditioned,” “deconditioning,” etc. are simultaneously being used in two different senses.

Firstly, they are being used in the Buddhist philosophical sense: the term I am translating as “conditioned” is the Sanskrit samskrita, corresponding to the Pali sangkhata, meaning “composite,” “made,” “shaped,” or “intentionally made,” and implying four traits—(1) production, birth or origination, (2) subsistence, (3) change, and (4) dissolution or disappearance—and three characteristics—(1) impermanence (Pali, anicca; Skt. anitya), (2) insubstantiality or selflessness (Pali, anatta; Skt. anatman) and (3) being a source of suffering (Pali, dukkha; Skt. dukkha). In its turn, the word I am rendering as “unconditioned” is the Sanskrit asamskrita, corresponding to the Pali asangkhata and implying the absence of these four traits and three characteristics. According to the highest philosophical systems of Buddhism, our perceptions are conditioned, but not so the material of these perceptions (i.e. the sensory continuum that our perceptions process, turning it into a world); however, according to the higher Madhyamaka sub-schools, it would also be illegitimate to define this “material” as lacking these four traits and three characteristics, for nothing that can be said regarding phenomena can correspond exactly to them or exhaust them—and the same will apply to all relative, conditioned phenomena if they are considered from the standpoint of absolute truth. At any rate, since our perceptions are conditioned, these do not correspond to the unconditioned stuff that they interpret, and thus are characterized by unawareness of the true nature of reality (first of the three senses of avidya posited by the Dzogchen classification adopted here), and by delusion (second and third of the three senses of avidya posited by the Dzogchen classification adopted here). It is because our perceptions are conditioned, but not so these perceptions process, that the Path of Awakening is a course of deconditioning: if that which perceptions process were conditioned, no
matter how much we purified our perception, it would continue to be a perception of conditioned phenomena.

Secondly, the terms “conditioned,” “unconditioned,” “deconditioning,” etc. are being given the psychological sense according to which rearing a child amounts to conditioning him or her.

This ambiguity was made possible by the fact that all that results from conditioning in the psychological sense is conditioned in the Buddhist philosophical sense, and that the repeated reGnition of the inherently all-liberating single gnosis (chikshe kundrö [gcik shes kun grol]), which is unconditioned in the Buddhist sense, deconditions the individual in the psychological sense.

(The Hinayana and the Mahayana have divergent views concerning what is conditioned and what is not so. According to the Hinayana, phenomenal entities are mutually conditioned and interdependent insofar as they are produced through praitiya samutpada or interdependent origination, which it understands in terms of the temporal succession of the twelve nidana or links. In the Prajñaparamita Sutras and the Madhyamaka school, this doctrine is not understood solely in terms of the temporal succession of the twelve links, but also in that of the essential [simultaneous or timeless] dependence of all entities on all other entities. Moreover, since according to highest Madhyamaka what is conditioned is our perceptions rather than the continuum of sensations processed by our perceptions and thereby perceived as a world, from the standpoint of highest Madhyamaka it is our perceptions that are mutually conditioned and interrelated, both in the temporal sense of the twelve links and in that of the essential, simultaneous or timeless dependence of all perceptions on all other perceptions.)

This is a free rendering of the poem, made for it to rhyme.

This is also a free rendering of the poem, made for it to rhyme. The original said that, since the mirror is void, the dust has nowhere to alight.

This work was hidden as a terma (gter ma) or spiritual treasure, and was revealed by tertön (gter-ston) or “Treasure revealer” Örgyen Lingpa (o rgyan gling pa) of Yarge (yar ri) in the sixteenth century AD. Its authenticity and antiquity is proven beyond any possible doubt by the fact that there are exact quotes of it in Nubchen Sangye Yeshe’s Samten Migdrön (bsam gtan mig sgron), which was buried in the ruins of the monasteries of Tun-huang from the beginning of the Second Millennium AD until the beginning of the twentieth century AD, and thus we can be certain that it was not tampered with by anyone.

As stated in the preceding note, this book was entombed in the ruins of Tun-huang, where it remained from the eleventh or twelfth century CE until 1908, when French Sinologist Paul Pelliot explored the cave temples that a local farmer had discovered accidentally at the turn of the twentieth century.

Nub Namkhai Nyingpo (gnubs nam mkha’i snying po) had perfectly mastered the Contemplation that, according to the sudden Mahayana, is the very state of Buddhahood corresponding to the final realization of the gradual Mahayana. Well, in his Kathang Dennga (bka’ thang sde Inga), this renowned Master explained that the Contemplation of Ch’an or Zen was somehow partial towards voidness (in Dzogchen terms, toward the katak [ka dag] aspect of the Base), which implied that it involved a certain degree of directionality, and therefore was not at all the same as the condition of Total Space-Time-Awareness in which the Vajra nature becomes perfectly evident, which is the condition of total completeness / plenitude and perfection called Dzogchen.

Namkhai Nyingpo illustrated this with two examples. The first is that of a hen pecking at grain; though it may seem that the hen is looking at the ground, it is actually looking at the grains. The second is that of a person threading a needle; though it may seem that the person is looking at the sky, he or she is actually looking at the eye of the needle. The similes are not exact insofar as the ground and the sky are objects of the mind, but they are being used to illustrate the condition beyond the subject-object duality called Dzogchen, characterized by Total Space-Time-Awareness and the absence of any directionality of consciousness (and may also illustrate the Vajra nature of the higher Tantras). Though it may seem that the practitioner of Ch’an or Zen finds him or her self in this condition, the truth is that there is still a certain degree of directionality, a partiality towards voidness that veils the indivisibility of the two aspects of the Base, which, as we will see in a subsequent chapter, are katak and lhundrub.

However, it is hard to imagine that when a genuine satori fully manifests in the context of, say, Rinzai practice, the ensuing condition may involve a partiality toward voidness. And yet this does not mean that Ch’an or Zen can lead to the same result as Dzogchen: I cannot tell to what degree Ch’an or Zen can make such a realization stable and uninterrupted, for that system does not have methods for catalyzing the spontaneous liberation of delusion so that it occurs the very moment it manifests,
such as those of Tekchö (khregs chod), and even less so does it have the methods of Thögel (thod rgal) based on the principle of lhundrub having the function of activating the propensities for the manifestation of zhedang (zhe sdang; Skt., dwesha) and therefore of delusion, in a context in which the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is extremely high and in which it is forced to liberate itself immediately and spontaneously, so that the wrathful dynamic of the dharmata may rapidly burn out samsara. At any rate, it is well known to all that so far no Ch’an or Zen Master has manifested any of the realizations of the Atiyoga that involve dissolution of the physical body when the selfless activities proper to fully Awake Ones have been completed.

This matter is discussed in depth in Capriles (2003).

In Chinese Ch’un, I am sure spontaneous liberation could occur occasionally through the practice of the methods reintroduced by the extraordinary patriarch Hsu-yun, who taught since the end of the nineteenth century and until more than halfway through the twentieth century—as it certainly did in T’ang times, at least in the context of the Southern School. In Japanese Zen, it may do so, perhaps even today, in the application of methods characteristic of the Rinzai school, such as, for example, in koan study.

In general, the practice of Thögel must be preceded by that of Tekchö, and may be undertaken only when Tekchö has developed sufficiently—as it is a method for exacerbating the process of spontaneous liberation proper to Tekchö. However, since an individual who may be frightened by visions is not ready for practicing Thögel, frequently the individual has to practice Chö (gcod) in order to resolve and neutralize the propensities generating fear before visions before he or she may set out to practice Thögel.

All sentient beings, and not only human beings, are supposed to go through the bardo; therefore, the bardo is a constant, not only for humans, but for all beings. However, I have kept the term coined by Herbert V. Guenther because insofar as only humans can react to psychological disturbances with spontaneous self-healing processes, and insofar as only humans can practice the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of teachings of Dzogchen, it is for humans that the bardo is particularly relevant as a “constant.”

The kalpa is also an experience the individual can go through at some point in her or his life, for there is a correspondence between the macrocosmic and the microcosmic; understood in this sense, it is briefly discussed in the last chapter of this volume.

Spencer posited a correspondence between the development of the individual and that of society; Haeckel posited a correspondence between the evolution of the species (phylogenesis) and the one the individual human being undergoes during his or her lifetime (ontogenesis), and something similar have done other authors, including Freud, Gebser, Cassirer, Neumann and Wilber. However, the correspondence posited here is of a very different kind, for it is limited to the process of the cosmic cycle or aeon (Skt. kalpa; Tib. kalpa [ka la pa or bskal pa]), which according to the Tantric and Dzogchen teachings of Buddhism unfolds in the process of human phylogenesis and in some special meditative experiences an individual may go through in his or her lifetime—in both cases culminating in the dissolution of delusion. This experience is characterized by a constant acceleration of “vibratory rates”—that is, of the frequency of the vibrations that seem to originate from or be concentrated in the heart’s focal point of experience, which sustain delusory valuation-absolutization and cause us to perceive the world as concrete. At the end of the process, the vibratory rates become so high that the units of experienced time become infinitesimal and thus, at the end, finite time (i.e. time as a dimension apparently separate from space and knowledge) disintegrates and disappears together with the dualities of subject and object and of being-for-Self and being-that-is-in-itself-for-being-for-Self, with the phenomenon of being, and with delusory valuation-absolutization itself.

The Mahayogatantras are structured in terms of a birth-and-rebirth sequence; however, unlike the practices of the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man ngag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings which involve accessing the bardo (bar do), in the case of Mahayoga this is done imitatively and does not involve the spontaneously liberating dynamic of the lhundrub (lhun grub) aspect of the Base: the imitative practice may also work as a preparation for actual lhundrub practice should the individual later on set out to practice Dzogchen, but in itself it is a self-contained practice that does not look forward to a subsequent, more advanced practice.

What is often called a “psychotomimetic experience” is an experience induced by so-called psychedelics that exhibits the characteristic marks of a psychosis, but which comes to an end when the drug’s effect
runs out. I prefer to speak of a psychotic episode confined to the duration of the drug’s effect, which in some cases may extend itself beyond the lapse in question, becoming a fully-fledged psychosis.

Psychedelic publicist Timothy Leary was quick to intuit that there was a relationship between psychedelic experiences and the bardo. However, his book on the subject (Leary, Metzner & Alpert, 1964) shows he failed to understand what this relationship was and therefore what was the difference between both types of experience.

Partly influenced by Bateson, but basing himself on his own experience, R. D. Laing (1967) in turn wrote: “There is a great deal that urgently needs to be written about this and similar experiences. But I am going to confine myself to a few matters of fundamental orientation.

“We can no longer assume that such a voyage is an illness that has to be treated. Yet the padded cell is now outdated by the ‘improved’ methods of treatment now in use.

“If we can demystify ourselves, we see “treatment” (electro-shocks, tranquilizers, deep-freezing—sometimes even psychoanalysis) as ways of stopping this sequence from occurring.

“Can we not see that this voyage is not what we need to be cured of, but that it is itself a natural way of healing our own appalling state of alienation called normality?

“In other times people intentionally embarked upon this voyage.”

“Or if they found themselves already embarked, willy-nilly, they gave thanks, as for a special grace.”

And also (Laing [1967]):

“From the alienated starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not ‘true’ sanity. Their madness is not ‘true’ madness. The madness of our patients is an artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us, and by them on themselves. Let no one suppose that we meet ‘true’ madness any more than we are truly sane. The madness that we encounter in ‘patients’ is a gross travesty, a mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of that strained integration we call sanity may be. True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated social reality: the emergence of the ‘inner’ archetypal mediators of divine power, and through this death a rebirth, and the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego function, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer.”

See Bateson (1972, 1990); Wilden (1980); Pribram & Gill (1976). In 2000, research showed that, though the left hemisphere functions mainly in digital terms and the right hemisphere functions mainly in analog terms, in case of need the left hemisphere can carry out analog functions and the right hemisphere can perform digital functions.

The most common way to refer to such states is probably “altered states of consciousness.” I do not admit this label, for the unaltered state is the one that manifests in the primordial yoga (atiyoga) of Dzogchen, which makes patent the dharmakaya. In fact, the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit term yoga is naljor (rnam ’byor), a compound of the terms nalma (rnam ma) and jorwa (’byor ba). The former means “unaltered condition of something,” whereas the latter means “to contract,” “to take” or “to adhere to.” Therefore, the compound term has the meaning of “acquiring (our own) unaltered condition and adhering to it.” However, since one cannot acquire what was always one’s own condition, the true meaning of the compound term is “discovering our original unaltered condition and maintaining awareness (of) it.”

Given the above, the condition of masked insanity which is our deluded normality is an altered condition, and so it would be absurd to use the term “altered stated” to refer to the alterations of this state—which may involve, among many other states, the one in which our original unaltered condition is discovered, and the one in which awareness of this condition is continuous.

“Nonordinary states of consciousness” is an apter term, at least so long as it is explicitly noted that “ordinary” refers to the state of mind that is ordinary in “normal” individuals in modern, civilized societies.


In the practice of the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings, this break-up of primary process function-relationships takes place after questioning experience in specific ways, looking into coarse or subtle thoughts (or into supersubtle thought structures) in special ways, and so on; only when it takes place in this way can this break-up be beyond all doubts the reGnition of the true condition of thoughts / manifestation of the self-qua-Path (rather than being a therapeutic occurrence in the worldly sense only).
Finally, it seems clear that the teleology Bateson referred to corresponds to the interpretation of the
concept of teleonomy is useful, not because it saves us from the supposed
in fact, according to Pittendrigh (1958, p. 394):

“Biologists for a while were prepared to say a turtle came ashore and laid its eggs. These verbal scruples were
intended as a rejection of teleology but were based on the mistaken view that the efficiency of final causes
is necessarily implied by the simple description of an end-directed mechanism. ... The biologists long-
standing confusion would be removed if all end-directed systems were described by some other term, e.g.,
‘teleonomic,’ in order to emphasize that recognition and description of end-directedness does not carry a
commitment to Aristotelian teleology as an efficient causal principle.”

If we accepted the above, we could ironize that Bateson incurred in the pseudo-scientific arguments which
beg the question (i.e., which involve what Sextus Empiricus called a circle and that later logicians
called petitio principii) he ridiculed with a pun by characterizing as dormitive hypotheses (insofar as
they put to sleep the mind’s critical faculty) such explanations as the one according to which opium has
narcotic effects because it contains a dormitive principle. In fact, if we accepted Pittendrigh’s statement
as valid, we would object to Bateson that he posited teleology as an as efficient cause of the processes
whereby the reductio ad absurdum and eradication of wayward patterns is achieved, and would have
demanded that Bateson replaced the term teleology with teleonomy. However, the objections Mayr
(1965, 1974) raised against Pittendrigh’s views show that there was no such problem in Bateson’s
reasoning.

In fact, Mayr (1965) noted that the system’s end-directedness need not be given by something external
to the system, as it can well be a characteristic internal to the system; that in evolution the causes
involved were final (a telos) and formal ones rather than efficient ones, and that in any case the
concept of teleology refers to final and formal causes rather than efficient ones. Furthermore, Mayr
(1974) noted that, if following Pittendrigh, on the grounds that the phrase in order to escape posits
an inadmissible teleology, we abstain from saying, “the Wood Thrush migrates in the fall in order to
escape the inclemency of the weather and the food shortages of the northern climates” and say
instead, “the Wood Thrush migrates in the fall and thereby escapes the inclemency of the weather
and the food shortages of the northern climates,” we would be thereby leaving without answer the
key question of why does the Wood Thrush migrate.

According to Mayr (1974) the concept of teleonomy is useful, not because it saves us from the supposed
error of making teleology into an efficient cause, but because it emphasizes the fact that a system is
“end-directed due to the operation of a program” (thus being confined to systems, and in particular
to autopoietic ones). In fact, it is in part due to a program that the relationships of primary process
that must be eradicated must develop to a threshold level at which they can break, so that we may
access what Bateson called “systemic wisdom”—even though it is not only a program, or, to express
it in ampler terms, a software, that is at the root of this, for it equally depends on our hardware,
insofar as the fact that we have a cerebral hemisphere that works in an analog way and another one
that functions digitally is equally determinant in making this possible. (In this context it is worth
remembering that toward the end of his life—at a time when he was studying Dzogchen with
Urgyen Tulkü—Varela disowned the concept of autopoiesis as he had originally developed it
together with Maturana.)

Finally, it seems clear that the teleology Bateson referred to corresponds to the interpretation of the
meaning of life that Indians expressed in terms of the myth of lila (which is most often understood in
ontogenetic terms) and which Heraclitus expressed in terms of the child playing chess (which refers
to the phylogenetic level), which was discussed in vol. I of this book: the meaning of life lies in the
progressive unveiling of our true condition, and therefore depends on the previous concealment of
this condition.

The fact that teleology is implicit in the Dzogchen teachings and in the teachings of other Paths of
Awakening is discussed below in the regular text of this volume. As to why teleology is compatible
with teleonomy, and for a brief comparison of both concepts, cf. the preceding note.

This does not mean that consciousness, functioning in terms of secondary process, most of the time fails to
feel in control of primary process; the well-adapted individual who does not exaggerate too much in his
attempts to control his or her impulses and emotions will certainly manage to feel more or less in control
of these a great deal of the time—even though this is not the case with those who obsessively and
uninterruptedly try to control primary process.

The argument developed in vol. I of this book was reproduced in an earlier endnote to this volume.
Likewise, I am following the traditional view that the reference mark for this note was affixed, Freud posited what he called Thanatos (drive or urge toward death) on the basis of the observation of the repetition compulsion (or compulsion to repeat), which he believed was of unconscious origin, for it was hardly controllable, and which led the subject to place him or herself repetitively in painful situations which may be seen as replicas of order experiences. Freud believed that in this process there was always some trace of libidinal satisfaction, but believed the pleasure principle was insufficient to explain it. His realization that the pleasure principle was involved may be seen as an intuition of the fact, discussed in the regular text of this section, that Thanatos is a modification of Eros.

Also in the case of Dzogchen practice we may see the painful experiences induced by the Thanatos as the repetition of previous experiences, for many of them reproduce to some extent the most authentic experiences of being-for-Self, being-for-others and so on. However, they are not repetition in the sense in which experiences occurring in psychosis, neurosis or vices such as alcoholism are said to be repetition, for unlike the latter they are not based on an obsession.

Bateson rejected explanations in terms of “instincts”—a concept that according to him was taken from the Bible, and which he regarded as a “dormitive hypothesis,” like the one according to which the narcotic effect of opium is due to its having a “dormitive principle.” Hence it is important to stress the fact that with regard to Eros and Thanatos Freud did not use the term Instinkt, but the word Trieb, which means drive, urge or even impulse; it was James Strachey that rendered this term into English as “instinct,” thus obliterating the Freudian distinction between Trieb and Instinkt, in which the latter applies only to what is also common to animals different from human beings. And yet there can be no doubt that the tropism described by Brodey and discussed above, once mothers become potential sources of danger, is in some way an instance of what Freud called Thanatos—and perhaps it could be the basic impulse at the root of Thanatos.

In agreement with the implications of the observations of anthropology, ethnology and archeology (which, however, I do not assume to be objective or to perfectly correspond to reality) I am assuming that in the earlier stages of humankind the basic institution was not the biological family, and that in the early stages of humankind, before the rise of the family, the tropism in question was probably a drive to cling to the person who is providing protection and care rather than to the physical mother. At these stages, or even after the rise of the family but before the rise of repression of infants, the positive feedback loops in which the mother is at the same time the source of danger and the protection from danger (just as happens with a protection racket) simply could not manifest.

Likewise, I am following the traditional view of Eurasian spiritual systems and philosophical traditions (including Bön, Taoism, Shaivism, Zurvanism and in general the traditions associated with Mount Kailash, as well as the derived views upheld by the Greek philosophical school of the Stoics and by Hesiod and other ancient Greeks) according to which human spiritual and social evolution has been a process of degeneration driven by the development of basic human delusion, and political power, class divisions, violence, sexism, repression (of children by adults and of all human beings by themselves after early infancy) and so on were absent in the initial stages of humankind. Although it is generally believed that the actual spiritual and social evolution of humankind is contrary to the way these traditions see it, as shown in Chapter V of this volume, paleopathology, archeology, anthropology, ethnology and so on have produced a great deal of “evidence” showing that in the early stages of our species—most likely before 4000 BC and Eurasia, and before 12000 BC in a few selected spots of the Nile valley—violence between human beings was unknown.

In the earlier stages of humankind, when human beings functioned on the basis of physis or nature rather than on the basis of nomos or social conventions, and when there was no restricted, exclusive family to have a monopoly over “their” children, mothers could hardly become a source of danger to infants. Then the need to socialize children, in the sense of making them adapt to a system of nomos, introduced this potentiality—and later on the development of neurosis and sheer evil as societies became ever more pathological made of the potentiality in question an ever more common actuality.

Since the term nirvana is a combination of the Sanskrit prefix nir with the verbal root va, its etymological meaning is that of “blowing out” or “extinguishing.” However, it is a mistake to believe that the Theravada conceives nirvana as a mere annihilation, or, furthermore, as the extinction of human life—which is how Albert Schweitzer interpreted it, as a result of which he classified Buddhism as a “life denying” religion. Many texts illustrate nirvana with the image of a flame that seems to go out, but which
in reality, rather than being annihilated, through entering pure space (akasha) disappears from view. Therefore, nirvana, which is not simply nonbeing (it is qualified as not nonbeing), would be the transition to a different dimension. For example, Hinayana Buddhism postulates two types of nirvana: nirvana with a residue of condition, called sopadhisheha nirvana, which is obtained during one’s lifetime, and nirvana without a residue of condition or nirupadhisheha nirvana, which is obtained posthumously. The former is the transition to another dimension, not in the sense of going beyond our world, but of continuing to live and yet experiencing the world (so to speak, for the concept of experience does not apply here) in a totally new way, utterly beyond dukkha and its cause, which is the basic human delusion.

In its turn, the Arab term fanâ is universally rendered as extinction. (Sufi Master Ibn-el-Arabi criticized the view according to which the Gnosis that unveils the absolute [in Muslim terminology, Allah] comes after the extinction [fanâ] of existence and of the extinction of this extinction [fanâ el-fanâ’i], saying that whatever does not exist cannot cease to exist. However, there is a most valid reason why Sufis claim that this Gnosis comes after extinction [fanâ] of existence and of the extinction of this extinction [fanâ el fanâ’i]: only after the extinction of ek-sistence, or which is the same, of the illusory mode of being that in this book I am calling being-for-Self, and of the extinction of this equally illusory extinction, can the Gnosis of primordial awareness become fully patent—for it is the illusion of ek-sistence that conceals the Gnosis that is the Gnitive aspect of the Self-quA-Base. El Arabi was right in making the point he made, for certainly the claim that the Gnosis in question comes after extinction of existence and of the extinction of this extinction, could be wrongly taken to mean that there was something truly existing that had to become extinguished—which would be a really grave error. However, it would be equally grave to conclude that since there is nothing truly existing there is no need for extinction: if the delusion involving the illusion of ek-sistence does not become extinguished [and the same happens with this extinction, which is just as illusory as ek-sistence], primordial Gnosis / the Self-quA-Base will never be unconcealed, and delusion will go ahead producing ceaseless samsara.)

Even though a low energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness and the concomitant small space-time-knowledge are conditions for delusion to function smoothly, in order to overcome delusion it is not enough merely to increase the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, thereby expanding space-time-knowledge. This can produce illusory experiences of the type designated within Buddhism by the Tibetan term nyam (nyams), the Chinese mo-ching, and the Japanese makyö, and within Sufism by the Arabic term hal, but cannot result in the Self-quA-Path that is the manifestation of nirvana while on the Path and that occurs upon the reGnition of the darg energy that is the true condition of the thoughts in terms of which we interpret and experience these illusory experiences, and which results in the spontaneous liberation of those thoughts. In particular, it might give rise to the succession of the neutral condition of the base-of-all and the subsequent samsaric experiences of oneness—which, in individuals who are not prepared to reGnize the underlying thoughts so that they spontaneously liberate themselves, may lead to birth in the arupyadhåtu, from which sooner or later they will fall, upon which they will probably face an experience of hell. Furthermore, an increase in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness can directly result in some kind of hellish experience (e.g. in that which Grof calls BPM 2, or that which he calls BPM 3), which the individual will not be prepared to deal with, in which case it may become a fully-fledged psychosis. The reasons for this are roughly the ones that were reviewed in the quotation from Capriles (2000c) explaining the dynamic of the mandala.

The restricted, hermetic, fragmentary consciousness associated with a low energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness functions in the code of secondary process, interacting with primary process, which as we have seen it cannot control at will; on the contrary, action in terms of the code of secondary process aimed at controlling or modifying primary process is subject to the law of inverted effect, which catalyzes the process described in the paragraph of the regular text to which the reference mark for this note was affixed. On the contrary, in total awareness / total energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness the two processes are totally integrated: one does not function in terms of one of them, trying to control the other, but they manifest coincidently, so that a spontaneity totally beyond dualistic control achieves everything consummately.

As will be shown in a subsequent chapter, the practice of Dzogchen begins with the manifestation of the Self-quA-Path, and hence it implies that the individual no longer has the possibility of experiencing panic. However, a Dzogchen Master, in the face of an experience of panic in one of his or her disciples, can provide the pit instructions and the confidence in the Vision that may result in an initial instance of spontaneous liberation of delusion, and hence of panic, in the manifestation of the Self-quA-Path.
The concepts of pathogenic double-bind, therapeutic double-bind and normalizing double-bind were discussed in an endnote to a previous chapter of this volume.

In this practice, one is supposed to maintain constant awareness of all of one’s activities, which gives rise to a condition that etymologically may be referred to as paranoia, for one is literally “beside oneself.” This, in its turn, may result in an increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness—just as an increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness may result in an experience of “being beside oneself.” (Elsewhere in this chapter I noted that Ronald D. Laing did an intensive retreat of this practice in Shri Lanka and subsequently declared that it was an excellent means to induce psychotic experiences.)

The nyam (nyams) or “illusory experiences” that practitioners of the Burmese variety of the practice of vipassana (Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhantong [thag mthong]; Chinese, kuan) often face as unintended results of the practice, which so often involve involuntary bodily movements, panic, hallucinations and so on, are proofs that this practice often results in an increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness.

It is well known that in Rinzai Zen practice (or in the use of the koan by many Soto Masters), the manifestation of the “great mass of doubt” is regarded as the precondition of satori (Chinese: wu). (Among many others, Murakami “Bobo” Roshi insisted that without the great ball of doubt there is no satori; see Richie [1982], p. 8.) As shown in Bateson (1972), the method of koan (Chinese: kung-an) study is a form of therapeutic double binding; this is why the application of that method boost the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness, and is one of the conditions for the manifestation of the “mass of doubt” that is the precondition of satori.

For an explanation of the term “completion stage” (or “stage of perfection:” Skt. sampannakrama; Tib. dzogrim [rdzogs rim]) cf. the upcoming definitive version in print of Capriles (2003). In Lama Govinda (1973), we are told experiences of terror may occur when the practitioner approaches these practices without the due preparation; however, there are practices (such as that of chö (gcod)) in which the experience of terror must occur for the practice to fulfill its purpose; also in these practices the experiences that manifest prove that the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness has risen.

According to Bateson, in all genuine spiritual Paths and in successful spontaneous self-initiation of the type psychiatry refers to as “psychoses”, a last level of learning, called Learning III, is achieved. Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche has noted that delusion—the Second Noble Truth—is “underdeveloped wisdom.” In terms of Gregory Bateson’s “levels of learning,” delusion is the result of Learning II, while (developed) Wisdom is the result of Learning III. Now, as regards wisdom, the ruling classes—political, social and intellectual—and the culture of the First World are underdeveloped; instead, in several Third World cultures there are traditions and individuals who possess fully developed Wisdom. Since survival depends on the restoration of Wisdom, it is extremely urgent that the First World learns from those Third World individuals, traditions and cultures that possess developed Wisdom, and who can transmit the methods for achieving it. (Bateson’s levels of learning were expounded in “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication, and the Acquisition of World Views.” Paper presented at the Werner-Green Commemorative Symposium on World Views, their Nature and Role in Culture. Reproduced in Bateson [1972]. Cf. also Capriles [1986].)

Jung (1975) wrote with regard to the “transcendent function:”

“131 There is nothing mysterious or metaphysical about the term “transcendent function.” It means a psychological function comparable in its way to a mathematical function of the same name, which is a function of real and imaginary numbers. The psychological “transcendent function” arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents.

“132 Experience in analytical psychology has amply shown that the conscious and the unconscious seldom agree as to their contents and their tendencies. This lack of parallel is not just accidental or purposeless, but is due to the fact that the unconscious behaves in a compensatory or complementary manner towards the conscious. The reasons for this relationship are:

“(1) Consciousness possesses a threshold intensity which its contents must have attained, so that all elements that are too weak remain in the unconscious.

“(2) Consciousness, because of its directed functions, exercises an inhibition on all incompatible material, with the result that it sinks into the unconscious.
“(3) Consciousness constitutes the momentary process of adaptation, whereas the unconscious contains not only all the forgotten material of the individual’s own past, but all the inherited behavior traces constituting the structure of the mind.

“(4) The unconscious contains all the fantasy combinations which have not yet attained the threshold intensity, but which in the course of time and under suitable conditions will enter the light of consciousness.”

The function in question involves a yearning to evolve, to transcend oneself and actualize the archetype of the coherent whole Jung called the Self, consisting in an archetypal process which mediates opposites and enables the transition from one attitude or condition to another, by the utilization of symbols. It is activated whenever consciousness is engaged in the tension of opposites and if blocked leads to “mental illness.” The function’s healing effect lies in bridging the gap between conscious and unconscious, and thus overcoming one-sidedness, reconciling the rational with the irrational, the objective with the subjective, the biological with the spiritual, and so on. As in his own experience of emerging from “the darkness,” mandalas, as expressions of the Self, of wholeness, had a function in this process.

Thus it is clear that the function in question may be viewed as the principle of the self-healing processes considered in this volume. When we fail to do whatever we need to do in order to do the changes necessary for going beyond our alienated condition and toward Awakening, if the contributory conditions manifest there is the possibility that the self-healing process associated with the bardo and so on be spontaneously activated. If then contributory conditions (in particular disorientation in both ourselves and those around ourselves) prevent us from going straight in the direction in which the process would naturally take us, and we begin spinning in vicious circles of pain, manifesting what Laing (1967) called the “mockery” that we see in mental hospitals of what genuine madness could be, then we have what can be properly called “mental illness.”

As noted below in the regular text of this chapter, the main problem I see in Cooper (1971), and in many of the works by Bateson, Laing and others, is that they assert that spontaneous episodes of madness in unprepared individuals—provided that they are not institutionally distorted or aborted—may be enough to allow these individuals to achieve Supreme Sanity (i.e. a state analogous to that of a true Master in a genuine Path of Awakening).

In O’Callaghan (1993/2001) we read (put in US English by this author):

“Perry’s work corroborated the results of R.D. Laing’s famous Kingsley Hall experiment in London in the 1960s, in which only nine out of sixty-five “certified psychotics” who were tracked afterwards were re-admitted to hospitals again. Those who insist that “schizophrenia” is a disease will have to admit that it is curable! The principal difference between Kingsley Hall and Diabasis were the rather chaotic organization of the former in a bleak London slum, and the more organized approach of the latter on sunny San Francisco Bay.”

Unfortunately, the Diabasis of San Francisco Bay area ceased to exist long ago; presently there is a Diabasis in (not-so-sunny) Prague.

I have objections to the conceptual framework developed by the Grofs. For example, in Grof & Grof (1992, Part I. chapter 4), the authors distinguish ten main types of spiritual emergencies, most of which would not fit the concept if it is to be understood as a synonym of what in this book are called [spontaneously occurring] “self-healing processes,” whereas others would fit the concept but in terms of the views expressed in this book should not be regarded as different types of process. Among the types of spiritual emergency the Grofs posit that in terms of this book would not be viewed as such are the four types I view as problems very different from the self-healing processes discussed in this book, and in particular the last three I view as dangerous deviations that a wise spiritual friend would make those seeking his advise ward off, and from which he would save them should they inadvertently fall into them. With regard to the processes that in terms of this book would constitute a “spiritual emergency,” it is a fact that all of them involve an increase in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness—which the Grofs view as only one of the their ten main types and call “awakening of kundalini.” (The use of spirit possession—the Grofs’ tenth variety of spiritual emergency—for oracle consultation has been practiced in Tibet with what may seem to be frequent useful results. However, even in this case the usefulness of such states is not with regard to an individual’s advance on the Path of Awakening, which is what we are concerned with here.)
A more detailed discussion of the views of the Grofs is undertaken in a subsequent section of this chapter.

In Grof (1998), the Czech-born psychiatrist acknowledged that in the past he referred to many experiences as BPM this or that, which in actual fact needed not be viewed in terms of perinatal matrixes.

An idea common to Wilber, Grof and other prominent theorists of transpersonal/integral psychology, is that for the problems concerning each different level (in Grof’s terms, biographical, transpersonal, etc.) a different psychological therapy must be applied. However, the Awake One’s responsiveness, which does not conceptualize “therapies” or “levels”, responds to the needs of each in a perfectly appropriate way. Unlike many transpersonal psychologists, here I will not establish rules concerning the type of therapy to apply to each different type of problems. In the conception I follow, the real therapy is the Path, and if someone finds a blockage on the Path that is a consequence of a psychological problem, it will be up to the reader of the Path to resort to a psychological therapy if he or she deems it necessary to do so; if the therapist is expert in all methods and therapies, between them they will be able to figure out what is best to apply. Therefore psychological therapy as different from the standard Path is not necessary except in the eventuality of special problems being faced by an individual.

New genuine spiritual Paths only arise after existing genuine spiritual Paths have disappeared from the face of the earth, and only do so through the individuals Tibetans call Tönpas (ston pa) or “primordial revealers”—the last of which was, in the case of Buddhism in general, the Buddha Shakyamuni, and in the case of Buddhist Dzogchen, Garab Dorje. In our time, genuine spiritual Paths have not become extinguished, and no primordial revealers—or, so far as I know, Awake individuals—have manifested as transpersonal psychologists, antipsychiatrists and so on.

The period of madness undergone by Rumi and other famous spiritual Masters are somehow intermediate between the one undergone by Mary Barnes and the experience of the human constant in practices such as Thögel, which belongs to a far more advanced stage of the Dzogchen Path and which is ineluctable for those who aspire to the highest Dzogchen realization.

Lit. “vehicle of the paramitas:” the Mahayana, and in particular the gradual Mahayana. This synonym is used here because reference is being made to the traditional explanations on the way to develop the six or ten transcendentals or paramitas.

As we have seen, emotionally charged thoughts are thoughts sustained by a particularly intense delusory valuation-absolutization.

These may range from the more fleeting highs obtained by movie stars, top artists, top politicians, spurious spiritual Masters and so on, to the somehow more stable absorptions of the top of the sphere of sensuality, of the sphere of form, and, even more so, of the formless sphere.

We know that within samsara Buddhism distinguishes six realms of experience. It is only in the human realm that the individual has the possibility of questioning his or her experience and applying the instructions that may create the conditions for the spontaneous reGnition of the Base to possibly take place. Therefore, in the Dzogchen process of Awakening, as contradiction turns into conflict and the individual faces pain and struggle, he or she must keep the capability to question experience and apply instructions that is characteristic of the human realm.

It is also worth noting that, after the first manifestation of the Self-qua-Path (i.e. after a first satori or, in Dzogchen terms, after Direct Introduction), the reestablishment of delusion does not imply one will have to go through the most conflictive and painful states of samsara. Furthermore, according to Buddhism, strictly speaking the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path “closes the doors to the lower realms” (which does not mean that one cannot have any conflictive experience whatsoever; what it means is that one can not become a denizen of the realms characterized by extreme conflict—i.e. that one cannot lose the typically human capacity to question one’s experience, or dwell in the most conflictive states for a significant period).

Since the most extreme manifestations of tension depend upon rejection of the unpleasant sensation of tension appearing as object, which in turn depends on the experience of the mental subject as separate and distinct from the tension and flow of experience, we look towards the place where the mental subject seems to lie, in order to check whether or not there is in fact such a separate entity. Upon failing to find a separate mental subject—or subsequently, when the runaway of tension reaches a given threshold—provided that all necessary conditions are given, delusion, and therefore the illusory subject-object duality and the tension it implies, may spontaneously liberate itself in the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path.
It may also be said that in this condition we are in "heaven" in the sense of the Tibetan word namkha (nam 'mkha), that may be translated both as "space" and as "sky"—provided that we use this word to indicate the panoramic and unobstructed character of primordial Awareness/Gnitiveness (e.g. as unconcealed in Awakening), rather than conditioned, samsaric states of the formless sphere or the neutral condition of the base-of-all.

The spontaneous dissolution of the ego-delusion and of delusion in general is abrupt and instantaneous; however, the constant repetition or continuity of this spontaneous liberation progressively neutralizes delusion, so that its manifestation in daily life progressively dilutes until it finally disappears altogether.

272 In German, abyss is Abgrund. Since the individual descending through Hell can feel that he or she is going down through a bottomless abyss, in German this fearsome vision of Hell could as well called der Ungrund—this term being the one Jakob Bohme used to refer to a bottomless abyss. To go on with the play of words, it may be said that each and every time conflict and pain manifest, they liberate themselves spontaneously in the unveiling of the Self-qu�a-Base (Grund) that is the true nature of our insubstantial (ungrounded) selves and of all insubstantial (ungrounded) entities. (Abgrund, Grund and so on are terms that were used by Heidegger; however, here some of them are understood in a way that is radically different from Heidegger’s.)

273 Indeed, the Divine Comedy’s Heaven must be contrasted with the Buddhist realm of the gods (deva loka or sura gati), which is the highest realm of conditioned existence, for it consists in the very surpassing of (conditioned) existence in the Self-qu�a-Fruit, which—as will be shown below in the regular text of this section—the Dzogchen teachings and in general the inner Tantras of the Nyingmapa represent as the irreversible Heaven of the Akanishta Pure Land (’og min stug po bkod pa’i zhing), the pure dimension of Awakening, the natural expression of the Awake condition, the dharmadhatu garden of the Primordial Buddha, which is referred to as Akanishta-Ghanavyuha (e.g. Dudjom Rinpoche, J. Y. D. English 1991, Trans.: Gyrme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein, vol. I, p. 413), for it is said to be “richly adorned” (Skt. ghanavyuha; Tib. stug po bkod pa) insofar as it spontaneously gives rise to the “offerings and adornments” of complete enjoyment. In Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé (1995), we are offered four different explanations of Akanishta.

274 It may also be said that in this condition we are in “heaven” in the sense of the Tibetan word namkha (nam ‘mkha), that may be translated both as “space” and as “sky”—provided that we use this word to indicate the panoramic and unobstructed character of primordial Awareness/Gnitiveness (e.g. as unconcealed in Awakening), rather than conditioned, samsaric states of the formless sphere or the neutral condition of the base-of-all.

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276 Samantabhada (Tib. Kuntuzangpo [kun tu bzang po]) represents vision (Tib. nangwa [snang ba]) or, which is the same, the phenomenal world that manifests through the senses with its perfect functionality by the power of primordial awareness (which may also be said to be what the male primordial Buddha stands for), and therefore the lhundrub (lhun grub) or spontaneous perfection aspect of the Base. Samantabhadri (Tib. Kuntuzangmo [kun tu bzang mo]) represents the basic space where all phenomena of vision or awareness appear (Skt. dharmadhatu; Tib. Chöjing [chos dbyings]), and therefore the katak (ka dag) or primordial purity aspect of the Base that is our true condition of Dzogchen. They are said to be indivisible insofar as they are the nondual, insubstantial, nonplural true condition of the single reality that the intellect disassembles into these two aspects, each of which cannot exist without the other. The name of this primordial Buddha, which means “All-good” or “All is viable,” stands for the fact that the Self-qu�a-Base that it represents does not discriminate between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, and so on.
Since in our time the only of these special modes of death that continues to manifest is the one listed (3) The body of light (öphung [2]) The body of atoms (lü dül thren du deng [1] The rainbow body (jalü [280]

277 In the Longde (klong sde) series of Atiyoga-Dzogchen, the term jerme (dbyer med) indicates the indivisibility of the experiences of nonconceptuality, clarity and pleasure in the manifestation of the Self-quà-Path. This is not the sense in which I am using the term here, where I am giving it the sense it has in the Menngagde (man ngag sde) or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen (and in particular in the context of Thögel and the Yangthik), which is that of the dissolution of the illusion that one’s consciousness is at a distance from physical reality.

278 The dharmadhatu is the unconditioned, basic space where all phenomena manifest, which is indivisible from these phenomena just as Samantabhadra is indivisible from Samantabhadra, and which may even be said to be the true condition of phenomena.

279 As Shantideva noted (IX.107. Shantideva [1996], p. 126), the Buddha is false imagination in the mind of another, but he does not exist because of conventional truth on his own part. For example, Buddhists who lived at the time of Shakyamuni through their false imagination perceived Shakyamuni as a Buddha, but Shakyamuni, who was not subject to false imagination, did neither perceive himself as a Buddha, nor perceive others as deluded sentient beings. This is why Jigme Lingpa asserted that, though Buddhist sentient beings may perceive Buddhas as carrying out countless activities on their behalf, Buddhas perceive no beings that must be helped, and harbor no intentions to help beings. The point is that, since Buddhas are free from grasping at the threefold projection (Tib., ’khor gsun), whatever they do is an instance of what is called “action and fruit [of action] devoid of the concept of the three spheres” (’khor gsun rnam par mi rtag pa’i las dang ‘bras bu): from their own standpoint they are beyond activity—and yet sentient beings, if they are devout Buddhists and are able to recognize the Buddhas as such, see the latter as carrying out countless activities on their behalf.

280 The especial realizations resulting in extraordinary modes of death are: (1) the rainbow body (Tib. jalü [’ja’ lus]); (2) the body of atoms (Tib. lü dül thren du deng [lus rdul phran du dengs]); and (3) the body of light (Tib. ökyiku [’od kyi sku] or öphung [’od phung]).

(1) The rainbow body (jalü [’ja’ lus]) is a level of realization entailing one of the modes of dissolution of the physical body after death, which results from the “mode of death of the dakinis (Tib. khando [mha’ ’gro])” and which in the past was attained by many practitioners of the “Vajra Bridge” or Dorje Zampa (rdo rje zam pa) of the Longde (klong sde) series of Dzogchen teachings who, through the practice of this system, attained the fourth vision of Dzogchen; it has not been attained for many centuries, as the exacerbation of delusion has made the methods of the Longde incapable of bearing such fruit in our time. This realization should not be confused with the so-called “rainbow body” resulting from specific Tantric practices of the Path of Transformation, which is not at all equivalent.

(2) The body of atoms (lü dül thren du deng [lus rdul phran du dengs]), which results from the “mode of death of the vidyadharas (rigdzins [rig ’dzin]),” is reputedly attained as a result of the practice of the first stage of the Menngagde (man ngag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings, which is that of Tekchö (khregs chod)—and especially of the Menngagde terma (gter ma) or treasure teachings of the Nyingthik (snying thig). If, through the practice of this system, the fourth vision of Dzogchen is attained, after death the body will dissolve into subtle atoms, and one will be said to have attained the body of atoms. Since no one has attained this realization in a very long time, I believe we may assume that in our time it is no longer an effective possibility.

(3) The body of light (öphung [’od phung] or ökiku [’od kyi sku]), which results from the mode of death called “self-consuming like a fire” and which is obtained as a result of developing the fourth vision (called chöze londe [chos zad blo ’das]) in the practice of the second stage of the Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings, which is that of Thögel, and of the Menngagde terma (gter ma) or treasure teachings of the Yangthik (which contain the essence of the Nyingthik and place the emphasis on Thögel). This body is often called in the same way as (1): the rainbow body (Tib. jalü [’ja’ lus]).

Since in our time the only of these special modes of death that continues to manifest is the one listed as (3), this is the one that we have the possibility of attaining (in the regular text I spoke of having the possibility of attaining one of the three because I was speaking in abstract, timeless terms, and I wanted to list all three special modes of death). These three modes of death were considered in Capriles (2000a, 2003), and will be considered in further detail in Capriles (work in progress 4).

281 The realization resulting in deathlessness is the one called phowa chenpo (pho ba chen po), resulting in the phowa chenpo ku (pho ba chen po’i sku), sometimes called jalü phowa chenpo (’ja’ lus pho ba
This deathlessness was considered in Capriles (2000a, 2003), and will be considered in further detail in Capriles (work in progress 4).

The Greek term *morphê* means “to be transformed” or “to be transfigured,” and hence implies that one conserves a structure, even though this structure is different from the preceding one. Since the idea to be conveyed here is that a breakthrough takes one (momentarily) beyond structures, I call this breakthrough “metamorphic.”

We already know it could not be regarded as morphostasis either.

Moreover, this process is no longer limited to a positive feedback loop propelling a process of empirical *reductio ad absurdum* that may lead to changes of norms, codes, programs and metaprograms, for now the spontaneous liberation of delusory valued thought and associated tensions in the manifestation of primordial gnosis introduces a condition that is beyond any kind of feedback or other systemic activities—for all such activities require the interaction of two or more elements, but the condition introduced by primordial gnosis is beyond dualism, plurality and even the concept of oneness. Furthermore, in the post-Contemplation state in which this condition beyond dualism is no longer manifest, the system incorporates ever more effective negative feedback loops.

The Greek term *metamorphoûsthai* means “to be transformed” or “to be transfigured,” and hence implies that one conserves a structure, even though this structure is different from the preceding one. Since the idea to be conveyed here is that a breakthrough takes one (momentarily) beyond structures, I call this breakthrough “metamorphic.”

This term is a compound of the Greek vocables *meta*, meaning “beyond;” *morphê*, meaning “structure;” and *rhesos*, meaning “flow.”

Of course, the functions that depend on the autonomic nervous system and so on continue to be regulated by programs; the point is that the programs that formerly caused problems, and that gave rise to the illusion of a self and in general to a program-conditioned experience, are now deactivated and neutralized. Since one lives in the bare patency of the unconditioned, and all that may condition one liberates itself spontaneously upon arising, one is free from all conditioning.

*Je Tsongkhapa* asserted the realization of emptiness of self-being to be the ultimate or absolute truth of the Prasangika Madhyamaka school, which is the true condition of ourselves and all other entities. However, in Capriles (2005) I showed that the Nyingmapa are right in asserting the absolute truth not to consist in the conceptual, dualistic realization of emptiness of self-being, but in the nonconceptual, nondual direct realization of the *dharmata* or true condition of all entities which
is beyond the four extremes consisting in self-being, emptiness of self-being, both self-being and emptiness of self-being, and neither self-being nor emptiness of self-being, which are mutually relative concepts.

This view the one expounded in the Mahaprajñāparamitāśāstra, which is extant in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation only and which is attributed to Nagarjuna, even though some scholars deny his authorship of the text (and in fact, whereas the rest of the texts by Nagarjuna limit themselves to achieve the prasanga or reductio ad absurdum of the views of common sense of other schools, this text posits autonomous [swatantra] theses, and some passages in the English translation by K. Venkata Ramanan [1966] may give the impression of positing a Swatantrika interpretation of Madhyamaka—which one is unable to either dispel or confirm, insofar as the translation in question does not explain each and every time which is the Sanskrit equivalent of the term be renders as this or that). However, for the Swatantrika school in general equates emptiness of self-being with the ultimate or absolute truth, whereas the Shastra attributed to Nagarjuna, like the texts by Nagarjuna and the genuine Prasangika interpretation of Madhyamaka, and like myself in the passage to which the reference mark for this note was appended, view the realization of emptiness of self-being as a stage on the way to and a precondition of the realization of absolute or ultimate truth.

K. Venkata Ramanan expounds the basis ideas in 437a of the Shastra as follows (I modify his rendering of dhārma as “being” and so on):

Shunyata as the mundane truth of things means the nature of change and relativity, and in this nature, things are [nondual and nonplural], indistinct, undivided, while as specific forms of becoming they are distinct, many, and different. It is this realization of the shunya nature, the non-substantial and dependent nature of things again that directs the mind to their ground, viz., the indeterminate dharmā, with which as the ground the many things appear as its phenomenal diversifications, and which they themselves are in their ultimate nature. The ultimate truth of things is the undivided dharmā. It is in this way that the denial that rupa etc. are... substantial and self-natured leads one to the further realization that they are themselves the unborn dharmā in their ultimate nature...

The term dharmā is used in the Shastra as a synonym of dharmata, tathata and dharmadhatu, whereas the term bhutakoti is used to refer to the unconcealment of the dharmadhatu (=dharmā in the above passage).

291 The combination of the first and second senses of the terms avidya and marigpa in the Dzogchens classification adopted here is a paramount contradiction, which even in the absence of avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses the terms have in the same classification would be the fundamental human contradiction. However, they could not sustain themselves indefinitely without the intervention of avidya or marigpa in the third of the senses the terms have in the Dzogchen classification adopted here.

292 In a note to the first volume of this book explaining the three kinds of avidya or marigpa in the Dzogchen classification adopted here I had referred to this type of suffering. In Capriles (2003) we read: In his Bodhicharyavatāra or Bodhisattvacharyavatāra, Shantideva explained the dukkha and suffering of samsāra in terms of three types of suffering, which Chögyal Namkhai Norbu (1999/2001, pp. 42-43) summarized as follows:

“…even though it may seem that at times in the karmic dimension of samsāra there is fleeting happiness, in reality beings of the three lower states (the hell realm, the preta realm and the animal realm) are afflicted with the ‘suffering of suffering’ or ‘double suffering’, like a leper who is also struck by bubonic plague; the beings of the three higher states (the realm of gods, the realm of anti-gods and the human realm) are tormented by the ‘suffering of change’, like a bee [that previously was happily flying around but then is] trapped in a jar [thereby becoming very agitated]; and all beings dominated by a distorted perception of reality are subject to ‘all-pervading conditioning suffering’, transmigrating infinitely like the turning of the paddles of a water mill...”

What Shantideva called “all-pervading conditioning suffering” is the relentless lack of plenitude resulting from the illusory sundering of our primordial completeness by the illusory subject-object cleavage—which, as we have seen, dooms the subject to experience the lack of completeness and plenitude that, as remarked in the above quote, affects “all beings dominated by a distorted perception of reality,” and therefore pervades all samsaric states of the three spheres (of formlessness, form and sensuality) and the six realms. This lack of completeness and plenitude involves not only a longing for them, but unabated discomfort and uneasiness as well, for as soon as we feel separate from the continuum of plenitude that the
Thus, this “all-pervading conditioning suffering” is the essential feeling of lack and the discomfort and uneasiness that all beings in *samsara* constantly strive to elude by the means considered in this chapter (there are many others and an inventory would take countless pages). It is precisely because to some extent we succeed in eluding it by the means described, that Shantideva compared this type of suffering to a hair, the normal individual to the palm of a hand and the *bodhisattva* or individual *en route* to Awakening to the eyeball, and noted that in the palm of the hand the hair can remain undetected indefinitely, but that in the eyeball, where its presence becomes evident and unbearable, it has to be removed immediately. Normal individuals to some extent succeed in eluding this all-pervading feeling of lack, discomfort and uneasiness, and insofar as they succeed in doing so they have no chance whatsoever of getting rid of it. The *Mahayana* practitioner *en route* to Awakening, on the other hand (to some extent because she or he has understood the dynamic of elusion partly described in this chapter), has brought about a deficiency in those conditions that tend to produce and sustain birth and death, which makes it impossible for him or her to succeed in effectively eluding the feeling of lack, discomfort and uneasiness—and therefore only she or he has the opportunity to uproot the cause of that feeling, attaining Awakening.

In turn, the “suffering of change” is typical of higher realms, whose denizens to a considerable extent succeed in eluding the all pervasive suffering described above, but are subject to the suffering of change that occurs when they come to know that they are about to lose the favorable conditions represented by their psychological state, comfortable life, status and position. In particular, the gods of the peak of samsaric existence completely succeed in eluding suffering until few days before their fall, when they are said to foresee their upcoming fall and the bad destiny that will follow thereafter, and therefore suffer bitterly anticipating what is to come—like a bee that, after being in boundless space, is to be confined to the claustrophobic dimension of a small jar. When they fall, they will have to face the “suffering of suffering” that is the third of the types of suffering listed by Shantideva.

Finally, this third type of suffering—the one called “suffering of suffering” or “double suffering”—is the suffering most people refer to by the term, which is characteristic of lower realms. Its example is a leper who is also struck by bubonic plague, which illustrates the pain of experiencing pain, illness, dejection, sadness, depression and so on that recurrently strikes beings who, being confined to *samsara*, already suffer from all-pervading suffering. Thus, in this case a misfortune falls on top of misfortune, resulting in a "double misfortune."

In Pali literature, and in particular in the *Udaana*, we find terms such as *ajata*, rendered as unborn; *abhēta*, translated as unbecome; *akata*, rendered as unmade; and *asankhata*, translated as uncompounded or unconditioned: they were used mainly in the rejection of the Hindu attribution of these qualities to the Self (Skt. *atman*; Pali, *atta*), as it would have been legitimate to predicate them only of *nirvana*. In the Mahayana, the concept of *abhēta* was replaced by the one expressed by the Sanskrit terms *anupada* and *anupatti*, which, just as the term *asamskrita*, which rendered the Pali *asankhata*, was predicated of all dharmas. The same applies to the Skt. *ajata*, which like the same term in Pali literally means “without birth,” and to *animitta*, which is also rendered as unconditioned: both were predicated of all dharmas. And the same applies to the opposites of these terms as well—i.e., to the various terms expressing the absence of cessation—which were also predicated of all dharmas. At any rate, in the Mahayana all of these terms directly imply the concept of *swabhava shunyata*.

Since *Totality* cannot be known as object or in terms of any concept, for the object excludes the subject and all concepts exclude their *differentia specifica*, and intuitions are perceptions in terms of subtle / intuitive concepts, *intuitions of totality* are to be contrasted with the *unconcealment of Totality*—the latter being necessarily nonconceptual.

Let us remember that, according to the Mahayana, Shakyamuni did not teach total shunyata in the first cycle of teachings or “turning of the wheel of dharma” (Skt. *dhammachakra-pravartana*; Tib.
In the early stages of the process of degenerative evolution of humankind, before the rise of the family, the tropism in question was probably a drive to cling to the person who is providing protection and care rather, who may not have always been the physical mother. At this stage, or even after the rise of the family but before the rise of repression of infants, the positive feedback loops in which the mother is at the same time the source of danger and the protection from danger (just as happens with a protection racket) simply could not manifest.

If we viewed the tropism to cling to the person who is providing protection and care as a manifestation of Eros, then Thanatos would arise after protection and care are monopolized by the physical mother, at the time in the process of degenerative evolution when mothers become potential sources of danger—and Thanatos might be seen as having its root in Eros, for it may be the infant’s drive to cling to mother in case of danger, that later on in life manifests as the drive to have repeated experience of the unpleasant which (correctly interpreting Freud’s analysis of the compulsion of repetition) Bateson explained to be the Thanatos.

The tradition in question is widely referred to as “shamanism;” however, the truth is that we have no way to establish whether the said tradition was purely shamanic, or whether, like Tibetan Bön and the Indian Shaiva tradition, it combined shamanism with what I refer to as metashamanism (a term that is explained in a subsequent note to this chapter). The fact that is uses of a map analogous to the Divine Comedy’s does not necessarily prove that Paleo-Siberian shamanism had a metashamanic aspect (see the definition of this term below in the regular text of this chapter); however, it proves at least that it knew how to use that which H. V. Guenther has called “the human constant” as an effective healing method.

In Guenther (1993), p. 153, we find a slightly different translation, which was reproduced in a previous note to this volume.

We can distinguish as many aspects as we want in the undivided Base, but for their purpose, the most common division the Dzogchen teachings make is into the three aspects which are essence, nature and energy. Since the Base is the Buddha-nature, we can illustrate it with a statue of Buddha, which is an undivided unity, but in which we can distinguish its form, its color and the material of which it is made. However, we could as well distinguish a fourth aspect if we deemed it useful, which could be, say, the indivisibility of the aforementioned three aspects. To which we could add the material’s brightness, its smoothness, or whatever else we deemed useful. This is why the Buddhist teachings divide the Buddha-nature into three aspects, which are the three kayas, or into four, if we add the swabhāvikāya which is the indivisibility of the three kayas, of into five if, so that the aspects in question may correspond to the five wisdoms, we add the vajrakāya to the four aspects we have already distinguished. Etc.

As clarified in note 68 to vol. I of this book, some teachers insist that the energy of thukje aspect of the Base does not consist in the unceasing process of manifestation of phenomena and in these phenomena themselves, but in the unimpededness that permits the manifestation of phenomena, which may be noticed in the instant preceding manifestation. The point behind this is easily understood in terms of the representation of the Base in terms of the simile of a mirror, which compares phenomena to the reflections in the mirror—for in fact it is not permissible to claim that the reflections that manifest in a mirror are the mirror. However, neither is it permissible to claim that they are something different or separate from the mirror, for they (are) a function of the mirror, and they (are) certainly not outside the mirror or separate from it—and, furthermore, they are nothing at all. If they were not utterly empty manifestations of the energy aspect of the Base, the phenomena of the three modes of manifestation of energy (dang [gDangs], rolpa [röl pa] and tsel [rtsa'll]) would involve self-being and be inherently different and separate from the Base, and hence dualism and self-being would be inherent in the true condition of reality, and the three modes of manifestation of energy could not be said to be what they are said to be. Furthermore, integration of the phenomena of the three forms of manifestation of energy would be impossible, and hence there would be no Awakening.

For a more thorough discussion of this, the reader is directed to the note in question and/or to the upcoming revised version in print of Capriles (2003).

Though in imagination and fantasy the dang (gDangs) mode of manifestation of energy is the “stuff” of which mental images “are made,” the said images are quite dim, not being visible in the sense in which
As Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche has noted in a series of Dzogchen retreats (the first time I heard this being in the Lhundrubgar retreat in 1997), the term tek (khregs) means bundle; for example, in Tibetan a bundle of hay (dza) is a dza tek wo (dza khregs bo), whereas a bundle of firewood (shing) is a shing tek wo (shing khregs bo). The sound chö, if written gcod and pronounced more abruptly corresponds to the transitive verb “to cut,” but when spelled chod and pronounced more softly means “to break” qua intransitive verb: the second syllable in the term Tekchö is chod rather than gcod because in this practice tensions, rather than being actively cut, are led to break spontaneously—a point that has been overlooked by those who have rendered the term Tekchö as “cutting up ties,” “cutting up fetters,” “breaking through resistance,” or the less inadequate “cutting of tension.” In fact, as shown below in the regular text, the rupture of tension in the practice of Tekchö may be compared unto the spontaneous rupture of the rope that was tying a bundle of hay or firewood, upon which the whole of the hay or firewood falls totally relaxed on the floor: this rupture of tension is not the result of an action of cutting (such an action would sustain tension insofar as it would affirm and sustain the subject-object duality and the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought in general, which are the very root of tension), but occurs spontaneously upon the bare, nonconceptual reGnition of the true essence of thought.

Hence my cumbersome but precise translation of the term Tekchö (khregs chod) as “spontaneous, instant, absolute release of tension.” Since the rope that ties our threefold existence is the tensions inherent in the subject-object duality and the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, which instantly disappear when the “rope” breaks, the spontaneous release of tension typical of this practice goes along with a spontaneous, instant dissolution of mindfulness (Tib. tenpa [draṇ pa]; Skt. smṛiti; Pali sati) and therefore of meditation as such—this being the reason why this practice is also called Tenchö (draṇ chod) or “rupture of mindfulness” and why the Dzogchen teachings note that the supreme state of Contemplation is that of nonmeditation or noncontemplation.

The spontaneous liberation of thought is radically different from the subsiding of thoughts of their own accord after they have had their moment, as it is the natural function of the all-liberating single gnosis (Tib. chikshe kundröl [geg shes kun gro], which functions only when the gnosis in question is patent and is a function of this gnosis, which is like a vajra that spontaneously destroys the enemies consisting in delusorily valued thoughts.

In the first type or capacity of spontaneous liberation, called cherdrol (geer grol) or “liberation upon looking,” they have their moment, but they liberate themselves instantly and spontaneously the very instant we look into their essence. In the second type or capacity of spontaneous liberation, called shardröl (shar grol) or “liberation upon arising,” as thoughts begin to arise and are about to have their moment, an automatic, unprompted movement of awareness results in their spontaneous reGnition and so they instantly liberate themselves spontaneously. In the third type or capacity of spontaneous liberation, called rangdröl (rang grol) or “utterly spontaneous liberation,” is as though the vajra were always manifest and so would not allow thoughts to have their moment; in fact, they liberate themselves spontaneously as they begin to arise, like drawings on water.

The beginner might only be aware of coarse / discursive thoughts, and hence these will be the only ones he or she will be able to look into in order to reGnize them as the dharmakaya. More advanced practitioners will be aware of subtle / intuitive thoughts as well, and so will also be able to look into them in order to reGnize them as the dharmakaya. Even more advanced practitioners will also, as soon as the mental subject arises or as soon as perception as object manifests coincidently with it, will be aware of the manifestation of the supersubtle threefold thought structure, and so will be able to look into it in order to reGnize it as the dharmakaya. However, in all cases, all thoughts of all possible kinds that may be manifest will instantly dissolve upon reGnition of the dharmakaya. Therefore, this reGnition will in all cases imply the instant dissolution of the activity at the root of delusory valuation-absolutization and of the subject-object duality, and therefore will give rise to an instant, absolute release of tension.

This is why, so long as the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought is functioning, the relaxation obtained by means of pacification meditation (Pali, samatha; Skt. samātā; Tib. zhiné [zhi gnas]; Chinese chih) cannot be absolute: the delusory valuation-absolutization of the “threefold projection” and the attitudes of the subject toward the object will give rise to some degree of
tension. In the practice of the *Upadeshavarga* or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought is interrupted by the sudden manifestation of the Self-quau-Path, and in the practice of pacification meditation it can only interrupt itself if we carry the practice so far as to beget an absorption of the neutral base-of-all. However, this should not lead us to believe that absorptions of the neutral base-of-all are valuable: the Dzogchen teachings compare dwelling in an absorption of this kind with “cutting one’s own head,” for so long as one dwells in it one cannot advance on the true Path or attain Awakening, and hence is wasting one’s precious human existence.

These are the paradigmatic visions of rölpa energy, which are likely occur in the case of those who have trained in Tantric visualization, but not the only possible ones: thigles may bear the images of people one knows, animals or whatever. Even a Master having extensive training in Tantric visualization like Chögyal Namkhai Norbu reports to have had visions of thigles bearing the images of people he met in his everyday life.

In other dark rook practices visions are elicited by sensory deprivation in combination with unelaborated nongradual visualizations, pressure on points of the organism (including some of those that are pressed in the practice of the Longde *klong sde* series of Dzogchen teachings) and so on. Consider the following words by Isaac Newton (2005):

“Qu. 16. When a Man in the dark presses either corner of his Eye with his Finger, and turns his Eye away from his Finger, he will see a Circle of Colors like those in the Feather of a Peacock’s Tail?”

The circle of colors in the feather of a peacock’s tail is a symbol of Thögel insofar as (1) it resembles the thigles that manifest during the practice in question, and (2) it is a naturally arisen manifestation (lhundrub *lхun grub*) rather than something made, produced or contrived.

In the last instance the root of the passions that constitute the kleshavarana or nyöndrib (*nyon sгріб*) is the belief in an objective external reality and of oneself as a living being in that reality. Hence the obstacle of knowledge is the root of the obstacle of the passions and (despite the fact that this is not explicitly asserted in the teachings of the Mahayana) the latter cannot be totally neutralized so far as the former is manifest.

Chögyal Namkhai Norbu has told his disciples that once during the practice of Thögel he had a vision of a central thigle with four other thigles around it, which afterwards he tried to reproduce in a drawing. It was at that point that he realized the amazing dimensionality of rölpa (rol pa) energy, for in his vision there was no empty space between the thigles—which not only was impossible to reproduce in the drawing, but which is an utterly impossible occurrence from the standpoint of the dimensionality conditioning our experience and common sense, which is that of tsel energy.

This dimensionality is one of the reasons why the manifestation of this energy does not allow the mental subject’s illusion of separateness with regard to visions to persist indefinitely, and why they are so effective for catalysing the process of spontaneous liberation proper to Dzochen Atiyoga.

The term Thögel has often been translated as “taking the leap.” However, this translation is misleading insofar as it seems to refer to an action carried out by the individual on the basis of the intentionality of dualistic mind—whereas in truth the practice consists in the unleashing of a spontaneous process that is not based on actions and that completely uproots the individual’s mind, intentional action and dualistic consciousness. This might perhaps be the reason why Master Namkhai Norbu often has preferred to render the term differently (occasionally he has translated it as “surpassing of the supreme”) and has explained that the exact sense of the term is “as soon as one is here, one is there.” In fact, Thögel and the Yangthik are the most direct, rapid and effective ways to develop the Contemplation or Gompa (*sgom pa*) of Dzogchen, permitting the integration of all phenomena and all circumstances in a natural, absolutely effortless manner: the Path of Dzogchen is a process of ongoing Awakening, and Thögel and the Yangthik are methods for rapid acceleration allowing us to move in a very short time from one point on the Path to another, far more advanced point.

I have personally known quite a few people who faced serious psychological problems after occurrences of the kind, and I am sure many of us also have seen such things occur among their acquaintances. However, should the reader lack experience of such occurrences, below I refer to a public instance of them.

In a well-known book, an important Western researcher recounted that he was put in a sensory deprivation tank and administered a dose of LSD, and that during the ensuing “trip” he felt the presence of two “guardians”—which according to his description he took to be independently, truly existing entities. This is the principle of how to create problems as described by Chögyal Namkhai
Norbu—and, in fact, according to another book by the same author, apparently in relation to the use of ketamine, the researcher in question repeatedly spent time in a mental hospital (book cited in the bibliography). In the first of the books we are told that the director of the center where the researcher went through the LSD experience in question would frequently tell all of his disciples that he himself and the researcher who had the experience with the guardians had the lowest vibratory rates in the whole community: this is, again, the principle of how to create problems. (As we have seen, low vibratory rates are not a sign of supramundane attainment, which is achieved through the acceleration of vibratory rates and subsequent collapse and cessation of the vibratory activity at the root of delusory valuation: they are a sign of having had some degree of success in the practice of mental pacification, which gives rise to samsaric states, or, in the “best” of cases, to the meditative absorption of the base-of-all wherein neither samsara nor nirvana are active.)

(The two books mentioned in this note are listed in the Bibliography to this book. There would be no point in pinpointing the researcher involved, for the idea is not to discredit anyone, but to show what may happen when the Path is approached in the wrong way.)

313 Since my early youth, I knew gurus that badly manipulated their followers. In fact, when I was 21 most of my close friends fell under the influence of one such individual, who used hypnosis and other means to get them to do whatever he wanted them to do in his own profit. I am sure many of us also have seen such things occur among their acquaintances; however, should the reader does not have experience of such occurrences, below I refer to some public instances of them.

A quite famous twentieth century Indian guru wrote in one of his early books (which was never available in the West and which is now out of print) that he used to climb a tree to meditate on its branches, and one night at some point he realized his body had fallen from the tree and he was seeing it from above: “...a bright line, a glittering silver cord from the navel of my body was joined on to me up above where I was perched on the tree.” He concluded, “That day first time I saw my own body from outside and since that day the mere physical existence of my body finished forever. I experienced that the body and spirit are two different things, quite separate from each other (!!!). That was the most important moment of my realization of the Spirit that is within every human body...” At the time and until the late nineteen seventies, the Indian guru seems to have posited this occurrence as the zenith of his realization. However, later on, after studying works on Taoism, Zen, Mahamudra and so on, he wrote a series of books providing interpretations of reality that resemble those of these traditions. The fact that these did not result from his own experience is evident in the description that he produced in a later period of the “Enlightenment” he allegedly had at age 21 (available in the web): according to his account, just before his “Enlightenment” he had become so sleepy that he failed to keep awake and fell asleep, but when he did so he was fully conscious, as though awake, so that his body was in the deepest sleep possible and yet consciousness was at its peak: according to the account, in this lay his Enlightenment. Now I understand why a friend of mine who went to see the guru in question told me upon returning: “He is Enlightened, but I realized I don’t want to be Enlightened:” he meant he did not want to be always in a state of sleep, independently of whether this sleep was conscious or unconscious. It is curious, however, that according to the Wikipedia entry on the guru in question, he used extremely high dosages of Valium over many years (DELETE THIS: and had a nitrous oxide dispenser by his bed). (This model of realization is that of the dualistic, antisomatic and cessationist Yoga system of Patañjali, which is in direct opposition to the views and model of Awakening of the nondual traditions that he glorified and pretended to coincide with throughout his later works, and in particular to those of Tantra and Dzogchen. In fact, in his account of his “Enlightenment,” the guru in question cited Patañjali’s assertion that sleep and samadhi are similar, the difference being that in samadhi the individual is simultaneously asleep and fully awake. In genuinely nondual traditions Awakening consists in moving through different bardos but in each of them being in the all-liberating state of rigpa: in the day one is fully awake and alert, but free of duality and in a condition in which whichever thoughts manifest spontaneously liberate themselves; while asleep, the individual rests in the reGnition of the clear light—and if dreams arise, for example to provide terma teachings, they are known to be dreams.)

Rather than ending up in a mental hospital, in the last period of his life the guru discussed in the above paragraph was accused of various crimes, including the planning of murder attempts (Wikipedia entry on the guru in question), so that he landed in jail—from which he was finally released on the
condition that he left the country. (In an article in his spiritual group’s magazine in the seventies, the guru in question asserted that when someone gets Enlightened he or she only has the lifetime in which he or she got Enlightened and an extra lifetime to benefit humankind, for thereafter he or she is no longer reborn. He claimed he was killed in his previous lifetime at an advanced age just before his Enlightenment, glorifying this supposed killing on the grounds that, had he not been killed, he would have died a few days after his Enlightenment, losing one of the two lifetimes in which he could have taught: it was due to this that he was allegedly Enlightened at age 21 in the following lifetime, having many years that very lifetime for teaching and benefiting people, and the whole of his next and last rebirth. In another article in the same magazine, he claimed that only one Enlightened individual could benefit humankind at a time, and so during the existence of an Enlightened individual the Enlightenment of a second individual would be put to waste. I was not surprised by the accusation of murder attempts made against the guru in question because, since none of these two views exists in traditional systems, I always feared that the guru in question concocted them for some obscure purpose [for example, his disciples could be led to believe that, if someone else was about to get Enlightened while he himself was alive, it would be very good for humankind that she or he be killed before Enlightenment, for then she or he would have two whole lifetimes to teach and benefit humankind, rather than putting to waste the lifetime in which there was already an Enlightened being on earth]).

Another likely example of disturbances probably related to the induction of experiences of some of the kinds that Stan Grof subsumes under the label “transpersonal” is that of Shoko Asahara, the creator of the heterodox Japanese Buddhist religious group Aum Shinrikyo (オウム真理教, which in 2000 changed its name to Aleph), who was convicted of ordering several of its followers to carry out the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subways.

The list of people who after becoming self-appointed gurus have harmed others is extremely long; even in those cases in which they don’t commit serious crimes, they abuse their disciples in various ways and often make them have serious psychological problems (I myself have known quite a few people who had such problems with different pseudo-gurus).

(The book, the webpage and the Wikipedia entry mentioned in this note are listed in the Bibliography to this book. There would be no point in pinpointing the Indian guru involved, for the idea is not to discredit anyone, but to show what may happen when the Path is approached in the wrong way.)

314 Unfortunately, not all teachers who have been officially recognized as such have the necessary realization: one will have to tell oneself the genuine master from the fake one, and hence finding the genuine master will ultimately depend on the seeker’s degree of sincerity, his or her karma, and a host of contributory conditions.

315 Supersubtle thoughts such as the threefold thought structure can and do manifest independently of the manifestation of subtle / intuitive thoughts, and subtle / intuitive thoughts can and do manifest independently of the manifestation of coarse / discursive thoughts; however, in samsara coarse / discursive thoughts never manifest without subtle / intuitive thoughts, and subtle / intuitive thoughts never manifest without supersubtle thoughts.

316 The whole sentence of the terma teaching by Padmasambhava from which the phrases quoted were extracted reads (Padmasambhava, 1977, p. 15; due to the loss of the English text, I had to retranslate into English from the Italian translation):

“The sphere of form is an ocean of vibration that becomes ever more turbulent as one moves away from its peaceful profundities; sensitive to the slightest tremor of pain or displeasure, the impulses [inherent in this sphere] formulate their own antidote to disharmony.”

The principle of Thögel and the Yangthik is that, when the self-luminous visions of the intermediate state of dharmata or chönyi bardo is apprehended in delusive terms, and therefore the sphere of form manifests, the impulses inherent in this sphere, which is “sensitive to the slightest tremor of pain or displeasure,” formulate what the above citation calls an “antidote to disharmony”—but which, nevertheless, is not an antidote in the sense in which the Mahayana is based on the application of antidotes, for in this case what the text refers to as an antidote is in fact a spontaneous liberation mechanism inherent in the lhundrub principle that is proper to the practice of Dzogchen Ati.

317 In Dzogchen there are four extraordinary modes of ending human existence, which were considered in two previous, consecutive notes to this chapter. Though only two of these result from the practice
of Thögel being considered at this point, all of them result from practices based on the principle of lhundrub zhiro (lhan grub zhi khor). The four extraordinary modes of ending human existence are the rainbow body, the body of atoms and the body of light, which are special modes of death, and the total transference, which is a way of putting an end to human existence that does not involve death.

I don’t know what the following is doing in this note:

As stated elsewhere in this book, the dang (gdangs) mode of manifestation of energy is in itself beyond the cleavage between an inside and an outside, a subject and an object. It is the tsel (rtsal) mode of manifestation of energy that involves the illusion of there being an external dimension, with regard to which dang energy may seem to constitute an internal dimension—and so once tsel energy manifests we experience everything in terms of the duality of interior / exterior, subject / object. Once this happens, the patterns of experience resulting from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the “threelfold projection,” which are concomitant with the manifestation of tsel energy, make us experience thoughts as object as well, even though they are manifestations of dang energy.

In the practice carried out in darkness, certain visualizations work as contributory conditions for the visions of rölpa energy to emanate from Self-qua-Path that manifested and was stabilized in the practice of Tekchö, as the manifestations of the state in question, so that the latter may be extended and developed rather than being disrupted by the appearance of something as external to it. Since the patterns of experience resulting from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the “threelfold projection” in the context of the manifestation of tsel energy will make us experience the visions of rölpa energy as something external, when this happens the wrathful activity of our own awareness, known as thinle drakpo (phrin las drag po), will force the apparently separate mental subject to disappear each and every time it manifests and experiences itself as being different and separate from the visions of the rölpa energy. In the long run, this results in the definitive disappearance of the mental subject, which is what the teachings call “integration in the visions of rölpa energy,” and which corresponds to the total neutralization of delusion.

So long as the above has not occurred, sounds, visions and so on will have greater or lesser power to interrupt our Contemplation, for the idea of an external dimension and a sentient being in it that must protect his or her existence against the dangers of the physical world will continue to arise. And, in fact, we will reject, and hence experience as pain and suffering, the sensations normal individuals experience as pain.

Though the above may seem to a defect of our practice, rather than being a defect it is a necessity of it, for it is solely when one has achieved a total integration, that awareness can respond to all life situations without either self-consciousness or the delusive experience of there being an external world interrupting Contemplation—and therefore it is only at that point that one no longer will need to react self-consciously to the stimuli that otherwise would have seemed to come from an external world, and yet will not be endangered or threatened by the phenomena responsible for the stimuli in question.

The sambhogakaya is one of the three aspects of dimensions of Buddhahood acknowledged by the Mahayana and higher vehicles; its wisdoms of quality (ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes) and quantity (ji bsnyed pa’i mkhyen pa’i ye shes) are illustrated by the simile of a mirror, which in the Dzogchen teachings is the example of rölpa energy (as we know, the example of dang [gdangs] energy is the crystal ball, and that of tsel [rtsal] energy is the rock crystal responsible for the refraction of light), has a limitless reflexive capacity: it can reflect anything, whatever their qualities (such as form, color, size, etc.): if we put a small mirror very near a flee it will perfectly reflect it even though it is quite small, but if we put it at a sufficient distance from Mount Kailash it will perfectly reflect it, despite its immensity. Likewise, a mirror can reflect any quantity of things: if in a toilet or in a very small room there is a person, the next will have to wait until the first one exits in order to get in; contrariwise, a mirror may seem full when it is reflecting one person, but if we bring the mirror farther away, without getting bigger it will just the same reflect ten people, and if we continue to move it away, while maintaining the same size it will be able to contain the reflections of an ever-increasing number of people, beyond any limit whatsoever. In the Buddhavatamsakasutra (CanonicalSource11) the wisdom of quantity is illustrated by the assertion in according to which in a single atom hundreds of Buddhas can manifest simultaneously, and in general both wisdoms are illustrated by many assertions of this Sutra, as well as of the Saddharma-pundarikasutra (CanonicalSource12), the Ghanavvyhasutra (CanonicalSource15) and other related canonical sources.
The Licchavi Vimalakirti replied, “Reverend Sariputra, for the Tathagatas and the bodhisattvas, there
is a liberation called ‘inconceivable.’ The bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation can put
the king of mountains, Sumeru, which is so high, so great, so noble, and so vast, into a mustard
corpses. In Chöphel (2005) we read:
“If just saying that there is no difference in size between an atom and the world makes us nihilistic
slanderers of the conventional world, then when Buddha goes so far as to apply such a nihilistic
view by eliminating differences in size, why do we fail to count that as an enormous sin? When,
after deciding that generally speaking there are differences in size, we say, The Buddha’s doing that
is an exception and make all kinds of other exceptions, that is a clear sign that our logical thinking is
riddled with leaking holes.
“Properly understood, when the Buddha makes an atom and the world the same size, it is not because
he has the incredible power to equalize things that are not equal. Is it not because the direct
contradiction (Tib., ngögal [dngos ’gal]) we imagine between big and small in no way constricts the
nondualistic innate wisdom of the Buddha? To the Buddha, big and small have the same taste, and
because big and small do indeed taste the same, he has merely made what is, be. Where is there any
greater display which changes what is not into what is?
“We imagine that [the terms in] each pair [of opposites]—such as existence and nonexistence, right and
wrong, big and small, good and bad—are mutually contradictory, and this imagination, which we
call valid cognizer, conjures up the great illusion of an atom that cannot contain a world. It is we,
not the Buddha, who are the real magicians.
“Chandrakirti said, Getting milk by milking the picture of a cow upsets people’s confirmed minds
(Tib., denpar zhenpa [den par zhen pa]; i.e., minds affected by delusion). However, if all
phenomena are established as valid (tshedrub [tshad grub]), then since the picture of a cow can have
no intestines, no lungs, and no teats, [by milking the mere picture of a cow] Chandrakirti actually
insulted dependent origination, but did he upset true reality? (Note by the author of this book: In
the Mulamadhyamakavrittiprasannapada [dbu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel pa iṣṭig gsal ba], which has been
translated as Clear Words, Commentary to [Nagarjuna’s] ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’, Chandrakirti
said that he produced milk from the picture of a cow in the monastery where he taught in order to
shatter the monks’ belief in true existence.)
“In Kadampa books, it is said that after Atisha performed numerous miracles such as fitting his perfect
body into a small clay bowl, he said, What I showed to you today, specious thinkers call
contradictory. If they want to take it like that, let them [do so]. I could swear in front of all India
and Tibet that this is the true nature of Dharma.
“To us, if something is not not existing, then it must be existing. If something is not existing, then it
must be not existing. Existing and not existing are directly contradictory and there can be nothing
that is not one of these two. Likewise, if something is small, it is not big. If something is big, it is not
small. We scream that eliminating the difference between these two would destroy all the principles
of dependent origination. If we say that viewing Essential Reality as free of the eight conceptual
extremes / dualistic activities is a nihilistic view, that is because our minds can only see and
recognize existence and nonexistence. But is the fact that something cannot appear in our minds
proof that it is impossible and nonexistent?”

The final paragraphs of chapter VI of the Vimalakirti Nirdesha Sutra for their part read (Thurman,
1987):

The Licchavi Vimalakirti replied, “Reverend Sariputra, for the Tathagatas and the bodhisattvas, there
is a liberation called ‘inconceivable.’ The bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation can put
the king of mountains, Sumeru, which is so high, so great, so noble, and so vast, into a mustard
seed. He can perform this feat without enlarging the mustard seed and without shrinking Mount Sumeru. And the deities of the assembly of the four Maharajas and of the Trayastrimsa heavens do not even know where they are.

Only those beings who are destined to be disciplined by miracles see and understand the putting of the king of mountains, Sumeru, into the mustard seed. That, reverend Sariputra, is an entrance to the domain of the inconceivable liberation of the bodhisattvas.

“Furthermore, reverend Sariputra, the bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation can pour into a single pore of his skin all the waters of the four great oceans, without injuring the water-animals such as fish, tortoises, crocodiles, frogs, and other creatures, and without the nagas, yaksas, gandharvas, and asuras even being aware of where they are. And the whole operation is visible without any injury or disturbance to any of those living beings.

“Such a bodhisattva can pick up with his right hand this billion-world-galactic universe as if it were a potter’s wheel and, spinning it round, throw it beyond universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, without the living beings therein knowing their motion or its origin, and he can catch it and put it back in its place, without the living beings suspecting their coming and going; and yet the whole operation is visible.

“Furthermore, reverend Sariputra, there are beings who become disciplined after an immense period of evolution, and there are also those who are disciplined after a short period of evolution. The bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation, for the sake of disciplining those living beings who are disciplined through immeasurable periods of evolution, can make the passing of a week seem like the passing of an aeon, and he can make the passing of an aeon seem like the passing of a week for those who are disciplined through a short period of evolution. The living beings who are disciplined through an immeasurable period of evolution actually perceive a week to be the passing of an aeon, and those disciplined by a short period of evolution actually perceive an aeon to be the passing of a week.

“Thus, a bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation can manifest all the splendors of the virtues of all the buddha-fields within a single buddha-field. Likewise, he can place all living beings in the palm of his right hand and can show them with the supernatural speed of thought all the buddha-fields without ever leaving his own buddha-field. He can display in a single pore all the offerings ever offered to all the Buddhas of the ten directions, and the orbs of all the suns, moons, and stars of the ten directions. He can inhale all the hurricanes of the cosmic wind-atmospheres of the ten directions into his mouth without harming his own body and without letting the forests and the grasses of the buddha-fields be flattened. He can take all the masses of fire of all the supernovas that ultimately consume all the universes of all the buddha-fields into his stomach without interfering with their functions. Having crossed buddha-fields as numerous as the sands of the Ganges downward, and having taken up a buddha-field, he can rise up through buddha-fields as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and place it on high, just as a strong man may pick up a jujube leaf on the point of a needle.

“Thus, a bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation can magically transform any kind of living being into a universal monarch, a Lokapala, a Sakra, a Brahma, a disciple, a solitary sage, a bodhisattva, and even into a Buddha. The bodhisattva can transform miraculously all the cries and noises, superior, mediocre, and inferior, of all living beings of the ten directions, into the voice of the Buddha, with the words of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, having them proclaim, ‘Impermanent! Miserable! Empty! Selfless!’ And he can cause them to recite the words and sounds of all the teachings taught by all the Buddhas of the ten directions.

“Reverend Sariputra, I have shown you only a small part of the entrance into the domain of the bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation. Reverend Sariputra, to explain to you the teaching of the full entrance into the domain of the bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation would require more than an aeon, and even more than that.”

Then, the patriarch Mahakashyapa, having heard this teaching of the inconceivable liberation of the bodhisattvas, was amazed, and he said to the venerable Sariputra, “Venerable Sariputra, if one were to show a variety of things to a person blind from birth, he would not be able to see a single thing. Likewise, venerable Sariputra, when this door of the inconceivable liberation is taught, all the disciples and solitary sages are sightless, like the man blind from birth, and cannot comprehend even a single cause of the inconceivable liberation. Who is there among the wise who, hearing about
this inconceivable liberation, does not conceive the spirit of unexcelled, perfect enlightenment? As for us, whose faculties are deteriorated, like a burned and rotten seed, what else can we do if we do not become receptive to this great vehicle? We, all the disciples and solitary sages, upon hearing this teaching of the Dharma, should utter a cry of regret that would shake this billion-world-galactic universe! And as for the bodhisattvas, when they hear of this inconceivable liberation they should be as joyful as a young crown prince when he takes the diadem and is anointed, and they should increase to the utmost their devotion to this inconceivable liberation. Indeed, what could the entire host of Maras ever do to one who is devoted to this inconceivable liberation?"

When the patriarch Mahakashyapa had uttered this discourse, thirty-two thousand gods conceived the spirit of unexcelled, perfect enlightenment.

Then the Licchavi Vimalakirti said to the patriarch Mahakashyapa, “Reverend Mahakashyapa, the Maras who play the devil in the innumerable universes of the ten directions are all bodhisattvas dwelling in the inconceivable liberation, who are playing the devil in order to develop living beings through their skill in liberative technique. Reverend Mahakashyapa, all the miserable beggars who come to the bodhisattvas of the innumerable universes of the ten directions to ask for a hand, a foot, an ear, a nose, some blood, muscles, bones, marrow, an eye, a torso, a head, a limb, a member, a throne, a kingdom, a country, a wife, a son, a daughter, a slave, a slave-girl, a horse, an elephant, a chariot, a cart, gold, silver, jewels, pearls, conches, crystal, coral, beryl, treasures, food, drink, elixirs, and clothes — these demanding beggars are usually bodhisattvas living in the inconceivable liberation who, through their skill in liberative technique, wish to test and thus demonstrate the firmness of the high resolve of the bodhisattvas. Why? Reverend Mahakashyapa, the bodhisattvas demonstrate that firmness by means of terrible austerities. Ordinary persons have no power to be thus demanding of bodhisattvas, unless they are granted the opportunity. They are not capable of killing and depriving in that manner without being freely given the chance.

“Reverend Mahakashyapa, just as a glowworm cannot eclipse the light of the sun, so reverend Mahakashyapa, it is not possible without special allowance that an ordinary person can thus attack and deprive a bodhisattva. Reverend Mahakashyapa, just as a donkey could not muster an attack on a wild elephant, even so, reverend Mahakashyapa, one who is not himself a bodhisattva cannot harass another bodhisattva, and only a bodhisattva can tolerate the harassment of another bodhisattva. Reverend Mahakashyapa, such is the introduction to the power of the knowledge of liberative technique of the bodhisattvas who live in the inconceivable liberation.”

In the distant past the realization of the “body of atoms” atoms (lú dül thren du dengs) that results from the “mode of death of the vidyadharas or rigdzins (rig ’dzin),” which is compared to the breaking of a closed vase, upon which the internal space or dimension and the external space or dimension fuse, could be achieved as the final, ultimate Fruit of the practice of Tékchü; however, in the last centuries delusion has developed so much and obtained so much power that no one has had this realization in a very long time—and so I suspect that it can no longer be achieved. At any rate, this body does not have the capacity to continue to transmit the dharma to human beings in the after-death, regardless of the latter’s degree of advance upon the Path.

Likewise, until the first centuries of the second millennium CE the realization of the ‘rainbow body” (jalü ’ja’ lus) could be attained as a result of the practice of the Vajra Bridge (Dorje Zampa ’do rje zam pa) of the Longde series of teachings, but the fact that it was not attained subsequently suggests that this is no longer an actual human possibility.

In Namkhai Norbu (unpublished ms.), we are told that when we see someone coming toward us, or when a plane first becomes visible over the horizon, the first thing we perceive is a thigle, which is the potentiality for the object to appear as a person or a plane, respectively, once it comes near enough. Likewise, subatomic particle-waves, when in their “particle” state (so to speak), are thigles.

Another alternative translation of Yangthik would be “kernel of the innermost potentiality.”

“Integral” philosopher-psychologist Ken Wilber (1977) has referred to the state of supreme sanity as “liberation,” the Sanskrit equivalents of which (moksha; mukti) are used in various Hindu traditions to indicate whichever condition they deem to represent the surpassing of samsara. It must be noted that in the context of the Buddhist Sutravyana the Tibetan equivalents of “liberation” (thar pa; drölwa [grol ba]) are applied to the Hinayana Buddhist’s individual liberation from suffering (though in the Tantras they are also used to indicate a type of Path leading to a more thorough kind of realization, and in
Dzogchen spontaneous liberation or rangdröl is a type of drölwa. The Tibetan equivalent of “Awakening” (changchub [byang chub], corresponding to the Sanskrit bodhi, the Chinese p’u-t’i, the Japanese bodai, etc.), in its turn, indicates the realizations of the Mahayana, the Vajrayana and the Ati[yogatantra]yana, involving, instead of the sarvajñata of the Hinayana, what is often rendered as “omniscience” (Skt. sarvakarajñata; Tib. tamche khyenpanyi [thams cad mkhyen pa nyid])—but which, rather than being a type of ESP, is a more complete form of realization, involving panoramic awareness and special capabilities allowing the individual to effectively help others to go beyond samsara.

Among the four dharmadhatus of the Avatamsakasutra, the second involves awareness (of) the dharmata or true nature of all phenomena. The third involves awareness of the dharmata in the perception of each phenomenon as the phenomenon it is in the relative plane, and, in the awareness (of) the dharmata, awareness that this nature involves all phenomena. And the fourth involves the awareness of the fact that the whole of phenomena and of the universe are contained in each phenomenon.

The wisdoms of quality and quantity, for their part, are mainly concerned with awareness (of) the fourth dharmadhatu of the Avatamsakasutra and the manifestation, in a realized individual, of the wondrous functionality of this fourth dharmadhatu—which are achieved as a result of the fusion of tsel (rtsal) energy with rölpa (rol pa) energy at some stage of the vision of the practice of Thögel (thod rgal). As we have seen, the sambhogakaya is one of the three aspects of dimensions of Buddhahood acknowledged by the Mahayana and higher vehicles; its wisdoms of quality (ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes) and quantity (ji bsnyed pa’i mkhyen pa’i ye shes) are illustrated by the simile of a mirror, which has a limitless reflexive capacity: it can reflect anything, whatever their qualities (such as form, color, size, etc.): if we put a small mirror very near a flea it will perfectly reflect it even though it is quite small, but if we put it at a sufficient distance from Mount Kailash it will perfectly reflect it, despite its immensity. Likewise, a mirror can reflect any quantity of things: if in a toilet or in a very small room there is a person, the next will have to wait until the first one exits in order to get in; contrariwise, a mirror may seem full when it is reflecting one person, but if we bring the mirror farther away, without getting bigger it will just the same reflect ten people, and if we continue to move it away, while maintaining the same size it will be able to contain the reflections of an ever-increasing number of people, beyond any limit whatsoever. In the Buddhavatamsakasutra the wisdom of quantity is illustrated by the assertion in according to which in a single atom hundreds of Buddhas can manifest simultaneously, and in general both wisdoms are illustrated by many assertions and similes of this Sutra, as well as of the Saddharmapundarikasutra, the Ghanavyuhasutra and other related canonical sources.

The truly, fully holistic condition consists in the manifestation of the wisdoms of quality and quantity involving the full awareness and wondrous functionality of the third and fourth dharmadhatus of the Avatamsakasutra.

Maslow showed wisdom in warning that for such “peak experiences” to be truly valuable they would have to arise in the context of the application of a self-consistent method; I would add that only ancient Wisdom traditions have truly self-consistent methods making it possible to use experiences in order to move from samsara to Awakening: the experience must be used as an impressive reflection in a mirror, which allows discovery of the reflecting nature of the mirror.

Furthermore, upon learning that many of his readers we resorting to all kinds of means for obtaining “peak experiences” outside the context of a self-consistent method, Maslow switched the emphasis from the concept in question to that of “plateau experiences,” which was also used by the Indian author U. A. Asrani, and which Maslow illustrated with the image of “a mother seeing a child play” (quite similar to the Dzogchen image of old man seeing children play). In Cleary & Shapiro (1996), we read (p. 218):

“Indeed, his journals (Maslow [1979]) reveal that by 1969, Maslow became convinced that the emotionality and excitability inherent in peak experiences may have been overvalued. He went on to say that having a glimpse of transcendental states through a peak experience was not the only way or even the best way to acquire and sustain higher transcendental experiences (Krippner [1972]; Maslow [1970]). Although he believed these glimpses might occasionally be useful, Maslow also arrived at the conclusion that an inordinate emphasis on such glimpses was a hindrance (Maslow [1971, 1979])... [furthermore, he] expressed considerable ire in several of his journal entries (Maslow [1979]) that his concept of peak experience had been misused to justify indulging in experientialism for its own sake... Maslow came to feel that appreciation of ordinary experience was not only an essential component of, but that it served as a trigger to, higher states of consciousness such as the plateau experience (Krippner [1972]; Maslow [1970]).”
Though the concept of “plateau experience” may to some extent serve as an antidote to overvaluation of peak experiences and attachment to the emotionality and excitability that typify the samsaric varieties of these experiences, it does not solve the root problem I am concerned with, which is the failure to discriminate between experiences of samsara, absorptions of the neutral base-of-all, and instances of nirvana of the kind that I have been referring to as the Self-qua-Path. The main advantage of switching the emphasis from the concept of “peak experiences” to that of “plateau experiences”—even though this term still conveys the idea of a “high”—seems to be that it would discourage the avid search for explosive instants that characterized the hippies and which produced many unwanted effects, and might be conducive to the discovery of the Tao / Buddha-nature (or however we call the ultimate) in ordinary experience. However, this would be possible only in those who have had access to the meta-experience of nirvana that I am calling the Self-qua-Path, which is the very kernel of the Path, and which the practice of Dzogchen has the function of stabilizing.

The tone of Tony Sutich’s mission statement for the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology clearly reflects the attitude of the pioneers of transpersonal psychology (Scotton, Chinen, & Battista [Eds.], 1996, p.10):

“The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology is concerned with the publication of theoretical and applied research, original contributions, empirical papers, articles and studies in meta-needs, ultimate values, unitive consciousness, peak experience, ecstasy, mystical experience, B-values, essence, bliss, awe, wonder, self-actualization, ultimate meaning, transcendence of the self, spirit, sacralization of everyday life, oneness, cosmic awareness, cosmic play, individual and species wide synergy, maximal interpersonal encounter, transcendental phenomena, maximal sensory awareness, responsiveness and expression; and related concepts, experiences and activities.”

With regard to the above mission statement, it must be clear that ultimate values are also values and as such are within samsara, that experiences of unitive consciousness are also in general within samsara, that awe and wonder are instances of the neutral base-of-all followed by samsaric conceptualization, and that also interpersonal encounter and maximal sensory awareness are within samsara (the rest being more difficult to categorize). However, all of the experiences or values mentioned in the statement are most legitimate objects of study, not only of transpersonal psychology, but of metatranspersonal psychology as well—in which case the most important task is to distinguish nirvanic from samsaric and from neither-samsaric-nor-nirvanic occurrences.

NOTE: The “B” in the term “B-values” stands for the word “Being.” Maslow’s List of B-Values (Maslow, 1962, p. 83) is as follows:

1. wholeness; (unity; integration; tendency to one-ness; interconnectedness; simplicity; organization; structure; dichotomy-transcendence; order);
2. perfection; (necessity; just-right-ness; just-so-ness; inevitability; suitability; justice; completeness; “oughtness”)
3. completion; (ending; finality; justice; “it’s finished”; fulfillment; finis and telos; destiny; fate);
4. justice; (fairness; orderliness; lawfulness; “oughtness”);
5. aliveness; (process; non-deadness; spontaneity; self-regulation; full-functioning);
6. richness; (differentiation, complexity; intricacy);
7. simplicity; (honesty; nakedness; essentiality; abstract, essential, skeletal structure);
8. beauty; (rightness; form; aliveness; simplicity; richness; wholeness; perfection; completion; uniqueness; honesty);
9. goodness; (rightness; desirability; oughtness; justice; benevolence; honesty);
10. uniqueness; (idiomsynchrony; individuality; non-comparability; novelty);
11. effortlessness; (ease; lack of strain, striving or difficulty; grace; perfect, beautiful functioning);
12. playfulness; (fun; joy; amusement; gaiety; humor; exuberance; effortlessness);
13. truth; honesty; reality; (nakedness; simplicity; richness; oughtness; beauty; pure, clean and unadulterated; completeness; essentiality);
14. self-sufficiency; (autonomy; independence; not-needings-other-than-itself-in-order-to-be-itself; self-determining; environment-transcendence; separateness; living by its own laws).

Significantly, Maslow (1970, ch. III, The “Core-Religious” or “Transcendent” Experience) writes:

The very beginning, the intrinsic core, the essence, the universal nucleus of every known high religion (unless Confucianism is also called a religion) has been the private, lonely, personal illumination, revelation, or ecstasy of some acutely sensitive prophet or seer. The high religions call themselves revealed religions and each of them tends to rest its validity, its function, and its right to exist on the codification and the
communication of this original mystic experience or revelation from the lonely prophet to the mass of human beings in general.

But it has recently begun to appear that these “revelations” or mystical illuminations can be subsumed under the head of the “peak-experiences”[1] or “ecstasies” or “transcendent” experiences which are now being eagerly investigated by many psychologists. That is to say, it is very likely, indeed almost certain, that these older reports, phrased in terms of supernatural revelation, were, in fact, perfectly natural, human peak-experiences of the kind that can easily be examined today, which, however, were phrased in terms of whichever conceptual, cultural, and linguistic framework the particular seer had available in his time (Laski).

In a word, we can study today what happened in the past and was then explainable in supernatural terms only. By so doing, we are enabled to examine religion in all its facets and in all its meanings in a way that makes it a part of science rather than something outside and exclusive of it.

Also this kind of study leads us to another very plausible hypothesis: to the extent that all mystical or peak-experiences are the same in their essence and have always been the same, all religions are the same in their essence and always have been the same. They should, therefore, come to agree in principle on teaching that which is common to all of them, i.e., whatever it is that peak-experiences teach in common (whatever is different about these illuminations can fairly be taken to be localisms both in time and space, and are, therefore, peripheral, expendable, not essential). This something common, this something which is left over after we peel away all the localisms, all the accidents of particular languages or particular philosophies, all the ethnocentric phrasings, all those elements which are not common, we may call the “core-religious experience” or the “transcendent experience...”

...To summarize, it looks quite probable that the peak-experience may be the model of the religious revelation or the religious illumination or conversion which has played so great a role in the history of religions. But, because peak-experiences are in the natural world and because we can research with them and investigate them, and because our knowledge of such experiences is growing and may be confidently expected to grow in the future, we may now fairly hope to understand more about the big revelations, conversions, and illuminations upon which the high religions were founded.

(Not only this, but I may add a new possibility for scientific investigation of transcendence. In the last few years it has become quite clear that certain drugs called “psychedelic,” especially LSD and psilocybin, give us some possibility of control in this realm of peak-experiences. It looks as if these drugs often produce peak-experiences in the right people under the right circumstances, so that perhaps we needn’t wait for them to occur by good fortune. Perhaps we can actually produce a private personal peak-experience under observation and whenever we wish under religious or non-religious circumstances. We may then be able to study in its moment of birth the experience of illumination or revelation. Even more important, it may be that these drugs, and perhaps also hypnosis, could be used to produce a peak-experience, with core-religious revelation, in non-speakers, thus bridging the chasm between these two separated halves of mankind.)

Elsewhere (1962, p. 106) Maslow describes peak-experiences in psychoanalytic jargon a:

“a fusion of ego, id, super-ego and ego ideal, of conscious, preconscious and unconscious, of primary and secondary processes, a synthesizing of pleasure principle with reality principle, a healthy regression without fear in the service of the greatest maturity, a true integration of the person at all levels.”

I see no reason whatsoever for qualifying the divisive and fragmentary perspective of consciousness as “matter oriented.” In fact, pre-Socratic philosophers viewed matter as an undivided continuous, and even post-Socratic dualistic Greek philosophers such as Plato (who, as we know, had dualistic, anti-somatic Orphic roots) and Aristotle were aware that in itself matter was free from limits or divisions. The same applies to twenty and twenty-one century physics, which has viewed matter as a continuum ever since Einstein developed his Field Theory—and then, when the supposed inherent dimensionality of the given was questioned by recognition physics and holonomic physical theories, the undividedness of matter was appreciated from an even deeper perspective. Furthermore, though otherworldly spirituality contrasts the spiritual with the material, and what Mircea Eliade called antisomatic spirituality deems the latter to be evil or a source of evil, neither of these assumptions are shared by nondual spirituality—whereas Tantra and Dzogchen go so far as to use somatic impulses as a Path of Awakening. In fact, I think Grof’s choice of the term hylotropic for providing a contrast to the term holotropic was most felicitous.

However, the Greek term hyle originally meant “living wood,” whereas the Latin term materia, sharing the same root as the English word “matter,” originally meant “cut (and hence dead) wood.” The point is that
the Greeks originally viewed the universe and hence matter as being somehow alive, which is not how present day hylotropic consciousness views it.

According to Grof, in this mode of consciousness the same space can be simultaneously occupied by many objects; the past and future are always available and can be brought experientially into the present moment; one can experience oneself in several places at the same time; it is possible to experience simultaneously more than one temporal framework.

Had Grof’s definition of holotropic consciousness assert it to be limitless, nonconceptual awareness, the oxymoron would be perfect. Since Grof speaks of identification with an area of consciousness lacking definite limits, the oxymoron is not as clear or direct.

Unfortunately, those who have not had experience of the spontaneous liberation of thought may take the absence of coarse, discursive thoughts characteristic of the absorptions in question to be the spontaneous liberation of thought. This is one of the reasons why the relation with a genuine Master holding a genuine lineage is indispensable: among many other things, such a Master will help us discriminate between the experiences of pseudototality conditioned by subtle and/or supersubtle thoughts pertaining to samsara, the experience of the base-of-all where neither samsara nor nirvana is manifest, and the genuine manifestations of nirvana.

Different manifestations of luminosity occur in the practices of Dzogchen and in spontaneous processes outside the context of a Wisdom tradition, including that of death – intermediate state or bardo between death and rebirth – rebirth (for a brief explanation of these, see Capriles [2000a]). However, only when their true condition is recognized are they manifestations of realization.

The Mandukya Upanishad describes this state in negative terms as “a neither subjective nor objective experience [involving] neither consciousness nor unconsciousness [and] neither sensory knowledge, nor relative knowledge, nor derived knowledge.”

Following the Mandukya Upanishad, also Shankaracharya posited four states of experience, which were: (1) that of awake experience; (2) that of dream; (3) that of dreamless, deep sleep; and (4) that of turiya ananda—the last of which, following the Upanishads, he viewed as the absolute reality and supreme level, and which, as required by the logic he borrowed from the Madhyamikas, he categorized as being beyond conceptualization—i.e. to be “unthinkable.” This shows that, though he borrowed the dialectic of the Madhyamikas, he applied it to the results of a practice based on Vedic methods and categories, which as such diverges radically from the Madhyamika practices and categories: Shankara applied categories inspired by the genuine realization of nonduality in instances of nirvana, to experiences that do not seem to correspond to this realization, giving rise to confusion concerning nonduality (in this case qua Path or Fruit, or what is the same, qua nirvana). An analysis of Shankara’s methods, carried out on the basis of a theoretical and practical understanding of genuine Buddhist practices from Dzogchen to Madhyamaka, shows the former to be conducive to the maintenance of dualism and of samsara, or, in the best of cases, to the achievement of absorptions of the neutral base-of-all wherein neither samsara nor nirvana are active.

Jim Bray (1998) writes:

The legitimacy of BPM I and IV can be questioned on the grounds that I is before the beginning, the timeless state of Original Embedment, and IV is after the end. If we are concerning ourselves with the process of differentiation, we are concerned with the onset of Disembedded/ Separation and the progress to the Egoic Stage, where the nonegoic is repressed and the mental-ego is stable. This seems to be the process reflected in both physical birth and in the Heroic and Creation myths. The process of reintegration leading to the Transegoic Stage does not seem to be a smooth continuation of this, but more like a recapitulation; the latency and middle-mental-egoic periods look very much like an interlude rather than a real part of this action. It could be said that BPM I precedes the process we are interested in, and IV commences an interlude that precedes another; indeed, the symmetry of I and IV lead me to question their separation, since the differentiation and reintegration processes seem to have a circular or spiral quality.

Dwelling in a BPM, no matter which, is never directly conducive to Awakening or liberation from samsara; contrariwise, in many cases it is altogether pathological. For example, being stuck in a BPM 2 or 3 is a most painful experience that, besides, may result in psychiatrization. However, the same BPMs may be most useful for someone having received the oral instructions and the blessings of the lineage, and having the capacity to apply those instructions despite the anguish and turmoil proper to BPM 2, to use as a springboard for the recognition of the Self-qua-Base—as in the transition from the bottom of Hell to Purgatory in the symbolism of the Divine Comedy, which in the context of Dzogchen practice results
in a most clear and useful reGnition of the Base which contrasts in a most striking manner with the immediately preceding samsaric condition, and which results in an instance of spontaneous liberation of delusorily-valued thoughts of such power and intensity as to give rise to a significant capacity of spontaneous liberation.

Nonetheless, in some cases the experience of a BPM can itself be useful on the Path; for example, BPMs 1 and 4, even though in no case whatsoever they are instances of nirvana, and the moment they become experiences that may be reflexively remembered they are already transitory, conditioned, spurious states belonging to samsara, may in themselves be helpful in developing faith in the possibility of going beyond the usual narrow state of mind. However, since the faith arisen from the manifestation of BPMs 1 and 4 is based on delusion, it is only useful until entering the Path in the truest sense of the expression, which occurs upon the initial manifestation of the Self-qua-Path; thereafter, incapacity to distinguish between nirvana, samsara and the neutral base-of-all would obliterate the useful effects of the previous manifestation of the Self-qua-Base and by the same stroke would block the Path to Awakening. If this occurs, the only way such faith may have long-term positive results is if the Self-qua-Path manifests again, the individual learns to tell this occurrence from the neutral base-of-all and from experiences of the samsaric formless sphere, and receives the instructions and blessing that will allow her or him to reGnize the true condition of all samsaric experiences so that they liberate themselves spontaneously.

The problem lies in being stuck in one so-called BPM, which occurs when an inner or outer obstacle (i.e. an obstacle manifesting as a result of occurrences in the practitioner’s mind that have not been triggered by an immediately preceding “external” occurrence, or an obstacle manifesting as a result of occurrences in the practitioner’s mind that have been triggered by an immediately preceding “external” occurrence, respectively) blocks the process death – intermediate state or bardo between death and rebirth (or human constant) - rebirth. As we have seen, even when this process manifests spontaneously outside the context of a wisdom tradition, provided that, rather than being blocked (which would cause the individual to turn round in circles), this process may be decidedly therapeutic it is allowed to follow its natural course toward a breakthrough or series of breakthroughs leading beyond conflict (these breakthroughs being somehow analogous to the one Grof represented as the transition from BPM 3 to BPM 4). However, if it manifests spontaneously outside the context of a wisdom tradition, the process in question will not have the potentiality to lead beyond samsara, for a process not involving the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path is not a Path leading to the manifestation of the Self-qua-Fruit: the only way the process may be ultimately liberating and conducive to Awakening is if and only if it is undertaken in the framework of a wisdom-tradition based on the principle of spontaneous liberation (for this is the only principle allowing the human constant to be conducive to Awakening and liberation from samsara). Grofian therapy cannot turn any BPM into the Path, for even if a Grofian facilitator insists on the need to let go of all BPMs, this will be of no help insofar as such facilitators lack the blessings of a genuine lineage and the knowledge of the traditional instructions which are indispensable for the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path to occur and result in the spontaneous liberation of whichever BPM is manifest.

338 In Lochouarn (1993) it was shown that, on the basis of the study of a very large quantity of European and North-African human fossils from the Paleolithic and the Neolithic, paleopathology has established that in those eras human beings did not die from traumatisms caused by other human beings, and that, on the contrary, whenever possible, wounds and traumatisms caused by the attack of animals or by accidents were cured with the help of other individuals. In the following years the research carried out by paleopathology encompassed the whole world, having as its object a very high number of ancient corpses; we find a wide summary of this research in van der Dennen (1995). Likewise, there are summaries of the subsequent results of this research in DeMeo (1998) and Taylor (2003, 2005).

339 The princes were Edward V of England and his brother, Richard of Shrewsbury, 1st Duke of York.

340 The paper being cited originally read “has preserved important shamanic elements,” which I changed into “contains important shamanic elements” because the previous wording may be wrongly understood to imply that metashamanic teachings truly leading to Awakening, such as those transmitted by current Tibetan spiritual systems, are a development based on pre-existent shamanic systems. Sufi Master Idries Shah (1975) asserted the opposite of this: what is known as shamanism is a degeneration of the genuinely liberating approach I have called “metashamanic.” Shah’s account fits the Tibetan-Indian-Persian-Greek-Roman vision of human evolution and history discussed in vol. III of this book, which posits temporal processes called aeons (Sanskrit: kalpa; Tib. kalpa [kal pa or bskal pa]), divided into eras of growing
Those Medieval theologians who used the term *metanoia* to refer to religious conversion understood its etymology in the sense of “change of mind” or “transition to a new state of mind,” and David Cooper’s usage of the term conserves this ancient etymological sense. However, from the fact that Cooper referred to the last stage of the process of achieving true sanity by the term *anoia* or “no-mind, it may be inferred that in Cooper’s work this sense coexists with that of “beyond mind.”
David Cooper dedicates this book to Ronald D. Laing, whom he refers to as “the human being to whom I owe most on earth, or under it.”

Cooper did not explicitly say that the superegos of the internalized others make up our superego (which was unnecessary, as Freud’s view in this regard are very well known), of that the egos of the internalized others somehow make up our ego. With regard to the latter, I assume the reader has in mind the excerpts from David-Neel & Lama Yongden (1967) quoted in a previous chapter, and in particular the assertion that the ego is a collage of others. Likewise, I assume the reader has in mind the citation from Gibran (2000), and what was said with regard to the section “Requesting the Land” found in many Tantric practices.

Let us remember the venerable meaning Desiderius Erasmus gave the term anoia in his book In Praise of Folly (Erasmus [2004]). I am giving it the meaning of the Chinese term wu-hsin (no-mind) as used in Ch’an Buddhism, which indicates the surpassing of the illusion that there is a separate, autonomous subject of experience and action (as well as the surpassing of the rest of the connotations of the term sens as understood in the Dzogchen teachings).

Hsin means both “heart” (Skt. hridaya) and “mind” (Skt. chitta); though the Fa-hsiang school used the term to refer to the universal mind that according to this school is the true nature of all reality, and the Ch’an school often used it in this way, the latter also used it to refer to the illusion, denounced by Heraclitus, of having a separate, autonomous intellect of one’s own, involving the illusion that the mental subject is a separate and autonomous doer of action, thinker of thought and controller of the body, as well as a receiver of sensations lying at a distance from the physical world. This is the sense of the term hsin when preceded by the negative wu: the combination refers to the state of realization in which there is no such illusion.

The term wu-nien is often rendered as “no thought,” yet it does not involve the total absence of thought as in states of the neutral base-of-all, but rather the condition in which one is not disturbed by thoughts, for these are not delusorily valued. Wong-Mou-Lam (trans. 1969) rendered the term as “idea-less-ness.”

However, in Ch’an Buddhism the term hsin may be used in two main, mutually contradictory senses, for it may either indicate: (1) the core of delusion that is to be eradicated through the practice of the Path, thus corresponding to the meaning the Dzogchen teachings give to the Tibetan term sem (sens) and its Sanskrit equivalent, chitta, or (2) the primordial nondual, nonthetic, nonpositional, nonreflexive awareness that is indicated by the Tibetan term seṁnyi (seṁ nyid) and its Sanskrit equivalents, chittata and chitta eva, by the Tibetan term rangrig (rang rig) and its Sanskrit equivalents, swasamvīttih and swasamvedana, etc. Thus it is clear that in the regular text I am using the term in sense (1).

In this, he coincided with Jung (as well as in, the field of philosophy, with Heraclitus and Lichtenberg, and in the field of poetry, with Octavio Paz), who learned from his daimon / guiding spirit / guru Philemon that thoughts are not produced by the thinker. In fact, in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung (1964) writes that Philemon, “said I treated thoughts as if I g

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus for his part had said, “The basic question is this: Are you in your senses or are you not?”

In Ch’an Buddhism the term hsing, which in ordinary language means both “heart” and “mind,” may be used in two radically different senses: to indicate the ordinary mind that the Dzogchen teachings call sem (sens), so that when the term is used in this sense Awakening is characterized as no-mind (wu-hsin), and to refer to the Nature or Essence of mind, which the Dzogchen teachings call semnyi (sems nyid) or changchubsem (byang chub sens), as well as by various other names. Thus there is a basic ambiguity with regard to terminology that in some contexts could be source of confusion.

From the Greek paranous, which combines the prefix para, meaning beside, with the noun nous, which in some contexts means mind.

This contradiction was exposed both in vol. I and in this volume of this book, throughout the discussion of the “law of inverted effect,” “backward law” or “reverse law” expounded by Alan Watts, and in general of the self-frustrating dynamics of samsara. Also the contradiction inherent in specific instances of this delusion have been discussed: we have already discussed the contradiction inherent in being-for-Self, which consists in its self-assertion through all of its attempts to achieve the Self; the one inherent in being-for-others, which consists in ruining the image of ourselves we project on others through the link
of being we are compelled to establish with what others perceive as ourselves; and the contradiction inherent in our conscious identity, which among other things consists in the evil our drive to feel that we are good causes us to inflict on others.

This, of course, is my own way of explaining Cooper’s view, as in the works by the author am familiar with he never referred to tsel or dang energy, or to Dharmakirti’s samanyalakshana (Tib. chitsen⁶¹) or general collections of characteristics or to David Hume’s ideas.

Whether one is treading the Dzogchen Path or going through a spontaneous self-healing process, one has to go through the stage of paranoia posited in Cooper, David, 1971, which, if understood in the clinical sense of the term paranoia, may be roughly equivalent to BPM 2. However, Cooper failed to note (and all indicates he failed to realize) that the process he represented in terms of the diagram reproduced here takes a very different course and leads to totally different results in people who are carried away by this process in a spontaneous way due to incapacity to adapt to a conflictive or unpredictable (etc.) relational environment (in connection with Laing’s “tenable positions,” Bateson’s “pathogenic double-binds,” Winnicott’s “mother’s reactions that respond to her own modes rather than to the infant’s behavior,” etc.), and in those who induce it by traditional means in the context of practices such as those of the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings: as we have seen repeatedly, provided that a wise human environment capable of offering genuine orientation and support rather than disorientation and interference may be set, the spontaneous activation of this process outside the context of a wisdom tradition can help overcome serious problems; but when activated by traditional means in the context of a wisdom tradition, it can lead to Awakening and even culminate in the Dzogchen realizations that result in special modes of death, or even deathlessness.

As we have seen repeatedly, the dissolution or spontaneous liberation of the ego-delusion and of delusion in general is abrupt and instantaneous; however, the constant repetition or continuity of this spontaneous liberation progressively neutralizes delusion, so that its manifestation in daily life progressively dilutes until it finally disappears altogether.

This outright contradicts Freud, who did not contemplate the possibility of liberation from the superego, and who, on the contrary, posited the principle of reality—adaptation to society implying subjection to the superego, the “heir of the Oedipus.”

Besides, the attainment of a noia implies the Jungian view that men must free themselves from their fathers and women must free themselves from their mothers.

I understand noia as implying, like Jung’s individuation, conscious awareness of most of what is normally kept below the threshold of consciousness (such as, for example, the shadow and the anima/animus). This, however, does not result in extreme conflict insofar as it results from a gradual and wise process that progressively makes the ego more flexible and decentralized; on the contrary, it results in the achievement of harmony between conscious and “unconscious,” without altogether putting an end to the distinction between these two. In the case of man, it implies liberation from his father; in the case of woman, liberation from her mother—without which there could be no true individuality. Though the individual may still incur in self-contradiction, rather than deceiving him or herself in this regard, she or he will be aware of this contradiction. Though the individual still has to assume one role or another, this will not give rise to a persona in the strict Jungian sense, for she or he will not believe him or herself to absolutely be the mask or role. Finally, it will involve becoming conscious of the self, or which is the same, it will result in self-realization—in a sense that includes the one Maslow gave the term. However, since noia can only develop interdependently with anoia, if the process is successfully carried out in the context of a wisdom-tradition such as Dzogchen, rather than the ego becoming inflated, it would be progressively uprooted (which makes it evident that the process Cooper described is not exactly the same as the one Jung conceived, despite the coincidences reviewed in this note).

Since Freud’s views are so well known, David Cooper seems to have found it unnecessary to specify that what the facial expressions, inflections of the voice and so on of significant others convey to us is their superego, so that when these active psychological characters constitute our superego, it is actually the superegos of the internalized others that are molding our superego.

I think the political and social ideas expressed in Cooper (1971), had they been put into practice just as he proposed in the time in which he wrote the book, most likely would have given rise to dire results.

Actually, I think The Death of the Family may be one of the most important psychological works of the twentieth century, and perhaps the most relevant for understanding the process of Awakening in terms of psychology.
As stated in a previous chapter, the concept is attributed to Melanie Klein, though the term was coined by Susan Isaacs (1989).

As stated in a note to a previous chapter, it is held that the ultimate cause of evil is not the shadow but our drive to project it on others and see it as the evil nature of those others. However, if we acknowledge the shadow to be but an unconscious phantasy, which by its very nature we are compelled to elude as having anything to do with ourselves by projecting it on others, there will be no grounds for this distinction.

Just as in Trungpa (1973), our ego and the whole of our hindrances were compared with manure necessary for the plant of Awakening to grow, so did Jung’s disciple Ian Baker with the shadow—a view inspired by Jung himself, who asserted that the shadow was “90% gold.” In the webpage of the Jungian Society of Atlanta Susan Olson writes:

“While I was studying in Zurich, I often heard Jungian analyst Ian Baker speak of ‘recycling the shadow’. This image offers us a new way of approaching the shadow and suggests that working with it is like creating a compost pit or recycling our household waste. In our ‘throw-away’ culture we regard refuse such as coffee grounds, wilted vegetables, newspapers and aluminum cans as so much garbage to be tossed away as soon as possible. Similarly, we regard shadow material such as disturbing thoughts and fantasies, painful emotions, and upsetting dreams as psychological garbage. We want to get rid of it, forget about it, sweep it under the rug, deny that it exists. But what would happen if we began to think of it instead as psychological gold? What if we engaged our own shadow material by writing down our dreams, accepting that we sometimes have ‘negative’ thoughts and feelings, and withdrawing our projections onto others? This would be the psychological equivalent of starting a compost pile in the back yard or deciding to recycle our old papers, bottles and cans. Instead of bundling our dirty stuff up in plastic and leaving it by the curb to be hauled away to the landfill, we would sort it out, clean it, plow it back into the soil of our inner gardens or re-process it to be used in new and creative ways. This work can be hot, dirty, smelly, and boring. It requires commitment, courage, patience, persistence, and imagination. The results, however, are well worth the effort. Less trash clogging up the environment. Conservation of our natural resources. Brighter flowers and juicier fruit in our gardens. Surprising inventions such as sweaters made from plastic bottles and notebook covers made from old tires. Mental and emotional well-being. Compassion towards ourselves and others. Creative work. Maybe even a measure of wholeness.

“Another memory from Switzerland: I am driving through the countryside with a German friend. It is a balmy warm spring day and the car windows are rolled down. Lovely aromas waft through the air, delighting our senses. Then we pass a large, well-kept farm with a sizable manure pile beside the barn door. Suddenly the sweet aroma changes to something far less delightful. As we hold our noses, my friend tells me that in Europe a farmer’s wealth is measured by the size of his manure pile. The more wealth, the more cows, and the more manure! We agree that this farmer must be very wealthy indeed, and laughingly drive on.

“Perhaps it is so with the shadow: the bigger and darker and smellier it is, the wealthier we are—if we are able to see it as wealth and learn how to use it. It can be garbage or compost, a manure pile or 99% pure gold. We are the farmers: the work is up to us.”

Jungian analyst James Hillman is perhaps the most renowned of those who elaborated on the theme of the shadow as gold.

In Jungian psychology, the anima-animus combination is known as the syzygy (a word also used to denote the alignment of planets), representing wholeness and completion. This unity possesses great power and can be found in religious combinations, of which the most conspicuous may seem to be the yab-yum (male-female union) figures of Tantrism and Dzogchen. However, there are problems in applying Jung’s term to what these figures symbolize, for it has many cosmological implications that do not correspond to the worldviews of Vajrayana Buddhism and the Dzogchen teachings. One further problem is that Jung viewed the syzygy as implying the conjunction of two organisms without the loss of identity (one Jungian definition of the syzygy goes: “an archetypal pairing of contrasexual opposites, which symbolized the communication of the conscious and unconscious minds, the conjunction of two organisms without the loss of identity”).

Jung took the term from Greek Gnosticism, and in particular Valentinianism, in which a syzygy is a divine active-passive, male-female couple of aeons, mutually complementary rather than in mutual opposition; in their totality they comprise the divine realm of the Pleroma—i.e., the totality of the powers of the unknowable Gnostic God—and in themselves characterize aspects of this God. It is important to keep in mind that in Buddhist Tantra the most common correspondence is of the
female with the active and of the male with the passive, though in so precise systems no correspondence is absolute, an in some respects the correspondence may contrary to the most common one.

According to Jung, an essential part of our persona is the role of male or female we must play, which for most people is determined by the physical gender. However, Jung, like Freud and Adler and Depth Psychology in general, felt that we are all really hermaphrodite or bisexual in nature. When we begin our lives as fetuses, we have undifferentiated sex organs that only gradually, under the influence of hormones, become male or female in the physical sense. Likewise, when we begin our social lives as infants, we are neither male nor female in the social sense. Almost immediately we come under the influence of society, which gradually molds us into men and women: our persona becomes male when we embody the symbols of maleness in our society, and it becomes female when we embody the symbols of femaleness. If women became more nurturing and less aggressive, and men became strong and ignored the emotional side of life, both had developed only half of their potential.

The anima is the female aspect present in the collective unconscious of men, and the animus is the male aspect present in the collective unconscious of women, which together are referred to as syzygy: the former may be personified as a spontaneous, intuitive young girl, as a witch, or as the earth mother, but in any case it is likely to be associated with deep emotionality and the force of life itself. The latter may be personified as a wise old man, a sorcerer, or often a number of males, and tends to be logical, often rationalistic, even argumentative.

The anima or animus was to Jung the archetype through which we generally communicated with the collective unconscious, and hence it was important to get into touch with it. It was also the archetype that is responsible for much of our love life, for as in the ancient Greek myth, we are always looking for our other half, which the Gods took from us, in members of the opposite sex. Falling in love at first sight means that we have found someone that fits into our anima or animus archetype particularly well.

According to Jung, in the process of individuation the anima or animus (according to the case) could be met and acquainted with—so that in the long run it could become a Hermes-like messenger between the unconscious and the conscious—only after meeting and acquainting oneself with the shadow. Thus in his view, since the shadow is somehow between the anima/animus and the conscious awareness of alienated individuals (in such a way as to somehow cover the anima/animus), it could be said that from the standpoint of this conscious awareness the anima/animus is somehow “behind” the shadow and in this sense it is associated with it. Jung contemplated four levels of the anima for men—Eva, Helene, Mary and Sophia—among which the first is clearly associated with the shadow.

If we admit Jung’s views in this regard, however, we will have to conclude that even this first level is somehow covered by the shadow, insofar as in degenerated societies such as present ones and those of civilizations in the last millennia, when individuals develop a conscious identity corresponding to the sex of their physical body, by the same token they associate the opposite sex—and hence the anima in the case of men and the animus in that of women—to the shadow: if I must believe myself to be good, I must see my own sex as good, and by the same token I must see the opposite sex as bad—which will give rise to a great deal of conflict, both on the level of the individual psyche, and on the level of society. Though in a filmed interview Jung acknowledged he was not sure whether the anima/animus archetype was totally unconscious, and said it was “a little bit conscious and unconscious,” it seems clear that (again provided we admit Jung’s views in these regards) in the case of those who have not worked with the shadow to the degree of going through the successive levels posited by Jung, and thus are trapped in the game of seeing the opposite sex as bad, both the shadow and the anima/animus are unconscious phantasies—and in the case of the anima, the first level Jung posited, which is that of Eve, is no doubt at the level of unconscious phantasy. The case of the animus in women seems to be more complex and it seems inappropriate to deal with it in a short note to a book dealing with other subjects. (All this is far more complex in cases such as that of transsexuals and other “sexual deviants,” in whom we might find a series of layers of anima/animus, which might be partly explained in terms of Laing’s spiral of pretences, and on which Sartre [1964], brightly sheds light.) I have dealt with this at greater length, though not in terms of Jung’s categories, and mainly in what concerns “normal” heterosexual individuals, in Capriles (1977, 1986).
I have shown that Zurvan (total or absolute space and time) is equivalent to Shiva (one form of whom is)

374 As the story of Tarpa Nagpo shows, actually all activities that conventions establish to be impure, reprovable or evil, are viable means on the Path to the realization of this Buddha-nature. However, since many of these would cause great suffering both to others and to ourselves, and would greatly delay our Awakening, I chose to say “many activities that conventions establish to be impure, reprovable or evil” rather than “all activities that conventions establish to be impure, reprovable or evil.”

375 As may be corroborated in several works in Western languages (cf. for example Namkhai Norbu, 1999/2001; Dudjom Rinpoche, 1991, vol. II, Glossary of Enumerations), the five nectars or amritas (Skt. pañchamrita; Tib. dütsi nga [bdad rtsi lnga]) are feces, urine, blood, flesh and sperm, of which those having the capacity to perform what is known as ganachakra or “wheel of offerings” used to partake in this ritual. The term “meat” refers to the five Tantric meats (Skt. pañchamamsa; Tib. sha lnga), which are those which Hindus, and Indians in general, deemed impure: human (in those places where there was no legal ban concerning its use), elephant, horse, dog and cow flesh—the last of which are in other traditions replaced by lion and peacock flesh (cf. for example Dudjom Rinpoche, 1991, vol. II, Glossary of Enumerations). In addition to the five nectars, in rituals of the Inner Tantras of the path of transformation five medicines (Tib. mennga [sman lnga]) were employed, consisting in tinospora cordifolia (Tib. ledre [sle tres]), erythrina indica (Tib. gyamtsu duwa [rgya mthos lbu ba]), rubus idaeopsis (Skt. kandakari; Tib. kan da ka ri), orichis latifolia (Tib. wangpo lagpa [dhang po lag po]), and acorus calamus (Tib. shudag karp [shu dag dkar po]) (Namkhai Norbu, 1999/2001). According to commentaries to the fundamental Tantra of Mahayoga, the Guhyagarbha, the five medicines are used to purify the five objects of enjoyment by the senses, whereas the five nectars are taken to purify the five elements (cf. Namkhai Norbu, 1999/2001); however, fundamentally what is to be purified by means of these levels of Tantric practice is the basic dualism of pure and impure, the five poisons of the passions and the five corresponding antidotes, and so on.

However, nowadays Tantric practitioners, instead of the ganachakra perform a ritual called ganapuja (Tib., tsog [shogs]), which is a make-believe ganachakra in which alcohol and meat, with a host of other foodstuffs, are consumed: the alcohol represents the amrita, corresponding to human sperm, and the meat represents the raktas, corresponding to human menstrual blood. And, of course, the meat can be of any animal that is traditionally consumed where the ritual is performed: bovine, caprine or other cattle, poultry, fish or whatever.

This is so in the Inner Tantras of the Nyingma (rnying ma pa): both in those making up the Way of Transformation—Mahayoga and Anuyoga—and in the one that constitutes the Way of Spontaneous Liberation—the Dzogchen Atiyoga. (The yab is the male, whereas the yum is the female.)

Sanskrit for “Lord (Ishwara) Who Is Half (ardha) Woman (nari).” In this form of Shiva, represented in many impressive Indian and Southeast Asian sculptures (consider the one found among the rupestrian sculptures in the cave of the island of Gharpuri / Elephant, in the bay of Mumbai harbor, in the present day Indian state of Maharashtra), the right half of the figure is male and is adorned with the traditional ornaments of Shiva: half of the hair is piled in a hairdress of matted locks, half of a third eye is visible on the forehead, a tiger skin covers the loins, and serpents are used as ornamens. The left half—representing Shiva’s consort, Parvati—is female and shows hair well combed and knotted, half of a tilaka (a round dot) on the forehead, the eye outlined in black, one well-developed breast, a silk garment caught with girdles, an anklet, and the foot tinted red with henna. A variety of this deity is Ardhanarinaratnasevara, in which nata comes from nata, meaning “dancer,” so that the whole term means Lord of the Dance (Shiva Nataraja) Who Is Half Woman.”

In the Bundahishn I, Ormuz appears as a bisexual god; however, research has shown that in the new form of the religions of the Magi—the Zoroastrian one, to which the mentioned text belongs—Ormuz took the place of the Zurvan or ancient Zurvanism, and therefore that originally it was Zurvan who was bisexual. I have shown that Zurvan (total or absolute space and time) is equivalent to Shiva (one form of whom is precisely Mahakala or “total time”). This passage from Bundahishn I, demonstrates that Zurvan also corresponded to the Ardhanarishwara form of Shiva.

We will depend on the acceptance or admiration of those belonging to the same social, professional, sexual (etc.) group as our own to a far greater extent than on that of those belonging to other groups, but we will be to some extent affected by the judgments of those belonging to other groups. However, though a law-abiding individual in general will not be significantly affected by the
judgments of outlaws (he or she may momentarily be affected by their judgments if they mock him or her while passing where they hang out, but the rest of the time he or she will be immune to their judgments), outlaws will always be in some way affected by the judgments of law-abiding individuals, and so it will be far more difficult for them to be temporarily free of conflict than it will be to law-abiding individuals. As shown in another note to this volume, this may become quite complicated in the case of individuals having contradictory personas and depending on the judgments of the opposite groups to which these contradictory personas correspond. However, this is not the place to discuss this in depth.


381 The Guhyasamaja Tantra, despite being a Father Tantra, reads (quoted in Guenther [1969] and Capriles [1977, 1986]):

“The adept (sadhaka) who has sexual intercourse with his mother, his sister, and his daughter, goes towards highest perfection, which is the essence of Mahayana.”

For his part, Anangavajra wrote in the Prajñopayaviniscayasiddhi (quoted in Guenther [1969] and Capriles [1977, 1986]):

“The adept who has sexual intercourse with his mother, his sister, his daughter, and his sister’s daughter, will easily succeed in his striving for the ultimate goal (tattwayoga)”

These symbolic statements express the need to make conscious the repressed / eluded erotic content of the relations that constitute us psychologically: it must be remembered that the Tantras express everything in symbolic terms, and that it would be a grave mistake to take the expressions found therein in a literal sense.

382 This is to a great extent related to Jung’s belief that psychotherapy (and this may be extended to those ancient forms of psychotherapy which are the spiritual Paths) had to make use of the symbolism in the individual’s racial unconscious, so as to achieve what seems to have amounted to an almost mystical, certainly Fascist union between the self and its racial background. However, it is also related to the fact that Jung’s impression of the Western practitioners of Eastern spiritual systems he met was that their practice caused them to raise problems rather than harmony. Furthermore, it may even be related to the misunderstanding of Eastern doctrines referred to in the immediately following note.

383 These commentaries, and in particular the one Jung wrote for the so-called “Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation,” show a miscomprehension of the Dzogchen Path, which John M. Reynolds was right to attribute partly to W. Y. Evans-Wentz’s defective understanding of the text, which affected the final result, partly to Jung’s Eurocentrism, his patronizing views of Asians, his fictional conception of a homogeneous “East” and so on. Cf. Padmasambhava according to Karma Lingpa, 1989, translation by John M. Reynolds, pp. 106-115.

I do not subscribe to all of Reynolds’ commentaries, but this is not the place to point out in which particular points I agree with him and in which particular points I disagree. Suffice to say that Reynolds does not seem to base himself on the direct experience of the practice, for he misrepresents the principle of spontaneous liberation; for example, in his translation of Dudjom Rinpoche’s Richö (Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdräl Yeshe Dorje, English trans. by John Reynolds, 1978), Reynolds mistranslates the author’s explanation of spontaneous liberation by writing that “one liberates oneself as a snake uncoiling” (thus implying what is liberated is one’s self and that this occurs as an effect of one’s own action), when its meaning is that delusive thoughts liberate themselves spontaneously without anyone having to liberate them. It seems to be because of this misconception that in his translation of Karma Lingpa’s revealed book (e.g. p. 105, last two links) he uses “self-realization...” as though this term could be a synonym of “spontaneous liberation”!!! One further example: in p. 108 he identifies the Buddhist concept of samadhi (Tib. tingnkedzin [ting nge 'dzin]) with the Buddhist conception of advayajñana (Tib. nyime yeshe [gnyis med ye shes]), when advayajñana in general refers to the nondual gnosis as it manifests in nirvana, whereas in most cases samadhi is for the Buddhists an absorption belonging to the neutral base-of-all or to samsara, and only rarely is the term used to refer to an instance of nirvana (one apparent exception being the usage of tingdzin [ting 'dzin] in the Longde [klong sde] series of Dzogchen teachings).

384 The Minotaur, just like dragons and other pre-Indo-European mythological entities, originally symbolized the energy and other aspects of our true condition. As reflected in the myth of Theseus and Ariadna (and then in the development of bullfighting), after the Indo-European invasion, the
worst aspects of the Indo-European shadow were assimilated into the Minotaur—just as occurred to dragons in Christianity, as reflected in the myth of Saint George. It is at this point that it becomes most important to see through them, and that the symbolism used in the regular text is most meaningful.

385 The Dzogchen teachings speak of successive modes of conduct. When the individual is in search of his or her teacher, conduct should be like that of a bee that goes from one flower to the next tasting the nectar of each. When she or he has had Direct Introduction and no longer remains in doubt, so that it is time to continue in the State, but her or his capacity to do so is undeveloped, conduct should be like that of a wounded deer that hides from human beings (for only in retreat will she or he rapidly develop the Contemplation). When Contemplation has been developed and it is time to integrate all daily activities and experiences in it so as to go beyond the division between a Contemplation state and a post-Contemplation condition, it is time to behave like a madman. Finally, when everything has been integrated in the Contemplation so that there is no longer a Contemplation and a post-Contemplation, the individual is like a lion playing, totally fearless and free from the need to do something in order to achieve a result.

When, as done in the regular text immediately after the reference mark for this note, Behavior is viewed as a stage posterior to Vision and Contemplation, and is explained as the means to integrate everyday activities and experiences in this Contemplation so as to go beyond the duality of Contemplation and post-Contemplation, the Behavior referred to is the one that is compared with that of a madman: only this behavior requires that we have a well-established Vision and Contemplation, yet we still need to integrate everyday activities and experiences in the Contemplation and go beyond the duality of Contemplation and post-Contemplation.

386 The second paragraph of the quotation in the regular text is an abridged rendering of the original. The paragraph below is a brief resumé of the paragraphs preceding the first of the ones cited in the regular text (as the reader can see, the first sentence in the quotation in the regular text was taken from one of the preceding paragraphs):

“Spontaneous nondual self-awareness (of) whatever arises as a seeming object through the six senses and Spontaneous nondual self-awareness free from the illusory subject-object duality should be left to itself like a little child. When in the sphere having no foundation other than itself Awareness is not even limited to a state of noninterference by dualistic mind, the unconceivable King, Gnitiveness, in its genuine (condition free from the three types of avidya or marigpa) rules unchangingly and spontaneously... In the sphere of self-manifestation that defies all calculation, Spontaneous nondual self-awareness, absolutely free, should remain in its absolute vastness of scope... Spontaneous nondual self-awareness with nothing before it to limit it and not holding to anything subjectively should be left to itself like a drunkard... The various detrimental conditions arise as the play of the true condition. Until true re Gnition as the creative center be never concealed, let your mind be like a jackal’s eye, not distinguishing between day and night... When your realization be like the meeting of a mother and its child, everything will arise in nondual, nonplural vastness. Spontaneous nondual self-awareness that spontaneously manifests its true condition from its own depth... without periphery or center, should be left to itself like space, which cannot be pointed out as “this is it.” Gnitiveness in its true (nondual, nonconceptual) condition (free from the three types of avidya or marigpa in the classification adopted here) is absolutely free in its self-manifestation and uninterruptedness, and as such should be left to itself like a river. Whichever thought-constructions there may be, it is patent that they are the dharmakaya; thus there being no need to accept or reject, there is over-arching nonduality and nonplurality beyond suffering. In brief, whatever arises is the play of the true condition, and composure free in itself without reference to objects is spontaneously manifest.”

A full, different version of these verses appears in Longchenpa (1975). Another full, different version of these verses, with their respective commentary (in French), appears in Cornu (1994).

387 This paragraph continues with the following words:

“But in the meantime the world of appearances, the devotion to the Guru, the accumulation of merits, the removal of intellectual and emotional obscurations, the meditation on impermanence and death—all the realities of the world of appearance are like a dream, an apparition, an echo, a mirage, a reflection, a magic show. Since it is no more than a mirage or the moon’s reflection in
A full, different version of these verses appears in Longchenpa (1975). Another full, different version of these verses, with their respective commentary (in French), appears in Cornu (1994).

Chandalis and chandalas (the latter, pronounced “chandal”) are the female and male dalits or untouchables in charge of disposing of corpses, respectively, and because of their occupations were seen as the most lowly of outcasts. In fact, many chandals lived from hunting and fishing, and many chandalis had professions that were equally seen as deserving contempt.

This was very common among those practitioners of Tekchö (khregs chod) who boosted their discipline by means of the practice of chö (gcod). In Tucci (1980), p. 92, we read:

“The familiarity of the followers of gcod with demonic powers (which are thoroughly real in the eyes of simple people) and the emphasis placed by them on everything macabre and gruesome has brought about an ever stronger ... attitude which links them, perhaps genetically too, apart from the specific content of their teachings, with certain Indian sects who were concerned with proving their total indifference to common opinion through ever stranger practices. The rules which they observed bear witness to a marked disdain towards everyday customs, indeed a total lack of concern and insensitivity (phyogs ris med) with regard to them. These people would eat the food of lepers and beggars and wear their clothes, and live in their company rather than in the monasteries.”

The point was not to prove total indifference to common opinion (for having to prove this would mean that one is bound by the opinion of others), but to turn contradiction into conflict so that it could be resolved through the spontaneous release of the tension inherent in the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought. How come such practitioners could eat the food of lepers and wear their clothes without becoming infected with the illness? Through the practice in which they faced their own fears in the guise of visions of demons that attacked them and ate their bodies, and the subsequent spontaneous release of tension and of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought, they went beyond any sense of an ego to protect, and this in its turn made them immune to infectious illnesses. Tucci goes on (same page):

“When epidemic disease breaks out, it is the gcod adepts who attend to the transport of the corpses to the [charnel ground] (they are believed to be immune to any infection) and to the cutting through and breaking up of the bones [so as to feed the corpses to the wild beasts that roamed the charnel ground].”

The practice of Chö (gcod) is discussed in detail in the third chapter of Capriles (2000a) and will be discussed perhaps in even greater detail in Capriles (work in progress 4 [that the discussion in question falls in this work depends on whether I manage to include in it the contents of chapters II and III of Capriles, 2000a]).

The principle of the practice was to activate the fears of the practitioner, so as to give rise to a dreadful hallucinatory experience in which he or she was eaten by the local demons, and then apply the oral instructions given by the teacher so that tensions would spontaneously break in the manner of the Dzogchen practice of Tekchö, and the hallucinations would instantly dissolve. Repetition of this rapidly neutralized delusion, and in particular the drive to self-protection at the root of many illnesses. As a result, realized practitioners of Chö became immune to infectious disease. Tucci (1980, p. 92) continues:

“When epidemic disease breaks out, it is the gcod adepts who attend to the transport of the corpses to the cemetery (they are believed to be immune to any infection) and to the cutting through and breaking up of the bones.”

In his Song of Experience, Milarepa wrote, “In Islamic countries there are very wise men, though these are not revered or followed by the majority of people.” However, in having to adapt the teachings to a religious system that refers to what here I am calling the Self by the word “God,” a difficulty is introduced for achieving the Dzogchen, Tantric and Madhyamika understanding of the impossibility of expressing the true condition of reality in concepts and words. The Sufis had to do this, as they had to function in Islamic societies and transmit higher teaching within these societies without thereby being prosecuted for heresy and blasphemy. However, in the lay societies of our time we do not need to suffer the burden of ciphering the teachings in theistic language. On the contrary, as I have shown elsewhere (Capriles, 1994a, 2007), the times reclaim the reintegration of God—which to some extent may correspond to what Marx called “the transubstantiation of God in Communism.”
“The Cynics... practiced a type of asceticism (askesis) that consisted, not in leaving the world to lead a life of silence and prayer, but in “living the life of a dog.” It could be inferred that they thought that the former kind of asceticism would cause the negative propensities at the root of human corruption to keep latent, [and in particular that it would reinforce the shadow and its dynamic, which as we have seen are at the root of a great deal of the evil in the world]; adepts had to live in society, so that the negative propensities [in question] activated themselves and therefore they could face them, [and thus would have] the possibility of uprooting them (parajarattein). [Therefore], what we could call the “asceticism” of the Cynics is in no way similar to the one practiced by the Brahmans who at a certain age become brahmacharya (celibate), or to the one practiced by the tapashya (penitents), or to that of the Jainas (who had to abstain from causing harm to any type of sentient beings, including plants, for they considered these to be sentient beings). It seems to be rather similar to that of these [Tantrics, Dzogchenpas and Chöpas (practitioners of gedod)] that some regard as “extremist,” who did not abandon society, even though their hanging around with lepers, prostitutes, outcasts and other of the excluded by the world, their complete indifference regarding the prevailing values in the communities in which they grew up, [received education and lived], and the fact that they spent long periods in charnel grounds (which all avoided, partly because they were believed to be inhabited by dangerous demons [and be] focuses of disease, partly because of the wild beasts that preyed in such places), caused them to be feared, despised, excluded and avoided. It is said that the aim of the “asceticism” of the Cynics was to harden the body and to temperate the mind by facing temptation itself—which [if they had a practice somehow analogous to that of Dzogchen] could create the conditions for the spontaneous liberation of “unnatural” perceptions [conditioned by nomos] and the manifestation of “natural” [physis-responding] Vision free from delusion. And in this again they resemble the supposedly “extremist” [Tantrics, Dzogchenpas and Chöpas (practitioners of gedod)] I have referred to, for the type of life these [Tantrics, Dzogchenpas and Chöpas] led, made ... the judgments that, like filters or veils, kept closed their doors of perception, [become evident]—which in its turn allowed [these practitioners] to reGnize the true condition and Base [of the thoughts involved], and remain in the natural condition wherein the doors of perception keep open, rather than being blocked by judgments about clean and dirty, pristine and polluted, good and evil, praiseworthy and desplicable, etc.

“There can hardly be anything more egalitarian than to embody what society regards as lowly and shameful, voluntarily adopting the status of a dog, for this uproots the source of all inequity, which is the wish to raise above others. Moreover, when we adopt the form that is most despised, upon becoming the [entity that others perceive as ourselves in the experience of being-for-Self, rather than] experiencing pleasure, we experience discomfort—which may be used as an alarm reminding us to apply the instructions that create the conditions for spontaneous liberation to occur (may this have been what the Cynics called the “release of natural perceptions”?). The Cynics deliberately adopted what their society viewed as the most shocking extremes of shameless speech and behavior (Diogenes ate flatulent foods and then set out to fart in the agora [i.e. in the forum or public square and market], whereas his disciple Crates openly made love with Hiparchia [in the same place, just as later on Drukpa Kunle did with some of his consorts]; and so on and on). I believe this served their own practice, and at the same time taught others not to dwell on appearances, showing them the absurdity of conventions (nomos) and the extent to which these were shackles. In fact, the Cynic was the watchdog of humankind, who barked at illusion so that all could recognize it as such; the surgeon whose knife cut the painful cancer of bias, conventions and hypocrisy in the minds of others. The gospel of Hercules (Hercules), the ideal king, was a gospel for all human beings, which had to be taught through personal example; it has been said that the vilification of wealth, luxury and sensual indulgence by the personal example of the Cynics was a source of spiritual hope for the poor, the disenchanted and the oppressed.”
Taking as a model Xenophon’s *Cyropædia* (Education of Cyrus), Onesycritus of Astipalea wrote a narrative on Alexander the Great that considered the Gymnosophists or naked sages of India similar to the prototype of the Cynics (Brown [1949]; Brantham & Goulet-Cazé [1996]). If Onesycritus were correct, this might even suggest [the existence of] a genetic link between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics (however, in such a case the Gymnosophists would certainly not be “space-dressed” [i.e. naked] Jainas, for the Jainas do not have a practice like the one being referred to here; neither does it seem likely that they be naked *Shaiva naga babas*; in fact, I tend to think that, if Onesycritus were right, the Gymnosophists would have been a school within the *mahasiddhu* tradition of Central Asia, India and the Himalayas). Furthermore, just like Shakyamuni Buddha, Crates stated that pleasure was but a momentary release from pain. Diogenes asked for his corpse to be fed to the wild beasts, just as Persian Zurvanists, Tibetan Bönpos and Tibetan Buddhists traditionally did. Likewise, just as it occurs in Tibetan Buddhism, Diogenes (Ep. 30) presented two roads to happiness: one that is long, easy and smooth, and another one that represents the shortcut of the Cynics, which was short and hard (and which involved leaving the clothes of the citizen for the robe of the Cynic; the shortcut is described in the Ps. Crates, Ep. 13 and Ep. 21). Pyrrho’s comparison of the sage with a pig is analogous to the Cynic comparison of the sage with a dog—and in fact these animals are two of the 21 examples of Behavior or chöpa in the Dzogchen teachings.”

Capriles (1999b), also provides an interpretation, in terms of the impossibility of correspondence between the analog (related to primary process and the functioning of the hemisphere that in males in normally on the right and in females is normally on the left) and the digital (related to secondary process and the functioning of the hemisphere that in males in normally on the left and in females is normally on the right), of the possible reasons that may have led Anthistenes to deny any validity to negation by declaring *ouk estin antilegein* (which could be rendered as “it is impossible [in the sense of ‘incorrect’] to contradict,” “it is impossible to say that x is not,” or even “it is impossible to properly construct any negative sentence,” and which would have been used by Protagoras, who was one of Anthistenes’ teachers), and at the same time deny validity to definition in terms of the syllogism “a *is* b” (deeming valid only definition in analog terms—an example of which is “a *is like* b”).

A Master must have been officially recognized by his or her teacher, who must have been officially recognized by his or her teacher... and so on unto the very source of the tradition he or she holds.

Freud also insisted on the need to encounter the traumas we have always repressed, but he did not agree that we would live a better life if we dismounted the mechanisms whereby we elude painful and ego-dystonic contents.

In general, existential therapy is associated with phenomenology as well, and may be divided into two main streams: (1) that of existential psychotherapy, based on Kierkegaard’s, views neurosis as an “unauthentic world” to be realized as such through an encounter with a psychotherapist, whose function may be related to that of Protestant pastors’ “souls cure,” and (2) the one developed by the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Biswanger on the basis of the theses by Husserl and Heidegger, is the one that Jakob Wyrsch called it *Daseinanalysis* or “analysis of the existent,” which is the term that is often rendered into languages other that German as “existential psychoanalysis.” The second stream is the one that includes Sartre, Viktor Frankl, Ronald Laing (in *The Divided Self* and to some extent in *Self and Others; The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise* and some subsequent works might be viewed as metaexistential insofar as they may be understood as envisaging the dissolution of the existent in a state beyond the subject-object duality), Eugène Minkowski, Igor Caruso and Michel Foucault until 1954.

In Sartre’s view, it was impossible for human beings to prevent the occurrence of bad faith (self-deceit) and live constantly in the state of authenticity—which in any case would be most painful insofar as the being of the human individual that became unconcealed in authenticity was Hell. However, as will be seen below in the regular text, in the view of other, less radical and less consistent existentialist psychologists, authenticity was possible, and rather than being Hell it was the condition for the solution of many conflicts.

Jaspers emphasized the need to face death. In Heidegger’s view, unauthentic existence involve avoiding death, and yet authenticity is not achieved by thinking about death.

Jung divided the process Self-realization into two stages: an initial one in which we separate from humanity by building up an identity and possibly rebelling against authority, and a second one in which we reunite with the human race, contributing and collaborating rather than destroying. The
result of this process, provided that the individual manages to bring it to its ultimate consequences, is the actualization of the Self briefly discussed in the regular text. The Self represents perfection, but perfection, for Jung, can only be achieved at death.

As a result of his studies at the Union Theological Seminar, May became a close friend of Protestant existentialist philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich. Then, during his TB episode, he was greatly influenced by his readings of the Protestant forefather of existentialist philosophy, Sören Kierkegaard. However, he also received an important influence from American humanism, and when he went on to study psychoanalysis at White Institute, he met dissidents of Freudism such as Harry Stack Sullivan (the creator of self-system and beacon of the social stream of dynamic psychotherapy) and Erich Fromm. His formation can already give us an idea of his thought.

May’s first work, written in 1950 (May, 1977), clearly showed the imprint of some of the principal existentialist authors, challenging the belief that mental health amounts to living without anxiety on the grounds that, in a world in which there is the possibility of mass destruction with the atomic bomb, living without anxiety would be a pathology, and that, moreover, anxiety is an essential part of being a human being, without which we would be overcome with boredom, become insensitive, and live without the tension necessary for preserving human existence. Like Sartre and the other figures of existential psychoanalysis—or, to use the term Jakob Wyrusch coined for the therapeutic method of Ludwig Binswanger, Daseinanalyse—and in a way very similar to Binswanger’s, yet to a greater degree than most Europeans, he reconciled existential psychology with Freudian thought, stressing the need to meet and face pain, choice and responsibility—which existentialists call “authenticity,” but which he called “courage”—and noting, like Irvin Yalom and James Bugental, that in our world it is much “easier” to avoid these uncomfortable experiences than to face them. However, when we avoid the painful aspects of existence we become alienated from the world, others and ourselves, and paradoxically reap pain, anxiety and depression—which, like all painful aspects of existence, can only be surpassed by facing them together with the rest of life: no matter how frightful and difficult this may, the long-term benefits of facing them are as significant as the drawbacks of avoiding them. May discussed Anxiety in its relation to Being, in its relation to Encounter, and in its relation to Self-Growth, and delved into the tragic dimensions of existence to a greater extent than other humanistic psychologists (May 1953, 1977, 1983, 1999), etc.).

As stated in a previous note, it was Jakob Wyrusch who christened Ludwig Binswanger’s system as Daseinanalyse or “analysis of the existent,” which is the term that is often translated into languages other than German as “existential psychoanalysis.” As a student, Ludwig Binswanger met Eugen Bleuler, and very soon after that met Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon and Carl Gustav Jung, all of which were at the time passionately Freudian; in January, 1907, he accompanied Jung and his wife Emma in the latter’s first visit to Freud, who manifested his desire of being initiated into psychoanalysis. However, his interest in philosophy led him to meet Ernst Cassirer, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, Edwin Fischer, Wilhelm Furtwängler, Kurt Goldstein (from whom he derived his holistic view of the self) and Eugène Minkowski (the French existential psychoanalyst). Binswanger acknowledged the existence of a Freudian hermeneutics based on experience long before Ricoeur. In Dream and Existence he combined the Freudian conception of human existence with those of Husserl and Heidegger; Michel Foucault was one of the co-translators of this work into French, to which he wrote a long preface (and in 1983, in the presentation of the English version of his book The Use of Pleasure, Foucault (1985/1984) acknowledged his debt with Binswanger end explained the reason that led him to distance himself from him). In spite of his intellectual departure from Freudism, he kept his admiration for his mentor, and the latter acknowledged that his intellectual development did not interfere with their friendship. Cf. Roudinesco & Plon (1997). In short, his system synthesized his existential and phenomenological influences with his Freudism—and yet he may have also received from Goldstein a holistic influence based on Gestalt theory, just as Goldstein (1963) may have absorbed from him his understanding of anxiety as an “existential fact.”

Fritz Perls (1893-1970) had been born in Berlin, and he studied medicine and psychoanalysis, but later became interested in ideas surpassing this system, partly due to his wife, Laura Posner, a psychologist who had contact with the early Gestalt school of experimental psychology. This was how, under the influence of Kurt Goldstein, Max Wertheimer, Martin Buber, and others, Perls
began to question orthodox psychoanalytic doctrine. One of Perls’ criticisms of Freud was that by putting the patient on the couch, an artificial situation is created, one that brings the patient even further from good contact, and the subsequent goal of personality integration. A quite personal influence on our character was Wilhelm Reich, with whom the former underwent a training analysis, and whom he said was the therapist who influenced him most; in particular, Reich’s approach to the role of the body in therapy influenced Perls, making Gestalt therapy to be body-oriented. Perls produced Gestalt therapy in the early 1950s in collaboration with anarchist social critic, poet, novelist and icon of the rebellious nineteen sixties, Paul Goodman. Perls’ first book, *Ego, Hunger and Aggression* perpetrated a penetrating critique of Freudianism from the holistic (as is characteristic of Gestalt theory) and semantic viewpoints, condemning the many misleading abstractions in the analytic terminology. He also borrowed from the work of early Gestalt psychologists, who had been mainly concerned with laboratory experiments in perception, applying their principles of perceptual organization to the understanding the structure of the human personality as it functions within the organism/environment field. This first book is significant because in addition to criticizing Freud, it also lays the groundwork for a new system of psychotherapy. Though he was disappointed after his stay in a Zen monastery in Japan, this kind of mysticism seems to have influenced his “concentration therapy,” aiming at synthesis rather than cold analysis, and calling for a natural holistic approach to body and mind, and a fresh face-to-face encounter between therapist and patient. The book Fritz Perls wrote with Ralph Hefferline and Paul Goodman, became a very influential work in the USA. In 1964 he joined Esalen Institute, irradiating center and core of the third wave of humanistic psychology, and by 1966 Gestalt Therapy began to be known all over the USA. In Spanish speaking-countries, a key figure of this movement is the Spanish professor, therapist and author Celedonio Castanedo Secadas (author of *Castanedo 1988 / 3d. revised Ed. 1997*, and *1990 / 2d. Ed. 1997*), who was very influential in Costa Rica, from where his teachings irradiated to the rest of Central America.

Moustakas’s desolation was probably all the worse because his daughter died as a consequence of his decision to submit her to heart surgery in order to correct a congenital heart problem.

Ernst Cassirer expounded in detail Goldstein’s theses, which he viewed as a confirmation of his theory of symbolic functions—to which, interestingly, Merleau-Ponty opposed his existentialist interpretation. Cf. Gurwitsh (1971).

In 1951, Maslow became the chairman of the psychology department at Brandeis University, where he began his theoretical work, and where he met Kurt Goldstein, who introduced him to the idea of self-actualization.

As we have seen, for Jung, *self-realization* amounted to becoming conscious of the “Self,” and represented the ideal term of therapy. Maslow did not employ the Jungian maps charting the course of what the Swiss analyst deemed to be the ideal therapy, and yet his ideal of self-realization coincided with Jung’s to a considerable degree.

Maslow divided human needs into what he called “Being Needs” and what he referred to as “Deficit Needs,” the former being basically the need for self-actualization, and the latter being the rest of human needs, which he divided into four main categories, which were esteem needs, belonging needs, safety needs and physiological needs. Though physiological needs are the most immediate, which must be covered in order to think of the higher ones, they are at the base of the pyramid, so that Being Needs are the higher though least immediate ones.

Those who are concerned with Being Needs are the individuals Maslow called “self-actualizers,” which are reality-centered in the sense of distinguishing what is fake and dishonest from what is true and genuine, and which have “natural” values that seem to flow effortlessly from their being rather then ones they Kantianlly imposed on themselves. They like solitude and enjoy autonomy understood as a degree of independence from physical and social needs, preferring fewer deep relations than an abundance of shallower ones. They resist enculturation understood as the tyranny of social pressure to conform and exhibit spontaneity and simplicity, preferring to be themselves than to be pretentious or artificial—to the extent of tending to conventional on the surface. They are problem-centered, meaning they dealt with the problems of life as difficulties demanding solutions rather than as troubles before which to complain or give up, and have an ability to be creative, inventive, and original. They don’t organize their perspective on the basis of means for achieving ends (Maslow goes so far as to claim that the means can be end in themselves and that the means are
often give priority before the ends). They have an unhospitable sense of humor, and have a quality he called acceptance of self and others, meaning that they are more likely to take others for what they are rather than trying to change them into what they feel they should be, and accept their own qualities so long as they are not harmful—in which case they would do all they can to change them. They have “democratic values” in the sense of being humble and respecting others, being open to and even treasuring ethnic and individual differences. They have Gemeinschaftsgefühl or human kinship, involving interest in social issues and compassion, as well as a strong ethics, spiritual but rarely religious in the conventional sense. They have some freshness of appreciation, in the sense of being able to see things, even ordinary ones, with wonder, and seem to be beyond many of the dichotomies in which most are trapped—such as those between the spiritual and the physical, the selfish and the unselfish, and the masculine and the feminine. In short, the needs of self-actualizers are B-Needs, and they naturally respond to these needs. In Maslow’s view, this is directly related to the fact that these people tended to have more peak experiences than the average person.

However, self-actualizers often suffer more anxiety and guilt than the rest, but these are of the “realistic” kind rather than misplaced or neurotic versions. Some of them are absentminded and excessively kind. And finally, some of them had unexpected moments of ruthlessness, surgical coldness, and loss of humor.

Maslow evolved with time, to the point of being, with Sutich and according to some with Assagioli, the founder of transpersonal psychology. Since a discussion of Maslow’s theories throughout his evolution is beyond the scope of this book, the discussion of his theories will be left at this point. (In 1966 Maslow and Toni Sutich, among others, acknowledged that the concept of self-actualization was not sufficiently encompassing, and emphasized the interest mystical states had for psychology. Thus arose the idea of creating a journal for the ostensibly emerging field, which was originally called “transhumanistic” and then received the adjective “transpersonal.”) However, Miles A. Vich [1990], editor of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, asserted that Toni Sutich was already using the term in 1967, citing as its source a communication by Stanislav Grof. Philosopher Dane Rudhyar [1983] claims the term originated in Jung and that he himself used it since 1930. A biographer of William James, R. B. Perry, in The Thought and Character of William James, vol.2, [1936], asserts that the beacon of pragmatism used the prefix trans, and even the term “transpersonal,” to indicate elements that then appeared in transpersonal thinking of the late 20th century [and which continue to appear in it in the 21st century]. Also Roberto Assagioli [Weil, 1988, cited in Vich, 1990, cited in Rodriguez Bornaetxea, undated] and Emmanuel Mounier [Descamps, 1987] have been said to be the coiner of the term. Cf. Fernando Rodriguez Bornaetxea, Fernando [undated]. Transpersonal. Internet at the URL http://www.ucm.es/info/eurotheo/diccionario/T/transpersonal.htm.}

Carl Rogers was initially influenced by behaviorism and the learning theories produced by Keller, Skinner and Schoenfield, as well as by Freudian Psychoanalysis and the ideas of John Dewey and William James. Then he met Alfred Adler, being deeply marked by his view that the history of patients is not as important as the meaning they themselves give it and the feelings implied in their narratives. In the same period he approached the works by Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi, who championed an active, brief, intense therapy more focused in the present than in the past, and on emotions than on intellectual understanding (their 1924 book The Development of Psychoanalysis [Ferenczi & Rank, 2006] being, according to many, the first text on psychotherapy and a precedent of humanistic psychology). In particular, Rank believed that the aim of psychotherapy was not to eradicate something wrong in the patient, but to help her or him open to a new way of being—a task in which a warm and authentic relationship with the client, with the former not hiding his or her feelings, was of utmost importance. It is thus easy to see why Rank is seen as a precedent of humanistic psychology. Later on Rogers acknowledged the influence of Kurt Goldstein, Andreas Angyal (who, like Jung, Adler and Rank—and later on Rogers—emphasized the need to balance the tendency towards individual development, with the “opposite” tendency toward the welfare of others and the achievement of a good society) and Abraham Maslow on his psychology, and that of existential phenomenology in its philosophical foundations.

This is what Rogers said, though twentieth century epistemology ruled out the possibility that a theory may arise in this way, without being molded by the preconception of its creator. Even an advocate of the supposed validity of knowledge and certainly no Luddite such as Karl Popper
acknowledged the fact that we do not derive our theories directly from experience, but that we
deduce them from our own principles or intellectual illuminations, and later on we try to validate
them by testing them against experience—and felt compelled to note that if no experience
contradicts a theory, scientists are entitled to admit it provisionally as a probable truth: Popper
rejected the essentialism of the rationalist philosophy of science, which supposes that the aim of
inquiry is a complete and final knowledge of the essence of things, on the grounds that no scientific
type can be completely substantiated and that the acceptance of a new theory gives rise to as
many problems as it solved. It is well-known that David Hume had already ruled out the universal
validity of deriving laws from experience. As will be shown in vol. III of this book, the ideological
character of the sciences has been admitted by Georges Sorel, Gaston Bachelard, Antonio Gramsci,
and towards the end of the twentieth century, almost universally among epistemologists and
philosophers.

If Rogers was influenced by Goldstein and Maslow (so far as I know he did not acknowledge the
influence of Jung) and knew their theories before positing the actualizing tendency, then it was
certainly conceived under their influence; if the influences in question took place at a later period,
then he conceived it deductively in interaction with experience rather than solely derived from it.

For Rogers people are basically good or healthy; on the psychological plane, the normal progression
of life, driven by the single “force of life” he calls the actualizing tendency, tends to optimize that health; and
mental illness, criminality, and other human problems, as distortions of the natural tendency in question.
The actualizing tendency, inherent in every life-form (not limited to humans, not even to single
organisms), is a drive to develop potentials and make the best of existence to the fullest extent possible:
all creatures strive to make the very best of their existence, though culture, despite not being intrinsically
evil, can prevent this—in which case it will die out, and we, in all likelihood, will die with it. We seek
what is good for us, including “positive regard,” Rogers umbrella term for things like love, affection,
attention, nurturance, but also for positive self-regard, that is, self-esteem, self-worth, a positive self-
image (which in terms of this book is not good for us, as for us we have seen is at the core of many of our
problems): This is called organismic valuing. However, our societies prevent us from achieving this
making “positive regard” be conditional: they give us what we want—including the projection of worth,
love and affection—if we show that we are worthy of them. This makes us renounce to the shape that
would result from our organismic valuing or actualizing tendency, shaping ourselves on the basis of
society’s demands, which may not correspond to our best interests, as they may not give rise to happiness,
health and so on. And, with time, we come to like ourselves only if we meet up with the standards others
have applied to us, rather than if we are truly actualizing our potentials, developing an “ideal self” we
need to be but in general cannot be—it is the standard we can’t meet—insofar as general demands often
contradict individual tendencies, giving rise to “incongruity,” consisting in the gap between the ideal self
and what we actually are, which is what neurosis is, and which is directly proportional to one’s degree of
suffering. Contrariwise, if we followed the actualizing tendency, organismic valuing, receiving positive
regard and self-regard rather than conditional ones, we would actualize our real self: the one that, if all
goes well, we will become. Incongruity is the source of threatening situations, which give rise to anxiety,
which tells us we should avoid the situation—psychologically by means of the two types of defenses:
denial, which means not facing reality (elusion of the kind Freud misunderstood as repression), and
perceptual distortion, in which we reinterpret the situation so that it appears less threatening (elusion of
the kind Freud called rationalization). Defenses increase incongruity and hence neurosis and suffering,
producing more threatening situations that result in the development of further defenses, in a system that
grows from its own feedback, from the individual cannot get out on his or her own. Psychosis, in its turn,
occurs when a person’s defense are overwhelmed, and their sense of self becomes “shattered” into little
disconnected pieces, and the individual may become unable to differentiate self and non-self, and become
disoriented and passive.

On the contrary, the healthy person is “fully-functioning” insofar as he or she has: (1) Openness to
experience, which is the opposite of defensiveness, and involves the capacity to accept reality and one’s
own feelings, which convey organismic valuing (and which must be distinguished from the anxieties of
conditional worth). (2) Existential living: in the here-and-now rather than in the past of in the future. (3)
Organismic trusting, in which we are guided by the organismic valuing process and do what feels right
and comes natural—which does not mean what comes natural out of incongruence but what comes natural
from the real self and hence is impossible if one is not guided by the actualizing tendency. (4) Experiential
In anarchist theory, the word revolution means the process by which the grip of authority is loosed, so
Anarchist theory is based on the idea that social groups can regulate themselves organismically. Paul
In this regard cf. Rogers (1942, 1965, 1967); Rogers & Kinget (1971) and Rogers & Rosenberg (1981).
Concerning therapy, his original principle was non-directiveness insofar as the therapist should not lead
the client, but be available as support while the client directs the progress of the therapy; however, he then
discovered that “non-directiveness” influenced clients, for clients would manipulate themselves through
the therapist. Rogers noted a therapist should have: (1) Congruence, involving honesty with the client; (2)
Empathy; and (3) Respect, which involves acceptance and having unconditional positive regard towards
the client.
According to Ludwig Binswanger (1987; cf. also Needleman 1963), melancholy—a humoural
condition comprising a painful but not pathological alteration of the perception and composition of
a temporal horizon— involves a distorted relationship between “being-in-the-world” and time, and
an unbalanced, and dissatisfactory relationship with praesentatio (existence in the present) that
inclines towards either the protentio (whose temporal objective is the future), or the retentio (whose
temporal objective is the past). It involves a gradual decline in a continuum amounting to
characteriological depression involving a tendency towards pessimism, unhappiness and the absence
of the pursuit of pleasure that in some cases can involve episodes of greater depression. The
persistence of this personality disorder distinguishes the humoural condition from pathological
conditions such as the oscillating bipolarity in manic depression. According to Binswanger, when the
melancholic falls into meditative otium (marked by the conventional posture of this humoural
condition), it can give rise to “figures of enlightenment:” ecstasy, prophecy ex somnio (examples
being Saint Ursula, the soldiers near the Sepulcher of the Risen Christ), and projections of
“protentive delirium” with visions of the future.

What may was proposing was not that we become enamored of our personas and reject our
shadows, but that no matter what ego-dystonic, shadow-like material we meet in the process of self-
actualization, must be faced in such a way that, rather than causing us to develop a sense of shame,
generates ever-increasing self-contentment. And, in fact, it is true that in genuine traditions of
Awarening the Path must put an end to disliking oneself—or, more precisely, to compulsive hatred
of the shadow and guilt of feeling one is the shadow—and as this progressively happens it is
inevitable that one comes to (so to speak) like oneself in post-Contemplation, where relative truth is
manifest. Nevertheless, this does not mean on should continue to like oneself forever, for the
function of the Path is to put an end to the illusion of there being a self to like or dislike.
Furthermore, as shown in the preceding section of this volume, the Behavior of Dzogchen may
naturally make one become an object of others’ contempt, precisely insofar as deriving pleasure
from being what others see as us makes it very difficult to do whatever may be necessary for going
beyond becoming what others see us.
What Jung called the “transcendent function” was discussed in a note to a previous section of this
chapter, the reference mark for which was appended to the term in the regular text the first time it
appeared in this volume.

Anarchist theory is based on the idea that social groups can regulate themselves organismically. Paul
Goodman (1977, p. 215) writes:
“in anarchist theory, the word revolution means the process by which the grip of authority is loosed, so
that the functions of life can regulate themselves without top-down direction or external hindrance.
The idea is that except for emergencies and a few special cases, free functioning will find its own right structures and coordination.”

As will be shown in vol. III of this book, this was possible in the krityayuga, satyayuga or golden age, and will be possible again when the present reductio ad absurdum of delusion results in the eradication of delusion and the consequent restoration of the primordial order that arises spontaneously from chaos (as in the case of Proudhon’s stones, which organize themselves better is you shake the tin containing them than if you try to order them, and hence you can put a greater number of stones in the tin through the first method than through the latter).

I do not agree that existentialism, and in particular Sartre, brought about a radical subversion of Western philosophical dualism; actually, Heidegger criticized Sartre’s dictum that existence precedes essence precisely because it presupposes and sustains the potency/act dualism. Furthermore, so long as there is a subject-object duality there is dualism, and no existentialist philosopher posited the surpassing of this duality (Sartre posited this surpassing as the telos of human existence, but said it simply could not be achieved). Hence the assertion that existentialism brought about a radical subversion of Western philosophical dualism is characteristic of those who do not understand what, in Buddhist terms, the term dualism really means.

Among the different tryptamines, psilocybin, psilocin, DMT and 5-MeO-DMT (the latter two being the principal psychoactive principles of the Amazonian snuff called yopo, which contains N,N-DMT as well, and which induces particularly powerful visions) are very well known CREV. Because of their short-lived psychoactive effects when smoked or snuffed (in the case of yopo snuff, Amazonian Indians mix it with lime, which they obtain from burning locally found seashells, for otherwise it will not be psychoactive—and the same applies to all substances in this category when taken nasally), DMT, 5-MeO-DMT, DET and DPT are very often classed together.

Synthetic tryptamines AMT (α-methyltryptamine), 5-MeO-AMT (5-methoxy-α-methyltryptamine), 5-MeOMiPT (N-isopropyl-5-methoxy-N-methyl-tryptamine) and Foxy / Foxy Methoxy / 5-MeO-DIPT (α-methyl-tryptamine) are universally classed as psychedelic as well. Most if not all of these drugs have a stimulant amphetamine-like effect as well, and—especially in the case of the latter two—they are deemed to be erotic enhancers (Foxy was widely used as such in the US before its prohibition in 2001, and just as it happened with the rest of these synthetic tryptamines, street dealers often made it pass for ecstasy, in many cases producing a fearful reaction on those who did not expect the typical effects of CREV).

The tryptamine bufotenine (5-OH-DMT)—found in the defensive exudations of the parotid gland of Bufo toads, in the seeds of the trees Anadenanthera colubrina and Anadenanthera peregrina, in several species of Amanita mushrooms (including Amanita muscaria, Amanita citrina and Amanita porphyria), in the latex of the takini tree (Brosimum acutifolium), and in the seeds of Mucuna pruriens—is not unanimously classed as a psychedelic: though some claim in some cases it has proven to have so-called psychedelic effects, most contemporary researchers deny this altogether. However, as shown in another endnote, some of the species containing this substance have reportedly been used as aphrodisiacs in different parts of the world.

This description of the effects of PCP (phenecyclidine), DXM / DM (dextromethorphan), ketamine and similar general anesthetics, as well as the fact that they are toxic (PCP and DXM / DM being extremely so) and addictive (DXM / DM, which is chemically related to codeine, is, like the latter, considered to be physically addictive; in their turn, PCP and ketamine produce psychological dependence to the extent that they induce a feeling of detachment with regard to problems and to the one affected by these problems, that they have a numbing effect on the mind, and that they provoke feelings of strength, power and invulnerability), may suggest a similarity of these general anesthetics with those, far less dramatic, of infamous opiates. However, perhaps with the exception of DXM / DM, which as just noted is chemically related to [the opiate] codeine, we are not entitled to class these drugs in the same category as opiates, for their effects are significantly different from those of the latter. Moreover, whereas opiates are not deemed to have any psychotherapeutic potential, ketamine has been reported to have a therapeutic potential in the field of thanatology, in the treatment of alcoholism and in that of psychiatric disorders (cf. Kolp, Young, Friedman, Krupitsky, Jansen & O’Connor, 2007, among many other works, some of which are cited by these authors).

It is because of their powerful tendency to dissolve the ego boundaries and induce depersonalization, and because of the drastic alterations of perception they induce, that unlike opiates they are unanimously
The vividness and continuity of the visions induced by ayahuasca is great, even when no additives containing tryptamines of the DMT family are put into the drink. Claudio Naranjo (1973) was startled by the fact that, when taken by city-dwellers who had never been in the jungle, harmaline often induced visions of jungle animals just like those reported by native ayahuasca users in the Amazon; likewise, Terence McKenna [1990] reports having given the drug to Eskimos who had never seen either snakes or big cats and claims that they described visions of both. Harmaline alkaloids (whether or not mixed with substances containing tryptamines of the DMT family) are also regarded as aphrodisiacs.

According to Marcia Moore (Moore & Alltounian, 1978), ketamine’s “psychedelic” power to dissolve the ego boundaries and induce depersonalization goes much farther than that of CREV, having the potential to entirely evaporate the observer and all sorts of concepts. However, this is not an advantage of ketamine over CREV, for a chemically-induced dissolution of the observer and in general of all concepts will result in a state of the neutral base-of-all in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active, and as shown in this volume the Dzogchen teachings compare spending time in such state with “cutting one’s own head” insofar as no karma is neutralized while we are in that state and so spending time in it amounts to squandering our precious human existence. In fact, it could be said that the general anesthetics under consideration are the base-of-all (kunzhi [kun gzhi]) drugs par excellence.

Furthermore, my impression is that the illegal use of this kind of so-called psychedelics (i.e., their use outside a genuinely effective and legally approved therapeutic context) may be even more dangerous than that of CREV, and therefore that warnings against this use will never be too many or too strong (incidentally, Marcia Moore—the author just quoted—died after going into the forest in the winter and injecting all the ketamine she could find).

Ayahuasca is prepared by boiling sections of a vine from the Banisteriopsis genus, which in most cases is Banisteriopsis caapi (Rivier & Lindgren, 1972). This vine contains harmala alkaloids, mostly harmine but also some harmaline, which in themselves can induce mild “psychedelic” states, but which by the same token provoke nausea. Usually another plant is added to the brew “to make visions more intense”: Psychotria viridis, a plant that contains DMT and 5-MeO-DMT. Although the content of tryptamines of the DMT family in ayahuasca is sometimes thought to derive solely from the additives, according to Peter Stafford (1978/1983/1992, p. 342) the leaves and stems of one Banisteriopsis species—namely the one called Banisteriopsis rustyana—“have a large amount of N,N-DMT, 5-methoxy-N,N-DMT, 5-hydroxy-N,N-DMT (i.e., bufotenine, which according to Stafford is no longer considered psychoactive) and N-β-methyltetrahydro-β-carboline.” At any rate, DMT is inactive when taken orally because in the stomach it is attacked by an enzyme called monoamine oxidase, which hacks the molecule apart, and therefore for it to be active when taken in this way it must be accompanied by MAO-inhibitors such as the β-carbolines present in the various so-called psychedelic species of Banisteriopsis (Stafford, 1978/1983/1992, p. 324).

(Some use the term yagé to refer to the beverage made by pressing sections of the raw vines of any of the so-called psychedelic species of Banisteriopsis and the term ayahuasca to refer to the beverage made by boiling the vine together with additives containing psychoactive substances of the DMT family; in a section of the book just quoted, Stafford (1978/1983/1992, p. 332-357) uses ayahuasca for the plant and yagé for the beverage produced by boiling the vine together with additives containing psychoactive substances of the DMT family; I do not know which of the two, if any, is the correct usage of the terms.)

As to the substances mentioned above, in 1847 the German chemist J. Fritsch isolated harmine from the seeds of Syrian rue (Peganum harmala), which consensus would eventually establish as the major β-carboline alkaloid of the Banisteriopsis species. In 1905 Zerda and Bayón reportedly isolated from an unvouched botanical material they called “yajé” (i.e., yagyé), the alkaloid they called telepathine (quoted in Perrot and Hamet, 1927) in response to the reported telepathic effects of harmala alkaloids. In 1923, an alkaloid was again isolated from unvouched botanical materials by the Colombian chemist Fischer Cárdenas (1923), who again called it telepathine. Nowadays this alkaloid is assumed to be harmaline. (The information in this paragraph was taken mainly from McKenna, 1998.)
As to the non-psychotomimetic character of these substances, which I called into question in the regular text, it is a fact that some people have reported frightening episodes with them. In my view, they are to be avoided, like the rest of so-called psychedelics, because of the significant dangers inherent in their use.

It was Claudio Naranjo (1973) who classified substances including MDA and MMDA, STP and harmaline as non-psychotomimetic psychedelics. Nevertheless, these drugs are supposed to “expand consciousness,” and in general consciousness expanders are potentially “psychotomimetic”—and in fact as noted in the regular text users have reported so-called psychotomimetic effects from some if not all of these drugs. At any rate, from the standpoint of the system expounded in this book, in the case of so-called psychedelic substances, not having a “psychotomimetic” potential should not be seen as being in itself better than having such potential: the so-called psychotomimetic effect of CREV, in spite of the danger inherent in it, is the one that, in the most unlikely, yet most fortunate cases, could have the most radical liberating potential (however, I have seen no such cases in this lifetime even though I have known, directly and indirectly, a great quantity of users of these substances; therefore, I must warn once more that the dangers of so-called psychedelics is so great that experimenting with them is to be strictly avoided).

The occurrence of states of deep unconsciousness that external observers could even mistake for physical death, together with a lack of so-called psychedelic effects, is generally reported when the mushroom is eaten fresh and raw rather than dried—either by the sun or over a fire (it has been asserted that the reason for this is that drying them in either way turns the slightly poisonous ibotenic acid they contain into the so-called psychedelic substance muscimol). However, also when the mushroom is eaten dry or cooked, users very often report an initial episode of sleep, in this case featuring extremely vivid dreams (Stafford, 1978/1983/1992, pp. 379-382)—and some have also reported a dissociative effect.

A peculiarity of these mushrooms is that most of its psychoactive principles are rapidly eliminated through the urine, and so paleo-Siberian shamans can pass it to others by making them drink their urine, and the latter can do the same with others, in such a way that a single dose can induce the effects of the drug in many people.

Finally, it must be noted that the active principles and hence the effects of amanita pantherina are very similar to those of amanita muscaria; however, users other than Siberian shamans have often mistaken some of the more poisonous types of amanita with the one they intended to take (this being the reason why manuals warn users not to eat mushrooms that are totally white).

Also Westerners have reported intense erotic effects; for example, Clark Heinrich (2002, p. 17) wrote:

“The elation and euphoria, if they are attained, can amplify to the point of what can best be described as bliss.

I would use the term “ecstasy” except that its real meaning is “standing outside,” that is, being beside oneself. The bliss experienced with fly agaric is oneself; the body is fully involved. It is as if every pore of the body were a sexual organ in orgasm, and I am not overstating things.”

If the mushroom alone can induce such powerful erotic-like feelings, Asian reports claiming that it enhances the sensations experienced in intercourse are likely to be true. Fly agaric contains bufotenine, and even though this substance is nowadays deemed by most researchers not to be psychoactive, as referred in the next endnote, the poison of those species of Bufo toads not containing the noted CREV, 5-MeO-DMT, yet containing bufotenine, has been said to be used as an aphrodisiac in different parts of the world, whereas the seeds of Mucuna pruriens, which also contain the substance in question, are an ingredient of various Ayurvedic aphrodisiacs (even of industrial ones such as the trademark medicine Tentex Forte of Himalaya Drugs (Bangalore, Karnataka, India)).

The only Bufo toad yielding exudations with a demonstrated so-called psychedelic effect is Bufo alvarius, found solely in the Sonora desert in Mexico, for they contain the powerful CREV, 5-MeO-DMT; however, there are reports claiming that the poisonous exudations of the parotid gland of different species of Bufo toads—all of which contain bufotenine—have been used as an aphrodisiac or enhancer of erotic pleasure both in parts of Asia and the West Indies (these toads are “milked” by stimulating the adjacencies of the gland in question, which causes the poison to be exuded as a defense).

Also a dissociative effect has been reported.

Bhang is the leaf and flower of a female Cannabis sativa plant, which is most often used in infusion (the traditional way to take it, which religious Brahmins do every Thursday, consists in washing it, then mixing it with black pepper and a pinch of salt and grinding it into a soft paste, and then swallowing it with water, after which a milk beverage often containing almonds, pistachios, saffron and a sweetener is drank; for the celebration of holi, or as a Kama Sutra recipe for enhancing lovemaking, bhang paste is cooked in ghee [clarified butter] so that the latter absorbs its active principles, and the resulting substance is used in the
elaboration of the traditional Indian sweet called *bhang ladu*; finally, *bhang* is often sold to tourists as the beverage called *bhang lassi*, prepared by shaking up *bhang* paste with milk curd, water and sugar). *Ganja* is marihuana, whereas *charres* is the Indian variety of what nowadays the West knows as *hashish*, and *hashish* is the variety of the same drug produced in Muslim countries from Morocco through Afghanistan (as different from the *hashish* used by some Europeans before the twentieth century, which was a sweet to be eaten rather than smoking stuff, and which may have been something similar either to *bhang ladu* or to the brownie-like hashish fudge obtained from the recipe offered in the famed 1954 Alice B. Toklas Cook Book).

Some sub-species of *Datura* (including those bearing thorn apples) are among the sacred plants Shaivas associate with the god Shiva—and indeed Shaiva yogis use them in order to induce visions that are to be recognized as mere visions, so as to develop a capacity to recognize the insubstantiality of all phenomena. The reason why they believe these substances may be used to this end is that unprepared individuals are as a rule unable to recognize the visions of *Datura* as intangible hallucinations different from the seemingly "material" reality of our common world, or as not being self-existing elementals, spirits or demons; therefore, it is held that if someone learns to recognize them as apparitions, in the long run he or she will develop a feeling of apparitionality with regard to ordinary reality as well, and by the same token will become immune to the influence of elementals, spirits and demons.

It is the above-mentioned difficulty to recognize *Datura* visions for what they are that makes the use of these plants extremely dangerous: among the unprepared Westerners that have used them I have had notice of, a very high proportion turned psychotic; likewise, in India there are stories of yogis who consumed these plants and subsequently saw a path on solid ground rather than the ravine that non-drugged individuals perceived instead, and when they began walking on the path they were seeing, other human beings saw them fall into the ravine and lose their lives.

At any rate, the aim of *Datura*-ingesting Shaiva yogis—independently of whether or not it may be attained by the means they used—is similar to that of Tantric practices such as illusory body and dream yoga and different from that of Dzogchen, in that it consists in the attainment of a condition roughly like the post-Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas, yogis, siddhas, mahasiddhas and so on—which as such is very similar to Ken Wilber’s and Stan Grof’s conception of the fruit of their respective systems. Though Vajrayana Buddhism values this condition, it views it as a relative condition rather than as the absolute, ultimate Fruit, and *at any rate employs radically different means for achieving it*. In fact, we should by no means consume these plants of their derivates.

423 Peter Stafford (1978/1983/1992, p. 385-388) and other experts on so-called psychedelics classed Daturas and Belladona as such (even though Stafford, rather than devoting a chapter of his book to these plants, briefly discussed them in a chapter called “Contrasting Profiles”—which suggests he realized they were somehow different from the substances he classed into all of the nine categories he discussed in the other chapters of his book). However, nowadays most researchers seem to exclude plants of this class from the category under consideration.

424 Here “deltic” represents expansion by shape of the capital form of the Greek letter *delta*, so that the term would mean “consciousness (psyche) expander (deltic).” I used this term in India in the mid 1970s.

425 Cf. note 57 to this volume.

426 In fact, after the stages of dissolution and death, a sequence of experiences manifests that is analogous to the one considered in my discussion of the effect of CREV (cf. below in the regular text). Firstly the “clear light” of dang (*gdangs*) energy shines forth in the chikhai bardo (‘chi kha’i bar do) in an instance of the base-of-all (Skt. *alaya*; Tib. *kun gzhi*); if this experience is taken as object, an experience of the formless realms (Skt. *arupyadhatu* or *arupa loka*; Tib. *gzugs med kyi kham*”) ensues. Then non-Jungian archetypal forms of rölpa (‘rol pa”) energy manifest in the chönyi bardo (chos nyid bar do) in an instance of the consciousness of the base-of-all (Skt. *alaya vibjñāna*; Tib. *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*); if these forms are taken as object, an experience of the form realm (Skt. *rupadhata* or *rupa loka*; Tib. *gzugs kham*”) manifests. Subsequently we react with passions to our experiences of the sipa bardo (srid pa bar do) in an instance of the defilement consciousness (Skt. *kīlshta mano vibjñāna*; Tib. *nyon mongs gyi rnam par shes pa*); as we reify these experiences and cling to them, an experience of the realm of sensuality (Skt. *kamadhatu* or *kama loka*; Tib. ’dod pa’i kham”’) occurs.

427 In this regard, cf. note 80 to this volume.

428 According to Buddhism, the sixth sense is the one that perceives thought, and according to the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakirti also in this sphere there is a moment of bare sensation before recognition
occurs and gives rise to perception. A more extensive discussion of this was carried out in vol. I of this book and in the first chapter of this volume, as well as in Capriles (2004).

This concept was explained in vol. I of this book and in Capriles (2000b, 2003): tônpas (ston pa) or Primordial Revealers are to be distinguished from tertöns (gter ston) or Revealers, in that the former arise at a time when the lineal transmission of the teachings of Awakening in general and the Dzogchen teachings in particular has died out, and thus they reintroduce a whole system of teachings where there was none, whereas the latter arise when the lineal transmission is still alive, yet it has become necessary to reintroduce specific teachings that have been lost and which are appropriate for the time at which they are introduced. After each tônpa manifests, many tertöns may arise and reintroduce specific teachings. Furthermore, whereas tônpas do not need teachings from the lineal transmission to attain full Awakening, tertöns do need them in order to obtain full Awakening.

The feeling tone (Skt. vedana; Tib. tsorwa [tshor ba]) is the sensation in the center of the chest at the level of the heart that accompanies every perception.

As we have seen, the increase in the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness manifests as an increase in the scope of the focus of conscious awareness, but also as a permeabilization of the latter’s limits. This may be compared to a balloon being inflated: the bigger the balloon, the thinner and more transparent the rubber becomes, so that at some point one can see right through it. However, in the case of our consciousness, the causal action of inflating it cannot make it blow out—i.e. to disappear together with the veil that dims or conceals the Self-qua-Base. In general, for this to be possible the transmission and teachings of a Master of a genuine wisdom tradition are indispensable—and at any rate the balloon’s explosion is beyond causality.

If the psychotic episode comes to an end when the effects of the drug subside, as shown in note 230 to this volume, it will be called a “psychotomimetic experience.” However, I prefer to speak of a psychotic episode confined to the duration of the drug’s effect, which in some cases may extend itself beyond the lapse in question, becoming a fully-fledged psychosis.

In note before last, elsewhere in this volume and in other works, I compared this effect with the thinning of the rubber of a balloon as the latter is filled up.

Since so-called psychedelics having a dissociative, anesthetic, mind-numbing and heroic effect such as PCP, ketamine and DXM / DM, when taken in anesthetic doses, sedate the so-called “mental” sensation experienced in the center of the chest, the positive feedback loop in question cannot manifest just as it does under CREV. However, it can manifest when these drugs are taken in sufficiently small doses, so long as these are potently psychoactive. At any rate, even when these substances are taken in anesthetic doses, if experiences of psychotic derealization occur under their effect, and these prolong themselves beyond the manifest effects of the drug, since at this point the so-called “mental” sensation is no longer sedated, the positive feedback loop is as likely to occur just as it may do under CREV.

I believe Alan Watts was perhaps the most important of the early diffusers of Eastern Wisdom traditions in the West, insofar as he had a great capacity to make relatively abstruse doctrines comprehensible to the average reader. Though now I could point out a series of defects in his explanations, I believe that at the time they were written they had one of the most beneficial effects among those produced by writers of the same period (Chan-Chen-Chi’s The Practice of Zen is subtler than Watts’ books on Zen, but Watts produced a far wider corpus of works than did Chan-Chen-Chi, and indisputably had the greatest and very likely the most beneficial influence on members of my generation).

It must also be noted that I believe that, with some specific exceptions, the preexistence of the works by Watts made a great deal of the work by Wilber and some other transpersonalists redundant. Furthermore, Wilber’s works are far less correct and show far less understanding of the dynamic of genuine Paths of Awakening than Watts’s.

Finally, it is a fact that Jung, then Blofeld and Huxley, and finally Bateson, realized that the ecological crisis had spiritual roots, but Watts showed very clearly that the deepest root of ecological crisis was the avidya of Buddhism (though I fail to remember whether or not he used this terminology).

Something similar applies to most other writers who described their experiences with CREV, including Aldous Huxley (1954, 1956) and the rest. Although Watts wrote that he was reporting on levels that went deeper than those described by Huxley, I do not have the impression that this is the case. On the contrary, in Huxley (1962), we are told that under CREV we may go to Heaven, to Hell, or beyond both conditions—which seems to go farther than the insights in Watts (1962).

There is a long list of works on the effects of CREV, but this is not the place to pass judgment on them all.
Regarding (1), it must be noted that when being disappears in the Self—a teleological process may tend asymptotically to an end, or may actually reach that end; in both cases the end in question is the telos.

As shown in a note to Vol. I of this book (as well as in Capriles [2000a, 2000b, 2003] and minor works), in Daniélou (1992), we are offered ample evidence of the unity of the Shaiva tradition of ancient India, the Dionysian tradition of ancient Greece, and the Egyptian cult of Osiris. Mount Kailash is the home of Shiva, and as Tucci (1980) tells us, also the Zurvanists and the followers of the Ismailian branch of Shi‘ah Islam had it as a place of pilgrimage—the identity between the ancient Persian god Zurvan and Shiva being substantiated by the fact that, like Shiva Mahakala, Zurvan is total time (and total space), and like the Ardhanarishwara form of Shiva, Zurvan is a hermaphrodite deity. For their part, many Taoists have asserted the unity of their own tradition with that of ancient Bön (bon)—which I have substantiated with the fact that Lao-tzu gave the Tao-Te-Ching to an officer of the Sino-Tibetan border upon leaving China for Tibet, and with a series of coincidences in the imagery (for example, that of the snake that sheds its skin), views and practices of both traditions. As shown in the note in question, this may be explained by the fact that, as we read in Namkhai Norbu (2004) and in many credible Bönpo (bon po) sources, Primordial Revealer Shenrab Miwoche, who taught Dzogchen in the area of Mount Kailash around 1,800 BC, had among his disciples the great sages Mutsa Trahe of Tazig (Persia or Tadzhikstan), Hulkaleg of Sumba (in what is today Pakistani Kashmir), Lhadag Nagdro of India, Legtang Mangpo from China, and Serthog Chejam of Khrom (also in what is today Pakistani Kashmir)—all of whom translated into their respective languages and spread in their native lands the teachings of Shenrab.

Just as the Dzogchen teachings speak of a process of ongoing Awakening, we could speak of a process of ongoing transition to an Age of Perfection: absolute perfection qua Fruit implies the subsequent dissolution of the “material” organism.

A teleological process may tend asymptotically to an end, or may actually reach that end; in both cases the end in question is the telos.

I titled “Integral Psychology” the lecture on psychology I gave repeatedly in three series of lectures in 1984 and 1985, which were turned into Capriles (1986). However, I was unaware that the same year Wilber would publish a homonymous book (1986; Spanish 1993) and cease using the term “transpersonal.” Since I had no intention of assimilating myself to those grouped under the term “integral” (such as Aurobindo Ghose, Jean Gebser, Haridas Chaudhuri, Ervin Laszlo, co-founder of Esalen Institute Michael Murphy, Clare W. Graves, Graves’ disciple Don Beck, Beck’s associate Chris Cowan and Ken Wilber), as soon as I saw Wilber’s book I stopped using the term.

Just by the way, it is important to note that those who ask what is the being of time are regarding the latter as an entity and assuming that entities in themselves have being. They are doubly wrong: when there is being and existence, there are time and becoming—which progressively accelerate until the vibratory activity at the root of being and existence, time and becoming, reaches a rate that exceeds the threshold at which this activity collapses. Then being and existence, together with time and becoming, dissolve—and, if the conditions are given, the Self-qua-Path manifests.

In Capriles (1994a), the accentuation of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and of the ensuing phenomenon of being, dualisms and so on in the process of the degenerative evolution of humankind was explained as the development of contradiction, both (1) insofar as we experience contradiction only if the terms of what we are to experience as a contradiction are sustained by the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and therefore by the phenomenon of being, and (2) insofar as the situations we perceive as contradictions within human beings, between human beings, between human groups, and between humankind and the rest of the ecosphere, result from degenerative evolution.

Regarding (1), it must be noted that when being disappears in the Self-qua-Path or the Self-qua-Fruit, we do not experience contradiction even if we are faced with situations that otherwise would be seen as sheer contradictions. It is well known that the Zen Buddhist method that the Japanese call kōan (Chinese: kung an) study, consists in confronting students with what they perceive as an unsolvable contradiction and requiring that they resolve it. So long as they are under delusion, the students will strive day and night to solve the kōan. However, at some point their effort to understand in terms of delusorily valued thoughts will collapse and the students will no longer perceive a contradiction in what they were trying to solve. Then, for a longer or shorter period, they will be in a state of unlimited freedom, beyond the yoke of the delusory valuation-absolutization of concepts and, therefore, beyond all limits. Similarly, that which Gregory Bateson (1972, Part III) called pathogenic doubly-bind will produce a pathological effect on the
child with corresponding predispositions, but will not produce the same effect in a normal adult and will not produce any effect whatsoever in the individual who has become free from delusory valuation-absolute.

(For the two types of double-bind Bateson posited and the extra one I posited, see Capriles [2000c, planned work to be undertaken at some point.].)

Higher bodhisattvas perceive contradictions as such in their post-Contemplation state (though they do so with lesser force than ordinary individuals), and insofar as they perceive a contradiction they work toward its resolution. For their part, the Buddhas do not perceive any contradictions at any moment whatsoever, yet they spontaneously (do) whatever is needed in order to solve what ordinary beings may validly perceive as contradictions.

The “peak of experience” (Skt. bhavagra) is the fourth and highest realm of the formless sphere that will be considered in a note below, and which is called “the dominion in which there is neither perception nor absence of perception” (Skt. naivasamjñanasamjña-samapatti), for in it gross discrimination is left behind and there is only the subtlest of discriminations.

The feather at the top represents the sphere of sensuality, which is worn as an adornment (and which in terms of my explanation involves the highest degree of being); the crown in the middle represents the sphere of form (which in terms of my explanation has a middle degree of being); the brim at the bottom represents the sphere of formlessness (which in terms of my explanation has the lowest degree of being).

In a note to the chapter in question I showed how Maslow himself realized peak experiences were being given too much importance—to which he responded by positing the concept of plateau experience.

As we have seen, all Buddhist systems warn that the transpersonal experiences of the summit of the sensual sphere (Skt. kamadhatu or kama loka; Tib. dod pa’i kham), of the form sphere (Skt. rupadhatu or rupa loka; Tib. gzugs kham) or of any of the four realms of the formless sphere (Skt. arupyadhatu or arupa loka; Tib. gzugs med kyi kham) are within samsara and constitute spurious achievements that, if mistaken for Awakening, will result in an exacerbation of delusion in an expanded ego experience (in fact, Shakyamuni left his two successive teachers and set out to seek for Awakening without external guides because he realized they did not go beyond samsaric realms, and yet posited their relative, conditioned attainments as the highest realization). For their part, Dzogchen and Ch’an or Zen go even beyond, for they further warn against mistaking for nirvana or Awakening the transpersonal state the Dzogchen teachings call kunzhi, which may involve deep nirodha absorptions or samadhis in which neither samsara nor nirvana are active. Furthermore, the Dzogchen teachings warn that dwelling in this condition is like cutting one’s own neck.

This tingsal may manifest in some specific meditative absorptions; it may also manifest in the chikhai bardo (’chi kha’i bar do), which is the first bardo to arise after death; and it may manifest when luminosity shines after falling asleep. (The bardos are not states of realization; an explanation of the term “bardo” is provided in a subsequent note.)

There are different manifestations of luminosity; for a brief explanation of these, see Capriles (2000a, 2003; and in particular 2007a). However, they are manifestations of realization only if and when their true condition is recognized.

It is difficult that, if luminosity is too intense, one may remain cozily fused in it, for one will tend to be disturbed by it and react with aversion (Skt. dvesa; Tib. zhedang [zhe sdang]); this is far more likely to occur when luminosity is dimmer. However, even when one reacts to luminosity with aversion, before one does so there has been a moment of the base-of-all or kunzhi (kun gzhi).

The bardos (bar do) are the six (or four) intermediate states samsaric beings transit through (even thought some of them are either states in which neither samsāra nor nirvāṇa are manifest, or comprise such states). No bardo whatsoever may correspond to nirvāṇa; for nirvāṇa to manifest the experiences that manifest in any of the six (or four) bardos have to be recognized.

As we have seen, what the Dzogchen teachings call the Base is the true condition of the whole of samsāra, nirvāṇa and the neutral condition of the base-of-all or kunzhi (kun gzhi); therefore, the summit of samsāra, just as all other possible states that may manifest as a result of the aforementioned three possible functionings, is in truth the Base—which therefore cannot be contrasted to that summit. However, the point is that the Base is not called “the Summit,” but “the Base,” and that there are most precise reasons for this—which are betrayed when the Base is represented as the Summit of a hierarchy, holarchy or however we may like to call our hierarchical classifications.

However, the above imprecision was not created by Wilber; it already existed in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad’s definition of turīya avasthā as the substratum of the three other states it describes. Paradoxically, the text
This also applies to modern thinkers, such as Bohm, Prigogine or Thom, who reject the framework of modem physics, but continue to believe in an abstract theory that includes models of human behavior together with atoms and galaxies will be the one to hit the mark. Only Bohr and, to some extent, Primas, seem to have taken into account the subjectivity of individual human beings.

The dichotomic distinction between natural sciences and social sciences ceased to be meaningful and useful.

Wilber (1982) criticized the so-called “new paradigm” precisely for incurring in this error, and the same applies to subsequent works by the same author, including Wilber (1996). So that the essence of this error may be appreciated, consider the following words by Boaventura De Sousa Santos (1988, p. 37):

“The dichotomic distinction between natural sciences and social sciences ceased to be meaningful and useful.

This distinction is founded on a mechanist conception of matter and of nature to which are opposed, with presupposed evidence, the concepts of human being, culture and society. The recent advancements of physics and biology cast doubts on the distinction between organic and inorganic, between living beings and inert matter, and even between human and nonhuman.”

Despite the distrust his alleged youthful relation with the National-Socialist party of Germany may raise in us, we have to admit that Paul K. Feyerabend is not far off the mark when, after commenting on some of reasons why the abstract approach inherent in all forms and models of scientific knowledge could never correspond to the real historical situation of human beings, he denounces the confusion we are concerned with here (Feyerabend [1987], p. 11; cf. also Feyerabend [1982, 1984]; the translation of the excerpt back into English is my own):  

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in question retains this imprecision in spite of the Buddhist influences it exhibits (for example, in its categorization of the state in question as atyanta-Sūnyatā or absolute emptiness (Nakamura, 2004, p. 285).

He did so at least until very recently; though I believe he has continued to do so, I must acknowledge I have not read all that Wilber has written.

In Wilber (1996, pp. 72-73), we are told:

“At first I thought [the holarchical] maps [from different traditions, times and places] were all referring to the same territory, so to speak. I thought they were all different versions of an essentially similar holarchy. There were just too many similarities and overlaps in all of them. So by comparing and contrasting them all, I though I might be able to find the single and basic holarchy that they were all trying to represent in their own ways.

“The more I tried this, the more it became obvious that it wouldn’t work. These various holarchies had some undeniable similarities, but they differed in certain profound ways, and the exact nature of these differences was not obvious at all. And most confusing of all, in some of these holarchical maps, the holons got bigger as development progressed, and in others, they became smaller (I didn’t yet understand that evolution produces greater depth, less span). It was a real mess, and at several points I decided to just chuck it, forget it, because nothing was coming out of this research.

“But the more I looked at these various holarchies, the more it dawned on me that there were actually four very different types of holarchies, four very different types of holistic sequences. As you say, I don’t think this had been spotted before—perhaps because it was so stupidly simple; at any event it was news to me. But once I put all of these holarchies into these four groups—and they instantly fell into place at that point—then it was very obvious that each holarchy in each group was indeed dealing with the same territory, but overall we had four different territories, so to speak.”

Of all hierarchical schemas, the only one I accept is the one discussed in the immediately following note.

I have tried to show that the intellectual constructions of the sciences cannot correspond exactly to what they interpret, and that all scientific interpretations of reality, insofar as they are posited as the exact, objective description of a self-existent, objective reality, are ideological constructs (Capriles [1994a, notes to 2004, Part III of this book]). However, this does not mean I advise that we forsake all attempts to apply scientific models to reality; even though I have criticized Wilber’s classifications of states of consciousness insofar as Awakening does not consist in establishing oneself in a level above other levels (to which the level in question would be relative), I fully agree with Wilber in that if we are to apply “scientific models” to different systems in the universe—such as physical, biological, human, social and so on—it is most important to switch models according to the level of complexity and the structure and function of the level we are dealing with. In particular, as shown in Capriles (1994a), it would be erroneous, dehumanizing and pernicious to understand those phenomena involving human consciousness in terms of models and concepts that apply to, say, the physical level, or the biological level, etc. and try to produce a scientific universal theory for explaining indistinctly the phenomena of all different “levels.”

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It would be a grave mistake to develop a systemic theory of the universe that reduced all levels of organization to a single one, for each level of reality responds to a different organizational principle, and some entities have feelings and some do not. Human beings, animals and other living beings and natural phenomena must be treated with the respect all of them are due, and phenomena involving human consciousness must not be understood solely in terms of concepts taken from physics, biology and other natural sciences (as have done, for example, those who apply indiscriminately and without modifications to multiple regions of reality the concept of autopoiesis developed by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana—and in particular those who beside doing so, use sophisms in order to justify the manipulation of human beings, such as for example Niklas Luhman, whose systemic theories of society were criticized in Capriles & Hocevar (1991, 1992). As Wilber rightly understood, each of the levels he regards as being “superior” exhibits the characteristics of inferior levels, but also exhibits other characteristics which are proper to it and which are absent in the so-called “lower” levels, and hence if we are to understand, say, phenomena involving human consciousness in terms of concepts from physics, biology and so on, we must make it clear that the former involve the principles of the latter but also have “something more.” (However, Wilber’s views on human phylogenesis are modeled on current views of human ontogenesis, and, as I show in part III of this book, the resulting errors are not any less damaging to science or offensive to human dignity.) Concerning the need to discriminate between the different levels of organization in reality, Ervin Laszlo writes (Laszlo, 1974, pp. 29-31):

“Conventionalist and social contract theories dealing with social phenomena cut the bonds between theories of natural organization and theories of society. In contrast, the constellation of theories in the category known as social Darwinism assert such bonds and, in fact, place too much emphasis on them. Where conventionalist theories affirm that societies are different from organisms in all that may be relevant, social Darwinists say they are just like organisms in these respects. Both positions are too extreme. Societies are at the same time different from other forms of complex organization and analogous to these, and the differences and analogies between the former and the latter may be specified. Nonetheless, there is no base for holding that societies are but “amper” individuals. Social Darwinists impute a number of basic biological attributes on societies, such as the need for growth (the concept of Lebensraum coined by Ratzel) and a predetermined sequence of aging (the Spenglerian vision of cultures), and may even conceive the planet as a living globe, a super-organism whose primary organs would be the continents (Ritter). Social Darwinism applied to the nation-state justifies aggression in the name of the struggle for survival that selects the most apt state, the one that can secure for itself sufficient territorial possessions. Such applications served Hitler’s ideologists to push the cult of the Arian German State in the name of science (e.g. the Geopolitics of Haushofer).

“Theories may not be blamed for the usage made of them, and the defect of social Darwinism is not that it has been used by real and potential aggressors, but that it indiscriminately reduces a level of organization to another. This approach has not become extinct in out days: contemporary literature is still full of examples of biological and ecological reasoning applied to social phenomena.”

Social Darwinism not only reduces a level of organization to another, thereby dehumanizing the human individual and justifying the instrumental manipulation of human beings, the aggressions of some nations-states against others and other dire aberrations; it also shares with Darwin’s evolutionary theory the blunder of making competition the sole motor of evolution, ignoring the privileged role of collaboration. In “The Struggle for Existence in Human Society” (1887; reproduced in Huxley, Thomas Henry, 1894, pp. 202-218), on the basis of Darwin’s Malthusian belief that overpopulation was the rule, T. H. Huxley adopted a social Darwinism avant la lettre (the term was coined about three years later), and maintained that inevitable struggle would make socialist cooperation impossible. Piotr Alekseyevich Kropotkin replied to him in Mutual Aid (1902, this English Ed. 1976), in which he showed cooperation to be far more determining than competition in the biological phenomena subsumed under the label “evolution.”*

Furthermore, it is not true that theories cannot be blamed for the usage given them, for specific courses of action are inherent in different worldviews; at the root of science are found an objectifying type of perception and a utilitarian type of intentionality that automatically lead to the development of technology and of the mechanist worldview that, as ecologists made it quite clear in the second half of the twentieth century, justifies and elicits the instrumental manipulation of the ecosphere and human beings. Since the perception at the root of science is fragmentary (like that of the men with the elephant in the fable considered in vol. III of this book), since the technological approach automatically results in the instrumental manipulation of the ecosphere and of human beings (against which the rest of the myths
reviewed in vol. III of this book warn), and since technology provides us with the power to kill the ecosphere and turn human beings into automatons, we must conclude that Desiderius Erasmus (Erasmus [1984]) was, quite right in claiming that the scientific approach (as it developed since ancient Greece) is in itself pernicious. This does not mean that we should do away with science and technology at this point of human phylogenesis: given the present condition of the planet and of human society, human existence would no longer viable without science and technology, and so the condition of human survival is that a revolution of the human psyche radically changes the perception and intentionality behind both science and technology, so as to radically change their nature, and make them collaborate with the ecosystem rather than destroy it. After some paragraphs, Laszlo goes on (ibidem):

“It is necessary to see both the differences and the similitudes between biological and social forms of organization. We must neither transplant empirical theories from one field to the other, or insist on theories entirely ad hoc. We can begin with the generalized premise according to which systems of complex organization arise in many sectors of reality, and acknowledge that these phenomena, on the one hand, exhibit the marks of specific difference, and on the other, exhibit the invarabilities resulting from the common constraints of existence in this universe. All process of progressive evolution are processes of structuring which are produced on the basis of rich and durable energy flows. Given a sufficiently rich flow over a sufficiently prolonged period, the progressive structuring begins, limited by the laws of thermodynamic and supported by the cohesion of the possible systems of stable configuration. Configurations exploiting the properties of stability inherent in the flow have selective persistence over less stable configurations, and tend to dominate the patterns of the flow. Persistent configurations continue to be subject to the ups and downs of the flow and can give rise to metaconfigurations equally endowed with a degree of stability. (Note by the author of this book: Laszlo wrote these words before the rise of the new vision of the relation between the laws of classic thermodynamic in general—and Bolzmann’s law in particular—and the self-organization of systems developed in Prigogine & Stengers [1984].)

“This general evolutionary paradigm applies in general to all important evolutionary processes, independently of whether it be the chemical aggregation of elements, the phylogenetic evolution of organic species, or the development of socio-cultural human systems. The process occurs regardless of whether or not there is consciousness in the entities it constitutes. In fact, consciousness only arises exceptionally; in our experience, it arises in the intersection of the higher phases of biological evolution with the lower phases of socio-cultural evolution. (Note by the author of this book: though I agree with what Laszlo has written so far, this agreement would come to an end if we considered Laszlo’s views on socio-cultural evolution; though a comparison of my own views with those of Laszlo’s might have been pertinent in the context of vol. III of this book [which discusses the degenerative view of spiritual and social evolution], such comparison would excessively enlarge this work). Henceforth the higher phases of socio-cultural processes exhibit the effects of consciousness, but their general characteristics continue to develop analogously to the general constraints of structuring. Therefore, when we compare the parts of the process comprising consciousness with those that do not include it, we find that what changes is the specific character of the emerging structures; now, they keep emerging by means of mutual adaptation, competition, natural selection and the symbiotic formation of super-structures.

“Whereas in the non-conscious stages of the process energy transferences are the key agents of change, in the phases in which consciousness already takes part, the flows of communication (i.e. the information super-imposed in low-energy transfers) are the agents of the interaction. The function of the flows of energy and communication is, nonetheless, quite similar in what regards the global character of the process of structuring. As noted by the theorist of human communication Klaus Krippendorf, ‘any process of communication, once begun and sustained, leads to the genesis of social structure—independently of whether this structure may have been anticipated or regarded as desirable’. (Note by the author of this book: Gregory Bateson and others might not agree with positing such a radical distinction between information transfers and preconscience energy transfers.)

“The conclusion systems theory offers us with regard to the evolution of complexity is that common processes of development characterize social evolution and other types of evolution, and that the products of such processes are therefore functionally similar. But there are differences in the way in which functions are performed, which may be explained with regard to the level and phase in which they operate. Biological organisms evolve from the patterns of symbiotic behavior of systems which are cells and organs. Sociocultural systems arise from the mutually adaptive patterns of behavior of human beings and their primary groupings in the reproductive, the social, the economic, the professional, the cultural
and the political. Therefore social organization is neither a subspecies of biological organization nor something entirely sui generis. Societies are analogous to biological organisms insofar as they are [energetically] open biological systems that maintain themselves in an environment characterized by a variety of constraints. They differ from biological organisms in that they satisfy their functional requirements by means of regulating processes which are specifically social rather than specifically biological. Therefore, we find self-stabilization, self-organization, hierarchization and irreducibility both in societies and in organisms, but these characteristics are expressed by different structures and produce qualitatively different phenomena.”

To Laszlo the energetically open character of such systems does not contradict their self-organization, which implies the operative closure Laszlo refers to as “the operative discontinuity that takes place between them and their environment.” In the case of systems involving consciousness, self-organization is accompanied by “something more.” Systems sociologist Walter Buckley, whose terminology I have used repeatedly (Capriles [1986, 1994a, 2000a, 2003, work in progress 2, work in progress 4]), writes (Buckley [1993], pp. 13-14; I am retranslating into English):

“It is... obvious that sociocultural systems have fundamental characters that distinguish them neatly from physical systems and biological organisms; but there is still another problem to be resolved: why is it that our theories concerning those systems still elicit sterile analogies with the latter? The scarcely fortunate answers refer no doubt to the considerable success and prestige of the physical sciences and the similarities and seducing affinities, often superficial, between the biological and social spheres, established by the great, albeit often grossly mistaken, intellects of past times. The great intellectual fermentation that took place in the remaining sciences beginning with the Second World War placed on the forefront a group of changes of perspective, which had been taking place at least from the beginning of the century. We are referring to the closely related theoretical advancements that respond to the denominations of cybernetics, theory of information and communication, research into general systems, and the like. Their development indicates a switch of interest from eternal substance and the dynamic of transformation of energy, to the approach centered on organization and its dynamic, the latter founded on the “unleashing” effects of the transmission of information. Here we must find the secret that distinguishes living matter from inert matter, morphogenetic and adaptational processes from balancing and entropic processes...”

Buckley warns that some may claim that though he has avoided physical analogies, still he may be accused of incurring in similar analogies in terms of systems theories, and then goes on to make it clear that there is a difference between prudently using analogies, one the one hand, and discerning fundamental similarities of structure, on the other—the latter being a reductionistic error in which other theorists have incurred (for example, Abraham Kaplan in “Sociology Learns the Language of Mathematics”—though he could as well have referred to John Lilly’s concept of the “human biocomputer”). Many pages after this, he notes (p. 167 of the Spanish Edition; I am retranslating into English):

“To sum up: if any particular science has a theory that is distinctively its own, it is not possible to deny it any of those that find themselves on a different level of reality. The only logical alternative would be to insist on a total reduction to physics.”

* T. H. Huxley’s social Darwinism avant la lettre was not all-embracing for long; in his last major talk—”Evolution and Ethics,” which he gave at the University of Oxford in 1893 (Huxley, 1894) he used the occasion to detach benign human ethics from natural competition: Darwin’s “war” still applied to relations between industrial nations, but had no place in our personal lives; society advanced through the selection of individuals who are ethically the best, rather than physically the fittest. (It is really surprising that in this talk Huxley praised Buddhism—though he did so in terms that show that he did not really understand this subject: “A system which knows no God in the Western sense; which denies a soul to man; which counts the belief in immortality a blunder and hope of it a sin; which refuses any efficacy to prayer and sacrifice; which bids men look to nothing but their own efforts for salvation; which in its original purity, knew nothing of vows of obedience, abhorred intolerance, and never sought the aid of the secular arm; yet spread over a considerable moiety of the Old World with marvelous rapidity, and is still, with whichever base admixture of foreign superstitions, the dominant creed of a large fraction of mankind.”)

456 However, we should not think that all conditioned experience should be placed on the same footing. For example, according to the Dzogchen teachings, the perception of one’s body (and ideally of the whole universe) as a magical illusion, an apparition, a phantom or a hologram, as achieved in the Tantric practice
of the illusory body, despite being conditioned, is more correct than the one featuring the perception of one’s body and the universe as concrete, self-existing realities. Similarly, the experience of the post-Contemplation stage of the aśraya bodhisattva of the Mahayana in the path of Seeing and the path of Contemplation (the third and fourth paths in the career of the bodhisattva), wherein the relative is perceived (to a greater or lesser degree) as being on the same status as an illusion or a mirage, despite being conditioned is more correct than the perception characteristic of deluded beings who have not entered the Path.

Nonetheless, since the above states are still conditioned by delusion, they are not in the same footing as what the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen-qua-Path and Dzogchen-qua-Fruit.

457 What Jean Gebser called “aperspectival freedom,” deriving from the fact that one no longer privileges any point of view over the plethora of other viewpoints at one’s disposal, can only result from that which Madhyamika Prasangika master Chandrakirti called “not having own-mind,” and which has also been called “not affirming anything from one’s own heart” and “not making self-directed or interior-directed assertions” (Tib. rangyü du khe lenpa [rang rgyud du khes len pa])—which implies only making “other-directed” or “exterior-directed assertions” (Tib. zhenngo khe len [zhan ngo khas len]). “To have own mind,” “to affirm from one’s heart” or “to make self-directed / interior-directed assertions” was the same as “to have theses of one’s own.”

In this regard, cf. Capriles (2005):

“There are abundant source quotes from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Chandrakirti asserting that Madhyamikas have no theses or system of their own (for a list of such source quotes, cf. Wayman [1979], pp. 288-289). One of the best known such quotes is the one that has often been taken from Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartanikarika:

“If I had any thesis then I would have that fault. Since I have no thesis, I am utterly faultless.’

“Does this mean that Nagarjuna never asserted anything? In his texts he explicitly said that there was Awakening, that bodhisattvas proceeded along a Path, etc. Furthermore, his statement in the above stanza that he had no thesis was itself an assertion. Tsongkhapa’s interpretation was that in the above stanza and similar ones the scope of the negation was limited. However, Nagarjuna asserted he had no thesis because, as we have seen, fully Awake individuals, no matter what they assert, have no ‘own mind’: being free from grasping at thoughts whenever they affirm that there is Awakening, that bodhisattvas proceed along a Path—or that they make no assertions, for that matter—they do not adhere to the idea they are asserting, which arises solely for leading beings along the Path. And the same is the case with the assertions they are forced to make upon facing different life situations; for example, upon being asked what were his family’s caste and his place of birth, most likely Nagarjuna would have replied he was born a Brahmin in Berar—

and if asked about his religion, surely he would have said he was a Buddhist. However, being free from grasping at thoughts, he would not have experienced this as being absolutely or truly so—and if someone spoke evil of Brahmins from Berar, or of Buddhists, he would not have felt ‘touched in the heart’ by the words spoken by that person and thus would not have felt to the least offended. On the basis of the views Tsongkhapa expressed in this regard, Elizabeth Napper (2003, p. 118) tells us:

“Even if one, trying to be free from assertions, says that all presentations are only from others’ point of view, this too is illogical, for even saying that much is an assertion, and thus one is not free from assertions.’ (In this regard, cf. Wayman [1979], pp. 288 and 296.)

“Since Nagarjuna was not a mindless person who went around contradicting himself, but a realized individual, he could not have understood the phrase ‘being free from assertions’ in the sense that one should refrain from making statements such as ‘If I had any thesis then I would have that fault; since I have no thesis, I am utterly faultless’—for, had he harbored the belief that one should not utter words that may be understood as assertions, he would not have written this stanza. The only plausible interpretation of the stanza is the one Chandrakirti summed up when he asserted followers of Madhyamaka should not have ‘own mind’, hold theses ‘from the heart’, or make ‘interior-directed’ / ‘self-directed’ assertions: Madhyamaka arose as a means for leading beings to Awakening, and only fully Awake Ones are true Madhyamikas, for only fully Awake Ones, upon making assertions, at no point whatsoever have ‘own
mind’, hold theses ‘from the heart’, or make ‘interior-directed’ or ‘self-directed’ assertions—which means that they never take them to be absolutely true or false, as deluded beings always do.

“Since, as we have seen, ‘other-directed’ or ‘exterior-directed’ assertions are those which are made without believing them to be true, the lies told by ordinary beings belong to this category. However, when ordinary beings speak, independently of whether they ‘lie’ or ‘say the truth’, their assertions are totally incorrect, in the sense that they are a function of delusion—and whatever is thought of or said under delusion is incorrect, for delusion is itself incorrectness. The point is that, since they cannot avoid grasping at their own thoughts and assertions, ordinary beings wrongly take their ‘interior-directed’ assertions to be absolutely true, and wrongly take their lies to be totally untrue: being deluded, in contradiction with Prajñāparamita Sutras like the Vajracchedikā and with Madhyamika thought, they take forms to be either existent or nonexistent, and if they take something to be existent they will perceive themselves as lying if they say it is nonexistent (and vice-versa): this is the reason why all they say is incorrect, and it is also the reason why, if they assert what they believe to be untrue while being connected to a polygraph, the machine will detect a lie. Contrariwise, whatever the Buddhas say, being always ‘other-directed’ or ‘exterior-directed’, is totally correct, for insofar as they are totally free from grasping at thoughts (and thus utterly undeluded and free from the power of conventional truth—which, as Gendün Chöphel shows in his text, is ‘deluded truth’), they do not experience their assertions as being either true or false: they do not take forms as being either existent of nonexistent. Therefore, if they assert something and immediately negate it, in neither case will the polygraph register a lie: this is the reason why the Maharatnakutasutra, quoted in Gendün Chöphel’s text, says, ‘Existence and nonexistence contradict each other; pure and impure also contradict each other; because of contradiction, suffering cannot be calmed; when contradiction is no more, suffering comes to an end.’ In fact, ‘surpassing contradiction’ does not mean ‘never asserting the opposite of whatever one affirmed in the past’; it means going beyond the grasping that causes one to perceive a contradiction in making contradictory assertions, and that hence causes the polygraph to detect a lie when one of the two contradictory assertions is made.

“In fact, insofar as the assertions made by Awake Ones are part of the spontaneous activities whereby they lead beings to Awakening, upon making them they (are) totally beyond action, beyond intention, beyond self-consciousness and beyond judging in terms of right or wrong. In the Bodhicharyavatara we read (Shantideva [1996], p. 126):

“[[Objection] How can there exist a liberated being?

“[[Madhyamika] He is false imagination in the mind of another, but he does not exist because of conventional truth on his own part. After something has been established it exists; if not, it does not exist even as conventional truth.’

“The above means that Buddhists who lived at the time of Shakyamuni through their false imagination perceived Shakyamuni as a Buddha, but Shakyamuni, who was not subject to false imagination, did neither perceive himself as a Buddha, nor perceive others as deluded sentient beings; therefore, in all that he asserted there was no own-mind, and therefore his assertions were of the type that has been called ‘other-directed’ (though, as will be shown below, this term is not really precise)...

“The stanzas by Shantideva coincide with Jigme Lingpa’s assertion that, though Buddhist sentient beings may perceive Buddhhas as carrying out countless activities on their behalf, Buddhhas perceive no beings that must be helped, and harbor no intentions to help beings. The point is that, since Buddhhas are free from grasping at the threefold projection (Tib. khorsum ['khor gsum']), whatever they do is an instance of what is called ‘action and fruit [of action] devoid of the concept of the three wheels’ (khorsum nampar mitokpe ledang drebu ['khor gsum rnam par mi rtog pa'i las dang 'bras bu]): from their own standpoint they are beyond activity—and yet sentient beings, if they are devout Buddhhas and are able to recognize the Buddhhas as such, see the latter as carrying out countless activities on their behalf. This is why the terms ‘other-directed’ and ‘exterior-directed’ do not categorize the actionless activities of the Buddhhas precisely: Buddhhas perceive no others and no exterior, and therefore, although for lack of a better term we call their assertions ‘other-directed’ or ‘exterior-directed’, in truth these belong to a category different from that of the ‘exterior-directed’ or ‘other-directed’ assertions made by sentient beings—which are the lies they say—and properly speaking should not be referred to by the same words. And this is also why ‘purpose’ is a term that does not apply to the Buddhhas.

“In turn, superior bodhisattvas (which are those in the third and fourth bodhisattva paths, or, which is the same, those ranging between the first and tenth levels [Skt. bhumi; Tib. sa]) have no ‘own mind’ and hold no theses ‘from the heart’ while they are in the state of Contemplation (Skt. samahita; Tib. nyamzhak

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Likewise, when Ashvagosha stated that we must use words [and concepts] in order to go beyond words [and concepts], he certainly did not mean that the purpose of teaching the dharma was to make interior directed assertions, or from the heart, or self-directed. Hence it is not correct to think that only the Madhyamikas made no statements from the heart (or, which is the same, made no interior-directed assertions), and that this was so because they abstained from positing autonomous theses and syllogisms. As we have seen, whether assertions are other-directed / exterior-directed, self-directed / interior-directed, or partly self-directed / interior-directed and partly other-directed / exterior-directed, depends on the spiritual status of the individual who is making the assertions, and thus when Awake Ones posit autonomous theses and use autonomous syllogisms they are not making statements from the heart (or, which is the same, they are not making interior-directed or self-directed assertions), for they do so utterly beyond grasping at thoughts and words. The Sutra of Hui-neng reads (Wong-Mou-Lam, trans. 1969, p. 99):

"Whenever an individual puts a question to you, answer him or her in antonyms, so that a pair of opposites will be formed, such as coming and going. When the interdependence of the two is entirely done away with there would be, in the absolute sense, neither coming nor going."

Does the above mean that replying to someone in antonyms will cause that person to become unable to move at all, and therefore he or she will not be able to either come or go? Except in the case of beings under hypnosis, words cannot result in paralysis, and at any rate the activities of Buddhas do not have the function of inducing paralysis. So when the text says that there will be neither coming nor going, what it is saying is the same Nagarjuna meant when he said he made no assertions: though there will still be what deluded beings perceive as going and coming and what they perceive as making assertions, and the Awake individual will be able to speak of going and coming or of making assertions, he or she will not perceive going or coming, or the making of assertions—and if he or she speaks about such things it will be solely in an other-directed way, without giving rise to own-mind.

"Likewise, when Ashvagosha stated that we must use words [and concepts] in order to go beyond words [and concepts] (Suzuki, 1900), he certainly did not mean that the purpose of teaching the dharma was to

Finally, bodhisattvas who have not yet reached the third bodhisattva path (or, which is the same, the first level) and who therefore have never gone beyond the state of ‘inverted / incorrect relative truth’ (Skt. mithyasamvritisatya; Tib. yangdgap bzhag denpa [yang dag pa'i kun rdzob bden pa]), therefore have not to believe that there is a final Buddhahood and a means to proceed toward it, as well as a series of dharma truths to be admitted; therefore, the conceptual positions they adopt are to a great extent correct.

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As we have seen, the Prasangikas and the original Madhyamikas (such as Nagarjuna and Aryadeva), rather than positing autonomous theses and syllogisms, used the procedure of reductio ad absurdum in order to refute the views of others. Therefore, they made fewer assertions than adherents of other philosophical schools. However, when Nagarjuna said he made no assertions, and Chandrakirti said one should not have ‘own mind’ and therefore should not posit theses ‘from the heart’ (i.e. theses that are self-directed or interior-directed), they did not mean one should not speak, but that whatever a true Madhyamika (i.e. a realized individual) may assert is of the kind that, for lack of a better term, I am calling other-directed / exterior-directed. Therefore, though a subschool such as Mahamadhyamaka, for example, laid out a complex interpretation of reality and its functionality, realized masters of this school may rightly say they do not posit theses of their own, insofar as they do not do so with own-mind—or, which is the same, they do not do so in an interior-directed or self-directed way. Hence it is not correct to think that only the Prasangikas or Consequentialists and the original Madhyamikas made no statements from the heart (or, which is the same, made no interior-directed assertions), and that this was so because they abstained from positing autonomous theses and from resorting to autonomous syllogisms. As we have seen, whether assertions are other-directed / exterior-directed, self-directed / interior-directed, or partly self-directed / interior-directed and partly other-directed / exterior-directed, depends on the spiritual status of the individual who is making the assertions, and thus when Awake Ones posit autonomous theses and use autonomous syllogisms they are not making statements from the heart (or, which is the same, they are not making interior-directed or self-directed assertions), for they do so utterly beyond grasping at thoughts and words. The Sutra of Hui-neng reads (Wong-Mou-Lam, trans. 1969, p. 99):

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Does the above mean that replying to someone in antonyms will cause that person to become unable to move at all, and therefore he or she will not be able to either come or go? Except in the case of beings under hypnosis, words cannot result in paralysis, and at any rate the activities of Buddhas do not have the function of inducing paralysis. So when the text says that there will be neither coming nor going, what it is saying is the same Nagarjuna meant when he said he made no assertions: though there will still be what deluded beings perceive as going and coming and what they perceive as making assertions, and the Awake individual will be able to speak of going and coming or of making assertions, he or she will not perceive going or coming, or the making of assertions—and if he or she speaks about such things it will be solely in an other-directed way, without giving rise to own-mind.

"Likewise, when Ashvagosha stated that we must use words [and concepts] in order to go beyond words [and concepts] (Suzuki, 1900), he certainly did not mean that the purpose of teaching the dharma was to
The essence of the excerpt of the Buddhist text quoted above lies in the fact that, whenever necessary, Awake Ones may assert the very opposite of what their interlocutors believe from the heart, and even prove it logically to them, not in order to lead them to adhere to the opposite idea, but to shatter their own-mind, thereby leading them beyond adherence to all positions, into the grasping-free condition in which the Awake Ones find themselves. This may involve asserting any of the four extremes—nonexistent, not-nonexistent, both-existent-and-nonexistent, and neither-existent-nor-nonexistent—but, at any rate, without the slightest trace of own-mind. Therefore, true Prasangikas agree that all four extremes are valid insofar as they can be validly asserted if this is demanded by syllogistic logic and/or direct perception; for example, all entities may be said to exist insofar as they produce effects, but may be said not to exist insofar as they have no self-nature or substance; all physical entities may be said to be units insofar as the concept in terms of which we understand them refers to the unity of a configuration (Skt. lakshana; Tib. tsenpai [mishtan dpe]), but all physical entities may be said to not to be units insofar as they may be found to be made of parts; etc. (Gregory Vlastos [1968] has rejected arguments of this kind on the grounds that the oneness and the multiplicity of an entity are not mutually exclusive features, and therefore that the multiplicity of what we consider as being a unit, does not contradict its oneness and therefore does not imply it is not a unit. However, when a deluded being recognizes and apprehends an entity, he or she perceives that entity as being exclusively and absolutely one [i.e. as being a unit], and there is no comprehension whatsoever in the deluded mind of the fact that the entity also is a multiplicity. If then the same individual mentally disassembles the entity, he or she will perceive it as a multiplicity, and there will be no understanding whatsoever in the deluded mind of the fact that this multiplicity also is a unit. This does not mean that the right thing to do is to say that the entity is both one and multiple, which if left unexplained would violate the law of the excluded middle [or law of the excluded third, or principle of non-contradiction], would not clarify anything, and would be but another conceptual position, contrary to saying that the entity is neither one nor multiple, and equally true and equally false as the latter [it would seemingly clarify things if we said that relatively the entity is one when viewed from one standpoint and multiple when seen from another, but that it cannot be said to be either absolutely one or absolutely multiple; however, this would be but another conceptual position which, if grasped at, would give rise to just another instance of delusion—and in this regard would be like Tsongkhapa’s qualification of the existence to be negated as inherent and of the nonexistence to be rejected as utter]. I have dealt with this problem in further detail in Capriles [2004] [the definitive, corrected version of which will soon be available in print], where logic is criticized in terms of Gödel’s theorem, of Bateson’s criticism of Russell & Whitehead [1910-1913], etc. However, grasping at any of the extremes (as deluded beings always do) is incorrect insofar as it implies believing one concept to be true and its opposite to be untrue; for example, if we believe in existence we take nonexistence to be untrue and vice-versa, and if we believe in the oneness of physical entities we take their plurality to be untrue and vice-versa—which is wrong because, as we have just seen, one concept will apply just as much as the opposite if we merely switch perspective. (Furthermore, it would not do to say that the existence that applies to entities is ‘mere existence’ and that the nonexistence that applies to them is the ‘absence of inherent existence’, or that the oneness that applies to physical entities is the one we perceive in direct perception and the multiplicity that applies to physical entities is the one that we infer upon analysis, for by so saying we would sustain own-mind, or, which is the same, we would continue to grasp at concepts—and, as we have seen, the essence of the CONSEQUENTIALIST or PRASANGIKA method lies in pulling the conceptual carpet from under the mind’s feet so that it may fall into a state beyond concepts and, especially, beyond own-mind.) To conclude, it may be reiterated that Awake Ones are correct when they assert any of the extremes, for, as we have seen so many times, they do so without own-mind. The meaning of the terms ‘valid’, ‘incorrect’ and ‘correct’ in the CONSEQUENTIALIST or PRASANGIKA system is as established in this paragraph—the last two terms being defined solely by the presence or absence of own-mind.”

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458 In fact, Wilber has studied the AYOGA-Dzogchen under Penor (Pad nor: Pad ma Nor bu) Rinpoche, the current head of the Nyingmapa School of Tibetan Buddhism.

459 In each of these levels of realization all three kayas are realized. For example, the first level of realization is the realization of the dharmakaya because it is the realization, in the practice of Tekchö (khregs chod),
of the true condition of the dang (gdangs) form of manifestation of energy, which in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings is the dharmakaya, and which illustrates the essence or ngowo (ngo bo) aspect of the Base or zhi (gzhi)—which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the voidness aspect of the Base, is also identified as the dharmakaya. However, in this level we realize the emptiness of dang energy simultaneously with its clarity and with its unceasing manifestation, and therefore in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin / rang bzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje / thugs rje aspect) is the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of dang energy that, in the special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man ngag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the dharmakaya.

Likewise, the second level of realization is the realization of the sambhogakaya because it is the realization, in the practice of Thögel (thod rgal), of the true condition of the rölpa (rol pa) form of manifestation of energy, which in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings is the sambhogakaya, and which illustrates the nature or rangzhin (rang bzhin) aspect of the Base or zhi (gzhi)—which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the clarity aspect of the Base is also identified as the sambhogakaya. However, in this level we realize the emptiness of rölpa energy simultaneously with its clarity and with its unceasing manifestation, and hence in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje aspect) is realization of the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of rölpa energy that, in the special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the sambhogakaya.

Similarly, the third level of realization is the realization of the nirmanakaya because it is the correct apprehension, as a result of advanced Thögel realization, of the tsel (rtsal) form of manifestation of energy—a realization that in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings is the nirmanakaya. It is also the nirmanakaya because this realization illustrates the energy or thukje aspect of the Base or zhi, which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the unceasing manifestation aspect of the Base, is also identified as the nirmanakaya. However, here we realize the emptiness of tsel energy simultaneously with its clarity and with its unceasing manifestation, and hence in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje aspect) is realization of the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of tsel energy that, in the special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the nirmanakaya.

Thus we could say that in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings the realization of the true condition of dang energy is the dharmakaya, but that this dharmakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. Likewise, we could say that in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings the realization of the true condition of rölpa energy is the sambhogakaya, but that this sambhogakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. And we could say that in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde series of Dzogchen teachings the realization of the true condition of tsel energy is the nirmanakaya, but that this nirmanakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings.

Independently of the above, I want to note that in Capriles (1977), I presented the diagram of a “spiral of spirals,” which was an elaboration on Ronald D. Laing’s diagram of the “spiral of pretences.” In it, it seemed that from the level wherein the anguish that is the being of the human individual is fully experienced (which in this sense would seem to correspond to Wilber’s six fulcrum), one proceeded to the realization of the nirmanakaya, and then from it to the successive realizations of the sambhogakaya and the dharmakaya. Therefore, an error could be appreciated that was partly similar to the one I am
Thus we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of dang energy is the dharmakaya, but that this dharmakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. Likewise, we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of rölpa energy is the sambhogakaya, but that this sambhogakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. And we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of tsel energy is the nirmanakaya, but that this nirmanakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings.

Furthermore, in each of these levels of realization all three kayas are realized. For example, the first level of realization is the realization of the dharmakaya because it is the realization of the true condition of the dang (gdangs) form of manifestation of energy, which is the dharmakaya and which illustrates the essence or ngowo (ngo bo) aspect of the Base or zhi (gzhi), which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the voidness aspect of the Base, is also identified with the dharmakaya. However, in this level we realize the emptiness of dang energy simultaneously with its clarity and with it unceasing manifestation, and therefore in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje aspect) is the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of dang energy that, in the special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man nagag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the dharmakaya.

Likewise, the second level of realization is the realization of the sambhogakaya because it is the realization of the true condition of the rölpa (rol pa) form of manifestation of energy, which is the sambhogakaya, and which illustrates the nature or rangzhin (rang bzhin) aspect of the Base or zhi (gzhi), which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the clarity aspect of the Base is also identified with the sambhogakaya. However, in this level we realize the emptiness of rölpa energy simultaneously with its clarity and with it unceasing manifestation, and hence in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje aspect) is the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of rölpa energy that, in a special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man nagag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the sambhogakaya.

Similarly, the third level of realization is the realization of the nirmanakaya because it is the realization of the true condition of the tsel (rtsal) form of manifestation of energy, which is the nirmanakaya, and which illustrates the energy or thukje ( thugs rje) aspect of the Base or zhi (gzhi), which from another standpoint (which, however, is also adopted by the Dzogchen teachings), insofar as it is the unceasing manifestation aspect of the Base, is also identified with the nirmanakaya. However, in this level we realize the emptiness of tsel energy simultaneously with its clarity and with it unceasing manifestation, complete in the realization of the true condition of tsel energy, and hence in the sense in which realization of the Base’s emptiness (its essence or ngowo aspect) is realization of the dharmakaya, realization of the Base’s clarity (its nature or rangzhin aspect) is realization of the sambhogakaya, and realization of the Base’s unceasing manifestation (its energy or thukje aspect) is the nirmanakaya, the realization of the three kayas is complete in the realization of the true condition of tsel energy that, in a special sense proper to the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man nagag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings being considered, is the nirmanakaya.

Thus we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of dang energy is the dharmakaya, but that this dharmakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. Likewise, we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of rölpa energy is the sambhogakaya, but that this sambhogakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings. And we could say that in a specific Dzogchen sense realization of the true condition of tsel energy is the nirmanakaya, but that this nirmanakaya has a dharmakaya, a sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya aspect in a wider sense that is not limited to the Dzogchen teachings.
This was what happened in those two “miracles” people perceived Milarepa as performing, with which Chögyal Namkhai Norbu illustrated the wisdoms of quality and quantity, and which were described in a previous note (the manifestation of the wisdom of quality in the nirmanakaya dimension is illustrated by the story of Milarepa finding shelter in an empty yak horn without reducing his own body and without increasing the horn’s size; the manifestation of the wisdom of quantity in the nirmanakaya dimension is illustrated by the story of Milarepa’s funerals, which according to tradition took place in three different places, even though there was a single corpse).

Concerning Wilber’s wording at this point, it seems relevant to note that the dissolution of the “separate-self sense” is not something that a person can do but something that happens, for all actions affirm and sustain the illusory mental subject.

The four formless absorptions (arupa-samadhi) were listed and explained in a previous note to this chapter.

Of course, in the Upadeshavarga or Menngagde (man ngag sde) series of Dzogchen teachings, in which the nirmanakaya is the final level in the sequence of realization, this kaya involves the manifestation of the sambhogakaya’s wisdoms of quality and quantity at the level of tsel (rtsal) energy; however, in this case we are not speaking of a level at which “consciousness starts to go transpersonal,” for as we have seen in this series of teachings the nirmanakaya is the last level of attainment on the Path and, if the Path is carried to its ultimate possibilities, results in the nirmanakaya’s manifestation as a body of light.

According to the Mahamudra tradition of the Kagyupas, on the occasion of listening for the first time to teachings concerning emptiness, beings of higher capacities experience great joy, to the point that all their down and hair may go on end; beings of middle capacities have no extreme reactions, and beings of lower capacities experience terror. The same may occur the first time the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness increases to a level at which the panoramification of the focus of conscious awareness and the permeabilization of its limits causes us to glimpse the voidness of all entities: beings of higher capacities may experience great joy, whereas those of lower capacities may experience dread—this being the reason why Lama Anagarika Govinda (1973) wrote that increase of the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness (Skt. kundalinī; Tib. thig le) can induce experiences of terror in beings who are not rightly prepared.

It is the Mādhyakama Prāsaṅgika school and the schools of the Inner Mādhyamaka that emphasize the fact that the absolute truth is disclosed in a gnosia beyond the subject-object duality that makes patent the true nature of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chos nyid), showing phenomena to be utterly void of self-nature (and, according to the Inner Mādhyamaka, showing this gnosia to be void of anything extraneous to itself). The Inner Mādhyamaka explains the absolute truth as the indivisibility of appearances and voidness (this is the Mahāmādhyamika definition), and identifies it with the Buddha-nature. See the upcoming revised version of Capriles (2004).

It must be clear by now that the basic experience of the anguish inherent in the being of the human individual has nothing to do with what I call panic and which Wilber associates with the manifestation of the intangible self-luminous visions of the intermediate state of dharmatā or chönyi bardo—even though in the West Kierkegaard (1968, 1970) seems to have placed in the same footing the fear that may be inspired by awareness of one’s own nothingness (which seems to be an instance of what I call panic), and all modes of despair, Angst, etc.

Kierkegaard (1968, 1970) seems to have placed in the same footing the fear that may be inspired by awareness of one’s own nothingness (which seems to be an instance of what I call panic), and all modes of despair, Angst, etc.

As shown in a previous note to this volume, the realizations involving a special mode of death are: (1) the rainbow body or jalū (ja’ lus) in the Dzogchen Longde (klong sde) series of teachings; (2) the body of atoms or lüdül threndu deng (lus rdul phran du dengs) in the Tekchö (khregs chod) level of the Menngagde (man ngag sde) or Upadeshavarga series, and (3) the body of light—ökyiku or öphung—(‘od kyi sku or ‘od phung) in the Thögel (thod rgal) level of the Menngagde or Upadeshavarga series. In another note it was stated that the realization involving deathlessness is the total transference or phowa chenpo (‘pho ba chen po), which is the highest possible realization of the practice of Thögel.

The latter includes those experiences of voidness that some lower Mahayana systems wrongly posit as absolute truth, such as the presence of the absence of the mode of existence we had wrongly projected on an entity, as it is supposed to manifest in the realization of the practice of insight meditation (Pali, vipassana; Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhantong [lhag mthong]; Chin. kuan) taught in the
Moreover, as I showed in Capriles (2005) and as will be seen below in the regular text of this chapter, the original realization of absolute truth of the Madhyamika Prasangikas was “the ultimate meaning without distinctions,” “the ultimate meaning which is not conventional,” “the inexpressible ultimate,” or “the true absolute that is nonconceptual (Tib. namdrgang mdinpa döndam [rnam grangs min pa’i don dam]);” the direct realization without elaborations (Tib. thödrel [spros bral]) of the dharmata or true condition of all phenomena that can only take place beyond the subject-object duality and in general beyond all concepts “when the conceptual carpet is pulled under the mind’s feet,” and in which, therefore, there is no one who may abide anywhere or on anything—which is the reason why in ancient times the Madhyamika-Prasangikas were referred to by the label “Thoroughly Nonabiding Madhyamikas” (Skt. sarvadharmapratisthanavadin; Tib. rab tu minepar mawa [rab tu mi gnas par smra ba]). Je Tsongkhapa disparaged this label together with the original Prasangika view and posited as the absolute truth of Madhyamika-Prasangika the voidness that manifests as object in the practice described in the texts listed in the above paragraph, by simply redefining this voidness in terms he deemed to correspond to the Madhyamika-Prasangika (Capriles [2005]); therefore, Je Tsongkhapa’s voidness is also included among the “experiences that some lower Mahayana systems wrongly posit as absolute truth” referred to above.

In the practice of Tekchö (khrugs chod) of the Menngagde (man ngag sde or man ngag gyi sde) or Upadeshavarga series of Dzogchen teachings, the voidness that, as seen in the Preamble to / first chapter of vol. I of this book, is the ngowo aspect of the Base, is realized on the occasion of the realization of the true condition of the dang mode of manifestation of energy, which is the basic constituent of thoughts. That very moment whichever delusorily valued thought may be manifest liberates itself spontaneously; since this applies also to the super-subtle thought known as the “threefold thought-structure,” the delusory valuation-absolute of which gives rise to the illusory subject-object duality, the duality of subject and object instantly dissolves. This is why in the practice of Atiyoga-Dzogchen (and in particular in the practice of the Tekchö of the Dzogchen Menngagde) the realization of voidness in the manifestation of rigpa necessarily implies the dissolution of the illusory subject-object duality. (In subsequent levels of realization voidness is evident as well, yet is not the most outstanding aspect of realization.)

Moreover, as I showed in Capriles (2005) and as will be seen below in the regular text of this chapter, the original Madhyamaka agreed with the Dzogchen teachings in asserting that the realization of voidness in the manifestation of absolute truth is beyond the illusory subject-object duality—which some have related to the already allegation by Pawo Tsuglag Threngwa (dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba [1504-1566]) in Feast for the Erudite: A History of the Dharma or Chöjung Khepai Gatön (Chos ’byung mkhas pa’s dga’ ston) according to which both Nagarjuna and Aryadeva were accomplished Dzogchen Masters, but which need not be related to this fact, for true realization is always beyond the subject-object duality. At any rate, it is most important to distinguish the realization of voidness upon the realization of the Base that privileges its ngowo (ngo bo) or “essence” aspect and the dang (gdangs) mode of manifestation of energy, from the mere experiences of voidness that manifest on the Path, and which are instances of true realization only when they coincide with the realization of the Base.

All such experiences may have value on the Path, in particular if used as an occasion for applying the instructions that may permit the realization of the true condition of the awareness represented by the mirror. In fact, realization in Dzogchen consists in the naked patency of the true condition of the primordial awareness that is compared with the mirror, rather than consisting in any of the “reflections” (i.e. experiences) that may manifest in the mirror—whether these be ordinary experiences of samsara such as that of phenomena as existing, or experiences of the practice such as the illusory experiences or nyam [nyams] of voidness, clarity or pleasure. In fact, the essential difference between transpersonal systems and what I call metamtranspersonal ones is that whereas the former take the production of transpersonal experiences to be an end in itself, the latter use these experiences in order to apply the instructions that may result in the realization of the true condition of what is represented by the mirror.
In the primordial, nondual awareness in question, appearances and voidness are indivisible, for neither side is or may be privileged. In the Dzogchen teachings, when this nondual awareness is manifest as Dzogchen-quaa-Path or Dzogchen-quaa-Fruit, it is called “all-liberating single gnosis” or chikshe kundrol (gcig shes kun grol), for whichever concepts manifest in it—whether of “existent phenomena” or of “nonexistence”—spontaneously liberate themselves.

The dissolution of the observer shows that the observer was void: that it was but an appearance that can dissolve without this affecting our Gnitiveness or the appearance of the myriad forms that manifest through the senses.

In the Kabbalah, the term ayin sof ohr refers to the eternal light that surrounds the void, or to infinite light (like Amitabha). To identify this with the dharmakaya involves mistaking the luminosity or clear light of the void with the dharmakaya, failing to acknowledge the fact that the dharmakaya is the reGnition of the true condition of dang (gdangs) energy (the luminosity called tingsel [gting gsal] in Tibetan being one of the manifestations of dang energy that, when reGnized, manifests as the dharmakaya

Middle German for vergessen, meaning, “to forget.” Various commentators on Zen (Ch’an) Buddhism, beginning with D. T. Suzuki, have identified Meister Eckhart’s usage of vergezen (for example, in the sentence Hie muoz komen in ein vergezen und in ein nihtwizzen) with the Buddhist shunya or shunyata.

This duality, however, is not to be taken too far. In the Samkhya darshana of Kapila, which as we have seen is coupled with the Yoga darshana of Patanjali, on the one hand it is the cosmic spirit (mahat), which contains the potentiality for both Purusha and Prakriti to manifest, that gives rise to the plurality of individual subjects (ahamkara) and individual objects (tanmatrani). On the other hand, everything contains Purusha (in some level or development: it is less developed in minerals, more so in plants, even more so in animals, and far more so in human beings) and Prakriti, which remain different, yet are never totally apart from each other. Furthermore, though all objects are reduced to a single Prakriti, whereas each subject is regarded as a different Purusha, ultimately all Purushas may also be reduced to a single universal spirit, which in the empirical individuals of the world has to contend with the manifold impediments of matter. Furthermore, the salvation of the Purushas, which lies in the aloofness of the sakshin before the movements of Prakriti, can only manifest thanks to the intervention of some specific mechanisms of Prakriti—and in general the wonderful ways in which the Purushas and Prakriti help each other show that the opposites fall within a whole. As the fact that the ahamkaras and the tanmatrani are somehow creations of the single mahat show, duality hangs from some higher unity placed above itself.

Furthermore, on the basis of a verse from the Mahabharata (12. 11419), Vijnanabikshu asserted that the ever-changing Prakriti is avidya, whereas the unchanging Purusha is vidya, and for their part others have associated avidya with being and avidya with nonbeing, for in their view wisdom realizes what is, whereas ignorance or delusion perceive what is not and nonetheless takes it as being—which the Samkhya deny, for they claim that a false entity cannot give rise to true bondage. (Of course, if bondage were truly existent, all entities of samsara would be truly existent, and release from samsara in nirvana would be impossible—and, if for some reason it were possible, this release would also be truly existent, which is something that the higher forms of Buddhism deny: in fact, the Samkhya insist that the opposition between being and nonbeing is truly existent and their identity is unreal.) However, no matter how much the Samkhya deny the interpretation in question, Prakriti is the negative of Purusha, the not-self of the self, and the witnessing of the not-self by the self is the affirmation by the self of the nonself of Prakriti, which is what gives Prakriti all the existence it has. The self-conscious spirit that goes along with mahat is not one particular jiva (individual soul), for it continues to force Prakriti into activity no matter how many Purushas attain liberation.

It is the Yoga darshana that is concerned with the attainment of liberation, which this system calls kaivalya or absolute independence, and explains as not being a mere negation, but the eternal life of the Purusha when it is released from the fetters of Prakriti, whereby it manifests in its true form (swarupa). Desire and reactions to the movements of Prakriti are a function of avidya, which is removed by discriminative knowledge or vivekakhyati, which removes all false notions, so that the self is purified and remains untouched by the conditions of chitta: it manifests as the disinterested witness or sakshin. And this condition is incompatible with all human relationships of family life, society and so on (however, since society is not to be destroyed, and in particular since Brahmanism is androcentric and interested in preserving the caste system, only after a certain age at which it is assumed that all men have fulfilled their worldly duties, and only if one is a male belonging to one of the higher castes, may one abandon the world to devote oneself to the quest for liberation). Those who don’t have the capacity to achieve this result
should practice the Yoga of action (kriyayoga), consisting of austerities (tapas), study (swadhyaya) and devotion to God (Ishvarapranidhana).

However, the Samkhya and Yoga darshanas are extremely complex systems, and therefore the lay reader should not think that the summary of some key points of both systems provided in this note exhausts the systems in question: in order to fully understand these two darshanas, intensive and extensive study of their respective texts is necessary.

German romantic poets such as Hölderlin and Novalis were among those who claimed that the absolute transcends subjectivity and that it is impossible to conceptualize it in a philosophical system. In Capriles (2005), I wrote:

“In relation to and in the context of Idealism, Western philosophers raised the famous objection according to which an absolute could not be an absolute of knowledge, for the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge are relative to each other (arguments of this kind are found, among other authors, in Bradley [1846-1924], who insisted [Bradley, 1978] that the absolute necessarily had to be nonrelational and free from the subject-object duality... Furthermore, knowledge is an understanding in terms of concepts, and concepts are defined by genus proximum or proximate gender (the immediately wider gender in which the class is included) and differentia specifica or specific difference (that which sets the class apart from other members of the same gender); for example, if we admitted the well-known definition of ‘human being’ as a ‘rational animal’, ‘animal’ would be the genus proximum and ‘rational’ the differentia specifica. Therefore, all concepts are relative to those that make up their proximate genus and those that make up their specific difference, and insofar as these for their part are relative to other concepts that are relative to other concepts, all concepts are relative to the whole galaxy of concepts. The concept of ‘absolute’, in particular, is defined by differentia specifica (i.e. in contrast) with that of ‘relative’, so that, in tautological terms, ‘absolute’ may be defined precisely as ‘that which is not relative’ (this is the sense in which the term ‘absolute’ is used in Madhyamaka philosophy and in F. H. Bradley [1978]; in common language, the term has also other acceptations; e.g. “absolute” alcohol is 100% alcohol). This implies that the true absolute cannot be the concept of absolute that is relative to the concept of relative—or any other concept, for that matter—but must be the utterly nonconceptual true nature of all reality, which can only be realized in a nonconceptual gnosis beyond the subject-object duality. This is the reason why voidness, understood as the presence of the absence of the mode of existence that deluded beings wrongly project on an entity and in terms of which they wrongly perceive it, could not be the absolute truth of Consequentialist or Prasangika Madhyamikas: voidness thus understood is relative, not only to the perceiving mind, but also to the entity of which it is supposed to be the voidness, to the mode of existence we had wrongly projected on that entity... and to all other entities and the mode of existence we had wrongly projected on them. How could the relative be the absolute truth?”

Although the Dzogchen teachings posit a nondual awareness inherent in Dzogchen-qua-Base, and although some terms used in the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings are similar to those in the Sutras of the Third Promulgation, on the basis of which the Yogachara School developed, Dzogchen does not posit a “mind only” view like the one expressed by the Sanskrit term Chittamatra and its Tibetan equivalent, Semtsam (sems tsam). However, this should not be understood as implying that the Dzogchen teachings agree with Brahmanic views that posit a sakshin that is different and separate from all objects: the Dzogchen teachings compare the relationship between awareness and its contents to that between water and the reflections in it, and note that although the latter cannot be said to be the water, the water is not at a distance from them and they are not at a distance from the water. In short, appearances are neither the dualistic mind nor the nondual Gniveness that allows the mind to know, but on the other hand neither the mind nor the nondual awareness that allows the mind to know are separate or different from appearances.

And, nonetheless, all phenomena are of one taste with the nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in which they manifest as in a mirror: bodhicittta is like the mirror, and the energy or thukje of bodhicittta, consisting of the plethora of phenomena, is like the reflections that arise in the mirror, which are not the mirror, but are not at a distance from the mirror’s reflexive capacity and therefore are not external to the mirror or different from it. This is the reason why Longchenpa notes that appearances that reveal the nature of mind: the mirror’s nature is to reflect, and since the mirror cannot be known as object, is nature is evidenced by the reflections. This is also the reason why, when we realize this nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in the manifestation of rigpa, the whole of phenomena have a single taste for us—and, contrariwise, if the whole of phenomena do not have a single taste for us, we are not in the state of rigpa. And this is also the reason why, unlike the Yogachara School, the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings...
assert that vision, sensory presentation or apparent phenomena (Tib. snang ba), whether in samsara or in nirvana, are always the play (Skt. lila; Tib. rol pa) or ornament (Tib. rgyan) of primordial bodhicitta (i.e. the Base of both samsara and nirvana). Moreover, this is also directly related to the fact that the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings explains the samsaric perception of a seemingly external world as resulting from dividing the given into an apparently internal dimension (dbyings) and an apparently external dimension (dbyings), and then projecting (Tib. rtsal) a great deal of the appearances manifesting as the energy (Tib. thugs rje) of bodhicitta into the dimension that appears to be external, so that the phenomena of tsel energy appear to manifest outside the mirror.

After the end of the excerpt from Longchenpa to which the reference mark for this note was appended, we read the following (Longchen Rabjam [1998], p. 85; the language was adapted to the terminology used in this book):

“‘Well’, you might ask, ‘aren’t you asserting everything to be mind?’ Let me clearly outline the distinction [between Mind-only and Dzogchen]. In general, when the world of appearances and possibilities, whether [as] samsara or nirvana, is explained to be Awake awareness, what is meant is that phenomena are alike [in that they do not waver from the single awareness] and manifest naturally as the display, projective energy and adornment of that awareness. [On the basis of this, phenomena have been said] to be mind, just as one uses the name ‘sun’ to refer to the rays of the sun when one says, ‘Sit in the midday sun’.

“There are two ways to refute the assertion [that “phenomena are mind”]. According to logical reasoning, this would require that mind exhibit color and other distinctive features, because apparent phenomena have color and such features…”

However, if mind had color and other distinctive features, it could manifest only its own color and its other distinctive features, and hence it could not manifest successively the countless colors and distinctive features of the variegated phenomena. This is obviously not the case, for awareness manifests innumerable phenomena one after the other as its display, projective energy and adornment—all of which manifest successively to the human mind. Longchenpa goes on to say (ibidem, p. 85):

“It would also require that mind be external or that apparent phenomena be internal, and so their actual relationship would be thrown into chaos. And it would require that when one died the universe would collapse at the same time. In these and other ways, the assertion is disproved by its logical absurdity [as corresponds to the method of prasanga or reductio ad absurdum]...

And then (ibidem, pp. 86-87):

“‘Ordinary mind’ refers to the eight modes of consciousness and their associated mental events, which together constitute the adventitious distortions affecting beings in the three spheres [of samsara]. ‘Primordial awareness’ refers to the naturally occurring primordial gnosis having no substance or characteristics [that is] the basic space of samsara and nirvana... While that which manifests as samsara and nirvana is understood to be the energy of awareness, one should further understand that awareness itself is an unceasing ground for the arising of things, although it has never existed as anything, whether of samsara or nirvana.

“Apparent objects are understood to be clearly apparent yet unthinkable and ineffable, and never to have been mind or anything other than mind, [for they are] empty and yet clearly apparent, groundless, and timelessly pure. When freedom occurs, the projective energy and display [of awareness], in being [realized to be] groundless, are [realized to be] naturally pure—which is like awakening from a dream. Thus one should understand that the [Awake] awareness that is [nondualistically] aware of itself [as well as of sense-data and so on], without ever having wavered from the unchanging dharmakaya [that is] its original state of natural rest, is uncontaminated by any substance or characteristics, [as these have never existed in truth and thus have been timelessly void, or, which is the same, pure]…”

All of the above is most relevant with regard to Wilber’s usage of the Brahmanic concept of the sakshin, which he seems to have attempted to unify with incompatible Buddhist concepts. In particular, in the electronic bulletin of the Association of Transpersonal Psychology, he once gave what he referred to as an instance of “what Buddhists call pointing out instructions,” but in which he pretended to introduce the sakshin (rather than the primordial awareness featuring the three kayas, which is what Buddhist “pointing out instructions” traditionally introduce), and which expressed views of Vedanta that are incompatible with Buddhism and with the manner in which the latter system presents its pith instructions—which means that the instructions Wilber was providing, rather than coming from an existing lineage, were but his own concoction. (Wilber says he does not assume the guru role because he is a pandita, and this would be wise, for in order to be a guru one has to be officially appointed by one’s guru as his or her successor,
and the same must have happened with one’s guru, and with one’s guru’s guru, and so on until the very source of the lineage, which must lie in a tönpa [ston pa] or Primordial Revealer. However, then he pretends to give “pointing out instructions,” which are traditionally given by gurus and not so by panditas—and the instructions he gives are his own creation rather than the teachings of a tönpa.) His instructions read:

“So Who Are You?

“The witnessing of awareness can persist through waking, dreaming and deep sleep. The Witness is fully available in any state, including your own present state of awareness right now.

“So I’m going to talk you into this state, or try to, using what are known in Buddhism as ‘pointing out instructions’.

“I am not going to try to get you into a different state of consciousness, or an altered state of consciousness, or a non-ordinary state. I am going to simply point out something that is already occurring in your own present, ordinary, natural state.

“So let’s start by just being aware of the world around us. Look out there at the sky, and just relax your mind; let your mind and the sky mingle. Notice the clouds floating by. Notice that this takes no effort on your part. Your present awareness, in which these clouds are floating, is very simple, very easy, effortless, spontaneous. You simply notice that there is an effortless awareness of the clouds.

“The same is true of those trees, and those birds, and those rocks. You simply and effortlessly witness them. Look now at the sensations in your own body. You can be aware of whichever bodily feelings are present—perhaps pressure where you are sitting, perhaps warmth in your tummy, maybe tightness in your neck. But even if these feelings are tight and tense, you can easily be aware of them. These feelings arise in your present awareness, and that awareness is very simple, easy, effortless, spontaneous.

“You simply and effortlessly witness them. Look at the thoughts arising in your mind. You might notice various images, symbols, concepts, desires, hopes and fears, all spontaneously arising in your awareness. They arise, stay a bit, and pass. These thoughts and feelings arise in your present awareness, and that awareness is very simple, effortless, spontaneous. You simply and effortlessly witness them. So notice: you can see the clouds float by because you are not those clouds—you are the witness of those clouds.

“You can feel bodily feelings because you are not those feelings—you are the witness of those feelings. You can see thoughts float by because you are not those thoughts—you are the witness of those thoughts. Spontaneously and naturally, these things all arise, on their own, in your present, effortless awareness.

“So who are you? You are not objects out there, you are not feelings, you are not thoughts—you are effortlessly aware of all those, so you are not those. Who or what are you? Say it this way to yourself: I have feelings, but I am not those feelings. Who am I? I have thoughts, but I am not those thoughts. Who am I? I have desires, but I am not those desires. Who am I?

“So you push back into the source of your own awareness. You push back into the Witness, and you rest in the Witness. I am not objects, not feelings, not desires, not thoughts. But then people usually make a big mistake. They think that if they rest in the Witness, they are going to see something or feel something—something really neat and special. But you won’t see anything.

“If you see something, that is just another object—another feeling, another thought, another sensation, another image. But those are all objects; those are what you are not. Now, as you rest in the Witness—realizing, I am not objects, I am not feelings, I am not thoughts—all you will notice is a sense of freedom, a sense of liberation, a sense of release—release from the terrible constriction of identifying with these puny little finite objects, your little body and little mind and little ego, all of which are objects that can be seen, and thus are not the true Seer, the real Self, the pure Witness, which is what you really are.

“So you won’t see anything in particular. Whatever is arising is fine. Clouds float by in the sky, feelings float by in the body, thoughts float by in the mind—and you can effortlessly witness all of them. They all spontaneously arise in your own present, easy, effortless awareness.

“And this witnessing awareness is not itself anything specific you can see. It is just a vast, background sense of freedom—or pure emptiness—and in that pure emptiness, which you are, the entire manifest world arises. You are that freedom, openness, emptiness—and not any itty-bitty thing that arises in it. Resting in that empty, free, easy, effortless witnessing, notice that the clouds are arising in the vast space of your awareness. The clouds are arising within you—so much so, you can taste the clouds, you are one with the clouds. It is as if they are on this side of your skin, they are so close. The sky and your awareness have become one, and all things in the sky are floating effortlessly through your own awareness. You can kiss the sun, swallow the mountain, they are that close. Zen says ‘Swallow the Pacific Ocean in a single gulp’,
and that’s the easiest thing in the world, when inside and outside are no longer two, when subject and object are nondual, when the looker and looked at are One Taste. You see?"

We have seen that voidness can be:

(1) “Illusory experiences” (nyams) such (i) as the experiences of absence of thought, of lack of concreteness, etc. that manifest in the meditation practice of calming the mind (Skt. shamatha; Tib. zhi gnas), or (ii) the nonexistence of entities in the way in which they appear to exist, which appears as an object to the mental subject (and hence is within samsara) as the outcome of the practice of insight meditation (Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhag mthong) of the Sandhinirmochana Sutra, the Shravakabhumi chapter of Asanga’s Yogacharabhumi, the three Bhavanakramas by Shantarakshita and the three by Kamalashila, and in Tsongkhapa’s Lamrim works. (In I.ii, the definition of the concept of voidness varies according to the school.)

(2) An aspect of the realization of the absolute truth of Mahayana (which the Mahamadhyamaka School defines as indivisibility of voidness and appearances and which the Uma Zhentongpa [dbu ma gzhan stong pa] School defines as indivisibility of voidness and awareness) that takes place in a gnosia beyond the subject-object duality; and

(3) The dharmakaya, which qua Base is the essence (ngo bo) aspect of the Base and the dang (gdangs) mode of manifestation of energy—which is the most prominent aspect of the Buddha-nature as realized in the Dzogchen practice of Tekchö (khregs chod).

Voidness qua illusory experience and voidness qua the perception of the fact that entities do not exist in the way in which they appear to exist could by no means be the same as the sakshin or witness of Vedanta, which would have to correspond to the awareness that is aware of the illusory experience, or that is aware of the fact that entities do not exist in the way in which they appear to exist: this type of voidness is an object, and from the standpoint of Vedanta, to claim that voidness thus understood is the witness, would be an error of the same kind as asserting any other object of our perception to be the witness. (The reasons why in itself and by itself voidness is neither the absolute truth of the Mahayana nor the condition of Dzogchen were considered in Capriles [2004, 2005].)

For their part, voidness qua aspect of the direct realization of the absolute truth of the Mahayana that takes place beyond the subject-object duality, and voidness qua the most prominent aspect of the gnosia in which, in the practice of Tekchö, the dharmakaya is realized, could not be the sakshin or disinterested witness, because in these realizations there is no witness that may appear to be different from, or at a distance from, that which is realized utterly beyond the subject-object duality.

Furthermore, Wilber says that the result of applying his “pith instructions” does not imply any extraordinary occurrence, but the reGnition (of) primordial awareness that instantly puts an end to the subject-object duality and that instantly results in the spontaneous liberation of whichever thought may be manifest is a most extraordinary occurrence indeed: it is the revolution whereby dualistic, samsaric experience is replaced by nondual realization.

At any rate, the sakshin or Witness could not be the same as the primordial awareness introduced in the Dzogchen teachings and discussed in the Mahamadhyamaka and Uma Zhentongpa philosophical schools of the Mahayana, for the sakshin or disinterested witness is defined as being different from feelings, thoughts, sensations and images, which as shown in the quotations included above in this note is not the case with primordial awareness: the schools in question make it perfectly clear that apparent phenomena are neither mind nor awareness, and yet may not be said to be other than, or different or separate from, mind or awareness. Feelings, thoughts, sensations and images arise in primordial awareness just as reflections in a mirror, and thus their relation to that awareness is like that of reflections to the mirror in which they are reflected: they cannot be said to be awareness (since awareness has no end in time, if they were awareness they would not have an end in time; since awareness has no shape or color, if they were awareness they would have no shape or color); however, they cannot be said to be other than awareness, for they are not made of a substance other than awareness, and they cannot be said to be separate from awareness, for they cannot exist separately from it. As Longchen tells us (Longchen Rabjimg [1998], p. 84), all apparent phenomena that seem to exist in their own right, are appearances manifesting to the mind and in fact are nothing other than manifestations appearing to the mind; though they appear to be other than the mind, like dreams, illusions and so forth, they are by nature empty, and, being unthinkable and ineffable, they have never been anything other than mind, nor have they ever been mind either: they are empty and yet clearly apparent, groundless, and timelessly pure.
The sakshin is supposed not to be any of the apparent phenomena it witnesses, but to be different from these, and thus it could not be the primordial awareness featuring the three kayas that is introduced by Buddhist pith instructions, which may not be said to be different from the phenomena it manifests: it will have to be the illusion of a separate knower that, according to the teachings of Dzogchen Atiyoga and to those of the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought-structure. Moreover, from the standpoint of the Dzogchen teachings, to tell oneself, “I am not objects, I am not feelings, I am not thoughts” (as Wilber asks us to do) and to believe from the heart that these thoughts express a truth, would be a manifestation of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought—and if we are actually experiencing that we are at a distance from objects, feelings and thoughts, this proves that we are taking ourselves to be the illusory mental subject that appears to be separate from its objects and which is one of the poles of the dualistic, intentional structure of knowledge that arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle thought structure called the threefold thought-structure.

In its turn, the realization of rigpa may not be described as “a sense of freedom, a sense of liberation, a sense of release from the terrible constriction of identifying with these puny little finite objects, your little body and little mind and little ego, all of which are objects that can be seen,” for the experience these words describe can only arise as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of concepts. Rigpa is the all-liberating single gnosis or chikshe kundrol (gcik shes kun grol) beyond the subject-object duality, and since in rigpa there is no subject or looker and therefore there is no object or looked at, it is incorrect to say that subject and object are nondual or that the looker and the looked at are one taste: if there is noticing, this is not rigpa. In the words of the Trungpa Rinpoche translation of Jigme Lingpa’s The Lion’s Roar (Trungpa, 1972):

> “Some individuals will be able to use both thoughts and the absence of thought as meditation, but it should be born in mind that that which notes (i.e. notices) what is happening is the tight grip of Ego.”

If we are noticing that there is as “a sense of freedom, a sense of liberation, a sense of release from the terrible constriction of identifying with these puny little finite objects, your little body and little mind and little ego, all of which are objects that can be seen,” then this is a manifestation of the “tight grip of delusion” rather than rigpa, which (is) a gnosis utterly free from the subject-object duality, characterized by the spontaneous liberation of whatever arises. Becoming aware that we are not objects, feelings or thoughts, and as a result of this becoming aware of a sense of freedom and so on, are manifestations of delusion, all of which would liberate themselves spontaneously upon the manifestation of rigpa, for in the state of rigpa, whatever manifests is like a drawing on water. Rigpa (is) the absolutely free condition of nirvana that cannot be described; what can be described is the spontaneous liberation of all that arises when rigpa is manifest, as well as the whole of the experiences that are not rigpa.

Vedanta tells us that what we really are is the true Seer, the real Self, the pure Witness. A seer is one who sees, and a witness is one who witness; however, in the state of rigpa, though the whole of the sensory continuum is manifest, there is no seeing, witnessing or noticing, for in rigpa neither that continuum or anything that may be singled out within it is taken as object and perceived (and if such delusory perceptions arise, they liberate themselves spontaneously upon arising). If there were seeing or witnessing, this would be “the tight grip of ego,” rather than the condition of rigpa beyond the subject-object duality in which whatever manifests liberates itself spontaneously upon arising, like a drawing on water.

To conclude, in the Upanishads, in the Vedanta Sutra, in Gaudapada’s Mayavada philosophy and in the Adwaita Vedanta philosophy of Shankaracharya, the concept of sakshin may seem to partly correspond to that which Kant called “pure apperception,” which according to the philosopher from Königsberg is the condition of possibility of “empirical apperception” or awareness that one is perceiving, and which as such may partly correspond to a literal understanding of Sartre’s (1980) definition of the Soi or Self as non-thetic, non-positional awareness (of) consciousness (which literally understood would refer to a non-thetic, non-positional awareness [of] there being a consciousness that is aware of an object different and separate from itself). In previous chapters of this volume, I explained in great detail that if Sartre’s Soi or Self were thus understood, it would consist in the dualistic delusion inherent in samsara and as such would radically contrast with the nirvanic conditions of Dzogchen-qua-Path and Dzogchen-qua-Fruit. If Shankaracharya’s sakshin were the same as Sartre’s Soi or Self as I have understood it here, the distinctions just made between the latter and what the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen would be the differences between Shankaracharya’s sakshin and what the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen... whether
According to the above argument, it is not permissible to assert that the apparent phenomena perceived by the mind are the mind, for if they were the mind, when the latter perceived a yellow phenomenon it would become itself yellow, and such yellow mind would forever be unable to perceive apparent phenomena of other colors; furthermore, as noted in the above quote, if the mind became the phenomena it perceives, the very moment it did so it would cease being a mind. For their part, if apparent phenomena were the mind, insentient phenomena should be able to feel, experience and know, just as the mind does; likewise, when a phenomenon ceased to be, the mind itself would cease to be, and henceforth it could no longer perceive further phenomena. This is why the Dzogchen teachings make it clear that, just as the images projected in the movies are not the process of projecting them, nangyül (snang yul)—i.e. “the seen,” “the presented,” or “what is experienced”—is not nangwa (snang ba)—i.e. vision or sensory presentation. And nonetheless all phenomena are of one taste with the nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in which they manifest, as in a mirror: bodhicitta is like the mirror, and the energy or thukje of bodhicitta, consisting of the plethora of phenomena, is like the reflections that arise in the mirror, which are not the mirror, but are not at a distance from the mirror’s reflexive capacity and therefore are not external to the mirror. This is the reason why, when we realize this nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in the manifestation of rigpa, the whole of phenomena have a single taste for us—and, contrariwise, if the whole of phenomena do not have a single taste for us, we are not in the state of rigpa.

All of the above is directly related to the reasons why, unlike the Yogachara School, the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings assert that vision, sensory presentation or apparent phenomena (Tib. nangwa), qua Base, qua Path or qua Fruit. (In the last section of Appendix II to Chapter I of Capriles [1994] I discuss some of the doctrines of Shankaracharya and show that they involve a subtle dualism which is somehow similar to the one that may be appreciated in Plotinus. However, there is no space in this chapter to include the arguments in question. Or is there? Copy them?)

(Though the sakshin of adwaita vedanta and so on could not be the same as the primordial awareness of the Dzogchen teachings, I would not discard the possibility that the samvid of Kashmiri Shaivism be the same as the primordial awareness of the Dzogchen teachings; for a discussion of the concept of samvid in Kashmiri Shaivism cf. Pandey [1963].)

The above is the shorter note I used for the paper; below I copy the original longer note, and then I will have to decide which one to use, or whether to use the above but to incorporate some excerpts from the one below:

Although the Dzogchen teachings posit a nondual awareness inherent in Dzogchen-qua-Base, and although some terms used in the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings are similar to those in the Sutras of the Third Promulgation, on the basis of which the Yogachara School developed, Dzogchen does not posit a “mind only” view like the one expressed by the Sanskrit term Chittamatra and its Tibetan equivalent, Semtsam (sems tsam). However, this should not be understood as implying that the Dzogchen teachings agree with Brahmanic views that posit a sakshin that is different and separate from all objects. That Dzogchen avoids both extremes is patent in the following quotation from a text on the Tekchö (khregs chod) of the Dzogchen Upadeshavarga revealed by the great tertön (gter ston: treasure revealer: the highly realized practitioners who reveal the Spiritual Treasures called terma [gter ma]) Dudjom Lingpa (bdud ’joms gling pa: 1835-1904) (Dudjom Lingpa [1994], p. 103):

“Some people hold apparent phenomena to be mind. They might wonder whether all external apparent phenomena are actually [delusorily valued] thoughts and therefore [whether they are] their own minds, but such is not the case. This is demonstrated by the fact that while apparent phenomena change from the very moment they manifest, ceasing and passing away in a succession of later moments following former ones, ordinary mind does not take on the nature of these passing phenomena, [for if it did so it would] become itself nonexistent qua mind [the very moment it took on the nature of these phenomena].

“Through the usual progression of apparent phenomena manifesting in this manner to the eight aggregates of consciousness, cyclic existence emerges in its entirety. By tracing the process back to consciousness as the ground of all ordinary experience, one is still left stranded at the very pinnacle of conditioned existence.

“Thus the world of all possible appearances, the whole of samsara and nirvana, is none other than the Base itself and is of one taste with that Base. To give an example, although myriad reflections of the planets and stars appear in the ocean, in actuality they are of one taste with the water itself. Understand that things are like this. This demonstration that all apparent phenomena are inherently self-manifesting appearances is the direct transmission instruction of Vajradhara.”

According to the above argument, it is not permissible to assert that the apparent phenomena perceived by the mind are the mind, for if they were the mind, when the latter perceived a yellow phenomenon it would become itself yellow, and such yellow mind would forever be unable to perceive apparent phenomena of other colors; furthermore, as noted in the above quote, if the mind became the phenomena it perceives, the very moment it did so it would cease being a mind. For their part, if apparent phenomena were the mind, insentient phenomena should be able to feel, experience and know, just as the mind does; likewise, when a phenomenon ceased to be, the mind itself would cease to be, and henceforth it could no longer perceive further phenomena. This is why the Dzogchen teachings make it clear that, just as the images projected in the movies are not the process of projecting them, nangyül (snang yul)—i.e. “the seen,” “the presented,” or “what is experienced”—is not nangwa (snang ba)—i.e. vision or sensory presentation. And nonetheless all phenomena are of one taste with the nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in which they manifest, as in a mirror: bodhicitta is like the mirror, and the energy or thukje of bodhicitta, consisting of the plethora of phenomena, is like the reflections that arise in the mirror, which are not the mirror, but are not at a distance from the mirror’s reflexive capacity and therefore are not external to the mirror. This is the reason why, when we realize this nature-of-mind or Base-awareness in the manifestation of rigpa, the whole of phenomena have a single taste for us—and, contrariwise, if the whole of phenomena do not have a single taste for us, we are not in the state of rigpa.

All of the above is directly related to the reasons why, unlike the Yogachara School, the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings assert that vision, sensory presentation or apparent phenomena (Tib. nangwa),
In this regard, these days some who arrogantly assume that they understand the Dzogchen approach, or who claim that apparent phenomena are one’s own mind. They speak without authority. [The extensive title of this Tantra is Kun tu bzang po thugs kyi melong ces bya ba thams cad ston pa’i rgyud].

There are two ways to refute the assertion [that “phenomena are mind”]. According to logical reasoning, this would require that mind exhibit color and other distinctive features, because apparent phenomena have color and such features...

However, if mind had color and other distinctive features, it could manifest only its own color and its other distinctive features, and hence it could not manifest successively the countless colors and distinctive features of the variegated phenomena. This is obviously not the case, for awareness manifests innumerable phenomena one after the other as its display, projective energy and adornment—all of which manifest successively to the human mind. Longchen Rabjam goes on to say (1998, pp. 85-87):

“It would also require that mind be external or that apparent phenomena be internal, and so their actual relationship would be thrown into chaos. And it would require that when one died the universe would collapse at the same time. In these and other ways, the assertion is disproved by its logical absurdity [as corresponds to the method of prasanga or reductio ad absurdum].

The [confusion of the view of Mind-only with that of Dzogchen] can also be disproved by scriptural authority. [The Atiyoga Tantra] Kun tu bzang po thugs kyi me long ces bya ba thams cad ston pa’i rgyud] states:

“‘To hold that apparent phenomena are mind is to stray from me.’

...And the [Atiyoga Tantra] Ngedön düpa’i gyü (Nges don ’dus pa’i rgyud) states:

‘Fools who do not perceive the ultimate meaning claim that apparent phenomena are one’s own mind. This is like taking brass to be gold.’

“In this regard, these days some who arrogantly assume that they understand the Dzogchen approach, or who follow ordinary spiritual approaches, hold apparent phenomena to be one’s own mind. They speak without
defining the issues involved and so commit an extremely serious error, for ordinary mind and primordial awareness are not at all the same. ‘Ordinary mind’ refers to the eight modes of consciousness and their associated mental events, which together constitute the adventitious distortions affecting beings in the three spheres [of samsara]. ‘Primordial awareness’ refers to the naturally occurring primordial gnosis having no substance or characteristics [that is] the basic space of samsara and nirvana... While that which manifests as samsara and nirvana is understood to be the projective energy of awareness, one should further understand that awareness itself is an unceasing ground for the arising of things, although it has never existed as anything, whether of samsara or nirvana.

“Apparent objects are understood to be clearly apparent yet unthinkable and ineffable, and never to have been mind or anything other than mind, [for they are] empty and yet clearly apparent, groundless, and timelessly pure. When freedom occurs, the projective energy and display [of awareness], in being [realized to be] groundless, are [realized to be] naturally pure—which is like awakening from a dream. Thus one should understand that the [Awake] awareness that is [nondualistically] aware of itself [as well as of sense-data and so on], without ever having wavered from the unchanging dharmakaya [that is] its original state of natural rest, is uncontaminated by any substance or characteristics, [as these have never existed in truth and thus have been timelessly void, or, which is the same, pure]...

“In this regard, tsel (rtsal) energy’ is the creative potential of awareness and accounts for the fact that samsara and nirvana arise differently, just as the very same ray of sunlight causes a lotus blossom to open and a night lily to close.”

As suggested above, samsara arises on the basis of the projection of tsel (rtsal) energy that gives rise to an apparently external dimension or jing (dbyings); as soon as this occurs, dang (gdoorangs) energy, which is beyond dualism and the division into internal and external, appears to be an internal dimension or jing, and most phenomena of this mode of manifestation of energy (namely thoughts) appear to be objects separate and different from the mental subject—which itself is also a phenomenon of this mode of manifestation of energy. Thus there arise the subject-object and the interior-exterior schisms, which are key features of samsara. Conversely, nirvana implies the nonduality of a single, indivisible dimension beyond the subject-object schism. However, both samsara and nirvana arise equally by the power and as the play (rōlpa [rol pa]) of the energy aspect of the Base, which in terms of the above may be compared to the same ray of sunlight. Longchenpa goes on (Longchen Rabjam [1998], p. 87):

“‘Display’ is used in the sense of the radiance of awareness displaying itself, like a lamp displaying itself as light or the sun displaying itself as sunbeams. ‘Adornment’ refers to the fact that naturally manifest phenomena, appearing in full array, arise of themselves as adornment in light of awareness. This is similar to rainbows, the sun and moon, stars and planets being adornments of the sky.”

All of the above is most relevant with regard to Wilber’s usage of the Brahmanic concept of the sakshin, which he seems to have attempted to unify with radically incompatible Buddhist concepts. In particular, in the electronic bulletin of the Association of Transpersonal Psychology, he once gave what he referred to as an instance of “what Buddhists call pointing out instructions,” but in which he pretended to introduce the sakshin (rather than the primordial awareness featuring the three kayas, which is what Buddhist “pointing out instructions” traditionally introduce), and which expressed views of Vedanta that are incompatible with Buddhism and with the manner in which the latter system presents its pith instructions—which means that the instructions Wilber was providing, rather than coming from an existing lineage, were but his own concoction. (Wilber says he does not assume the guru role because he is a pandita, and this is wise, for in order to be a guru one has to be officially appointed by one’s guru as his or her successor, and the same must have happened with one’s guru, and with one’s guru’s guru, and so on until the very source of the lineage, which must lie in a tônpa [ston pa] or Primordial Revealer. Hence it seems contradictory that he may pretend to give “pointing out instructions,” which are traditionally given by gurus and not so by panditas, and that the instructions he gives are his own creation rather than the teachings of a tônpa.) His instructions read:

“So Who Are You?

“The witnessing of awareness can persist through waking, dreaming and deep sleep. The Witness is fully available in any state, including your own present state of awareness right now.

“So I’m going to talk you into this state, or try to, using what are known in Buddhism as ‘pointing out instructions’.
We have seen that voidness can be: (1) an “illusory experience” or nyam (nyams), such as the experiences of absence of thought, of lack of concreteness, etc. that manifest in the meditation practice of calming the mind (Skt. shamatha; Tib. zhine [zhi gnas]); (2) the fact that entities do not exist in the way in which they appear to exist, which manifests as an object to the mental subject (and hence is within samsara) in the practice of insight meditation (Skt. vipashyana; Tib. lhantong [lhag mthong]) taught in the Sandhinirmochana Sutra, in the Shravakabhumī chapter of Asanga’s Yogacharabhumī, in the three Bhavanakramas by Shantarakshita and the three Bhavanakramas by Kamalasila, and in Tsongkhapa’s Sandhinirmochana practice of insight meditation (Skt. vipashyana; Tib. zhine [zhi gnas]).
At any rate, the Voidness qua threefold projection. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the Dzogchen teachings, to Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, arises as a result of the delusory valuation of the phenomena it manifests: it will have to be clearly apparent, groundless, and timelessly pure.

Feelings, thoughts, sensations and images, which as shown in the quotations included above in this note of the Mahayana, for the Yogacharas, for whom the Sandhinirmochana Sutra is the foremost canonical source, voidness is the fact that the object of analysis does not exist separately or independently from mind; according to the Bhavanakramas by Shantarakshita and Kamalashila, belonging to the lower form of Mahayamaka-Swatantrika-Yogachara, it is the fact that the object does not exist independently or truly; for Tsongkhapa, it is the fact that the object does not exist inherently—i.e. that it lacks self-existence.)

Voidness qua illusory experience and voidness qua the perception of the fact that entities do not exist in the way in which they appear to exist could by no means be the same as the sakshin or witness of Vedanta, which is the awareness that is aware of the illusory experience, or that is aware of the fact that entities do not exist in the way in which they appear to exist: this type of voidness is an object, and from the standpoint of Vedanta, to claim that voidness thus understood is the witness, would be an error of the same kind as asserting any other object of our perception to be the witness. For their part, voidness qua aspect of the direct realization of the absolute truth of the Mahayana that takes place beyond the subject-object duality, and voidness qua the most prominent aspect of the gnosis in which, in the practice of Tekchö, the dharma field is realized, could not be the sakshin or disinterested witness, because in these realizations there is no witness that may appear to be different from, or at a distance from, that which is realized utterly beyond the subject-object duality. Furthermore, Wilber says that this does not imply any extraordinary occurrence, but the reGnition (of) primordial awareness that instantly puts an end to the subject-object duality and that instantly results in the spontaneous liberation of whichever thought may be manifest is a most extraordinary occurrence indeed: it is the revolution whereby experience is replaced by nondual realization. (The reasons why in itself and by itself voidness is neither the absolute truth of the Mahayana nor the condition of Dzogchen were considered elsewhere in this book; for a more extensive and thorough discussion of these reasons, cf. the upcoming definitive version in print of Capriles [2004], and also Capriles [2005].)

At any rate, the sakshin or Witness could not be the same as the primordial awareness introduced in the Dzogchen teachings and discussed in the Mahayamaka and Uma Zhentongpa philosophical schools of the Mahayana, for the sakshin or disinterested witness is defined as being different from feelings, thoughts, sensations and images, which as shown in the quotations included above in this note is not the case with primordial awareness: they make it perfectly clear that apparent phenomena are neither mind nor awareness, and yet may not be said to be other than, or different or separate from, mind or awareness. Feelings, thoughts, sensations and images arise in primordial awareness just as reflections in a mirror, and thus their relation to that awareness is like that of reflections to the mirror in which they are reflected: they cannot be said to be awareness (since awareness has no end in time, if they were awareness they would not have an end in time; since awareness has no shape or color, if they were awareness they would have no shape or color); however, they cannot be said to be other than awareness, for they are not made of a substance other than awareness, and they cannot be said to be separate from awareness, for they cannot exist separately from it. As Longchenpa tells us (Longchen Rabjam [1998], p. 84), all apparent phenomena that seem to exist in their own right, are appearances manifesting to the mind and in fact are nothing other than manifestations appearing to the mind; though they appear to be other than the mind, like dreams, illusions and so forth, they are by nature empty, and, being unthinkable and ineffable, they have never been anything other than mind, nor have they ever been mind either: they are empty and yet clearly apparent, groundless, and timelessly pure.

The sakshin is supposed not to be any of the apparent phenomena it witnesses, but to be different from these, and thus it could not be the primordial awareness featuring the three kayas that is introduced by Buddhist pith instructions, which may not be said to be different from the phenomena it manifests: it will have to be the illusion of a separate knower that, according to the teachings of Dzogchen Atiyoga and to those of the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold projection. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the Dzogchen teachings, to tell oneself, “I
am not objects, I am not feelings, I am not thoughts” (as Wilber asks us to do) and to believe from the heart that these thoughts express a truth, would be a manifestation of the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought—and if we are actually experiencing that we are at a distance from objects, feelings and thoughts this proves that we are taking ourselves to be the illusory mental subject that appears to be separate from its objects and which is one of the poles of the dualistic, intentional structure of knowledge that arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the supersubtle thought structure called the threefold projection.

In its turn, the realization of rigpa may not be described as “a sense of freedom, a sense of liberation, a sense of release from the terrible constriction of identifying with these puny little finite objects, your little body and little mind and little ego, all of which are objects that can be seen,” for such experiences can only arise as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of concepts. Rigpa is the all-liberating single gnos is or chikshe kundrol (geik shes kun grol) beyond the subject-object duality, and since in rigpa there is no subject or looker and therefore there is no object or looked at, it is incorrect to say that subject and object are nondual or that the looker and the looked at are one taste: if there is noticing, this is not rigpa. In the words of the Trungpa translation of Jigme Lingpa’s The Lion’s Roar (in Trungpa [1972]):

“Some individuals will be able to use both thoughts and the absence of thought as meditation, but it should be born in mind that that which notes (i.e. notices) what is happening is the tight grip of Ego.”

If we are noticing that there is as “a sense of freedom, a sense of liberation, a sense of release from the terrible constriction of identifying with these puny little finite objects, your little body and little mind and little ego, all of which are objects that can be seen,” then this is a manifestation of the “tight grip of delusion” rather than rigpa, which is a gnos is utterly free from the subject-object duality, characterized by the spontaneous liberation of whatever arises. Becoming aware that we are not objects, feelings or thoughts, and as a result of this becoming aware of a sense of freedom and so on, are manifestations of delusion, all of which would liberate themselves spontaneously upon arising if rigpa manifested, for in the state of rigpa, whatever manifests is like a drawing on water. Rigpa (is) the absolutely free condition of nirvana that cannot be described; what can be described is the spontaneous liberation of all that arises when rigpa is manifest, as well as the whole of the experiences that are not rigpa.

Vedanta tells us that what we really are is the true Seer, the real Self, the pure Witness. A seer is one who sees, and a witness is one who witness; however, the state of rigpa, though the whole of the sensory continuum is manifest, there is no seeing, witnessing or noticing, for neither that continuum or anything that may be singled out within it is taken as object and perceived (and if such delusory perceptions arise, they liberate themselves spontaneously upon arising). If there were seeing or witnessing, this would be “the tight grip of ego,” rather than the condition of rigpa beyond the subject-object duality in which whatever manifests liberates itself spontaneously upon arising, like a drawing on water.

To conclude, in the Upanishads, in the Vedanta Sutra, in Gaudapada’s Mayavada philosophy and in the Adwaita Vedanta philosophy of Shankaracharya, the concept of sakshin may seem to partly correspond to that which Kant called “pure apperception,” which according to the philosopher from Königsberg is the condition of possibility of “empirical apperception” or awareness that one is perceiving, and which as such may partly correspond to my understanding of Sartre’s definition of the Soi or Self as non-thetic, non-positional awareness (of) consciousness—i.e. to a non-thetic, non-positional awareness (of) there being a consciousness that is aware of an object different and separate from itself. In the last chapter of vol. I of this book I explained in great detail how Sartre’s Soi or Self, thus understood, referred to the dualistic delusion inherent in samsara and as such radically contrasted with the nirvanic conditions that I am calling the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit (and which the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen-qua-Path and Dzogchen-qua-Fruit). If Shankaracharya’s sakshin were the same as Sartre’s Soi or Self as I have understood it, the distinctions I made between the latter and what here I am calling the Self (which the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen) would be the differences between Shankaracharya’s sakshin and what here I am calling the Self and which the Dzogchen teachings call Dzogchen... whether qua Base, qua Path or qua Fruit.

479 At any rate, all Hinayana schools agree that in fully Awake Buddhas suffering and duhkha in general are totally eradicated, so that Buddhahood involves the cessation of duhkha, yet does not involve the coming to a halt of Gnitive activity in a deep absorption (Skt. samadhi; Tib. tingnrgedzin [ting nge ‘dzin]).

480 The Vaibhashikas, for example, posit two types of nirodha or cessation: nonperception of phenomena due to the absence of prataya or contributory conditions and resulting from concentration rather than discrimination (apratisamkhyanirodha), and supreme wisdom of cessation deriving from discrimination
As shown elsewhere in this volume, the arising of the mental subject cleaves the undivided experiential totality that the base-of-all is, and though the ensuing object, being undivided, still seems to be a totality, it is no longer totality insofar as it excludes the mental subject.

The Yogacharas posit three types of nirodha or cessation: (1) pratisamkhyanirodha or cessation (nirodha) of the passions (klesha) by the power of perfect discrimination; (2) apratisamkhyanirodha or cessation of the passions or kleshas without the intervention of perfect discrimination; and (3) samjñavedananirrothda, which is a state wherein samjña or recognition in terms of concepts and vedana or mental sensation are inactive.

I believe the Tibetan word namkhyen (rnam mkhyen) renders the Sanskrit word sarwajñata or “all-inclusive understanding,” which is a quality shared by shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas, whereas nampa tamche khyenpa (rnam pa thams chad mkhyen pa) renders the Sanskrit term sarvakarajñata, meaning “knowledge of all forms,” which is a quality exclusive to the Buddhas, and which involves rnam mkhyen gyi ye shes or “gnosis embracing the knowledge of all forms.” However, rnam mkhyen is often given as the translation of sarvakarajñana or “gnosis embracing all forms” (cf. for example, Napper, 2003, pp. 541, 561, 591).

Wilber’s ninth fulcrum does not correspond to the ninth oxherding picture, partly because the sequence in his own series is arbitrary, partly because his fulcra begin at birth and embrace the whole process of ontogenesis, whereas the ten oxherding pictures begin at the point when an individual begins to do spiritual practice with the aim of attaining Awakening.

All that was expressed in the note that is fourth before the present one applies here again.

This sentence seems to imply that in fulcrum-8 the experience of immaterial, self-luminous forms did not involve the “unity” in question. However, this seems to be a sleight-of-hand, for as we have seen Wilber explicitly claims that in the higher levels of the fulcrum in question such unity is experienced.

If the subject becomes absorbed in the experience of a form as object, regardless of whether the form in question is gross / tangible or subtle / intangible, the ensuing experience pertains to the realm of form. If the subject reacts emotionally to it or derives sensual pleasure from it, the ensuing experience pertains to the realm of sensuality. However, it is very common that experiences with subtle form take us to the realm of form (cf. the warnings by Kyeme Dechen [skye med bde chen] and the first Karma Thinle [kar ma phrin las pa] against falling into the realm of form in the practice of visualization, yet believing the experience to be an instance of the sambhogakaya, in Guenther, 1973) and experiences with gross form take us to the realm of sensuality.

In fact, the subject-object duality may be said to be the the second of the senses the term avidyâ has in the threefold Dzogchen classification favored by Longchen Rabjam, and it is certainly a fundamental element in the second of the senses the term has in the Dzogchen classification used in this book. As we have seen, the first of the senses of avidyâ is the same in both classifications, and in both of them avidyâ cannot manifest in the second of the senses if it is not already manifest in the first of the senses. Therefore, when the subject-object and other dualities are manifest, but not so the belief that these are self-existent realities, avidyâ in the first two senses of the term in both classifications (and in the third in the classification favored by Longchen Rabjam) must necessarily be manifest.

Also René Descartes denied this possibility.

According to Paul Williams (1998), Je Tsongkhapa’s reinterpretation of Prasangika, according to which the subject-object duality is manifest in the Contemplation state of the higher bodhisattva, agrees that in the Fruit of Buddhahood rather than dualistic knowledge based on the subject-object duality what is at work is nondual gnoses. However, in discussing Ju Mipham Ngawang Namgyal’s writings, John W. Pettit (1999, p. 129) writes:

“Mipham also maintains that Buddhas have no dualistic perceptions, while Gelug commentators find this position to be incompatible with buddhas’ omniscience, specifically, with their awareness of the experiences of sentient beings.”

Though I am far from being a Tsongkhapologist who has studied in detail all of Je Tsongkhapa’s works, what I gather is that Tsongkhapa accepts that nondual gnoses are at work in Buddhas, yet does not make it clear that in Buddhahood only nondual gnoses obtain, in this way leaving the road open for the interpretation according to which the only way in which a Buddha could be aware of the experiences of sentient beings would be by having dualistic cognitions just as the latter do (something that does not really follow from
the Buddhas’ awareness of dualistic experiences, for it is clear that the awareness in question is a nondual awareness of dualistic experiences that is not sullied by the blemish represented by these experiences).

Though the Gelugpa School associates this Sutra with the Yogachara School, which is based solely on the Third Promulgation, the Nyingma School sees it as one of the most direct canonical sources of the Mahamadhyamaka School, which they view as the supreme philosophical school of the Mahayana and which is based both on the Second and Third Promulgations. The italics are my own and the terminology was adapted to the one used in this book.

Despite the fact that all Madhyamaka Swatantrika subschools are supposed to be based on the original, generic Madhyamika texts by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, we have seen that some of the lower subschools comprised in this category have meditations treatises that posit a realization of absolute truth involving the subject-object duality. However, as shown by the verses by Prasangika Master Shantideva quoted below in the regular text, the original Madhyamaka Prasangika subschool makes it clear that the realization of absolute truth cannot involve such duality. (We have seen that Je Tsongkhapa, on the basis of the insight practice taught in the Bhavanakramas of the lower Madhyamaka-Swatantrika-Yogachara subschool, posited as the absolute truth of the Prasangika one involving the subject-object duality; however, all Red-Hat Schools disagree that this is the absolute truth of the original Prasangikas, who are the Thoroughly Nonabiding Madhyamikas [cf. the corresponding note to this book]; furthermore, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Gelugpas in general admit that the Fruit is characterized by a nondual gnosis utterly free from the subject-object schism, and that equivalent gnoses manifest on the Path as well. In this regard, cf. Capriles [2005].)

All objects, including the manifestation of voidness as object, are the sphere of activity of the seed of samsara, and thus could by no means be what, from an epistemological standpoint, may be rightly said to be the absolute truth that manifests in nirvana (and which, as we have seen, being what is not at all relative, cannot be an object of knowledge). By dwelling on an experience that belongs to the sphere of activity of the seed of cyclic existence, we sustain this very seed, and therefore our method, rather than leading beyond samsara, will sustain samsara.

Nonaffirming negation, nonimplicic negation or absolute negation (Skt., prasajyapratisedha; Tib., megag [med dgag]) is a negation which negates the object of negation without implying anything else, as in the statement “A brahmin should not drink alcohol” (Capriles, 2005). Jeffrey Hopkins (1983, p. 723) defines this type of negation as “a negative which is such that the term expressing it does not suggest in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of negation.” This is the type of negation employed by a Madhyamika negating an object’s supposed swabhava or self-existence.

On the other hand, affirming negation or implicative negation (Skt., paryudasapratisedha; Tib., ma yin dgag) is a negation that upon negating its object of negation implies the assertion of some other facts, as in the statement “this man is not a brahmin” (which implies he either belongs to another of the Hindu casts, or has no cast whatsoever and thus is either a dalit, an adivasi or a non-Indian).

Whereas Je Tsongkhapa views the apprehension of ultimate truth in the Contemplation state of the superior bodhisattva as involving nonaffirming negation or absolute negation, and views this type of negation as a distinguishing feature of Prasangika, Mipham (cf. Pettit, 1999, p. 109) sees it as a special emphasis of the Swatantrika system. Pettit (ibidem) writes:

“According to Mipham, absolute negation is a suitable way to conceptualize the ultimate for beginners, but because it is still a conceptual formula, it does not represent the final significance of nonelaboration (nishprapañcha; spros bral). It is a mere nonsubstantiality (dngos med), as opposed to substantial existence (ngos po). It corresponds to the analytical wisdom (prajña, shes rab) of the post-meditative state and is adequate to emptiness as an object of ... thought but not to the nonconceptual gnosis of sublime equipoise (aryajñana, 'phags pa'i ye shes).”

A more detailed definition of the terms kāta (ka dag) and lhundrub (lhun grub), as well as a more complete explanation of the reasons why the Self-qua-Path and the Self-qua-Fruit do not entail cessation or nirodha, are provided in Capriles (2000a, 2003, 2004, work in progress 2 and work in progress 3).

By the way, Stan Grof (1998, p. 92) claims that Tibetans view uterine life as a bardo; however, none of the six bardos listed in the regular text immediately preceding the reference mark for this note, which are those universally accepted by Tibetans whenever they classify bardos into six (other classifications list three or four bardos according to the criterion used), may be said to correspond to uterine life (Grof gives Evans-Wentz’s [1928] version of the Bardo Thödröl as the reference [he gives the 1960 edition]; I have
no access to the Evans-Wentz version as I write this, but it is well known that the book in question is an important pioneering work that, precisely for this reason, contains mistaken assertions—as Evans-Wentz often interpreted Tibetan teachings in terms of the views of Western Theosophy or of Hindu doctrines. However, Grof is right in that there are many descriptions of birth and perinatal life in Tibetan texts, which compare birth to being crushed between two mountains and so on.

If we fail to reGnize the true condition of the clear light in the chikhai bardo (‘chi kha’i bar do), the neutral condition of the base-of-all manifests, and if then we perceive this shining forth as occurring in an external dimension, samsara begins to develop from the base-of-all; however, if the reGnition in question takes place, the luminosity in question is the dharmakaya itself. In the same way, if we take the contents of thought to be inherently true or false and to be ultimately important and so on, they are the source of samsara; however, if we look thoughts directly in the face and reGnize their true condition, we discover them to be the dharmakaya and they spontaneously liberate themselves in the patency of the dharmakaya.

Stan Grof’s (1998, p. 90) critique of Wilber’s view of this involution is wrong, for his objection is that Wilber’s explanation of this involution is “culture-specific” insofar as he uses a Tibetan view to explain a universal process. However, what if a universal process is correctly interpreted by a tradition located in a particular area and incorrectly interpreted by traditions located in other areas? And, furthermore, is it not more “culture-specific” to extrapolate to the whole of humankind the psychological processes and structures that Freud and other Western psychologists inferred from the observation of their Western patients? Or is it that the discoveries of Western scientists are Truth itself and those of Eastern mystics are culture-specific illusions? Postmodern thinking will not allow either generalization; however, it could as well be that postmodern thinking will have to face that some culture-specific views are universal—at least as rough maps that cannot perfectly coincide with the territory, which is how the Dzogchen teachings have always seen their own maps.

As shown in a previous note, Gendün Chöphel (2005) wrote:

“Relative’ is the word ancient scholars used for translating the Sanskrit samvriti, which means ‘obscuration to correctness’ or ‘thoroughly confused’. Because one is ‘deluded about the meaning’, we must also understand ‘relative truth’ as ‘deluded [pseudo-]truth’.”

Socrates’s death sentence would be more comprehensible if the true Socrates were that of the Cynics—who was a king of anarchist agitator—rather than that Plato’s.

Previously to the radical psychic transformation that, in the ample region James DeMeo (1998) called Sahara, gave rise to sexual repression, domination over women and children, and war (Taylor, 2005; Capriles, 2007a vol. III), the peoples of Eurasia and Northern Africa had an antisomatism-free spirituality that used the body’s natural impulses as means for Communion (not in the sense in which Wilber says women are characterized by communion, but in the sense of limits-dissolving transpersonal, holotrophic conditions that often correspond to the Self-qua-Path). The Saharasian peoples—including the Kurgans or Proto-Indo-Europeans and the Semites (Eisler, 1987 [to be balanced by objections in Radford-Ruether, 1992]; Gimbutas, 1991; Ceruti & Bocchi, 1993)—began systematically plundering their neighbors, and then went on to conquering them. As conquerors, they established a vertical, oppressive relationship with the conquered, in which they were at the top and the latter at the bottom, and they had to keep those at the bottom, whom they logically distrusted, tightly under control. It was probably as the structure of this relationship was internalized, that Saharasians—including Indo-Europeans and Semites—developed the need to oppress and keep tightly under control the impulses of the organism, women and children (the latter two because they were Other with regard to themselves and it was easy to associate both of them with nature—to which the impulses in question belong), and that they came to view those impulses as not-to-be-trusted and (as a result of the dynamic of the shadow that led them to project the latter on those they preyed upon, and of the superimposition of their relationship with the latter on their relationship with the impulses under discussion) as being outright evil (furthermore, it is likely that in the association of the erotic impulse to evil an important element may have been the conquerors’ raping of the conquered women after the slaughtering of men). (It must be noted that I outright disagree with DeMeo’s ecological-geographical determinism, according to which it is the desertification of highly populated regions that gives rise to war, sexual repression and the oppression of women and children, as well as with many of his late-[orgonic]-Reich-inspired views—even though I admit that desertification, whether or not occasioned by the humans themselves, may help determine which human groups are first to develop these vices in the process of degeneration produced by the gradual development of the basic human delusion called avidya or marigpa as the aeon or cosmic time cycle [Skt. kalpa; Tib. kal pa or bskal pa] unfolds.)
Thus it is easy to see why in Eurasia and Northern Africa antisomatic, sexually repressive spiritual traditions have a Saharasian origin—and in particular why I assume the Orphic tradition to have a Kurgan / Proto-Indo-European origin.

Despite the mythological links between Orpheus and Dionysus and the fact that some hymns to Dionysus have been thought to be of Orphic origin, it has been widely substantiated that the Orphic and Dionysian traditions held contrary, struggling worldviews. In fact, as Kerényi (1998, pp. 165-166) has made it clear, Orpheus seemed to reject the dark Dionysus in favor of the clear god, ‘Apollo and sun in the same person,’ whom he adored. Furthermore, there is an important Orphic myth according to which it was the female Thracian bacchantes known as bassarai who, in one of their Dionysian orgies, tore Orpheus into pieces as he (because of his dislike of the dark Dionysus, and his anti-somatic and female-despising ideology?) refused to join their ritual and grant them his favors. At any rate, the philosophies derived from Orphism were diametrically opposed to those developed by the thinkers who expressed in philosophical terms the views of the genuine Dionysian tradition, or who received influences from it—among whom I rank Heraclitus, the main Skeptic Schools, some of the Sophists and the Cynics (and, though only in what regards philosophy of history and socio-political views, the Stoics, who polemicized so much with the Skeptics). In fact, fragments DK 40, DK 129 and DK 81 of Heraclitus’ book show the extent to which the Ephesians berated the dogmatic system of Pythagoras—whom he called “chief captain of cheaters” and whose learning he called “deceitful erudition and evil art.” It is well known that the Skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus also directed his book against the Pythagoreans—which may be inferred even from its title, *Adversus mathematicos*.

The Dionysian roots of the systems of Heraclitus, the Skeptics, various of the so-called sophists, probably also Socrates (of whom the Cynics give an account in sharp contrast with Plato’s, who in his dialogues seemingly put his own views in the mouth of Socrates), the Cynics (Anthistenes was a disciple of both Protagoras and Socrates) and, at least in what respects their views of spiritual and social evolution, the Stoics, will be discussed at greater length in Capriles (work in progress 3). The same applies to the alleged derivation from the teachings Shenrab Miwoche taught at the foot of Mount Kailash (abode of Lord Shiva to the Shaivas), probably around 1,800 BCE, of spiritual systems such as Shaivism, Zurvanism, Taoism, the cult of Osiris, the Dionysian mysteries, the Ismaili doctrines and the doctrines some Sufi traditions received from the barmaids of Nova Bihar and from the Ismailis, among others—which is very briefly discussed in the following note. In the meantime cf. the notes to Capriles (2007a vol.) and Capriles (1999b, 2000b).

In Daniélou (1992) a great deal of evidence is provided that substantiates the identity of Indian Shaivism, the Greek Dionysian tradition and the Egyptian cult of Osiris. It is universally known that the Shaivas see Mount Kailash as the abode of the Lord Shiva, and it was at the foot of Mount Kailash and near the lake of Manasarovar that the Tönpa (*ston pa*) or Primordial Revealer Shenrab Miwoche taught the Dzogchen teachings of the Bön tradition known as Dzogpa Chenpo Zhang-Zhung Nyengyü (*rDzogs pa chen po zhang zhung ngyan brgyud*), as well as a host of other teachings, seemingly including some forms of Tantrism. In Tucci (1980) the author discusses the relationship between the terminology used in Shaivism and that employed in the Dzogchen teachings, and reports on the spiritual groups that consistently made pilgrimages to Mount Kailash, and which viewed this mountain as their most sacred place—among whom he mentions, beside Tibetan Bönpos and Buddhists, the Indian Shivas, and the followers of two Persian systems: the Zurvanists (followers of the pre-Zoroastric Persian religion), and in Islamic times, Ismailis. In the notes to Capriles (2007a vol. I), I pointed out some of the striking coincidences in the symbolisms of Taoism and Dzogchen, and provided a bibliography of works that assert the identity and common roots of Taoism and Bön—the latter being the pre-Buddhist spiritual system of the Himalayas that, as just noted, comprised all the teachings of Shenrab Miwoche. The ancient Bönpo sources cited in Namkhai Norbu (1997, 2004), suggest that Bön, Shaivism and all of the traditions listed in this note had their roots in these teachings, for among Shenrab’s disciples there were sages from India, China, Persia and other nearby regions that brought their Masters’ teachings to their own countries, establishing them there. This will be discussed at greater length in Capriles (work in progress 3); in the meantime cf. the notes to Capriles (2000b, 2000c, 2003, 2007a vol. I).

Since the Pythagoreans disparaged the body, basis of the human reality, to which humans are confined so long as they are alive, their ideology doomed human beings to insurmountable conflict, while favoring the development of what Gregory Bateson (1968, 1972) called *conscious purpose against nature*. Moreover, the Pythagorean ideology, like those of most Orphic-derived dualistic, anti-somatic, oppressive systems,
associated the female with evil and the male with goodness—and produced a long list of contraries in which the curve, the circle, the limitless and movement were associated with evil, whereas the straight line, the square, the limited and stillness were associated to goodness. The association with evil of the female—one of the two basic aspects of life, as well as the anima aspect and one of the two main somatic energies of male human beings—was a recipe for insurmountable conflict. Like the rest of the traditions that despised the corporeal material universe, the Pythagoreans disparaged and opposed the physiological energies that constitute the very vehicle of realization. By viewing the corporeal, apparently material world as evil, they disparaged the wisdom that corporeal reality is (as shown in Capriles, 2007a vol. I, Chapter I, according to the Dzogchen teachings, the reality in question is the tshal [rtsal] mode of manifestation of the energy of thukje [ thugs rje] aspect of the Base, and those teachings refer to the three aspects of the Base as three wisdoms). Their negative view of movement (in which a similitude with the Samkhya darshana of Kapila and the related Yoga darshana of Patañjali may be observed) was also a source of insurmountable conflict, in movement is inherent in being alive. Furthermore, Pythagorean rejection of the limitless (Greek, apeiron; Skt. aditi) amounted to rejection of the single true condition of all entities that was to be realized in the pan-Eurasian traditions of which the Dionysian mysteries were the Greek expression. Since in higher forms of Buddhism the circle, which has no corners (which represent limits, which in their turn represent concepts, for insofar as these always exclude something they establish limits), represents the absence of limitations of the dharmakaya, their rejection of the circle expresses just the same attitude as their rejection of the limitless. To conclude, as the Manichean ideology makes it evident, to view the corporeal, material reality as evil, ultimately may even be thought to justify the destruction of the world—which the Pythagorean sorcerer’s apprentices set in motion by beginning to build the technological Golem that, as shown in Capriles (1994a) and in Part III this book, has grown beyond viability in the current ecological crisis and, unless dismantled as a result of the reductio ad absurdum of the delusion that gave rise to it, will destroy the fabric of human society and possibly the biological existence of our species. (To conclude, it must be noted that the Pythagorean dualism was moral—they deemed the soul to be good and the body to be evil—but not ontological, for supposedly they deemed the soul to be material.)

506 It is well known that mathematics are incorporeal: mathematical operations are abstract and, although they are according to Plato instances of dianoia, they depend on subtle / intuitive thoughts, which I relate to the noein that philosophers whose views derived from the Orphic tradition valued so much. A mathematical point, as different from a physical one, is incorporeal in that it does not occupy any space; a mathematical line, as different from a physical one, has length but no thickness; etc. With regard to music, from a physical standpoint it may be seen as vibrations of corporeal air, or of the corporeal ear drum, and so on—yet this does not apply in any way to our experience of music, which has hardly anything to do with all of this and reflects harmonies that in their turn may be viewed as being as incorporeal as mathematics. Furthermore, musical instruments give one or another note according to mathematical measurements, and this may have been seen as the index of the relationship between harmonies and mathematics and between mathematics and music.

507 It was Kant who introduced into Western philosophy the idea of evil as an active force rather than the mere absence of the good.

508 As stated in a note to vol. I, according to Diogenes Laërtius (1972-1979, vol. 2, IX, 21), Parmenides was a disciple of Pythagorean philosopher Ameinias. Though present day scholarship has disqualified this allegation, Plato (Sophist [1993], 242 C-D) claimed that Parmenides was a disciple of Xenophon—who in his fr. 7 narrated an episode of the life of Pythagoras and who, together with the latter, was berated in Heraclitus’ fr. DK 40. In his turn, John Burnet (1964) referred to the cosmogony of Parmenides as “a sketch of Pythagorean cosmology.” Emile Bréhier (1988, vol. I, p. 68) noted that the cosmogony of Parmenides was different from that of the Ionians insofar as it incorporated theogonic myths such as those described by Hesiod (also berated by Heraclitus in fr. DK 40) and those upheld by the Orphics; insofar as it regarded Love as the first god (Symposium [Plato, 1995, 195C]; and especially insofar as, rather than viewing the arche or Principle to be a single primordial constituent of reality, it asserts it to be a pair of opposites (day and night, or light and darkness). Bréhier concluded that all this referred to Hesiodic fantasy rather than Ionic thought—and, more significantly, he stressed the fact that positing a pair of opposites as the arche is characteristic of Pythagorean dualism. Moreover, despite Parmenides’ assimilation of the Ionian structure of the heavens, the latter are to him (as in some Platonic myths) the place of transit of the souls, where necessity (anangke) lay, distributing their portions (Aecius, Synagoge
It could be thought that the Eleatic ideology may have been akin to the May avada philosophy developed by the Hindu author Gaudapada, inspired by Yogachara Buddhist philosophy. However, Parmenides (1984) does not assert the only truth to be ājñāna or gnosis (in spite of the similarity between the terms ājñāna and noēin, the latter term means “intellectual intuition,” which corresponds to “subtle thoughts” as understood in the Dzogchen teachings, yet fancied to be independent from both mental images and sensory data), which by definition cannot be expressed by thought (even though it may be said to be the basic “constituent” and dynamic of thought), but affirms that the only truth is thought, identifies thought with being, insists that the impossibility that something be thought proves its nonexistence, and [in fr. 8, 34-36] asserts that, “it is the same to think and to think that [the content of thought] is, because without being, in what is expressed you could not find thought.” The claim that the impossibility that something be thought proves its nonexistence may seem to suggest the claim that the possibility that something be thought, together with the fact that it is actually thought, proves its existence—which is a position often attributed to Parmenides, and which, insofar as the contents of thought are manifold, implies the existence of multiplicity. How can someone who makes an assertion that clearly implies the existence of multiplicity be positing a monism in which the only true reality is thought = being? The only explanation I can think of is that, since according to him the only true reality was thought = being, and the manifold contents of thought were manifestations of thought, these contents shared the being that was one with thought. However, still his system would clearly breach the principle of noncontradiction, of the excluded middle, or of the excluded third, for he asserted the sole existence (in the ordinary sense of the term) of the single principle that in his system thought = being is, and at the same time asserted the existence (in the ordinary sense of the term) of the manifold contents of thought. We might try to solve the contradiction by concluding that in his view the single being = thought was the absolute reality, the manifold contents of thought were some kind of relative reality, and the physical world was simply nonexistent. However, in the extant fragments of the book there is no mention of an absolute reality and a relative reality, not are there indications in them that he may have been positing a view like the one just described; therefore, I acknowledge my powerlessness to arrive at a clear, noncontradictory conclusion with regard to the true import of his system.

We do not know whether Parmenides viewed thought as lying in the soul or mind, or outside the soul or mind; however, since common sense views them as lying in the soul or mind, we must assume that in the absence of a negation of this assumption a thinker agrees with it.

Let us keep in mind that the Greeks viewed evil as he mere lack of goodness, and ugliness as the mere lack of beauty, etc.: it was Kant who, for the first time, conceived evil as an active force rather than as the mere absence of goodness, etc.
Also Protagoras and Gorgias might have been showing the relativity and ultimate nonexistence (voidness) of the relative as a means to lead people to the realization of the absolute. According to Diogenes Laërtius, Protagoras held that “...concerning any matter (pragma), there are two contrasting discourses (logoi),” and considered both to be equally valid. In turn, in his treatise On Nonbeing, Gorgias of Leontini held that no assertion or conceptual position with regard to reality could be in any way true. Most scholars take this to mean Gorgias and Protagoras held mutually contradictory positions; however, highest Madhyamika philosophy would agree to the statements of both and yet deny the absoluteness of either, for it is precisely insofar as no conceptual position can be absolutely true with regard to any given object, that mutually contradictory conceptual positions can be both valid and relatively true with regard to it. And, in fact, it is not unlikely that Gorgias may have been saying precisely that no conceptual position can be absolutely true with regard to any given object, and that Protagoras may have been saying precisely that mutually contradictory conceptual positions can be both relatively valid with regard to any given object—in which case both of them would have been expressing the very same view.

Furthermore, Protagoras was one of the two main teachers of Anthistenes (the other one being Socrates), who is widely regarded as the teacher of Diogenes of Sinope and therefore as founder or forefather of the Cynic school—which, as shown in vol. I of this book, might have been a Dionysian school with methods of spiritual liberation similar to those of some Tantrics, Shaivas and Dzogchenpas who were often regarded as “extremist” in the East.

Whenever questioned, Chu-ti would raise his finger and remain in the condition beyond thought. He used this method so consistently that, when he was about to die, he told the assembled monks of his monastery, “I attained T’ien Lung’s one-finger Ch’an and have used it all my life without exhausting it. Do you want to understand?” Then he raised his finger and died. (Cleary & Cleary, trans., 1977, vol. I, Nineteenth Case, p. 125.)

The Orphic mysteries (such as those held at Eleusis) were to the Orphics the means to purify the soul and endow it with a mystic “seal” that would be recognizable after death, so that it would be allowed to dwell with the gods rather that suffer the fate of the uninitiated and be plunged into the mud (Plato, Phaedo [1980], 69E), where the initiated would force them to eternally fill sieves with water by means of other sieves (Plato, Gorgias [1973], 493B).

Many Pythagoreans adopted the ancient vision of spiritual and social evolution as a process of progressive degeneration beginning with a perfect Golden Age, without even feeling compelled to modify it—as Plato, on the other hand, did (Capriles, 1994a). Furthermore, after the degenerative vision in question was lost in Greece, it was Hesiod—berated by Heraclitus and thus probably an Orphic—who reintroduced it into Greece.

The Cynics, in their turn, may have received it from Anthistenes, who would have received it either from Protagoras or from Socrates. The links between Heraclitus and Protagoras or Socrates are unknown.

The Golden Age corresponds to the “preceding age” in which human beings were born from the earth rather than as a result of sexual contact, insofar as the age in question was the perfect age in which each provided for all needs by effortlessly taking the fruits of trees and of a whole generous vegetation, so that they spent their time devoted to philosophy, there were no savages, animals did not devour each other, there were no wars or quarrels, all lived nude in the open without beds (for the grass was so soft), there was no constitution, and no possession over women and children insofar as all were born from the earth (since time was reverted, rather than dying and being earthened, people were born by being unearthened [upon which they would not remember their previous lives]). The mode of birth attributed to the perfect age is asexual because of the Orphic contempt toward the body and its functions. And the claim that there was no possession over women and children because all were born from the earth implies that when all are not born from the earth such possession is justified and unavoidable.

Then, when time reverted upon the inversion of the rotation of the world, at the beginning all beings followed the divine commands, but then degeneration ensued: the divergence from the ancient degenerative myths lies in the role of an “organizing god” and in the fact that in this case degeneration resulted from the influence of the corporeal principles and the wayward character of their primitive nature; whereas the god taught them how to live a harmonious life, their former constitution gave rise to all evils and inequities. And the more they revolted against the commands of the god, the more their primitive turbulence flourished—until finally the organizing god, in face of the tempest that threatened to send all beings into the bottomless ocean of dissimilarity, would invert the rotation of the planet once more, restoring the age of perfection.
Thus the myth corresponds to the ancient ones in that there is an initial age of perfection, then a progressive degeneration, and finally a restoration of perfection; however, it contradicts the ancient myths insofar as in this one degeneration is due to contamination by the body and the corporeal, and in that the change of eras is the result of the action of a god.

Whereas in Republic (Plato, 1979) the supreme *eidos* is that of the Good, in Symposium (Plato, 1995) the supreme *eidos* is that of Beauty; since according to Plato Truth lies in the *eidos*, and since supreme truth lies in the supreme *eidos*, taking the Platonic dialogues as a whole we may conclude that in Plato’s view Truth, Goodness and Beauty coincided.

Aldous Huxley (1956) discussed this in the noted essay Heaven and Hell; I discussed it more at length in Capriles (2000b). However, neither of us distinguished between inducing what I call the aesthetic *epoche* or “suspension of aesthetic judgment,” which may result in the neutral condition of the base of all, and the use of experiences in order to recognize the Self-*qua*-Base (I did not enter into sophisticated discrimination of spiritual conditions because the book in question was intended for my University students of Asian art, to whom the distinction under consideration is not directly relevant).

It is also worth noting that the views of Plato discussed here are those found in his written works, and that according to some scholars (e.g., Copleston, 1993) the works in question convey his esoteric doctrines, Plato having as well a corpus of *agrafa dogmata* or unwritten doctrines that supposedly conveyed his esoteric, innermost teachings. However, even if there had been such *agrafa dogmata*, an Orphic’s doctrines, no matter how esoteric, could by no means coincide with the perfectly non-dual *dharma* as represented by the Dzogchen teachings, or even by Madhyamika philosophy.

The Bönpos in the Himalayas and the Stoics in Greece coincided in asserting that in the Golden Age there were no divisions between human beings: the Logos spontaneously guided and operated all affairs without the interference of the ego, and therefore human beings were all free and equal among themselves and were not divided by national boarders or by distinctions of social class, wealth or ancestry. There were no such institutions as private property, the individual family, slavery, servitude, or the State in which a few prevail over the majority. The goods of nature were enjoyed in common by all human beings, who lacked any sense of possessiveness and naturally achieved the common benefit of all beings and of the totality of the ecosphere, abandoned to the natural flow of the Logos beyond any kind of government or control. Since Greece and Tibet are geographically so distant from each other, and because of the coincidences between most extant texts of different Kailash-originated traditions in this regard, we may take for granted that this was the original conception of the Golden Age, Era of Perfection or Age of Truth in all Kailash-originated traditions, and that those later Indian castist systems that claimed that in the Primordial Age the Brahmin cast prevailed, misrepresented the original conception of the Age in question to fit what they viewed as the interests of their own group (for an ineflicitous example of this deformation, cf. Biës, 1985).

Bön asserts the introduction of private property by the males in spite of the protests of the females, to have given rise to struggles that could only be suppressed when, finally, all recognized a Sovereign. Though the first Sovereign was of divine origin, after a short while he became corrupt and abused power—which resulted in a system of privileges that later on gave rise to political, social and economic stratification (Reynolds, 1989). In claiming that the first divisions were economic and that these gave rise to political divisions, the Bönpos agree with Marxism and differ from anarchism, which claims that the first divisions between human beings were political—namely between rulers and the ruled—and that this later gave rise to social differences (Sahlins [1972, 1974] illustrated this with his field observations of the development of Polynesian monarchies). At any rate, it is an established fact that primal societies of the Paleolithic did not exhibit any type or degree of stratification (even hunter-gatherers and early horticulturalists of our time fail to exhibit a clear stratification) and that political power, private property and the separate family arose and developed interdependently as a result of the progressive “Fall” of our species (for a survey of works confirming this, cf. Taylor, 2003, 2005).

In classical China, Confucianism (and, previously to that, the worldview of Heaven and Earth) was associated to the Imperial State and the court’s nobility, whereas the original Taoism I call “Taoism of Inorigination,” which includes Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, Lieh-tzu and the Huainan Masters, was associated to the primitive commune and the “lowly” people, and preached ecological harmony and social and political equality, in many ways like later, Western anarchists (this is evident in most of the early Taoist works, and especially in the *Tao-Te-Ching* and the *Chuang-tzu* [in the latter text, cf. the parable of horses, among many other significant passages], but it is the *Huainanzi* [Cleary, 1990] that emphasizes this the most, having it as a leitmotif, and that may be regarded as a striking manifesto of political anarchism, social and economic
egalitarianism, end ecological awareness). Thus it is not surprising that the historian of anarchism Max Nettlau [1979] should have viewed early Taoists, together with Cynics and Stoics, as representatives of what he called “the prehistory of anarchism,” and that several sinologists since James Legge should have associated Taoism with anarchism (Ames, 1983; Bender, 1983; Hall, 1978, 1983; Hall & Ames, 1995). In the course of Chinese history, Taoists implemented successive egalitarian revolts, which were repeatedly defeated by imperial forces (paradoxically, one of these revolts was crushed by forces commanded by the Confucian general Ko-hung, who was one of the originators of the distortion of Taoism that circumscribed itself to striving for long life and immortality, and who bitterly criticized Chuan-tzu for “asserting death and life to be the same”).

In Dionysian Bacchanalia men and women of all social positions mixed up freely, and, as shown, for example, in Eisler (1987), in Minoic times, when the Dionysian religion prevailed, and in general in what she calls the “old (pre-Indo-European) Europe,” there were no marked social differences (a state of affairs she describes by speaking of a wide middle class that virtually included the whole of society).

In Tibet, we have seen that the Bönpos posited a primitive communism at the beginning of the time cycle. Yet the old religion was not alone in upholding egalitarian values. In the ninth century CE King Mune Tsampo was killed by his mother in complicity with his country’s nobility because of his attempts to implement the social doctrines of his Buddhist teachers: on three consecutive occasions he attempted to redistribute the wealth of his country’s citizens, giving rise to ever more irate and radical reactions on the part of the nobility, until finally they got his mother, who was jealous of the other widows of Mune Tsampo’s father (whom, as was customary in Tibet, Mune Tsampo had inherited upon the latter’s death—his mother being the only of his father’s wives he would not inherit because of their immediate kinship), to kill her kingly son. The great Dzogchen Master Longchen Rabjampa had to go into exile in Bhutan as a consequence of his political positions. In the course of history, there were repeated revolts against the monastic feudalism implemented by the monastic schools. And in Bhutan the present dynasty put a ceiling of 30 acres to land property, and the king cannot be distinguished from the common folk by dress or adornments. However, in the case of Buddhism, egalitarianism is not circumscribed to Kailash-related traditions: the Aggañña Sutta presents private property as the occasion for the arising of stealing, beggary and violence; the Digha-nikaya’s Cakkavattisihananda-sutta asserts poverty to be at the root of perversion and crime; Nagarjuna posited a welfare state; and what is nowadays called “engaged Buddhism” was a most important force in Shri Lanka, Vietnam, Myanmar and India (with Dr. Ambedkar’s ex-dalits), and in our time is becoming an important force worldwide (among many other works, cf. Capriles, in press).

The Indian Tantrics were to a great extent exterminated by the Vaishnavas because they endangered the cast system, reintroducing the Bacchanalia, where all casts, and even dalits, freely mixed, and they always did their best to equalize economic and social inequalities.

Among the Ismailis, the Carmathians, de facto founded by Hamdan Qarmat when he began preaching in 877-8 CE, upheld radically egalitarian ideals and practices (Bausani, 1988), and practiced a mysticism based on Communion. They inspired and carried out the rebellion of the Zanj African slaves that took place in the region that nowadays is the state of Kuwait. In their apogee they endangered the Abbaside Empire, and a Carmathian chief went so far as to conquer Mecca in 930 CE. Though later on they were defeated, they retained power in Bahrain. Though the Ismaili Fatimide dynasty in Egypt did not implement egalitarian doctrines, the Carmathians, whom they supported, freely worked on their behalf (ibid.).

The Knights Templar allegedly received their mystical doctrines from Ismaili chief Hassan Ibn el-Sabbah in el Alamud. Alan Butler (2000) believes that the most important figure in Templarism may have been Saint Bernard of Clairvaux—who produced a wonderful mystic theology of communion strikingly similar to the philosophy of the mystical traditions having their roots in Kailash, and who established the guidelines for building gothic cathedrals—noting that past researchers generally failed to credit St Bernard with the pivotal role he played in the planning, formation and promotion of the infant Templar Order, and casting doubts as to whether there may have been an “intention” to create an Order of the Templar prior to the life of St Bernard himself. André de Montbard, one of the first Templar Knights, was his maternal uncle, and he may also have been related to the Counts of Champagne, who themselves appear to have been pivotal in the formation of the Templar Order. At any rate, it was St Bernard who wrote the first Rules of the Order in question. I mention this because the traditions imported into Europe by the Knights Templar seem to have played a pivotal role in the arising of the free cities of the High Middle Age, which exhibited some kind of direct democracy (the cities were self-ruled through a counsel integrated by the federation of guilds and the federation of neighborhood councils) and an extremely high degree of socioeconomic
equality (apprentices earned the same as the masters of their professions who instructed them), and in which the standards of living were higher than in any twentieth or twenty-first century society.

According to Plato’s Republic, the human soul has three parts: a rational part that seeks after truth and is responsible for our philosophical inclinations; a spirited part that desires honor and is responsible for the feelings of anger and indignation, and an appetitive part that lusts after all sorts of things and especially of money (insofar as the latter may be used to fulfill any other base desire). The just individual can be defined in analogy with the just society: just as in the former the rational part of the soul rules, the spirited part of the soul supports this rule, and the appetitive part of the soul submits and follows wherever reason leads, in society the philosopher must rule, the guardians must support this rule and defend the city against its potential enemies, and the producers must submit and follow whatever the king philosophers dictate. And in both levels this is the meaning of justice: whereas in a just individual the entire soul aims at fulfilling the desires of the rational part, in the just society the entire community aims at fulfilling whatever the rulers will. So justice consists in each part of the individual and society playing the part that is supposed to be natural to it.

Plato distinguishes between dianoia, which is the discursive thought proper to mathematics and which does not recognize its premises to be mere hypotheses, and noesis or dialectical thought, which on the contrary treats its premises as literally hypothetic—i.e., it treats hypotheses as concepts that have been expounded but which must be dealt with as mere steps to the encounter with the First Principle—(Rep. 511b) and which in his view arrives at the “pure intuition” free from aisthesis called noein, the object of which is experienced as the absolute truth that is not hypothetic and that is the First Principle. Having reached this principle, understanding descends again to a conclusion, “without resorting in any way to something visible, but proceeding by means of eidos to their conclusions, which are eidos as well” (Rep. 511c). To Plato noesis or true understanding, which is the highest type of thought, makes intelligible, by means of the First Principle, the objects of mathematic thought—i.e., of dianoia—which, as studied in mathematics, are not really or truly understood (Cf. Annas, 1981 [Spanish pp. 248, 250]).

Plotinus may have taken this view from Heraclitus’ fragment DK 206, which reads (adapted from various translations):

“Things as a whole are whole and nonwhole, identical and not identical, harmonic and nonharmonic; the one is born from the whole and from the one all things are born.”

The error of positing the One as the absolute is the same one Indian philosopher Shankaracharya committed in the transition from the eighth to the ninth century CE. For some time the Adwaya Madhyamaka philosophy of Buddhist sage Nagarjuna—who opposed Hindu casteism—had defeated all Hindu systems in debates and controversies. Shankara was one of the theorists of orthodox Brahmanism who strived to devise doctrines sophisticated enough as to give his religion a chance of resisting Nagarjuna’s philosophy and thus maintain the cast system, which was endangered by the ascent of Buddhism. His Adwaita Vedanta resulted from divesting Madhyamaka philosophy of all that could contradict the dogmas at the root of the Upanishads and Vedanta, which required the assertion of the One (i.e., of Brahman-Atman). However, the assertion of the One was a conceptual position or thesis (paksha) just as valid as its opposite (pratipaksha) and which, therefore, could be easily refuted. On the contrary, Nagarjuna’s Adwaya Madhyamaka did not assert anything, but limited itself to refuting by means of reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) whatever position were adopted by opponents. Nagarjuna’s basic premise, which Shankara could not keep, was that in order to discover the absolute it was necessary to dissolve the subject-object duality and, in general, all instances of understanding in terms of delusorily valued-absolutized thoughts.

Also the spiritual practices described by Shankara fail to correspond to Nagarjuna’s approach, for none of them involves the means that could provide an opportunity for the unconcealment of the true condition of the essence or ngowo (ngo bo) aspect of the Self-quà-Base, which is the constituent of the thoughts that color our perception or that chain themselves in trains of thought, and which, when unconcealed, is the dharmakaya. On the contrary, many of them only seem to reinforce dualism and delusion.

The One is the first hypostasis, the transcendent absolute; when it begins to think, it does so in and as the second hypostasis, which is the nous or Intelligence. The soul or psyche is the third hypostasis, in which and through which the spatio-temporal universe begins to be produced, and which can have this function because it limits with the material world that it creates (Plotinus, IV 8, in Cappelletti, 2000, p. 251).

Michael Zimmerman (1998, p. 202) objected that this does not apply to the pioneer theorist of deep ecology / ecosophy Arne Naess, insofar as Naess distinguishes between the phenomenal realm, which the
Norwegian thinker calls spatio-temporal “span,” and what the same thinker calls non-spatio-temporal “depth” or “emptiness”—and which, we may infer, Zimmerman views as a transcendent spirit. However, at first sight the latter, rather than seeming to be a transcendent spirit, seems to correspond to Kant’s Ding-an-Sich or Thing-in-Itself, which is the given—as different from the phenomena that according to Kant arise when the human psyche structures the given for experience in terms of the a priori forms of sensibility. Rather than referring to what Naess calls non-spatio-temporal “depth” or “emptiness” by the term Ding-an-Sich, Zimmerman calls it the noumenal domain—which etymologically means “the realm of what is thought.” Since it is not clear whether Kant took the noumenon and the Ding-an-Sich to be exactly the same truth or gave each term a subtly different nuance, and since the former involves the rather bewildering reference to thought, I use the term Ding-an-Sich. It is true that the term noumenon, because of its etymology, might be taken to have something to do with “spirit,” but in order to assert it to be transcendent we would have to redefine the term transcendent as “that which is beyond the phenomena of our experience” (rather than being beyond the supposedly physical reality, which is how most people understand the term).

In Khuddaka Nikaya, III: Udana, VI, 4-5 (“The various sects,” 1 and 2), the fourteen avyakrita questions or avyakravastuni are divided into four sets, the first one containing the four questions concerning the “origin of the universe,” which are: (1) is the world eternal?; is it not eternal?; is it both eternal and not eternal?; is it neither eternal nor not eternal? The remaining three sets of questions are the following: (2) is the world infinite?; is it not infinite?; is it both infinite and not infinite?; is it neither infinite nor not infinite?; (3) are the animating principle and the body identical?; are the animating principle and the body different?; (4) does the Tathagata exist after death?; does the Tathagata not exist after death?; does the Tathagata both exist after death and not exist after death?; does the Tathagata neither exist after death nor not exist after death? As we can see, this discourse of Buddha Shakyamuni prefigures the structure of Madhyamika refutations, which do but bring it to subtler philosophical subjects. As we can see, this discourse of Buddha Shakyamuni prefigures the structure of Madhyamika refutations, which do but bring it to subtler philosophical subjects. (These occur in several places in the Nikayas: twice in Majjhima I [sutta 72], once in Samyutta, III and once in Samyutta, IV; once in Digha 9 [Pottapada Sutta] and once in Digha 29 [Pasadika Sutta]. In his turn, Nagarjuna deals with them in the Mulamadhyamakakarika, XXVII, and in Dharmasamgraha.)

Cf. the preceding note.

In Dudjom Rinpoche (1991, vol. I, p. 219), we read:

“The dependent is without essence in respect to creation, because creation from the four alternative limits do not exist: Things are not created from themselves because that which was created and creation itself consist of instantaneous time moments, which renders them mutually exclusive substances. Nor are things created from something else, because on analysis the specific characteristics of that something else are not [found to] exist. Then, things are not created from both [themselves and other causes], because [themselves and other causes] are mutually exclusive substances. And, [finally], without a cause, creation is impossible. …whatever is appariotional and so forth instantly appears inasmuch as it is dependently originated, in the manner of a dream or an illusion. Such is said in the Sarvabuddhavishayavatarajñanalokalamkarasutra:”

“‘Mañjushri, dreams appear but do not exist. Similarly all things, too, appear but do not exist.

“Down to:

“They are illusory, like a mirage, a castle in the sky, the moon in water, a reflected image and an emanation’.”

The above refutation is based on the view of time as a succession of instantaneous moments (which are not self-existent), according to which the illusion of there being a continuity of substances and actions would be similar to illusion of there being a continuity of substances and action in a movie picture, which results from the succession of still individual pictures in the film (with the difference that yogis have always insisted that the successive time moments have no duration whatsoever). Contrarily to the opinion of some dialecticians and scholars, this view of time is not an abstract theory of reality that the Yogacharas borrowed from the theoretical schools of the Hinayana, but is based on yogic experience. In turn, the rejection of this view by the Madhyamika Prasangikas is based on logical reasoning.

In case anyone would like to see the negation of production or creation confirmed by scriptural authority, the Anavatapitanagarajaripricchasutra (klu’i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa’i mdo) reads:

“Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced;

it does not have a nature of production.
Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty; one who knows emptiness is [rightly] mindful.”

In Namkhai Norbu (1999, p. 93), we read:

“In the Dzogchen teachings, it is considered that the primordial state, which is beyond time, and beyond creation and destruction, is the fundamentally pure Base of all existence, both at the universal and at the individual levels. It is the inherent nature of the primordial state to manifest as light, which in turn manifests as the five colors, [which are] the essences of the elements. The essences of the elements interact (as explained in the Bön cosmology) to produce the elements themselves, which make up both the individual’s body and the whole material dimension. The universe is thus understood as the spontaneously arisen play of the energy of the primordial state, and may be enjoyed as such by an individual who remains integrated with his or her essential inherent condition, in the all-liberating, self-perfected state, the state of Dzogchen.”

Does the timeless Base or Self-quä-Base both antedate and outlast manifestation? Insofar as this question presupposes time, it is senseless to make it with regard to what from its own perspective is timeless.

The Dzogchen view of the Base as being from its own perspective timeless is in accordance with seeming implications of Mahayamika philosophy, and of the thinking of Buddhist Master Ashvagosa, according to which space and time, rather than being self-existent, depend upon perception, for then it could be assumed that in the absence of perception and hence of life, and therefore previously to manifestation, there is no space and no time. According to Kant, space and time are a priori forms of sensibility, and therefore we may assume that they cannot exist before sensibility, and therefore before the origin of life.

According to Superunification theory, dimensions, including time, “expanded” with the supposed big bang, and hence we may assume before the supposed big bang there was no explicate dimensionality. The same might be the case with the holonomic theory of David Bohm and in general with what John Wheeler calls recognition physics, according to which at the dimensional level of Plank’s constant there is no explicate dimensionality. And so on.

Do the above systems imply that, even from a relative perspective, we are not entitled to speak of a “before” and an “after” manifestation, and perhaps even that we cannot speak of a manifestation (for so long as there are space and time there is the manifest, and hence we may not speak of its manifestation)? There is no doubt that from the perspective of the absolute there is no manifestation and hence no before or after manifestation; however, as to whether there are such things from the relative perspective is something that—as may be inferred from Shakyamuni’s negation to discuss the origin of the world and so on, both in the Pali Canon and in the Sanskrit Mahayana Canon—Sutric Buddhism would refuse to answer.

Although the Charvaka or Lokayata was an Indian materialistic philosophical school, as a rule manuals of Buddhist philosophy refer by the Tibetan translation of these terms—gyangphenpa (rgyan ’phen pa)—in a generic way to a class of view that comprises various systems that deny the existence of anything transcendent, that deny the existence of a soul, that deny causation and the law of cause and effect, that deny that any view may be established, and so on. Among the subsystems they include in this category are those of the phelpa (phyal ba), of the gyangphenpa (rgyan ’phen pa) in the narrow sense of the term, and of the murthugpa (mur thug pa) or nihilists. Since the discussion of the views referred to by these terms is beyond the scope of this work, the reader is referred to: Karmay (1988), Baroetto (1990), Downman (1992), Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), and Namkhai Norbu (1999 / 2001).

He refers to them as causal mystics or mystics who attained the causal realm. However, since he believes what he calls the causal to be the dharmakaya, what he is saying is that they are dharmakaya yogis.

I am not advocating for a return to the time prior to the development of science and technology, but for a redimensioning and restructuring of these roughly as conceived by Marcuse (1972, p. 61). However, I agree with Marcuse (1964, ch. 6: “From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination”) that science is ideological insofar as it has built into its concepts and methods an interest in instrumental action—that is, in the technical manipulation and control of nature—and hence it is necessarily committed to an exploitative view of nature and human beings, rather than neutrally and accurately reflecting an objective reality. In fact, as shown in vol. III of this book, and in Capriles (1986, 1990b, 1994a, 2007a, 2007b), the development of science and technology was a direct consequence of the development of the basic human delusion the Buddha called avidya and Heraclitus called lethe, which then catalyzed this very development, exacerbating it, and thus led to the current ecological crisis—which represents the reductio ad absurdum of delusion that makes its eradication possible. In this light, the development of science and technology has a positive side, which is that of making possible the reductio
ad absurdum of delusion and hence the latter's eradication at a global level, which in its turn would make possible the beginning of a new Golden Age—or rather of a Millennium like the one prophesized in the Kalachakra Tantra, the Book of Ismaïlis (Under the direction of Brice Parain, 1972, p. 281) and John’s Apocalypse. This is discussed in greater detail in vol. III of this book and in Capriles (1994a).

If the Path one has followed is based on a single principle, and on the basis of one’s experience of that Path one tries to understand other Paths which combine different principles including the principle on which the Path one followed is based, one will correctly understand those aspects of the Paths in question that are based on the principle of the Path one has followed, but not necessarily other aspects of those Paths. However, if one has obtained realization through the vehicle that the Samten Migdrön (bsam gan mig sgron) calls the “primordial ancestor of all vehicles” (i.e. the Dzogchen Atiyoga), one will understand the principles of all Paths and vehicles.

Wilber asserts his position to lie above the dichotomies in question, yet throughout his whole work he systematically argues in favor of the “ascending path” and disparage the advocates of the “descending” one. He writes (Wilber 1995, pp. 345-346, quoted in Daniels, 2004, p. 75):

“The great dualism of all dualisms, I have suggested, is between ‘this world’ and an ‘other world.’ It has infected our spirituality, our philosophy, our science; it runs as equally through the repressive Ascenders who wish only the ‘other world’ or eternal release, as through the shadow-hugging Descenders, proper troglodytes each and all, who want salvation solely in the passing glories of ‘this world.’ It slices through every Age of Enlightenment with its upward-yearning Reason and every Romantic reaction that seeks instead to explore every downward-turning darkness and depth. It governs where we seek our salvation, and which ‘world’ we will ignore or destroy in order to get it… And they are both right. Or, we might say, they are both half right and half wrong.”

However, though Wilber presents himself as being above the debate, as noted in the paragraph or the regular text to which the reference mark for this note was affixed, and as shown in the discussion of his system in Beyond Mind II (Capriles, 2006a) and Capriles (2007a vol. II), he is one of the most rabid advocates of the ascending path—which is the reason why Washburn calls his paradigm “structural-hierarchical.” And since, as shown in Beyond Mind II (Capriles, 2006a) and many other works of mine (Capriles, 2000b, 2000c, 2003, 2007a, etc.), Vajrayana Buddhism in general and Dzogchen in particular, the Bön tradition, Shaivism, Taoism, Zurvanism and so on share the view of human spiritual and social evolution as a process of degeneration, he is disparagingly calling the founding Masters, and all Masters in the lineages of these traditions, by the epithet “trogloodyes,” which he intends to constitute an insult—even though from the standpoint of the view of human spiritual and social evolution as degeneration it would be a praise.

Wilber (1996, pp. 10-11) writes:

“The Ascending path is purely transcendental and otherworldly. It is usually puritanical, ascetic, yogic, and it tends to devalue or even deny the body, the senses, sexuality, the Earth, the flesh. It seeks its salvation in a kingdom not of this world; it sees manifestation or samsara as evil or illusory; it seeks to get off the wheel entirely. And, in fact, for the Ascenders, any sort of Descent tends to be viewed as illusory or even evil. The Ascending path glorifies the One, not the Many; Emptiness, not Form; Heaven, not Earth.

“The Descending path counsels just the opposite. It is this-worldly to the core, and it glorifies the Many, not the One. It celebrates the Earth, the body, and the senses, and often sexuality. It even identifies Spirit with the sensory world, with Gaia, with manifestation, and sees in every sunrise, every moonrise, all the Spirit a person could ever want. It is purely immanent and despises anything transcendental. In fact, for the Descenders, any form of Ascent is viewed as evil.”

This dichotomous classification of worldviews is extremely reductionistic; very few worldviews fit into one or the other of these extremes, for most combine elements Wilber sees as belonging to one of them with elements Wilber sees as pertaining to the other. In fact, Wilber’s classification of paths into “Ascending” and “Descending” makes very little sense. However, the worst is that Wilber’s concept of nondual paths does not fit true nondual Paths, for as shown in the preceding section of this chapter, he asserts nondual paths to point to the true condition of reality, without this pointing resulting in the dissolution of the subject-object duality that, in terms of the threefold Dzogchen classification of avidya / marigpa favored by Longchen Rabjamapa (cf. Longchenpa, 1976, p. 24, and Cornu, 2001, p. 62), constitutes the second layer of the veil that prevents the realization of this true condition of reality. In fact, the nonduality of nondual Paths lies in the fact that they lead to the nonconceptual realization of what Buddhism calls the unproduced / unconditioned, which is the true condition of reality when not filtered-through / structured-
Thus what all of these practices have in common is that, on the one hand, they make it impossible for the subject-object duality to be properly realized—and definitive, irreversible Awakening involves the irreversible fall of the subject-object duality.

Expression attributed to Madame de Pompadour, or alternatively to French King Louis XV, meaning “after me the Deluge” and indicating an attitude of total unconcern with whatever may happen after one’s own existence. By extension, it may be applied to an attitude of unconcern with the fate of others, not only in the future, but in the present as well.


As stated in a previous note, in the Pali Canon the term ābhēta was used to express something that some Hindu extremists illegitimately predicated of the Self (Skt. atman; Pali, atta), but which it would have been legitimate to predicate only of nirvana. Therefore it is in the Mahayana that anutpada and anutpatti are predicated of whatever originates from the conjunction of causes and conditions, or from interdependent arisings.

Buddhism negates atman or self and asserts anatman (Pali, anatta) or nonself. However, Wilber does not refer to a truly existing self, but to a sense of self and the operations whereby this sense of self is produced and sustained.

We have seen that the progression nirmanakaya-sambhogakaya-dharmakaya-swabhavikaya is proper to the inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation, whereas the Path of Spontaneous liberation of Dzogchen attiyoga involves instead a sequence dharmakaya-sambhogakaya-nirmanakaya—where these names do not at all refer to the same conditions as in the Tantras of Transformation. Likewise, I showed Wilber’s descriptions of the seventh, eighth and ninth fulcra not to fit the conditions of the nirmanakaya, the sambhogakaya and the dharmakaya, respectively, as they are understood in the Path of Transformation.

On three consecutive occasions he tried to redistribute the wealth of his country, giving rise to an ever more irate and radical reaction on the part of the nobility, until finally they got his mother, who was jealous of the other wives of his father (whom, as was customary in Tibet, Mune Tsampo had inherited upon the latter’s death—his mother being the only of his father’s wives he would not inherit because of their immediate kinship), to kill him.

Both the great scholar Gendun Chöphel and my teacher, the great Dzogchen Master Dudjom Yeshe Dorje, were imprisoned on trumped up charges—the former in Tibet before the Chinese invasion, the latter in India. However, behind the false accusations against them there were political and spiritual reasons—as was also the case with other incarcerations in the twentieth century (including that of Lama Tapgyal and various other ones).

The practice of Chö (gcod) depends on the arising of visions of fearsome demons and elementals attacking and intending to devour the practitioner, and without these visions and the ensuing dread it would not yield its fruit, for it is when, terrorized by the visions and tortured by the excruciatingly painful mental sensation (Skt. vedana; Tib. tshorwa [tshor ba]) in her or his own heart, the practitioner looks into his inner dimension to seek for the seemingly separate mental subject who dreads the visions and, feeling separate from the mental sensation, deems it unbearable and rejects it, that the illusion of duality and delusorily valued-absolutized thought in general spontaneously liberates itself in the manifestation of the Self-qua-Path (cf. Capriles, 2000a, 2000b Part III).

The practices of Thögel and the Yangthik depend on the occurrence of visions of luminous spheres (thig le), which in the long run activate the propensities subsumed under the Tibetan term zhedang (tsho dang), which transform the delusional perception of the visions as objects lying in an external dimension into conflict—which in its turn automatically results in the spontaneous liberation of the illusory subject-object duality and delusorily valued-absolutized thought in general (cf. Capriles, 2000b Part II, 2007a vol. II).

Thus what all of these practices have in common is that, on the one hand, they make it impossible for the illusions of duality, of the self-existence of phenomena, and of the ultimate importance of the individual and her or his experiences, to go on unnoticed, and on the other they create the condition in which they are more likely to liberate themselves spontaneously and in which this spontaneous liberation has greater power for neutralizing karma. Therefore, they force their spontaneous liberation of delusory experiences as soon as they manifest, each and every time they do so, and the continued repetition of this while the energetic-volume-determining-the-scope-of-awareness is so high and conflict is so extreme, in very short time neutralizes the propensities for the delusory valuation-absolutization of thought and hence for the
illusion of duality to manifest. This is why the practices in question are deemed to be the most direct, and in this sense the “highest” Buddhist practices.

I will not refer to cases like that of the Hopi girl discussed by R. Coles that was mentioned by Sean Kelly (1998a, p. 128, note 1; 1998b, p. 379), or to the rest of the evidence adduced by Kelly (1998a, p. 128, note 1), because although such evidence may contradict Wilber’s views, it is quite possible that the cases will not fit my definition of supreme spirituality: this is why I will limit myself to testimonies taken from the Dzogchen tradition. With regard to Wilber’s amplified lam rim (lam rim) view, consider his words on the subject (Wilber, 1998, p. 333):

“The question then becomes: [Do] people have to pass through these stages (postconventional, centauric, integrated, etc.) in order to make genuine spiritual progress?

“Once again, you see, it depends upon the meaning of spiritual. If we define spirituality as postformal and post-postconventional, the answer is yes, definitively. But if we define spiritual as being a separate line of development, the answer is no, definitely not. In this case, spiritual development is occurring alongside or behind or parallel to those other lines of development, and thus it may race ahead of, of lag behind, those other lines.

“But that simply pushed the question back: Does stable postconventional spiritual development depend upon passing from its preconventional wave to its conventional wave to its postconventional wave? And I believe the answer, backed by the preponderance of evidence, is most definitively “yes.”

“To say the same thing using other terms, the spiritual line moves from a prepersonal wave (archaic, food, safety, preconventional) to a personal wave (from beloneliness and conventional concern to postconventional/global) to a transpersonal wave (post-postconventional, psychic, subtle, causal, bodhisattvic). In short, the spiritual stream runs through subconscious to conscious to superconscious waves, by whatever name.

“These spiritual stages, I believe, are transitional stages (stages in the “soft” sense); of course, the self-system can still be “all over the place.” This is not a rigid and mechanical clunk-and-grind view, as I said. At the same time, it does show, on the long haul, a general unfolding through the expanding waves of consciousness, with developments in the spiritual stream depending upon previously established competences in the stream itself.”

The absolute wrongness of this view becomes even more apparent in the context of phylogenesis, which is one that I have not discussed extensively so far, and which will be discussed in depth in vol. III of this book (in the meantime, the reader may consult the provisional version of the work in question posted in my webpage, as well as Taylor (2003, 2005). However, we have already seen that the Dzogchen teachings assert the root Tantra of the Dzogchen Menngagde (man ngag sde) or Upadeshavarga, the Drataljur Chenpoi Gyü (sgra thal ’gyur chen po’i rgyud; Skt., Shabda maha prasamga mula tantra), to have been taught in the primordial age corresponding to the very beginning of our species, and that Dzogchen was very widespread at the time, when according to Wilber’s view humans were unconscious and could by no means access the transpersonal realms in any stable way, let alone attain Awakening: according to Wilber, at that stage the religion of people was food (Wilber, 1998, p. 336)—i.e., the ultimate concern of human beings was procuring food!!!

Chögyal Namkhai Norbu (unpublished ms.) tells us:

“Another very interesting story is that of tertön Mingyur Dorje (mi ’gyur rdo rje)... He was a true Tulku (sprul sku), even though he was not recognized as such as an infant and had not been appointed as the abbot of a monastery. Let us briefly consider his story.

“There was a very important Kagyüpa Master called Araga Karma Chagmê (a ra ga kar ma chags med, or kar ma chags med ra ga a sya [Karma Chagme Raga Asya]; 1613-1678), who was also a Dzogchen Master and a Tertön (ger ston) or Treasure Revealer recognized as an emanation of Ma Rinchen Chok (rma rin chen mchog, one of the 25 direct disciples of Guru Padmasambhava), and who spent most of his life in mountain retreat (he was the author / compiler of a noted richō [ri chos] or text on mountain retreat that the Karma Kagyu, Drikung Kagyu and Nyingma traditions classify among the definitive texts on the subject). While in retreat, one night in a dream he had the indication that not far from his retreat place a baby had been born to a simple family, who was the Tulku of a former Master of the Nyingma (rynγ ma pa) monastery of Khatok (kah thog) that despite not being so famous was a great practitioner who had achieved stable rigpa. A few days afterwards Araga sent one of his disciples to find out whether a baby had actually been born in that family, and the reply was in the affirmative. Since Araga was not one of the Masters who habitually recognize Tulkus, instead of making a formal recognition he talked to the infant’s
parents, asking them whether they agreed to send the child to him when he arrived at the age of eight and he no longer needed to be near his mother. Since that family, like everyone else in that region, had great faith in Araga, their reply was in the affirmative, and the Master helped them financially until the child attained the age at which he would move with him.

The Master asked his disciples to take care of the child, teaching him how to read and transmitting to him the knowledge deemed elementary in Tibet at the time. When he was eight or nine years old, the Master gave him teachings, transmissions and initiations in order to Awaken him. And, in fact, when he was ten years old he Awakened and started recounting the visions he began to have both while awake and in dreams, featuring Guru Padmasambhava and many Awake Ones with whom he had contact. Initially Araga had recognized the child, invited him and taught him, but now the child became his teacher. Between the ages of eleven and thirteen, the child dictated thirteen volumes of namchö (nam chos: nam mkha’i chos) terma (gter ma) teachings, which we have with all their transmissions. How could anyone doubt that the child was a Tulku when he had manifested such impressive signs, which had marveled everyone? Tulkus must be like this; if someone is the Tulku of a great Master, he or she must have this capacity to remember his or her previous learning and Awaken easily.

The great tertön Jigme Lingpa (’jigs med gling pa: 1730-1798) is possibly the most famous example in the last centuries of an individual who, without having done systematic or institutional studies, as a result of his supreme Dzogchen practice achieved one of the highest levels of learning among Tibetan Masters of all times—to the extent of having been granted the title kun mkhyen (kun mkhyen) or “all-knowing.”

However, it would not be altogether impossible, as demonstrated by the case of Pang Gen Mipham Gönpo, whom Vairotsana the translator met when Pang Mipham was eighty-five years old, after which he gave him teachings on the Dorje Zampa (rdo rje zam pa) or “Vajra Bridge” of the Longde (klong sde) series of Dzogpa Chenpo (rdzogs pa chen po)—so called because the practice was a bridge between the normal physical condition and the rainbow body or jalû (’ja’ lus). Because of Mipham Gönpo’s advanced age, he could not sit in meditation posture, and so he used a meditation belt and support stick in order to sit up straight and remain motionless. However, by applying the practice in question, the old man attained jalû (’ja’ lus), the rainbow body, at the age of 110 years old. Of all of Vairotsana’s many disciples, Mipham Gönpo, Yudra Nyingpo, Nyag Jñanakumara, and Sherab Dölma from Li, became his four chief disciples.

Each of them is a more thorough unconcealment of the Trikaya qua Base because from one perspective the dharma kaya is the realization of the essence or ngowo (ngo bo) aspect of the Base, which is voidness; the sambhogakaya is the realization of the nature or rangzhin (rang bzhin) aspect of the Base, which is clarity and which is realized in its inseparability from the essence or ngowo aspect; and the nirmanakaya is the realization of the energy or thukje (thugs rje) aspect of the Base, which is the disposition to manifest and the continuous process of manifestation, which is realized in its inseparability from the other two aspects. Thus the end result of the process is the total unconcealment of the whole Trikaya.

On the other hand, each of them is a different dimension because the dharma kaya is the correct apprehension of the dang (gdangs) form of manifestation of energy, the sambhogakaya is the correct apprehension of the rölpa (rol pa) form of manifestation of energy, and the nirmanakaya is the correct apprehension of the tsel (rtsal) form of manifestation of energy. However, as noted above, each of these successive dimensions embraces the preceding ones, for in the realization of the sambhogakaya that of dharma kaya is perfectly manifest, and in that of the nirmanakaya those of the sambhogakaya and dharma kaya are included.


“I had to abandon the idea of the superordinate position of the ego... I saw that everything, all paths I had been following, all steps I had taken, were leading back to a single point — namely, to the mid-point. It became increasingly plain to me that the mandala is the centre. It is the exponent of all paths. It is the path to the centre, to individuation.

“... I knew that in finding the mandala as an expression of the self I had attained what was for me the ultimate.”

This point is also clearly made in Jung (1968, 1964, 1928). It is related to the difference between Self and ego, which Jung dealt with in Jung (1975, 1964). Of course, Jung is not speaking of the ultimate in the Buddhist sense of the term.

I decided not to discuss David M. Levin in this volume because the view of the Ground as Being at the core of Levin (1985), which he took from Heidegger and from Herbert V. Guenther’s interpretation of Heidegger, was refuted in vol. I of this book. In its turn, the prediction that a new paradigm going beyond ocularcentrism would characterize our postmodern future (Levin 1993a, 1993b), was discussed in the
Therefore, it is prudent to respect the phenomenological

Norman O. Brown (1959) viewed sublimation as being largely a bogus category and as being, rather than a substitute for repression, a continuation of it by different means, and proposed a “radical desublimation” that would involve a return to the wisdom of the polymorphously perverse body, a rejection of goal-oriented culture in favor of living in the moment, and the replacement of the dread of death that paradoxically turns life itself into a living death for an acceptance of death as part of life. His views were clearly descending and may be very validly made the object of Wilber’s critique of descending systems, yet I find them far more interesting than Wilber’s.

Also cited in Daniels (2004, p. 76). The fact that I refer to Daniels’ work does not imply I agree that people are entitled to bestow on themselves the titles that traditions confer on their most extraordinary representatives; such titles have traditionally been bestowed by official representatives of the tradition to which the honored individual belongs.

This is the translation Chögyal Namkhai Norbu and Adriano Clemente (1999) chose for the Tibetan term kunje gyālpo (kun byed rgyal po), literally meaning “All-creating King,” which is used in the Semde series of Dzogchen teachings for designating the source and true condition of all phenomena, and which gives its name to the fundamental Tantra of this series of teachings (kun byed rgyal po ‘i rgyud; Oddiyana language, sarwadharmamahashantibodhicittakularaja). I believe Chögyal Namkhai Norbu and Adriano Clemente dismissed the literal translation of the Tibetan term because it could be taken to refer to God as Creator.

Washburn does not list all of these functions, but he discusses some of them. For example, in the section “Ego Development” of Chapter Four, “Ego Development and Dualism in Latency,” in Washburn (1994), he discusses functions such as synthesis, self-reflection, knowledge of one’s own initiative and active volition, devoting various pages to each of them. In the book in question Washburn also discusses gender differences in the development of “independence and ego functions” (Chapter Ten: Gender and Transcendence”).

I assume the root of Washburn’s concept of the mental ego to lie in Wilber’s (1981, 1996d) work, and the root of Wilber’s concept of the mental ego to lie in the phenomenological ego-psychology of Paul Federn (1952). However, Washburn’s concept seems to have its own features, just as does Wilber’s.

It would be a truism—which as noted in vol. I of this book Wittgenstein dared to state—to say that insofar as we cannot see into the exterior of our experience, denying that there is something out there is just as illegitimate as asserting that there is not. Therefore it would be equally illegitimate to claim that, (a) there is a dimensional world, or a nondimensional Ding an Sich, or a contradictorily dimensional implicate order (cf. my critique of Bohm’s understanding of dimensionality in what he calls the implicate order in Capriles, 2007a, vol. III), or a transcendent spirit (as asserted by both Wilber and David Bohm—for the latter posits an explicate order that is within the bounds of our experience, an implicate order inferred from physical experiments and that as such is conjectured on the basis of scientific experience, and a Spirit that is beyond the implicate order itself), or (b) to claim there is nothing beyond our experience (as did Berkeley [except with regard to God], post-Kantian German idealists, and Hegel in his “solution” to the Kantian problem of the Ding-an-Sich).

Therefore, it is prudent to respect the phenomenological epoché and, in agreement with Washburn, abstain from considering anything that is not our own experience. However, it is well-known that according to Einstein’s Field Theory the universe is an energy continuum, and so even if we assumed the existence of an objective universe external to our experience, from the standpoint of Field Theory—and even more clearly so from the standpoint of subsequent theories such as Superunification, recognition physics and the holonomic theory of David Bohn—both our own selves and the whole of the universe would be what I am calling the Self qua Base. And what is far more important, it is legitimate to see our experience as a continuum, for it would be absurd to think that aspects of our experience may be inherently external to other aspects of the same experience, or that some phenomena within it may be inherently separate from other phenomena within it, when it is clear that our figure / ground minds single out segments of a
In conclusion, the fact that we keep the phenomenological *epoche* does not in any way imply, as Washburn seems to believe, that we are not allowed to assert our experience of what we normally view as an external world to be part of the Supreme Source / the Self-*qua*-Base: the whole of our experience, including the experience of what we view as external, is beyond any doubt part of the Supreme Source / the Self-*qua*-Base. However, this posits a new problem: is there a different Base for each individual, or is there a single universal Base for all individuals? In the Dzogchen teachings the Base or zhi (*gehi*) is at the same time individual and universal, insofar as the Base is the Trikaya of Buddha, and the Trikaya comprises the dharmakaya, which is universal and common to all beings, and the rupakaya (i.e. the combination of the sambhogakaya and the nirmanakaya), which is different for each different being (a fact that involves the same ambiguity as human experience insofar as the latter is universal in that human experience is always human experience, but is individual in that each individual experiences only her or his experience and cannot experience anyone else’s experience).

Elusion is Laing’s (1961) term for what Sartre (1980) called bad faith: a self-deceit that plays the same role as Freud’s repression, but which does not have its source either outside the ego or outside the conscious. For a comparison of the Sartrean and the Freudian model of elusion/repression, and an exposition of my own model, cf. Capriles (2007a vol. II, Chapter V, section “The Metaexistential View: The Paradise of Truth, the Hell of Delusion, and the Perennially Frustrating Elusion of the Hell of Delusion [Featuring a Discussion of the Concept of the “Unconscious”], pp. 314-341 of the version of November 2007).

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre (31st Ed. 1980) illustrated the link in question with the example of a man who, as he is unselfconsciously looking through a keyhole, suddenly realizes he is being watched. He instantly “feels touched in the heart by the Other’s look,” whereupon a *link of being* is established, via the sensation experienced in the heart, between *being-for-Self* (i.e. the being of the mental subject) and the shameful entity the Other is perceiving as object. This is at the root of that which Sartre called *being-for-others*—the bare, most basic experience of which is for Sartre the experience of hell he called “shame.”

As shown in various works of mine, and in particular in *Capriles* (2007a), the continuum of beings who have not reGnized their true nature has always involved the ignorance of this nature that is the first sense of avidya or marigpa in all Dzogchen classifications. Then at some point the subject-object duality arises. Then on the occasion of being punished as infants the mental subject establishes what Sartre (1980) called a *link of being* with the monster the punisher perceives as being the individual referred to by one’s name, *becoming* that monster. And then in order to elude the pain of being the monster in question we build a self-image and thus come to develop a roughly Freudian ego, turning the monster into what Susan Isaacs (1989) called an *unconscious phantasy*. Thus the illusion of estrangement from the Self-*qua*-Base is prior to the ego both in the chronological and the ontologically-[meta]phenomenological senses of the term.

The conception of ego qua sense of self is comprised in Freud’s operational conception of the ego in the second topic, for ego functions are responsible for producing and maintaining the sense of self. Thus the ego of the second topic also involves illusion and delusion as I have defined these terms.

As shown in a previous note, Washburn does not list all of these functions, but he discusses some of them. In the section “Ego Development” of Chapter Four, “Ego Development and Dualism in Latency,” in Washburn (1994), he discusses synthesis, self-reflection, knowledge of one’s own initiative and active volition, devoting various pages to each of them. In his discussion of synthesis, Washburn includes the development of an identity project, and we can see that this involves the mental subject’s identification with a self-image, modeled on the basis of the superego (perseverance) and the “ego-ideal” (aspiration). The fact that the subject-object duality is a precondition of self-reflection as discussed by Washburn is self-evident insofar as self-reflection consists in taking as object those elements of our own mental
activity that can be objectified (in his view self-reflection switches from empty and self-assured reflection of the mental ego over itself and becomes reflection of the mental ego over itself as embodied in an ongoing identity project, and it helps create the object of reflection). That the subject-object duality is a prerequisite of knowledge of one’s own initiative is a point that would require too long a discussion, but the reader can confirm it by reading Washburn’s consideration of the problem. Active volition, in its turn, involves assuming a compromise with a particular vital course, involving a compromise with new possibilities and one that either reaffirms or reneges on it—all of which requires the subject-object duality insofar as it has to do with self-identity.

(With regard to Washburn’s use of the term “ego-ideal,” it must be noted that Freud used two different terms: Ichideal, which is the one which, following the established usage, in Capriles [2007a vol. II] I render as “ego-ideal,” and Idealich, which literally means “ideal ego.” Jacques Lacan [1975], in particular, sustains that the two terms designate two totally different functions: “The Ich-Ideal, the ego-ideal, is the other qua speaker, the other insofar as he has a symbolic, sublimated relationship with the ego, which in our dynamic dealing is at once similar and different from the imaginary libido.” On the other hand, according to Lacan [1960], the ideal ego [Ideal-Ich] would be an essentially narcissistic formation that is built up during what he calls the stage of the mirror, and accordingly would belong to the register of the imaginary and become an “aspiration” or a “dream.” I am not at all convinced Freud consciously established this difference between terms—which Laplanche & Pontalis [1967] outright deny—but if so then what Washburn refers to, rather than the ego-ideal, would be the ideal ego. Cf. also Roudinesco & Plon [1997].)

This follows from the fact that Washburn is writing from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, in which there is discussion regarding the origin and mutations of the ego, and he uses the term ego to refer to a series of different functional structures, yet speaks of all of them as “the ego,” asserting the latter to be inherent in the human psyche and not to dissolve at any stage of life and under any circumstances (even if we follow a spiritual Path like those of the higher forms of Buddhism to its end).

The term ego has been used by philosophers and psychologists in very different senses. In both philosophy and psychology the term has been used to refer to the person, to consciousness and to personal identity, and has been understood in psychological, epistemological and metaphysical senses—often mixed with each other. In a psychological sense, the term has often been used to refer to a substance underlying all of its manifestations, but the existence of such substance has been thoroughly refuted by Buddhism (as well as by the various thinkers discussed in Capriles [2007a, vol. II]). In an epistemological sense, it may refer either to a knowing substance or to the series of knowing acts (real [“empiric” in Kantian terminology], potential [“transcendental” in Kantian terminology], or both). In a metaphysical sense, it has been used to refer to a substance that is deemed to be more fundamental than all psychological and epistemological entities—namely the soul, which has also been negated by Buddhism and which could hardly be that which at different stages of life becomes the various functional structures considered by Washburn.

In all the senses listed above, in those it has in psychoanalysis, in that of the mental subject that constantly becomes this or that object (and which in particular becomes a given individual’s perception of others’ perception of the entity indicated by that individual’s name—the concrete reference of which is the body), in that of the switching identification in adult experience that causes an individual to feel at one time that she or he is someone in the head moving the body and at other times that he or she is the body others see as him or her, and in all other senses of the term, the ego is a spurious product of the interaction of the three senses of avidya in both of the classifications found in the Dzogchen teachings, a delusion produced by the drive the illusory entity Sartre (1980) called being-for-Self manifests to become what the same author called being-for-others and then form a self-image, an illusion produced by the interaction of the five skandhas, or a provisional functional structure—yet in all cases it is an illusion that provisionally dissolves in the Contemplation state of superior bodhisattvas and so on, and definitively dissolves when Buddhahood is attained.

I object to this integration being called tertiary process: if primary and secondary process have ceased to be two, what remains is a single process rather than a third one; if they continue to be two but they work in a perfectly integrated way, then there is no third process that may be so called.

These positive feedback loops are of the kind discussed in Bateson (1972) and then in Capriles (1977, 1986, 1994, 2000a, 2000b, 2007a vol. II, etc.).

Furthermore, in Washburn (1994), section “Ego Development” of Chapter Four, “Ego Development and Dualism in Latency,” in the context of a discussion of knowledge of one’s initiative and active volition, while considering Klaus Riegel’s (1973) and Michael Basseches’ (1980, 1984a, 1984b, 1989) dialectical
model of postformal cognition, after noting that dialectical thinking was originally formulated by Hegel in the nineteenth century, Washburn explains dialectic in clearly Hegelian terms. Since he does not offer alternative explanations of dialectic elsewhere, I assume that whenever Washburn speaks of dialectic without making it clear that he has in mind operations of thought rather than developmental changes in reality, he has in mind Hegel’s model of dialectic.

Even though Marxism in general rejected Hegel’s concept of nature and in general of the physical universe as a projection of Mind that was not different from Mind, which as such obliterated the map-territory distinction and implied that the dynamic of nature and in general of the physical universe was ruled by the laws of thought, by speaking of a dialectic of nature in spite of the fact that dialectic is supposed to be the movement of Mind and hence of thought, Engels (1998/2001) unwittingly reproduced the Hegelian outlook. With regard to the Aufhebung or sublation, whereas in Hegel this negation is what allows the movement of Geist (spirit, usually rendered as Mind) to give rise to evolution in the sense of gradual perfecting, Marx views it as the manner of development of material conditions—and although he shares Hegel’s inverted view of the development of society as a process of gradual perfecting (which, however, involves repeated “qualitative leaps” after periods of quantitative accumulation, and which also involves increasing injustice, at least until the transition from capitalism to socialism), he does not fall into exactly into the same error as Engels insofar as the material conditions in question are those produced by human beings who in his view function in terms of the laws of dialectic.

In Washburn (1994), Chapter Four, section “Ego Development,” subsection “Ego Development and Dualism in Latency,” in the context of the discussion of knowledge of one’s own initiative and active volition, while considering Klaus Riegel’s (1973) and Michael Basseches’ (1980, 1984a, 1984b, 1989) dialectical model of postformal cognition, Washburn implicitly accepts Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation as an existing occurrence insofar as he writes that dialectical thinking moves in the direction of an increasing unification and inclusion, and that each phase that transcends, subsumes and integrates formerly independent or fragmented theoretical structures—just as, for example, Newtonian physics are subsumed in relativistic physics. However, the scientific example Washburn gives is not pertinent, for in this and similar cases no negation different from logical negation comes into play; what happens is simply that logical negation is applied to some aspects of the older theory but not to other aspects. The processes I call “phenomenological” are those involving the succession of states of being rather than the succession of concepts or systems of thought built on the basis of secondary process / operative thinking logic; in processes of this kind, the only negation involved that is different from logical negation is the one I call phenomenological negation, which is the one that comes into play in Sartre’s (1980) bad faith and that Laing (1961) explained in terms of a spiral of pretences, and which increases fragmentation and falsehood. Understanding processes of this kind as involving Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation would only be possible on the basis of the false Hegelian premise that nature and reality in general are a projection of spirit ruled by the secondary process / operative thinking logic that rules discursive thought, but that the occurrences in nature and reality in general are self-contradictory and can only be described dialectically in terms of contradictions. (The phenomenological double negation that occurs in Sartre’s bad faith and that Laing illustrated with a spiral of pretences was contrasted with Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation in other terms of my works [Capriles, 2007a vols. II & III; for less complete explanations cf. Capriles, 1992, 1994]).

Though Washburn’s explanation of dialectic development could apply to Marx’s understanding of it just as much as to Hegel’s or Engels’, by applying dialectic to evolutionary changes occurring in the psyche of an individual he is clearly understanding sublation in particular and dialectic in general in Hegel’s sense of the term.

The Madhyamaka Prasangika school of Buddhist philosophy insists that if we assert the emptiness of the I but not so that of phenomena other than human beings (including the five skandhas or aggregates that interact for producing the illusion of egohood), we will be unable to truly realize the emptiness of the I: in order to realize the voidness of the I we have to realize that of the five skandhas or aggregates, none of which is an I, and which interact for producing the illusion of an I. This is quite logical, for without realization of the emptiness of the skandhas, it would be just too easy to conceive the I as the collection self-existent skandhas, and hence as a self-existing I qua collection of elements.

For example, the idea of a metaphysical ego in the sense of a substance underlying all of its changes does not have a referent, even illusory, for such an ego simply does not exist, and we cannot speak of the arising or dissolution of what does not exist. On the other hand, the ego in the sense of the mistaken belief
in an ego, or in the early Freudian sense of sense of self, or in the late Freudian sense in which it designates a set of functional structures that nonetheless include the sense of self they contribute to produce, have a referent, for they refer to something that manifests in experience, even though it does so as an effect of delusion.

According to some Bönpo (bon po) sources Tönpa Shenrab Miwoche (ston pa gshen rab mi bo che) lived around 16,000 BCE. However, Chögyal Namkhai Norbu finds far more credible the Bönpo sources that give us 1,800 BCE (or 1,856 for greater precision), which he assumes to be the correct date. Even though I have no elements for judging which date is the correct one, I adopted this Master’s view in this regard because I have corroborated that he is right in so many interpretations in which he differs from other Masters and researchers. (Some Buddhist sources give us the eighth century CE, but this simply does not seem credible, appearing to be a concoction intended to negate the existence of pre-Buddhist Dzogchen teachings.)

Heidegger used the term in a sense very different from that of zhi (gzhi) in the Dzogchen teachings, even though there is a relationship between the two that I will not discuss here. For the usage of the term “ground” (Grund) in Heidegger’s sense by Levin, cf. Levin (1985, pp. 281-319). At any rate, Levin does not make the distinction between ground in the sense of zhi (gzhi) in the Dzogchen sense of the term and ground in the sense of Heidegger’s Grund, and hence he incurs in the error of identifying zhi (gzhi) with being (das Sein) in Heidegger’s sense denounced in vol. 1 of this book and other shorter works of mine.

It must be noted that one of the authors who took from Guenther the translation of zhi (gzhi) as Ground was his disciple Kennard Lipman, who was an acquaintance of David Levin.

The identification of the Base or zhi (gzhi) with thigle (thig le), which translates the terms kundalini and bindu, would not be wrong, for the Base is Dzogchen-qua-Base, and thigle is one of the synonyms of Dzogchen. However, the term thigle that is used as a synonym of Dzogchen does not refer to something that is located in one particular location in the body, but the true condition of the totality of reality, which includes this totality: in this case the term means sphere, and is used because spheres have no angles, which represent conceptual limits—and the true condition of reality cannot be thought insofar as it lacks differentia specifica and genus proximum. It may also be taken to refer to the fact that the whole of reality is pure energy. However, in no case does the term refer to the region of the body where the source of kundalini energy is supposed to be located.

I believe that by asserting Freud’s conception of the id to be preegoic or subegoic Washburn means that it responds to the manifestation of drives and tendencies in infants and children in civilized societies, which exhibit wayward characteristics. However, Washburn admits drives to be distorted by repression, which is precisely the point I am making—and admits that in the process of integration, in the long run they come to manifest in a wholly different manner, which is beneficial to both self and others.

Freud used the word Trieb (which had precedents in Nietzsche, and, according to Roudinesco & Plon [1997], p. 883, also had precedents in the psychiatric theories of Karl Wilhelm Ideler [1795-1860] and Heinrich Wilhelm Neumann [1814-1884]), which implied the concept of a thrust, to refer to the drives or urges proper to humans, and reserved the work Instinkt for what he regarded as “animal components.” In his monumental translation of the complete works of Sigmund Freud called Standard Edition or SE (Freud [1953-1974]), the British psychoanalyst James Strachey overlooked the linguistic distinctions Freud himself made, seemingly in order to be faithful to the Freudian idea of an articulation between psychoanalysis and biology. However, by so doing he made Freud’s work less sophisticated and vulnerable to criticisms that it did not really deserve.

For his part, Jung only used the term Instinkt, making no difference between thrusts in general and thrusts that depend on “animal components.”

Furthermore, though Washburn maintains an epoche with regard to the possibility that the Ground may be a dynamic reality existing independently from the psyche (Washburn, 1995, Ch. 5, The Unconscious, section The Dynamic Ground, pp. 130-131. Spanish Ed. P. 195), and although in his discussion of the problems of adolescence he admits that the “soul” cannot be directly know, he seems to posit a soul when he claims that spirit is something that necessarily expresses itself within the bounds of the soul (ibidem). Since Washburn is not naïve in this sense, I assume he is using “soul” as a translation of psyche rather than in the Judeo-Christian sense of the word.

Daniels (2004) claims that, in Wilber’s view, at the end ego and consciousness are supposed to dissolve in realization of egolessness; however, Wilber is against the dissolution of consciousness, for he asserts the subject seemingly different from its objects, qua sakshin, to persist in realization.
As shown in another note, Wilber is ambiguous as to whether or not the subject-object duality dissolves in this pointing out. Firstly, he suggests the subject-object duality dissolves in fulcrum—yet his descriptions of this fulcrum give to understand it does not. Secondly, in his description of fulcrum he notes that nondual traditions point out the nondual Base from the dualistic condition, rather than making dualism dissolve so that the condition in question may be directly realized. At any rate, he is utterly unambiguous in asserting fulcrum to involve the subject-object duality.

As we have seen, the element of stupefaction or mongcha (rmongs cha) that has always been flowing with the continuum of those beings who have never realized the true condition, which is responsible for the ignorance of the true condition of reality that manifests in the neutral condition of the base-of-all and throughout samsara, is the lower layer of avidya or marigpa in both classifications of avidya or marigpa posited by the Dzogchen teachings. In its turn, the subject-object duality that arises as a result of the delusory valuation-absolutization of the threefold thought structure is the second layer of avidya or marigpa in the classification favored by Longchenpa, and is part of the second layer in the classification adopted here and in Capriles (2007a).

For a Master’s “pointing out” the Self qua Base to set an individual on the Path of Awakening in the truest sense of the term, it must dissolve in the individual the beclouding element of stupefaction called mongcha and the subject-object duality that, as we have seen, are the lower layers of the three tier delusion that conceals the true condition in question.

In the Path of Transformation the three elements that must be received from the Master in order to follow the Path are wang (dbang), lung (lung) and tri (khris); though this may be said to apply to the Dzogchen Atiyoga as well, in the latter Path the most essential elements that must be received from the Master are Direct Introduction and secret oral instruction (Skt. upadeshā; Tib. menngag).

However, there are many requisites an individual must fulfill in order to receive the necessary elements from the Master, including possessing the psychological state of the human realm, having faith and devotion, possessing a given spiritual capacity, and so on. In particular, the Dzogchen teachings list five capacities an individual must possess in order to practice Dzogchen: participation, diligence, present awareness, actual practice and prajñā (for an explanation of these, cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu [2000, pp. 134 and 140]).

As noted in the regular text, the binary character of Washburn’s classification causes the author to classify the practices of visualization of the Inner Tantras of the Vajrayana, on the one hand, and the koan (Chin. kung-an) study of Ch’an or Zen, on the other, as pertaining to the same type of meditation as... the raja yoga of Patañjali, and to class together in the opposite camp the practice of sitting meditation of Ch’an or Zen and the vipassana taught by the Burmese Theravada—even though the practice of Patañjali’s raja yoga is based on the view of subject and object as inherently different substances constituting a duality that by no means can be eradicated, and ultimately leads to fleeing the senses into a blank concentration, whereas the rest of the meditations mentioned are supposed to lead to the realization of the nonduality of awareness and appearances. In fact, Washburn admits the paradigm of CM to be Patañjali’s raja yoga, which is intended to stabilize a condition in which Purusha (consciousness) remains aloof before the movements of Prakriti (sensory experience), regards the duality between these two principles as being impossible to overcome, and sustains the subject-object duality until, if the ultimate aim of the practice is attained, the practitioner establishes him or herself in an instance of the neutral condition of the base-of-all that is cut from sensory experience and that does not involve the subject-object duality. Contrariwise, the aim of practices of visualization such as those taught in the Inner Buddhist Tantras of the Way of Transformation is ultimately to lead the practitioner beyond absorptions and into the senses, for the visualizations employed are dynamic, and after the generation or creation stage (Skt. upatītkrama; Tib. kyerim [bshyed rim]) in which one has developed the visualization of oneself as the deity and of one’s dimension as the mandala of the deity, one must practice the perfection or completion stage (Skt., sampannakrama; Tib., dzogrim [rdzogs rim]), in which, while maintaining the visualization, most powerful sensory experiences are induced, such as for example those of total pleasure—which may be attained either through the solo practice of heat or tummo (gtum mo) that constitutes the method of the higher doors, or through the union with a consort that constitutes the method of the lower doors, but which in any case must be experienced as indivisible from emptiness. Furthermore, in these practices the coincidence of the clarity of visualization with the just mentioned pleasure and voidness are to be used for reGnizing the Gntiveness in which—like in a mirror—they manifest, and thus discover The Self qua Base in the state called Mahamudra or Dzogchen (the latter term in this case referring to the result of the
Although Washburn takes as the paradigm of CM the raja yoga of Patañjali’s as instances of CM.

Like all types of meditation, the two kinds in Washburn’s division—with the exception of sub-varieties such as koan study and Tantric Buddhist visualization—are initially based on the subject-object duality, yet unlike the types of meditation I favor, in the absence of accompanying skillful means they are likely to maintain the duality in question—or, should they lead beyond it, to result in one or another variety of the neutral condition of the base-of-all. In particular, a meditation like the shikantaza of zen in Soto Zen, in those cases in which it leads actually beyond the subject-object duality, is likely to result in a variety of the neutral condition of the base-of-all involving the continuum of the senses—which is likely to be taken for the dharmakaya, insofar as Soto Zen claims that being seated in shikantaza is the very state of Buddha. (Hence, as Roshi Shenyu Suzuki [1980] noted, in Japan, where younger brothers are deemed to be more acute than elder brothers, what the Japanese call mokusho Zen, which is the way of the Soto School and which rather then seeking a sudden breakthrough emphasizes shikantaza and asserts it to be the very state of Buddha, is referred to as the path of the elder brother, whereas Rinzai Zen, which emphasizes koan study, mondo, and dokusan [literally “to go alone to a high one,” this term refers to the meeting of a Zen student with his teacher alone in the Master’s room, which Soto Zen gave up since the middle of Meiji times], is said to be the path of the younger brother.) In its turn, Patañjali’s raja yoga, in those cases in which it leads beyond the subject-object duality, results in the variety of the neutral condition of the base-of-all that excludes the sensory continuum, and in which one is “at the same time asleep and fully awake”—which, insofar as the Yoga darshana of Patañjali views this state as the ultimate realization, practitioners of the system in question mistake for liberation.

Although Washburn takes as the paradigm of CM the raja yoga practices of Patañjali’s Yoga darshana, the initial stages of the practices of samadhi existing within Buddhism as applied in different Tibetan schools, and even the initial stages of the practice in the Dzogchen Semde (sems sde) according to the tradition of Kham (khams), involve varieties of this kind of meditation. However, the aim of such Buddhist practices is roughly the same as that of the practices of visualization of the Tantras of the Way of Transformation and of koan study in Ch’an or Zen Buddhism—that is, to lead beyond absorptions while maintaining openness to the senses, and ultimately to the realization of the true condition of reality—and as such is diametrically opposed to that of the raja yoga of Patañjali, which, as we have seen, is based in a darshana that sees Purusa and Prakriti as two self-existing substances making up an ineradicable duality, and is aimed at the stabilization of a condition in which the former remains aloof before the movements of the latter. For example, in the first stages of the practice of the Semde in the tradition of Kham (khams), once a samadhi is attained, concentration must be released so as to attain a condition of mental calm (Skt. shamatha; Pali, samatha; Tib. zhinai [zhi-gnas]; Chinese chih; Jpn. shi; Viet. tam) proper to the type of meditation Washburn calls RM, and once this condition is attained, we must apply instructions directing us to discover the Gniiveness in which, like in a mirror, the experiences of the practice are occurring—which may allow our perspective to switch from the dualistic awareness of the experience (which the Semde teachings call “the state of the reflected”) to the reGnition (of) the nondual self-awareness that the Dzogchen teachings call rig pa (which the same teachings call “the condition of the mirror”). (In fact, since the Dzogchen teachings are the most ancient spiritual teachings of the Indo-Tibetan region, and since pre-Indo-European Indian religion was Shiavism, which had as its source the teachings of Shenrab Miwoche in the region of Kailash around 1,800 BC [according to some Bönpos, around 16,000 BC], we must assume that Dzogchen was common in India before Patañjali created his Yoga darshana; therefore, his system might have arisen as the result of the institutionalization of a deviation in practitioners of the initial concentrations of the Dzogchen Semde presently conserved in the Kham [khams] tradition [provided this system existed in the original Semde teachings, long before the time of Aro Yeshe Jungnai], who incurred in the error of taking states without thought that result from these concentrations as the aim of the practice. If this were so, then the hatha yoga of Patañjali would be a modification of the
Suzuki comments concerning the above (ibidem, p. 148):

"There is something lame in this interpretation, but the fact cannot be denied that the nembutsu, at that time, was sapping the doorways of Zen, and we are going to see that in the psychology of nembutsu there is a factor that could easily ally itself with the exercise of kô-an in its mechanical phase. For, despite his attitude towards the nembutsu, which he considered like some kind of practice for the shravaka, K'ung-ku kept on asserting it to be as effective as the kô-an in the realization of the true way of Buddha."

Furthermore, even if one had spiritual experiences, or even a satori, as the result of a practice having faith as its pivot, afterwards one could use the occurrences thus obtained as a confirmation of the dualistic, substantialistic belief in an external power (such as a God, a Buddha, a saint or whatever) and an ego or self. The illusion of an ego or self could also be sustained by the act of prayer itself, insofar as it involves the appearance, inherent in the three tiered avidya or maripga that conceals the Self-quâ-Base, that the ego...
is a source of action separate from the Supreme Source (when in truth all human acts are the latter’s play): even if this illusion dissolves in the Self-quā-Path, after delusion is reestablished it is unlikely that the individual may have a clear understanding of the fact that, rather than the ultimate source of action, the ego is an empty appearance.

588 I retranslate into English Washburn’s words in pp. 310-311 of the Spanish Ed. of Washburn (1995):

“Upon being reintegrated, the two poles of the psyche retain their distinct natures as the opposite poles of a bipolar psyche. Upon so doing, however, they cease being alienated the one from the other, as they were during the mental-egoic period. Nor are they in collision, as they were during regression in the service of transcendence. They are not even in a relationship of interactive cooperation, as they were during regeneration in the spirit. Instead, the two poles are here completely married to each other, acting as a single life...

“This fusion of opposites includes not only the two psychic poles, but also all of their characteristic functions and potentials. Thus, not only the ego unites with the Ground creating an all-embracing coincidence of opposites, but also the mind unites with the body, thought with feeling, operational cognition with creative imagination, and developed personality with instinct, creating minor coincidences of opposites. In each of these unions, a completely harmonious duality is forged—a complementary yin-yang duality—and each of these harmonious dualities is in itself a facet of the more essential harmonious duality constituted by the fully integrated psyche.”

589 Though Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative is supposed to be at the root of Freud’s conception of the superego, the Oedipal complex and the moral of psychoanalysis (Roudinesco & Plon, 1997; Fine, 1987; Rodrigué, 1996, Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967; Gay, 1989; Jones, 1979; Vals, 1995; Gregory; Bloch, Postel & Others, 1996; Assoun, 1982a), and Kant’s concept of moral consciousness is supposed to be at the root of the homonymous Freudian concept, Marta Gerez-Ambertin (1993, p. 39) and Ramón Sanz-Ferramola (2001) have asserted that Freud modified the Kantian sense of these concepts, whereas Paul-Laurent Assoun (1982b) has asserted that Freud understood them in terms of Schopenhauer’s non-Kantian understanding of the concepts in question. With regard to all of this, cf. Ramón Sanz-Ferramola (2001).

For example, the empty trances occurring in the second period of regression in the service of transcendence described in Washburn (1995, Spanish Ed., p. 184).

591 I have in mind, in particular, the theories of Melanie Klein, Susan Isaacs and Donald W. Winnicott. Also some specifications by the American Otto Fenichel would be worth incorporating to the system in question.

592 The difficulty to buy foreign books in Venezuela stems from the draconian foreign currency restrictions implemented by the Chavez government (each Venezuelan citizen who applies for it, is allotted a very small sum of foreign currency every year for use with credit cards in Internet shopping) and the fact that it is hard for University professors to buy foreign books at black market prices, for the government failed to adjust salaries proportionally to inflation, causing the former to dwindle considerably in real terms—and, at any rate, I am not aware of any means to do Internet shopping with cash (at least from Venezuela). As noted in the regular text, even in the absence of this difficulty, I would not procure and read all Wilber works as he publishes them, as his views are a secondary matter in my writing, which must address a huge amount of what are for me far more important views and points.

I doubt I will produce critiques of any future turns in Wilber’s system, but if I did, it must be taken for granted that I will not do so immediately after these new turns take place.

593 This refers to Wilber’s former claim that the world came out from a supramundane source yet continues to be one with the latter.

594 If the term rūpa were understood in the sense of form perceived through the five Universally admitted senses—thus including the so-called material forms of tsel (rtsal) energy and the luminous, yet intangible forms of rölpa (rol pa) energy—and thus as excluding phenomena of dang energy, such as the mental images involved in fantasy, imagination, visualization and so on, then the latter would need be excluded. However, here I am using the word “form” in the sense it has in common English, of configurations or patterns no matter whether or not perceivable through the five Universally admitted senses.

595 Doplopaa Sherab Gyaltseten and the Jöanggpas would agree that the absolute may be identified with voidness, yet this emptiness is the absence of anything other than the Buddha-nature endowed with the qualities of Buddhahood, and as such it is not a mere lack (certainly it is not a nonimplicative negation, which is how Tsongkhapa conceived voidness).
...is devoid of whatever is imputational or any other... A second line of development is the Graves-
inspired one that he calls values / spiral dynamics, having as a first rung, on the right, one that is centered on survival and that is at the same level of the first rung of the first line; as a second rung on the right, what he calls the kin spirits, corresponding to the first rung on the left, which is the one he calls magic-animistic—both of which are the level of the second rung in the first line; as a third rung on the right what he calls the power gods, corresponding to the second rung on the left, which is the one he calls egocentric—both of which are the level of the third rung in the first line; as a fourth rung on the right what he calls the truth force, corresponding to the third rung on the left, which is the one he calls absolutistic—both of which are at the level of the fourth rung in the first line; as a fifth rung on the right that which he is calling the strive drive, corresponding to the fourth rung on the left, which is the one he calls multipistic—both of which are at the level of the fifth rung in the first line; as a sixth rung on the right what he calls the human bond, corresponding to the fifth rung on the left, which is the one he calls relativistic—both of which are at the level of the sixth rung in the first line; as a seventh rung on the right the one he calls flex-flow, which is at the level of the seventh rung in the first line; and as an eighth rung on the right the one he calls global view, which is at the level of the eighth rung in the first line—with what he calls the systemic as the sixth rung on the left, placed between the corresponding...
seventh and eighth rungs of both the first line and the right of the second line (this second line hence not reaching beyond the eighth level of the first line, and thus not reaching the third tier).
The third line is the Kegan-inspired one of orders of consciousness, beginning with Orders 0, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 4.5, which are, respectively, at the level of the six lower stages of the first line and of the right side of the second line, and ending with the 5th Order, which lies at the level of the eighth stage of both the first line and the right of the second line. This line thus does not reach the third tier.
The fourth is the Loevinger/Cook/Greuter-inspired line of self-identity that includes eight rungs referred to as symbiotic, impulsive, self-protective, conformist, conscientious, individualistic, autonomous and integrated, which are at the level of the eight lower rungs of the first line and the right of the second line, followed by an ninth stage, called construct-aware—at the level of global mind in the first line—and a final, tenth stage, called ego-aware—which lies at the level of meta-mind on the first line. The last two rungs are within the third tier.
The fifth is the Gebser-inspired line of worldviews, which goes from the archaic (at the level of the first rung of lines one, three and four, as well as of the right of the second line) through the magic (between the second and third rungs of the first, third and fourth lines, and of the right of the second line), the mythic, the rational and the pluralistic (at the level of the fourth, fifth and sixth rungs of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second line, respectively), up to the integral (at the level of the systemic on the left of the second line). This line does not reach into the third tier.
Finally, the sixth is the Fowler-inspired line of stages of faith, going from (0) the one he calls undifferentiated (at the level of the first rung of the first, third, fourth and fifth lines, as well as of the right of the second line) through the magical (at the level of the second rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as the right of the second line), (2) the mythic-literary (at the level of the third rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second line), (3) the conventional (at the level of the fourth rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second line)—which as already noted are at the level of the third rung of the fifth line), (4) the individual-reflexive (at the level of the fifth rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second line, and at the level of the fourth rung of the fifth line), (5) the conjunctive (at the level of the sixth rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second line, and of the fifth rung of the fifth line), and (6) the universalizing-commonwealth, which is at the level of the systemic at the left of the second line and of the integral on the fifth line. Hence this line does not reach into the third tier either.

601 The only version of the book in question I have is [a photocopy of] the 1995 original edition, as Bolivarian Venezuela’s foreign currency restrictions—citizens are allotted a very small amount of foreign currency every year for Internet shopping—and constantly dwindling real terms University salaries prevent me from buying all books published by transpersonal and integral theorists. Moreover, even in the absence of these impediments, I would not buy all of Wilber’s works as he publishes them, as I have so much to read for the research at the root of the several books I am writing; moreover, Wilber is a secondary matter in my writing, which must address many far more important views and points—and, moreover, reading him is for me an unpleasant task.

602 The source Wilber (2001b, note 1, pp. 717-741) gives for his presentation of the progressive attainment of the four kāyas is none else than the infamous Geshe Kelsang Gyatso (usually written Kelsang Gyatso; cited repeatedly by Wilber in the same note, pp. 726-729), leader of the most recently created Tibetan Buddhist School, which is universally viewed by Tibetans (except for members of the school in question) as the terrorist organization that committed a bloody triple murder against important associates of the Dalai Lama and that has repeatedly tried to murder the illustrious Buddhist Master and Tibetan political leader. Concerning these accusations, cf. the original Newsweek article by Tony Clifton [with Suzanne Miller] (1997) and the exhaustive investigation by Raimondo Bultrini (2008), among other sources.

603 Whereas in the Mahāyāna both the Cittamātra School and the peculiar Gelug understanding of the Mādhyamaka Prāsaṅgika School consider emptiness of self-existence to be the ultimate, according to the Dzogchen teachings and the non-Gelug Tibetan Buddhist understanding of the Mādhyamaka Prāsaṅgika and Mahāmādhyamaka Schools, the absolute is not emptiness of self-existence.

In fact, the Nyingma view in general is that emptiness, understood as the presence of an absence (which, as noted in the regular text right after the reference mark for this note, is how Je Tsongkhapa understood it and how his Gelugpa followers [and in recent years also those so-called “New Kadampa,” headed by the alleged source of Wilber’s description of his last four fulcrum] comprehend it)—namely as the absence of the “inherent existence” that we mistakenly project on and perceive in all entities, which allegedly becomes
The view according to which the absolute or ultimate truth is no other than primordial gnosis itself, which is

“Here in the Madhyamaka system, the object itself cannot be divided into the two truths. Relative truth and absolute truth are established in terms of the modes of apprehension (mthong tshul): in terms of the subject apprehending falsehood and the Awareness apprehending truth; or of mistaken and unmistaken apprehensions (’khrul ma ’khrul); or of deluded or undeluded apprehensions (rmongs ma rmongs); or of erroneous or nonerroneous apprehensions (phying ci lg ma log), or of valid gnition or invalid cognition (tshad ma yin min).” (Ngedön Rabsel (nges don rab gsal), p. 375b; careful substantiation in p. 375b-d.)

The view according to which the absolute or ultimate truth is no other than primordial gnosis itself, which is utterly undeluded, and relative truth is the deluded perspective of the obscured consciousness of sentient beings, is shared by the most widely acclaimed Masters of all of Tibetan Schools except for the Gelug: Longchen Rabjamapa, Sakya Pandita, Rongtön Shakya Gyaltser, Taksang Lotsawa, Shakya Chogson, Ju Mipham, the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje, Gendun Chöphel and so on (all of these Masters except for Gendun Chöphel are listed in Thakchoe [2007, p. 15]; as for Chöphel, cf. Chöphel [2005]).

On his part, Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltser (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan) and his Jonangpa followers, though they privilege other definitions of the absolute truth, in what may at first sight seem an agreement with Je Tsongkhapa, accept that voidness may be viewed as the absolute truth. However, they would do so only if voidness is understood in the zhentong (gzhan stong); Skt. paraśānyatā) sense of lack of any substances other than the dharma-kāya, or the Buddha-nature, etc.—which is a view Tsongkhapa most emphatically rejected (among other sources, cf. Hopkins, 2002).

The above was not meant to imply Wilber should embrace the non-Gelug understanding of the absolute, but to expose his confusion and contradictions, for if he embraces the Gelug view of the ultimate as eminness understood as the presence of an absence, then he is forbidden from identifying it with the Base of Dzogchen, which is not a mere voidness, and if he embraces the non-Gelug view of the absolute as primordial gnosis, or the related Dzogchen view according to which the absolute (so to say, as these teachings place no emphasis on this concept) is the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, then he may not assert the absolute to be emptiness. In other words, Wilber has incurred once more in the repeatedly denounced error of viewing incompatible concepts pertaining to incompatible systems as being just the same, as though he were a bootstrapper who has produced a superior synthesis of all teachings—when what he is actually doing is obliterating the most essential distinctions in Buddhism and in this way producing a confusion that may have the power to block the Path to Awakening.

The Dzogchen teachings make it clear that the true condition of ourselves and the whole of reality—which the Mahāyāna would call absolute truth (Skt. paramārthaśatya; Tib. nam drangpa döndam [rnam grangs pa ’i don dam]), Buddha-nature (Skt. tathāgata-garbha; Tib. dezin shegpai nyingpo [de bzhin gshogs pa’i snying po]; also Skt. sugatagarbha; Tib. desheg nyingpo [de gshegs snying po]; also Skt. buddhatva / buddhatva / bhūtattathā [mainly in Chinese Buddhism: XX]), etc. (since Dzogchen does not emphasize these terms, I note this is how the Mahāyāna would call the condition of Dzogchen; however, the Mahāyāna concepts of absolute truth and Buddha-nature fall short of the condition of Dzogchen, as the realization of this condition obtained in the vehicle in question is partial; cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu [1984b] and Capriles [2000a, 2003])—is the Base of Dzogchen, which is what in the above passage Wilber referred to as the unborn, changeless ground and which qua Buddha-nature is fully actual—but which is not at all the same as emptiness, for the latter, if understood as the presence of an absence, is according to these teachings no more than an illusory experience (Tib. nyam [nyams]) on the Path, and if understood as an aspect of the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, it is its primordial purity (Tib. kāda [ka dag]) aspect—the other one being spontaneous perfection (Tib. lhundrub [lhun grub]), which is the spontaneous manifestation of experience and the consummate spontaneous functioning of the manifest. (Note that Wilber speaks of understanding emptiness, when the emptiness that is important on the Path, rather than an understanding, is a nonconceptual realization.)

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The insight (Skt.vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong [lhaḥ mthong]) meditation Tsongkhapa taught as a means to
purportedly arrive at emptiness as conceived by the Mādhyamaka Prāsaṅgikas was the one taught in the
Samdhinirmocanasūtra (a Third Promulgation text that the Cittamātra (the lower, “idealist” school of the
Mahāyāna) takes as its root canonical source and that is a key source as well for the Mādhyamaka
Śvātantrikas Yogācāra (and for Mahāmādhyamaka, which, however, contextualizes its teachings). This
meant that he used one method of a lower Path to purportedly arrive at the Fruit of a higher Path, thus
overlooking the indivisibility between Path and Fruit emphasized in the Śāraṅgamanasūtra. So it does not
seem to be a mere coincidence that he taught a difference that seems to be related to that between (1)
the nature that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the Cittamātra philosophical school calls dependant nature
(Skt. paratrantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhon dbang]) and the Mahāmādhyamaka philosophical school calls
dependent patterns or dependent collections of characteristics (Skt., paratantrakalakṣaṇa; Tib., zhen wang
tsennyi [gzhon dbang gi mtshan nyid]), and (2) the nature that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the
Cittamātra philosophical school call imaginary nature (Skt., parikalpita; Tib., kun tag [kun brtags]) and the
Mahāmādhyamaka philosophical school calls imaginary patterns / collections of characteristics (Skt.,
parikalpitalakṣaṇa; Tib., kun tag kyi tsennyi [kun brtags kyi mtshan nyid]).

In fact, Je Tsongkhapa understood the qualification of existence as true in the Tibetan term denpar yöpa
(bden par yod pa) or as inherent in the Tibetan term rongzhingyi yöpa (rong bzhin gyi yod pa) to mean that there
was another kind of existence that was not true or inherent, and hence he coined the term “mere existence”
(Tib., yöpa tsam [yod pa tsam]) to refer to it—which is the one hat in the preceding paragraph I related to
dependent nature or dependent patterns / collections of characteristics (even though it is not exactly the
same thing). An example of “mere existence” was the presence in the world of the “corporeal pattern” we
call “pot,” and the actuality and functionality of this “corporeal configuration.” An example of the illusion
of “inherent existence” or “true existence”—which in the preceding paragraph I compared with imaginary
collection / characteristics (even though it is not exactly the same thing)—was our delusive apprehension of
the same “corporeal configuration” as having a self-nature (Skt., svabhāva; Tib., rangzhin [rang bzhin]) and hence as being a self-existent pot. Having taken the distinction
between these two senses of the term “existence” as the key to the correct understanding of Mādhyamaka,
Tsongkhapa set to systematically qualify as “inherent” or “true” the existence that was the object of
negation in Mādhyamika refutations (though of course he did not insist that these qualifiers should be
introduced into the Tibetan translations of traditional texts each and every time the term “existence” was
used, and he did not introduce them each and every time he himself used the term in his own texts).

However, though at first sight the distinction may seem quite sound, the truth is that it is hardly applicable to
the experience of sentient beings. The reason why the distinction is hardly applicable to the experience of
sentient beings is because, so long as we are in samsāra, whenever we perceive something as existing or as
being (or think of something as existing or as being) the super-subtle thought-structure attributing
existence or being to that entity is delusorily valued, giving rise to what the Gelugpas refer to as the
“illusion of inherent existence” or “illusion of true existence.” Therefore, for us sentient beings in samsāra
the term “existence” always refers to a delusive phenomenon which manifests in our mental continuum—
which is what Je Tsongkhapa, on the basis of writings by Candrakīrti, systematically called inherent

Furthermore, in fact, Gorampa juxtaposes verses 6:23 and 6:20 in the "In the first [etymological explanation of]

This term and the distinction at its root were rejected by Tibetan philosophers other than those who followed Tsongkhapa, of which outstanding examples are the the Indian follower of Candrakīrti, Jayānanda, Loingchen Rabjam, the Tibetan Sakya Master who adopted Jayānanda’s interpretation of his teacher Jayānanda, Gorampa Sōnam Sengé (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge: 1429-1489), Rendawa, Rongtön Shakya Gyaltser, TatsangLotsawa, Shakyachogden, Ju Mipham, and Gendün Chöphel (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 61), and, in the twentieth century, Singh, Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Lindtner and Murti (ibidem), who insist that the appearance of existence is always the appearance of inherent existence, and that no beings have an experience of existence that is not an experience of the illusion that Tsongkhapa called inherent existence, and that hence it is both superfluous and misleading to make the distinction the founder of the Gelug order made. In fact, all of the aforementioned Tibetan Masters remind us of the etymology of the word that is regularly rendered as relative or conventional (truth), saṃvyrti (satya); as Gorampa puts it (Thakchoe, op. cit., pp. 48-49):

"In the first [etymological explanation of] saṃvyrtisatya, sam is [an abbreviated form] of samyag, meaning ‘reality,’ and vṛti means ‘to conceal.’ Since it conceals the true meaning of reality, delusion—the [mistaken] conception of true existence—is a model of kunzob (kun rdzob [the Tibetan translation of saṃvyrtisatya])… Satya (denpa [bden pa]) means ‘truth.’ It is truth in the sense that is appears true from the perspective of deluded consciousness.”

In fact, Gorampa juxtaposes verses 6:23 and 6:20 in the xxxxxxxxxx to show that “perceiver of falsities” is one who is under the power of timug (gti mug), bewilderment or concealer (Thakchoe, op. cit., p. 67).

In the same paragraph of the regular text I noted that emptiness—albeit in a particular sense of the term—is only one of the aspects of the Base—namely the primordial purity (Tib. tatak [ka dag]) or essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect. If the emptiness Wilber posited were the same as the essence aspect of the Base, identifying it with “the unborn or the changeless ground”—i.e., with the Base—would amount to identifying an aspect or part of a whole [emptiness thus understood] with the whole itself [the Base of Dzogchen]—which would be a major logical contradiction.

As stated in a previous endnote, Wilber (2001b, note 1, pp. 717-741) gave as the source for his view on the progressive attainment of the four kāyas, none else than infamous Geshe Kelsang Gyatso (usually written Kelsang Gyatso; cited repeatedly by wilber in the same note, pp. 726-729), who leads the most recent Tibetan Buddhist School, universally viewed by Tibetans (except for members of the school in question) as the terrorist organization that committed a bloody triple murder against associates of the Dalai Lama and that has reputedly tried to murder the illustrious Tibetan Master and leader. Concerning these accusations, cf. the original Newsweek article by Tony Clifton (with Suzzanne Miller, 1997) and the exhaustive investigation by Raimondo Bultrini (2008), among other sources.

Furthermore, Wilber adds to his quotations of his dubious source phrases in brackets such as “[which are both subtle-level illuminations]” and “[causal cessation],” which are very likely to distort the author’s intended meaning.

At any rate, the version I have of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, is the 1st Edn. (Wilber, 1995) rather than the 2d, which Abramson used (Wilber, 2001b), which is the one that fetures the notes he refers to. Since, as stated in a previous endnote, it is so difficult to buy books in Venezuela, and since I have so much to read for the research at the root of the several books I am writing, and reading Wilber is for me an unpleasant task, I never bought the 2d. Edn. of that work.
Readers are advised not to read the books in question or contact in any way anything having to do with the Gyalpo demon that the character in question and his associates worship, as in the view of various important Masters (e.g., Chögyal Namkhai Norbu) to do so has the potential of making the individual susceptible to that demon and other beings of its class. If the reader finds this strange, he or she may refer to my rational explanations of the inner meaning of the term “demon” in Chapter I of this book and my rational explanation of the inner meaning of guardians and elementals elsewhere (Capriles, 2000a, 2003). (However, this is not the reason why I don’t read the books in question, for in my retreats in the higher Himalayas a series of circumstances made enter in conflict with worshippers of the noted Gyalpo demon—and if I had the intention of protecting myself against the demon in question I would not be denouncing the controverted character Wilber took as his source.)

As to the alleged dangerousness of the character in question, in an endnote to my first mention of him I directed the reader to the Newsweek article in http://dorjeshugden.com/wp/?p=1235 and to Bultrini (2008).

In fact, in Wilber (2007), Appendix II, “Integral Post-Metaphysics” (p. 234), we read:
1. It is not justified to maintain that levels of reality exist as consciousness-independent structures just waiting to be discovered; rather, if there exist levels of reality, they exist as structures of human consciousness (that are co-constructed by subjects),
2. The verification methods for the existence of these structures of consciousness must involve demands for objective evidence (modernity's contribution) and intersubjective grounding (postmodernity's contribution), and
3. If structures of consciousness exist, they are not eternal and timeless structures but “forms that have developed in time, evolution, and history” (bolds by Wilber).

Note in Abramson (in press): “But not historical eras. Although Wilber agrees that people of previous eras can advance to spiritual states irrespective of their stage of development, he continues to posit (as in ‘Up from Eden’ 1981) that some of the most ‘advanced’ spiritual states were not attained in previous eras—i.e. the most advanced state increased from psychic in the ‘magic’ era, through subtle and causal in succeeding eras, and only reached non-dual in the current era. This is clearly completely at variance with Capriles degenerative view of evolution. Also Capriles would maintain true Awakening/non-dual states were potentially available, in any era, to anyone, at any stage of development, following an authentic (e.g. Dzogchen) spiritual path.”

Wilber did so in the context of “proving” that, however much meditation accelerates stage development, cultural factors can potentially be a dominant breaking force

As written in a previous endnote, the character in question is accused of being intent on doing away with the great Tibetan spiritual and political leader—having been accused of being behind at least three murder attempts against the latter. As advised in a footnote, in order to understand the reasons for this, cf. Clifton & Miller (1997) and Bultrini (2008).

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True enough, he mentions that for me the accessibility of Communion will result from a reduction ad absurdum, and inserts a note that may give a clue to readers, but readers who are not very familiar with my views, and/or who do not read the notes, will miss this point.

Someone so informed as Wilber must necessarily be aware of the ecological situation of our planet and its consequences, and hence if he writes as though everything could continue to be the same for very long time without this resulting in self-destruction, he must necessarily be acting purposefully. And if he were not, then he would be wearing the most gigantic blinders without even noticing them!

Since God is totally Good, He cannot deceive us, and hence he could not have instilled in us the belief in an external, physical reality if the latter were nonexistent.

 Allegedly, at least one letter by Kant was found recently in which he confesses not to believe any of the postulates of his own system, and to have produced the latter by order of a high political authority. However, most of those who hold Kant’s system dear, assert the letter to be apocryphal.
It must be noted that, although the Vienna Circle claimed to follow Wittgenstein, the latter asserted logical positivism to be a gross misreading of his writings, and went so far as to read poetry during the Circle’s meetings.

A perfect adequatio or matching is impossible insofar as, as shown in vol. I of this book, conceptual maps are digital, whereas the territory they interpret is analog (the discrepancy between these two being aptly illustrated by the relationships between a digital photograph, which is discontinuous, and what it represents, which is continuous and to which therefore it cannot correspond: if the number of dpis is extremely high, one may get the illusion that is looks roughly alike, but as soon as one zooms in into the picture all one sees is a combination of squares of different colors having no resemblance whatsoever with reality), and insofar as from different viewpoints different maps are equally valid—and for the same reason equally incapable of perfect correspondence with what they represent. However, the problem arises when the fragmentary outlooks the Buddha represented with the fable of the men with the elephant and the image of the frog in the well takes its perceptions to fit the undivided, holistic territory they interpret—and in general when we confuse the map with the territory of take it to perfectly correspond to it, as happens when the basic human delusion that the Buddha called avidyā and that Heraclitus called lethe (λήθη) is active. Cf. also Capriles (2004) and other works.

Sorel’s apology of violence is to be rejected with all of one’s might.

As will the shown below in the regular text, Antonio Gramsci wrote: “In reality science is also a superstructure, an ideology.” (Cited in an e-article by Gustavo Fernandez Colon that circulated through email in the context of the dialogue between Alex Fergusson and Rigoberto Lanz concerning the “Misión Ciencia” created by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.)

As shown in Appendix I to this book, the development of science and technology began long before the modern age in Greece, and was particularly dear to the Pythagorians, to whose ideology it was associated at the time. However, Christianization suspended the project until the Modern Age, when it was revived in its present form, in the way expressed in the section of the regular text to which this note was appended.

This thesis by Marcuse (which he set forth in ch. 6 of Marcuse [1964], “From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination”) is discussed elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a Vol. III, section “The Ideological Character of the Sciences, The ‘New Paradigm’ Championed in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Role of Science and Technology in the New Age”).

In Sokal & Bricmont (1999), Deleuze is criticized in two different sections of the book; however, the theory according to which philosophy and the sciences are “more than ideologies” is not among the objects of this criticism.

It has been alleged that the project of modernity, rather than aiming to give rise to a technological Eden, was intended to allow the ruling class to increase its exploitation of the rest of human society, and that the ideal of the technological Eden was no more than a façade or a pretext. However, even if this were correct in the case of some of the promoters of the project in question, it could not be correct in the case of all of them—and in any case, since the powerful and their descendents would be destroyed together with the rest of society, the project’s effects would indicate delusion was at its root.

It is well known that the initial philosophical elaboration of the project of modernity was carried our in its empiricist version by Francis Bacon, and in its rationalist version by René Descartes. Later on positivism gave a different expression to it, and the same did the grand systems of modernity, among which the most renowned are Hegel’s and Marx’s. In general, almost all philosophers of the modern era (with exceptions such as Georges Sorel and a few others) elaborated different versions of the myth in question.
A lengthier discussion of this subject is featured in Capriles (2007a, Vol. III); my initial discussion of the subject appeared in Capriles (1994) and there is an ample discussion of it in the Introduction to Capriles (under evaluation by publishers).

That which Kant called “transcendental illusion(s)” consisted in going beyond the empirical use of the categories of the Understanding and applying the latter to “transcendent objects”—which some of the key twenty-century phenomenologists did not posit. However, according to Kant, the transcendental illusion stood on subjective principles that appear as though they were objective; provided that we understand the term subjective as referring to whatever manifests in the individual’s mind—i.e., thoughts, representations, mental phenomena—as different from all that is not merely thought or representation, this is the core error of phenomenology.

In Capriles, 2007a vol. I, I undertook an exhaustive discussion of the above-mentioned and other defects of phenomenological and existential 20th century thought on the basis of a careful hermeneutical analysis of the essential works of the thinkers concerned.

In spite of having received important influences from Buddhism and Daoism, and of having claimed that Zen Buddhism popularizer D. T. Suzuki was saying exactly what he tried to say throughout his works (Saviani, 2004; May, 1996), Heidegger’s concept of being (das Sein) not only was in itself contradictory but that contradicted Buddhist theory as well. In fact, on the one hand he identified it with the arché (ṭīrtha) which is the underlying principle and true condition of the universe and which as such is the same as the true nature of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]) or perhaps the absolute space (Skt. dharmadhātu; Tib. chöjing [chos dbyings]) of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which does not exclude anything and has no limits (so that, as Nāgārjuna made it clear, it cannot enter into the concept of being, that of nonbeing, or those of both-being-and-nonbeing and neither-being-nor-nonbeing), and which is an absolute impossible to eradicate. Yet on the other hand he asserted it to be a phenomenon that is elicited whenever we think of, listen or pronounce the word being—thus contradicting its identification with the arché, for whatever is conceived by the mind has limits, as it is defined by proximate gender and specific difference (genus proximum et differentiam specificam), and therefore could not be the limitless arché, dharmatā, dharmadhātu, or absolute truth. Furthermore, as shown in Capriles, 2007a vol. I, 2007e, and other of my works, that which manifests when we think of, listen or pronounce the word being is the most basic delusive appearance of samsāra. (In the same work on the basis of several of Heidegger’s key works, of what from the standpoint of Buddhism and Dzogchen are the German philosopher’s core philosophical errors, and a discussion of the numerous tomes giving proof of the influence he received from Buddhism and to some extent from Daoism, and of the fact that he believed his philosophy to be congruent with the systems in question.)

In Sartre (1980) the French philosopher does not reduce being to the phenomenon of being (in his view [Sartre, 1980] the phenomenon of being is not the being of the phenomenon), but he takes it to be independent from experience, to be a kind of absolute, and to precede human experience (he asserts the being of the human individual he calls être-pour-soi to “arise in [preexisting] being,” so that being cannot depend on our experience), and asserts the phenomenon of being not to be the being of the phenomenon. And though he avoids the error of making of the absolute an “absolute of knowledge,” effectively deconstructs the Cartesian-Husserlian cogito, and offers concepts and descriptions I have used to great profit in various works (Capriles, 1994, 2007a vol. I, under evaluation by publishers), he breaches the phenomenological époché in various ways. Cf. Capriles (2007a Vol. I).


Sartre believes the holon (ὄλον), which he defines is a way that makes it seem to be the same as Awakening, even though his definition of the term is internally contradictory (this being the reason why in Capriles [2007a Vol. I] I had to redefine it). In fact, Sartre used the term holon in a sense that is very different from Koestler’s (1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1970), to designate a Totality characterized by fullness, plenitude and coincidence with itself that being-for-Self tries to attain through all of its endeavors, which involves what the French philosopher inaccurately called the “translucency of consciousness” proper to being-for-Self simultaneously with the “coincidence with itself” characteristic of being-in-itself, and which is beyond the duality between these two modes of being. Sartre likened this Totality unto God, yet the characteristics he attributed to it are also those of Awakening—except for
some basic problems in his definition that were problematized and resolved in Capriles, 2007a vol. I, and for the fact that Sartre deemed it to be impossible to attain. In fact, Sartre deems the holon to be unattainable, and throughout his books he deals solely with the experiences and ontological structures of samsāra; etc. However, he is right in noting that all that being-for-Self does for attaining the Self/holon maintains it as being-for-Self and thus as being-at-a-distance-from-the-Self/holon—this being the reason why the French philosopher asserts being-for-Self to be unhappy consciousness that is unable to overcome its condition of unhappiness. This inability is the reason why that mode of being is compelled to elude this unhappiness by means of bad faith (self-deceit)—and why, according to Sartre, it is impossible for it to achieve authenticity (in the sense of not eluding anguish and shame by means of bad faith) in a continuous way.

This term was coined by Derrida for expressing a particular type of difference (différence); he made this term differ in spelling but not in pronunciation from the French term différence ("difference"), in order to mark a sharp difference of meaning. Différence is not merely difference; it is supposed to be that which makes differences possible and which constitutes all signs as signs (i.e., as something that refers to something supposedly different from itself). In order to further explain what is différence I would have to use other Derridean terms and explanations which then would need to be explained, so I direct readers who are not familiar with Derrida’s thought to Capriles (2007a Vol. III).

In fact, no one could deny that throughout his works Derrida has outlined an ontology. For a sample of how this is so, suffice to mention his statement that, The thing itself is a sign. He wrote (Derrida, 1976 / 1998, Ch. Linguistics and Grammatology, p. 49):

“Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence as the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a signified. Now Peirce considers the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us to recognise that we are indeed dealing with a system of signs. What broaches the movement of signification is what makes its interruption impossible. The thing itself is a sign.”

These questions occur in several places in the Nikayas: twice in Majjhima, I [sutta 72], once in Samyutta, III and once in Samyutta, IV; once in Digha 9 [Pottapada Sutta] and once in Digha 29 [Pasadika Sutta]. For his part, Nāgārjuna deals with them in the Mālamādhyamakakārikāḥ, XXVII, and in Dharmasamgraha. In Khuddaka Nikaya, III: Udāna, the fourteen avyakrit questions or avyakravatun are divided into four sets, which will be considered in a note to Appendix I.

The event(s) of nirvāna could be equally regarded as countless or as a single one, for although in nirvāna no differences apply, language has to distinguish among different moments. Thus metaphenomenon is as valid and as wrong as metaphenomena—terms in which the prefix meta indicates that they are not mere appearance (phainómenon: φαινόμενον), as they unveil the true condition of reality.